Planning Practice & Research

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What Should Planners Do to Address Unethical

Political Pressure?

Tej Kumar Karki

To cite this article: Tej Kumar Karki (2017): What Should Planners Do to Address Unethical
Political Pressure?, Planning Practice & Research, DOI: 10.1080/02697459.2017.1286891

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2017.1286891

Published online: 20 Feb 2017.

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Planning Practice and Research, 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2017.1286891

What Should Planners Do to Address Unethical Political

Pressure?
Tej Kumar Karki
Malaysian Sustainable Cities Program (MSCP), MIT, Cambridge, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper presents the case study of three planners who risked their Ethical planning practice;
jobs to oppose unethical political pressures in Kathmandu Valley, political pressure;
Nepal. It attempts to understand what was done by these planners planner’s ethical dilemma;
to address those pressures and what lessons could we learn from their enforcement action; political
retribution
experiences. This research found that in a hostile political environment
where unethical political pressure is strong, and voicing is of little help,
unique actions of procedural planning (exit, deny-exit-and-expose,
and defend), deontological in nature, may have to be adopted. If
that is not adequate one should also consider de-communicating or
manipulative actions, teleological in approach.

Introduction
Risks of political retribution are high for most planners wanting to take an ethical stand
in their planning duties (Hoch & Cibulskis, 1987; Hoch, 1988). In one instance in 2003, a
planning director in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA tried to persuade the mayor and the city man-
ager not to approve real estate developments that violated every aspect of the city plans and
codes (Mitchell, 2003). The director of planning put all her efforts into changing their minds.
However, she was unsuccessful. The mayor and the city manager abolished the city’s entire
planning department, and fired most of the planning professionals to eliminate obstacles
to the real estate interests (Mitchell, 2003). There are many instances where local officials
and developers have forced planners to apply planning rationale in order to justify their
own individual gains (Hoch, 1994). Often, they have offered bribes or coerced planners
to tell lies (Hoch, 1988). In some cases, those planners who resisted developers’ unethical
proposals were either fired or disciplined (Hoch, 1988; Krumholz, 2001; Mitchell, 2003).
Most planning theorists suggest that planners would be better at dealing with political
pressures if they worked as skillful bureaucrats (Campbell & Marshall, 1999; Sanyal, 2005;
Read & Leland, 2010); advocates (Davidoff, 1965); communicators (Forester, 1980); or pow-
er-players (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Others argue that planners will do well in ethical
matters if they follow a planning code of ethics (Peterson, 2006). However, when planners
face unethical unilateral political pressures, these skills and codes can do little to help them
resist or ameliorate those pressures (Innes, 1995; Sanyal, 2002; Binder, 2012; Grange, 2012;

CONTACT  Tej Kumar Karki  tejkarki@gmail.com

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2   T. K. KARKI

Harrison, 2013). Little is known about what planners should do when they face unethical
political pressure. Some studies have shed light on the structure of the planner’s ethical
choices, and on planners’ views on ethics (Howe & Kaufman, 1979; Baum, 1983; Bolan,
1983; Howe, 1990; Hendler, 1991; Kaufman, 1993; Campbell & Marshall, 1998; Pløger, 2004).
Others have researched the type of political conflicts faced by planners, and the subsequent
harm and mistreatment received by them when they resist unethical pressures (Hoch,
1994; Hoch, 1988). The book titled ‘Ethics in Planning’, edited by Wachs (1985), has com-
prehensively covered ethical issues in urban planning, policy-making and environmental
complexities. However, information or specific cases on what planners should do when they
face unethical pressures is thin. On the other hand, the fields of economics, management
and medicine have carried out a substantial amount of work on this research question.
Drawing insights from these disciplines, this paper examines the work of three planners
who risked their jobs to oppose unethical planning practices in Kathmandu Valley, Nepal.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. First, the paper explains the
research method that informs about the subject and the context for the research. Second, it
introduces what planning ethics is in theory and how challenging it is to practice. Third, the
paper presents theoretical insights from economics, management and medicine to inform
what a planner could do to address unethical political pressure. Fourth, it presents the
institutional context under which civil servant planners operate in Nepal. Fifth, it presents
the case of three civil servant planners in Nepal and what they did to address unethical
pressures. Sixth, the paper presents the findings and discussion. Finally, it lays out what
lessons have been learned from the Nepal case, followed by conclusion.

Research Method
Three planners (A, B and C) who had faced unethical political pressure in the central gov-
ernment planning offices in Nepal are purposefully selected for this research. Planner-A
works at the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC),
Planner B works at the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Planner C at Kathmandu Valley
Development Authority (KVDA). These three planners are selected because each of their
experience represents unique political pressure. Planner A encounters a minister’s pressure
to award contract to a particular contractor, Planner B resists civil servant–trade union
leader’s pressure to make staff transfers according to the leader’s wish list and Planner C
defends minister and senior bureaucrat’s pressure to stop removal of illegal building struc-
tures from public road right-of-way (ROW1).
The planners working in central government are selected also because they have more
experience on resisting pressures compared to the local government planners because the
former enjoys more job security (explained in detail in the section that deals with institu-
tional culture). Face to face interviews were carried out to know about the experience and
stories of the three planners. In addition, some information on planner B was taken from
the interview that he gave to a national daily newspaper. Some contextual information in the
paper is also based on my own familiarity with the subject and location. I formerly worked
in the same organization as these planners. Planner C was my predecessor and Planners A
and B were my supervisors. Owing to my affiliation, as the author of this paper, with the
planners under study, some biases may be present in this research.
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   3

What Planning Ethics is and How Challenging is it to Practice?

Planning ethics is guided by two philosophies: teleological and deontological. Rational
planning theory embraces teleological ethics. It focuses on the end results and pays less
attention on means—how or through what process the end result was achieved (Bolan,
1983). For example, the urban renewal in the US focused on the end result (creating better
city) by adopting a rational process that ignored the concerns of low-income families and
minorities (Bolan, 1983). In the words of Hoch (2007), it is about ‘being right’ rationally
but not ‘being good’ socially. Next, deontological ethics holds that wrong means or actions
cannot be justified for good end and the actions themselves should be good. The forced
displacement and relocation of low-income families and minorities (action) during the
urban renewal was wrong, regardless of the merits of the good city. Reacting to the ethical
weaknesses of rational planning, teleological in nature, more procedural planning theories,
deontological in approach, came in the fore (Campbell, 2012). Some of the prominent ones
are—bureaucratic planning, advocacy planning and communicative rationality. Each of
them are explained and critiqued below in brief.
The bureaucratic planning approach asserts that through policies, rules and administra-
tive procedures better planning and policy could be ensured in society and public interest
would be served better (Campbell & Marshall, 1999; Sanyal, 2005). Rule following civil
servant planners would be effective in responding to public interest (Healey, 1998). Next,
Paul Davidoff proposed a theory of advocacy that argues that just planning is possible by
including plural views in the planning process, especially the voice of the weaker section
(Davidoff, 1965). He urges planners not only to work in government offices, but also to go
outside and openly advocate on behalf of weak and minorities (Davidoff, 1965).
Furthermore, Forester (1980), leading scholar in communicative rationality theory con-
tends that a good planner is not the one who can analyze and make plans but the one who
can convince people to support for ethical options, be watchful that information may be
distorted by powerful at the expense of the poor (Forester, 1980). Communicative rationality
theory argues that under certain ideal conditions, we could come to a consensus regarding
our moral, political and social disagreements (Habermas, 1984).
However, Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that power often disables most procedural planning
ethics explained above. In many cases, dominant elite class dictates bureaucratic planners
what public interest is (Sanyal, 1996). The larger property owners own more power to influ-
ence law and local planning decisions (Krumholz, 2001). In 1969, Paul Davidoff, principal
proponent of advocacy planning, formed a Suburban Action Institute (SAI) in Westchester
County, NY to ‘open the suburbs for all, in particular for the non-affluent and non-white’
(Danielson, 1976). In the early 1970s, SAI declared several projects for minorities in the
suburbs. However, none of them got local zoning approval.
Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002) noticed communicative rationality theory less useful in
Demark because the powerful and clever people were active in manipulating, dominating
and thwarting impartial process of discourse ethics. In Aalborg city, the authors found that
the chamber of commerce and the city officials using incorrect information in favor of car
instead of pedestrian-oriented policy for the city. The authors applied phronesis: used public
media, to expose the distorted rationality.
Some argue in favor of misinforming and deception in certain planning situations.
Forester (1989) argues that planners have to exercise power by withholding or manipulating
4   T. K. KARKI

information, emphasizing some issues and down playing others. Planners may have to play
‘truth-claiming’ and ‘truth-hiding’ (hiding findings that contradict interests) game to achieve
the right kind of goal (Ploger, 2001). To counter hegemonic power, deception and alliance
may be necessary (Ploger, 2001). In Planner C’s case deception was necessary to counter
the minister’s possible unethical order to stop the building removal work.
The procedural planning theories work in an ideal political environment but they are
less helpful for planners confronting the very real ethical dilemmas (Campbell & Marshall,
1999). Campbell (2012) argues that ‘ethical debates confront situations where simple distinc-
tions between good and bad, right and wrong, do not pertain. Rather difficult judgments,
with uncertain impacts, have to be made as to better and worse courses of action’ (p. 382).
Healey (2008) defines practical judgment as trying to pull together all kinds of consider-
ations in relation to the specific puzzle that is being faced in a unique context. Flyvbjerg
(2004) too argues that general rules may not work for a specific situation, and practitioners
may have to apply practical wisdom, practical judgment, common sense or prudence.
This suggest that the planners facing unexpected, unethical and unilateral political pres-
sure have little choice other than to base their actions on practical judgment: Do what
you can do within a given limitations by putting other ethical principles into perspective:
teleological and deontological concerns; the issue of being right and doing good, following
bureaucratic rules; communicative ethics; and phronesis. The planners’ actions presented
in this research would be assessed in the backdrop of these theoretical insights.

What Could Planners do to Address Unethical Political Pressure?

According to Hirschman (1970), when a regime (political head) pressures planners to
undertake tasks that are less ethical, they have three choices: to exit, voice or show loyalty.
Exit means leaving the job in order to avoid unethical political pressures. Voicing is about
educating: staying in the organization and trying to correct the unethical situation and,
through discussions and awareness-raising activities, suggesting to senior and junior officials
and politicians that they do the right thing. Finally, showing loyalty is to obey the senior
officer or political authority on all matters including those that are unethical. Loyalty for
unethical motives (by accepting instead of criticizing them) (Birch, 1975) is problematic.
Loyalists are those who tolerate less than ideal conditions (Graham & Keeley, 1992). They
could do this unwillingly (Farrell, 1983) or happily.
Grange (2012), interviewed UK planners for her research and she found that many
planners were acting as loyalist unwillingly simply because of the pressures they received
behind the scene and in the planning committees. On the other hand, Flyvbjerg (2012)
found a very willing loyalist planner while carrying out megaproject research in Denmark.
The Chief Planner from the Danish Department of Transport, as a spokesperson of the
minister of transportation, warned this scholar not to produce the results that contradicts
the Department’s estimate and the Chief Planner even held meeting outside Denmark to
bypass whistle blowers. These loyal planners are of less interest for this research because they
do not resist unethical pressures and have no experience on how to resist unethical pres-
sure. Planners exercising exit and voice (educating, guerrilla bureaucracy, whistle blowing
and resistance) are the principal subjects of this research because they would be in a better
position to tell under what circumstances they exited and voiced and what consequences
they faced. Experiences on exit and voice are explained below in greater detail.
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   5

Exit
Exiting or resigning could be a sensible option if a planner sees no possibility of avoiding
unethical political instructions and believes that sticking to his job under any unethical
circumstances might compel him to commit more unethical acts (Dobel, 1999). Dobel
(1999), studied White House bureaucracy and found that those state secretaries and senior
army officials who offered or threatened to resign were able to stop unethical actions in
their organizations or strengthen their policy position. For example, according to Dobel
(1999), the US secretary of state George Shultz opposed the White House policy of taking
lie-detector tests to all government staffs dealing with classified documents to discourage
staffs to leak information. Shultz opposed saying that I would resign the day I have to take
the polygraph test. He further said that the test is an insulting act and unnecessary unless
in cases of due cause. The President Ronald Reagan listened to Shultz and did not accept
his resignation and the President made lie test requirement only in case of due cause.
However, Dobel (1999) also warns that one should not use the threat to resign unless one
is prepared to do so. If the political head does not value the importance of the bureaucrat
who offers resignation, the head would accept the resignation. Most bureaucrats would
not dare to face resignation-driven economic consequences of job loss. Many bureaucrats
are not as affluent as the White House ones. Not all those who dare, use exit as a threat,
they just move out. Campbell and Marshall (1998), report a British planner who quit his
job simply to avoid the unethical demand made by his employer (rural district council in
the South West). Furthermore, it is also important to note that exiting without exploring
the opportunity for voicing is also running away from responsibility (The Saturday Night
Massacre, 1977) and loosing the opportunity to learn how to deal with unethical pressure.

Voice (Educating, Acting as Guerrilla in Bureaucracy, Whistle Blowing and

Resisting)
Educating (communicative rationality) would work only if there is more room for improve-
ment: an open-minded political head not interested in pressuring planners unilaterally
to make unethical decisions. What we most encounter is that the political head does not
want to listen but sees what he thinks is right (which is often less ethical) be implemented.
The other variations of voicing are: guerrilla-in-bureaucracy, whistle-blowing and resisting.
The guerilla bureaucrats secretly work below the organization’s radar against those who
are acting unethically: doing wrong things within the organization (O’Leary, 2010). They
try to find evidences, leak them to media and privately motivate people to work against
unethical deeds (O’Leary, 2010). Members of the organization’s inner circle know more
about the wrong-doing than outsiders: for this reason, guerrilla bureaucrats are valuable
in providing evidence of wrong-doing.
Next, whistle-blowing is disclosure of wrong doing by members of organization in order
to stop those acts (Cho & Song, 2015). Unlike guerrilla bureaucrats, the whistle blowers
often go public and provide information to media. For example, Mark Felt, a bureaucrat
in FBI leaked information to press and that exposed Watergate scandal. However, often
guerilla bureaucrats and whistle blowers risk retaliation such as job loss, demotion and
transfers (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Cho & Song, 2015). Leaking information
is often against the organizational code of conduct and they are susceptible to organizational
6   T. K. KARKI

punishments. As a result, both the guerrilla-in-bureaucracy and whistle-blowing may not

be feasible to many.
Resisting is not exiting but trying to stop, delay or alter the less ethical actions (through
education or other means) as and when possible in day to day work of bureaucracy (Bemmels
& Reshef, 1991). It is about trying to find ways and strategies within one’s organization to
resist the unethical acts without acting as guerrilla or a whistle blower. According to Piderit
(2000), employees’ resistance is often motivated by a desire to protect or defend what they
think is the right thing to do for the organization (Waddell & Sohal, 1998).
Peter et al. (2004), analyzed nursing literature published between 1990 and 2003, and
found that most nurses were not happy with the quality of care of patients and with unjust
organizational practices. Some concerns were related to disagreement with the treatment
of dying patients that caused suffering and indignity. The authors found that some nurses
took appropriate actions without physician’s approval (disobedience) (Dawe et al., 2002).
Some refused to provide treatment that they believed to be unethical (denial) (Åstrom
et al., 1995; Wurzbach, 1999). In other cases, nurses adopted slowed down the processes
and steps (delaying), and sometimes sticking to the policy and rules (defending) rather
than the medical instructions (Sleutel, 2000).
In summary, threat of exiting or resigning could be a good strategy for planners to
pressure regime to reconsider their unethical policy choice. However, only resourceful and
affluent bureaucrats are likely to exercise the threat of exiting. Voicing (educating) works
well only when political heads are open minded and not interested in imposing unilateral
unethical political pressure. Next, guerrilla and whistle blowing roles are important ones
but they risk political retribution and bureaucratic disciplinary actions. For civil servant
planners, resisting actions are safer. They could watch and see, and resist when the time is
right. The resisting actions practiced by bureaucrats and practitioners as mentioned above
were disobedience, denial, delay and defend.
Planning scholars too allude that some dgree of disobeidence and deception may be
necessary in certain planning circumstances: Forester (1989) argues that planners have to
exercise power by withholding or manipulating information, emphasizing some issues and
down playing others. Planners may have to play ‘truth-claiming’ and ‘truth-hiding’ (hiding
findings that contradict interests) game to achieve the right kind of goal (Ploger, 2001).
To counter hegemonic power, deception and alliance may be necessary (Ploger, 2001). In
Planner C’s case deception was necessary to counter the minister’s possible unethical order
to stop the building removal work.
This suggests that in a hostile political environment where unethical political pressure is
strong, and voicing (educating)—a gentle version of procedural planning actions (bureau-
cratic and communicative) is of little help to deal with the pressure, unique actions of proce-
dural planning (exit, deny, delay and defend: close derivatives of communicative rationality
or advocacy coalition), deontological in nature; and teleological in approach (disobedience
or deception) may have to be adopted.

What did the Three Planners do to Cope with Unethical Political Pressures in
Nepal?
The planners’ case studies would proceed with an introduction of institutional arrangements
for civil servant planners in Nepal. In particular, the introduction would explain about the
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   7

institutional structure, job security and civil servant–trade union system and its negative
impacts.

Institutional Culture and Norms for Civil Servant Planners

Nepal is a republican nation with a parliamentary form of democracy where both the cen-
tral government line agencies and local governments look after urban planning issues. The
Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning (MHPP) is the highest level of government that
oversees planning issues through its branches such as the DUDBC and Kathmandu Valley
Development Authority (KVDA: Town Development Act 1988). Planner A presented in
this research is from DUDBC, Planner B’s parent organization is MHPP but is working at
MOE and Planner C is from KVDA. Local Self-Governance Act of 1999 authorizes local
governments to exercise the authorities similar to the KVDA in their jurisdictions. However,
for the most part, the local governments remain passive in enforcing planning regulations
partly for political reasons and lack of adequate technical manpower.
The civil servant planners working in central government planning agency (e.g. DUDBC,
MOE and KVDC) in Nepal enjoy fair amount of job security even though they are highly
exposed to political pressures. To fire an officer-level civil servant, the case has to be dis-
cussed before the cabinet of ministers of the central government, and the attempt usually
fails unless the case reflects serious legal concerns. Rarely, civil servants working in the
central government are fired through this process. This provides an edge for planners willing
to stand up against unethical pressures. However, the planners working in local govern-
ment do not enjoy the same job security; they are more vulnerable to municipal mayor
and city council’s job termination decisions. Having said that, it is also important to note
that although the civil servants working in central government enjoy a larger degree of job
security, they are not immune to frequent transfers, often to remote areas and into passive
positions, if the minister concerned chooses to do so.
Next, prevalence of trade union system in civil service is a big problem in Nepal. Higher
ranked civil servants (officer- level: planners belong to this category) in Nepal are not
allowed to form trade unions. Only the lower ranked civil servants (non-officer-level) are
allowed to do so. There are eight trade unions in operation, each affiliated to one of the
political parties (there are dozens of political parties but four of them are the powerful ones).
The union leaders mobilize their respective political parties to pressure senior civil servant
officers (including civil servant planners) to make transfers of their favorite colleagues (lower
ranked civil servants) to resourceful offices located in important locations. These trade union
leaders are active not only because they care about their fellow civil servants, but because
they make monetary deal with them for transfer (Khadka, 2015). Once the union leader’s
pressure suceeds in making transfer, as wished by a civil servant, the leader will receive
backdoor payments from the beneficiary (Bhandari, 2012; Khadka, 2015; Ranjitkar, 2015).
In recent days, they were active even in transfering very high-level officers such as secretary
(chief of staff) of ministry (Khadka, 2015). There are instances where a junior staff (because
of his political party backing) has threatened and manhandled the senior most staff of the
ministry (secretary of the ministry or the chief of staff). Fearing that the junior staff might
complain to the political power centers and make their transfers in less active places, the
senior civil servants show tolerance to their disrespect. Planner B, one of the subject of this
study, had encountered one such trade union. It is explained below.
8   T. K. KARKI

Case Studies
The three planners presented in this section were grappling with two types of unethical
pressures in their institution. Planners A and B experienced pressure to violate organiza-
tional rule to favor some individuals over others. Planner C was pressured to retreat from
enforcing planning regulations in the city of Kathmandu. Paragraphs that follow provide
a detailed account of their stories.

Planner A
Planner A had worked on an urban infrastructure improvement project funded by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). He had worked with the ADB as government counterpart.
The planner was in charge of project implementation and procurement of contractors for
roads, drainage, sewerage and solid waste management. To procure contractors, the plan-
ner should first prepare a list of prequalified contractors, and from them, he should select
the one who agrees to do the work for the lowest bid. One day, the Director General (DG)
of DUDBC (Planner A’s immediate boss) took the planner to the minister. The minister
asked Planner A to find ways to award the contract to the third lowest bidder instead of
the lowest one. Planner A said that he could not do this as it was against the legal norms.
The minister continued pressing to find some ways. Finally, Planner A’s polite response to
the minister was, ‘Just transfer me from here and that will pave the way to do what you
want.’ The minister agreed and told the Planner A to come back next day to discuss the
transfer matter. However, the next day, when Planner A went back, the minister said, ‘Since
the rules are complicated to transfer you, for now you are to continue what you are doing.’
In another similar contract, the DG had asked Planner A about the ranking score of the
third lowest bidder, in response to which the planner verbally provided a tentative figure.
However, in the final calculation, the figure slightly changed. The DG asked the planner
to stick to the tentative figure instead of the final one. Planner A said that he could not do
that. According to the planner, the DG became annoyed and threw the document at him.
Planner A remained calm and just waited. The DG fortunately did not proceed with further
retribution, and after a few days, accepted Planner A’s stand.
When asked how he survived these confrontations with higher authorities, Planner A
said that very few civil servants liked to work hard and stay at work for the extra hours at a
low salary. He added, ‘For a while, the authorities may transfer me to a less active place, but
when they do not find a capable, sincere, and serious man, they eventually would have to
call me back.’ Planner A said that there was nothing that he would lose by taking an ethical
stand against the authorities because he does not take commission or corruption money,
and works sincerely in a salary way below what one would earn in the private sector.

Planner B
Planner B, after working several years in DUDBC and MHPP, was eventually promoted
as secretary (chief of staff) of the MOE in 2011. At MOE, his first task was to transfer staff
(lower ranked civil servants). The work had been pending for the previous three years as
a result of the inaction of previous secretaries. Staff transfer was necessary for fairness in
administrative actions, replacing staff who had worked in remote areas for a long time with
those who had never served in those areas.
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   9

As Planner B was mindful that these transfer decisions would trigger potential pressures
from the civil servant trade union leaders (explained above), he had several meetings with
them to establish commonly agreed criteria for staff transfers. According to Planner B, in
public, the union leaders agreed on fair transfer principles; however, in private, they pres-
sured the planner to make transfers according to their wish list (Bhandari, 2012). Many
attempts to convince the trade union leaders to establish common criteria failed. Realizing
the urgency of the transfer needs of those staffs stuck in remote locations, Planner C decided
to proceed despite the lack of agreement with the trade union leaders (Bhandari, 2012).
Planner B consulted with his experienced staff on the subject, establishing criteria that
would ensure fairness and generate minimum transfer controversy. On this basis, he then
transferred 130 staff nationwide after he had spent several weeks working extra office hours
(Bhandari, 2012).
However, as this decision served none of the interests of the trade union leaders, it infu-
riated them. One day, as Planner B was about to leave work at the end of his tiring day, he
saw a group of people entering his office. The trade union leader affiliated with one of the
largest political parties entered his office with 25 people (Bhandari, 2012). The leader banged
on the table and demanded that he repeal his decision: all other shouted in support, and
their language was not civil. This time, Planner B lost patience. He said to the trade union
leader that this staff transfer decision had not been made by him but by the institution based
on criteria, the system and administrative procedure (Bhandari, 2012). He added, ‘I would
rather leave this job but not change my decision. Maybe the next would-be secretary would
fulfill your wishes but not me.’ Subsequently, he tendered his resignation on 16 March 2012
to the chief secretary, two and half years before his retirement (Bhandari, 2012).
The story spread quickly on the news, social media and radio. Planner B provided a
detailed interview to a national daily newspaper on what had happened and why he had
to resign (Bhandari, 2012). As many other secretaries were experiencing similar pressures
from trade union leaders, they too showed solidarity with Planner B and offered the threat
of joint resignations. Owing to these new developments, Planner B’s resignation was not
accepted: a few months later, he was transferred to MHPP, his parent organization, where
he spent his remaining term of civil service. His staff transfer decision at MOE was not
repealed: instead, it was enforced exactly in line with what Planner B had wanted (email
conversation 17 November 2015).

Planner C
Planner C was at work in removing illegal building structures from the ROW (see above
for definition) of public roads in Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal. Due to the lack of
enforcement of ROW standards for 35 years (1976–2011), hundreds of buildings and struc-
tures had been illegally erected on the ROW of public roads. These illegal developments
had posed a serious obstacle to the tasks of road widening and traffic easing. The majority
of these illegal developers were not informal settlers or squatters. They were adjoining
private property owners who had resources in terms of wealth, power and politics. These
powerful perpetrators had thwarted several attempts to remove buildings from the ROW
in the past. The traffic congestion problem reached at its peak in 2011, as did the people’s
frustration. According to Planner C, the prime minister (PM) himself was a victim of the
traffic congestion, having on a daily basis to spend one hour to travel along 3 km of city
road to his office from his residence. To overcome this problem, the PM called the Planner
10   T. K. KARKI

C and all related agencies, urging them to show full commitment to the ROW clearing and
road-widening task, and pledging for full financial and other supports. With this highest
level of commitment, Planner C commenced the work in a well-coordinated way (Karki,
2015).
However, resistance to stop the building removal task followed shortly. As Planner C
started clearing the road-ROW encroached on by a large four-star hotel, he heard cell
phone ringing several times with calls coming from powerful people including the MHPP
minister and secretary. He deliberately chose not to receive these calls, believing that the
calls were to stop the work. Only when half the work was done did he return the secretary’s
call. In reply, the secretary told Planner C that the MHPP minister was furious at what he
had done, and suggested that the Planner C call the minister immediately. When Planner C
called, the minister responded: Why did you go to the hotel area in the morning and scare
tourists? In response, the planner said, ‘If you want, I will stop the work.’ The minister asked
how much work had been done: Planner C’s reply was 70% (actually 50% was complete).
After learning the scale of the work accomplished, the minister signaled to Planner C to go
ahead and complete the remaining work. Later that evening, the minister said in the media
that he had sent Planner C to do the work, and took the credit.
The action against the hotel united many other powerful illegal developers to pressure the
government bureaucracy to form a central monitoring committee under the chairmanship of
the chief secretary, in the hope that this committee would be able to stop Planner C’s work.
The committee, immediately after its formation, called a meeting under the chairmanship
of the PM to discuss the work. Ministers, secretaries, senior bureaucrats and Planner C
were invited to the meeting. At the meeting, most of the secretaries, ministers and higher
officials expressed the opinion that the work should stop. They told Planner C that, as he
was an expert in planning, he should plan in new areas and not in the already built city.
They added that this would cause much dust pollution and inconvenience and, if the work
continued, the people would not spare them. When the meeting was about to conclude,
Planner C raised his hand seeking sometime to speak. The PM denied his request stating
that no new idea would come from his, that they are running out of time. Planner C said
he needed only two minutes. Finally, the PM allowed him to speak. Planner C said, with
the planning bylaws book in his hand:
What we are doing is in accordance with building regulations2 and laws, and if I receive PM’s
support, I can change the face of Kathmandu; otherwise, within 30 minutes, I will recall all
the dozers and equipments from the streets
After hearing this reassuring argument, the PM said to Planner C: ‘You go ahead with the
work and if someone calls you to stop the work, let me know. I will take strong action.’ The
PM’s final statement broke down most of the barriers to taking action against the illegal
developers. By 2012, the planning authorities were able to remove hundreds of illegal devel-
opments in 200 kilometers of Kathmandu city’s ROW, and to widen many narrow roads
(Karki & Lu, 2015).
Those illegal developers who had built their structures on the road premises prior to
the enactment of the ROW standard in 1976, they were compensated by the KVDA and
those who built after that were not given compensation considering their act as illegal.
After the public notification3 about the removal of illegal structure from the ROW, 60% of
the structures under the ROW were demolished by the illegal developers themselves and
the remaining 40% by the planning authority, according to the secretary of the Ministry of
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   11

Urban Development. He further said, only 2% of the houses were entirely under the ROW,
subject to complete demolition. The remaining 98% of the houses were partially cut since
those houses did not completely fall inside the ROW. The planning authorities erected
new walls to cover the cut portion of the building. Since most residents continued living in
their remaining portion of their building, there was little need or cost for temporary shelter
arrangements and resettlement.

Findings and Discussion

This section presents findings and relates them with the theories of planning ethics and
practical judgment. The planners took three types of actions to cope with unethical pres-
sures. Planner A, adopted exiting as a way to escape from committing unethical acts (see
Table 1). Planner B adopted resistance: deny, exit and expose strategy to disable the trade
union’s unethical pressure; and, Planner C adopted defend, de-communicate and manipulate
strategy to enforce road planning regulation. Each of their strategies is presented below.

Planner A: Exit
Planner A offered to exit from his current responsibility (he sought a transfer) as a way to
refrain from making an unethical procurement decision. The planner chose to exit because
manipulating the figures to favor one contractor over the other was against the institutional
rule (it was not being right), and by doing so it would allow the corrupt deal between the
minister and the contract to succeed and negatively impact on the quality of the construction
work (it was also not doing good). Planner A took deontological position that wrong process
is not acceptable irrespective of the outcome. In this case even the outcome would not be
good (quality of construction work). This suggests that accepting the minister’s pressure
was against both the teleological and deontological philosophy of ethics.
In this context, the planner applied practical judgment as follows: since the minister
would not take the planner’s upfront refusal positively and it would do no good to the plan-
ner in the long run, the planner did not refuse the minister but chose to exit (sought transfer
from current position—exiting is softer than upfront refusing). Most planners would not
seek a transfer from active jobs in good locations. They would fear losing project resources
and social capital. However, Planner A was happy to be transferred to low key positions as

Table 1. Characteristics of planners, and their strategies to deal with political pressure.
Subjects Type of institution
Planner A civil servant Branches of central government
(DUDBC)
Planner B civil servant Central government: Ministry
(MOE/MHPP)
Planner C civil servant Branches of central government
KVDA
Practical judgment
applied to deal with
Type of political pressure political pressure
Minister and senior bureau- Exit
crat’s pressure to favor one
contractor over the other
Civil servant–trade union Resist: Educate, deny; and
leader’s pressure to make exit-and-expose
transfer decision according
to his wish list
Illegal development regime’s Defend, de-communicate;
pressure to stop ongoing and manipulate
removal of illegal building
structures from public road
right-of-way
12   T. K. KARKI

long as he is not fired, and he knew very well that being fired was least likely in the current
civil service system (explained above).
Furthermore, his willingness to be transferred from his current position may also be
related to with his economic status and his demand in the profession. For instance, I know
that the Planner A’s wife works in a professional job. The planner owns a house in the city
and has a good social network in the local job market. Planner A has been involved in the
project from its inception, and removing him would create an information gap and delays.
However, despite his offer to exit, he was kept in the same position even by accepting the
planner’s ethical stand. This conforms to Dobel (1999)’s assertion that the ‘offer or threat
to exit’ often has leverage if the bureaucrat has the ability to sacrifice the position as some
of the affluent White House bureaucrats did.

Planner B: Deny, Exit and Expose

Planner B stood behind deontological ethical position by adopting a fair process: first he
applied voicing (educating) approach using communicative ethics: tried to negotiate and
find common ground or principles for staff transfers (consensus). As this failed, he denied
the unilateral pressure and applied bureaucratic rules and made staff transfer decision. The
outrage that came with the decision was beyond the planner’s tolerance. In this extreme
situation, the planner chose to exit, and expose the dark side of the power as practiced by
Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002). The planner resigned, used media and allowed the issue
to surface in public (Mouffe, 1999) and countered the power as Flyvbjerg (2012) did in his
megaproject research. The planner’s action paid off. He neither had to resign nor change his
staff transfer decision. Planner B’s action brought the result exactly as stated by Hirshman
(1977): exiting exposes the ethical issue in an organization, and resigning while using one’s
voice further increases the public visibility of the issue that may prompt improvement.

Planner C: Defend, De-communicate and Manipulate

Planner C defends his illegal building removal action (deontological approach: following
planning standards) from the public road ROW to ease traffic and ensure city mobility
(doing good). When most senior bureaucrats were against the move he defended by show-
ing building bylaws and evidence of illegal occupations, and succeeded to get approval to
continue the building removal work. Had he not chosen to speak and defend, the decision
could have gone in any direction including cancellation or delays, and Kathmandu city
would not see the extent of work that we see today. This is consistent to Piderit (2000)’s
observation that defending is a form of resistance to protect better values or a policy that
is good for the society (Waddell & Sohal, 1998). Up to this stage Planner C applied deon-
tological ethical position by following legal process to restore the ROW.
When he was about to confront the powerful force that were against restoring the ROW,
Planner C applied teleological approach (he applied some degree of deception to avoid
obstruction to his mission of restoring the ROW): he had turned off his cell phone when
he was carrying out the building removal work: blocked the channel of communication
(de-communicating) until a large portion of the demolition work was accomplished (at least
for three hours or so). Furthermore, he also manipulated: over reported that ‘a lot of building
structure removal work has been completed’ so that the minister would get discouraged to
 PLANNING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH   13

press the planner to stop the work, thinking that the ‘damage has already been done.’ The
Planner C’s action mentioned above is consistent to the teleological approach that Forester
(1989) and Ploger (2001) have argued above.
This practice is not uncommon. In Curitiba, Brazil, Mayor Jaime Lerner too applied
deception to achieve certain planning goals. He started his pedestrian movement (restrict-
ing car) in historic downtown by Friday with over 100 construction workers and finished
pedestrianization work during the weekend before the opposing groups would go to the
court for filing injunction against the move (Macedo, 2013). However, local residents when
they saw the pedestrian path, they were impressed and realized that the move increased
shopping activities and business sales. The nurse practitioners as shown above disobeyed
(Dawe et al., 2002) and delayed (Sleutel, 2000) their work to protect their patients from
unethical medical treatment.

Lessons Learned
This research has found that the planners facing unilateral unethical political pressure
could consider following practical judgmental actions: exit; deny-exit-and-expose; defend,
de-communicate, and manipulate.

Resign (Exit)
If a political pressure is unacceptable and intolerable to a planner and if he sees no possibil-
ity to change the mind of the pressure group (such as the minister soliciting face to face),
the planner could show his willingness to exit (resign or transfer) as a way of refraining
from the unethical tasks or as a way of exerting pressure to discourage the unethical act,
if his exiting would not negatively impact his financial situation. Exiting is deontological
principle: refraining from acting against the ethical process or a way of pressuring regimes
to stick to the principle (Dobel, 1999).

Deny-exit-and-expose
If all attempts to educate and stop unethical political pressure fail, the planners could deny
and take ethical action. If this action brings intolerable retribution, they consider exiting and
expose as a last option. This is a firm deontological position: taking all risks to implement
fair process. Exiting and exposing the issues as a last resort, using media, would spark some
debate on the issue and pressure the regime to implement the deontological position taken
by the planners such as Planner B. This is similar to exposing the dark side of the power
that is against better planning options as argued by Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002), by
exposing truths to the media.

Defend, De-communicate and Manipulate

Planners should defend and not hesitate to put forward their argument simply because most
senior politicians and bureaucrats in a meeting are not in favor of your idea (deontological
ethical position: defending regulatory process). They should back up their arguments with
evidence, and follow legal process to restore public amenities. However, when powerful and
14   T. K. KARKI

clever people make attempts to thwart the deontological position, some degree of teleological
actions (de-communicating and manipulating: adopting deceptive approach to achieve the
goal) may be necessary as argued by Ploger (2001): Planners may have to play ‘truth-claim-
ing’ and ‘truth-hiding’ (hiding findings that contradict interests) game to achieve the right
kind of goal. Deception and alliance may be necessary to counter hegemonic power. Forester
(1989): Planners exercise power by withholding or manipulating information, emphasizing
some issues and down playing others.

Conclusion
For years, planning scholars have written articles after article saying that the ethical prin-
ciples of procedural planning theories are helpless in guiding planners facing unilateral
political pressures. However, articles on what needs to be done or how planners should deal
with those pressures are thin. Healey (2008) suggests for applying practical judgment by
pulling together all kinds of considerations. The key question is what could those practical
judgments be? Nepal’s experience shows that those judgments could embrace both deonto-
logical and teleological positions depending upon the circumstances. In a hostile political
environment where unethical political pressure is strong, and voicing (educating)—a gentle
version of procedural planning actions (bureaucratic and communicative) is of little help to
deal with the pressure, unique actions of procedural planning (exit, deny-exit-and-expose
and defend), deontological in nature, may have to be adopted. If that is not adequate one
should also consider de-communicating or manipulative actions that are teleological in
approach. Provided those actions do no harm to the people and the society as we saw in
the Brazil’s case.

Notes
1. 
ROW is a strip of land owned by public authority for utility development and expansions such
as strip land owned and reserved for road, sidewalks, landscape and future road expansion.
2. 
The regulation shows the width of the ROW for all the major roads in Kathmandu Valley
determined in 1976.
3. 
The illegal developers had given two month notice to consult the planning authorities for
further queries. The perpetrators were encouraged to demolish the illegal portion of their
building at their own and they were also notified one week ahead of the demolition date.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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