EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V CA

G.R No. 131719, May 25, 2004

Principle: To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed

to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm and must
demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

FACTS:
The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter,
Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional
Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a)
and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the
assailed provisions of the law.

Petitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or
suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are
unjust and unconstitutional.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because
they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued
that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely
prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to
abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled
workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. Licensed and authorized
recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the
person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against
licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it.
RULING:

No. The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an
injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its
face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be

unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in
its favor. The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or regulations
developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover, an injunction will
alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the
relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the
merits.

Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether
to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the
situation, including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and private parties,
courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they
are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be
entitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial
hardship.
Suntay v. People

101 Phil 833 J une 29, 1957

Principle: Notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating due process. Among
these are the cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime.

FACTS:

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that
on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon
City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP)
compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December
1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of
Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of
Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney
referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955,
Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981
[A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where
he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed
and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case
Q-1596).

On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order
"directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10
February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the Secretary cabled the
Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of
the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved.
On 5 July 1955, Suntay’s counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him
be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its
order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July
1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be cancelled.

RULING:

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge
against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to
the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed
whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing.

If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said
clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is
facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG
1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntay’s suddenly leaving the country
in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his
part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of
the law should join together to bring him back to justice.