G.R. No.

118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
 vs.
 EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were
charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a
firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means
of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then
fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to
their damage and prejudice.1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan
y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan
appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June
1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some
3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat
caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano
Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With
his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan
Jr. to "dapa."3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils.
There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat,
covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to
ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the
accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that
they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be
killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat.
Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the
point of a tres cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose
boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and
that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to
approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat.
Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town
of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net
and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between
the two, or I will kill you."5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal
hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front
part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt
threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then
untied his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat.
Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of
any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment,
or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the
value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And
a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or
watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another
through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats
used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him
to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential
that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his
companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using
force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were
already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some
other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently
taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when
they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that
boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant
claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion
was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of
the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening —
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers
of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in
that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how
did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis
supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion
would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was
seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As
Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining
witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck
his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan
told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full
control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the
case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the
succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in
sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces
of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the
townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to
deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the
purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of
another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a
floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in
open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat,
the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat
broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take
them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of
gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the
matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced
in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it
again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation
the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of
piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the
Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27,
2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene,
2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value
of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded,
with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45
and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete
control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and
rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel.
The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo,
Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending
misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine
Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed
to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to
18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to
transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong
San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer,
after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March
30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the
transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities
for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The
first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven
by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought
them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-
appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places
in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,
called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident.
The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers
and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo
Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No.
532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the
vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter
returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of
any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their
own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain
Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel.
They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period.
They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they
cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They
denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas.
Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00
each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment
signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at
home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio
Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced
evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief
Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such
for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte.,
Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco
and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile
Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio
telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to
Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact
vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong,
upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-
to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be
designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of
the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase.
Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride"
sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would
be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port
authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a
port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul
Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through
the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried
11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers
then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer
of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the
latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi
Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report
which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then
handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the
morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to
the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by
the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and
drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The
transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid
in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels
and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker
or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to
discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer,
this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was
scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY
CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was
thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of
the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime.
Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is
mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court
cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San
Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article
52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to
return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to
remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said
cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported
to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants
may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the
trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they
were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving
them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or
on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member
of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined
seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly
contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read
the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed
of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the
crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge
that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or
that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery
Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in
making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which
in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in
convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not
prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy.
He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not
aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act
No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can
accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as
such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on
February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they
were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be
valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation
that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of
the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the
same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court
(tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself
in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon
motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the
illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were
sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure.
Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently
made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson
vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation
may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave
birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds
the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions
of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of
Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible
in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with
the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and
"UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and
confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now
Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and
members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to
the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on
March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro,
with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew
of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles
off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong
upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the
mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were
taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed
their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as
some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of
March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination,
which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial
is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is
given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime
(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by
three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore.
And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an
indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even
knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects
needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in
accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that
Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the
vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place
merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14
and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house
in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and
inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
(People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and
concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to
do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the
dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a
certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated
to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was
to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other
accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia
Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences
are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are
close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their
parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-
appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides,
Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
"M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989.
Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that
time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted
of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659
(effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that
Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous"
because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in
order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of
Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532
shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers
of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are
neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding
him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall
attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger,
shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
— The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as
follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates
and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement
or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and
its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the
vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need
not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No.
532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same,
piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
[1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground
that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section
2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or
highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids
or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires
or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any
benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of
piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of
the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in
favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs.
Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided
in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption
that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property
taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of
the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the
quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in
falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer
went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates
with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure)
and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi
Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said
entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal
activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail
accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized
as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
"Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T
Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record)
to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration"
(for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH"
and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at
2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload
and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee"
with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that
the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although
Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate"
above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid
P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco
also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival
at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A
CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700
tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the
"M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the
same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from
his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source
and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao".
Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided
any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under
which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even
a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T
Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met
for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer
took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine
vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine
transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus
safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1,
the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half
of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity.
Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate
sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring
was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the
orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to
an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised
Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere
clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented
himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate
Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and
the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to
the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence
on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO,
alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed
the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and
found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were
charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting
ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as
may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately
resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO
and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed
on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail
term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages
and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved
and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the
offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following
counter-statement of facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established
findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the
transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988
by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon
City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her
husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp.
8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went
onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p.
10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and
they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened
her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he
is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out
of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was
injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the
car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They
thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the
stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by
explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three
theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The
trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be
kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same
holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his
motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids
in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or
essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a
murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter
absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in
which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual
performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance
because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by
the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be
physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated,
candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I
know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that
I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me
any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that
for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early
as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been
held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused,
even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of
killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty
does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to
your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic)
being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her
to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will
take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic)
already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach
Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the
police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop
and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the
nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point,
what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in
the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts
involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which
she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime
committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the
theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated
in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in
the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the
North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma.
Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason
Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing
clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the
legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is
not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident
from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that
is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands
are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put
our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of
ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of
the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery
and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope
with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime
is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as
are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22
(Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating
and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein,
could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted
the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by
the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from
the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements
are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage
which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree
does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use
unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly
underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the
highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner
as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under
the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the
crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory
decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already
been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that
presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It
is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of
an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that
criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is
forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto,
would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the
categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is
one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532
and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery
in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of
things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by
Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply
demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in
this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery
defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29
shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be
further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of
either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a
firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article
295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of
the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for
ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in
the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is
sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the
robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against
appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not
expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the
taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was
unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the
presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra
and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in
relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the
amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 104461 February 23, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA, defendants-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main question answered in this case is whether the accused should be
convicted of highway robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged on June 17, 1991
before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) of the crime of
"ROBBERY HOLD-UP (sic) with HOMICIDE (P.D. No. 532, Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highwat (sic) Robbery Law of 1974)" 1 in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of May 1991, in the municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused, armed with gun and knives, conspiring and confederating together
with one alias Jack whose true identity and present whereabouts is still unknown,
and mutually helping and aiding one another with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of cash money amounting to P30.00, while
the said victim was aboard a passenger jeep, cruising along Aurora Blvd., San Juan,
Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof, in the aforementioned amount of P30.00; that on the occasion of said
robbery (hold-up) and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away
personal belongings of all passengers in pursuance of their criminal act said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the passengers (sic) of said passenger jeep, one
Ramilyn Zulueta by then and there hitting her head with a gun and kicked (sic) her
out of the passenger jeep which caused her to fall in (sic) the pavement hitting her
head on the ground, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly
caused her death, while Ma. Grace Zulueta, punching her face and hitting her head
with a gun, as a result of which said Ma. Grace Zulueta sustained physical injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and
incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The records show that both accused were assisted by their counsel de oficio, Atty.
Fernando Fernandez of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), when they pleaded not
guilty to the charge upon arraignment on August 9, 1991.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution thereafter established that on May 29, 1991, at about 9:00 in the
evening, 17-year-old Ma. Grace Zulueta and her elder sister, Ma. Ramilyn, were on
their way home from their grandparents' house in Altura Ext., Sta. Mesa, Manila.
They boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd. The jeepney
was fully loaded with the driver, his wife and two children on the front seat and eight
passengers on each of the two parallel back seats. 2
The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of the jeepney 3 with
accused Romeo Mendoza seated beside Grace. 4 It was through Mendoza that
Grace handed over their fare to the driver as the jeepney passed by the SM
complex. 5 Glory Oropeo (or Lory Europeo 6 ), who boarded the same jeepney near
the Stop and Shop Supermarket, was seated behind the driver. Accused Jaime
Rejali was beside Glory while their companion named Jack, who has remained at
large, was seated across her. 7
When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd. in San Juan, Metro
Manila, near St. Paul's College, just after the bridge and before Broadway Centrum,
someone announced a hold-up. 8 Both Mendoza and Rejali had guns while Jack was
armed with a knife. It was Rejali who fired his gun. 9 Jack told the Zulueta sisters that
they would "bring" the sisters along. As the accused appeared drunk, the sisters
ignored them. However, a male passenger jumped off the jeepney and a commotion
ensued. Perplexed ("naguluhan") by this turn of events, the accused held Ramilyn
who started kicking, trying to extricate herself from their grasp. This prompted
Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He boxed and kicked her, causing
Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street where she rolled. 10
Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled, Grace shouted,
"bitawan mo ako, bitawan mo ako," in an attempt to call the attention of the drivers of
the other vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit Grace on the head with a gun
causing her to lose consciousness. 11 (She finally came to at the St. Luke's Hospital;
she was confined there up to June 7, 1991. 12 ) While all this was happening, Rejali
poked his gun at the other passengers. 13
From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of P30.00. She handed it to
the holdupper seated in front of her. When the commotion took place, the driver
slowed down the jeepney but the holduppers told him to keep on moving. One of
them ordered the driver to proceed to J. Ruiz St. and make several turns until, when
they reached Paterno, the culprits alighted and made their escape. 14
Ramon Zulueta, the father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned about the incident from his
other daughter, Joralyn, who was informed that Grace was at the St. Luke's Hospital.
Grace, who was then a student employed at the Pizza Hut for P3,000.00 a month,
was confined in said hospital from May 30 to June 7, 1991 for head trauma; she had
contusions and hematomas on the left temporal region and on the right occipito-
parietal and anterior temporal regions, and abrasions on the supra orbital area as
well as elbow. 15 Ramon Zulueta spent around P19,000.00 for Grace's
hospitalization. 16
Upon learning from Grace that Ramilyn had been with her, Ramon Zulueta surmised
that she might have been brought to the hospital nearer the place of the incident, the
UERM hospital. When he got there, he learned that Ramilyn, 21 years old and a
computer management student, had already died of severe, traumatic head injuries.
17 The Zulueta family spent around P15,000.00 for her interment. 18

Two days after the incident, Ramon Zulueta was informed that the jeepney driver
and his wife had "surrendered" to the police station in San Juan. The following day,
he went there but the driver was not around. He gave a statement to the police. 19
By fluke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about the apprehension of
Mendoza. On the morning of June 12, 1991, Grace saw Mendoza selling ice cream
along Altura St. She noticed Mendoza staring at her. When she stared back,
Mendoza lowered his gaze and left immediately. That same afternoon, she saw him
again. Considering her poor eyesight, she was instructed by her cousin to buy ice
cream from Mendoza so that she could get near enough to be sure if he was indeed
one of the holduppers. When she approached and asked Mendoza, "Mama, kilala
kita?", he could not look her in the eyes and seemed confused. Certain now that he
was one of the holduppers, Grace announced to her brother and the other people
present that Mendoza was one of the holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for it,
but the people gave chase and overtook him. 20
Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was identified by Grace in a
line-up. 21 Rejali was apprehended that same night by police operatives. According
to SPO1 Dalmacio Luces, Lucia Salinas, the wife of Jeepney driver Virgilio Salinas,
described one of the suspects to the NBI cartographer who came out with a sketch
of his face. 22 However, Luces failed to get a statement from Lucia. 23
Evidence for the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi as defenses. Both of them admitted knowing
each other as they were working as ice cream vendors at the Ana Maria Ice Cream
Factory in 1045 Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila where they also lodged in rooms
provided by their employer. Mendoza, 28 years old, swore that on that fateful day,
he sold ice cream from 8:30 a.m. to about 4:00 p.m. From the factory, he went as far
as V. Mapa St., passing under the bridge near the Stop and Shop Supermarket. By
5:30 in the afternoon, he was back at the factory. He spent the night of May 29, 1991
in his living quarters at the factory taking care of his child as his wife was pregnant.
24

For his part, 27-year-old Rejali testified that he also sold ice cream on the date in
question, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., along E. Tuazon St. near Balic-balic. He
claimed that he had not gone to San Juan as he did not even know where San Juan
was, being new in the vicinity. Once back in the factory, he prepared ice cream for
sale the next day. Then he rested in his room. 25
Myrna Balderama, who also stayed in the living quarters within the same ice cream
factory, corroborated the testimonies of the two accused. According to her, she saw
Mendoza enter the compound in the afternoon of May 29, 1991. From outside her
room, she could see Mendoza's room; on the night in question, she saw him taking
care of his child. As to Rejali, she knew that he did not leave the premises that
evening as she had a conversation with him up to 10:00 p.m. while he was preparing
ice cream. 26
On March 10, 1992, the trial court 27 rendered the Decision subject of this appeal. Its
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused ROMEO
MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974) and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Ramilyn
Zulueta in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), to pay the sum
of P23,673.35 by way of reimbursement of the hospitalization, burial and other
related expenses for Ramilyn Zulueta and the further sum of P30,000.00 by way of
moral and exemplary damages; to pay Glory Oropeo the sum of P30.00 by way of
reparation of the stolen cash money; to pay Ma. Grace Zulueta the sum of
P6,400.00 by way of reimbursement of her hospitalization expenses, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period
of their preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving credence to the "inconsistent,
conflicting and contradictory testimonies" of prosecution witnesses Grace Zulueta
and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the crime charged "despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 28
Although not directly raised by the appellants, we find upon a thorough scrutiny of
the facts that there is yet another question which is of concern to the bar and the
bench: are the facts attendant to this case constitutive of the crime of highway
robbery with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 or of the felony of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?
The Court's Ruling
This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses. As this Court
has ruled in innumerable cases, the trial court is best equipped to make the
assessment on said issue and therefore, its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is perceived to have overlooked,
misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if
properly considered, would affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal of the
decision involved. 29 We do not find in the instant case any such reason to depart
from said general principle. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we
shall confront the issues raised herein by the appellants.
Appellants allege the following "inconsistent" testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses: (a) Grace testified that it was Rejali who shouted "hold-up", pulled out
a gun and fired, in contradiction to Glory's testimony that the man in front of her,
referring to Jack, announced the hold-up, and (b) at the direct examination, Grace
pointed out that she was struck behind her right ear but during cross-examination,
she said that she was hit on the left ear.
The first inconsistency may be attributed to the difference in the relative positions of
Grace and Glory inside the jeepney. Grace was seated near the rear entrance of the
jeepney while Glory was behind the driver. Because Grace was far from both Jack
and Rejali who were seated near Glory, this could have affected her perception of
who announced the hold-up. At any rate, such disparity in their testimonies does not
at all derail the sufficiently established fact that both appellants herein participated in
the hold-up. As regards the injuries sustained by Grace, the certificate issued by her
attending physician, Dr. Sosepatro Aguila, states that she sustained injuries on both
sides of the head 30 , clearly showing no "contradictions" in her testimony with
respect to where she was hit.
Be that as it may, these "inconsistencies" or "contradictions" are minor ones which
do not have any material bearing on the culpability of the appellants as they do not
in any way refute their positive identification by the two eyewitnesses as the
perpetrators of the holdup. 31 On the contrary, they reflect the truthfulness of the
testimonies of Grace and Glory. As this Court said in People vs. Retuta 32 :
The discrepancy signifies that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the truth
in their narrations. The discordance; in their testimonies on minor matters heightens
their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed
(People v. Doria, 55 SCRA 425). As this Honorable Court held in People v. Agudu,
137 SCRA 516 to wit:
"However, the variance, if any, is on a minor detail which would not destroy the
effectiveness of their testimony. We cannot expect absolute uniformity in every detail
because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear, depending upon their
situation and state of mind. Complete uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness. The light contradictions, on the other hand, strengthens the sincerity
of the testimony of the witnesses."
Thus, far from evidence of falsehood, the minor inconsistency between the
testimonies could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of their good faith.
The strongest part of the defense arguments concerns the identification of the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime considering the lighting condition inside
the jeepney. Appellants believed that they could not have been recognized because
both Grace and Glory admitted that the place was dark, and so surmised that it
would have been darker inside the jeepney because the eyewitnesses failed to point
out the source of light therein. 33 However, in trying to prove their allegation,
appellants unwittingly brought out details via Grace's testimony which demolish their
surmise. Thus:
Q. Despite the darkness, you were able to identify the gun?
A. I did not say it was completely dark. I said in the jeepney it was quite lighted. I
said it was dark outside but in the jeepney, it was quite lighted. 34 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It seems, moreover, that appellants only quoted portions of the testimonies of Grace
and Glory to suit their purpose. Had the appellants been candid enough, they would
have retained portions of the same testimonies evidencing that it was the place
where the jeepney was passing through that was dark but, inside the jeepney, it was
"medium light". Grace had testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q. Will you mention again the exact location of the alleged incident?
A. I am not familiar with the streets, sir. It was after a bridge. After UERM, sir.
Q. What was the condition of the place at that time?
A. It was moderately dark. Quite lighted. Medium.
Q. How about inside the passenger jeepney? Was it lighted?
A. Medium, sir. Since it was dark, you cannot have a complete light there.
Q. It was quite dark?
A. Yes, sir. 35
For her part, Glory testified on cross-examination in this wise:
Q. Madam witness, will you mention again the exact location where you said you
were allegedly held up?
A. San Juan, H. Lozada and J. Ruiz St., sir.
Q. What was the condition of that place at that time?
A. It was dark because it was already nighttime.
Q. You mean the exact place where you were held-up is a dark place?
A. Yes, sir. 36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender. However, its
relative weight and significance depends largely on the attending circumstances and
the discretion of the trial court. 37 Another overriding consideration is the fact that the
most natural reaction of victims of violence is to see the appearance of the
perpetrator of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime was being
committed. 38
In the case before us, Grace's unrebutted testimony is that the jeepney was "quite
lighted . . . medium". Even granting that the light was dim as most jeepneys have
colored or low-wattage bulbs for the passenger area, the added illumination from the
headlights of passing vehicles traveling the busy Aurora Boulevard would have been
sufficient to permit positive identification of the appellants. 39 Moreover, identification
of the appellants as the hold-uppers was facilitated by their physical proximity to the
said eyewitnesses. Grace was seated beside appellant Mendoza while Glory was
beside Rejali. That Grace had poor eyesight does not affect her positive
identification of Mendoza because she was wearing her eyeglasses when the hold-
up took place. 40 As stated above, because they were victims of violence, both Grace
and Glory must have had the appellants' features indelibly imprinted in their minds.
In light of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime,
their alibis are worthless. 41 Moreover, the defense failed to meet the requisites for
alibi to be considered as a valid defense. It is not enough that the appellants were
somewhere else when the crime transpired. They must likewise duly establish that
they were so far away that it was not physically possible for them to be present at
the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at or about the time of its commission. 42
Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and Aurora Boulevard in San Juan, Metro Manila are
not very distant from each other considering the numerous public transportation
facilities plying between said places.
But, while there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability on the appellants
for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the physical injuries sustained by her sister
Grace and the asportation of Glory Oropeo's thirty pesos, we do not agree with the
trial court that the crime committed by appellants is covered by P.D. No. 532.
In its Decision, the trial court curtly said:
The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged, namely, intent to gain,
unlawful taking of property of another, (the P30.00 of Glory Oropeo) violence against
or intimidation of any person, on a Philippine Highway and death of Ramilyn Zulueta
and physical injuries upon Ma. Grace Zulueta, (Section 2, par. 3 and Section 3, par.
b, Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres. Decree No. 532) have
been duly proved in the instant case.
Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide?
Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the above elements mentioned by
the court a quo. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined by Section 2 of said
decree as follows:
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or
other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway.
In People vs. Puno 43 , this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as follows:
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422
[1904].) . . .
. . . Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, . . .
Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There, however,
was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any previous
attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate"
commission thereof.
Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number of perpetrators is no longer
an essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by P.D. No. 532. Mr.
Justice Regalado explained this in Puno:
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree
does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use
unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. . . .44
Under the old doctrine, brigandage was committed by a "cuadrilla" 45 or by "more
than three armed persons" per the definition of brigands in Article 306 of the Revised
Penal Code. 46
Even before the Puno holding, however, there had been cases 47 where less than
four offenders were held guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532, which just
strengthens the view that the number of offenders is not an essential element in the
crime of highway robbery. 48
It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a high way within the purview of P.D.
No. 532, 49 the prosecutors deemed it proper to charge appellants with violation of
said decree. In this regard, the Puno ruling is enlightening. This Court held:
. . . (i)t would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of
property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress
the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes
but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines
in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be far-
fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning,
we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of
the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and
conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly
taken at gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the
location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense
within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 533, thus rendering nugatory the
categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is
one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532
and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974? 50
Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider whether or
not the very purpose for which the law was promulgated has been transgressed.
Citing the "whereas clauses" of P.D. No. 532 51 in Puno, the Court said:
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people," such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. 52
Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and
death) committed against the middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed against the
economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to bring
forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that all doubts are to be
resolved liberally in favor of the accused. As such, appellants may not be held liable
under P.D. No. 532 but only under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged. 53 Considering the allegations of the aforequoted
Information, appellants herein should be liable for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery having
been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the asportation of thirty pesos
from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta's death was accidental
because it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 54 The
physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the commission of the crime are
absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide. 55
Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of the appellants and their
companion 56 of depriving Glory of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and Grace
which resulted in Ramilyn's accidental death. Since both appellants took part in the
robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide in the
absence of proof that they endeavored to prevent the accidental killing of Ramilyn. 57
In view of the prohibition against the imposition of the death penalty when the crime
was committed, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was then the single and indivisible
penalty for robbery with homicide. It shall be imposed on each of the appellants
regardless of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime. 58
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
(Branch 156) in Crim. Case No. 87218 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Romeo
Mendoza y Reyes and Jaime Rejali y Lina are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
accordingly, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The other portions of the trial court's decision, including the monetary
awards imposed against them, are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 18.
2 TSN, November 27, 1991, pp. 9-10.
3 TSN, September 24, 1991, p. 7.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
5 TSN, September 11, 1991, p. 3.
6 Exh. H-3; Records, p. 141.
7 TSN, November 27, 1991, p. 4.
8 According to Grace, it was Jaime Rejali who announced the hold-up (TSN,

September 24, 1991, p. 10) but according to Glory, it was the man seated across her
who did so (TSN, November 27, 1991, p. 5).
9 TSN, September 11, 1991, pp. 3-6; TSN, November 27, 1991, pp. 5-6.
10 TSN, September 11, 1991, p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 4.
12 Ibid., p. 4; Exh. A, Records, p. 123.
13 TSN, November 27, 1991, pp. 5-6.
14 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
15 Exh. A.
16 TSN, December 4, 1991, p. 4; Exhs. A-1 to A-4
17 Exh. C.
18 TSN, December 4, 1991, p. 3.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 Exh. J; TSN, September 24, 1991, p. 9.
21 TSN, September 24, 1991, p. 8.
22 Exh. G.
23 TSN, November 8, 1991, pp. 5-6.
24 TSN, January 8, 1992, pp. 4-7.
25 TSN, February 10, 1992, pp. 3-4.
26 TSN, February 10, 1992, pp. 9-12.
27 Presided by Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
28 Appellants' Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 34.
29 People vs. Nemeria, 242 SCRA 448 (March 20, 1995).
30 Exh. A.
31 People vs. Canceran, 229 SCRA 581 (January 31, 1994).
32 234 SCRA 645, 654 (August 2, 1994).
33 Appellants' Brief, pp. 8-9.
34 TSN, September 24, 1991, p. 10.
35 Ibid., p. 7.
36 TSN, November 27, 1991, p. 9.
37 This Court has held that the culprit was properly identified even if the witnesses
were five (5) meters away from the tent where the crime was committed and the tent
was lighted only by a kerosene lamp (People vs. Sabado, 168 SCRA 681
[December 22, 1988]); where the crime scene was lighted by a gasera aided by a
shining moon (People vs. Almenario, 172 SCRA 268 [April 17, 1989]); where the
eyewitness was able to recognize the culprit by the reflection of light from the nearby
houses (People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA 226 [August 30, 1990]); where the assailants
were six (6) meters away from the Meralco post and the witness was below a lighted
Coleman petromax (People vs. Riego, 194 SCRA 578 [February 27, 1991]).
38 People vs. Apawan, 235 SCRA 355 (August 16, 1994).
39 People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 (April 21, 1995).
40 TSN, September 24, 1991, p. 11.
41 People vs. Miraday, 242 SCRA 620 (March 23, 1995).
42 People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 (May 11, 1995).
43 219 SCRA 85, at p. 97 (February 17, 1993).
44 Ibid., p. 98.
45 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, 1988 ed., p. 170.
46 "Art. 306. Who are brigands-Penalty. When more than three armed persons form a

band of robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping
persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom, or for any other purpose to
be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers
or brigands. . . ."(emphasis supplied)
47 In People vs. Chanas (212 SCRA 65 [August 4, 1992]), two (2) persons were

charged of said crime and only the one arrested was convicted thereof while in
People vs. Matilla (l05 SCRA 768 [July 24, 1981]), only one (1) accused was
convicted thereof.
48 See also People vs. Ocimar (212 SCRA 646 [August 17, 1992]), where the

accused were six (6) in number, and People vs. Nebreja (203 SCRA 45 [October 17,
1991]), where they were five (5).
49 This decree defines Philippine highway as "any road, street, passage, highway,

and bridges or other parts thereof, or railways or railroad within the Philippines used
by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of
persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property or both."
50 Supra, at pp. 99-100.
51 "WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements

are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;.
"WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
"WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people;"
52 Supra, at p. 98.
53 People vs. Aczon, 225 SCRA 237 (August 10, 1993); Avecilla vs. People, 209

SCRA 466 (June 2, 1992).

54 Aquino, supra, at pp. 115-116.
55 People vs. Pamintuan, 222 SCRA 716, 722 (May 28, 1993).
56 People vs. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235 (May 22, 1995).
57 People vs. Escosio, 220 SCRA 475 (March 25, 1993).
58 People vs. Yabut, 226 SCRA 715, 721 (September 27, 1993).

G.R. No. 179041 April 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARNEL NOCUM,* REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO
POLING PANGANDAG (all at large), Accused,
REYNALDO MALLARI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00930, which dismissed the appeal of appellant Reynaldo
Mallari (Mallari) and affirmed with modification the December 15, 2003 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No.
00-551 finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping
with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On May 25, 2000, an Information3 was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arne!
Nocum (Nocum ), Rey Johnny Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and
Pandao Poling Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag (Pangandag) with violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
as amended by RA 7659.4 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for themselves
and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away one motor vehicle more particularly described as
follows:
:
Make/Type Toyota Tamaraw FX
-
:
Motor No. 7K-0157101
 -
:
Chassis
KF52-011609
No.
-
:
Plate No. PXT- 143
-
:
Color Med. Grey Net
-
valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of its owner, Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and
in the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said vehicle,
was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari
appeared as his co-accused remain at-large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.6
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed
member of "FX gang," a syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The
modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles, transport them to
Mindanao, and have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together
with Mallari and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping 7
before the RTC of Parañaque City but was later on discharged to be a state
witness.8 Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program
of the Department of Justice (DOJ).9
Mahilac testified that the "FX gang" was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. 10
Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who
was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte, 11 led the
Mindanao operations.12 Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.13
On September 6, 1998, while in Calamba, Laguna, Mahilac received a call from
Nocum14 informing him of Pangandag’s arrival in Manila on September 12, 1998. 15
Subsequently, Mahilac, Nocum, Pangandag, Ramos, Posadas and Mallari met in
Chowking fastfood restaurant in Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.16 During the said
meeting, Pangandag demanded that their group deliver two Toyota FX vehicles to
him in Lanao Del Norte by Monday or Tuesday of the following week. 17 Nocum
agreed and gave Mallari ₱20,000.00 for operating expenses. Mahilac received
₱3,500.00 and was instructed to meet the group in Cagayan de Oro City.18
As the group was departing from the restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi with plate number
PXT-143 passed-by.19 Mallari flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded the
same together with Ramos and Posadas.20 They proceeded south.21
On September 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in Cagayan de Oro City and proceeded to
McDonald’s Restaurant on Limketkai Street.22 Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived
at around 4:14 p.m. on board the same Toyota FX taxi that Mallari flagged down in
Muntinlupa City.23 They agreed to proceed to Iligan City en route to Tubod, Lanao
del Norte, where said vehicle was to be delivered to Pangandag. 24 Mallari told
Mahilac not to board the said vehicle because its back portion reeked of the dried
blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico Medel (Medel), who was stabbed to death
while resisting the group. Mallari also informed Mahilac that Medel’s corpse was
25

dumped somewhere in Atimonan, Quezon.26 Mahilac thus took a taxi to Iligan City.27
Upon their arrival in Iligan City, Pangandag instructed them to take the vehicle to his
residence in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.28 They arrived at Pangandag’s residence and
were given ₱250,000.00 as consideration for the vehicle. 29 Mahilac received
₱20,000.00 as his share.
The gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilac’s arrest by law
enforcement officers.30
In the meantime, on September 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of
decomposition was found along Zigzag Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan,
Quezon. It was interred in the municipal cemetery of Atimonan, Quezon but was
later on exhumed for identification.31 Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece
of white "FILA" shoe,32 the mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the
cadaver to be that of Medel.
Appellant's Version
Mallari denied any knowledge of the carnapping incident. 33 He also denied knowing
Nocum, Ramos and Posadas.34 He testified that he was with his wife and two
children in their home in Tunasan, Muntinlupa City at the time the alleged
carnapping occurred.35 He claimed that on June 25, 1999, four men in civilian
clothes came to his house and forced him to board a van 36 where he was
blindfolded. He was then taken to Camp Crame, Quezon City.37
According to Mallari, Mahilac was his employer.38 He was unaware of Mahilac’s
reason for implicating him in the case.39
Mallari further testified that while in detention, he was made to sign a document
which he cannot remember.40 He was taken to the DOJ and told that his case would
be studied if he signs a document the contents of which were duly explained to
him.41 Should he not sign the same, he will be charged immediately with carnapping
with homicide.42 He therefore decided to sign the documents without the assistance
of a lawyer, but continued to be detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City.43
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision 44 finding Mallari guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the
testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of the FX taxi and the killing
of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It
also found that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with
Mallari and all the accused doing their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation
of their common criminal objective.45
The trial court further held that Mahilac would not have known about the killing of
Medel if he had not been informed by Mallari. He had no reason to falsely accuse
Mallari and even implicated himself by: (1) admitting his presence during the
planned theft of the FX taxi; (2) admitting his presence in Cagayan De Oro City
together with Mallari; (3) directing Mallari and his co-accused to proceed with him to
Pangandag in Lanao Del Norte; and (4) receiving the sum of ₱20,000.00 as his
share in the criminal operation.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, Accused Reynaldo Mallari is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE and is hereby
sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The Jail Warden of Muntinlupa City is hereby directed to bring Reynaldo Mallari to
the New Bilibid Prison where he may serve his sentence.
It Is SO ORDERED.46
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision47 affirming with modification the
ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification
of Mallari as a member of the "FX gang" and his participation in the theft of the FX
taxi and killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The discovery of the remains of Medel in the
vicinity mentioned by Mallari to Mahilac also gave credence to the latter’s testimony.
The CA further held that the trial court’s determination on the credibility of Mahilac
must be given great respect and, as a rule, will not be reversed on appeal in the
absence of cogent reason. The CA also found no ill-motive on the part of Mahilac to
testify falsely against Mallari.
According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole
witness is of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict
Mallari,48 whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the straightforward
testimony of the former.49
However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
RA 934650 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.51
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed December 15, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276, in Criminal Case No. 00-551, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, which did away with the imposition of death
penalty.
SO ORDERED.52
Mallari filed a Notice of Appeal.53 On October 15, 2007,54 we accepted the appeal
and notified the parties to file their supplemental briefs. However, Mallari opted not
to file a supplemental brief in the absence of new issues to be raised. For its part,
the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is likewise adopting the
Appellee’s Brief it filed with the CA as its Supplemental Brief.55
The Assignment of Errors
The errors assigned in the Appellant’s Brief are as follows:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE THE LACK OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVICTION;
and
II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE LACK OF
EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MERE ALLEGATION BY THE LONE
PROSECUTION WITNESS CHRIS MAHILAC THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ERIC MEDEL.56
Mallari assails the credibility of Mahilac. He contends that as a state witness under
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, Mahilac would implicate just any person
as his cohort to justify his inclusion in the program.57 Mallari also argues that the
evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.58
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to convict Mallari.59 Finally, the prosecution sought civil indemnity and
moral damages of ₱50,000.00 each.60
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Carnapping defined; Burden of the prosecution in a case for Carnapping with
Homicide.
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The crime
of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 1461 of the said law, as
amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that:
(1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal design was carnapping;
(3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 62
The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its
burden of proving that Mallari was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping
with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven by Medel after
he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and
appellate courts found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of
the carnapping.
We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s culpability.
The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one
of the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial
evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly
established by the confluence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he
was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the "FX Gang,"
gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to
unscrupulous buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw
Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other
conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days
later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the
same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original
criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his purpose without
the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan de
Oro City, its driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried
human blood. Upon inquiry by Mahilac, Mallari admitted that the dried blood
belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group. Mallari also told him
that Medel’s body was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari
and his co-accused received ₱250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX taxi to its final
destination. These prove that Medel was killed in the course of the commission of
the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and wife
who both stated that he was the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by Mallari
and his co-conspirators.63 The two later on identified his corpse when it was
discovered in the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where they
dumped the dead body of Medel.64
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as
well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone,
fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven
by Medel and in killing him.
Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no credence.
Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the time the
crime was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety, leads to the
reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime.
Moreover, alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated. 65 Hence,
it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if
not, is fatal to the accused.66 Here, Mallari could have presented evidence to support
his alibi, but oddly, he did not. Thus, such a defense fails.
The Penalty
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended
by Section 20 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 67 In this case, the trial
court considered as aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a
member of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the RPC as
amended by RA 765968 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.
However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and
qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information. This new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is
favorable to the appellant.69 Here, there is no allegation in the Information that
Mallari was a member of a syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed
part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain,
which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group." 70 Hence, the same
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in
consonance with Article 63(2) of the RPC, which provides that in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.71
Mallari is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 72 of RA 9346.
The Damages
For the killing of Medel, we award to his heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.73 Said heirs are also entitled to an
award of moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 as in all cases of murder and
homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 74
We cannot, however, award actual damages due to the absence of receipts to
substantiate the expenses incurred for Medel’s funeral. The rule is that only duly
receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages. 75 "Nonetheless, under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount
was not proved."76 We therefore award the sum of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of Medel.. "In addition, and in
conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6o/o from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid."77
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00930 finding appellant Reynaldo Mallari guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide is
AFFIRMED with the following modifications: ( 1) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
and, (2) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is ordered to pay the heirs of Erico Medel the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and interest on all
these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
61Republic Act No. 6539, Section 14 previously reads:
Penalty of carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping
is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of life imprisonment
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping.
As amended, it now provides as follows:
Penalty for carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping
is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

G.R. No. 187044 September 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y
VILLAROSA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also
known as Renat Gawan, and James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the
Court of Appeals’ October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869, for
affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Carnapping in Criminal Case No. 21-4949.
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping
as defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 143 of Republic Act No.
6539. The accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving with each other, and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain
and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing
Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and
owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱ 70,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the
above-named accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping each other,
and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound the said JOSE
BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the
body of the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds which
directly caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.
Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005. 5 Palalay, on the other
hand, did not enter any plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for
him.6
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 7 In
their plea-bargaining proposal,8 they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the
crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and that the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a
wrong be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at ₱
120,000.00. This proposal was rejected9 by the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial
conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the following facts as admitted
by the parties:
1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn.
Guillermo road by members of the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson
Dulay and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in
Alicia, Isabela.
3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as
described in the Autopsy Report and death certificate which shall be submitted
during trial.10
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose
Biag (Biag), to testify on the circumstances leading to Biag’s disappearance and the
discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s tricycle, and the expenses she incurred
and the income she had lost as a result of her husband’s death. Florida testified that
her husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.11 On April 12,
2005, at around two o’clock in the morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle
for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when news reached her
that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of
Alicia and that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident,
Florida sought the help of their Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who
immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain
Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband. 13 Florida then
presented in court the receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her
husband’s wake and funeral and for the repair of their tricycle, which was recovered
with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer,
a tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless
nights.15
The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe
Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy.
Captain Dulay received Florida’s report, they immediately went to the Alicia Police
Station, wherein they found Biag’s tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the
identification card recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used
in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a certain
Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that
the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San
Guillermo Road. They were thereafter shown the two suspects and the place where
Biag’s body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able to identify the body as
Biag’s, which was almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only
because Biag had a mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of. 16
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the
witness stand next. He testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with
other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report from
Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying
Station in Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male
persons. PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of Police
composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan
Abuan, to verify the veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw
the tricycle described to them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two
accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team were about
to approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered" 17 to different directions.
After "collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station
together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they
reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for
both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They
allegedly kept silent even after they were informed of their rights not only to remain
as such, but also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to
them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they
unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He
also personally found a wallet containing the tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and
Official Receipt18 issued by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag.
When they asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay
voluntarily answered that the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle,
whom they killed and dumped along Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when
they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation,
they again informed Lagat and Palalay that anything they say would be used against
them, and that they had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the
PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused, they
proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a
ravine just after the bridge near the road.19
The prosecution’s last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador’s testimony
on the events that led them to the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body
of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvador’s claim that they had informed the two
accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with
their investigation.20 PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how
they killed Biag, to wit:
A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan.
And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away.
They chased him and stabbed him, sir.21
Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the
murder weapon despite diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the
people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that the two accused had no
other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and
Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any
time during the custodial investigation.22
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr.
Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of
Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed between 12:00 noon
and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an
incise wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the
abdomen."24
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence25 without leave of court26 on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that
their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they
were interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third
person to assist them. Moreover, the admissions they allegedly made were not
supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoa’s
testimony showed that he had a "swelling above his right eye" and "a knife wound in
his left arm," which suggests that he was maltreated while under police custody. 27
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to convict them. They averred that aside from the
alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing else: they had no
object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder
weapon was never found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was
presented to show that they were in possession of the tricycle at the time they were
arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus,
they were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof
that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect
waived their right to present evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.29
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the
accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of them to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the
sum of Twelve thousand three hundred pesos (₱ 12,300.00) as actual damages plus
Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for death indemnity and another Fifty thousand
pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for moral damages.30
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the
accused that their rights were violated during their custodial investigation as they
had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they had made, whether
voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in
evidence.31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution
was able to establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and
Palalay committed the crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag’s tricycle,
loaded with stolen palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag’s wallet with documents
to prove that Biag owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag,
and this was how the barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that
Biag’s tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and
Rumbaoa to where they dumped Biag’s body.32
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the
killing of Biag, which, according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the
course of the carnapping.33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it
erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and in
relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.34
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the
witnesses were credible and supported by the attending facts and circumstances,
and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the accused.
Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence,
to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each and every
hypothesis consistent with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their
situation. They elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated
could not be taken against them:
1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this
case), and not the tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag
himself. They could have easily been Palalay’s, who was shown to have a knife
wound; and
4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine
where Biag’s body was dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel,
which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in evidence.39
On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago
City, in Criminal Case No. 21-4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are
ordered to pay to private complainant the increased amount of ₱ 14,900.00 as actual
damages.40
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the
elements of carnapping were all present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they
were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation
as to how they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also
agreed with the RTC that whatever confession or admission the Alicia PNP
extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for having been done
without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the
RTC’s judgment as it was "convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence
supported the conviction of the accused for qualified carnapping:
1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;
2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April
13, 2005;
3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it,
together with the original receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of Jose Biag;
4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and
Lagat to Brgy. Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;
5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his
corpse in a ravine; and
6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained
tricycle immediately after their arrest.41
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited
before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.42
Ruling of the Court
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified
carnapping under Republic Act. No. 653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Section 2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things.
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes
if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor
vehicle with no power rating.44
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.45
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and
were proven during trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by
the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from
this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene
when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all,
Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their
unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the
unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states
that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be
proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is
unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.47 As mentioned above, all these were
proven by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay
had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In People v. Bustinera, 48 this Court defined
"unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same.49
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as
they were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they
obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to
sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and
said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the
act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owner’s consent constitutes gain.50
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now
go to the argument of the two accused that they cannot be convicted based on the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded
on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection
between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.52
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.53
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those
that are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a
whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable
doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that
it, together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen
tricycle packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the
moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in
possession of Biag’s tricycle.
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle
upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy
done on him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and
Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two
accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before,
during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common
purpose and design.54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are
consistent with one another and the only rational proposition that can be drawn
therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping,
as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.) (Emphasis
ours)
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
the RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱ 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of Jose Biag and ₱ 50,000.00 as moral
damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his untimely death.
However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than
₱ 25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱ 25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. 55 Thus, an award of ₱
25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of ₱ 14,900.00 that the Court
of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of
the Civil Code, the accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs. 56 In People
v. Jadap,57 this Court said:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented to
prove the claim of the victim’s heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning
capacity. However, the victim’s father testified that at the time of his son’s death, he
was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of ₱
3,000.00. We find the father’s testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages for
loss of earning capacity.58
Biag’s widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle
driver, and that his income amounted to ₱ 40,000.00 per cropping season as a
farmer, ₱ 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and ₱ 300.00 per day as a tricycle driver.
However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining to Biag’s
appointment as a tanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider
only his earnings as a tricycle driver. According to the death certificate 59 submitted
by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his death.1âwphi1
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased is based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the
heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x
80 – age of the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted
from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality.60 Net income is computed by
deducting from the amount of the victim’s gross income the amount of his living
expenses. As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net income is estimated
to be 50% of the gross annual income.61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased is computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses]62
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual
income]
= 2/3 [80-56] x [₱ 109,500.00 - ₱ 54,750.00]
= 16 x ₱ 54,750.00
= ₱ 876,000.00
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato
Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim Jose Biag the following: (a) ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱
50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱
876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213913, September 02, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULKIPLI
ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN A.K.A."JUL" AND "REY", Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated May 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated October 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Comt (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos.
MC08-11421 and MC08-11422.

The consolidated cases for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, and Qualified Theft were filed
on January 16, 2008 against accused Julkipli Asamuddin y Salapudin
(appellant). The accusatory portions of the Informations alleged as
follow:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421:

For Violation of R.A. No. 6539

That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, ste[a]l and carry away a motorcycle, Honda XRM with
plate no. UU-9142 amounting to P49,000.00 belonging to EMELINA
GLORIA Y UMAL[I] without the latter's consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned sum ofP49,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3cralawrednad

Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422:

For Qualified Theft

That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then employed as a messenger of E. Gloria's
Money Changer owned by Emelina Gloria y Umali, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of the trust reposed upon him, with
intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away cash money of various denominations P800,000.00, Yen
660,000.00, Pounds 50.00, Dirham 530.00, Brunei Dollar 100.00 and
Singapore Dollar 467.00 with an aggregate amount of P1,077,995.00, to
the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned
amount of P1,077,995.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The criminal cases were temporarily archived, but were revived with the
arrest of appellant in Zamboanga City on February 25, 2009.

Assisted by a counsel de oficio at his arraignment on August 19, 2009,

appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.5cralawrednad

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Emelina Gloria y Umali

(Emelina), proprietor of E. Gloria Money Changer where appellant works
as a messenger; and fmee Gerbon6 (Imee), domestic helper of Emelina.
Among the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution were (1)
the list of currencies Emelina entrusted to appellant that fateful day of
July 11, 2007 (Exhibit "F"7); and (2) Sales Invoice Retail No. 16607
(Exhibit "I"8), Official Receipt (Exhibit "J''9), and certification (Exhibit
"K"10), all issued by Triumph JT Marketing Corporation, which show that
the Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 was purchased by
Emelina's husband.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He denied the

charges against him.

THE FACTS

Emelina hired appellant as messenger in E. Gloria Money Changer,

Mandaluyong City, sometime in 2006, with the main function of delivering
local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers.11 Assigned
to appellant to be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda
XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142.12cralawrednad

At 12:30 in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, Emelina handed to appellant

the cash amount of P800,000.00, and various foreign denominations
consisting of 66 pieces of lapad,13 50 pounds, 530 dirhams, 467
Singaporean dollars, and 100 Brunei dollars,14 with a peso value of
P277,995.00.15 She instructed appellant to bring the currencies to her
friend Rina Rosalial, a money changer in Mabini, Manila.16 After receiving
the monies from Emelina, appellant left aboard his service motorcycle on
his way to Manila.17cralawrednad
Imee, the domestic helper of Emelina, was then inside E. Gloria Money
Changer, and saw Emelina hand to appellant currencies of various
denominations,18 and as appellant left his service
motorcycle.19cralawrednad

By 1:30 p.m. of the same day, Emelina received a call from Rina Rosalial
informing her that appellant has yet to arrive in her shop.20 Emelina's
calls to the cellular phones of appellant and his wife were at naught, 21
prompting her to lodge a complaint against appellant at the Philippine
National Police, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),
Camp Crame.22cralawrednad

In August 2007, the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-
9142 was found abandoned in Silang, Cavite, and was returned to
Emelina.23cralawrednad

Appellant vehemently denied asporting currency totaling P1,077,995.00,

and the subject motorcycle. He admitted working as a Messenger/Runner
at the E. Gloria Money Changer starting October 2006 but he resigned
from his job on July 10, 2007. Appellant asserted that the money he
received from Emelina on July 11, 2007 was his last salary for the period
July 1 to 10, 2007. His family's return to Zamboanga City on September
7, 2007 was due to the high cost of living in Metro Manila which he could
no longer afford.24cralawrednad

Relying on the categorical and straightforward testimony of Emelina, and

rejecting the defense of denial advanced by appellant, the RTC rendered a
guilty verdict in both criminal cases, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the

accused JULKIPILI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN @ ''Jul" and "Rey"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972)[,] as amended[,] and he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, as maximum. Likewise[,] the court finds JULKIPLI
ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with all the accessories of the
penalty imposed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is
also condemned to pay the offended party, EMELINA GLORIA Y UMALI[,]
the sum of Php1,877,995.00, as actual damages representing the total
amount of the money entrusted to him by the said offended party.

Further, let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused

JULKlPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey" from
Mandaluyong City Jail to the BBureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED.25cralawred

On November 6, 2012, appellant timely tiled his Notice of Appeal.26 The

consolidated cases were subsequently elevated to the CA, and was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870. Before the CA, appellant
ascribed to the RTC the following errors:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING [APPELLANT'S]

TESTIMONY.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF

QUALIFIED THEFT AND CARNAPPING DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.27

In the Decision dated May 22, 2014, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal but modified appellant's civil liability in Criminal Case No. MC08-
11422 by reducing the awarded actual damages from P1,877,995.00 to
P1,077,995.00.28 The appellate court emphasized that the amount alleged
in the Information for Qualified Theft, and established by Exhibit "F" was
only PI,077,995.00.29cralawrednad

Appellant perfected his appeal to this Court with the timely filing of a
Notice of Appeal on June 16, 2014.30 The Solicitor General and appellant
separately manifested to adopt their respective briefs filed before the CA
as their supplemental briefs.31cralawrednad

The main issue for resolution is whether the CA correctly affirmed the
conviction of the appellant for Qualified Theft and Carnapping.
The Court rules in the affirmative and finds the appeal without merit.

Appellant primarily assails the testimony of Emelina to be inadequate to

anchor his conviction for the crimes charged. Branding Emelina's
testimony to be self-serving, unsubstantiated, and uncorroborated by
documentary and credible testimonial evidence, appellant asserted that
no credible proof was presented by the prosecution to establish that he
actually received from Emelina the subject peso and foreign currencies
and that he used and unlawfully took away the service motorcycle.

When the credibility of the witness is in issue, the settled rule is that the
trial court's assessment thereof is accorded great weight by appellate
courts absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain matters
which, if taken into consideration, would have materially affected the
outcome of the case.32 And where the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.33 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left to
the trial court judge because of his untrammeled opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness on the stand and, thus, to determine
whether he or she is telling the truth.34 After a circumspect scrutiny of the
records of the case, we find no reason to modify, alter or reverse the
factual finding of the lower court and affirmed by the CA that in the
afternoon of July 11, 2007, appellant received money from Emelina; used
his service motorcycle; and disappeared with the money and the
motorcycle.

Moreover, appellant failed to establish the alleged ill-motive of Emelina in

implicating him in the present case. No evidence was presented to show
that the business of Emelina incurred losses that needed to be concealed
from her business partners. Absent any improper motive to falsely testify
against the appellant, Emelina's declarations are worthy of full faith and
credence.35 In like manner, Imee's employment as the domestic servant
of Emelina is not a ground to disregard her testimony. Relationship alone
is not enough reason to discredit and label Imee's testimony as biased
and unworthy of credence. It is settled that the witness' relationship to
the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her
testimony.36cralawrednad

We now resolve the criminal liability of the appellant for the unlawful
taking of the service motorcycle, and the peso and foreign currencies
amounting to a total of P1,077,995.00.
I. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421 (For Violation of R.A. No. 6539)

The elements of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539,

as amended, are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;

(2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of

violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things;
and

(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37cralawrednad

All these elements were established by the prosecution beyond

reasonable doubt.

Exhibits "I"38 "J"39 and "K",40 proved that the blue Honda XRM motorcycle
with plate number UU-9142 used as a service vehicle by appellant was
acquired from Triumph JT Marketing Corporation by Manolito, Emelina's
spouse, establishing the first element.

It is the second element that the appellant claimed was not proven
because the prosecution's evidence failed to show that he took the
motorcycle without the consent of Emelina. Indeed, Emelina herself
tasked the appellant to proceed to Mabini, Manila, and permitted him to
use the service motorcycle.

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle

without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.41 In Roque v.
People,42 the Court ruled that qualified theft may be committed even
when the personal property is in the lawful possession of the accused
prior to the commission of the felony. The concept of unlawful taking in
theft, robbery and carnapping being the same,43the holding in Roque v.
People44 equally applies to carnapping. Henee, in People v. Bustinera,45
appellant, who was hired as taxi driver, was found guilty of carnapping
under R.A. No. 6539 after he failed to return the Daewoo Racer taxi
assigned to him by the cab company where he was employed.
In the present case, the Solicitor General aptly argued that appellant's
failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after his working hours from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.46 constitutes "unlawful taking". Emelina lodged a
complaint against appellant with the PNP-CIDG for the loss of the service
motorcycle47 confirming that appellant's continued possession thereof is
without her authority.

The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle will not preclude the
presence of the third element. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain or animus lucrandi.48 Intent to gain is
an internal act presumed from the unlawful taking49 of the motor vehicle
which the appellant failed to overcome with evidence to the contrary.
Verily, the mere use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes
gain.50cralawrednad

Appellant is thus guilty of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539.

II. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422 (For Qualified Theft)

Appellant asserted that he cannot be convicted of Qualified Theft because

his employment as messenger did not create a fiduciary relationship that
will qualify the crime of theft. He also insisted that Exhibit "F" is self-
serving and is incompetent to establish the amount of money handed to
him by Emelina.

For the successful prosecution for Qualified Theft committed with grave
abuse of confidence, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt the following elements: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that
the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's consent; (5)
that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave
abuse of confidence.51cralawrednad

All these elements are present in the instant case. Emelina positively and
credibly testified that she entrusted to appellant the amount of
P800,000.00 and foreign currencies valued at P277,995.00. Instead of
delivering the money to the designated money changer as directed by
Emelina, appellant breached the trust reposed in him and disappeared
with the cash bills.
We agree with the RTC and the CA that a fiduciary relationship between
appellant and Emelina, his employer, existed contrary to the assertion of
appellant.

In Candelaria v. People,52 petitioner Candelaria was the driver of the truck

loaded with liters of diesel fuel for delivery to a customer. Instead of
delivering the fuel, petitioner Candelaria disappeared together with the
truck and its cargo. With the recovery of the truck, petitioner Candelaria
was convicted of Qualified Theft for the lost fuel.

Here, the function of the appellant as a messenger of the E. Gloria Money

Changer is to deliver amounts of money, both peso and foreign currency,
to the clients or to exchange the currency with another money changer.
Emelina routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily basis, various amounts
of money from P50,000.00 to P500,000.0053 without requiring the latter
to acknowledge receipt thereof. Emelina testified that she does not have
proof that he handed to appellant P800,000.00 and various foreign
currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total trust and high degree of
confidence on appellant ("tiwalaan lang po").54 This exhibited the trust
and confidence of Emelina to the appellant which he exploited to enrich
himself to the damage and prejudice of the former.

The straightforward and credible testimony55 of Emelina is adequate to

establish the exact amount of money handed to appellant. She could not
have forgotten about the denominations given to appellant as the same is
subject of her transaction with a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and
she counted56 the same before handing it to appellant. Thus, the
testimony of Emelina sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that
she delivered to appellant monies valued in the total amount of
P1,077,995.00.

APPELLANT'S DEFENSE

The lame defense of denial is all that appellant could offer against the
prosecution evidence. Denial is a negative and self-serving evidence that
requires to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence of
non-culpability to merit credibility.57 Otherwise, it will not overcome the
testimony of the prosecution witness/es who testified on affirmative
matters.58 Except for the testimonial assertion of appellant in the present
case, no credible corroborating evidence was presented by the defense to
bolster his denial. Emelina's positive assertions that she handed to
appellant the money to be delivered to a money changer in Mabini,
Manila, and that he did not return the service motorcycle, prevail over the
denial of the appellant. Appellant's admission59 that he was at E. Gloria
Money Changer shop in the morning of July 11, 2007 further served to
bolster the testimony of Emelina.

In the face of the overwhelming and positive evidence against the

appellant, even if his return to Zamboanga City is disregarded as an
indication of his guilty conscience, his conviction should still be sustained.
Unfortunately for appellant, there is no case law holding non-flight as an
indication or as conclusive proof of innocence.60cralawrednad

THE PENALTIES

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed in Criminal Case No.
MCOS-11421 (for carnapping) the penalty of 14 years and 8 months, as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, which is within the
range of the imposable penalty under Section 14 of R.A. No.
6539:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Further, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua

for Qualified Theft in Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422. Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished

by:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if

the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one.
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year tor each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

The basic penalty when the value of the stolen item exceeded
P22,000.00 is the maximum period of the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods which is 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to
10 years of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of
imprisonment, the difference after deducting P22,000.00 shall be divided
by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The
amount of cash stolen by appellant is P1,077,995.00. Thus, 105 years61
shall be added to the basic penalty. However, the penalty for Simple
Theft cannot go beyond 20 years of reclusion temporal, and such will be
the sentence of appellant if he committed Simple Theft.

The penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher under Article 31062
of the Revised Penal Code, thus appellant was correctly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. However, appellant is disqualified under R.A. No.
9346,63 in relation to Resolution No. 24-4-1064 to avail the benefits of
parole.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision

dated May 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05870 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.65cralawrednad

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED

G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding
appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for
the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9 th day of January, 1997, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi
Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address
at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free
access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by
his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth
₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of ₱303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the
taxicab business of his father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to
drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant
would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to
ESC Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per
day.5
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi,
but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi
driver of the taxi company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: ₱780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with
that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also
sign something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the
procedure reflect (sic) by your company when you return a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir. 6
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to
ascertain why the taxi was not returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not
find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived. 8
Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police
station and reported that his taxi was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and
revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon
City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the
taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on
December 25, 1996 as he was short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not
abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5, 1997;12 and that on
December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.00 13 to his wife whom he
instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee 14 and to tell
the latter that he could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.15
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the
garage to remit the boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996), 16
Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi.17
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed
the record book,18 which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it
and gave his employer ₱2,500.0019 as partial payment for the boundary fee covering
the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he
left his driver’s license with Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only
work he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and with the obligation to pay
the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February
18, 1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00, 21 until
March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his
obligation;22 and that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s license was
returned to him.23
Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and
that he had in fact paid the total amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May 17, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as charged, and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the
preventive imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE
BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE
FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED
THEFT.25
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may
be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310
has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING
CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing,
or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter,29 or have the same purpose or object,30 the rule dictates that they
should be construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus
interpretandi modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence,32 as this Court
explained in City of Naga v. Agna,33 viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that
they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same
legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in
mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act
with reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to
have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied
in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all
should be construed together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the
same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if
possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect
may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision
and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall
prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will . . .34 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs
to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without
the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.35
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption,
or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines
"carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1)
the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the
consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. 37
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. 39
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and
in the later case of People v. Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha
motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or
robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from
the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It
particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special
law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-
carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles.
Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or
without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft
or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.42
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful
taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as
roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks,
and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles
would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the
provisions on robbery, respectively.43
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a
Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft
which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions
mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for
qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of
carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct
name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling
but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the
crime.44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the
taxi owned by Cipriano without the latter’s consent. 45 Thus, the indictment alleges
every element of the crime of carnapping,46 and the prosecution proved the same.
Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.47
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was
hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it
to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one.49 Appellant
himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with
Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the
₱2,500.00, you also told her to go to the company to ask the company for
permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still short of the boundary.
Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between December
27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the
company to that request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use
of the taxicab without first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the
same to the company, you still went ahead and make (sic) use of it and returned it
only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the
mere taking of the taxi without the owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for
failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his earnings that
day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of
the taxi was not permanent in character, he having returned it.
Appellant’s position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration
is the intent to gain.52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from
the act which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of
Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice
Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance
policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the
latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there
being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was
"temporary" and for a "joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that which
holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or
learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because
by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard
who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls
it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the
taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject
vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of
₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten (10) days. He
could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner.
On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27,
1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to
Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife
on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.59
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear
showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the
result of the case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct
advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial. 61
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any
scintilla of evidence that he indeed returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my
driver’s license with them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic)
boundary, did you turn over any money to your employer when you returned the
taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness
(sic) or short boundary (sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement
was that I have to pay the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied)
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book
indicating that he returned the taxi on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of
₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the
documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record
book is in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as
appellant has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the production
of evidence on his behalf.63
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it
erred in the imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime
was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as
the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of
application, either by express provision or by necessary implication. 64
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are
without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be
no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code
or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules
for felonies under the Code.65
Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty
imposed was the indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to
17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own
penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There
can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under
the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or
applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that
the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually
equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such
technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the
Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to
Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we
hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-appellants is an
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months, as maximum.67 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months, 68 for, as
discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied
suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence cannot be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall
not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a
range.70
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Records at 90-94.
2 ART. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties

next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if
the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
3 Records at 1-2.
4 Id. at 36.
5 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), July 10, 2000 at 8.
6 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 5-8.
7 TSN, July 10, 2000 at 14.
8 Id. at 9.
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 9-10.
11 Id. at 10.
12 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 8.
13 Ibid. On cross-examination however, appellant later claimed that the amount he

gave was ₱2,500.00.

14 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 18.
15 Id. at 8.
16 Id. at 21.
17 Id. at 20.
18 Id. at 9.
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 26.
21 Id. at 29.
22 Id. at 30.
23 Ibid.
24 Records at 93.
25 Rollo at 40.
26 People v. Salvador, 398 SCRA 394, 412 (2003); People v. Napalit, 396 SCRA

687, 699 (2003); People v. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195, 204 (2003).
27 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended defines motor vehicle as follows:

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-
sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on
rails or tracts, and tractors, trailers and reaction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels,
when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall
be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
28 Statutes which are in pari materia may be independent or amendatory in form;

they may be complete enactments dealing with a single, limited subject matter or
sections of a code or revision; or they may be a combination of these. [2B N. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction 140 (5th ed., 1992)]
29 Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680, 687 (1994).
30 Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 145 SCRA 385, 394 (1986);

City of Naga v. Agna, 71 SCRA 176, 184 (1976).

31 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed., 1990) translates the maxim as "to interpret, and

[in such a way as] to harmonize laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation."
32 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

276 SCRA 681, 696 (1997); Natividad v. Felix, supra; Corona v. Court of Appeals,
214 SCRA 378, 392 (1992).
33 71 SCRA 176 (1976).
34 Id. at 184.
35 People v. Sison, 322 SCRA 345, 363-364 (2000).
36 Id. at 364.
37 People v. Napalit, supra at 700; People v. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332, 342 (2000).
38 People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002).
39 People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 132788, October 23, 2003; People v. Sia, 370

SCRA 123, 134 (2001); People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, 334 (2000).
40 323 SCRA 30 (2000).
41 388 SCRA 417 (2002).
42 People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002); People v. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, 39

(2000).
43 Vide Izon v. People, 107 SCRA 118, 123 (1981) where this Court said the

following:
From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as authoritative,
highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the
law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor
vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the
streets with or without the required license, same comes within the protection of the
law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or
highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to
which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or
unregistered as when they have just been bought from the company, or only
on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping
statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the
Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the
anti-carnapping law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any
vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for
private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not
included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as
defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
44 People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450, 469 (2000); People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86,

94 (2000); People v. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404, 416 (2000); People v. Diaz, 320
SCRA 168, 175 (1999).
45 Records at 1-2.
46 It should be noted that appellant cannot be charged with estafa as it was not

alleged in the information that he had juridical possession of the motor vehicle. In
Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492 (1990), this Court distinguished between theft
and estafa to wit:
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between
the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives
the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft
even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only
with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement
or estafa. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Moreover, in People v. Isaac, 96 Phil. 931 (1955), this Court convicted a jeepney
driver of theft and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its owner since
the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its owner, although physically
held by the driver. The Court reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of
the jeepney because the Public Service Law and its regulations prohibit a motor
vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract with any person if by the
terms thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a
fixed rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the "boundary system,"
legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the owner. Thus, the
accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of the owner’s.
47 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 5-8.
48 People v. Ellasos, 358 SCRA 516, 527 (2001).
49 Vide People v. Isaac, supra, where this Court convicted Isaac, who was hired as a

temporary driver of a public service vehicle – a jeepney –of the crime of theft when
he did not return the same.
50 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 22-23.
51 People v. Ellasos, supra; People v. Gulinao, 179 SCRA 774, 780 (1989).
52 Venturina v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 40, 46 (1991); People v. Seranilla, 161

SCRA 193, 207 (1988).

53 3 R. Aquino & C. Grino-Aquino, The Revised Penal Code 206 (1997).
54 Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co,

Inc., 124 SCRA 618, 620-621 (1983); Villacarta v. Insurance Commission, 100
SCRA 467, 474-475 (1980).
55 100 SCRA 467 (1980).
56 124 SCRA 618, 620-621 (1983).
57 According to Justice Florenz Regalado [F. Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus

543-544 (2003)], historically, opinion as to whether or not the unlawful taking of the
personal property belonging to another must be coupled with the intent of the
offender to permanently deprive the owner of the said property has been divided:
(1) In one robbery case, it was held that there must be permanency in the taking, or
in the intent for the asportation, of the stolen property (People v. Kho Choc, CA, 50
O.G. 1667).
(2) In several theft cases, there were divided opinions, one line of cases holding that
the intent of the taking was to permanently deprive the owner thereof (People v.
Galang, CA, 43 O.G. 577; People v. Rico, CA, 50 O.G. 3103, cf. People v. Roxas,
CA-G.R. No. 14953, Oct. 31, 1956). The contrary group of cases argued that
there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere
disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner was already apoderamiento
(People v. Fernandez, CA, 38 O.G. 985; People v. Martisano, CA, 48 O.G. 4417).
(3) The second line of cases holding that there need be no intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his property was later adopted by the
Supreme Court, in construing the theft clause in an insurance policy, and ruling that
there was criminal liability for theft even if the car was taken out only for a joyride but
without the owner’s knowledge or consent. (Villacorta v. Insurance Comm., et al.,
G.R. No. 54171, Oct. 28, 1980; Ass’n of Baptists for World Evangelism v. Fieldmen’s
Ins. Co, Inc., G.R. No. L-28772, Sept. 21, 1983). (Emphasis supplied)
58 Villacorta v. Insurance Commission, supra.
59 Records at 93.
60 People v. Muros, G.R. No. 142511, February 16, 2004.
61 Ibid.
62 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 9-10.
63 Rules of Court, Rule 115, sec. 1, par. (g); Vide People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA

235, 255-256 (1995), where this Court said the following:

Just like appellant Williams, she sought to buttress her aforesaid contention by
lamenting the alleged failure of the State to present in the trial court her baggage
declaration and the confiscation receipt involving these pieces of her baggage. In the
first place, it was not the duty of the prosecution to present these alleged documents
on which she relies for her defense. And, just as in the case of appellant
Williams, it is a source of puzzlement why she never sought to compel either
the prosecutors to produce the aforesaid documents which were allegedly in
the possession of the latter or the customs office where such declarations are
on file. Contrary to her argument hereon, since such pieces of evidence were
equally available to both parties if sought by subpoena duces tecum, no
presumption of suppression of evidence can be drawn, and these
considerations likewise apply to the thesis of appellant Williams. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
64 People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 574 (1994).
65 Id. at 576.
66 310 SCRA 66 (1999).
67 Id. at 99-100. It should be noted, however, that the passage of Republic Act No.

7659, otherwise known as "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON

CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," introduced three amendments to the anti-carnapping law: (1)
the change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion
of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to
"in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
[People v. Latayada, G.R. No. 146865, February 18, 2004; People v. Santos, supra
at 333; People v. Paramil, 329 SCRA 456, 464 (2000); People v. Mejia, 275 SCRA
127, 153 (1997)] With the amendment of the penalty to life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code can be suppletorily applied in
qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form as defined in Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659 –
whenever the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. In People v.
Simon [234 SCRA 555, 574 (1994)], this Court said that when an offense is defined
and punished under a special law but its penalty is taken from the Revised Penal
Code, then the provisions of the said Code would apply suppletorily. In the case at
bar however, appellant is not being charged with qualified or aggravated carnapping,
but only carnapping under the first clause of the anti-carnapping law. Since the
imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot
be applied suppletorily.
68 SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. – Any person who is found guilty of carnapping,

as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen
years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months,
when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and
four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
69 SECTION 1. Hereinafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punishable

by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense
is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

G.R. No. 127500 June 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOEL SANTOS y CRISPINO and FELICIANO FUNCION alias JON-JON,
accused, NOEL SANTOS y CRISPINO, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 117, 1 convicting accused-appellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, also known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, on the basis of an Information the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, and by means of violence employed against RUEL VALENTINO
MORALES, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive
away from the latter a Toyota Tamaraw, bearing Plate No. UAM 540, Engine No. 2-
C 2928663 and Chassis No. CF50-0012454 valued at P387,000.00 and belonging to
TEODULO NATIVIDAD y DELA CRUZ, to the damage and prejudice of said owner
in the amount of P387,000.00; that as a result of the violence employed on the
person of RUEL VALENTINO MORALES, the latter sustained injuries which caused
his death.2
The above Information, which named as accused Noel Santos and one John Doe,
was amended on July 31, 1995 to cancel the designation of John Doe and substitute
in its place the name of Feliciano Funcion, alias Jon-jon.3 Up to the time of the
rendition of the assailed decision, however, accused Funcion remained at large.
The prosecution presented ten witnesses during trial, consisting of the apprehending
and investigating officers of the Pasay City and Magalang, Pampanga police
stations, the medico-legal officer, and the family and friends of the victim. Also
submitted in evidence were the articles recovered at the scene of the crime,
including the murder weapon and personal belongings of both the victim and
accused-appellant.
PO3 Alfredo Galang was manning the traffic at the intersection in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga at around 2:30 in the morning of June 19, 1995 when he
noticed an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX. He signaled for the vehicle to pull
over to the side of the road, approached the vehicle then asked the driver for his
license. The driver, who turned out to be accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion, handed
him an expired driver's license without plastic cover issued in the name of the victim,
Ruel Morales.4 Observing that the driver and his companion, herein accused-
appellant, were acting suspiciously, PO3 Galang asked them to turn on the lights
inside the vehicle, to which accused-appellant complied. He then borrowed the key
to the rear door of the FX from the driver. While PO3 Galang was opening the rear
door, the driver fled unpursued towards a nearby sugarcane field. The rear portion of
the FX, as PO3 Galang found out shortly thereafter, contained the dead body of
victim Ruel Morales wrapped in the seat cover and curtains of the vehicle.
This account was corroborated by Ernesto Gonzales, one of two traffic aides then
stationed at the traffic outpost in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, and who assisted
PO3 Galang in the inspection of the FX and the apprehension of accused-appellant.
PO3 Galang took custody of accused-appellant, who all through out the incident
remained seated in the front passenger seat of the FX. He called a funeral parlor to
collect the corpse, brought the FX and accused-appellant to the Magalang police
station, and immediately executed an affidavit of arrest5 against accused-appellant.
The next day, accused-appellant was brought by one SPO2 Nuqui of the Magalang
police station to the Pasay City police station and indorsed to the officer on duty,
SPO2 Renato Guzman. It was SPO2 Guzman who interviewed accused-appellant,
who in turn denied responsibility for the death of Morales and pointed all the blame
at accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion.
Also delivered to the Pasay City police were an autopsy report of the body of the
victim, a gray Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UAM 540, and the items recovered
therein. SPO1 Manuel Abenoja, the evidence custodian of the Pasay City police
station, identified in open court the articles recovered from inside the FX, namely: a
deformed and blood-stained kitchen knife, a stone measuring about 3 to 4 inches
across, a Certificate of Registration pertaining to the Toyota Tamaraw FX issued in
the name of Teodulo C. Natividad, a pair of checkered short pants, a wrist watch, a
brown scapular necklace, two leather wallets, a PCIBank card in the name of Ruel
Valentine Morales, a Makati Public Safety Office badge, three pictures of Ruel
Morales, a pair of denim long pants, a leather belt, three pairs of shoes, and
assorted identification papers in the name of Ruel Morales.6
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Natividad, rural health physician of Magalang, Pampanga,
conducted the post-mortem examination of the body of the victim. Based on her
findings, the cause of death was hemorrhage as a result of the victim's fractured
skull. Dr. Natividad testified to the presence of the following injuries on the victim's
body: fracture of the frontonasal bone (between the victim's eyes7 ); multiple
lacerations, incisions and hematoma on the face and arms, abrasions on the face
and lower extremities, and ligature extending horizontally from right to left and
covering almost two-thirds of the neck.8 In her testimony, the doctor stated that the
fracture between the victim's eyes and the contusions were likely caused by a blunt
instrument, while the lacerated and incised wounds were inflicted by a sharp
instrument. The ligature across the neck could have been caused by strangling with
a rope.9
Three of the victim's friends who last saw him alive were also presented as
prosecution witnesses. Elizalde Claridad declared that at around 11:00 in the
evening of June 18, 1995, he was drinking with his friends at the corner of Lim and
M. Reyes Streets in Makati City when Ruel Morales drove by in a Toyota Tamaraw
FX. Morales called to him and asked that he accompany him in looking for his
(Morales's) brother, Hoppy. Morales was wearing a T-shirt, shorts, slippers and a
lady's Rolex wrist watch with gemstones. They drove around Barangay Bangkal in
Makati then proceeded to Padi's Point, a restaurant-bar at Pasay Road, also in
Makati; unable to locate the brother, Morales dropped him off at the corner of Lim
and M. Reyes Streets and drove back to Pasay Road. The next time he saw Morales
was the next day, when they fetched his body in the morgue in Pampanga.
Meanwhile, Arnie Bordeos testified that on the night of June 18, 1995, between
10:00 to 11:00, he saw Ruel Morales in a Toyota Tamaraw FX along M. Reyes and
General Luna Streets in Makati conversing with two persons by the side of the road.
Earlier to this conversation, these two persons approached him and his friends and
talked to them in a drunken and rude manner. One of them, whom he identified as
herein accused-appellant, even bragged that he was the nephew of a city mayor. He
then saw Morales opening the passenger doors to let the two persons in, then
Morales drove away with the two on board. Leo Soriba, who was with Arnie Bordeos
at the time, corroborated this account.
Teodulo Natividad testified that he was the owner of the Toyota Tamaraw FX where
the victim's body was found. He stated that on June 18, 1995 he lent the FX to the
victim, Ruel Morales, who was a good friend of his and who often borrowed the FX
from him. The vehicle was recovered and restored to him by the Pasay City police. It
had a dent on the roof and the seat covers and curtains were missing, but it was in
otherwise good condition. 10
Antonio Morales, Jr. presented receipts covering the expenses incurred by his family
for the wake and burial of his brother. The total costs reflected in the receipts
amounted to P56,319.30. He also stated that his brother worked as an entertainer in
Japan, earning US$1,000.00 a month. 11 He was, however, unable to submit
documentary evidence to support this.
In contrast to the ten witnesses presented by the prosecution, defense presented as
its sole witness accused-appellant himself. In his version of the story, accused-
appellant was at the Malvar Sports Complex in Bangkal, Makati City on June 18,
1995 at around 10:00 in the evening. He was playing darts with accused-at-large
Jon-jon Funcion and two other friends, when Jon-jon told them that he was in need
of money as he needed to go to Tarlac to see his girlfriend. Because no one among
them could lend him money, Jon-jon asked accused-appellant to accompany him to
the house of one Councilor Ferdie Eusebio from whom he intended to borrow
money. Upon reaching Eusebio's house, however, Jon-jon decided against it
because it was already late at night and it seemed as if the occupants of the house
were already asleep. They returned to the Malvar Sports Complex where one of their
friends, Jeffrey Abigabel, suggested they try borrowing money from his friend, Joel.
Jon-jon left with Funcion to go to Joel, but they returned shortly after. Jeffrey then
said he was going home, and as Jeffrey was walking away from them a Toyota
Tamaraw FX stopped beside him. Accused-appellant saw Jeffrey converse with the
driver of the FX, then Jeffrey went on his way and the FX went towards Mabolo
Street. Accused-appellant then said that Jon-jon asked him who the driver of the FX
was, but he answered that he did not know. Then Jon-jon left towards the direction
of Mabolo Street, saying "didiskarte raw siya ng pera." 12
At this point, accused-appellant decided to go home. While walking along Macabolos
Street he met the FX, being driven by Jon-jon, which stopped beside him. The
person on the front passenger seat opened his window, and he observed that the
person was "gay". Jon-jon asked him where he was going, and when he said he was
on his way home, he and the "gay" passenger invited him to ride with them and that
they will drop him off at his house. He identified the passenger as "Sharon", or the
victim Ruel Morales in the instant case. Accused-appellant accepted the offer and
boarded the FX.
However, instead of dropping him off at his house in Malibay, Pasay City, Jon-jon
drove to PICC, where they parked in a dark area where the trees screened off the
light of the electric lamps. Jon-jon then asked accused-appellant to step out of the
FX, saying that he and "Sharon" had matters to discuss. He consented, walking
about 8 meters away from the vehicle. Because it was dark, he could not see the
interior of the FX but he observed that it was "umuuga", or rocking lightly, for about
10 to 15 minutes. He came to the conclusion that the two were having sex.
Then Jon-jon called him and alighted from the middle right-side door of the FX.
When accused-appellant approached, Jon-jon placed his right arm on the right
shoulder of accused-appellant, and the latter noticed from the open car door that
someone was lying inside the FX. He asked Jon-jon what happened and he
reportedly replied, "Don't ask anymore, you might be the next one." 13 Then he felt
something poke him sharply on the neck, and Jon-jon said in an angry voice, "Just
follow what I instructed (sic), if not, I will kill you." 14 Jon-jon then told him to remove
the seat covers of the FX and as he did so, Jon-jon went behind him leveling the
knife on accused-appellant's neck with one hand while holding to the waistband of
accused-appellant' pants with the other. 15 Jon-jon made him cover the dead body,
with the seat covers; then Jon-jon tied both of accused-appellant's hands behind his
back, took his wallet and made him sit on the front passenger seat of the FX. He
then placed a seat belt around him, locked the door at his side, started the engine
and drove to Buendia Avenue and north to Pampanga. All the while Jon-jon
reportedly threatened to kill him if he attempted to escape or to alert anyone, such
as the toll booth personnel, of what was happening. 16 Throughout his testimony,
which ran the course of four hearings, accused-appellant insisted that he had no
opportunity to escape and that he was overcome by fear of accused-at-large Jon-jon
Funcion.
When they were accosted at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga,
accused-appellant testified to the following chain of events: Jon-jon pulled over to
the side of the road, unfastened the seat belt around accused-appellant, untied
accused-appellant's hands, threw something at the back of the vehicle, turned on the
light, told accused-appellant to remove his (accused-appellant's) sweatshirt, wore
the sweatshirt to cover the blood stains on his arms, turned off the light, threatened
him some more, took money from accused-appellant's wallet, then alighted. 17 All of
this presumably transpired during the interim that it took for PO3 Galang, who was at
a distance of about 30 meters away, 18 to approach the FX.
At some point in his testimony, accused-appellant said that while the policeman and
Jon-jon were talking, he called to one of the traffic aides and said that there was a
dead body at the back of the car. 19 This, however, was not in the testimony of
Ernesto Gonzales, one of the traffic aides present at the time.
After Jon-jon Funcion fled and the police officer found the dead body at the back of
the FX, they approached accused-appellant who remained seated at the front
passenger seat and led him to the nearby police outpost. He was then brought to a
police station where he was placed under investigation.
The trial court viewed with disbelief the version of accused-appellant. In its decision
rendered on October 25, 1996, it declared:
The Court believes that Jon-jon alone could not inflict all the wounds on Morales
alias Sharon which caused his death. So that the claim of Santos that he had no
participation in the killing of Morales is not credible. Santos himself testified that his
friend Jon-jon was in need of money as he was to go to his girlfriend in Tarlac. When
they were not able to borrow money from Councilor Eusebio, Morales came along
and invited them to PICC. Morales alias Sharon being a gay wanted to use Jon-jon
and Santos who were teenagers. While there is no direct evidence in the killing of
Morales, the presumption is that the person found in the unexplained possession of
the stolen effects is the author of the aggression and death of the victim and the
robbery committed on him. (People vs. Prado, G.R. No. 95260, March 8, 1996) At
the time they were committing the crime, their action impliedly showed a unity of
purpose between them and a concerted effort to bring about the death of Morales.
(People vs. Ferrer, et. al., G.R. Nos. 114931-33, November 16, 1995) 20
Thus, the trial court made a finding of implied conspiracy and meted out a judgment
of conviction. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision is quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Noel Santos y
Crispino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended (Anti-Carnapping Act). There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the Court sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of Ruel Valentino Morales in the amount of P50,000.00; the
amount of P56,319.30 as damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 21
On appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos is guilty of violating
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended (the "Anti-Carnapping Act"), considering that
the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Noel Santos beyond reasonable doubt.
1a. The trial court gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy between
Funcion and Noel Santos, and that their actions showed unity of purpose and a
concerted effort to bring about the death of victim Morales.
1b. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos participated in the
forcible taking of the Tamaraw FX and the killing of victim Morales.
1c. The trial court erred in finding that Funcion alone could not inflict all the wounds
victim Morales sustained.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish the presence of Noel Santos in the vehicle when the crime was committed
by Funcion.
2a. The trial court gravely erred in finding Noel Santos guilty based on a
presumption that the person found in the unexplained possession of the stolen
effects is the author of the aggression and death of the victim and of the robbery
committed on him, considering that Noel Santos was able to fully explain his
presence in said vehicle where the body of the victim Morales was found. 22
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things: the fact of
the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused
stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In the
instant case we find the prosecution unable to discharge on both aspects, leaving us
with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
"Carnapping", as defined by Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as
amended, is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. 23 By the amendment in Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and
eight months and not more that seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, what the carnapping is committed by means of violence
or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall; be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
On the last clause, three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the change of the penalty from life imprisonment to
reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof." 24 This third amendment makes clear the intention of the
law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis
paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. 25 Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act, the prosecution not only has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of Ruel Morales 26 but more importantly, it
must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Needless to say, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and
the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the herein case, we find the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of
the prosecution to prove an unlawful taking. The application of the presumption that
a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to a person robbed
or killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well
as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such
possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 27 The rebuttal of
such presumption, invariably employed in cases of robbery and theft under the
Revised Penal Code, validly applies to a case of carnapping, for indeed the concept
of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same, and had it not been
for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. 28
However incriminating the circumstances of accused-appellant were — having been
apprehended in an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX, which later turned out to be
owned by the victim's friend, and where the victim's body and a blood-stained knife
were found — he did in fact set up a defense of duress on which, as the records
plainly show, he had been subjected to exhaustive cross-examination by the
prosecution. During cross-examination, accused-appellant adhered to his version of
the story, insisting that his presence in the FX was for no reason other than as a
captive of accused-at-large.1awphi1 While we are not prepared to say that the
explanation of accused-appellant is seamless, the point we want to make at this
juncture is that once an explanation is offered for the possession of the stolen
effects, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may not anymore be
invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence
that would render the defense of accused improbable. On this burden we find the
prosecution in the instant case unable to discharge.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of Ruel Morales may not be treated
as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide
and murder under the Revised Penal Code, we find that the guilt of accused-
appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court itself admits that there is no direct evidence indicating the guilt of
accused-appellant for the killing of Ruel Morales. Following are the circumstantial
evidence relied upon for his conviction: first, accused-appellant was in the Toyota
Tamaraw FX containing the victim's body and a blood-stained knife; second, the FX
was caught "overspeeding" at 2:30 in the morning at a provincial intersection, and
the occupants were acting suspiciously; third, earlier accused-appellant was seen
with accused-at-large in Pasay City, appearing drunk and behaving rudely; and
fourth, he was seen with accused-at-large boarding an FX being driven by the victim,
the same FX where the victim's body was subsequently found.
For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 29 On the latter, decided cases expound that
the circumstancial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 30
The circumstances abovementioned do not lead to an inference exclusively
consistent with the guilt of accused-appellant. Quite to the contrary, we observe that
while the arresting officer was preoccupied with opening the rear door of the FX, at
which time accused-at-large took the opportunity to flee, accused-appellant
remained seated on the front passenger seat, a behavior quite uncommon for a
guilty man faced with the inevitability of arrest. Although no one corroborated
accused-appellant's allegation that he volunteered the information that there was a
dead body at the back of the car, his demeanor all throughout the search of the FX
and during his arrest was, to say the least, not inconsistent with the hypothesis of
innocence. He did not resist arrest, and during his testimony he did not waver in
insisting that it was accused-at-large alone who was responsible for the crime.
Thus, even if we accept as credible all the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
it does not rule out the probability of accused-appellant's story — that it was
accused-at-large who killed Morales then threatened him at knife-point — having
taken place, for there were no eyewitnesses to the killing itself, and all the
prosecution was able to show were the events before and after the killing of Morales.
A situation as this calls for the application of the equipoise rule, which requires that
where the inculpatory circumstances are capable of two inferences, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with a finding
of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and therefore is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction. 31
Our ruling to acquit does not hold a corollary upholding of the credibility of the
testimony of accused-appellant. The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt,
which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to
sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and
does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is
not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance
of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. 32 An acquittal based on
reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be
doubted, 33 for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. 34
Having resolved against the individual culpability of accused-appellant in this
manner, the theory of implied conspiracy of the trial court must likewise fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-7258 of Branch 117 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant Noel
Santos y Crispino is ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered,
unless other lawful and valid grounds for his further detention exist. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.

Footnotes
1 Presided by Judge Leonardo M. Rivera.
2 Rollo, 3.
3 Amended Information; Records of the Case, 40.
4 TSN, July 24, 1995, 5, 10.
5 Records of the Case, 6.
6 TSN, October 3, 1995, 3-8.
7 TSN, July 24, 1996, 24.
8 Autopsy Report; Records of the Case, 165.
9 TSN, July 24, 1995; 26.
10 TSN, August 15, 1995, 5-6.
11 TSN, December 13, 1995, 9.
12 TSN, May 22, 1996, 16.
13 TSN, June 10, 1996, 6.
14 Ibid., 7.
15 TSN, June 26, 1996, 12.
16 Ibid., 18.
17 TSN, June 10, 1996, 29-34.
18 Ibid., 32.
19 Ibid., 36-37.
20 RTC Decision; Rollo, 33.
21 Ibid.; Rollo, 33-34.
22 Accused-Appellant's Brief; Rollo, 85.
23 Sec. 2, RA. No. 6539, a amended.
24 Prior to the amendment, the last clause of Section 14 of RA. No. 6539 read: ". . .

and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. in the commission of the
carnapping."
25 People vs. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127.
26 In People vs. Mejia, supra, the Court stated that since Section 14 of the Anti-

Carnapping Act uses the words "is killed, no distinction must be made between
homicide and murder insofar as the penalty is concerned. It is, however, required
that the felony of either murder or homicide be consummated for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death to set in; otherwise, or when the murder or homicide is
merely attempted or frustrated, it must be deemed to fall under the clause "when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person",
also in Section 14 of the same law.
27 People vs. Geron, 281 SCRA 36.
28 See People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, January 21, 2000.
29 Sec.4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court; cited in People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA
124; People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705; People vs. Bato, 284 SCRA 223.
30 People vs. Geron, supra; see also People vs. Quitorio, 285 SCRA 196; People vs.

Llaguno, supra.
31 People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267; People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94.
32 People vs. Geron, supra.
33 People vs. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000.
34 People vs. Fronda, supra; People vs. Crispin, G.R. No. 128360, March 2, 2000;

People vs. Rugay, 291 SCRA 692.