Persons Case Digests:

Tañada vs. Tuvera – Willaware vs.

Jesichris
Cases
Case Case Title G.R. No. Date
#
1 Tañada vs. Tuvera L-63915 April 24, 1985
2 Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee L-18081 March 3, 1982
3 People vs. Patalin 125539 July 7, 1999
4 Cui vs. Arellano University L-15127 May 13, 1961
5 US vs. Soliman L-11555 January 6, 1917
6 US vs. Palacio L-11002 January 17, 1916
7 Ang Ping vs. Regional Trial Court of Manila 75860 September 17, 1987
8
9
10 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown 162155 August 28, 2007
Property Group, Inc.
11 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. AICHI 184823 October 6, 2010
12 William Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products 183994 June 30, 2004
13 Bellis vs. Bellis L-23678 June 6, 1967
14 Miciano vs. Brimo 22595 November 1, 1924
15 Gatchalian vs. Delim 56847 October 21, 1990
16 Virtucio vs. Alegarbes 187451 August 29, 2012
17 Ting vs. Velez-Ting 166562 March 31, 2009
18 Felipe vs. Leuterio L-4606 May 30, 1952
19
20 RCPI vs. CA L-44748 August 29, 1986
21 Wassmer vs. Velez L-20089 December 26, 1964
22 Cecilio Pe vs. Alfonso Pe L-17396 May 30, 1962
23 Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. vs. CA L-30736 April 14, 1975
24 Gashem vs. CA 97336 February 19, 1993
25 Amonoy vs. Gutierrez 140420 February 15, 2001
26 Allied Bank Corporation vs. Lim Sio Wan 133179 March 27, 2008
27 Ledesma vs. CA L-54598 April 15, 1988
28 Willaware vs. Jesichris 195549 September 3, 2014
Tanada vs. Tuvera

Facts:

Petitioners seek a Writ of Mandamus to compel various Presidential Decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation, and administrative orders
due to non-publication, before the law has been implemented. Respondent contended that publication
in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the law
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provision as to the date they are to take effect publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

Lorenzo Tanada requested for publication of the said laws for public purposes. But the respondent
argued that publication is not necessary as a rule because the provision states that phrase “unless
otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is indispensable for the effectivity of the
presidential issuances in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect.
2.) Whether or not the clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication.

Held:

Yes, it is indispensable. The objective of the Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legit non excusat”. The
court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
publishes, shall have no force and effect.

Yes. The clause “unless otherwise provided” does not mean that the legislative may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in this matter because the omission of which would offend the process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge about the new laws. The phrase stated pertains to the date of effectivity, the
date depends to the author of the law but the publication is indispensable. The court holds therefore to
publish the presidential issuances as a condition for their effectivity.
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
GR No.18081 March 3, 1922

Facts: on August 5, 1919, Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands.
He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by
Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo
with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who
alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The trial judge, the
Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of
Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should
share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her
daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the
Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia
would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that
there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children,
Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and recognizable in the Philippines.
(2) Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid.

Held: (1) No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that “All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same
were contracted, are valid in these Islands.” To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity
provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy
concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong,
and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.

(2) Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.”
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the
right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be
valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages.

The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will effectively
promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into
effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the
deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
would be far-reaching in the disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred
fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it within our
power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of
these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality;
either to block or to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is obvious as the law is plain.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
People vs. Patalin
GR. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

FACTS:
On October 11, 1987, Alfonso Patalin Jr. and Alex Mijaque, herein accused-appelllants were charged of
robbery with multiple rape which they committed on the evening of August 11, 1984. They forcibly
entered the house of Aliman family and stole cash and other personal properties.

After hearing, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed
against them. At the time, the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape is punishable
by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished and reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty
Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitutions abolition of the death penalty had
retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on
January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by
the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

ISSUE:
W/N the accused gain vested rights upon the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 so that any future
law restoring the same would no longer cover them

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-
appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them.

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that
it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a
statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular
matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that
accrued under the old law. Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing
rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or
attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from
them.
Cui vs Arellano University
L-15127
May 13, 1961

Facts:

Emeterio Cui, the petitioner, was a law student in Arellano University, the respondent, from first
year up to the first semester of his fourth year. During his stay at the respondent university, he was a
scholar so his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the end of every semester. He
transferred to Abad Santos University to finish the last semester of his fourth year. After graduating,
when he was applying to take the bar exams wherein the transcript of records is needed, AU refused to
issue until he had paid back the total amount of tuition fees that were returned to him when he was still
their scholar. Mr. Cui paid under protest and he seeks to recover it from the defendant. The lower court
sided with the university, thus, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby
the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent
of his scholarships in cash, is valid.

Held:

No. Regardless of Memorandum no. 38, the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy
and hence the contract is null and void. The memorandum incorporates a sound principle of public
policy. The defendant uses the scholarships as a business scheme to increase the business potential of
an educational institution, thus it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also with good morals.
The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs
nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institution as in
Arellano University.

Decision is reversed.
US vs Soliman

Facts:
Gabino Soliman, testifying in his own behalf on the estafa case charged to him and several
individuals, swore falsely to certain allegations of fact. The trial judges acquitted him for there was room
for reasonable doubt but he was guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in section 3 of Act no. 1697.
However, since judgment was entered on November 23, 1915, Section 3 of Act no. 1697 has been
expressly repealed by the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), which became effective on July 11, 1916.
It has been suggested that the repealed section 3 of Act No. 1697 should be held to have the effect of
remitting and extinguishing the criminal responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of
the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of Administrative Code lowers the penalty imposed to Mr.
Soliman.

Held:
Yes. The Administrative code expressly repealed section 3 of Act no. 1697 and the latter
impliedly repealed the Penal Code. Thus, we apply the rule that a law which repeals a prior law, not
expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law
revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.

In any case in which a statute prescribing a penalty for the commission of a specific offense is
repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the commission of such
offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense prior to the enactment
of the repealing statute is that one which is more favorable to the convict. In the case at bar, penalty
prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed upon the convict.

Judgment affirmed but penalties should be reversed. Provisions of Act 2142 must be applied.
G.R. No. L-11002 January 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MATEO P. PALACIO, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

On December 18, 1914, a complaint was filed against defendant, Mateo P. Palacio, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Leyte, for violation of section 87 of Act No. 82, the Municipal Code. Based on the
complaint, defendant being the deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte who is charged of assessing
real property, revised and reassessed the property of Francisco Mdlonito, to omit from the tax list certain
real properties and improvements knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable.

The CFI found defendant guilty of the crime therein charged, he sentenced him to the penalty of forty
days' imprisonment in the provincial jail, to pay a fine of P100, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs

ISSUE: Whether or not the facts alleged in the complaint and proven at trial do not constitute the
infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code.

HELD:

Defendant's counsel alleges, however, that the act committed by his client and which, as aforesaid, was
proven at trial, does not constitute an infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82,
known as the Municipal Code."

Section 87 provides Any officer charged with the duty of assessing real property, who shall willfully omit
from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court.

Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of the municipality shall be valued and
assessed for taxation by a board, to consist of the president, the municipal treasurer, and a specially
authorized deputy of the provincial treasurer, which board shall be known as the municipal board of
assessors. However, it was later amended by section 1 of Act No. 1930, so that the aforementioned
municipal board of assessors should consist of the municipal president the municipal treasurer and,
instead of the deputy to the provincial treasurer, of a third member to be appointed by the provincial
board.

Subsequently, on February 11, 1913, Act No. 2238 which created the office of provincial assessor and
allowing him such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the
approval of the Executive Secretary. Moreover, said Act No. 2238 provides in section 18 that all Acts or
parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed.

In the two aforementioned Acts, Nos. 82 and 1930, in so far as relates to the assessment and
valuation of taxable real property in municipalities, there is, strictly speaking, nothing which may
be said to be in conflict with said Act no. 2238, not only for the reason above stated, but also because
this Act has done nothing but change the method and procedure provided in Act No. 82, the Municipal
Code, for determining the taxable real property in the municipalities and the value thereof, by means of
the intervention which in said procedure is given to the provincial assessors. But that municipalities are
not excluded from taking part in the proceedings is shown by the fact that section 9 of this Act No. 2238
provides that, prior to directing the provincial assessor in accordance with the provisions thereof, to
proceed to revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property, the provincial board shall
require each municipal council of the municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code
(Act No. 82) to prepare, in such form and detail as the Executive Secretary may prescribe, a general
schedule of the values of the different classes of land for the municipality which shall be forwarded to the
provincial board for approval, and such schedule, when approved by the provincial board, shall serve the
assessor as basis for the valuation and assessment. It also provides in section 13 that it shall be the duty
of the municipal president, secretary and treasurer and all municipal employees, to render every
assistance in their power to the provincial assessor.

Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly said by defendant's counsel in his brief, is
that "when there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, and it appears evidently by
the form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole
of the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a provision, the latest law should
be considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all
that is not shall rejected and repealed." A simple perusal of Act No. 2238 is sufficient to show that it was
not the intention of the legislature to cover all matters relative to the assessment and valuation of the
taxable real property of the municipalities, and subject, because, as aforesaid, the Act in question is
closely related to Act No. 82, of which it is virtually a complement in so far as regards the organization of
the service of making the lists for the complete and adequate collection to the tax on the real property in
municipalities organized under said Act No. 82. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that section 87 of
this latter Act should be considered as repealed, in so far as it prescribes the penalty incurred by
any official who, being charged with the duty of assessing real property, wilfully omits form the
tax lists any real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable.

Repeals by implications are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that
the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating
to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also
clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act
fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is
beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand
and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier. (23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 489, and cases there cited
[vol. 26, pp. 721, 726].)

As said Act No. 2238 provides no penalty for the provincial assessor or his deputy who, in revising the
assessment and preparing the tax list of real property, wilfully makes any omission such as that
aforestated; and as the provincial assessor, or his deputy, is a public official or an official of the class
referred to in section 87, it being immaterial whether he be a provincial or a municipal official (for it is
sufficient that it be the duty of such official to assess real property) it is evident that the said penal
provisions in force and is applicable to the provincial assessors and their deputies referred to in Act No.
2238, and that the lower court did not err in sentencing defendant, under the provisions of said section
87, to the penalty specified in the judgment appealed from.
G.R. No. 75860 September 17, 1987

ANG PING and CARMEN PIMENTEL, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, Branch 40; and JULIO and ZENAIDA KO, respondents.

FACTS:

In the ejectment case filed by Petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel against private
respondents Julio Ko and Zenaida Ko, the MTC of Manila ordered the respondents to vacate the disputed
property and pay Php 5,000 as payment in rental from March 1, 1981 until they vacate. RTC affirmed the
Decision, however reduced the rental fees to Php500.

CA and SC - affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Motion for reconsideration is denied.

The Petitioner’s returned to the MTC to file a motion for execution of judgment. However, it was opposed
by respondents on the ground that a complaint for annulment of sale which they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila had, in the meantime, been decided in their favor. The RTC ruled in Civil Case No.
13911 that the earlier sale of T & C Corporation, to the petitioners are null and void on grounds of equity
under Article 19 of the Civil Code and ordered the petitioners to sell 190 square meters of the land they
had purchased to the respondents upon Julio Ko's paying them P190,000.00. The Civil case is now
pending before the CA.

The MTC denied Respondents opposition and granted the motion for execution. In this regard,
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary
injunction (PI) to stop the implementation of the writ of execution in the ejectment case.

RTC issued a preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the Court gravely abused its discretion when it issued a TRO and PI to stop the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by the MTC of Manila.

HELD: Yes.

As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that "the only function of a lower
court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the
higher court."

This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states with finality how the
particular case before it has been resolved.

We refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision in the nullification of sale and
reconveyance of property case. The merits will have to be threshed out by the proper court on a full
consideration of the evidence and the law upon which it is based. Our decision here is limited to the
execution of the decision in the ejectment case.

From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of the petitioners. The injunction was improperly
issued.
Do the equities of the case warrant a disregard of established precedents? It is true that the private
respondents would suffer painful consequences if they are ejected now only to be reinstated if they
eventually win the nullification of sale case. However, the petitioners are also suffering an injustice. The
ejectment case in their favor was decided as early as 1983. The regional trial court affirmed the decision.
The Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that the promulgation of the trial court's decision was defective
and ordered it repromulgated but this Court set aside the appellate decision and reinstated the
metropolitan trial court and regional trial court decisions.

There being no final decision in the annulment of sale case, the petitioners have equal chances with the
private respondents of also winning that case. The private respondents cannot claim to have overriding
considerations of equity on their side, sufficient to stop the execution of a final judgment in the ejectment
proceedings.
CIR. vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

G.R. No. 162155

August 28, 2007

Facts:

On 1999, respondent filed for a refund of its credit income tax that it paid on 1997. Respondent claimed
that their company is not liable to pay income tax sue to the losses that it suffered. Nonetheless,
respondent paid its corresponding corporate income tax and creditable withholding tax from the
proceeds of real estate sales and remitted the same accordingly to BIR. Respondent claimed that such
payment of corporate income tax and creditable withholding tax entitled them tax refund or tax credit.

Accordingly, respondent filed its claim, but the Revenue Officer did not act on such request and instead
further required respondent to submit additional documents in support of its claim. Aggrieved,
respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) where the latter dismissed
its petition on the ground that the claim of respondent for tax refund was filed beyond the 2 year
prescriptive period under Art. 229 of the NIRC applying Art. 13 of the Civil Code, and. Further maintained
that respondent filed its claim exactly 731 days, following the said provision of the Civil Code on
computation of legal periods.

Issue:

Whether or not Art. 13 of the Civil Code is applicable in computing the legal periods or Sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.?

Held:

NO, Art. 13 of the Civil Code is not the applicable provision in computing legal periods which postulates
that a year is comprised of 365 days. The Court ruled that the enactment of the Administrative Code of
1987, Section 31 said code should be the governing legal provision in computing legal periods, being the
recent law, it impliedly repealed Art. 13 of the Civil Code applying the principle of “Lex posteriors
derogat priori”. Under the said code the number of days of a respective month is immaterial for legal
periods are computed on calendar months regardless if a year is a leap year. Hence, respondent filed its
claim on the last day of the 24th month and did not prescribed, as it was filed on the reglementary
period under Art. 229 of the NIRC.
CIR v. AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc.

G.R. No. 184823

October 6, 2010

Facts:

Respondent filed a claim for refund of input VAT for the period of July 01, 2002 to September 30, 2002
with petitioner CIR through the Department of Finance (DOF). However, on the same day, respondent
filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review for the refund of the same input VAT filed
originally with the CIR. Subsequently the 2nd Division of the CTA partially granted the petition of
respondent. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the contention that the period
of filing of such input VAT refund was filed beyond the prescriptive period with respect to
administrative and judicial claims before the CIR and CTA. Petitioner further maintained that since 2004
when respondent filed is a leap year invoking Art. 13 of the Civil Code. In addition, petitioner contended
that an administrative claim for refund is a condition that first must be sought before resorting to
judicial remedy in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period.?
2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims is violative of
the Sec. 112(d) of the NIRC and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.?
Held:

YES, respondent timely filed its claim for tax refund within the prescribed period contemplated under
Section 229 of the NIRC. The Court following the ruling in CIR v. Prime town Property Group, Inc.
discarded the application of Art. 13 of the Civil Code being impliedly repealed by Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 in computing legal periods of contemplation of years to be of 365 days to
12 calendar months. Consequently, applying the maxim of “Lex posteriors derogat priori”, it is the latter
or latest law that must govern, in which to this case is the Administrative Code of 1987. The contention
of petitioner that the date of filing of the claim of respondent falling on Septmber 30, 2004 already
prescribed is misplaced, following the 12 calendar month rule under Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987, such days of a month is immaterial, and regardless if such year is a leap year. Hence, the
reckoning date of such filing should commence on September 30, 2002. Following the 12 calendar
month rule, the reglementary period falls on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent timely filed its
claim when it filed the same on September 30, 2004.

YES, it was expressly provided under Section 112(d) of the NIRC that the CIR within 120 days shall deny
or grant such claim. Hence, respondent could have or should have waited the lapse of 120 days before
resorting to judicial remedy. With such move, the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim of
respondent and considered such filing as premature remedy, where the CTA should have dismissed
outrightly respondent’s petition
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, petitioner, vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented
by ELIZABETH UY, respondent.

G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

The Facts:

Respondent (Uy) filed criminal cases against the petitioner (Co) in violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, cases were then raffled to MeTC Branch 49 of Caloocan City. The cases were provisionally
dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On July 2, 2003, Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order, while her counsel-of-record
received a copy a day after. Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases on July 2,
2004. The MeTC Branch 49 Presiding Judge granted he motion and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration. The Presiding Judge inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases when Co moved
for recusation. Thereafter, the cases were raffled to MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. Co filed before
the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases, that the provisional dismissal have
become permanent one year after the issuance of temporary dismissal of the cases. It was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit. Co filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court,
subsequently, it was dismissed. The dismissal became final and executory. Co filed a Motion for
Permanent Dismissal before the MeTC branch 50. In spite of Supreme Court’s dismissal of the same
issues, Co’s motion was granted. Uy petitioned to the RTC, the RTC annulled and set aside the MeTC
Orders. Co petitioned to the CA, the CA dismissed the petition and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue:

Whether or not the prescriptive period to file the revival of the criminal cases have lapsed.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the filing of the motion to revive the case and the count order
reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such
interpretation is not found in the Rules, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at
the mercy of the trial court. Also, The Court held that the year 2004 as a leap year is inconsequential to
determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1, it provides that a year is composed of twelve (12) calendar months.
The numbers of days are irrelevant. This was the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Primetown Property Group, Inc., which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. Thus, the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co
was timely filed. The petition was denied and the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court are affirmed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA
CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.,
heirs-appellees.

L-23678 June 6, 1967

The Facts:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States of
America. By his first wife, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three illegitimate children. On August
5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he divided in a following order and
manner. Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died on July 5, 1958. His will was admitted to probate in the Court
of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of
the will, paid all the bequests therein. On January 8, 1964, the executor submitted and filed its
Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition wherein it reported the
satisfaction of the will of Amos G. Bellis. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children, and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. The lower
court, relying on Art. 16 of the Civil Code, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor’s final account, report and administration and project partition.

The Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine law on successions will apply. Thus, making the illegitimate
children compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Held:

It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and domicile thereof at the
time of his death. Assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back to the Philippine law, but would still refer to
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict rule adopting to the situs theory calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions. The counter of the
appellants that Article 17, par. 3, of the Civil Code, prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2, of the Civil
Code, is not correct. Congress made the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate successions, they also added a new provision under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the probate court
that successional rights are to be determined by Texas law.
 Miciano vs. Brimo
GR No. 22595, 01 November 1924
Romualdez, J

Facts:

The herein appellant, Andre Brimo, brother of the deceased testator named Joseph G. Brimo,
opposed the schedule of partition filed by the judicial administrator of the latter’s estate. The appellant
contended that the partition he questioned puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16 of Civil code). He was also denied in the
partition of inheritance in the estate of his brother for failing to comply or by opposing the second
clause of the will, thus this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the Philippines, as a requested condition by Joseph Brimo in
the second clause of hi will, shall govern in the partition and disposition of his estate.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the said condition in the second clause of the will is null and
void being contrary to law because it expressly ignores the national law of the testator when, according
to Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16), such national law of the testator, in this case the Turkish
Law, is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Therefore, the Supreme Court modified the
orders appealed and directed that the distribution of the estate be made in such a manner as to include
the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects.
 Gatchalian v. Delim
G.R. No. 56847, 21 October 1990
Feliciano, J.

Facts:
The case arose from the accident that happened on 11 July 1973 wherein the herein petitioner
Reynalda Gatchalian was one of the boarded passengers in a bus owned by the herein respondent
Arsenio Delim. The bus that the petitioner is riding bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell
into a ditch. The passengers’ hospital bills were paid by the respondent’s wife on July 14. The injured
passengers who received financial and medical assistance from Mrs. Delim, one of which is the
petitioner, were made to sign an affidavit waiving their future claims against the respondent. Despite
the existence of said document, the petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages. One of
the defense raised by the respondent is the waiver signed by the petitioner. The Court of First Instance
of La Union affirmed the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals,
however, ruled that the waiver was invalid but pointed out that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages, hence this petition was filed.

Issue: Whether or not the signed affidavit by the passengers are valid waiver.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that a waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up
a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
such person. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy
or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger,
under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decisions of Court of First Instance of La Union
and Court of Appeals and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner the damages.
 Virtucio v. Alegarbes
G.R. No. 187451, 29 August 2012
Mendoza, J.

Facts:
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of
unsurveyed land situated in Basilan. His application was only approved after some years, however, the
land was subdivided into three (3) lots―Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140, Pls-19—as a consequence of a public
land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio. Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his
approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. The Regional Trial Court
ruled in favour of Virtucio, considering the decisions of Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Office of the President about Alegabres protest. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the decision of Regional Trial Court and ruled that Alegarbes is the owner of Lot 140.
Hence, Virtucio sought to reverse the ruling of Court of Appeals insisting that the CA gravely erred in
disregarding its decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
which involved the same factual circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.

Issue:
Whether or not the Custodio vs Alegarbes, a Court of Appeals decision, may be applied as Stare
Decisis in the present case.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that a decision of the Court of Appeals does not establish a judicial
precedent. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established
by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The petition
is denied.
BENJAMIN G. TING, petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, respondent.

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

The Facts:

On 1972, petitioner (Benjamin) and respondent (Carmen) first met while they were classmates
in medical school. Respondent was already pregnant when they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City.
In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations. Benjamin completed the
preceptorship program by 1979. In 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s
family, as member of its active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer. The couple begot
six (6) children. After being married for more than 18 years, Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City on October 21, 1993, praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at
the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as
his peers would confirm. The lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void ab
initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner appealed to the CA and reversed the trial
court’s ruling. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The respondent filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court, thereafter granted the petition and directed CA to resolve
respondent’s motion for reconsideration. CA reversed its first ruling and sustained the trial court’s
decision.

The Issue:

Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven to declare that the marriage of petitioner
and respondent null and void

Held:

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s and appellate court’s rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio. The Court found the totality of
evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit.
Respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. The application of Article 36 of the Family Code must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Felipe vs. Leuterio

G.R. No. L-4606

May 30, 1952

Facts:

On March 12, 1950, an inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held at Naga City. Said contest were
competed by Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial and Luis General, Jr. The contest was presided over by five
judges where petitioner was the chairman. Thereafter, after the contestants have delivered their
respective oratorical pieces, the board of judges reached reached a decision to award the first place to
Nestor Nosce. Four days after the contest, Imperial under protest, wrote to the board of judges
complaining that she should have been awarded the first place arguing that one of the judges
committed mathematical error. The board of judges set aside Imperial’s protest which prompted
Imperial to file a complaint before the Court of First Instance. Imperial contended that her total score
should be 95 placing her first in the contest. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the Supreme Court seeking to
nullify the CIR’s judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not Court’s have the power or authority to reverse the award of the board of judges in an
oratorical competition.

Held:

NO, respondent judge erred in his finding that there was a wrongful violation of Imperial’s right which it
considered in reversing the award of the board of judges. The Court pointed out that Imperial has no
right over the disputed prize as it did not ripen into a demand able right, unless she was declared as the
winner of such contest. Furthermore, if there is fraud or malice employed in violating such right, then
the Court may take cognizance of the enforcement or rderess of such right being sought. In this case,
what is being claimed by Imperial is the first prize, she was never declared winning the first prize, the
Court ruled that she has no right to claim the same as Imperial did not acquire rights over it, unless there
was fraud or malice which deprived Imperial of winning the first prize.
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.

FACTS: Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following: “SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG
DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO” Loreto alleged that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of
said defamatory words. Loreto sued RCPI for damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code
which provides:

 ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

In its defense, RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and
therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. RCPI also
disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its employees.

The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would
logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of
P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower
court stating that the company failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident, and the fact that The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other
telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient
publication; however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00

ISSUE: whether The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-
employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of
private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondent’s breach
of contract thru negligence of its own employees.

RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard
against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for
their clientele’s interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and
not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI
acts and conducts its business through its employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its
employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its
business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate
remedy.
Velez vs Wassmer

Facts:
Francisco X. Velez, plaintiff, and Beatriz P. Wassmer, defendant, are set to be wed on September
4, 1954. They applied for marriage license and did all the necessary preparations needed for the event.
Two days before the wedding, plaintiff left a note for defendant informing her that the wedding will not
push through. The next day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will return soon but never showed
up. She sued Velez for damages. Court ordered plaintiff to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Thus, this appeal is filed.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

Held:
No. mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with article 21 of the New Civil Code. The
Court awarded damages because he exhibited a behavior that was contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy and also because of the public humiliation suffered by Wassmer and her family.
Cecilio Pe et al., plaintiffs-appellans, vs. Alfonso Pe, defendant-appellee
GR No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

FACTS:
Alfonso PE, a married man, was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Becco, a collateral relative of
Lolita Pe’s father. Because of such fact and similarity in their family name, Alfonso became close to
Lolita’s family who regarded him as a member of their family. In 1952, Alfonso frequented the house of
Lolita on the pretext that wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. In 1955, the rumors about their love affair reached the
ears of Lolita’s parents and forbidden Alfonso from going to their house. Their affair continued
nonetheless. In 1957, Alfonso wrote Lolita a note asking her to have a date with him. When Lolita went
to see him, they elope and Lolita never returned home. Lolita’s family sued Alfonso for damages under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: W/N Alfonso is liable to the family of Lolita

HELD: Yes. Alfonso is liable for damages. The circumstances under which Alfonso tried to win Lolita’s
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme or
trickery seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. No other conclusion can be
drawn from the chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The
wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

PETITION GRANTED.
Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. vs. CA

Facts:

The private respondent Christian Alcantara is an employee of Philippine Chamber of Industries. Due to
good performance the petitioner offered him to work at the former’s company but eventually dismissed
to his job at Lirag Textile Mills Inc., because the company has suffered some serious reverses, both in
terms of pecuniary loss and in market opportunities and the respondent suffered from lack of skill. But
upon checking the financial status of the company, the performance of the Lirag Textile was getting
stronger, contrary to its letter to Christian Alcantara. And with regards to lack of skill, there are
documents and letters of appreciation from the company for having a great job.

The latter filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance against his employer for terminating him
without valid causes and for the breach of contract with fraud and deceit. The CFI and Appellate Court
ruled in favor of the respondent with award for damages. The petitioner’s contention is that an
employer’s liability for terminating without just cause the employment of an employee is governed by
the provisions of Republic Act 1052 which justifies his act of termination.

Issue:

Whether or not there was fraud or bad faith on the part of Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. when it committed the
breach of contract.

Held:

Yes. It is clear that petitioner Lirag Textile violated the contract of employment with private respondent
Alcantara when the former terminated his services without valid cause. The act was attended with bad
faith and deceit because said petitioner made false allegations of a supposed valid cause knowing them
to be false, thus making itself liable for payment of damages pursuant to Article 2220.

Felix Lirag also held liable to the private respondent for having induced the latter to leave a permanent
position on his first job and accept the job in Lirag and subsequently dismissed without valid cause. His
responsibility is not only moral but also legal under Article 21 of the Civil code: “Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Gashem vs. CA

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

Facts:

Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian Citizen who is studying here in the Philippines. On the other hand,
Marilou Gonzales is a Filipino Citizen. Sometime in 1987, Baksh courted and proposed to Gonzales for
the purpose of marrying the latter. Thereafter, Baksh and Gonzales went to latter’s parents so as to
obtain their consent. Thus, Baksh and Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a
week before their marriage, their relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and
threatened to kill Gonzales. This ordeal culminated to a confrontation before the Barnagay where Baksh
repudiated their marriage agreement, asked Gonzales to leave and disclosed that he was already
married to another woman. Aggrieved, Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Baksh with the
RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise to marry Gonzales.

Held:

Yes. The Court is of the opinion that where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and the promise was a scheme to entice her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act could justify the damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation.
Sergio Amonoy, petitioner vs. Sps. Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda
GR No. 140420 February 15, 2001

FACTS:
In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda in a partition case. Since Fornilda had no
money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he acquires as a security for the payment of
the attorney’s fees which amounted to P27,600. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A month later, the property
was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute.
Fornilda was, however, unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in
1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses Jose Guitterez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy
questioning the validity of his mortgage agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorney’s
fees he was collecting was unconscionable and that the same was based on the invalid mortgage due to
the existing attorney-client relationship between him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was
executed.

The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the mortgaged property. Amonoy was the
highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure and was able to buy it for
P23,760.

During the pendency of the spouses' appeal, Amonoy was able to secure a demolition order and so on
May 30, 1986, he started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on June 2, 1986, the Supreme
Court (SC) issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the demolition order. On June 4, 1986,
Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. The SC promulgated a decision on June 24, 1989 where it ruled that
the mortgage is void. Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this time, the house of the spouses
was already demolished because it appears that despite the TRO, the demolition continued until in the
middle of 1987.

The spouses sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of Amonoy that he incurred no liability
because he was merely exercising his rights to demolish (pursuant to the demolition order) hence what
happened was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury without loss)

ISSUE:
W/N Amonoy is liable for damages in connection with the continued demolition despite the TRO

HELD:
Yes. What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s right but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation
on all rights that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in the Article 19 must be
observed. When a right exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible.

Clearly then, the demolition of the respondents’ house by petitioner despite the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.
PETITION DENIED.
Allied Banking Corporation vs Lim Sio Wan

Facts:
On September 21, 1983, FCC deposited a money market money placement for two million pesos
with Producers Bank. On November 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied) a money market placement of P1, 152, 597.35 for a term of 31 days. A person claiming to be Lim
Sio Wan called Allied and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money to issue a
manager’s check and to give it to Deborah Dee Santos. After the issuance to Santos, the check was
deposited in the account of FCC at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank) with the forged
signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser as Producer’s Bank payment of its obligation to FCC. Upon the
maturity date of the money market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it but she was
informed that it was pre-terminated upon her instructions which she denied. Lim Sio Wan filed with the
RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of her money. RTC ruled Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan, CA
affirmed and modified by ordering and sentencing Allied to pay 60% and Metrobank 40%. Thus, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was an unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank.

Held:
Yes. There was an unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank. Allied correctly claims in its
petition that Producers Bank should reimburse whatever judgement that may be rendered against it
pursuant of Article 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”

The proceeds if the placement were deposited in Producers Bank’s account in Metrobank
without any justification. There is no reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans’ placement should be
deposited in FCC’s account purportedly as payment for FCC’s money market placement and interest in
Producers Bank. With such payment, Producers Bank’s indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby
beneffitting the former. Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan and they
should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio
Wan.
Petition is partly granted, judgement affirmed with modifications.
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
FACTS:

Violeta Delmo an elected treasurer of an organization named Student Leadership Club of the
west visayas college extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. "the
petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the
petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped
from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the
school.
The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for
reconsideration by the president. The director after due investigation ruled that Violeta Delmo acted in
good faith, in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in accordance to the
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said constitution was presented and approved by
the president. In this regard the office holds and directs that all club members or officers involved in the
case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise they are entitled there
to.The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and even wrote the director for the
reconsideration of his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain student and without honors
and her award as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the receipt
by the president of the decision and after the graduation.

Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses
Delmo and awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral
damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and
P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: No. the court ruled that there is no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should
be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages (under article 27 of the
new civil code) are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or
omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
 Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation
GR No. 195549, 03 September 2014
Peralta, J
Facts:

The herein respondent, Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation focused on

manufacturing and distribution of plastic-made automotive parts, filed a complaint in the RTC against
the herein petitioner, Willaware Products Corporation, a corporation focused on manufacturing and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal. The reason for filing the complaint was
because the former is being prejudiced by the latter when it start engaging in the manufacturing and
distribution of plastic-made automotive parts similar with the respondent. The petitioner started hiring
former employees of the respondent to learn more of their process of production of those copied
products and started selling those to the customers of the respondent. Both the RTC and CA ruled in
favor of the respondent, thus a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the 24 November
2010 Decision and 10 February 2011 Resolution of the CA was filed by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28
of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that in order to qualify the competition as “unfair,” it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or rival, and (2) it must involve acts which
are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to judicial sensibilities,” or otherwise
unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. Both characteristics are present. First, both parties are
competitors or trade rivals engaged in manufacturing of plastic made automotive parts. Second, the acts
of the petitioner were clearly “contrary to good conscience” as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied the products of respondent and event went to the
extent of selling these products to customers of respondent.