Ilusorio vs CA
the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order
FACTS:
Ilusorio was a businessman who was in charge of 20 or so corporations. He was a depositor in
good standing of Manila Banking Corporation. As he was in charge of a big number of
corporations, he was usually out of the country for business. He then entrusted his credit cards,
checkbook, blank checks, passbooks, etc to his secretary, Katherine Eugenio. Eugenio was also in
charge of verifying and reconciling the statements of Ilusorio’s checking account.
Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her personal account checks drawn against Ilusorio’s
account with an aggregate amount of 119K. Ilusorio didn’t bother to check his statement of account
until a business partner informed him that he saw Eugenio using his credit cards. Ilusorio then fired
her and instituted criminal case of Estafa thru falsification against Eugenio. Manila Banking Corp.
also instituted a complaint of estafa against Eugenio based on the affidavit of Dante Razon, an
employee. Razon stated that he personally examined and scrutinized the encashed checks in
accordance with their verification procedures.
Manila Bank sought the expertise of NBI in determining the genuineness of the checks but Ilusorio
failed to submit specimen signatures and thus, NBI could not conduct the examination.
Issue: W/N Manila Bank is liable for damages for failing to detect a forged check
Held:
No. To be entitled to damages, Ilusorio has the burden of poving that the bank was negligent in
failing to detect the discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. Ilusorio had to establish the fact of
forgery which he failed to do by failing to submit his specimen signatures for NBI to conclusively
establish forgery.
Furthermore, the Bank was not negligent in verifying the checks as they verified the drawer’s
signatures against their specimen signatures and in doubt, referred to more experienced verifier for
further verification.
On the contrary, it was Ilusorio who was found to be negligent. He accorded his secretary with an
unusual degree of trust and unrestricted access to his finances. Furthermore, despite the fact that
the bank was regularly sending statements of account, he failed to check them until he found out
that his secretary was using his credit cards.
Sec. 23 of the Negotiable Instruments law provides that a forged check is inoperative, meaning
there was no right to enforce payment against any party. But it also provides an exception: “unless
the party against whom it is sought enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or
want of authority”. This case falls under the exception since Ilusorio is precluded from setting up
forgery due to his own negligence considering that he allowed his secretary access to his credit
cards, checkbook, and allowed his secretary to verify his statements of account.
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their
rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963,
Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could
also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued
contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in
Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality
should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is
found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, e.g.
or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of
police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in
the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic,
pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Lozano vs. v. Martinez
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC
Manila declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the
law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it
impairs freedom of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa
was not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only
punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous obligations but
not pre-existing obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the
state because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The “debt”
contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to
prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely
why the mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by
Congress. It is a valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following
acts:
…any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
And
…any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a huge
problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and
confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings.
If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly
diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community. Thus, the Congress, through their exercise of police power, declared that the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation on ex
delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order.
Tiro v. Hontanosas
FACTS:
Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the former’s
collection of salary checks of school teacher from division office, following the issuance of Circular
No. 21 s. 1969 by the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special
powers of attorney and to declare Circular No. 21 as illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of Zafra.
Tiro sought a petition for review and reversal of trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-impairment clause
under the Constitution.
HELD:
No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition is granted.
RATIO:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him
before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government.
Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot
assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal
footing.
Ganzon v. Inserto
May the respondent court order that a mortgage on real property be substituted by a surety bond
and direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated on the Torrens Title since
the surety bond already secures the obligation earlier secured by the cancelled mortgage?
The petitioner comes to us stating that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of its jurisdiction in so ruling.
On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a
real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage executed on March 19, 1979 (Annex "A", Petition) between Randolph Tajanlangit and
Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other
hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to
P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
That whereas, the MORTGAGORS are justly indebted to the MORTGAGEE in the amount of
FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by their promissory
note for said sum, in the words and figures as follows:
P40,000.00 Iloilo City
March 19, 1979
For value received, we promise to pay RODOLFO T. GANZON, or order, at his residence in Molo,
Iloilo City, the sum of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, in two (2)
installments as follows: P20,000.00 on or before 25 May 1979; and P20,000.00 on or before 25
August 1979. This note shall not draw interest. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 15)
The mortgage covered a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1- F of the subdivision
plan Psd-274802, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-50324.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo served
personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on the private respondents. Lira also caused the
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Iloilo of a Notice of
Extra Judicial Sale of Mortgaged Property, setting the sale at public auction of the mortgaged
property at 10:00 a.m. on September 28, 1979, at his office at the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City.
On September 27, 1979, a day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a
civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against
the petitioners with the respondent court. The action, docketed as CFI Case No. 13053, sought to
declare the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith
null and void. The private respondents asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioners from proceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the
urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the
provincial sheriff from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979.
On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. For purposes of the
instant petition, the pertinent allegations in the amended complaint are the following: (1) On August
25, 1978, defendant, now petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel
of land in favor of plaintiff, now respondent Esteban Tajanlangit. The parcel of land, subject of the
sale is described as Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo located at Molo, Iloilo City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579 with an area of 24,442 square meters, more
or less; (2) The deed of real estate mortgage which is the subject of the extra-judicial proceedings
initiated by defendant Rodolfo Ganzon executed by plaintiffs Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph
Tajanlangit in his favor was for the purpose of securing the payment of P40,000.00 which formed
part of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900; (3) Incorporated in the aforesaid deed of absolute sale
was a proviso to the effect that vendor-defendant Rodolfo Ganzon guaranteed to have the
occupants of the lot to vacate the premises within 120 days after the execution thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above- mentioned parcel of land
and that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at the execution of this deed shall
vacate the premises within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days computed from the date of
the execution of this document.
(4) The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot
up to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is
illegal since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate
mortgage does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged property.
On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint. They admitted the
veracity of the deed of absolute sale covering said Lot No. 1900 but denied that the real estate
mortgage covering Lot No. 1901 subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was executed
by Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon to secure the
payment of the balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. They maintained that the real estate
mortgage was an entirely different transaction between the Tajanlangits and Ganzon from the sale
of Lot No. 1900 embodied in the absolute deed of sale of realty. They further maintained that the
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings would be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
said mortgage.
After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For
Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to
which the petitioners interposed an Opposition.
In an order dated November 20, 1980, the respondent court granted the respondents' motion. The
order states:
This is a Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to Accept Bond or
Cash in Lieu Thereof.
It appears that defendant sold to Esteban Tajanlangit, Jr. Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of
Iloilo under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579. The document of sale provides that the
vendee who is the defendant herein, promised to exclude from the premises the occupants. To
secure the unpaid balance of P40,000.00, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage on their Lot
No. 1901-4-61-B-1-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-274802. Because defendant failed to clear the
occupants of Lot No. 1900, as provided for in the contract of sale, plaintiffs withheld payment of the
P40,000.00. To clear the title of Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-1 plaintiffs are willing to submit a bond in
the sum of P80,000.00 which is double the consideration of the mortgage.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, considering that plaintiffs are willing and able to pay the
P40,000.00 and considering further that defendant has not yet cleared the premises he sold to
plaintiffs of tenants, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered to cancel the mortgage lien on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324, upon showing by the plaintiffs that they have put up the
surety bond in the sum of P80,000.00. " (Annex "F", Rollo, p. 58)
On January 28, 1981, the respondents after receipt of the aforesaid order, put up a surety bond in
the amount of P80,000.00 with the Summa Insurance Corporation as surety (Annex " G ") for the
approval of the respondent court,
On February 14, 1981, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of The Order
Dated November 20, 1980, And Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond.
The respondent court in its order dated February 24, 1981, denied the aforesaid motion. The order
states:
Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond well taken and
considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not question the validity of the surety bond
itself but is anchored upon grounds that had already been passed upon by this Court in the order
dated November 20, 1980, the surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa
Insurance Corporation is hereby approved.
The defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon, through Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, Jr., is hereby ordered to
surrender to the plaintiffs, through Atty. Hannibal de los Reyes the owner's copy of TCT No. 50324,
so that the mortgage annotated therein in favor of defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon could be duly
cancelled. (Annex "I", Rollo, p. 65).
Hence, the instant petition.
On March 18, 198 1, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch I at Iloilo City.
On July 8, 1981, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
As stated earlier, the issue raised before us is whether or not the trial court may order the
cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of
a promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same
court to secure the payment of the promissory note.
In issuing its November 20, 1980 order, the trial court before trial on the merits of the case
assumed that the real estate mortgage subject of the extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings was
indeed a security for the payment of a P40,000.00 promissory note which answered for the balance
of the purchase price of the sale between Ganzon as vendor and Esteban Tajanlangit was vendee
of Lot No. 1900. With this assumption, the trial court concluded that Rodolfo Ganzon violated his
warranty that he would clear the parcel of land of its occupants within 120 days after the execution
of the deed of absolute sale of realty. On this premise and upon motion of the private respondents,
the court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated in the Transfer
Certificate of Title covering the mortgaged parcel of land and to substitute therein a surety bond
approved by the trial court.
It must be noted that petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon vehemently denied the allegation that the P
40,000.00, consideration of the promissory note which resulted in the execution of the real estate
mortgage to secure its payment was a balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. As earlier
stated, Ganzon maintained in his Answer that the real estate mortgage arose from a different
transaction. At the pre-trial, what the parties admitted were the existence and due execution of the
documents, including the absolute deed of sale of realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In
connection with the documents, the issues per the pre-trial order were "... whether or not the
documents express the true intention of the parties, and whether or not they complied with the
provisions of the document. (Rollo, p. 78) Hence, at that stage of the case, the trial court's order
dated November 20, 1980 had no factual basis.
Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were justified
by evidence in the records the same would still not be proper.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same
consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract."
(Banco de Oro v. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation v. Lichauco, 46 Phil.
460). On the effects of a mortgage we ruled in Philippine National Bank v. Mallorca (21 SCRA
694):
xxx xxx xxx
... By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.) a
'mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or
transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge
and respect the encumbrance to which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal
of the creditor 'in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his
credit therefrom.' (Bischoff vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690, 700) For, a recorded real estate is a right in
rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. (Altavas, The Law of Mortgages in the
Philippine Islands, 1924 ed., p. 2) Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the
mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a
debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of
the mortgagee. (Id., at p. 6) So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property
mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to
them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows
the property. (Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1961 ed., p. 225; emphasis supplied.
See also V. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1962 ed., p. 477)
Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted
on Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as
ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable
from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage
with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This
conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage
contract.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under
the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the
P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even
before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation
from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated November 20, 1980
and February 24, 1981 of the trial court are SET ASIDE. Our March 18, 1981 Temporary
Restraining Order is made PERMANENT. No costs.
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa
thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his
alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry
of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury
and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA
checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the
government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for
municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused
in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto
law.
Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as
among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office
during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a
judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does
not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public
funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended
from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan,
FACTS:
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial document committed in connivance with his other co-
accused, all public officials, in several cases. The informations were filed respectively on February
21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion
to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such
motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No.
1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post
facto clauses of the Constituiton, thus decraling it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be
adjudged. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful
scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as
applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been
heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law.” This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1606.
Petition dismissed. No costs.
Pp v. Ferrer
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against
thefollowing: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP)aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band
and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of
the NPA,inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
AggravatingCircumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that
1.) The Congressusurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CPPwithout any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt bybeing members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.The Anti Subversive
Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Partybeing
although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not
onlyby force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that
the CPP is aclear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that
affiliation with fullknowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due
investigation by adesignated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of
information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides
for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.(2) Whether or Not RA1700
violates freedom of expression.
Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.)
thestatute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex
postfacto law.)In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP
but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is
on the conduct not person.Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown
that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts.
This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required
proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful
acts.Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is
given anopportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8.
The statuteapplies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made.The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Governmentshould not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act.
The EXISTENCEOF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exe
rcise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in
the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the
following elements must also be established:1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must
be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines
and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of
the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan
The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners’ motion to
quash the second amended information,[1] denying the motion to defer arraignment,[2] and
entering a plea of “not guilty” for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead to the information,[3] are
assailed in the present petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have
been going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan,
and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay
Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done
under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein
petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto
Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some
were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the
custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound
demanding the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to
salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the
approval of the CENRO, it was denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner,
Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor
Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the
same without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor
Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound accompanied by two fully
armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber
to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints
for robbery[4] and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829[5] (DECREE PENALIZING
OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS)
against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution[6] of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the
filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829,[7] and the
forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further
proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being
work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review
Action[8] of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information[9] for violation of Section
1(b) P.D. 1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 25065.
A warrant of arrest[10] was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before
the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and
posted a cash bond on January 4, 1999,[11] as did Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29,
1999.[12]
On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment,[13] they having filed on even
date a Motion to Quash[14]. By Order[15] of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the
arraignment to February 26, 1999.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to defer the
arraignment as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the
Ombudsman. Without objection from petitioners’ counsel, the arraignment was reset[16] to April 8,
1999.
In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition[17] to petitioners’
Motion to Quash.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information[18] which was filed
by the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Order[19] of April 8, 1999.
Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash[20] the amended information, to which motion
the special prosecutor filed a comment/opposition[21] on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated
filing thereof was due to the transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its
new office at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit
Amended Information[22] which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled
hearing on November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled and reset[23] to December 3, 1999 upon
urgent motion by petitioners’ counsel upon the ground that on said date, he needed to appear
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.
By Order[24] of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended
information, denied the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of
petitioners on January 17, 2000.
On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss[25] the second amended
information.
During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in
open court the assailed separate orders denying petitioners’ motion to quash the second amended
information,[26] denying the motion to defer arraignment,[27] and entering a plea of “not guilty” for
both accused[28] herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for
almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as
accused to due process,[29] they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[30] They add that the repeated
and ex-parte amendment of the information by the Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in
bringing the case to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in
relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).[31]
Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations
against them, one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the
Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject
matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised
Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and
necessarily places both of them in “double danger of conviction and punishment for the same
offense.”[32]
Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are
not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but
are mere executive officials of their respective local government units with entirely different official
functions and, as such, the accusation against them is not in relation to their office.[33] Petitioners
thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as
Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and
penalized in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.[34]
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[35] cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present
case. The cases against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to
dismiss them in light of the following observations: political motivation played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant departure from established
procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the record.[36]
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took
only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution
finding probable cause against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months
to review the case and come up with the joint review action on October 19, 1998. On the other
hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months. Considering that the
records were passed upon by three offices, the period of preliminary investigation, which did not
exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed
rights to procedural due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37] instructs:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when the
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that maybe
considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[38]
Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
themselves contributed to the delay, thus:
With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally getting
the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a certain extent,
the claim is valid although the delay is caused not unreasonably but because of the exercise of the
right of the accused to determine whether or not they could be charged under the Information for
which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor
the grounds for setting aside the amended Information as it now stands.[39] (Underscoring
supplied)
The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay.[40]
In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7[41] and 13[42] of R.A.
8493, averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the
dismissal of the case, they having been arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and
repeated amendments of the information.
The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners’ continuous filing of motions that
the arraignment was deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the
pendency of petitioners’ motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and
pre-trial) provided under Section 2 of said law.
Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused
pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to
quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause justifying suspension of arraignment shall be
excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated
amendments of the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be
amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time before an accused enters his
plea.[43]
In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed
forum shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional
Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum
Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was
also filed before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the
Office of the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, “since the
Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988,
while the information before the regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then,
if there is any case to be dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one before the
Regional trial Court, as it was the second action filed.”[44]
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were
indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for
instead of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D.
1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that they are not tasked
with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 – the offense subject of the investigation
which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners’ argument
that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as
long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989,[45] the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees in relation to their office.[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of “Grade 27” under the Local Government Code
of 1991[47], committed the offense charged in relation to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario[48], this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not
accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office.[49]
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,[50] held that although public office is
not an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal
motive to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office,[51] the accused is held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in
relation” to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,[52] held that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person,
whether a public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner,
who was a member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of
trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioner’s case squarely within the meaning of
an “offense committed in relation to the [accused’s] public office.”[53]
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may
not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to
exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces[54], used her
influence, authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to
haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits[55] signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the
letter of petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:
To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan and
PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;
PNP Members of Taytay
Municipal Police Office,
Taytay Palawan
Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion Taytay,
Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul the flitches ipil lumber
intended for the projects of the Municipal Government of Taytay and to turn over to the DENR
office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict compliance. [56]
Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution[57] of
the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the
Joint Review Action[58] of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the information[59]. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as
municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the
municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested
jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section 1(b),
Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:
“That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EVELYN
VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public officers, being the Municipal
Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of the same municipality, respectively, committing
the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of the same, confederating and
conspiring with each other enter the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio
Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while inside with force, intimidation and against the will of
the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully, feloniously,
unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted dimensions of
ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN,
PNP-TINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for
safekeeping while waiting for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and
brought the same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the
primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in the
investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended.[60] (Italics supplied)
There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order
of January 17, 2000, denying petitioners’ motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of
not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any
grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Katigbak v. Solicitor General
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since
the central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2 As posed by the referral
resolution, 3 the question is whether or not said statute.
...en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor del Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente adquiridas
por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes de la aprobacion de la ley ... es nula y anti-
constitutional porque:
(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una propiedad privada
adquirida antes de la aprobacion de la ley y obliga el funcionario o empleado publico a explicar
como adquirio sus propiedades privadas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a si mismo, y
en cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad sin debido proceso de la ley; y
(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente hipotecados de buena fe a
una persona.
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a
complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2)
said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired
before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against
Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when
he was out of the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI
officers and the Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the
forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him
illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak
was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau
of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife
and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and
the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080,
ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in
1953,1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor"
during the preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379
did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all,
Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379 is not
penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of
property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things acquired through delicts,
prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may not be deemed to
have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. 10 The
Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a new trial
but modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ... to
P80,000.00." 11
Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as
earlier stated, was certified to this Court.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern
mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of
said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial
Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and
categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities,
the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a
penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are
deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the
obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable thereto. 15 The doctrine was
reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling of the
Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the validity and
enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of said law
cannot be given retro active effect."
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty;
and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or,
"assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by
R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of
the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is
precisely what has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their
acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the
enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.
As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made
answerable for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an
arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any
intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial
court further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19,
24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation
was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that he
was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's factual conclusion
that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and
consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this
Court absent any showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of
property by the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien
thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
US v. Lovett
was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that Congress may not forbid the
payment of a salary to a specific individual, as it would constitute an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.
In February 1943, the Democratic chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee,
Martin Dies, gave a speech at the floor on the House of Representatives accusing 39 unspecified
government employees of "subversive" activities. An amendment was proposed to defund the
salaries of the 39 people whom Dies had "indicted". After some debate, the matter was referred to
a special subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, which held secret hearings chaired by
John H. Kerr. The subcommittee created a definition of "subversive" activity and decided that
Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr. and Robert Morss Lovett were guilty of such activity.
Despite attempted interventions by many supporters, including noted federal judge Learned Hand
(a friend of Lovett's) and Lovett's superior, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, the
subcommittee recommended that Lovett be removed from office.[1][2]
Kerr proposed as part of the appropriations bill a section denying the payment of a salary to
Watson, Dodd, and Lovett. Although divisive, his measure passed the House. The Senate
Appropriations Committee and the full Senate unanimously and repeatedly rejected the measure.
However, the House made it clear that they would not approve an appropriations bill without the
provision and after five conference reports, the Senate finally acceded and passed a version of the
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 that included Kerr's provision. President Roosevelt
signed the bill while simultaneously declaring his belief that Kerr's provision was
unconstitutional.[1][2]
The provision mandated that the three would not receive payment for any work performed after
November 15, 1943. Nonetheless, all three continued to work for some time after that date and
filed for back pay with the Court of Claims. The three were victorious before the Court of Claims,
and the government appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard the cases in a consolidated
argument in 1946.[1] The Court heard the case as a seven-member panel, with Justice Jackson
recused and Chief Justice Stone having died a month before oral arguments.
The Court, in a decision authored by Justice Hugo Black, ruled unanimously to uphold the decision
of the Court of Claims, finding that Kerr's provision was an unconstitutional "bill of pains and
penalties" (forbidden under the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article One of the Constitution).[2] Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, concurred in the result. However, he took issue with the
Court's characterization of the provision as a bill of attainder and, citing the principle of
constitutional avoidance, avoided ruling the provision unconstitutional by concluding that while
Kerr's provision "prevented the ordinary disbursal of money to pay respondents' salaries", "[it] did
not cut off the obligation of the Government to pay for services rendered".[3] To define what a bill
of attainder was for purpose of American law, the Court looked back to Cummings v. Missouri
(1867) and Ex Parte Garland (1866). Lovett was the first time since the Reconstruction era that the
Supreme Court reexamined its Bill of Attainder jurisprudence, although state and lower federal
courts had confronted the issue at various points since.[4]
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Republican-controlled House Appropriations
Committee refused to allocate the $2,158 (about $29,411 today) to return the back salary to the
three men. However, the full House of Representatives narrowly voted to appropriate the funds and
the three men received their money.[5][6] However, in the same budget in which the entire House
authorized the back pay for the three men, it again tried to deny funding for the salary of Edgar
Warren, the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service;[7] on this issue, Senator
William F. Knowland refused to budge on the issue and the House eventually agreed to fund
Warren's salary (although he resigned after the appropriation was passed).[8]
Garner v. Board of Public Works
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), is a ruling by the United States Supreme
Court which held that a municipal loyalty oath which required an oath and affidavit about one's
beliefs and actions for the previous five years and which was enacted more than five years
previous is not an ex post facto law nor a bill of attainder.
Background:
In 1941, the California State Legislature amended the charter of the city of Los Angeles so that no
person could obtain or retain public employment with the city if they advocated the violent
overthrow of either the state or federal government, belonged to any organization that did so
advocate, or had advocated or been a member of an organization which advocated such action in
the last five years. In 1948, the city of Los Angeles passed local ordinance No, 94,004, which
required all employees to take the loyalty oath.
Fifteen employees with the Los Angeles Board of Public Works refused to execute the required
affidavit. At an administrative hearing on January 6, 1949, all 15 individuals were fired. They sued
for back pay and reinstatement in their jobs, claiming that the oath and the affidavit they were
required to execute constituted a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. The District Court of
Appeals denied relief.
The petitioners then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Decision:
Majority opinion:
Associate Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the opinion for the majority.
Clark discussed the oath and the affidavit separately. In three sentences, Clark held that since past
actions and beliefs may impugn present fitness for duty, the affidavit was justified.[1] The question
for the oath (which reached back five years into the past) was its constitutionality, and here Clark
relied heavily on United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), to answer that the oath
was valid.[2] Since the charter change had occurred seven years before, and the oath reached
back only five years, the oath was also not a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.[3] Clark
distinguished United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), which was not a general law
establishing qualifications for office but which specifically named certain individuals and required
their separation from government service.[4]
Petitioners had argued that the charter amendment required scienter (knowledge that the
organizations they belonged to did, in fact, advocate the violent overthrow of the government or a
communist political philosophy). Clark assumed that the city would not implement the law in such a
way as to punish those individuals who lacked scienter, and assumed that scienter was implicit in
the ordinance.[4]
The decision of the District Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Frankfurter's dissent
Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part.
Frankfurter noted in his dissent that the majority had repeatedly referred to public employment as a
privilege, which to his mind invoked the "doctrine of privilege."[5] Invoking this doctrine, he
concluded "does not meet the problem."[6]
But Frankfurter was unable to agree that the Los Angeles ordinanace implied scientier. He wrote:
"To find scienter implied in a criminal statute is the obvious way of reading such a statute, for guilty
knowledge is the normal ingredient of criminal responsibility. The ordinance before us exacts an
oath as a condition of employment; it does not define a crime. It is certainly not open to this Court
to rewrite the oath required by Los Angeles of its employees..."[7] The lack of an explicit
requirement for scienter in the law, he concluded, asked the employees "to swear to something
they cannot be expected to know. Such a demand ... can no more be justified than the inquiry into
belief which [was] invalid in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950)."[8]
Frankfurter would have remanded the case back to the state court with instructions that the
petitioners be allowed to take the oath under the scienter requirement imposed by the Court.
Burton's dissent
Associate Justice Harold Hitz Burton dissented in part. Under the Court's decisions in United
States v. Lovett, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277
(1867), Burton concluded, the oath as currently framed was an ex post facto law and a bill of
attainder.[9] However, Burton would have affirmed the lower court concerning the judgment
regarding the two employees who had refused to sign the affidavit. The affidavit merely
represented an assertion of true facts, Burton said, and as such could be required of the
employees.[10]
Douglas' dissent
Associate Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Associate Justice Hugo Black.
Douglas concluded that the entire case was governed by the decisions in Ex parte Garland and
Cummings v. Missouri.[11] A bill of attainder as defined in these cases inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial, and may be inflicted against an individual or a class (contrary to the majority's
conclusion that it applies only to an individual).[12] That Garland and Cummings involved
professionals rather than laborers and that Garland and Cummings involved vague accusations of
misconduct rather than the single specific accusation in Garner was irrelevant, Douglas said.[13]
Since the Los Angeles ordinance permitted no hearing, it was a bill of attainder and not
constitutionally valid.[14]
Douglas did not reach the issue of whether the ordinance was an ex post facto law.[15]
Black's dissent
Justice Black further dissented from the majority by making two additional points. First, he argued
that the majority mischaracterized the decision in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors. The Maryland
law in Gerende was limited to actual acts of violence or overthrow, while the Los Angeles
ordinance was not.[16] Second, Black believed that the majority's decision in Garner significantly
weakened the Court's holdings in Ex parte Garland, Cummings v. Missouri, and United States v.
Lovett.[17]
Sura v. Martin
Facts:
Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son and
to provide support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court
affirmed said decision. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The Sheriff's
return of service stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and
in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property;
he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For failure to satisfy
the writ of execution, plaintiff's counsel prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty of contempt of
court. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Martin.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for failure to
satisfy the decision requiring him to support his natural son due to insolvency were violative of his
constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.
2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to be considered
indirect contempt.
Held:
1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his
arrest and imprisonment for failure to satisfy the judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment for
debt in violation of the Constitution.
2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a
judgment to pay past and future support are illegal because such judgment is a final disposition of
the case and is declaratory of the rights or obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt refers to a
special judgment which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as that which
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real or
personal property which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings.
Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other proper officer"
to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment
debtor. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to
whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment
debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ. (Sura vs.
Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)
US v. Cara
FACTS:
The defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered in this case by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, on October 19, 1916, in which he was found guilty, as
principal by direct participation of the crime of
estafa , defined in paragraph 1 of article 535 and punished in paragraph 2 of article 534 of the
Penal Code. No modifying circumstance being present he was sentenced to suffer four months and
one day of arresto mayor , with the accessory penalties of article 61 of the same code, to return to
the aggrieved party Juana Juan P327 and 60 cavans of rice(palay) , that is, the sum of P477, or, in
case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed one-third of
the principal penalty, and to pay the costs. The complaint set forth that, on May 7, 1912, in the
municipality of Santo Domingo of the Province of Nueva Ecija, the defendant fraudulently and by
means of the pretense, statement, and representation that he was the owner of, and possessed, a
certain tract of rice land, situated in said municipality, of 10 hectares in area, the metes and
bounds of which are mentioned in the complaint, did induce one Juana Juan to believe in said false
pretense, statement, and representation, for in fact he knew that he was not the owner of, and did
not possess said land, and to buy from him, as in fact she did, said land for the sum or P327,
Philippine currency, and 60 cavanes of rice(palay) which were paid by the said Juana Juan to the
defendant, who received the said sum and appropriated it to himself to the injury and prejudice of
said Juana Juan.
ISSUE:
WETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF NON-IMPRISONMENT OF DEBT
WAS VIOLATED.
RULING:
The penalty of arresto mayor
imposed upon the defendant in the judgment appealed from, was not imposed upon him because
he owed any sum to Juana Juan, but because he defrauded her in the manner above-mentioned,
and such fraud constitutes the crime of estafa defined in paragraph 1 of article 535 and punished in
paragraph 2 of article 534 of the Penal Code, as was held in the judgment of the court below. It is
true that as a result of the criminal liability incurred by the defendant, he was ordered to return to
Juana Juan the amount which she suffered by reason of the estafa , or, in case of his insolvency,
to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, under the provisions of article 50 of said
code: but it cannot be maintained that the trial court thereby violated the constitutional provision
invoked by the defense, which prescribes that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. In the
judgment appealed from the defendant was found guilty of the crime of estafa , not because Juana
Juan could not get possession of the land that he had offered as security for the payment of his
debt
— that the first subdivision of section 4596 is in violation of the thirteenth amendment, in that it
as incorrectly stated in the second assignment of error by the defense, for, as already stated, there
was no such debt or any security for it
— The record was somewhat meager, but it sufficiently appeared that the petitioners had shipped on
but because, according to the facts proven at the trial, the defendant pretended to be the owner
and possessor of the land described in the deed Exhibit A, when in fact such land did not exist,
deceived said Juana Juan in order to obtain from her ht P327 and the 6 cavanes of rice which were
delivered to him by her, and to her prejudice, appropriated to himself said money and rice. These
acts defined in paragraph 1 of article 535 of the Penal Code, and punished in paragraph 2 of article
534 of the same code, constitute the crime of estafa , as the court below so held. The later,
therefore, did not err in not acquitting the defendant and, in imposing upon him instead, the penalty
corresponding to said crime in the medium degree, since it was not found that its commission was
attended by any circumstance modifying criminal liability. For the foregoing reasons we affirm the
judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Pp v. Soza
FACTS:Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violationof
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. Itis alleged that these
two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the ageof twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year,
even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear
before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not register up to
the date of the filing of the information.Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa
is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a
father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First
Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
ISSUE:WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutionalby
virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:SEC.
2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
HELD:YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary,
in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make thisduty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that aperson may
be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army of hiscountry, and risk the chance
of being shot down in its defense.What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the
State, whetheractual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
Thecircumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to present themselves
before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to
these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
Robertson v. Baldwin
This was an appeal from a judgment of the district court for the Northern district of California,
rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the petition of Robert
Robertson, P. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson.
The petition set forth, in substance, that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of their liberty by
Barry Baldwin, marshal for the Northern district of California, in the county jail of Alameda county,
by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a United State commissioner, committing them for
trial upon a charge of disobedience of the lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine
Arago; that such commitment was made without reasonable or probable cause, in this: that at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioners were held on board the Arago against
their will and by force, having been theretofore placed on board said vessel by the marshal for the
district of Oregon, under the provisions of Rev. St § 4596, subd. 1, and Id. §§ 4598, 4599, the
master claiming the right to hold petitioners by virtue of these acts; that sections 4598 and 4599
are unconstitutional, and in violation of section 1 of article 3, and of the fifth amendment to the
constitution; that section 4598 was also repealed by congress on June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. 262); and
compels involuntary servitude.
board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton, in the state of Washington, thence to
Valparaiso, and thence to such other foreign ports as the master might direct, and return to a port
of discharge in the United States; that they had each signed shipping articles to perform the duties
of seamen during the course of the voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they
left the vessel at Astoria, in the state of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the
provisions of Rev. St. §§ 4596-4599, taken before a justice of the peace, and by him committed to
jail until the Arago was ready for sea (some 16 days), when they were taken from the jail by the
marshal, and placed on board the Arago against their will; that they refused to 'turn to,' in
obedience to the orders of the master, were arrested at San Francisco, charged with refusing to
work, in violation of Rev. St. § 4596, were subsequently examined before a commissioner of the
circuit court, and by him held to answer such charge before the district court for the Northern
district of California.
Shortly thereafter they sued out this writ of habeas corpus, which, upon a hearing before the district
court, was dismissed, and an order made remanding the prisoners to the custody of the marshal.
Whereupon petitioners appealed to this court.
J. H. Ralston, for appellants.
Sol. Gen. Conrad, for appellee.
Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the
court.
US v. Pompeya
FACTS:
A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of Act No.
1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the
president, to assist in themaintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending
ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons inthe locality. The
amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who
refuse to render the same.
• impose the punishment provided for by law, becauseit does not show (a) that the defendant was a
A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with
violation of the said ordinance for failing to renderservice on patrol duty required under the same
• municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.
defendant argued that the municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it
is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, whichguarantees the liberty of the citizens
ISSUE:
whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based is constitutional.
HELD: Yes
•
The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power
of the state and the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the
municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are
constitutional andnot in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby
→ continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties, and that a temporary solution,
Police power has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and
cannot be limited.
Thepower vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the
state and its subjects. The power togovern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protectionof all property within the state.
The authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may
beconducive to the public interest.
→ against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a series of conferences held
Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws, defines police power as "the
defenses, regulations, anddomestic order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like
members of a well-governed family, are bound to conformtheir general behaviour to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, andinoffensive in
their respective stations."
→
The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by
which the state seeks not onlyto preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state,
but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rulesof good manners and
good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterruptedenjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the
rights of others. The police power of the state includesnot only the public health and safety, but
also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best best
interest.It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining
it, but decide each specific case on its merits
•
It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon persons,
imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) Theperson called upon to render such services
must be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18
and 55[50], and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons
→
It will not contended that a nonresident of the municipality would be liable for his refusal to obey the
call of the president; neither can it belogically contended that one under the age of 18 or over the
age of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey thecommand of the
president. Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be called upon
at the mere whim orcaprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at
least sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before thepresident can call upon the the persons
for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all persons. The law does not
applyto every condition. The law applies to special persons and special conditions
→
A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must
show that the person charged belongs to theclass of persons to which the law is applicable
•
Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to
male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under
18years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the
Kaisahna ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas"
prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its
resolution of July 11, 1947 (Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main case (case No. 31-V
of the Court of Industrial Relations) declared a strike on September 10, 1946, "which suspended all
the work in the respondent company"; that on September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had
been brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed the parties that the
satisfactory to both parties, must be found to put an end to it, at the same time, urging both parties
to be reasonable in their attitude towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both
parties to iron out their differences until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the
conference at which, among other things, the leader of the laborers informed the court that,
although said laborers were not exactly satisfied with the arrangement, in order to cooperate with
the court and with the parties so that the laborers could return to work and the company resume its
operation, they had no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal, as
on September 23, 1946, the date of the order now under consideration, the labor leader decided to
accept a temporary arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00
over-all increase without meal to all striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union,
manifested that he would have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in view of their desire to
preserve that harmony which used to exist between the parties, they were going to accede to this
proposition, provided that the management would permit the laborers to bring with them home, if
available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated in an
agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at
7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company would resume its operation on said date
under the following conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase of P2.00 daily, without
meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;
(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces
of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return of the workingmen to
work until the final determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable and advantageous
to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking laborers of the respondent company to
return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the
respondent company to resume its operation and admit the striking laborers. The respondent
company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any laborer affiliated with the petitioning
union, nor suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not
to stage a walk-out or strike during the pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco
Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the petitioning
union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case
"in violation of the order of this court dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other things, that a representative
of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding certain discriminations obtaining in the
respondent's saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances said respondent in a haughty
and arbitrary manner ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and
there stop working; and in the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held for
contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the
main case, without express authority of the court and in violation of section 19 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited in the said order of March 28, 1947, that on that same
date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed with the court another urgent motion for contempt against
the petitioning union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's saw mill and for grave
threats which prevented the remaining laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence pertinent to the
incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and the court
stated therein the three questions to be determined as follows: first, if there was a violation by the
petitioning union of the order of said court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and circumstances attending
the picketing constitute contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the respondent of
section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking four Chinese laborers
pending the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the dismissal of
Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23, 1946, by the petitioning
union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court, to take such action as
may be warranted in the premises against the person or persons responsible therefor for contempt:
(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the strike which had been
found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent having violated
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was thereby exonerated from
any liability in connection with the alleged employment of four Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work among his fellow
laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main case was thereby
denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting
in banc, and denied reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as requested by the petitioning
union's contention is recited that the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended, upon which order of September 23, 1946, was based, had not been complied with; in
other words, that the said order was not issued in conformity with the requisites of said section,
because, it was said, before its issuance there had been no proper hearing and there was and
there was no express finding by the court that public interest required the return of the striking
workers. The further contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of September 23,
1946, was issued in conformity with said section 19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in
violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing upon these contentions, the
Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the provisions of section 19. Said
order was proposed and issued on the basis of the agreement entered into by the parties after the
preliminary hearings and conferences. While it is true that the order of the Court now in question
did not make any express finding as to whether public interest required the return of the striking
workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the numerous incidents arising therefrom since the
certification of the dispute promptly, need not be stated in the said order because it is a fact which
is borne out by the entire record of the case. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the
order, it could have objected right then and there and could have appealed said order within the
period prescribed by law, and nor to wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive. The
record shows that the petitioner in its answer answer and counter-petition for contempt based its
complaint upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V [4]). It is, indeed, strange that after taking
advantage of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the petitioner now comes
to impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for reconsideration is the sad instance
where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order under which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section is presumed to be
constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals
were "subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power".
The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the concern of
the State to promote social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people.
In order to attain this object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to
capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the
Court to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it by
the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and "other
plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions matters, controversies
or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees", "to prevent non-pacific
methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes" (International HardWood and
Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao
Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been
upheld in the case aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to execute its orders under
section 19 is also the same power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially
follows that section 19 is likewise valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union,
G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra, this Court said:
In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of Industrial
Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power to execute its
decision thereon. The absurdity of this proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19
is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of the law, if
follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power that it
possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order such as those now under
consideration as for contempt of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is
constitutional. It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment said law went into effect, voluntarily
accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or
laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or
laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and
when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or
when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.)
The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has a free
choice between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of September
23, 1946, was issued after a series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied
that these were "hearings" within the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the law. The
record certainly reveals that what was done during and what resulted from said preliminary
hearings or conferences were reported to the court at a formal hearing. As to public interest
requiring that the court enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from the
legal presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied with the provisions of the law in
this respect, we think that, considering the universally known fact, of which this Court takes judicial
notice, that as a result of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social
rehabilitation of the country urgently demands the reconstruction work will inevitably tend to
paralyze, impede or slow down the country's program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and
natural reasons, the government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. And that order
was made after hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for
an order of the court fro the return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other cases,
"when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The provision says: "...
and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order
of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the
dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, (emphasis supplied). In other words
the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued "only after
hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion the dispute can not be
promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we construe
the provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute
confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason that the public has an interest in
preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the
court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact
which was borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need express statement in the
order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial
Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559,
section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th
Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the
constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become
necessary to decide it.
For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations assailed
by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree with the pronouncement
depriving the Supreme Court the power to revise findings of facts made by the Court of Industrial
Relations.
We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is violative of the spirit
and purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of revision granted by the Supreme Court
should not be limited so as to deny relief to any party that may foundedly feel aggrieved by any
substantial finding of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations center on disputed facts, such
as reasonable salaries, reasonable working conditions, periods of rest, reasons for strikes or
lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer and employees, etc. The aggrieved party
must not be denied his day in court in the highest tribunal.
Validity of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on constitutional grounds, upon
the allegation that it is tantamount to authorizing involuntary servitude. We cannot agree with the
proposition. Under said section, the question of involuntary work is not involved, but only the
workability of the settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 103. When
workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial Relations to seek remedy under
Commonwealth Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in their employment were
and are agreeable to their conscience and dignity and, as a matter of fact, they claim the right to
continue performing the same work. Otherwise they would not have resorted to strike, a means
resorted to, to compel the employer and let them continue working, but on conditions more
agreeable to the workers. If the strikers should feel that their work is in the nature of involuntary
servitude, they would not resort to a strike nor recur to the Court of Industrial Relations, but will
simply resign and seek some other employment.
When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of Industrial Relations, the
court may impose such reasonable conditions, one of them being that provided by section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, but because it is a reasonable implementation of the powers of the
court to effectively settle a labor controversy.
If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to perform something which is
repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial
settlement of the controversy, as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can
compel them to continue therein.
Caunca v. Salazar
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the
employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her
liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was
applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could
be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee
or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress
or physical coercion.
Pollock v. Williams
1. A statute of Florida which makes guilty of a misdemeanor any person who, with intent to
defraud, obtains an advance upon an agreement to render services, and which provides further
that failure to perform the services for which an advance was obtained shall be prima facie
evidence of intent to defraud, held violative of the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal Anti-
peonage Act. Pp. 322 U. S. 5, 322 U. S. 17.
2. In view of the history and operation of the Florida statute, it cannot be said that a plea of guilty is
uninfluenced by the statute's threat to convict by its prima facie evidence section; hence, the entire
statute is invalid, and a conviction under it, though based upon a plea of guilty, cannot be
sustained. P. 322 U. S. 15.
3. That, upon a trial of the defendant, his testimony in respect of his intent would have been
competent is immaterial. P. 322 U. S. 25.
153 Fla. 338, 14 So.2d 700, reversed.
Page 322 U. S. 5
Appeal from the reversal of a judgment which, upon a writ of habeas corpus, discharged the
prisoner, appellant here.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Pollock questions the validity of a statute of the State of Florida making it a misdemeanor
to induce advances with intent to defraud by a promise to perform labor and further making failure
to perform labor for which money has been obtained prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.
[Footnote 1] It conflicts, he says, with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and
with the anti-peonage statute enacted by Congress thereunder. Claims also are made under the
due process and equal
Page 322 U. S. 6
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which we find it unnecessary to consider.
Pollock was arrested January 5, 1943, on a warrant issued three days before which charged that,
on the 17th of October, 1942, he did,
"with intent to injure and defraud under and by reason of a contract and promise to perform labor
and service, procure and obtain money, to-wit: the sum of $5.00, as advances from one J. V.
O'Albora, a corporation, contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the
peace and dignity of the State of Florida."
He was taken before the county judge on the same day, entered a plea of guilty, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and, in default, to serve sixty days in the county jail. He was
immediately committed.
On January 11, 1943, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the judge of the circuit court, directed
to the jail keeper, who is appellee here. Petition for the writ challenged the constitutionality of the
statutes under which Pollock was confined, and set forth that,
"at the trial aforesaid, he was not told that he was entitled to counsel, and that counsel would be
provided for him if he wished, and he did not know that he had such right. Petitioner was without
funds and unable to employ counsel. He further avers that he did not understand the nature of the
charge against him, but understood that, if he owed any money to his prior employer and had quit
his employment without paying the same, he was guilty, which facts he admitted."
The Sheriff's return makes no denial of these allegations, but merely sets forth that he holds the
prisoner by virtue of the commitment "based upon the judgment and conviction as set forth in the
petition." The Supreme Court of Florida has said that "undenied allegations of the petition are taken
as true." [Footnote 2]
Page 322 U. S. 7
The Circuit Court held the statutes under which the case was prosecuted to be unconstitutional,
and discharged the prisoner. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed. [Footnote 3] It read our
decisions in Bailey v. Alabama [Footnote 4] and Taylor v. Georgia [Footnote 5] to hold that similar
laws are not in conflict with the Constitution insofar as they denounce the crime, but only in
declaring the prima facie evidence rule. It stated that its first impression was that the entire Florida
act would fall, as did that of Georgia, but, on reflection, it concluded that our decisions were called
forth by operation of the presumption, and did not condemn the substantive part of the statute
where the presumption was not brought into play. As the prisoner had pleaded guilty, the Florida
court thought the presumption had played no part in this case, and therefore remanded the
prisoner to custody. An appeal to this Court was taken, and probable jurisdiction noted. [Footnote
6]
Florida advances no argument that the presumption section of this statute is constitutional, nor
could it plausibly do so in view of our decisions. It contends, however, (1) that we can give no
consideration to the presumption section, because it was not in fact brought into play in the case,
by reason of the plea of guilty; (2) that, so severed, the section denouncing the crime is
constitutional.
I
These issues emerge from an historical background against which the Florida legislation in
question must be appraised.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, made in 1865, declares that involuntary
servitude
Page 322 U. S. 8
shall not exist within the United States, and gives Congress power to enforce the article by
appropriate legislation. [Footnote 7] Congress, on March 2, 1867, enacted that all laws or usages
of any state
"by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly
or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of
any debt or obligation, or otherwise"
are null and void, and denounced it as a crime to hold, arrest, or return a person to the condition of
peonage. [Footnote 8] Congress thus raised both a shield and a sword against forced labor
because of debt.
Clyatt v. United States was a case from Florida in which the Federal Act was used as a sword and
an employer
Page 322 U. S. 9
convicted under it. This Court sustained it as constitutional, and said of peonage:
"It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of
the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . . . Peonage is sometimes classified as
voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the
character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the
service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. . . . A clear
distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services
in payment of a debt. In the latter case, the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by
labor or service, and subject, like any other contractor, to an action for damages for breach of that
contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a
continuance of the service. [Footnote 9]"

Then came the twice-considered case of Bailey v. Alabama, [Footnote 10] in which the Act and the
Constitution were raised as a shield against conviction of a laborer under an Alabama act
substantially the same as the one before us now. Bailey, a Negro, had obtained $15 from a
corporation on a written agreement to work for a year at $12 per month, $10.75 to be paid him and
$1.25 per month to apply on his debt. In about a month, he quit. He was convicted, fined $30, or, in
default, sentenced to hard labor for 20 days in lieu of the fine and 116 days on account of costs.
The Court considered that the portion of the state law defining the crime would require proof of
intent to defraud, and so did not strike down that part; nor was it expressly sustained, nor was it
necessarily reached, for the prima facie evidence provision had been used to obtain a conviction.
Page 322 U. S. 10
This Court held the presumption, in such a context, to be unconstitutional.
Later came United States v. Reynolds and United States v. Broughton, [Footnote 11] in which the
Act of 1867 was sword again. Reynolds and Broughton were indicted under it. The Alabama Code
authorized one under some circumstances to become surety for a convict, pay his fine, and be
reimbursed by labor. Reynolds and Broughton each got himself a convict to work out fines and
costs as a farmhand at $6.00 per month. After a time, each convict refused to labor further, and,
under the statute, each was convicted for the refusal. This Court said, "[t]hus, under pain of
recurring prosecutions, the convict may be kept at labor to satisfy the demands of his employer." It
held the Alabama statute unconstitutional, and employers under it subject to prosecution.
In Taylor v. Georgia, [Footnote 12] the Federal Act was again applied as a shield, against
conviction by resort to the presumption, of a Negro laborer, under a Georgia statute in effect like
the one before us now. We made no effort to separate valid from invalid elements in the statute,
although the substantive and procedural provisions were, as here, in separate, and separately
numbered, sections. We said,
"We think that the sections of the Georgia Code upon which this conviction rests are repugnant to
the Thirteenth Amendment and to the Act of 1867, and that the conviction must therefore be
reversed."
Only recently, in a case from Northern Florida, a creditor employer was indicted under the Federal
Act for arresting a debtor to peonage, and we sustained the indictment. United States v. Gaskin.
[Footnote 13]
These cases, decided by this Court under the Act of 1867, came either from Florida or one of the
adjoining states.
Page 322 U. S. 11
And these were but a part of the stir caused by the Federal Anti-peonage Act and its enforcement
in this same region. [Footnote 14] This is not to intimate that this section, more than others, was
sympathetic with peonage, for this evil has never had general approval anywhere, and its sporadic
appearances have been neither sectional nor racial. It is mentioned, however, to indicate that the
Legislature of Florida acted with almost certain knowledge in designing its successive "labor fraud"
acts in relation to our series of peonage decisions. The present Act is the latest of a lineage, in
which its antecedents were obviously associated with the practice of peonage. This history throws
some light on whether the present state act is one "by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter
be made" to "enforce involuntary servitude," in which event the Federal Act declares it void.
In 1891, the Legislature created an offense of two elements: obtaining money or property upon a
false promise to perform service, and abandonment of service without just cause and without
restitution of what had been obtained. [Footnote 15] In 1905, this Court decided Clyatt v. United
States, indicating that any person, including public officers,
Page 322 U. S. 12
even if acting under state law, might be guilty of violating the Federal Act. In 1907, the Florida
Legislature enacted a new statute, nearly identical in terms with that of Alabama. [Footnote 16] In
1911, in Bailey v. Alabama, this Court held such an act unconstitutional. In 1913, the Florida
Legislature repealed the 1907 act, but reenacted in substance the section denouncing the crime,
omitting the presumption of intent from the failure to perform the service or make restitution.
[Footnote 17] In 1919, the Florida Supreme Court
Page 322 U. S. 13
held this act, standing alone, void under the authority of Bailey v. Alabama. [Footnote 18]
Whereupon, at the session of 1919, the present statute was enacted, including the prima facie
evidence provisions, notwithstanding these decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida and by this
Court. The Supreme Court of Florida later upheld a conviction under this statute on a plea of guilty,
but declined to pass on the presumption section because, as in the present case, the plea of guilty
was thought to make its consideration unnecessary. [Footnote 19] The statute was reenacted
without substantial change in 1941. Again, in 1943, it was reenacted despite the fact that, the year
before, we held a very similar Georgia statute unconstitutional in its entirety. [Footnote 20]
II
The State contends that we must exclude the prima facie evidence provision from consideration
because, in fact, it played no part in producing this conviction. Such was the holding of the State
Supreme Court. We are not concluded by that holding, however, but, under the circumstances, are
authorized to make an independent determination. [Footnote 21]
Page 322 U. S. 14
What the prisoner actually did that constituted the crime cannot be gleaned from the record. The
charge is cast in the words of the statute, and is largely a conclusion. It affords no information
except that Pollock obtained $5 from a corporation in connection with a promise to work which he
failed to perform, and that his doing so was fraudulent. If the conclusion that the prisoner acted with
intent to defraud rests on facts, and not on the prima facie evidence provisions of the statute, none
is stated in the warrant or appears in the record. None was so set forth that he could deny it. He
obtained the money on the 14th of October, 1942, and the warrant was not sought until January 2,
1943. Whether the original advancement was more or less than $5, what he represented or
promised in obtaining it, whether he worked a time and quit, or whether he never began work at all,
are undisclosed. About all that appears is that he obtained an advancement of $5 from a
corporation and failed to keep his agreement to work it out. He admitted those facts, and the law
purported to supply the element of intent. He admitted the conclusion of guilt which the statute
Page 322 U. S. 15
made prima facie thereon. He was fined $20 for each dollar of his debt, and, in default of payment,
was required to atone for it by serving time at the rate of less than 9
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports.
Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current
legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the
accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked
to from this site. Please check official sources.
Alcantara v. Dir. of Prisons
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty
from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on
the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus from
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?
HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which
petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already
penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law
and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for
the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the case
at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8,
1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion
perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years
by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex
crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is
illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is
applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively.
Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez
et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter.
Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a
favorable decision.
Zafra v. City Warden
After their conviction as accessories on a plea of guilty, to the following information for "Robbery In
Band" têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1978, at about 5:15 o'clock P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the Said accused, conniving,
confederating, together with Ranulfo Arellano, Toto Estandarte, Elmer Valdez and Edito Tejero and
mutually helping with one another, two of whom were armed with firearms, with deliberate intent,
with intent of gain, then succeeded to enter into the store of Gaysen Goldsmith located at
Magallanes Street, and by means of violence upon person, to wit: by pointing their firearms upon
one Chua Tec cautioning him not to move nor make any outcry, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereon, did then and there take, steal and carry away therefrom the following
things to wit:
1) Assorted Kinds of jewelries worth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 200,000.00
2) Cash. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……. . 130.00
3) One (1) Citizen watch worth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500.00
4) Two (2) Sharp Calculators worth .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 600.00
TOTAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 201,230.00
in the total value of P201,230.00 belonging to said Chua Tec, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the amount aforestated.
That the accused Bernabe Zafra y Cubillo, Laurencio Zafra, Tereso Zafra y Tabanas and Celerino
Taboada y dela Cerna, having knowledge of the crime described above but without having
participated therein either as principals or as accomplices, with deliberate intent, with intent or gain,
did then and there take part subsequent to its commission, by profiting themselves or assisting the
offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.
above-named petitioners were sentenced by the Circuit Criminal Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu
City to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years and one (1) day as minimum, to four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, both of prision correccional as maximum, to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the offended party CUA TEC in the unrecovered amount of P201,230.00 and
to pay proportionate costs.
Their motion for reconsideration claiming that they should he sentenced only to 21 days of arresto
menor, and to indemnify the offended party in such amount as each received out of the amount of
P 201,230.00, the total value of the properties stolen having been denied, petitioners appealed the
decision to this Court on purely question of law. Their motion to fix their respective bail bond for
their provisional liberty pending appeal having been also denied by the lower court, petitioners filed
a petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. L-49602) on January 5, 1979. 1 However, the petition for
review by way of appeal of the decision of the lower court was filed only on March 28, 1979, 2 in
compliance with the Resolution of this Court dated February 26,1979.
Being intimately interrelated, the two petitions above referred have been consolidated for joint
consideration and decision.
As culled from the petition for habeas corpus, 3 the facts which gave rise thereto are as follows:
têñ.£îhqwâ£
1. That in an information dated August 21, 1978, your petitioners were charged as
accessories after the fact for the crime of Robbery before the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu; xerox
copy of said information is attached herewith as annex "A";
2. That upon arraignment on September 8, 1978, your petitioners pleaded guilty as
accessories after the fact as charged in the aforementioned information;
3. That in a decision dated Sept. 15, 1978, which was duly promulgated, the Circuit
Criminal Court convicted your petitioners as accessories after the fact and imposed upon all of
them the penalty of imprisonment for Two (2) years and One (1) day of prison correccional as the
minimum, to Four (4) years Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as the
maximum and to indemnify the offended party Cua Tec in the amount of P 201,230.00 and to pay
the costs of suit; xerox copy of the said decision is attached herewith as annex "B";
4. That within the reglementary period, your petitioners not being in accord with the
decision against them with respect to the penalty imposed upon them, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the afore-mentioned decision, copy of which motion for reconsideration is
attached herewith as annex "C"; your petitioners contended in said motion for reconsideration that
at most the penalty that ought to be imposed upon them should only be a prison term of 21 days of
arresto menor;
5. That in an order dated September 20, 1978, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu denied
the afore-mentioned motion for reconsideration; copy of said order is attached herewith as annex
"D";
6. That on September 26, 1978, your petitioners filed their notice of appeal and they
requested that their appeal be lodged before this Honorable Supreme Court on pure questions of
law; copy of said notice of appeal is attached herewith as annex "E ";

7. That likewise, on September 26, 1978, your petitioners filed a motion, copy of which is
attached herewith as annex "F", praying that the amount of the appeal bail bond for the temporary
liberty of your petitioners pending appeal be determined and/or fixed;
8. That in an order dated September 26, 1978, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu gave due
course to the appeal interpose by your petitioners; copy of said order is attached herewith as "G";
9. That however, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu in an order dated September 26, 1978,
denied the motion of your petitioners to fix and/or determine the amount of the appeal bail bond;
copy of said order is attached herewith as annex "H";
10. That in a manifestation and motion dated November 20, 1978, your petitioners again
prayed that they be allowed to post an appeal bail bond and that the amount thereof be fixed, copy
of said manifestation and motion is attached herewith as annex "I";
11. That in an order dated November 23, 1978, copy of which is attached herewith as annex
"J", the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu denied the afore-mentioned manifestation and motion on the
ground that since the appeal of your petitioners had been perfected, it has no more jurisdiction to
resolve the same;
12. That despite consistent follow up and urgings on the Clerk of Court of the circuit Criminal
Court of Cebu, the records of the above-entitled case to date had not been forwarded to this
Honorable Supreme Court to the great prejudice of your petitioners, thus your petitioners had no
other recourse but to file the instant petition since until at present, the appeal of your petitioners
had not been docketed yet before this Honorable Supreme Court.
In their petition for review, 4 petitioners allegations of the essential facts are Identical to those
alleged in the petition for habeas corpus, so much so that they merely adopted as their
Memorandum in the petition for review, the Memorandum they submitted earlier in the petition for
habeas corpus, 5 the issues being also essentially the same.
Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus (G.R. No. L-49602)
This petition is not without merit if viewed from the denial by the lower court of the motion of
petitioners to fix the amount of bail bond at P3,000.00 lack which they wanted to post for their
provisional liberty pending appeal. 6 In denying said motion, the lower court gave as reason the
fact that petitioners have pleaded guilty, and their appeal is purely on a question of law, to wit, the
propriety of the penalty imposed upon them. 7
Regardless of the nature of the appeal whether it is on question of fact or on purely legal issues,
the right to bail pending appeal remain unabridged. The right, after conviction, may be a matter of
discretion, 8 but it does not appear in this case that the lower court denied bail upon consideration
of certain facts and circumstances that relate to the possibility of petitioner absconding to thwart
the process of criminal justice, which is the primary consideration in granting or denying bail. 9 For
it is not so much in the imposition of an allegedly excessive penalty that habeas corpus might lie,
for as correctly observed by the Solicitor General appeal is the proper remedy, but in the denial of
bail without sufficient warrant that the detention of petitioners is illegal. While the petitioners
pleaded guilty, and their appeal is only on question of law, the questioned sentence has not
become final as to give warrant to petitioners' detention pending appeal without right to bail. Nor
may petitioners be said to have commenced service of a sentence since they have assailed their
sentence as illegal. The lower court's reason for denying bail pending appeal is, therefore, legally
untenable. Petitioners should have been allowed to post bail for their provisional liberty while their
appeal is, pending in this Court.
In any event, with how the petition for review is going to be resolved, this petition for habeas corpus
would become academic and moot.
Re: Petition for Review (G.R. No. L-49938)
The sole issue raised in the appeal is whether the penalty imposed by the lower court is proper.
The contention of petitioners is that in determining the penalty to be imposed on them as accessory
in the offense charged, which it two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated
offense, the whole penalty provided for in paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code for
simple robbery and not paragraph 5 of Article 295 which is the penalty prescribed when the
robbery is committed by a band, as was applied by the lower court, should be the basis.
The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners not because regardless of whether the robbery
committed is by a band or not, the basis for determining the penalty for the accessory in the crime
is invariably the penalty prescribed for simple robbery, unattended by any qualifying or aggravating
circumstance, but because in the instant case, the petitioners pleaded guilty to an information
which charges simple robbery, not robbery in band, although so designated by the prosecuting
fiscal. The Solicitor General explains his position in the following manner: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Although the crime to which petitioners had pleaded guilty as accessories had been designated as
Robbery in Band in the Information, the allegations in the body thereof show that only two of the
four principal accused were armed. Under Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, it is necessary
that there be more than three armed malefactors taking part in the commission of the robbery in
order that the crime could be considered as one committed by a band. Falling short of this
requirement, the crime charged in the Information in question cannot be properly considered as
robbery in band, Contrary to the lower court's ruling, the definition of band in General Order No. 54
dated October 22, 1975, did not actually repeal the definition of band under Article 296 of the
Revised Penal Code. As defined in said General Order, 'a band consists of three or more persons,
at least one of whom is armed, for use in the commission of a crime.' However, this definition was
strictly 'for purpose of this General Order, which was to vest on the 'military tribunals ... exclusive
jurisdiction of the crime of robbery committed by a band as defined in said General Order No. 54.
There was no provision in this General Order from which could be drawn the slightest implication,
that band as defined in Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code has been repealed. Besides,
General Order No. 54 had been repealed or superseded by General Order No. 59 dated June 24,
1977, which invariably removed from the jurisdiction of Military Tribunals the crime of robbery in the
manner that it might have been committed. Hence, at the time of the commission of the crime in
the present case on July 29, 1978, General Order No. 54 was no longer in effect.
We are in full accord with the above observation of the Solicitor General. Accordingly, his
recommendation as to the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioners, which is that of destierro
maximum, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the prescribed penalty
being destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its medium period (Article 71, in relation
to sub-paragraph 4 of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code), 10 merits our approval.
As to the civil liability, We likewise agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that no error
was committed by the lower court in condemning petitioners to pay the offended party in the sum of
P201,230.00 which represents the total value of the properties subject matter of the robbery as
alleged in the information to which the petitioners pleaded guilty, and there being no principals yet
convicted as they have remained at large, and petitioners' liability being joint and several or in
solidum as specifically provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by imposing the penalty of
destierro in its maximum period instead of the prison term imposed by the court a quo, and
affirmed in all other respects. It appearing that petitioners have served even more than the
maximum of the imposable penalty, because they have been in detention since their arrest up to
the present time, their immediate discharge is hereby ordered, unless they are being detained for
some other causes.
Celeste v. People
Petitioner Amalia B. Celeste, under confinement in the jail of the City of Manila, invoking the
protection that habeas corpus affords, would seek the restoration of her liberty, alleging the nullity
of a decision of the Court of Appeals of March 2, 1966, now final and executory, convicting her of
the crime of estafa, the only thing lacking being the reading of the sentence by respondent Judge
Ruperto Kapunan. She would support such a plea on her being acquitted by an earlier Court of
Appeals decision on what she alleged to be essentially the same transaction, the sale of jewelry on
commission, considered in such decision as giving rise at most to a civil liability. There were
different cases filed apparently as there was more than one offended party.
There is no specific claim that thereby there was a denial of constitutional right, but it was more
than hinted at in her petition, which would characterize the circumstances under which she was
deprived of liberty as "utterly illegal and [unchristian] if not inhuman." Apparently not unaware that
her petition could have been more strongly buttressed in the law, she would likewise invoke
"humanity, justice and equity" to regain her freedom. This Court, however, feels that even with all
the sympathy that her plight evokes, there is no legal justification that would entitle her to the writ
prayed for.
This petition for habeas corpus originally started as a special proceeding for certiorari, injunction
and mandamus against the Court of Appeals and respondent Ruperto Kapunan, whom she would
enjoin from reading the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals of March 2, 1966. She would
have this Court annul it, notwithstanding its finality, justifying her rather unorthodox plea on the
ground, above noted, that earlier on April 11, 1960, another decision of the Court of Appeals
considered the liability she incurred as a result of a transaction wherein she was given jewelry for
sale on commission basis as civil in character. The alleged offended party in that case was a
certain Victoria Vda. de Tengco. In the Court of Appeals decision where she was convicted for
estafa, while it was apparent that the transaction did occur at about the same time, the complainant
was a certain Eden Patdo, who entrusted the jewelry to her. It was the holding of the Court of
Appeals in this case that the agreement being clear to the effect that if she were not successful in
selling the same she was under obligation to return them and there being a failure on her part to do
so resulting from her entrusting them to a third party, who apparently was another sub-agent, she
would be held liable for estafa.
While the decision was rendered as far back as March 2, 1966, petitioner alleged that she never
knew about its existence as her previous lawyer did not notify her. It thus became final but no
reading could be had in the meanwhile as she was out on liberty under bond. It was only on
December 13, 1969 that she was arrested and lodged in jail pending the reading of the sentence
which she would, in her original petition, postpone indefinitely while this Court was passing on the
question on whether or not its nullity could be decreed considering the above circumstances. This
proceeding was filed on January 5, 1970, Thereafter, on January 8, 1970 she sought to convert it
into a petition for habeas corpus, based on the same facts but insisting on the illegality of her
detention, not to mention what she considered its unchristian if not inhuman character.
On January 10, 1970, this Court adopted a resolution commanding the warden of the city Jail to
appear and produce the body of petitioner before it and to make a return of the writ on January 16,
1970. Such a return was duly made, the offense charged, according to such Acting City Warden,
being one for estafa. 1 The decision convicting petitioner on appeal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as already made mention of, on March 2, 1966.
In the light of the above facts, this Court finds itself unable to accede to the plea of petitioner. This
is not to deny the latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas corpus as the most effective remedy
against illegal restraint or detention. Correctly has it been aptly referred to as protean in its reach.
The duty is thus cast on the judiciary to put an end to any form of denial of physical freedom, which
in a constitutional regime is intolerable except according to law. No deviation from the legal norm is
permissible. It is in that sense that Chafee could refer to it as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 2 That is to assure the rule of law.
So it was affirmed in one of the truly outstanding opinions of Justice Malcolm, Villavicencio v.
Lukban 3 As was there stated: "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful freedom." 4 It cannot be denied, to follow the
language of a leading American Supreme Court decision, that while the writ "is simply a mode of
procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal
liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must
always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment . . ." 5
Moreover, it has the procedural advantage, to paraphrase Holmes, of cutting through all forms and
going to the very tissue of the structure. 6 There is no higher duty cast on courts then than to
maintain it unimpaired and to assure the utmost respect for the amplitude of its coverage. 7 So we
have consistently acted. We have not allowed technicalities to stand in the way of the writ being
given the effectiveness and efficacy, implicit in its recognition in our Constitution. There is no
thought of our deviating from such a norm. That would be to fail to accord supremacy to its dictate.
The moment, however, the detention Or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, a different question arises. The writ ordinarily
cannot be availed of. It still may be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at
the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to
exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain
one’s liberty. 8
To repeat, while the original suit was for certiorari, injunction and mandamus it was subsequently
converted primarily to a habeas corpus proceeding. It is not to be attended with success, not being
persuasive enough to justify the issuance of the writ prayed for. There is no explicit allegation of a
denial of a constitutional right. At the most, such an intimation is sought to be yielded by the
circumstances above narrated which could indicate that on what practically appeared to be the
same transaction resulting, however, in two criminal actions in view of there being more than one
offended party, two divisions of the Court of Appeals, which passed on the matter, reached
different conclusions. In the 1960 decision, petitioner’s liability was declared to be merely civil. In
the 1966 decision, which petitioner would have annulled, she was held criminally liable.
The fact, however, that the later decision is admittedly now final and executory, interposes a bar to
any judicial relief. If at all, recourse must be had to executive clemency. So this Court holds. Two
members of this Court, 9 however, while in conformity with such result, the controlling legal
principles being what they are, would not be adverse to a further inquiry on the matter. Petitioner
could thus be afforded an opportunity to explain precisely, if she could, why under the
circumstances an element of arbitrariness could be plausibly asserted and maintained. A due
process question might arise. Then if there were really such a denial, this habeas corpus petition
would not be impressed with the apparent hopelessness which now characterizes it, considering
only the pleadings thus far submitted. As the Court, however with full support from settled doctrines
views the matter differently, it being undeniable that the petition on its face lacks merit, the above
observation falls short of calling for a different outcome.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. So is the original petition for
certiorari, injunction and mandamus. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Conde v. Rivera
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with
her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the
cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now,
after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems
as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained
of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
Lansang v. Garcia
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were
invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned
the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the
constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this
case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no
legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on
this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was
divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In
the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-
oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC
unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
121 SCRA 472
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees.
Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining
room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they
were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive
activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the
present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question
and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have
vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has
been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the
said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the
aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected
to review by the President or the by the Review Committee created for the purpose.
would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the
Information filed against the accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of
the Rules of Court.
The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such
investigation could be conducted.
... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the
Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be
inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having
been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

Ilagan v. Enrile
FACTS:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-
INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the
Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited
Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were arrested for the same cause.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers
hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and
violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that
there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on
May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to basis of a PDA issued
by the President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in organizing mass
actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to due process and the
benefit of a preliminary investigation.

HELD:
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary
investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a
Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds
provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus