G.R. No.
L-1159 January 30, 1947 court charging Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent
CECILIO M. LINO, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor,
Chief of Police and Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila, respectively,
respondents.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique M. Fernando, Manuel M. Crudo Claudio,
Teehankee, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be
unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe
in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the
City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondent's return that ten of the petitioners
had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their
prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and
Pacifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against them in the
municipal court for unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute-resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the ten
petitioners already released and we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel
and Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a
writ of habeas corpus is only to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is
purposeless. If they have been the victims of illegal arrest or detention, they can have
recourse to criminal actions in the proper courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing
by respondents, are as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the
police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico
Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On
November 11 when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were
still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for three and four days respectively,
without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases
were not transmitted to the City Fiscal's office until late in the afternoon of November 11.
Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the
prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and Pacifico Deoduco for resisting
arrest, but both remained under custody because of informations filed with the municipal
of a person in authority under the second paragraph of article 151 of the Revised Penal
Code. These informations were filed on the same day when this case was heard before
this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal court pursuant to the
informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even
assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946,
respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours
without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125,
Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal
late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is, four and three days, respectively,
after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention was not cured by the filing of
information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been
issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case before this Court.
It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informations, the two petitioners are
charged with light offenses punishable by law with arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5
to 200 pesos or both, according to the second paragraphs of articles 151 and 287,
respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under the Rule 108, section 10, when the offense
charged is of that character, "the judge with whom the complaint or information is filed,
shall not issued any warrant or order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the
latter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint or
information," although in particular instance he may also "order that a defendant charged
with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing bail." The general
rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be
arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise
of its discretion. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the
informations nor exercised its discretion to order the arrest of the two petitioners and,
therefore, they are still detained not because of the information filed against them but as
a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers. While an arrest maybe made
without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109, section 6, Rules
of Court), the prisoners cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a
warrant is procured from a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers vs. Mallon, 46 Neb.,
121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk vs. Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607;
Karner vs. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S.W., 656; Johnson vs. Americus, 46 Ga.,
80; Leger vs. Warren, L.R.A., 216-218 [Bk. 51.] It is obvious in the instant case that the
City Fiscal had no authority to issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and
Hashim vs. Boncan and City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such
illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or
implied.
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within
the purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for
even if he were, the petitioners' case was referred to him long after the expiration of the
six hours provided by law. And since the City Fiscal, unlike the judicial authority, has no
power to produce to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons
charged with penal offense (Adm. Code, section 2460), the petitioner's further
confinement after their case had been referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere
continuation of their illegal detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law,
therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations
were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely
because of the filing of such informations it appearing particularly that the offenses
charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds for arrest, under Rule 108,
section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could legalize the
prisoner's continued confinement, and no such order has been issued. Indeed, the
municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said prisoners only by the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of summons as provided in the
aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Hilado, JJ., concur.
Moran, C. J., I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.
Appendix A
PETITION
Petitioner Cecilio M. Lino, through his undersigned counsel, respectfully alleges:
1. That the petitioner is of legal age and a resident of the City of Manila, Philippines; the
respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso is the Mayor of the City of Manila; the respondent
Lamberto T. Javalera is the Chief of Police of the said City; and the respondent John Doe
is the Officer in Charge of the Municipal Jail of the same City;
2. That the petitioner is the President of the City Employees' and Workers' Union,
Congress of Labor Organization (CLO), duly registered as a labor organization under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 213; and he files this petition on behalf of the
following persons, members of the said labor organization, who are imprisoned and
deprived of their liberty, to wit:
1. Ricardo Suarez (Juarez)
2. Gregorio Santiago
3. Ismael de Jesus
4. Serafin Pascual
5. Amado Racanday
6. Antonio Bulagda (Burlagada)
7. Mauro Fernandez
8. Jose Badeo
9. Francisco Nevado (Lebado)
10. Pascual Montaniel
11. Pedro Martinez and
12. Pacifico Deoduco;
3. That, within the time comprised between November 5 and November 8, 1946, the
persons above named were arrested without warrant and without lawful cause, upon order
of the respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of City of Manila, by members of the
Police Department of said City, of which the respondent Lamberto T. Javalera is the Chief,
and, immediately thereafter, were taken to, and detained at, the Municipal Jail of the
aforementioned City, of which the respondent John Doe is the Officer in Charge;
4. That since their arrest all the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof have been
detained and deprived of their liberty by the respondents at said Municipal Jail, although
no charges have been filed against any of the above mentioned persons in any lawful
court, nor has any judicial or other proper authority issued any order authorizing their
continued detention, and notwithstanding the lapse of the period of six hours from the
time of their arrest and/or commitment;
5. That the aforementioned persons were arrested while in the peaceful exercise of their
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of the press and peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for the redress of their grievances, specially, while performing
the following acts to enlist public support in the pursuit of their right to a living wage, to
wit:
(a) Ricardo Suarez (Juarez), Gregorio Santiago, Ismael de Jesus and Serafin Pascual —
arrested on November 5, 1946 at Pinkian Street, Tondo, Manila, for no apparent reason,
but for posting and distributing handbills explaining the plight of the city laborers on
strike, and appealing to and for the sympathy and lawful support of the public; (b) Amado
Racanday, Antonio Bulgada (Burlagada) and Mauro Fernandez — arrested on November 6,
1946, while standing at the corner of Gral. Luna and California streets, Paco, Manila, for
no apparent reason, except that they had joined the city laborers' strike, and for having in
their possession some copies of the handbills above mentioned;
(b) Jose Badeo and Francisco Nevado (Lebado) — arrested on November 6, 1946, while
standing at the corner of Perez and California Streets, Paco, Manila, for no apparent
reason except that they had joined the city laborers' strike and had in their possession a
notice of a meeting of their labor organization;
(c) Pascual Montaniel — arrested on November 8, 1946, at Cristobal Street, Paco, Manila,
for no apparent reason, except that he made a friendly greeting to a non-striker;
(d) Pedro Martinez — arrested on November 8, 1946, at Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin,
Manila, for no apparent reason, except that he had joined the city laborers' strike and
walked along the street with a paper band strung diagonally from his shoulder around his
body bearing the following words: "Damayan Kami! Huag Mageskirol" (Help us! Do not be
scab); and
(e) Pacifico Deoduco — arrested on November 7, 1946, at Cristobal Street, Manila, for no
apparent reason except that he had joined the city laborers' strike.
Wherefore, petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus be directed forthwith to the
respondent commanding them, or any of them, to have the bodies of the above named
persons who are restrained and deprived of their liberty before this Honorable Court at a
time and place to be designated by this Court; and, after due hearing, forthwith to order
their discharge from confinement, with cost against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, November 11th, 1946.
Emmanuel Pelaez
Francisco A. Rodrigo
Enriquez M. Fernando
Manuel M. Crudo
Claudio Teehankee and
Jose W. Diokno.
By: (Sgd.) Emmanuel Pelaez Pelaez Counsel for the petitioner % Philippine Civil Liberties
Union 503 China Bank Building, Dasmariñas Manila
By: (Sgd.) Claudio Teehankee Counsel for the Petitioner % Philippine Lawyers' Guild, 319
Lardizabal Street, Manila
VERIFICATION
Cecilio M. Lino, of legal age, after being duly sworn in accordance with law, deposes and
says:
1. That he is the petitioner in the foregoing petition for a writ of habeas corpus;
2. That he caused the same to be prepared and presented; and
3. That all the facts therein alleged are true and correct.
Further affiant sayeth naught. Manila, November 11, 1946.
(Sgd.) Cecilio M. Lino
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of November, 1946, at the City of
Manila, Philippines. The affiant exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. A-20721,
issued at the City of Manila, on January 9, 1946.
(Sgd.) F.A. Rodrigo
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1947
Doc. No. 36
Page No. 9
Book No. 1
Series of 1946.
Appendix B
RETURN OF WRIT
Come now in the above-entitled case, Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto T. Javalera and John
Doe, in their respective capacities as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in Charge of the
Municipal Jail, all of the City of Manila, through their counsel, the undersigned City Fiscal,
and in making their return to the petition filed herein, to this Honorable Court respectfully
allege:
1. That they admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of said petition.
2. That they admit the fact, stated in paragraph 3 of said petition, regarding the arrest of
the persons whose names are listed in paragraph 2 thereof, without warrant, by members
of Manila Police Department, and their detention until yesterday, November 11, 1946, at
the Municipal Jail of the City of Manila; but they deny the rest of the allegations especially
that which states for a fact that said detained persons were arrested without lawful cause
upon order of the respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, the
truth of the matter being that the arrest was lawful, it having made by members of the
Manila Police Department duly appointed and qualified as such who acted in the
performance of their official duties, and acting in the belief that the said detained persons,
before or at the time of their arrest, were committing acts in violation of the laws of the
land.
3. That they admit the fact, alleged in paragraph 4 of said petition, that all the arrested
persons have been placed under detention until yesterday, November 11,1946, at the
Municipal Court of the City of Manila; but they deny the rest of the allegations, specially
that part which says that no charges have been filed against them notwithstanding the
lapse of the period of six hours from the time of their arrest and commitment, the truth of
the matter being that charges for inciting to sedition, disobedience to police orders and
resisting arrest have been filed against them by the arresting police officers with the
Office of the City Fiscal which has conducted the preliminary investigation of said cases in
accordance with law.
(e) That Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco continue to be detained and are deprived
of their liberty not without lawful cause, for the reason that there are at present pending
against them criminal complaints with the Municipal Court of Manila for unjust vexation
and disobedience to police orders as stated above.
Wherefore, respondents herein pray this Honorable Court to dismiss the petition, with
costs against the petitioner.

4. That they deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of said petition, the same Manila, November 12, 1946.
being merely conclusions of facts and/or of law.
(Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon
As special defenses, respondents hereby allege:
City Fiscal
(a) That all of the twelve detained persons were arrested by police officers for acts which
the arresting officers believed to constitute inciting to sedition, resisting arrest and Annex 1
disobedience to police orders, filing the corresponding cases against them with the Office
of the City Fiscal immediately thereafter. INFORMATION

(b) That yesterday, November 11, 1946, before and after the receipt by them of their The undersigned accuses Pascual Montaniel y Avelar of the crime of unjust vexation,
respective copies of the petition for habeas corpus herein filed, complaints had already committed as follows:
been presented with the Municipal Court of Manila against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico
That on or about the 8th of November, 1946, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
Deoduco not for inciting to sedition but for unjust vexation and for disobedience to police
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and unjust vex and annoy one
orders, respectively, the same being criminal cases Nos. 6765 and 7666 of the Municipal
Jesus Cambare, who was then a driver at the City Motor Pool assigned to the Department
Court of Manila, copies of which complaints are being attached hereto and made a part
of Engineering and Public Works of the Government of the City of Manila, while in the act
hereof as Annexes 1 and 2.
of managing, driving and operating a jeep being used by the Assistant City Engineer of
(c) That likewise, before and after the receipt by them of their respective copies of the said City in the latter's capacity, by then and there stopping the jeep driven by said Jesus
petition of habeas corpus, said respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso and Lamberto T. Javalera Cambare without any just cause therefor and telling him to stop driving for the City of
had already been notified of the dismissal by the Office of the City Fiscal of the cases for Manila while the strike of city laborers was still going on, all in a threatening attitude, and
inciting to sedition against all the detained persons, for insufficiency of the evidence, and to the great disgust and annoyance of the aforementioned Jesus Cambare. Contrary to
of filing in the Municipal Court of Manila complaints against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico law.
Deoduco, as aforesaid.
(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR
(d) That, similarly, before and after his receipt of a copy of the petition for habeas corpus,
Assistant Fiscal
the respondent John Doe, in his capacity as Officer in charge of the Municipal Jail, had
received from the City Fiscal letters bearing date of November 11, 1946, copies of which
Witnesses:
are hereto attached as Annexes 3 and 4 of this Return, wherein he was advised that the
cases against said detained persons for inciting to sedition have been dismissed for
Jesus Cambre — 615 Merced, Paco
insufficiency of evidence, but the complaints were being filed against Pascual Montaniel
and Pacifico Deoduco for unjust vexation and for disobedience to police orders, Dets. Felix T. Pineda and
respectively, and wherein said respondent John Doe has been ordered by the City Fiscal to
forthwith release all of said detained persons with the exception of Pascual Montaniel and Victoriano Antonio — Det. Bureau
Pacifico Diodoco, an order which has been complied with by said respondent John Doe as
shown by the fact that said detained persons, with the exception of the latter two, had Chief Clerk — Dept. of Engineering and
forthwith been released from custody.
Public Works, City Hall (bringing records re
appointment of Jesus Cambare as driver at the City Jail, Manila.

City Motor Pool) Sir:

Annex 2
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses Pacifico Deudoco of a violation of the second paragraph of Art.
151 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1946, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously disobey Vicente
Celeridad, a duly appointed and qualified police officer of the City of Manila and, therefore,
an agent of a person in authority, while the latter was acting in the performance of his
official duties, to wit: while he was guarding the premises of the City Motor Pool on
Cristobal St., in said City, which acts of disobedience was in the following manner: That
said accused, having entered and was actually found in the aforesaid premises where he
had no right to be, without the knowledge and consent of the authorities concerned, and
having been ordered several times by the aforesaid police officer to go out of and leave
the said premises, defiantly and persistently refused to do so, but instead he continued to
remain therein. Contrary to law.
With reference to the case of inciting to sedition presented with this Office against (1)
Ricardo Suarez, (2) Gregorio Santiago (3) Ismael de Jesus,(4) Serafin Pascual, (5) Amado
Racanday, (6) Antonio Bulagua (Burlagua),(7) Mauro Fernandez, (8) Jose Radeo, (9)
Francisco Navado (Levado), (10) Pascual Montaniel, and (11) Pedro Martinez, please be
informed that after an investigation has been conducted in the premises, it was found out
that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of said accused in court, it
appearing that the leaflets, posters and other propaganda sheets which said accused
distributed to the public and pasted or posted at different places within the city, did not
contain any statement or phrases of seditious nature or of the nature to incite to the
commission of sedition. This Office, however, is filing a complaint with the Municipal Court
against Pascual Montaniel y Avelar for unjust vexation only, wherein a bail of P100 has
been recommended for his temporary release.
In view of the foregoing, of the said accused, except Pascual Montaniel y Avelar, should be
released from the custody or their bonds cancelled, if any have been put up for their
temporary release unless they are held on other charges.
Respectfully,

(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR (Sgd.) JOSE P. BENGZON

Assistant City Fiscal City Fiscal

November 11, 1946. ANNEX

Witnesses: November 11, 1946

Pat. V. Celeridad, Precinct No. 3. The Prison Officer

Pat. Pedro Camata, Precinct No. 3. City Jail, Manila.

Chief Clerk, Manila Police Dept., to bring a certified Sir:

copy of the latest appointment of Pat. Vicente Celeridad of With reference to the cases of disobedience to the Police and resisting arrest presented to
this Office against Pacifico Deoduco y Docio, please be informed that after an investigation
the Manila Police Dept. has been conducted in the premises, it was found out that there is no sufficient evidence
to warrant his prosecution in court for the offense of resisting arrest. This Office, however,
Bail recommended: P200 is filing today a complaint with the Municipal Court against the said accused for
disobedience to an agent of a person in authority, under the second paragraph of Art. 151
Annex 3
of the Revised Penal Code, wherein a bail of P200.00 has been recommended for his
temporary release.
November 11, 1946
Very respectfully,
The Prison Officer
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon
City Fiscal
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA,
Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for injunctive relief seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1
dated May 17, 2013 as well as its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No.
123759. In the main, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 130 in Caloocan City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and decide a special civil action for
habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor residing in Quezon City.
The Facts
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-Caloocan a
verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-
4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special
writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her
the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3)
known addresses where she can be served with summons and other court processes, to
wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9Street,
Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special
Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor.
Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus,
ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts
and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving
petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29,
2011, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as
witnessed by respondent’s counsel and barangay officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed
to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person
of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among
others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping
before the Office of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the
guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-
Caloocan.4
The falloof the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly,
the case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of
habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8,
2011. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner
at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10, 2011.6 In
compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as well as the Alias
Writ during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.7
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the
quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition,8 claiming, among others, that she was not personally served with
summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criselda’sperson was
not acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus
motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,9 where the Court held that a writ of habeas
corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays
a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner
herein.10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require that service be
made exclusively at petitioner’s given address, for service may be made elsewhere or
wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy of the court process in
person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve
petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired
jurisdiction over her person.11 The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion (Motion to Quash Alias Writ;
Motion to Dismiss)filed by respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante dated August 11, 2011
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is hereby directed to appear
and bring Criselda Martinez Cada before this Court on February 10, 2012 at 8:30 o’clock in
the morning.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17, 2013,13 dismissed the
petition for certiorari in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 130 of Caloocan City is DIRECTED to proceed with due dispatch in
Spec. Proc. Case No. C-4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving utmost consideration tothe best
interest of the now nearly 14-year old child.
SO ORDERED.14
In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the
habeas corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City.15 It also
relied on the certification issued by the punong barangay of Brgy. 179, Caloocan City,
stating that petitioner is a bona fide resident thereof, as well as the medical certificate
issued by Criselda’s doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her address is "Amparo
Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the appellate court ruled that
service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise
known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions
have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special
proceeding.17
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the same was denied by the CA
in its December 27, 2013 Resolution.1âwphi1
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC Caloocan has
jurisdiction over the habeascorpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it
does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of
Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in
Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus
petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served
with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies on
Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should
have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or
that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.18 As to respondent, she asserts,
among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC.19
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
beenforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding
judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case
tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there
are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial
region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The
appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the
decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed
withany of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.21
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which contains the
enumeration of judicial regions in the country, states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen Regional
Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati,
Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
(emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is
proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial
Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City.
Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ
issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner
resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a
plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions
for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay
be found. (emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice
it to state thatservice of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus
petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in
Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons,
in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent.22
In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 1 7,
2013 and its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision2 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice)
granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . .
. Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He
returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant
of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.,
et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi
Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was
not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his
passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then
detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in
Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his
thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is
currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17
He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered
the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the
scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on
September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo
before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the
hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00
p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the
September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L.
Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden
and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on
behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the
hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar
Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a
valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer
availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias
Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he
was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial
court to order his release from detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any resolution,
information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He
was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest
against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his
liberty under process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged
with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of
Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged
of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's
picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"33
from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a
Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival
in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and
Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
trial court's Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and
subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even
assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and
the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40
According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With
Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which petitioner
Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of
murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the
Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is
being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the
Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on
the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court.
Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash
Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on
petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and
Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
I
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the
Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this
court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances
authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The
court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return
of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55
Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue
of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the
merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a
decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this
Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court
of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied
Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the
Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely
delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say regarding the issues
raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be regarded as
operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than
real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior
court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the
petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or
deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated
"does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and
conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a
decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First
Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be
released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the
Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of
Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority
to determine the merits of the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent
Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority
to determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for
Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals.
Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for
personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a
person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words,
habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas
corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and
deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further
curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon),
Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and
Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences,
this court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of
rebellion with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed
a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued
that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly
availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ
— its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with
the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued
Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from
their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare
reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish
themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the
other Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since the application questioned the
legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ
of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the
Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o
exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed.
The female sex workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and
placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to
Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return
of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did
not have custody of the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of
the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban
illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of
their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the women, "despite their being in a sense
lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the
issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person
allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision
where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is
the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the
speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally
issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid
of merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in
cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may
not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.111 The
restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot
and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission
Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister
Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano,
however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based
on an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos
Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan.
Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested
based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition
for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of
the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos),
and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier
General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This
court set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to
respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General
Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an
Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for
Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to
them, no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information.
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process.
Consequently, the Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and
academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in
court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic
by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense,
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue
of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ
had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty.
Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B.
Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against
them were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court,
rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic,
thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed
in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for
habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.133 This ordinary
remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash
complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3
of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b)
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c)
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d)
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e)
That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f)
That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g)
That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h)
That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
(i)
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the information."136 If the accused avails
himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts
alleged in the information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the
information are not to be considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the
complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the
facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court
shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If
after amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial
court shall quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested
by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful
process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore,
correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged
and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may
be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on-
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.
When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the
"disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp
Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty.
Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice
Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar,
together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law — a ground for
the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary
investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked
and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a
warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985.
Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA
and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is
premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself.
The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without
warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto,
viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's
arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in
promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules
more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been
committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old
rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has
committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has
committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed
against the petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis
in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured
by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of
the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S.
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S.
Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that
the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another
person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his identification card
from the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and
clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his picture and
indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued
documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."

Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23,
2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed
for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December
20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo
departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7,
2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on
December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary

People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex
case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of
which have become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused
have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been
resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally
deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given
the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.

In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his
innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his
liberty without due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the
resources at [its] command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule
in favor of the citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is
illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon
City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby
NOTED.

SO ORDERED.