Beyond Art and Beauty

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Beyond Art and

Beauty: In Search
of the Object
of Philosophical
Aesthetics
Andreas Speer
Published online: 08 Dec 2010.
To cite this article: Andreas Speer (2000) Beyond Art and Beauty: In
Search of the Object of Philosophical Aesthetics, International Journal of
Philosophical Studies, 8:1, 73-88, DOI: 10.1080/096725500341729
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/096725500341729
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Beyond A rt and Beauty
In Search of the O bject of
Philosophical A esthetics*
A ndreas Speer
A bstract
This article deals with the ambigous situation of philosophical aesthetics,
which now seems to have lost its proper object. Moreover, A rthur C. D anto
has popularized talk of an end of art, in which he ties that end to the end
of any aesthetic master narrative. Comparing modern and medieval
approaches to art, this paper tries to reformulate the question of philo-
sophical aesthetics, which has to be understood in a hermeneutical way.
Taken in a heuristic manner ‘art’ and ‘beauty’ remain the principal aesthetic
categories able to keep the understanding of what belongs to aesthetics open
to different historical approaches.
Keywords: art; beauty; aesthetics; Suger
I
The present-day situation of philosophical aesthetics is quite ambiguous.
O n the one hand, there is an aesthetic boom. A esthetics is no longer
treated as a philosophical discipline of peripheral importance, but seems
to be everywhere in various elds of culture such as communication as
experience-oriented animation, the presentation of reality by the mass
media as an aesthetic construction, styling and design. Moreover, aesthetics
has become foundational for philosophizing itself. Wolfgang Welsch, one
of the leading gures of G erman post-modern aesthetics, even speaks of
aestheticizing epistemology, which includes the understanding of truth.1
But this E ntgrenz ung, this expansion of the horizons of aesthetics, leads
on the other hand to a fundamental uncertainty about what philosophical
aesthetics really is – or to put it in technical scholastic terms, what the
subiectum of this science might be (if we can consider aesthetics as a
science, that is). So the widespread interest in aesthetics today paradoxi-
cally gives rise to the loss of its proper object. Jean-François Lyotard
International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 8 (1), 73–88

ISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online © 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L ST U D I E S
therefore calls ‘aesthetic’ the mode of a civilization abandoning its ideals

and merely cultivating the pleasure of performance.2
The colourful picture of modern art and especially the new museum –
as A rthur C. D anto calls it – might seem to underline this question. The
new museum combines the consumption of art with the consumption of
food and with the purchase of goods in gift shops, from which people can
walk away with posters of soup cans or with images of idols such as E lvis
and Marilyn. A ndy Warhol’s thought that anything could be art was a
model, in a way, for the hope that human beings could be anything they
chose, once the divisions that had de ned the culture were overthrown.
A nd Joseph Beuys’s claim that everyone was an artist was a corollary to
Warhol’s sweeping egalitarianism, or its pendant. This expansion of what

can be taken as art leads to a similar consequence: although there is,
of course, still a difference between art and non-art, between works of
art and ‘mere real things’, one cannot tell when something is a work
of art just by looking at it, for there is no particular way that art has
to look.3
In comparison with, let us say, the G reek and Latin terms techne, and
technites and ars and artifex, the E nglish terms ‘art’ and ‘artist’ – as they
are commonly understood – re ect a speci c and restricted meaning, which
represents in the history of concepts (B egriffsgeschichte) a minor but
powerful and in uential tradition. This meaning is de ned by adding a
differentia speci ca, namely ‘beautiful’, to the generic term ‘art’, which
includes all kinds of productive activity. So, one should speak in our
context, the aesthetic context, more precisely of ‘ ne arts’, equivalent to
– for example – les beaux arts or die schönen K ünste. A lthough one can
nd the rst attempts to found a philosophical aesthetics in Baumgarten
and Kant, it was mainly H egel who restricted the proper object of the
aesthetica – de ned by Baumgarten as ‘scientia cognitionis sensitivae’4 –
to the schöne K ünste, the ne arts, and established aesthetics as an
autonomous philosophical discipline. Let me quote from the introduction
to H egel’s lectures on the philosophy of art, delivered in Berlin in 1828:
‘denn die Wissenschaft, die gemeint ist, betrachtet nicht das Schöne über-
haupt, sondern rein das Schöne der Kunst. . . . D er eigentliche Ausdruck
für unsere Wissenschaft ist “Philosophie der Kunst” und bestimmter
“Philosophie der schönen Kunst”’ (‘For this science treats not of beauty
in general, but purely of the beauty of art. . . . The proper expression for
our science is “philosophy of art”, and more speci cally, “philosophy of
ne art”.’).5
‘A rt’ and ‘beauty’ – taken in a transhistorical sense – became the master
narrative, which was driven by the idea that there is a kind of transhis-
torical essence in art, everywhere and always the same, but which discloses
itself through history. This means that, for H egel, to speak about art is to
speak about something which is, by de nition, something in the past. This
74
B E YO N D A R T A N D B E A U T Y
master narrative is the basis for art history as an autonomous discipline,

and, as well, it can be seen as a kind of metaphysical justi cation – using
the words of H ans Belting – for the classic art-museum.6 A nd it is not
surprising that this narrative also directs the entries under aesthetic
keywords in standard dictionaries and compendia.
O ne has to remember the strength of this model of aesthetics not only
for understanding the history of Modernism, which can be seen as a history
of the step-by-step dismantling of a concept of art (understood in the strict
sense as ne art) which had been evolving for over half a millennium,
since the very beginning of its conceptualization at the end of the Italian
R enaissance, when one can also nd for the rst time the notion and the
concept of the ‘ ne arts’.7 Therefore, I will consider the history of aesthetics

by taking our perception of pre-R enaissance art as a test case for the
central question of the object of philosophical aesthetics. If one refers to
standard overviews of the history of aesthetics, one might have the impres-
sion of a clear and homogeneous development of artistic styles and their
underlying ideas. Because of that let me use an example to show the
hermeneutical background of this approach towards aesthetics and its
implications for our understanding of art.
II
The paradigm I have chosen is the present cathedral and the former A bbey
church of Saint-D enis, north of Paris. It is commonly treated as the birth-
place of G othic architecture and is the home of the rst G othic choir; its
construction was overseen by A bbot Suger himself. The choir was conse-
crated in 1144 – again by Suger, who recorded this landmark historical
event in his own writings, with their precise descriptions of how things
proceeded, from the laying of the cornerstone to the consecration of the
nished choir, and with his singular re ections regarding the go als of the
medieval architectus , and the place of a pseudo-D ionysian light-meta-
physics within them.
This in uential picture – which even today provides the dominant
paradigm for our understanding of medieval art, and especially for the
so-called birth of G othic architecture – was the creation of the renowned
art historian E rwin Panofsky. H is edition of, E nglish translation of, and
commentary on the ‘aesthetic’ writings of Suger, and above all, his intro-
duction to the text (which has been translated into several languages),
served for generations as the authoritative point of reference in this eld.8
H is introduction is a compelling portrait of a twelfth-century abbot in the
guise of a R enaissance artist. A recent study by Bruno R eudenbach
discloses the complex net of intentions and implications in Panofsky’s
portrait of Suger.9 A s R eudenbach points out, Panofsky never intended
to portray Suger as a medieval statesman and thinker. Instead, he means
75
to present him as the exp onent of a transhistorical continuity, a viable

intellectual tradition born in antiquity and enduring to the present day.
Panofsky’s notion of ‘tradition’ was of one existing amid a host of threats
to its existence.10 A gainst the background of the Second World War,
Panofsky’s portrait of Suger expressed an alternative to barbarism, the
inheritance of Western H umanism.11 The stylization of Suger as a human-
istic gure rests on its placement of him within a timelessly relevant
intellectual tradition, bridging diverse historical epochs. Panofsky’s
remarks about Neoplatonic light-metaphysics move the same way: G othic
architecture becomes the transformation of a metaphysical system. The
‘architecture of light’ gives expression to an intellectual experience, a
creative process within an artist’s mind; it enables us to experience

the supernatural divine light in worldly materiality, leading the human
intellect to a knowledge of G od.12 H ans Sedlmayr and O tto von Simson
– two reknowned G erman art historians – have offered their own versions
of this kind of analysis, although both remain within the con nes of
Panofsky’s overarching hermeneutic.13 Von Simson’s attempt in his book
T he G othic Cathedral to demonstrate a formal ef cient causality between
Neoplatonic-D ionysian philosophy and G othic architecture 14 failed, of
course, as did Panofsky’s later endeavo ur to unite the system of G othic
architecture with the intellectual character of the H igh Middle A ges – his
ambitious attempt to elucidate the ‘genuine cause-and-effect-relation’
between the Scholastic method (above all, that of Thomas A quinas) and
the architectural principles of the G othic cathedral.15
These interpretations are inspired by a still more basic intuition, namely
that the cathedral in some way captures the essence of medieval art and
medieval culture. O ne cannot deny that all three interpretations assume a
rather facile congruity between modern and medieval notions of aesthetics.
That is to say, each assumes a relation of identity between ars and ‘art’,
pulchrum and ‘beauty’, etc.16 O n the basis of such assumptions, the rich
history of Saint-D enis could be accounted for in a way that becomes a claim
about how medieval art and artistry are to be understood.
III
In his little treatise D e consecratione, Suger gives the main reasons for
the decision to rebuild the A bbey church.17 These are found, rst, in a
detailed and urgent report about dangerous overcrowding, particularly
on feast days. O n these days, the church became so full of pilgrims that,
in Suger’s own words, ‘the outward pressure of the foremost ones not only
prevented those attempting to enter from entering but also expelled those
who had already entered’.18 This problem obviously arose in the area of
the transept crossing and the original apse of the old Carolingian basilica
– the place where pilgrims entered the crypt. There, on account of the
76
narrowness, ‘the brethren partaking of the most holy Eucharist could not
stay’ and ‘oftentimes they were unable to withstand the unruly crowd of
visiting pilgrims without great danger’.19 Therefore, it was for the sake of
the liturgy that Suger tried to restore the damaged parts of the A bbey
church, to enlarge and reconstruct others, and to revive forgotten elements
of the ancient cult-tradition (especially those linked to the Merovingian
and Carolingian kings D agobert, Pippin and Charlemagne).20
So, a glance at our primary source, Suger’s D e consecratione, reveals
that liturgy is the main topic and also the key in which Suger exp resses
what we commonly conceptualize in terms of medieval art. What a modern
historian of architecture like O tto von Simson nds ‘disappointing’, namely
Suger’s way of reporting and describing architectural structures,21 echoes

the same lack of understanding regarding context that we saw in Panofsky.
Both historians, that is to say, overlook the central importance for Suger
of liturgy and cultic history. Contrary to Panofsky’s insinuations, A bbot
Suger did not conduct himself like a modern movie-producer.22 H e does
not relate all that he has written to the overarching goal of building a
career. A s von Simson maintains, he is actually not interested in aesthetics
as such, but is – as I would emphazise – much more guided by liturgical
needs. There can be no doubt about this. A fter all, Suger presents, in his
accessus, the object of his treatise, his method, his intention and its utility.
Thus he closes his prooem ium with the following words:
We have endeavored to commit to writing, for the attention of our

successors, the glorious and worthy consecration of this church sacred
to G od and the most solemn translation of the most precious martyrs
D enis, R usticus and E leutherius, our Patrons and A postles, as well
as of the other saints upon whose ready tutelage we rely. We have
put down why, in what order, how solemnly and also by what persons
this was performed, in order to give thanks as worthy as we can to
D ivine grace for so great a gift, and to obtain, both for the care
expended on so great an enterprise and for the description of so
great a celebration, the favorable intercession of our H oly Protectors
with G od. 23
What can we conclude from this inquiry? H ave we really arrived at a

new paradigm – one based on liturgy – to replace Panofsky’s paradigm?
What role does the D ionysian light-metaphysics play in this? The opera-
tive terms commonly connected with the concept of a D ionysian
light-metaphysics and a ‘G othic abundance of light’ – lux, sol, splendor
and clarus – do not constitute a closed metaphorical system which might
justify discourse about a distinct or characteristic use of the light-motif in
Suger’s writings.24 There is indeed no ‘orgy of neo-platonic light meta-
physics’,25 no recourse to a ‘de nite metaphysical system’ inspiring a new
77
artistic design.26 O ne can draw a similar conclusion from an inspection of

the semantic eld surrounding ‘beauty’: there is no evidence for believing
that Suger conceptualizes ‘beauty’ in respect of the two great medieval
traditions, Augustinian and D ionysian. H e nowhere speaks of beauty with
reference to the Augustinian model in which ‘beauty’ is de ned by
proportio, harm onia and consonantia. Neither does he speak of beauty in
the D ionysian idiom, lauding its claritas, splendor and consonantia.27 The
locus classicus for Pseudo-D ionysius’ discussion of beauty is the fourth
book of his D e divinis nom inibus. H e there speaks of beauty as a divine
name in the context of a general exposition of G od’s goodness. G od is
called Beauty, D ionysius asserts, because G od confers beauty on all things.
H e is the cause of the consonance and clarity in all things.28 In the same
book, D ionysius also introduces light as a name by which we can praise
G od. G od is the ever-shining sun which illuminates the visible world and
causes visible things to participate in its own harmony and clarity. This is
a true image of G od’s goodness.29 The passage in Suger’s little treatise on
the consecration of the A bbey church of Saint-D enis in which one can
nd a certain accumulation of ‘aesthetic’ terminology is linked to his
description of the old Carolingian basilica founded by King D agobert.30
The words pulchritudo and splendescere are used here within a common
semantic context. But it is precisely here where Suger self-consciously
inverts the traditional relationship between visible and invisible beauty.
H e describes how ‘the marvellous variety of the marble columns enriched
with treasures of purest gold and silver and richly adorned with a variety
of pearls’ appears to surpass ‘the ornaments of all other churches’. Its
very physical, visible beauty ‘blooms with incomparable lustre’; ‘the old
basilica was shining with every terrestrial beauty and with inestimable
splendour’ (‘inestimabili decore splendesceret’).31
In the same way, the locus classicus for stressing the Sugerian light
aesthetics, his description of the enlarged stained-glass windows, must be
read within context. From a grammatical point of view, the phrase in which
Suger speaks about the ‘elegant and praiseworthy extension of the radi-
ating chapels (in circuitu oratoriorum ), by virtue of which the whole church
would shine by the wonderful and uninterrupted light of the most lumi-
nous, radiant windows passing through the beauty of the inside’, is a simple
addition or appendix to the description of the complex space analysed
above, where the transept crossing meets the choir.32 The radiating chapels
are not part of Suger’s crucial effort to balance the m edium by geomet-
rical and arithmetical means, by relating the axis of the old basilica and
of the new enlargement (m edio novi augm enti) to the dimensions of the
new side-aisles.33 Suger does indeed mention them because of their
enlarged stained-glass windows.34 But let us take the description of the
old Carolingian church and its liturgical background; remember that Suger
tried to re-establish the old cults of the Merovingian and Carolingian
78
kings, including the laus perennis, the perennial praise before the tombs
of the H oly Patrons and Martyrs.35 O ne can imagine a monk who ex-
perienced the liturgical of ces year after year:36 the light passing through
the sanctuary might have impressed him in the same way that it does a
modern visitor. But here we can see the difference: our medieval monk
at Saint-D enis would never have celebrated a ‘creative artistic event’ with
which the history of G othic glass may be said to have begun.37 Suger
certainly never did. Perhaps he would have perceived the light streaming
through the window as a symbol of the perennial liturgical order within
the changing hours of the of ce;38 as a representation of G od’s own beauty
and goodness, to which all creatures are called and in which all are able
to participate.
IV
This difference between the perception of the modern visitor and that of
the medieval monk regarding what we are accustomed to call ‘medieval
art’ raises the following question: can any universal aesthetic paradigm
which invokes transhistorical categories of beauty and art improve our
understanding of medieval art? Let me just point to the fact that more
or less all histories of medieval aesthetics, like those of E dgar de Bruyne
or U mberto E co, are based on equating pulchrum and ‘beautiful’, ars and
‘art’, artifex and ‘artist’.39 But let me also recall that this ordinary and
everyday conception of aesthetics, whose subject is commonly taken to
lie in the point of intersection between art and beauty, is itself merely a
particular historical model. This raises the question: what then is m edieval
art? or exp ressed hermeneutically, how do we perceive and understand
medieval art? A nd, expanding the question to our general task, how can
we perceive and understand art at all? There can, of course, be no simple
answer to this question. O n the one hand, we know that our own concepts
and presuppositions are the necessary starting point for understanding
what medieval art is, as they are for every act of understanding. The
hermeneutic circle does, however, have another side: we are obviously not
merely interested in understanding our own perceptions, but also in under-
standing wider horizons, what is unknown, unfamiliar and strange. What
is needed and what, moreover, may not be avoided, is a careful recon-
struction of how a medieval gure like Suger experienced art and what
expression he has given to those experiences.40 This is furthermore the
only appropiate methodology for an ‘integrated’ view of artistic
phenomena – say of G othic cathedrals.41
A present-day visitor must pay the standard entrance fee at a state
museum in France to enter the choir and the crypt at Saint-D enis. H ere the
perception of medieval art ts into the aesthetics of the modern museum.
That means that our perception is shaped by at least two antiquarian points
79
of view: by the ‘culture’ of the museum as well as by the recent popular inter-
est in the Middle A ges. A t the same time, our general understanding of the
category of the ‘aesthetic’ follows a more or less H egelian paradigm. We see,
that is to say, ‘a common idea’ underlying particular historical mani-
festations – something that we can analyse, which makes art a part of history.
The H egelian assumption that to speak about art is to speak about some-
thing which is, by de nition, something past lies at the deepest roots of the
discipline of art history.42 By now we are aware of some of the deeper foun-
dations and weaknesses of E rwin Panofsky’s stylization of A bbot Suger as
a creative genius – as the father of the G othic style who stands within the
great tradition of Western H umanism.
But what has this example of a twelfth-century church and a twelfth-

century abbot, which I have treated in greater detail, to contribute to our
general question? In what respect might this example serve as a model
for understanding modern art? Let me rst address the latter point. Both
present-day art and what we call medieval art are outside any master
narrative at all, and therefore cannot be understood in H egelian terms.43
A s artists today are at the end of a history in which those narrative struc-
tures have played a role, so were medieval artists before them. Therefore
a speci c hermeneutic approach is needed if the re ection on the modern
or medieval understanding of art is to be able to go behind the re ections
on our own perceptions, guided probably by a commonplace aesthetics.
What I have introduced for the purpose of Saint-D enis as ‘a reconstruc-
tive hermeneutics for experiencing medieval art’ (‘eine rekonstruktive
H ermeneutik mittelalterlichen Kunsterlebens’),44 may serve as a working
hermeneutic model also for the more general question of how philo-
sophical aesthetics can proceed in dealing with an art world unstructured
by any master narrative at all. The starting point for such hermeneutics
is the entity that one identi es as art by asking how that entity is perceived
and experienced.
V
This brings us back to the question of the categories by which we are able
to perceive this particular eld of exp erience related to the ne arts in its
peculiarity. If we furthermore accept the structure of the hermeneutic
circle that the necessary starting point for understanding wider horizons,
what is unknown, unfamiliar and strange, is our own concepts and presup-
positions, we are dependent on concepts which might serve as paths
bridging the different horizons of understanding, and then we rely again
on ‘art’ and ‘beauty’ as categories for conceptualizing aesthetic experi-
ence. O ne should notice also that the attempts to dismantle a concept of
aesthetics whose object (or subiectum ) is commonly taken to lie in the
point of intersection between art and beauty has its point of reference in
80
those categories. A lso, if art no longer has to be beautiful, one has to

know what beauty signi es. In the same manner a broadened and
expanded concept of art – what, for example, Joseph Beuys means by
‘erweiterter Kunstbegriff’45 – presupposes a certain understanding of a
restricted meaning of art in terms of the ne arts.
What I have put as an abstract hermeneutic question can be easily
demonstrated by a brief look at the history of Modernism. Let me start
with the famous example of Marcel D uchamp’s celebrated work Fountain
of 1917, which was nothing but a urinal of that period, disconnected from
the plumbing which gives it its familiar utility (at least for the men of
Western civilizations) and turned on its back like an immobilized turtle.
It was just a piece of industrial porcelain, produced by a company called

Mott Works, and could be replaced by another one of the series if the
original was lost – which really happened with the rst copy, inspiring
D uchamp to put out an edition of eight signed and numbered pieces of
this kind of artwork.46 O r let us take another objet trouvé of D uchamp,
a snow showel, which bears the title In A dvance of the B rok en A rm . What
D anto has called the ‘metaphysical homelessness’ of the object is what
one comes to see that no one is going to break his or her arm shovelling
snow with In A dvance of the B rok en A rm , just because its promotion to
the status of art lifts it above, or at any rate outside the domain of, the
mere utensil.47 Speaking of A rthur C. D anto’s, favourite example of the
change in understanding art is A ndy Warhol’s B rillo B ox. Moreover,
D anto stylizes his visit to a Warhol exhibition at the Stable G allery on
E ast Seventy-four th Street in Manhattan in the late spring of 1964 as his
key exp erience that art had come to an end.48 The B rillo B ox does look
so like boxes of Brillo in the supermarket that the differences surely cannot
constitute the difference between art and non-art. That means – as I said
at the outset – that one can no longer teach the meaning of art by example.
It means that as far as appearances are concerned, anything can be a work
of art and that if yo u are going to nd out what art is, you have to turn
from sense exp erience to thought. You have – following D anto’s conclu-
sion – to turn to philosophy! For the B rillo B ox demonstrated that the
difference between art and non-art is philosophical and momentous, by
constituting itself as an example of the kind that always implies a philo-
sophical boundary.49 A s the meaning of art cannot be taught by examples,
it depends on the concepts of interpretation.
But hasn’t this always been the case? Let me recall how closely
connected the idea of the classic art-museum was – historically and system-
atically – to the H egelian master narrative, just as the new museum
depends on the expansion of aesthetics and the broadening of the concep-
tualization of art. But in the same way, a medieval cathedral can be seen
as a context for singling out the artwork which became part of it, for
promoting that artwork by elevating it above the domain of the mere
81
utensil and raising the meaning through interpretation. Similarly, one

can see Suger’s treatise on the consecration of the A bbey church and
its liturgical exegesis as a powerful narrative of its own, by which a
context of interpretation is established for understanding the art-treasures
of Saint-D enis that Suger is talking about. Incidentally, if a present-
day visitor treats the cathedral like a museum without participating
in the liturgy, what is he or she able to understand of what medieval
art might be, of what a medieval abbot like Suger has intended? O ur
modern visitor is missing the true narrative – or to put it in hermeneu-
tical terms, he or she remains a prisoner of modern aesthetic
presuppositions.
VI
Within this context of interpretation – taken in a wide sense – the
categories of ‘art’ and ‘beauty’ play an important role, because – as we
have seen – they seem to be in an af rmative or in a negative sense an
undeniable point of reference. Let me add two observations with respect
to the medieval experience of art. My rst observation concerns the under-
standing of ‘beauty’, which in the Middle A ges is not primarily related to
art or human culture. The medieval accounts of beauty belong to ontology
or theology. The context for Thomas A quinas’s so-called ‘formal de ni-
tion of the beautiful’ – better characterized as analysis of the three
conditions of beauty in the Sum m a theologiae, for example – is the doctrine
of the Trinity. A quinas there asks whether the property ‘beauty’ is correctly
ascribed to the second Person of the Trinity, the Son.50 H is analysis is not
intended as an aesthetic theory. In the same manner the teaching of beauty
as transcendental – as Jan A ertsen has clari ed – does not offer a starting
point for the reconstruction of a medieval aesthetics.51
O n the other hand – and this is my second observation – one can nd
a rst important move towards the modern scheme of ne arts within the
reformulation of the ars-concept occasioned by the thirteenth-century
reception of the A ristotelian philosophy. Through its association with
the ancient educational programme of the septem artes liberales, ars had
been understood as encompassing the entire spectrum of human knowl-
edge. The differentiation of the complex ars-concept undertaken in the
thirteenth century understood the term as mediating, on the theoretical
plain, between experience (experientia/em peiria) and knowledge (scientia/
episteme). Consequently, an artifex became distinguished by his eld-
speci c expertise, directed towards certain particular subjects. The
differentiation of meanings within the ars-concept known, for example, to
Thomas A quinas followed upon another epochal change: the loss of the
notion of a theory of the sciences encompassing all human knowledge and
activity, as well as of the speculative certainty, af rmed well into the twelfth
82
century (most tellingly in the D idascalicon of H ugh of St Victor), of the

deep unity of the technico-productive, scienti co-philosophical and theo-
logical bodies of knowledge.52 O n this older view (which is, by the way –
if one looks at it in a kind of historical abstraction – very close to Joseph
Beuys’s claim of a broadened and expanded concept of art, his ‘erweiterter
Kunstbegriff’53), all human knowledge was seen as ordered uncondition-
ally to the one highest wisdom. Beauty is in this respect an expression of
the anagogical character of the artes of this period, as well as of their
objects.
The relative independence of ‘artistic knowledge’ (ars) and scienti c
knowledge (scientia), as articulated by Thomas, led on the one hand to
the loss of the conception of beauty in this sense of an ‘anagogical way’

(m os anagogicu s). Nevertheless a more restricted ars-concept is one of
the presuppositions of theoretical re ection within the speci c domain
of a particular art. With this re ection, which is of such a nature as to be
capable of grounding its judgments, the meanings of aesthetic notions asso-
ciated with individual arts began to grow. This development led nally to
the modern scheme of the ne arts, which itself saw further theoretical
elaboration in the R enaissance.54
Such an understanding of aesthetics is not to be found in the Middle
A ges; the statements of Thomas A quinas about ‘art’ and ‘beauty’ must
not be taken in this sense. Paul O skar Kristeller rightly suggests that the
attempt to conceptualize an aesthetics in accord with Scholastic principles
is a modern projection.55 The multiple meanings of artistic activity in the
Middle A ges, each deriving from particular and diverse conceptions of
beauty, can only be understood when read with a general hermeneutical
reservation. This does not amount to a general denial of the category of
the aesthetic, whose function certainly does not consist in the manifesta-
tion of supra-temporal properties of being, but is rather heuristic; it
consists in an encounter across diverse horizons of understanding, which
themselves are located in this diversity of interests. It is in this respect
that the enterprise of developing an aesthetic paradigm which must
proceed reconstructively and is faithful to the medieval understanding –
as well as to the understanding of art at all – proves valid.
VII
Looking back to this hermeneutic switchback comparing modern and
medieval approaches to art, what is the philosophical return of this
inquiry? There is, rst, the probably surprising proximity of medieval and
modern art concerning the dif culty in understanding either from the point
of view of what I have called the classic H egelian master narrative. But
the parallelism does not consist only in the need for methodological sensi-
tivity that I have spoken about in extenso. There is also in many respects
83
an astonishing parallelism concerning the conceptualization of those

contexts which are singled out from the surrounding reality by a certain
increase of meaning and which are mainly called aesthetic or artistic. Let
me just recall the complex ars-concept of H ugh of St Victor and the
expanded concept of art of Joseph Beuys as an equivalent starting point
for artistic expression and liturgical performance. A nd, last but not
least, there is the context of interpretation, which points to philosophy –
or shall we say more precisely to philosophical aesthetics? But what is
philosophical aesthetics? A n answer cannot be found by means of one
major narrative or by expanding the horizons of aesthetics quite arbi-
trarily. This paper cannot present an exhaustive answer either, but our
cross-historical attempt to answer this question has shown some paths

along which to reformulate the question of philosophical aesthetics – and
that (to quote a title of A rthur C. D anto’s) ‘beyond the Brillo Box’.56
Major paths still remain the categories of ‘art’ and ‘beauty’, insofar as
they point to the articulation of those objects and interpretations which
are considered and singled out at different times as artwork and artistic
productions of particular importance. Taken in a heuristic manner both
categories are able to keep the understanding of what belongs to the
aesthetic horizon open for different historical approaches without losing
the proper object of a philosophical aesthetics, which does not always lie
in the same point of intersection between ‘art’ and ‘beauty’, but some-
times beyond them.
Universität z u K öln
Notes
This paper is a revised version of my Thursday Lecture delivered at the H oger
Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte of the Katholieke U niversiteit Leuven on 22 January
1998. I would like to thank the president of the H oger Instituut, Professor Carlos
Steel, for the honour of this invitation and the participants of this session for their
comments.
1 Wolfgang Welsch, ‘D as Ä sthetische – ein Schlüsselkategorie unserer Z eit?’,

in Wolfgang Welsch (ed.) D ie A k tualität des Ä sthetischen (München: Wilhelm
Fink Verlag, 1993), pp. 1–47, see p. 34.
2 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘A nima minima’, in Welsch (ed.) op cit., pp. 417–27,
see p. 417.
3 A rthur C. D anto, B eyond the B rillo B ox: T he Visual A rts in Post-H istorical
Perspective (New York: Farrar, Straus and G iroux, 1992), pp. 4–5.
4 A lexander G ottlob Baumgarten, A esthetica (Frankfurt, 1750; repr.
H ildesheim: W. O lms, 1961) §1: A E S T H E T I C A (theoria liberalium artium,
gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia
cognitionis sensitivae.’
5 G eorg Friedrich Wilhelm H egel, Vorlesungen über die Ä sthetik I, Theorie-
Werkausgabe, vol. 13 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 25.
84
6 H ans Belting, D as E nde der Kunstgeschichte: Eine R evision nach zehn Jahren
(München: C. H . Beck, 1995), p. 138; see also H egel, op cit., vol. 13, p. 25.
See further A rthur C. D anto, A fter the E nd of A rt: Contem porary A rt and
the Pale of H istory (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1997), esp. Ch. 3
(‘Master Narratives and Critical Principles’), pp. 41–58.
7 See Wilhelm Perpeet, D as Kunstschöne: Sein Ursprung in der italienischen
R enaissance (Freiburg–München: Karl A lber, 1987). I will especially point to the
‘paragone’ and to the canonization of the ne arts by G iorgio Vasari; see Bernd
R oggenkamp, D ie Töchter des ‘D isegno’: Z ur K anonisierung der drei bildenden
K ünste durch G iorgio Vasari (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 1996); see also B.
R oggenkamp, ‘Vom “A rtifex” zum “A rtista”: Benedetto Varchis Auseinander-
setzung mit dem aristotelisch-scholasitschen Kunstverständnis 1547’, in J. A .
A ertsen and A . Speer (eds.) Individuum und Individualität im M ittelalter,
Miscellanea Mediaevalia 24 (Berlin–NewYork: Walter de G ruyter, 1996),

pp. 844–60.
8 E rwin Panofsky, A bbot Suger on the A bbey Church of Saint-D enis and its A rt
Treasures (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1946; 2nd edn by G erda
Panofsky-Soergel, Princeton, 1979) .
9 Bruno R eudenbach, ‘Panofsky und Suger von St. D enis’, in Bruno
R eudenbach (ed.) E rwin Panofsky: B eiträge des Sym posions H am burg 1992
(Berlin: A kademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 109–22.
10 Ibid., pp. 118–19.
11 Panofsky, who was forced to leave his chair in H amburg in 1933 under pres-
sure from the Nazi regime, had planned the publication of his Suger edition
for 1944, intending to mark the 800th centenary of the consecration of the
choir at St D enis. U nfortunately, history intervened. Panofsky wrote in a letter
to Tarkington on 20 September 1945: ‘the bomb, incidentally hit Suger, among
other things: the Princeton Press prints untold numbers of the Smyth report
and had to shelve everything else for the time being’. See Panofsky’s letter
from 20 September 1945, in D r. Panofsky and M r. Tark ington: A n E xchange
of L etters 1938–1946, ed. R . M. Ludwig (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press,
1974), p. 83; see also R eudenbach, op cit., p. 111.
12 R eudenbach, op cit., pp. 115–20; see also A . Speer, ‘A bt Sugers Schriften zur
fränkischen Königsabtei Saint-D enis’, in: A . Speer and G. Binding (eds) A bt
Suger von Saint-D enis. A usgewählte Schriffen: O rdinatio, D e consecratione, D e
adm inistratione (D armstadt: Wiesenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000),
pp. 13–66.
13 H ans Sedlmayr, D ie E ntstehung der K athedrale (Z ürich, 1950, 2nd edn G raz:
A kademische D ruck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1988); O tto von Simson, The G othic
Cathedral: O rigins of G othic A rchitecture and the M edieval Concept of O rder
(New York: Bollingan Found ation, 1956, 2nd edn 1962); concerning Saint-
D enis, see in particular Part II, Chs 3 and 4.
14 Von Simson, op cit., esp. pp. 21–58 (Part I, Ch. 2); cf. the critical discussion
of von Simson’s thesis by G ünther Binding: ‘D ie neue Kathedrale: R ationalität
und Illusion’, in G eorg Wieland (ed.) A ufbruch – Wandel – E rneuerung.
B eiträge z ur ‘R enaissance’ des 12. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Frommann-
H olzboog, 1995), pp. 211–35.
15 E rwin Panofsky, G othic A rchitecture and Scholasticism (Latrobe, 1951), esp.
pp. 27–35; see my critical remarks: A . Speer, ‘Vom Verstehen mittelalterlicher
Kunst’, in G. Binding and A . Speer (eds) M ittelalterliches Kunsterleben nach
Q uellen des 11. bis 13. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Frommann-H olzboog, 1993) ,
pp. 13–52, in particular pp. 13–16 and 40–1.
85
16 R egarding this question, see in detail A . Speer, ‘Kunst und Schönheit: Kritische
Ü berlegungen zur mittelalterlichen Ä sthetik’, in I. Craemer-R uegenberg and
A . Speer (ed.) Scientia und ars im M ittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 22
(Berlin–New York: Walter de G ruyter, 1994), pp. 945–66.
17 For the analysis of the archaeological situation, see Jan van der Meulen and
A ndreas Speer, D ie fränk ische K önigsabtei Saint-D enis: O stanlage und
Kultgeschichte (D armstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988) .
Concerning the thirteenth-century church, see Caroline A . Bruzelius, T he
Thirteenth-Century Church at St.-D enis (New H aven: Yale U niversity Press,
1986) .
18 D e consecratione 10, 83–87 (pa. 86, 27–31): ‘[. . .] ut sepius in sollempnibus
uidelicet diebus admodum plena per omnes ualuas turbarum sibi occurentium
super uitatem refunderet et non solum intrantes non intrare, uerum etiam qui
iam intrauerant precedentium expulsus exire compelleret’.

I quote the Latin text from the new edition of A . Speer and G. Binding (eds)
A bt Suger von Saint-D enis. A usgewählte Schriffen (see n. 12). I will give also
the reference to the Panofsky edition (see n. 8), introduced by ‘pa.’, and, in
the absence of a revised translation based on a new critical text, I will follow
in general Panofsky’s standard translation.
19 O rdinatio 36, 129–204 (pa. 134, 11–17): ‘H uc accessit nostram rapiendo deuo-
tionem, quoniam infra sancti sanctorum locus ille diuinitati idoneus, sanctorum
frequentationi angelorum gratissimus tanta sui angustia artabatur, ut nec hora
sancti sacri cii in solemnitatibus fratres sacratissime eucharistiae communi-
cantes ibidem demorari possent nec adventantium peregrinorum molestam fre-
quentiam multociens sine magno periculo sustinere ualerent.’
In D e consecratione 46, 270–4 (pa. 98, 22–7) Suger again mentions this dan-
gerous overcrowding as the main reason for starting with the rebuilding cam-
paign in the eastern part of the A bbey church, but without repeating the
dramatic description.
20 William W. Clark speaks accurately of Suger’s enterprise as a ‘religious pil-
grimage through the history of the abbey’ and sees the category of continuity
also expressed in the ‘reuse and repositioning of actual architectonical ele-
ments’; see William W. Clark, ‘The R ecollection of the Past is the Promise of
the Future.’ Continuity and Contextuality: Saint-D enis, Merovingians,
Capetians, and Paris’, in V. Chieffo R aguin et. al. (eds) A rtistic Integration in
G othic B uildings (Toronto: U niversity of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 92–107, in
particular pp. 94 and 98. See also van der Meulen and Speer, op cit., pp. 267–71
and 302–7.
21 Von Simson, op. cit., pp. 123–4.
22 Panofsky, A bbot Suger on the A bbey Church of Saint-D enis, pp. 14–15.
23 D e consecratione 7, 47–58 (pa. 84, 23–34): ‘[. . .] in medium proferentes glo-
riosam et D eo dignam sancte huius ecclesie consecrationem preciosissimorum
martirum dominorum et apostolorum nostrorum D yonisii, R ustici et Eleutherii
et aliorum sanctorum, quorum prompto innitimur patrocinio, sacratissimam
translationem ad successorum noticiam stilo assignare elaborauimus, qua de
causa, quo ordine, quam sollempniter, quibus etiam personis ad ipsum actum
sit, reponentes, ut et diuine propitiacioni pro tanto munere condignas pro posse
nostro gratiarum acciones referamus et sanctorum protectorum nostrorum tam
pro impensa tanti operis cura quam pro tante sollempnitatis adnotatione opor-
tunam apud D eum optineamus intercessionem.’
24 Concerning the hermeneutics of the medieval understanding of the motif of
light see the introduction of Klaus H edwig: Sphaera L ucis: Studien z ur
86
Intelligibilität des Seienden im Kontext der m ittelalterlichen L ichtspek ulation,

BG PhThMA N.F. 18 (Münster: A schendorff, 1980), pp. 1–22. Nevertheless
H edwig treates the so-called light aesthetics in the traditional way (see
concerning Suger ibid., pp. 193–5).
25 Panofsky, A bbot Suger on the A bbey Church of Saint-D enis, p. 21.
26 Von Simson, op cit., p. 102.
27 See Jan A . A ertsen, ‘Beauty in the Middle A ges: A Forgotten Transcendental?’,
M edieval Philosophy and T heology 1 (1991), pp. 68–97; Jan A . A ertsen,
‘Schöne (das)’, II. Mittelalter, H istorisches W örterbuch der Philosophie VIII
(Basel: Schwabe/D armstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-gesellschaft, 1992), cols
1351–6; A . Speer, ‘Schöne, das’, L exikon des M ittelalters VII/7 (München:
A rtemis-Verlag, 1995), cols 1531–4; concerning the wider semantic eld of pul-
cher see also M.-M. G authier, ‘Pulcher et formosus, l’appréciation du beau, en
latin médiéval’, in Colloques internationaux CN R S 589, pp. 401–19.

28 Ps.-D ionysius A reopagita, D e divinis nom inibus, cap. IV, §7 (PG 3, 761–6).
29 Ibid., cap. IV, §4–6 (PG 3, 753–62).
30 D e consecratione 9, 67–80 ( pa. 86, 10–24).
31 Ibid., 9, 67–74 (pa. 86, 10–17): ‘Q uam miri ca marmorearum columpnarum
uarietate componens copiosis purissimi auri et argenti thesauris inestimabiliter
locupectasset ipsiusque parietibus et columpnis et arcub auro tectas uestes mar-
garitarum uarietatibus multipliciter exornatas suspendi fecisset, quatinus
aliarum ecclesiarum ornamentis precellere uideretur et omnimodis incompa-
rabili nitore uernans et omni terrena pulcritudine compta inestimabili decore
spendesceret [. . .]’.
32 Ibid., 49, 295–302 (pa. 100, 14–22): ‘Prouisum est sagaciter, ut superioribus
columpois et arcubus medis, qui inferioribus in cripta fundatis superponeren-
tur, geometricis et arimeticis instrumentis medium antique testudinis ecclesie
augmenti noui medio equatur nec minus antiquarum quantitas alarum
nouarum quantitati adaptaretur excepto illo urbano et approbato in circuitu
oratoriorum incremento, quo tota clarissimarum uitrearum luce mirabili et con-
tinua interiorem perlustrante pulcritudinem eniteret.’
33 Ibid.
34 See Madeline H . Caviness, ‘Suger’s G lass at Saint-D enis: The State of
R esearch’, in A bbot Suger and Saint-D enis: A Sym posium , ed. Paula Lieber
G erson (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of A rt, 1986), pp. 257–72.
35 See A nne Walters R obertson, T he Service B ook s of the R oyal A bbey of Saint-
D enis: Im ages of R itual M usic in the M iddle A ges (O xford: Clarendon Press,
1991), pp. 13–23, 37–8, 220, 224–5; van der Meulen and Speer, pp. 137–8 and
375–7.
36 A good example is an annotated breviary from the early twelfth century,
Vendôm e, B ibliothèque M unicipale 17C; see R obertson, op cit., pp. 435–6.
37 Von Simson, op. cit., p. 100.
38 See H anns Peter Neuheuser, ‘D ie Kirchweihbeschreibungen von Saint-D enis
und ihre Aussagefähigkeit für das Schönheitsemp nden des A btes Suger’,
in G. Binding and A . Speer, M ittelalterliches Kunsterleben, pp. 153–62, esp. pp.
154–7.
39 I have done so elsewhere; see Speer, ‘Kunst und Schönheit’, pp. 945–66.
40 Concerning this hermeneutical approach see my article ‘Vom Verstehen mitt-
alterlicher Kunst’, pp. 34–49.
41 Bernard McG inn, ‘From A dmirable Tabernacle to the H ouse of G od: Some
Theological R e ections on Medieval A rchitectural Integration’, in Chieffo
R aguin et al., pp. 41–56, here p. 43.
87
42 Speer, ‘Kunst und Schönheit’, pp. 945–7.

43 I am aware that my portrait of H egel is sketchy, and points to a more or less
everyday understanding of aesthetics. I agree with A rthur C. D anto that this
simple picture (not the sophisticated one) is still the major paradigm and at
least the silent point of reference in many of the discussions on aesthetic
topics as well as for our ordinary thought on aesthetics. That there could also
be a productive way of understanding modern art from a sophisticated reading
of the H egelian aesthetics is beautifully shown by William D esmond in his
A rt and the A bsolute: A Study of H egel’s A esthetics (A lbany: SU NY Press,
1986) .
44 See Speer, ‘Vom Verstehen mittelalterlicher Kunst’, pp. 37–8 and 49–52.
45 See Volker H arlan, Was ist Kunst? Werk stattgespräch m it B euys (Stuttgart:
U rachhaus, 1986); A . Speer, ‘D er erweiterte Kunstbegriff und das mittelal-
terliche “Kunst”-Verständnis’, in Joseph B euys und das M ittelalter, ed. H iltrud

Westermann-A ngerhausen (Köln: Cantz Verlag, 1997), pp. 166–75.
46 See A rthur C. D anto, T he Philosophical D isenfranchisem ent of A rt (New
York: Columbia U niversity Press, 1986), pp. 13–14 and 32–3.
47 Ibid., p. 31.
48 D anto, A fter the E nd of A rt, pp. 13 and 24. O ne should be aware that D anto
and H egel understand the phrase ‘the end of art’ very differently.
49 D anto, B eyond the B rillo B ox, p. 7; D anto, A fter the E nd of A rt, p. 13.
50 Sum m a theol. I q.39 a.8 c; cf. Sum m a theol. I q.5 a.4, ad 1. See A . Speer,
‘A quinas, Thomas, in: E ncylopedia of A esthetics, vol. 1, ed. Michael Kelly
(New York-O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 1998), pp. 76–79.
51 See A ertsen, ‘Beauty in the Middle A ges: A Forgotten Transcendental?’,
pp. 68–97; Jan A . A ertsen, M edieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: T he
Case of T hom as A quinas, STG MA 52 (Leiden–New York–Köln: E. J. Brill,
1995), pp. 335–59.
52 See in comparison H ugo of St Victor, D idascalicon II. 1 (ed. C. H . Buttimer,
Washington: The Catholic U niversity Press, 1939, pp. 23–5; PL 176,
751A –752B) and A ristotle, M etaph. I.1–2 (980a21–983a23); E th. N ic. VI.3–6
(1139b14–1141a8). Concerning the change in understanding art and sciences
see Craemer-R uegenberg and Speer op cit.
53 See n. 45 above.
54 See A . Speer, ‘Jenseits von Kunst und Schönheit? Auf der Suche nach dem
G egenstand einer philosophischen Ä sthetik’, A llgem eine Z eitschrift für
Philosophie 20(3) (1995), pp. 181–97, esp. pp. 192–5. See also n. 7 above.
55 Paul O skar Kristeller, ‘D as System der modernen Künste’, in his H um anism us
und R enaissance II: Philosophie, B ildung und Kunst (München: W. Fink, 1976) ,
pp. 164–206, esp. p. 175.
56 See n. 3 above.
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therefore calls ‘aesthetic’ the mode of a civilization abandoning its ideals

Warhol’s sweeping egalitarianism, or its pendant. This expansion of what

master narrative is the basis for art history as an autonomous discipline,

concept of the ‘ ne arts’.7 Therefore, I will consider the history of aesthetics

to present him as the exp onent of a transhistorical continuity, a viable

creative process within an artist’s mind; it enables us to experience

Suger’s way of reporting and describing architectural structures,21 echoes

We have endeavored to commit to writing, for the attention of our

What can we conclude from this inquiry? H ave we really arrived at a

artistic design.26 O ne can draw a similar conclusion from an inspection of

But what has this example of a twelfth-century church and a twelfth-

those categories. A lso, if art no longer has to be beautiful, one has to

It was just a piece of industrial porcelain, produced by a company called

utensil and raising the meaning through interpretation. Similarly, one

century (most tellingly in the D idascalicon of H ugh of St Victor), of the

the loss of the conception of beauty in this sense of an ‘anagogical way’

an astonishing parallelism concerning the conceptualization of those

cross-historical attempt to answer this question has shown some paths

1 Wolfgang Welsch, ‘D as Ä sthetische – ein Schlüsselkategorie unserer Z eit?’,

Miscellanea Mediaevalia 24 (Berlin–NewYork: Walter de G ruyter, 1996),

iam intrauerant precedentium expulsus exire compelleret’.

Intelligibilität des Seienden im Kontext der m ittelalterlichen L ichtspek ulation,

latin médiéval’, in Colloques internationaux CN R S 589, pp. 401–19.

42 Speer, ‘Kunst und Schönheit’, pp. 945–7.

terliche “Kunst”-Verständnis’, in Joseph B euys und das M ittelalter, ed. H iltrud

Potrebbero piacerti anche

concept of the ‘ ne arts’.7 Therefore, I will consider the history of aesthetics