to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid.
MADERADA V. MEDIODEA Thus, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties
may personally do everything during its progress --
from its commencement to its termination. When they,
however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and
when they do so, they are not considered to be in the
practice of law. One does not practice law by acting
for himself any more than he practices medicine by
rendering first aid to himself.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by
profession to litigate their own case in court. The right
of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot
be taken away from her. Her being an employee of
the judiciary does not remove from her the right to
proceedings in propria persona or to self-
representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a
right cannot make one administratively liable.
However, it was also clearly established that
complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff
in the case below, for which act the former cannot be
completely exonerated. Representing oneself is
different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent
themselves in court will not apply when a person is
already appearing for another party. Obviously,
because she was already defending the rights of
another person when she appeared for her co-
plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was
merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be
interrelated will not give complainant authority to
appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she
and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The
former may be impairing the efficiency of public
service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
without court authority and is likewise warned that a
future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
CANTIMBUHAN V. JUDGE CRUZ AND FISCAL
QUILATAN
Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo
Diaz for less serious physical injuries in the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in
1979, were senior law students of the U.P. assistance
separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal
Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners,
and respondent judge sustained the respondent fiscal
and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana
and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal
cases.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that in the municipal court a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an
agent appointed by him for the purpose. Further, if a
non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as
friend of the accused in a case before the municipal
trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision
and control of the trial fiscal.
CRUZ V. JUDGE MIJARES and MINA
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to
enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the
RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance.
Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim
on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a
non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct
his litigation personally. The trial court held that for the
failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised
document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to
satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was
denied.
Petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance
was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He
contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule
138-A
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules,
it will have to be conceded that the contention of the
petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to which he
is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct
his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney,
and that his appearance must either be personal or by
a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the course of
proceedings from commencement to the termination
of the litigation. Considering that a party personally
conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules
of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself,
runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of
his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his
own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of
Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not
as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that
the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice
Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis
of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The
former rule provides for conditions when a law student
may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing
himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A
superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
1
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule
138 when it released the guidelines for limited law
student practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of
Court through Rule 138-A.
PAAR V. BORROMEO
TeofiloPaar is charge in Manila with treason before
the People's Court, and prayed that he be assisted in
his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a
member of the bar.
“But in provinces where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available, the court may, in its
discretion, admit or assign a person, resident in the
province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
aid the defendant in his defense, although the person
so admitted or assigned be not a duly authorized
member of the Bar.”
It is clear from these provisions that in Manila where
there are many members of the bar, defendants in the
People's Court may be assisted only by members of
the bar.
A layman is permitted by the Supreme Court to
appear for another only in the municipal or
metropolitan trial courts. Accordingly, he cannot,
even in a single occasion, represent another in
any other court.
4. Under Rule 138, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 33.Standing in court of person
authorized to appear for Government. — Any
official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear
for the Government of the Philippines shall
have all the rights of a duly authorized
member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct
or indirect.
PAFLU V. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR
COMPANY
May a non-lawyer, for a example a union
representative as permitted by the rules, who
appeared for his organization or any of its member,
recover attorney's fees for such legal services
rendered?
The permission for a non-member of the bar to
represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative to compensation for such
representation.
For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to
fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees.Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,
and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted
only to those possessing tested qualifications and
who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of
the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients
and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American
jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes
have now been enacted prohibiting persons
not licensed or admitted to the bar from
practising law, and under statutes of this
kind, the great weight of authority is to the
effect that compensation for legal services
cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or
in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered.
No one is entitled to recover compensation
for services as an attorney at law unless he
has been duly admitted to practice ... and is
an attorney in good standing at the time.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession
should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with
authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the
law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if
were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-
recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an
attorney.
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION V. NLRC
Private respondents filed separate complaints against
petitioner claiming that the latter paid them wages
below the minimum and sought payment of their
salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay.
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents. Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's
liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their
wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay.
Petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor
arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the
reason that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent
petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on
appeal to respondent Commission.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to
appear before the labor arbiter and respondent
Commission in cases before them.
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters
and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a
party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or
its members, with written authorization from them: or
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(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid
office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
to by the latter.
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers.
Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal
aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters
in their capacity as parties to the cases was
authorized under the first exception to the rule.
However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was
incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-
respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent
this authority, whatever statements and declarations
Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not
bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the
cases appealed to respondent Commission did not
cure Engineer Estacio's representation. Atty.
Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to
appear before the respondent Commission.
6. A person representing a land claimant in cadastral
court.
Section 9 of Act No. 2259
Sec. 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of
the lands, whether named in the notice or not, shall
appear before the Court by himself, or by some
person in his behalf and shall file an answer on or
before the return day or within such further time as
may be allowed by the Court.
To summarize, the following are allowed limited
representation on behalf of another:
1. In case of law student practice as permitted
by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
2. Those provided under Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court
3. Under Section 7 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, in a criminal proceeding before a
municipal trial court in a locality where a duly
licensed member of the bar is not available,
a municipal trial court may, in its discretion,
admit or assign a person, resident in the
province and of good repute for probity and
ability, to defend the accused, although the
person so assigned be not a duly authorized
member of the Bar. Again, it follows,
therefore, that in a place where a duly
licensed member of the Bar is available, the
municipal trial court may not admit or assign
a layman to defend the accused.
4. In case of those authorized to represent the
government. Any person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear
for the Philippine government or any of its
officials shall have all the rights of a duly
authorized member of the bar to appear in
any case in which the government has an
interest, or in which such official is charged
in his official capacity.
5. Under the Labor Code, a union
representative may appear for his
organization or any of its members before
the NLRC, Labor Arbiter or Arbitrator; a non-
lawyer may appear for himself, if he
represents himself as party to the case; a
non lawyer who is a duly-accredited member
of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines in cases referred thereto
by the latter.
6. A person representing a land claimant in
cadastral court.
VARGAS AND PANES V. IGNES, ET AL.
Do respondents have valid authority to appear as
counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no
valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of
KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty.
Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating
counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution
No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes
“presently stand as KWD legal counsels,” there is no
proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty.
Nadua’s engagement as legal counsel or
collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr.
and Mann are concerned, their appointment as
collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No.
009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same
situation as the private counsel of Phividec Industrial
Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that
said private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a
GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case
in Phividec’s behalf considering that the requirements
set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied
with. Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority
to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as
collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was
not notified of the pre-termination of his own
retainershipcontract cannot validate an inexistent
authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as
collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as
counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority
as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA
approved his retainership contract for one (1) year
effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as
true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of
his contract, the records still disprove his claim
that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified
manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP
on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the
transcript of stenographic notes in Civil Case No.
1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes
argued the extremely urgent motion for the
immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the
KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to ask
him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he
filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the
RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to
the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented
by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his
appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as
counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however,
when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per
the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion
3
sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its
Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a
motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice
of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that
Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his
authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not
lost on the RTC in denying due course to the notice of
appeal.
Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as
counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a
valid ground to impose disciplinary action against
them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
and should be imposed only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting
the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the
bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe such as a
reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the
end desired. InSantayana,we imposed a fine
of P5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The respondent therein also appeared as
private counsel of the National Electrification
Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from
the OGCC and COA.
SPOUSES AGBULOS V. GUTIERREZ
The records reveal that on December 15, 2003,
respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge
Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan,
Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive
a communication from the court informing them that
their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She
also stated in the letter that there was no formal
agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they
would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of
the plaintiffs was still in America.
Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the
appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty.
Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without
respondents’ knowledge and consent.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court
is presumed to represent such client before the
appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this
presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower
court presumed to represent client on
appeal. — An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client
on appeal, unless he files a formal petition
withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the
RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw
Atty. Magbitang’s authority to represent respondents
in the case. The letter merely stated that there was,
as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an
appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an
attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly
or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the
lawyer’s first appearance and validates the action
taken by him.Implied ratification may take various
forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by
acceptance and retention of benefits flowing
therefrom. Respondents’ silence or lack of
remonstration when the case was finally elevated to
the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing
of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to “serve his client
with competence and diligence.”Consequently, a
lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.In light of
such mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing the
notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to
direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.
CATU v. RELLOSA
Complainant WilfredoCatu is a co-owner of a lot and
the building located at Malate. His mother and
brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the LupongTagapamayapa where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay summoned the
parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent
issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants
in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint, claiming that
respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between
the litigants as punong barangay.
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials
and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession
“unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.” This is the general
law which applies to all public officials and
employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of
RA 7160governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. – (a) All governors,
city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives.
4

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality
of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the
Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession
even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do
not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to
the practice of profession by elective local officials. As
a special law with a definite scope (that is, the
practice of profession by elective local officials), it
constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and
employees.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays are the following:
the governor, the vice governor and members of
thesangguniangpanlalawigan for provinces; the city
mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniangpanlungsod for cities; the municipal
mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniangbayan for municipalities and
the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of
thesangguniangkabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors
and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. This is because they are required to
render full time service. They should therefore devote
all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was
not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he
should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations
RAMOS v. RADA
Moises Rada: messenger in the CFI of Camarines
Norte
Charge: violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule
XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government.
Rada receives a monthly salary of P267.75. He was
extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing
Corporation to manage and supervise real properties
situated in CamarinesNorte which were foreclosed by
the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and
discharged his duties as administrator.
Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil
service rule prohibiting government employees from
engaging directly in a private business, vocation or
profession or being connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department.
But, indubitably, also, his private business connection
has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government
service. Thus, his violation of the rule — the lack of
prior permission is a technical one, and he should be
meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty,
which is REPRIMAND.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally
ministerial which do not require that his entire day of
24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such
being his situation, it would be to stifle his
willingness to apply himself to a productive
endeavor to augment his income, and to award a
premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned
from engaging in or being connected with a
private undertaking outside of office hours and
without foreseeable detriment to the Government
service. His connection with Avesco Marketing
Corporation need not be terminated, but he must
secure a written permission from the Executive Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who
is hereby authorized to grant or revoke such
permission, under such terms and conditions as will
safeguard the best interests of the service, in general,
and the court, in particular.
ZETA v. MALINAO
Felicisimo Malinao: court interpreter CFI Catbalogan,
Samar
“ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR.
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an
attorney. Reliable information also says he has been
appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not
authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his
means of livelihood as he collects fees from his
clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay
anything. We believe that his doing so should be
stopped for a good government. These facts can be
checked with records of those municipal courts.”
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic)
for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot,
even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in
appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
permission from his superiors and, worse, he
falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question.
5
Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as
counsel under the above circumstances would
indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of
justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants
a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative
than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court
or investigative body wherein only members of the
bar are allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent FelicisimoMalinao is
hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI,
Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the
government.