Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property

January to June 2006

EJECTMENT: PRESCRIPTION, POSSESSION, NOT OWNERSHIP

QUEVADA V. COURT OF APPEALS

502 SCRA 233

FACTS:
- Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the plaintiff/respondent said that he is the lessor of a
parcel of land with a residential house in Sampaloc, Manila.
- Sometime in 1994, he (as a lessor) and defendant/petitioner entered into a Contract of
Lease of a portion of the residential house.
- After the expiration of the extended Lease, the petitioner continued possessing the
premises, but without payment of any reasonable compensation (for the use and
occupancy thereof).
- Private respondent made several demands to the petitioner to vacate the premises but was
refused.
- Private respondent referred the matter to the barangay court for conciliation, only for the
former to repudiate the “agreement to vacate as of December 31, 1997.”
- Private respondent served upon the petitioner a notice to vacate the leased property.
- Petitioner’s version was that the property was really a trust in favor of him. Petitioner
added that there was an implied trust by virtue of the “true agreement” whereby the
purchase price of the lot would be paid by the private respondent and for the latter, later
on, to transfer the title after he (private respondent) shall have paid the purchase price.
- MeTC ruled in favor of private respondent.
- RTC affirmed MeTC.
- CA affirmed RTC. Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) whether the action for ejectment is proper
- (2) whether such action can be brought by private respondent who is not the titled owner
of the property
- (3) whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the value of the house on the property

HELD/RATIO:
- (1) The action for ejectment or, more specifically, unlawful detainer or desahucio is under
the proper jurisdiction of the MeTC.
- As a lessor, private respondent was unlawfully deprived possession of the residential
house after petitioner’s right to its possession as lessee had expired.
- Under Section 2, Rule 70, such action by the lessor shall be commenced after demand to
pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee.
- Petitioner’s continued use and occupancy of the premises without any contract between
him and private respondent was by mere tolerance or permission of the latter.
- Aside from the fact that the lease contract had expired, petitioner also did not honor the
agreement to vacate as of December 31, 1997 before the barangay court.

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- Its filing was within the one-year period after private respondent had been unlawfully
deprived or withheld of its possession. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession started not from the date the lease contract expired, but from the date the
written notice to vacate was served.
- Necessarily, the prescriptive period was suspended while the case was pending before the
barangay authorities.
- (2) Private respondent may bring the action for unlawful detainer, even though he is not
the titled owner of the leased property.
- Such action has “for its object the recovery of the physical possession” or determination
of “who is entitled to possession de facto” “of the leased premises (the house) not the
ownership of the lot” and not its “legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil
law.”
- The Court has consistently held that the only issue to be resolved in unlawful detainer or
desahucio is the actual “physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.
- Petitioner should not trifle with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple
expedient of asserting someone else’s ownership over the leased property.
- (3) Petitioner should be paid for the value of the portion of the house covered by the
lease, to be offset against rentals due.
- No supporting evidence was presented showing that petitioner’s construction of the house
was with the consent of the land’s previous owner, but good faith should be presumed,
particularly since the lease relationship was open and in plain view.
- In order to satisfy the demands of substantial justice, morality, conscience, and fair
dealing, and pursuant to equity and the principle proscribing unjust enrichment, the value
of the portion of the house covered by the lease should be determined so that
compensation of its value against the rentals due can take effect.

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January to June 2006

BUYING IN GOOD FAITH: SPA MUST BE DULY NOTHARIZED,

SPA HAS NO APPARENT FLAWS

BAUTISTA V. SILVA
502 SCRA 335

FACTS:
- That Transfer Certificate of Title was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva
and Pedro M. Silva.
- Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a
Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed
and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-
spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
- Transfer certificate was cancelled and issued in the names of spouses Bautista.
- The RTC also found that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
- RTC rendered judgment nullifying the deed of absolute sale, in favor of respondent.
- CA affirmed RTC.
- Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value
having relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine
on its face.
- (2) Whether or not the nullity of the deed of absolute sale will only pertain to the one half
share of the wife.

HELD/RATIO:
- (1) There is no merit to petitioners’ claim that they are purchasers in good faith.
- That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The
same is conclusive upon the Court, especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the
NBI which constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing evidence that respondent
did not sign the SPA.
- Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.
- Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact not
cognizable by us in a petition for review.
- A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith as a
defense against any action questioning his title. Such status, however, is never presumed
but must be proven by the person invoking it.
- He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
- Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is

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in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any
claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the
title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
- In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and
possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the
property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that they inquired not only into
the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.
- When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized,
we know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie
evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would
have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the
signature on it.
- In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title
to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if
he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s capacity to
sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s
duly notarized special power of attorney.
- Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the operative
words “duly notarized” and “all things being equal.” Thus, said rule should not apply
when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the special
power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and authenticity of the
document; or when the buyer has actual notice of circumstances outside the document
that would render suspect its genuineness.
- In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were
buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial
acknowledgment.
- All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the
photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should
have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it.
- (2) That said, we come to the issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro
Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of
conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the wife
affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. We see no reason to deviate
from this rule.

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TORRENS TITLE: INDEFEASIBILITY DOES NOT APPLY WHEN ISSUANCE

IS ATTENDED WITH FRAUD

FELICIANO V. ZALDIVAR
503 SCRA 182

FACTS:
- Remegia (petitioner) alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land.
- Sometime in 1974, Aurelio (respondent), allegedly through fraud, was able to obtain
another TCT No. T-17993 covering the 243-sq-m portion of Remegia’s lot as described in
her TCT No. T-8502.
- According to Remegia, the 243-sq-m portion (subject lot) was originally leased from her
by Pio Dalman, Aurelio’s father-in-law.
- Thereafter, in 1974, Aurelio filed with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental a petition for partial cancellation of TCT No. T-8502. It was allegedly made to
appear therein that Aurelio and his spouse Luz acquired the subject lot from Dalman who,
in turn, purchased it from Gil.
- Remegia denied that she sold the subject lot either to Gil or Dalman.
- Petitioner alleged that she never parted with the certificate of title and that it was never
lost. As proof that the sale of the subject lot never transpired, Remegia pointed out that
the transaction was not annotated on TCT No. T-8502.
- Remegia Y. Feliciano filed against the spouses Aurelio and Luz Zaldivar a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17993 and
reconveyance of the property covered therein.
- The version of the respondent is that they really purchased it and are therefore the owners
of the subject property.
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed to CA.
- CA reversed the RTC and ruled in favor of respondents.
- Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the court who ordered the issuance of new certificate of title despite
existence of owner’s duplicate copy that was never lost has jurisdiction over the case.
- (2) Whether or not respondents can claim the defense of indefeasibility of title.
- (3) Whether or not the claim of ownership of petitioner over the property was barred by
estoppel or laches.
- (4) Whether or not the respondents can claim as absolute owners of the property.

HELD/RATIO:
- (1) Court has no authority to issue a new certificate.
- As the trial court correctly held, the CFI which granted respondent Aurelio’s petition for
the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-8502 did not acquire
jurisdiction to issue such order. It has been consistently ruled that “when the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another

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person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the
decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of
the original certificate.” In such a case, the decision authorizing the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time.
- (2) Respondent Aurelio cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of title because “the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the
issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.”
- (3) Contrary to the appellate court’s holding, laches has not set in against Remegia. She
merely tolerated the occupation by the respondents of the subject lot.
- Case law teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its
lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches.
- (4) Respondents cannot claim to be the absolute owners of the property because of their
adverse possession. Respondents’ claim that they had been occupying the subject lot
since 1947 openly, publicly, adversely and continuously or for over 41 years is
unavailing. In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that lands covered by
a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. A claim of acquisitive
prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land following Article 1126
of the Civil Code in relation to Section 46 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act
(now Section 47 of P.D. No 1529).

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ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION: REQUIREMENTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TRI-PLUS CORPORATION

503 SCRA 91

FACTS:
- Tri-Plus Corporation, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the MTC of
Consolacion, Metro Cebu, and an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels
of land.
- Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including
the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in
actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest.
- The trial court received an Opposition to the Application for Registration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the
grounds that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto and that the subject parcels of land are portions of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to private
appropriation.
- MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. OSG appeals to the CA.
- CA affirmed the MTC decision.
- Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
property is alienable and disposable.
- (2) Whether or not the respondent has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation.

HELD/RATIO:
- Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
- (1) The respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the lands were
alienable.
- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification
and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is
the prerogative of the Executive Department.
- All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as

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alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
- It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
- In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the
said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification
refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
- (2) Respondent was not able to prove adverse possession.
- Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.
- Respondent having failed to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable
public lands, the Court agrees with petitioner that there would be no basis in concluding
that these lands have already become private. The presumption remains that said
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become
the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.

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EJECTMENT: EXPEDITIOUS MEANS OF PROTECTING ACTUAL POSSESSION

MADERAZO V. PEOPLE
503 SCRA 234

FACTS:
- Verutiao (offended party) had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She
paid a monthly rental of P200.00. She was allowed to finish the construction of the
market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.
- Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development of
the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private
parties of buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the
expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to the monthly
rentals when occupied for business.
- She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized
statement of expenses.
- She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses.
- Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract, renewable every
year with a monthly rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the
conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding
the fact that the contract has not yet expired.
- The Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction
of the market stall. However, considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her
expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent.
- Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas
holidays and returned a month after.
- She and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her
to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals
for the stall.
- The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
- An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging grave
coercion against the municipal mayor, members of the Sangguniang Bayan, and the
Police Station Chief among others because of the seizure and confiscation of the
inventory goods of the offended party.
- The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo,
Seniforo Perido, and Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted
the other accused.
- Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’
guilt for unjust vexation.
- (2) Whether or not the Mayor could immediately recover possession of the market stall
since the lease contract has already expired.

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January to June 2006

HELD/RATIO:
- (1) On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed, the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of petitioners
Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for
unjust vexation. (this is not really a property issue)
- (2) No. Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on
January 13, 1997 without having been renewed, and petitioner Mayor ordered Verutiao to
vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under Section
44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be
disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer against
Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises.
- It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction of
Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is
entitled to the actual possession and to place the burden upon the latter of instituting an
action to try the property right.
- An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings established
for the purpose of providing expeditious means of protecting actual possession, which is
presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven.

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RECONVEYANCE: PRESCRIPTION IF ARISING FROM IMPLIED TRUST

CERVANTES V. FORMER NINTH DIVISION OF

THECOURT OF APPEALS
503 SCRA 451

FACTS:
- Petitioner Ildefonso Cervantes began possessing and cultivating a lot.
- Petitioner filed a Free Patent Application over the lot with the District Office of the
Bureau of Lands of Puerto Princesa.
- In 1975, petitioner’s nephew, private respondent Moises Madarcos, started staying in his
house. Sometime in 1976, private respondent informed petitioner that he knew somebody
at the Bureau of Lands who can help him title his land.
- Petitioner was introduced to Administrative Assistant Gerardo Jacinto, and he requested
for an amendment of his free patent application with regard to the total land area covered
by the application which should be 6.473 hectares instead of 5.670 hectares. Jacinto
agreed to survey the lot and make the necessary corrections in the application.
- Petitioner executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim relinquishing all his rights and interests
over a portion of the land, estimated to be around 1.5 hectares, in favor of private
respondent, purportedly for the amount of P1,000.
- He claimed that private respondent and Gerardo Jacinto of the Bureau of Lands connived
to dispossess him of his land. He added that he was intoxicated at that time, and because
of the trust and confidence that he reposed in his nephew, he did not bother to read the
contents of the document which later turned out to be an affidavit of quitclaim. He was
made to believe that the document that he signed was for the purpose of expediting his
free patent application.
- On the basis of the quitclaim, private respondent applied for a free patent over the
aforesaid area.
- A free patent covering an area of 14,860 square meters was granted to private respondent.
- The Bureau of Lands granted petitioner’s application for a free patent for which, on
September 5, 1977, O.C.T. No. G-298 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Puerto
Princesa City in favor of petitioner. The title, however, covered the entire land area of
6.4730 hectares under Free Patent Application No. 598, which necessarily included the
portion that was previously awarded to private respondent.
- Petitioner went to the Bureau of Lands and there, he allegedly discovered that O.C.T. No.
G-286, covering an area of 14,860 square meters, had been issued in favor of private
respondent.
- Petitioner demanded from private respondent an explanation regarding the issuance of the
free patent in his favor.
- However, private respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner.
- Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan an action for the annulment or
cancellation of O.C.T. No. G-286 on the ground of fraud.
- RTC ruled in favor petitioner. Respondent appealed to the CA.
- CA reversed the RTC.

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- Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the property.
- (2) Whether or not the action of petitioner has already prescribed.

HELD/RATIO:
- (1) Since the land in question was evidently obtained by private respondent through
fraudulent machinations by means of which a free patent and title were issued in his
name, he is deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit of petitioner who was
prejudiced by his actions.
- (2) No. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Here, private respondent’s certificate of
title was issued on April 6, 1977. Petitioner previously initiated a similar case, Civil Case
No. 1505, against respondent on September 8, 1981 which had the effect of suspending
the prescriptive period until it was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Palawan on
October 21, 1981. The present case was later on filed on May 18, 1987. Clearly, the
present action is not barred by prescription.

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REVERSION: BURDEN OF PROOF

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC. V. REPUBLIC

503 SCRA 522

FACTS:
- Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for
Lot No. 1434.
- Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one
of Orcullo’s heirs.
- The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT
No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public
domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434
was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of
the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.
- The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional
Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of
mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area covered by Urgello’s Fishpond
Lease Agreement.
- Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the
allegations of respondent. However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint
and were thus declared in default.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint for reversion. Respondent appealed.
- CA reversed the trial court. Petitioner appeals.
- Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- Whether or not the complaint for reversion should be given due course.

HELD/RATIO:
- Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
- It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a
question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the government and it is
aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain.
- The State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the
application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as
grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but

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must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not
even being adequate.
- It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the
details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain why
such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property.
- It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original title were
truly erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.
- The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution, but also in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and upheld the
Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in
applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right by
the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and
due process must be observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot
is part of timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted
status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances,
respondent’s insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be
rejected.

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FORCIBLE ENTRY: ISSUES INVOLVED, PRIOR POSSESSION

COPUYOC V. DE SOLA
504 SCRA 176

FACTS:
- Mario L. Copuyoc (petitioner) and his spouse are holders of a Contract to Sell dated
September 6, 1995, between them as buyers and the Bank of Commerce (formerly The
Overseas Bank of Manila) as seller, while Erlinda de Sola (respondent) has Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87569 in her name.
- Respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35, a
complaint for Forcible Entry.
- The complaint contained the allegations that: respondent is the owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision located at No. 6 Guerrero
St., Xavierville I, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, by virtue of TCT No. 87569; respondent
has been in actual possession of the property since June 7, 1993, when the same was sold
to her by Christine C. Quesada, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate;
petitioner commenced construction of a house on the property without respondent’s
consent and despite demands, petitioner refused to stop the construction and vacate the
premises.
- MeTC issued a temporary restraining order.
- Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, denying respondent’s allegations.
- MeTC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry. The MeTC found that the property over
which the Bank of Commerce holds title to is not the property mentioned in respondent’s
title; hence, there was no forcible entry to speak of.
- RTC reversed the dismissal. The RTC disagreed with the finding of the MeTC, ruling that
petitioner’s evidence proved that the property in litigation is one and the same, and that
respondent was in prior possession of the property.
- CA upheld the findings of the RTC.

ISSUES:
- Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would prosper.

HELD/RATIO:
- An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It is designed
to recover physical possession through speedy proceedings that are restrictive in nature,
scope and time limits. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The presence of any of these
elements in the present case implies that the possession of the disputed land by the
defendant has been unlawful from the beginning; that is, he acquired possession by illegal
means.

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- The principal issue to be resolved in forcible entry cases is mere physical or material
possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor
ownership of the property involved.
- It is also well settled that in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence.
- In the present case, it devolved upon respondent to show by preponderance of evidence
that she was illegally deprived of possession of the property subject of the forcible entry
case for her to obtain judgment in her favor.
- Coming now to the issue of who, as between petitioner and respondent, has priority in
possession of the property, the Court notes, at this juncture, a basic error in the decisions
of the MeTC, RTC, and the CA, which should be rectified. All three courts entertained
the impression that petitioner’s possession is based on his claim of ownership of the
property. This is not so. It should be pointed out that petitioner’s right to possess the
property is not derived from any claim of ostensible ownership over the same but on the
provision in the Contract to Sell allowing him to take possession of the property pending
reconstitution of the title and full payment of the purchase price. Ownership remained in
the name of the Bank of Commerce, and petitioner is yet to become the owner of the
property at the time the ejectment proceedings were had. This is simply because in a
contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to
the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
- Given the surrounding circumstances of this case, the Court finds that petitioner is in
prior possession of the property, and is entitled to remain therein.
- while it may be true that the Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate between respondent
and Christine Quesada was executed on June 7, 1993, prior to the Contract to Sell
between petitioner and the Bank of Commerce on September 6, 1995, it should be
emphasized that the execution of a deed of sale is merely a prima facie presumption of
delivery of possession of a piece of real property, which is destroyed when the delivery is
not effected because of a legal impediment.
- Records show that respondent never occupied the property from the time it was allegedly
sold to her on June 7, 1993 or at any time thereafter.
- In contrast, petitioner was able to establish his actual physical possession over the
property, having started construction thereon soon after the property was turned over to
him by virtue of the Contract to Sell on September 6, 1995.

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EXPROPRIATION: EXPROPRIATOR AS ABSOLUTE OWNER

DE GUZMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS

504 SCRA 238

FACTS:
- Petitioners Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo and Nicasio Magbitang were among the
tenants of a parcel of land.
- Respondent Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan (municipality) sought the expropriation of
the land before the now defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
- During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, the municipality and petitioners
entered into a compromise agreement, whereby petitioners irrevocably withdrew their
opposition to the expropriation of the land in consideration of the payment of a
disturbance compensation of P25,000.00 per hectare or P2.50 per square meter.
Petitioners also waived “all claims and demands” against the municipality.
- The Court of Agrarian Relations approved said compromise agreement in its decisions
dated 16 April 1979 and 9 August 1979.
- It can be gathered that the municipality eventually acquired ownership of the land
through expropriation but allowed petitioners to continue cultivating their lots pending
the construction of the Baliuag Wholesale Complex Market.
- Despite the lapse of several years, construction of the market did not push through. This
prompted petitioners, who had continually occupied and cultivated the land, to file in
1996 a petition with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Baliuag, praying
that the land be placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) in accordance with
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
- The Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order
granting the petition and declaring the land as covered by OLT.
- The municipality elevated the matter to the DAR Secretary who, in his Order dated 8
August 1997, reversed the Order of 6 January 1997 of the Regional Director.
- Petitioners, aggrieved this time, filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On 1
July 1999, Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, by authority of the President,
dismissed petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the order of the DAR Secretary.
- The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, dismissing petitioners’ appeal.
- Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- Whether or not the subject land can be reclassified to agricultural after the purpose of its
conversion to a non-agricultural land had not materialized.

HELD/RATIO:
- No. That the subject land had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural is not
disputed. The records reveal that as early as 1980, the municipality had passed a zoning
ordinance which identified the subject land as the site of the wholesale market complex.

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January to June 2006

- After the municipality acquired ownership over the land through expropriation and
passed the ordinance converting said land into a commercial area, any transaction entered
into by the municipality involving the land was governed by the applicable civil law in
relation to laws on local government. At this point, agrarian laws no longer governed the
relationship between petitioners and the municipality. While it was not established
whether the relationship between petitioners and the municipality was that of a lessor and
lessee or that of an employer and laborer, as the supposed written agreement was not
offered in evidence, the fact remains that the subject land had already been identified as
commercial in the zoning ordinance.
- Certainly, petitioners’ occupation of the land, made possible as it was by the tolerance of
the municipality, was subject to its peremptory right to terminate. As absolute owner of
the land, the municipality is entitled to devote the land for purposes it deems appropriate.
- The mere fact of cultivating an agricultural land does not ipso jure vest ownership right in
favor of the tiller.

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