[G.R. No. L-16257. January 31, 1963.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-

appellant, vs. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant
-appellee.

San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.

Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jose S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. TORRENS REGISTRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — The main

purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid conflicts of title in and to real estate, and
to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further
inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R.
No. L- 19940, March 30, 1960; Mañacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13971,
February 27, 1961).
2. EMINENT DOMAIN: EXPROPRIATION OF LANDED ESTATES; HOW
COMPENSATION DETERMINED. — Since the
right of the Province of Negros Occidental to expropriate the lot in question in the
present case is not contested, the owner of said lot is entitled to recover from
said province the fair and full value of the lot, as ofthe time when possession
thereof was actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages —
including attorney's fees — from which the consequential benefits, if, any should
be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner
from and after the date of actual taking.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J : p

Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant,

the Province of Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral
survey of Bacolod,Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to
attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal
taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme
Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered
the case remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision
was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case
is, once again, before us, this time on appeal by the plaintiff, the subject
matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusiveof interest and
costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan,
consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned
cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally
registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an
area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August 25, 1916, in the
name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the
aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents
as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable in installments,
as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924, said Original
Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on March
12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose Benares
to the Bacolod- Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On
December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said
Lot 378, to the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded
in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on the
corresponding certificates of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6295, covering Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29,
1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 —
which, owing to its subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the Bank, was issued on March 14,
1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the
Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Benares, for the sum of P400,000,
payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment
thereof, title would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares
transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which
completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on
September 29, 1949, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale
to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering Lot
378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted
Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in
1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose
Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this
reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P.
Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the
deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff
took steps to take possession of the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was
the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately,
thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper
officials to clarify the status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot
378 in the year 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that immediately
after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said
lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was
completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely,
notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that, "for some reason or other and
for cause beyond comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never
transferred in the name of said defendant"; that said lot had been placed in
defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No. 16269
(dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing
said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital
was where it is up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its name for
assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo Montelibano, the
controlling stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff corporation,
was the first City Mayor of Bacolod, which contributed to the support, operation
and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November 8,
1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned expropriation case was
"amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the sense that the . .
. Province of Negros Occidental would pay . . . and did in fact pay to Jose Benares
the assessed value of Lot 378 . . . and whatever consideration pertaining to said
lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid by the Province would be
donated and was in fact donated by said . . . Jose Benares in
favor of the Province purposely for Hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein
had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. The
decision appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and
declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it
ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated,
substantially, upon the following premises, namely; that case No. 3041 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the expropriation of the hospital
site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that, among
the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the
aforementioned cadastral survey, belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it,
on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding
transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued on July 12, 1926; that,
according to the testimony of Jose Benares, the expropriation of Lot 378 was
settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and that defendant's
failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificateof title to Lot 378 was due to
"the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan
(Exhibit X).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence,
because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff
and its president, for the former believes that the latter had "manipulated" to
exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been four (4) litigations
between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally decided against
the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified
to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the rate of P1,000
a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378, he should
have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters; (b) he claimed to have
received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days"
after the Government had taken possession of the land, and to have sent the
money the next day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have
received said sum of P12,000 on November 7, 1928;

3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco,

former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares asserted
that there was a written compromise agreement between him and the Government,
whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely oral; and (b) Marco stated that
Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378, the assessed value
thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government the difference between
this sum and the true value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first
offered P300 per hectare which he rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a
hectare, which the Government agreed to pay, although, subsequently, he said
that Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept P1,000 per
hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso
Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case "was
not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no agreement
for the acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and that the
expropriation had not been consummate For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing
and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices (Exhibit 1);
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the
Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name and
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province, when
contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a transfer
certificate oftitle in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly suggest that
no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had been made or
reached;
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12,
1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until
September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without
the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted a second mortgage in
favor of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not
belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated
subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation. What is
more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R),
promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos P. Benares, it was explicitly
stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410, forming part of said Hacienda and
designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A, 407-B and 410-A, had been expropriated by the
Provincial Government of NegrosOccidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
". . . It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with
the expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed.
The Court had to examine carefully and minutely every single
 piece of evidence adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct
solution of the mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the
government to secure the corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies in
the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This
conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The
plan shows that while all the subdivided lots were properly identified by lot
numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled
with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding
lot number and that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where
the hospital building was constructed. This plan was prepared for the
government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento,
embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for the Capitol and hospital
sites. The fact that this particular portion was not labelled with the
corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to believe that
it formed a part of lot 405B, which adjoins it, altho separated by the creek.
This lack ofreasonable explanation why the government failed to secure
the corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient
proof that Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of sale in
favor of the government."
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness
and moral courage that account for the well earned reputation and prestige of the
Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to concur in the foregoing view. To
begin with, there is no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove, that
the expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned.
Hence, the lower court merely speculated about the "chances that the
(expropriation) case was dismissed." By the way, the contrary was intimated by
defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he testified that the expropriation
case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and
the record before us suggests that since the Province took possession of the land
in 1924 or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were
no further proceedings in said case.
With respect to the plan Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that
the authorities had been 'misled . . . to believe" that the portion at the lower
corner ofsaid plan — which was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red
pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 — formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been
expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion Exhibit X-
1 is not part of the land covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of the
latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan. More
important still, on the right hand side of Exhibit X, the following appears in bold
letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403, 405, 406,
407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial
Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental(Capitol site)". The absence of Lot
378 from said enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that
it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of its being mistaken by any
body, much less by government engineers, as including the hospital site, and,
hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the defendant herein, specially
the assessor's field sheets and declarations of real property for tax purposes
(Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government had always regarded Lot
378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any event, said
possibility of mistake, if any which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant —
in the race of documentary evidence to the contrary — the conclusion that Lot 378
has already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and
applied by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could
not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly
agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00 in this connection, it
should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site,
another expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose
Benares, appears to have been instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the payment for
his land included in the CapitolSite, as one intended for Lot 378, which was
affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount to a probability when
we consider that he erroneously believed that there had been
only one expropriation case, instead of two cases, against him, and that Lot 378
was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine
National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate recollection of the
events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence, his testimony may not
be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged
acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the
exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the
testimony of plaintiff's president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that
the land on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held
that plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive
knowledge of defendant's possession ofthe property at the time it was bought by
the plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares — whose right to buy the Hacienda
Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff — "is a part
owner of the Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein",
because "the hospital was already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot
was declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in
1935, the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvements";
because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over their supposed rights to take
possession of Lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that Lot No.
378 was erroneously or inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q &
R) executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiffsubdivision and
that same lot was occupied by the defendant government for the provincial hospital
for the last 34 years, as owner thereof."

As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did
not know until 1949 that Lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial
hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known
to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from
the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the
latter appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose
Benares did not apparently know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings
affecting said properties; that the P12,000 received by him from the Government
was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged
by him to the Bank.
Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible
conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-
13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960;
Mañacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13971, February 27, 1961). In the case at
bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was
not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot
378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the
hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date,
or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in
favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in
1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos
P. Benares and the latter, subsequently, conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as
well as when the Bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on
September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank.
Considering that sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an
array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was
not justified in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot
378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said
mortgages were constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was
executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for
value.
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378
is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due
by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover
from the defendant the fair and full equivalent of Lot 378, as of the time when
possession thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential
damages — including attorney's fees — from which consequential damages the
consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interest, at the legal rate,
on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual
taking. The case should be remanded, therefor, to the lower court for the
reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the
amount of compensation collectible from the defendant, and the rendition,
thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs
against the defendant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal, J ., took no part.

(Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. L-16257,

|||

[January 31, 1963], 117 PHIL 59-71)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997.]

TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-
appellees.

Godofredo D. Cabildo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING. — A land

registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its
branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing
of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said
application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.
2. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION. — A decree
of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the
questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might
be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. With the certification
duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this Court),
its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of
Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no
doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It
is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one
year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be subject to the
conditions set forth in the 1914 case ofCacho vs. US would be tantamount to
setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year
from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action
would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE JUDGMENT AND RESULTING DECREE ARE RES
JUDICATA. — To sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring
petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a
derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject
decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees
is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the
NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the
judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior
fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913
(upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record
No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on
December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915). Requiring the submission of a new
plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality
attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule
regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting
decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the whole world, the
proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a
requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the
Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACHES CANNOT BAR THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE. — As to
the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is
that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor may be
gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]): . . . This provision of the
Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom. . . . There is nothing in the law that
limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is
. . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission . . . Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25
SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be
rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was
reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988])
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS;
THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS IS ENTITLED TO A
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND PROOF IS REQUIRED TO
CONTROVERT THE SAME; BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS UPON HIM WHO
ALLEGES THE CONTRARY. — By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of
Demetria Cacho, the property in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner
under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate General of the
Philippines in Chicago. The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho
was published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before
Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic
of the Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case. The execution of public
documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a
presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same.
Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and
respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his
existence and his identity without presenting preponderant evidence to controvert
such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the
Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of
the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath being
of itself a performance of duty by a public official.

DECISION

MELO, J :p

The late Doña Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land
situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the
limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly
tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho
vs. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the
applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title
of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and
signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who acted for her husband, a
Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto
Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting this parcel to registration, it is
ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights
in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered
that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon
on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger
of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres. This
was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.
 Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his
uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the balance by his own
possession and cultivation.
A tract of land, 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the
Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of
parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is
not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with
all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in
question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner
of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No.
6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said
case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had
another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part
cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E.,
& N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the
points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs of the new
survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of
the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said
deed and the new plan.

On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the
late Doña Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO
Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines,
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic
and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence
inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The
same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of
decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No.
10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court
specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of
this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon
some conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit
amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495)
but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept
the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees under the
following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and
the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the
decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the
respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept
the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-
issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party-
in-interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the
properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance
of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its
decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and
18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the
issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18959 were
issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that
the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited
pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final and
conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the
Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all certified that
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and
Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits "C",
"D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner
Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed
that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for
reconstitution have been regularly and properly done based on existing
records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded
in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and technical description
of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the LRC and
transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63
in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969
in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla,
Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and validated the report
of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh. "M"), shows that the
decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and date of issuance of
Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the
approval of the plans and corresponding technical descriptions of the lots
involved in the aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. "T"). aisadc

It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel,

Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary
Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that
Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs.
"T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the existence
of the decrees have been established sufficiently and indubitably by the
evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended petition
has to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring
Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration Commission) to
 re-issue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry
Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon
payment by the petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint
brief assigned the following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended
petition for reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued in
LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that —
I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;
II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the
United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908
and 6909 had been reserved pending compliance by the applicant
therein of certain conditions albeit, as of Date, No competent
evidence exists showing compliance with the imposed conditions
and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance of
decrees pursuant thereto;
III. The petition is barred by laches; and
IV. The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person
and/or a party who does not have a lawful interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of
titles when the same is already barred by laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no
proof that Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a real party-in-interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence
of sufficient proof to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 &
18969 were indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April
1979 dismissing the original petition for reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by
appellant City of Iligan pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469
(dated 4 October 1965) which ownership was affirmed by the Supreme
 Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al.,
158 SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed
aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the
issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to
wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree Nos.
10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and GLRO
Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission
Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court), submitted a
Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at
the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the
land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed
properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were
regularly done based on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with
prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the
United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617,
regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted
in part the application for adjudication and registration of the two parcels
of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final
decision on the cases was reserved pending compliance with conditions
set forth therein.

1.) Re: Case 6908, ". . . before admitting this parcel to registration, it is
ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his
rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in
Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares .
. . (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by
the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel
object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day
of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular
inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto
Anandog . . . with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and
representative Señor Vidal. Having arrived late, Señor Vidal did not assist
in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking
the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated
by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered that the new
survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil.
630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the
Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho
in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares,
and as to the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the
Supreme Court decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be
made in accordance with the points mentioned"; that applicant Demetria
Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in Case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if
it was made, must have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO
No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of
the "new survey" on which to base the area and technical description of
the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the
original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right
to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by
reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to
act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that
appellee would not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to
them in the event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the
suit is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property
covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
 The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless
the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle
that all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the
King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he
is a real party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest
in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present
petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance
in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a
reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and
July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance with
conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively presumed
to have been complied with before the original decrees were issued and
can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing
doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as
a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this
Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof
to establish the requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian
doctrine" to dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to
uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the
identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild
and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their
respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and
its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the
filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to
said application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration
proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration
Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a
distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head
Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of
Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact
been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees
attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final
decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case
of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot
be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual,
107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose
of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to
fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the
doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a
mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the
NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the
judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior
fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913
(upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record
No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on
December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the
decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory,
thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that
the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon
the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem.
Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders
the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor
may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act
to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission . . .

(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316
[1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered
inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated
in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real
party-in-interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his
existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in
question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series
of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the Times Journal.
Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to
represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication,
is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and
controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the
contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting
doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant
evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule
apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine
Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the
administering oath being of itself a performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial
Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
(Cacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 154-
|||

168)

B. NATURE OF DUTY TO REGISTER INSTRUMENTS

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988.]

EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO

HITALIA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO,
ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.

Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.

Rico & Associates for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS; PURPOSE. — "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real
rights of the party causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly
recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it.
For, notice of lis pendensserves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep
his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3,
11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban,
18 SCRA 481, 485-485).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT TO CANCEL LIS
PENDENS; DELAYING TACTICS OF PARTY IN CASE AT BAR IS A GROUND
FOR CANCELLATION. — A notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 15871 was
annotated on petitioner's Certificate of Title No. 106098 covering Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre. It appears, however, that private respondents in filing said
case were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered the immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution
proceedings involving said lot. The foregoing facts necessitate the application of
the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal
Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363)
and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that: "We have once held that
while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot
be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has
the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance,
where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to
the prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v. Rovira, supra;The Municipal Council
of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS
CANCELLATION OF LIS PENDENS UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF
NOTICE IS TO MOLEST THE ADVERSE PARTY; FAILURE TO CANCEL
NOTICE PURSUANT THERETO, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Respondent
Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of
the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the
ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77
ofPresidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof
which provides: "Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may
also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration thereof."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. — Under
Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance, instruments and
the like is ministerial in nature.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATUTES MUST BE TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY WHAT
IT DAYS; P.D. NO. 1529 IS CLEAR. — The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals,
127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v.
Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of
Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no
room for construction.
6. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF WORD "SHALL". — According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory."
7. CRIMINAL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; A REGISTER OF
DEEDS HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; OPINION OF COMMISSIONER MUST BE SOUGHT IN
CASE OF DOUBT. — The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument presented
to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration
now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; DELAY IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT'S FINAL RESOLUTION; RESPONSIBILITY
FALLS ON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. — In the ultimate analysis, however, the
responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final
resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He
should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as
excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private
respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own
Torrens Certificate of Title.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432
and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two
(2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the
filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution
dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo
S. Baranda. The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez,
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that
they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No.
25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried
out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition
was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982,
the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the
petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the
Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution
dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial
is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant
case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented;
that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was
filed only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the
 respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession
and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of
prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate
Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that
— (1) there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed
in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent
court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court
was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending
the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of
issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of
possession and demolition is likewise ordered." (pp. 107-108, Rollo —
G.R. No. 64432)

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Barandaand Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case
No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited
pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
"Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
"(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
"(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R.
No. 64432;
"(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act
496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this
Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
 "Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition
thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is
hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as
prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo - G.R. No. 64432).
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case before this
Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed
by Atty. EduardoBaranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this
Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
"1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under
Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P.
Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473,
64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on
another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another
Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6, 1986
and January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit:
"O R D E R
"This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register
of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
 Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds,
Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
"Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of
the writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court,
Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17, 1986, the present
motion is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
"O R D E R
"This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with
the order of this Court dated November 25, 1986, a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel
on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its
Order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed
within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition
tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days
from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the
name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which
certificate shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate." (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and
manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT
T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as
mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already
deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated
September 17, 1986)?
"b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT
T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432).
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983
and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the
matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary
sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the
resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be
entertained by this Court." (p. 615, Rollo - 64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560,
T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case
(Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and
annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld
by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987
ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the
new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in
another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February 12, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of lis
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-
111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:

"'At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or

other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights
of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any
case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been
registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis
Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a
certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding
was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.'
"That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-
106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed
as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, entitled, 'Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maxima Provido
and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus EduardoBaranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, Respondents.'
"That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 1529, the cancellation of
subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled
upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the
action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
"Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis
Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable
Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens." (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court
resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order
and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared
valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A
corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or
annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No.
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Providos' counsel,
a notice of lis pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-
106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order
dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason
why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the
certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in
the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly
are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E," G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo)
In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria
Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent
Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera
and her other co-owners." (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No.
62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained
and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and
subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25, 1983
long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432
wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession
and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
"Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he
could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For,
notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should
keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v.
Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,
citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486).
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in
this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases
of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the
effect that:
"We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has
been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is
pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power
to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the
evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for
which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, supra)"
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfully the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining
the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that the notice of lis pendens in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based
on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:
"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof."
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he
was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871
prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to
the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below
but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed
by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the
defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the
name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of
the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate
of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party
in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds . . ."

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning
the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate
of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of
any deed . . . or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the
opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the
National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with
Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are
SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (Baranda v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, [September 26, 1988], 248 PHIL 205-220)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-20611. May 8, 1969.]

 AURELIO BALBIN and
FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ILOCOS SUR, respondent.

Vicente Llanes for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.

SYLLABUS

1.LAND REGISTRATION ACT; VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED

LAND; PRESENTATION OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
FOR REGISTRATION OFVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT; ONLY ONE DUPLICATE
COPY OF TITLE IS SURRENDERED. — Section 55 of Act 496 obviously
assumes that there is only one duplicate copy ofthe title in question, namely,
that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary
instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for
the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTER OF DEEDS' REFUSAL TO ANNOTATE DONATION
PROPER WHERE THERE WERE THREE OTHER COPIES OF TITLE. — Where,
when the petitioner presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title and a deed of donation for annotation, three
other copies of the title were in existence, the register of deeds was correct in
denying the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law." As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner,
petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is
beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in
existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEED OF DONATION SIGNED BY HUSBAND
DISPOSING OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE REGISTERED. — Where
the deed of donation executed by the surviving husband bears on its face an
infirmity, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of the conjugal property which
he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what
remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other
parties, the denial of the registration of the said deed of donation was justified.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT OVER A
REGISTERED LAND MAY BE SUSPENDED. — Where there is a case pending
wherein the civil statusof the donor and the character of the land in question are in
issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him, the
matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that
case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected
by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
5.ID.; OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; IMPORTANCE
THEREOF. — The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical
entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered
by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J : p

Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC

Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur
a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same
be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated
one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No.
548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (2/3) portion
thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective
or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate
sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in
favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
"Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 3.710 square meters
only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title
No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3.710
square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee . . . is
 hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in
interest of the vendor . . .
"Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 16.713 square
meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title
No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion
. . . and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee . . . is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the
vendor . . . "Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953, . . .
'Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15.000 square
meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548
is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion . . . and
in lieu thereof the name of the vendee . . . is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor . . .
"Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952, . . ."
The final part of the annotations referring to the above-mentioned sales contains
an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate
certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos
Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon
verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in
the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly
because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had
not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the
requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a
resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy,
the Commissioner observed.
"(1)It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously
sold undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in
favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's
duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's
duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers.
Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate ofTitle No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise
 be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the
issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside
the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the
contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued."
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would
want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their
possession, citing Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner
to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with
such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the
presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it
speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the property
is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case;
and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was
illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes
that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the
registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument
is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to
make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three
other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under Section
43 * ofAct 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner,
petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is
beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in
existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical
entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered
by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding
the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property
subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the
marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina,
"there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse
may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and
sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a
surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein—
subject of course to the resultof future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be
denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the
deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share,
not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the
same land to three other parties.

It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the
character ofthe land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different
conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation
may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the
interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Capistrano J., did not take part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more
persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in
common, or otherwise, duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided share.
(Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, G.R. No. L-20611, [May 8, 1969], 138
|||

PHIL 12-18)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22486. March 20, 1968.]

TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-

appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respond
ent-appellee.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; REGISTER OF DEEDS; NO POWER TO

DETERMINE VALIDITY OF DOCUMENT. — The Register of Deeds may not
validly refuse to register a deed of sale presented to him for registration. Whether
a document is valid or not, is not for the Register of Deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed,
a register of deeds is entirely precluded by Section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.
For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken
with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all
that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO REGISTER; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES. — Mandamus does not lie to compel
the register of deeds to register the deed ofsale in question, because pursuant to
the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act 1151, where any party in interest does
not agree with the register of deeds, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, whose decision on the matter shall be binding
upon all register of deeds. Hence, this administrative remedy must be resorted to,
before there can be recourse to the courts.

DECISION

CASTRO, J : p

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the
office of the Register of Deeds ofAgusan in Butuan City to register the
deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration
was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated
in his letter of May 21, 1962:
 "1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
presumption, is considered conjugal property;
"2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but
"3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was
made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property
without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10,
1958).
"To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the
name of the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased wife by
means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such
other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document
ratifying this sale executed by their father."
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel
the Register of Deeds to registerthe deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages
and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation. It is Almirol's assertion that
it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him,
and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated
the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has
"other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the
decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration,"
and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus
does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep.
Act 1151," dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his
part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
 "Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction." (Gabriel vs.Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L- 17956, Sept.
30, 1963).
". . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection
to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence
or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration
does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can
parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they
become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then
questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to
be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards." (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco,
92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with
the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be
taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissionerof Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section
4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
"Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. —
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the
certification ofthe Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he
is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by
the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to
the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may
be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after
receipt of the notice thereof."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does
not agree with the Register of Deeds .. the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be
"conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative
remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the
courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1963 is affirmed,
at petitioner's cost.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1.In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell
& Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register of Deeds,
Pasig, Rizal vs. Heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza vs. Abrera,
et al., L- 10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit Cooperative
Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28, 1960; Dulay, et
al. vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30, 1962.

(Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486, [March 20, 1968],
|||

131 PHIL 257-262)

7. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-67742. October 29, 1987.]

MELITON GALLARDO and TERESA

VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MARTA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE AGANA,
VISITACION AGANA KIPPING, PEDRO V. AGANA, MARCELO V.
AGANA, JR., TERESITA AGANA SANTOS and JESUS V.
AGANA, respondents.
DECISION

PARAS, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the
decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) promulgated
on May 22, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton Gallardo and Teresa
Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, et al. (Rollo, p. 37) affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna 8th Judicial District, Branch II,
**

Sta. Cruz, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna) dated January
20, 1982, which dismissed the complaint for Quieting of Title in Civil Case No. SC-
1492 and declared the plaintiff's (petitioner's herein) Reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No. 23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp.
215-216).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is in full accord with the evidence
and the law and is hereby therefore affirmed in all its part. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED."
The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,
Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an
original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered
in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (former Justice of the Peace of the
Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna), pursuant to Decree No. 150562 issued in L.R.C.
Cadastral Record No. 136, Cad. Case No. 1 (Record on Appeal; Answer, p. 28). prcd

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of
the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the
daughter of Pedro Villanueva.
On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them
in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog (Annex "B"
of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying
and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners (Record on
Appeal, Exhibit "B", pp. 9-10) which deed is reproduced as follows:
"Ako, Pedro Villanueva, 66 taong gulang, balo at nananahanan sa
municipio ng Cavinti, lalawigang Laguna at Kapuluang Pilipinas, alang-
alang sa halagang LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00) salaping filipino, na
sa akin ibinayad ng mag-asawa ni Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva,
tagarito rin sa nasabing municipio, lalawigang at kapuluan, sa hinaharap
ng kasulatan ay sinasaysay ko na aking inililiwat at pinagbili ng biling
 patuluyan sa nasabing mag-asawa Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva,
sampo na sa kanilay mangagmamana at hahalili, ang aking isang palagay
na lupa na nabubuo sa limang luang na tubigan, punlang kalahating
kabang palay at saka dalatan o katihan na may isang kabang palay na
hasik, tumatayo sa nayon ng Kanlurang Talaongan, sakop nitong
municipio ng Cavinti at napapaloob sa mga hangganang sumusunod:
HILAGAAN, Braulio Villanueva at Modesto Ribera.
SILANGAN, Braulio Villanueva.
TIMUGAN, Braulio Villanueva, Ilog Kaliraya at Jacinto Toque.
KANLURAN, Jacinto Toque.
Ang pagaaring ito ay tunay kong pananarili sapagkat aking nabili sa
magkakapatid na Aniano Gallardo, Zacarias Gallardo at Perfecto Gallardo
at natatala sa Registro ng Amillarmiento dito sa Cavinti sa ilalim ng Blg.
22888, at walang ano mang ipinagkakautang ni pinanagutan kaya at
magagamit na nitong aking pinagbilhan ang kanilang matwid na
maipamana at mailiwa sa iba. Gayon ding sinasaysay ko na akoy
umaakong mananagutan dito sa aking pinagbilhan, tungkol sa pagaaring
ito na ang katibayay aking ipagsasanggalang laban sa kanino mang
maghahabol.
"Dapat tantoin, gayon man, na ang pagaaring ito ay registrado na sa
Registro de la Propiedad nitong lalawigang Laguna, subalit at sa isang
kamalian ng pagkakasukat tungkol sa lawak at laki, ay hindi pa natutubos
ang kanyang titulo, kaya at kung maisaayos na ang nasabing titulo ay
saka na ipatatala sa pangalan nitong aking pinagbilhan upang lalong
malagay sa katahimikan itong aking pinagbilhan.
"At sa katunayan ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito dito sa municipio ng
Cavinti, Laguna, ngayong ika sampung araw ng Agosto taong isanglibo
siyam na daan at tatlompu at pito (1937).
"(LGD) PEDRO VILLANUEVA.
"Nagpirma sa hinaharap ni:
"(LGD) BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA.
"JUAN VILLANUEVA"
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis of the
private document of sale (Exhibit "B") and a new certificate of title was issued in
the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293
(No. 23350) on January 4, 1944, particularly describing the land as follows:
"A parcel of land (Lot No. 401 of the Cadastral Survey of Cavinti), with the
improvements thereon, situated in the municipality of Cavinti. Bounded on
the N and NE., by Lot No. 403; on the SE., by Lot No. 393 and the Caliraya
 River; and on the SW., by Lot No. 515. Area — Eighty One Thousand and
Three Hundred (81,300) Square Meters, more or less." (Record on
Appeal, Annex "A," pp. 7 and 9).
During the Second World War, the records as well as the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna, where the original of the new transfer certificate of title was kept,
were completely burned. Accordingly, by virtue of an Affidavit of Reconstitution
dated December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal, Annex "DD," pp. 41-42) and upon
presentation of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, the title was
administratively reconstituted and the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) in the name of the petitioners (Record
on Appeal, Annex "B", pp. 7-9).
On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro
Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Record on
Appeal, Annex "C", pp. 10-13). However, on December 6, 1976 a joint affidavit
was filed by Pedro G. Villanueva, Jr. and Restituto Villanueva withdrawing their
adverse claim on the said parcel of land, with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna (Record on Appeal, Annex "D," pp. 13-14).
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to
settle said controversy amicably. Several demands made by herein petitioners
upon private respondents Marta Vda. de Agana to withdraw her adverse claim,
failed.
On December 9, 1976, said private respondent executed a Deed of Conveyance
and Release of Claim (Record on Appeal and Annex "AA", p. 35) wherein the
parties agreed, among other things, to the following:
"That in consideration of the said transfer and conveyance over a 1,000
square meter portion mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, the
VENDEE (Marta V. Agana) does hereby withdraw the adverse claim
mentioned above;" (Rollo, p. 119).
However, when private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana refused to sign
an Affidavit of Quitclaim (Exhibit "9;" Record on appeal, p. 195), petitioners
instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo
S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977, demanding that their title over the
questioned land be fortified by a declaration of ownership in their favor and
avoiding the aforecited Deed of Conveyance and Release of Claim (Record on
Appeal, pp. 1-7). Accordingly, private respondents in their answer countered that
the Deed of Sale in Tagalog and petitioners' title over the land be declared void ab
initio, among other demands (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-35).
On January 20, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision
declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer
certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio Record on Appeal, pp. 208-216). prLL

The dispositive portion of said decision (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216)

reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, as follows:
a. declaring as null and void the private document dated August 10, 1937
written in Tagalog (Exhibit B);
b. declaring as null and void plaintiffs' reconstituted Transfer Certificate of
Title RT-6293 (No. 23350) (Exhibit F) and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Laguna to issue a new reconstituted or to reinstate Original Certificate
of Title No. 2262 Issued on April 2, 1924 in the name of Pedro Villanueva
within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision;
c. declaring the heirs of Pedro Villanueva as the owners of the property in
litigation and ordering the plaintiffs and her agents and those acting for in
their behalf to vacate the land in question and surrender the possession
of the same to the heirs of the late Pedro Villanueva thru Marta V. Agana;
d. declaring all buildings; plantings and improvements introduced by the
plaintiffs forfeited in favor of the defendants;
e. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendants the sum
of P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
f. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
g. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal on February 10, 1982, followed by an
appeal made to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate
Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
On August 30, 1984, the Court in its Resolution without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment on the said petition (Rollo, p. 50).
However, the counsel for private respondents failed to file comment on the petition
for review on certiorari within the period which expired on September 17, 1984.
Thus, in the Resolution of January 7, 1985 the Court, required counsel for
petitioners to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
(Rollo, p. 51).
cdrep
On February 23, 1985 respondents filed their comment (Rollo, p. 57). Considering
respondents' comment as answer the petition was given due course and the
parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 104).
Private respondents and petitioners filed their respective memoranda on May 18,
1985 (Rollo, p. 117) and on June 7, 1985 (Rollo, p. 143) respectively. On July 1,
1985, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for deliberation (Rollo, p.
168).
Petitioners, however filed a Supplemental Memorandum, with leave of court on
May 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 169) which was noted by the court in its resolution dated
June 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 188).
In its petition petitioners raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBIT B DOES NOT
TRANSFER OWNERSHIP, THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS CANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LAND
BY PRESCRIPTION UPON THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO TITLE TO
REGISTERED LAND IN DEROGATION OF THAT OF THE
REGISTERED OWNER SHALL BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT STATUTE OF
LIMITATION HAS SET INTO THIS CASE; AND,
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. RT-6293 AS NULL AND VOID.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.
It is admitted that the land in question is formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2262, issued in the name of Pedro Villanueva and that the cancellation of
said OCT No. 2262 and the issuance of the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) are based either on the Affidavit for Reconstitution
of Teresa Villanueva and not of Pedro Villanueva, or the unnotarized deed of sale
of August 10, 1937 (Annex "B" for plaintiffs), held void by the lower court and by
the Court of Appeals. As a consequence TCT No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) was
likewise held void ab initio. (Record on Appeal, p. 20).
As to the validity of the Affidavit for Reconstitution, affiant Teresa Villanueva
testified on December 19, 1980, that she did not know anything about the
reconstitution of their title as it was their children who took charge of the same and
that she never participated in the said reconstitution. In fact she never appeared
before the Notary Public and this testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
Eleuterio Rebenque, entry clerk in the Office of the Register of Deeds who never
made any categorical affirmation that said Teresa Villanueva appeared at said
office. (Rollo, p. 43).
Cdpr

Consequently, the crux of the matter now centers on whether or not the
unnotarized deed of sale purportedly executed on August 10, 1937 by the primitive
owner Pedro Villanueva, in favor of petitioners, can be considered as a valid
instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens System. Corollary thereto, it becomes necessary to examine
other matters surrounding the execution of the alleged document of sale (Exhibit
B).
Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, is nevertheless
valid and binding citing this Court's rulings in the cases of Cauto v. Cortes, 8 Phil.
459, 460; Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil. 52, 53; Bucton v. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499
wherein this Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces
legal effects between the parties.
The contention is unmeritorious.
As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision:
"True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered
property is valid as between the parties. However, the only right the
vendee of registered property in a private document is to compel through
court processes the vendor to execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in
law for purposes of registration. Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article
1356 of the Civil Code is unfortunate. The general rule enunciated in said
Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have
been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. The next sentence provides the exception, requiring a contract to
be in some form when the law so requires for validity or enforceability.
Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things,
that the conveyance be executed 'before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who
shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next herein after
stated.'
 "Such law was violated in this case. The action of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was
unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private
document of sale."
With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration
Act, Act 496 (now Sec. 112 of P.D. No. 1529) provides:
"Sec. 127. Deeds of Conveyance. . . . effecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber, . . . or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use: Provided, That
every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing
the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument
as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be
his or their free act and deed by the person or persons executing the
same, before the judge of a court of record, or clerk of a court of record,
or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such
acknowledgment substantially in the form next hereinafter stated."
(Emphasis supplied).
It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable
under the Land Registration Act.
Likewise noteworthy is the case of Pornellosa and Angels v. Land Tenure
Administration and Guzman, 110 Phil. 986, where the Court ruled:
"The deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in
favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively
establish their right to the parcel of land. While it is valid and binding upon
the parties with respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is
not sufficient to convey title or any right to the residential lot in litigation.
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property
must appear in a public document."
Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the assailed document, the trial court found that said private document (Exhibit
"B") was null and void and that it was signed by somebody else not Pedro
Villanueva. Such findings of fact besides being based on the records, were
sustained by the Court of Appeals. LLpr

The contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by

prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered
land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also against his hereditary successors (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA
427 [1985]). The right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible
because possession is a mere consequence of ownership (Umbay vs.
Alecha, supra, citing Atun v. Nuñuz, 97 Phil. 762; Manlapas and Tolentino v.
Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, 308; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110, 113-
114) where land has been registered under the Torrens System (Alarcon v. Bidin,
120 SCRA 390; Umbay v. Alecha, supra) because the efficacy and integrity of the
Torrens System must be protected (Director of Lands v. CA, 120 SCRA 370). As
prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to
suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time
and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become
obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of
witnesses (Senoan v. Sorongon, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
In the matter of laches, the Court aptly stated in the case of Marcelo Sotto v. Pilar
Teves, et al., 86 SCRA 155 (1978) that "in determining whether a delay in seeking
to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship
between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration. A delay under
such circumstance is not as strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to
each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives,
and the fact that the parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to
excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay."
In the case of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Alfonso Lim, 123 SCRA 464, 480
[1983], the Court ruled that laches cannot be asserted by a mere possessor without
claim of title, legal or equitable because for laches to exist, there should be a
showing of delay in asserting the complainant's right. The complainant should have
knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and an opportunity to institute a
suit. Delay is not counted from the date the lot was sold to the buyer but from the
time of entry of the defendant or from the time the complainant came to know of
the occupancy for that is the only time it could possibly have demanded that he get
out of the premises or could have instituted a suit. In the case at bar, it will be noted
that what transpired was an administrative reconstitution, essentially ex-parte and
without notice, thereby lending credence to the claim that private respondent Marta
Agana was unaware of such reconstitution and possession until she discovered
the same in the Office of the Register of Deeds in 1976. As such it cannot be
claimed that she slept on her right as from that time on, it is undeniable that she
filed her adverse claim on the said lot. LLpr

After a careful perusal of the case, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial
court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
||| (Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742, [October 29, 1987])

C. REGISTRABLE AND NON- REGISTRABLE PROPERTY

8. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 83609. October 26, 1989.]

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia
Bisnar.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION: ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LANDS;

CLASSIFICATION OR RECLASSIFICATION THEREOF AS PREROGATIVE OF
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. — In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court
of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled: "As provided for under Section 6
of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands
is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through
the Office of the President.
2. ID.; POSITIVE ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO DECLASSIFY
LAND INTO ALIENABLE LAND FOR AGRICULTURAL OR OTHER PURPOSES.
— It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 679).
3. ID.; POSSESSION HOWEVER LONG OF FOREST LANDS CANNOT RIPEN
INTO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP. — Possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]).
4. ID.; FOREST LAND; BEYOND JURISDICTION OF THE CADASTRAL COURT
TO REGISTER UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM. — A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210
[1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
5. ID.; SECTION 48 (b) OF C.A. NO. 141; APPLICABLE EXCLUSIVELY TO
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND. — Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded.
6. ID.; ID.; APPLICANT TASKED WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT HE
MEETS THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. — "In confirmation of imperfect title
cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from
old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
application." (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the
decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426,
entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application
for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad.
Rec. 1256. cdll

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July
20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee
simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares (345,385
sq.m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of
Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of
land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:
"1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied
for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title
issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant,
(2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el
estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra' or title by
purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information
under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized
mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
"2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application.
"3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp
17-19, Record on Appeal)." (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
"Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case,
they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years." (p. 16,
Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the
application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting
coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into
productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the
classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in
the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than
as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of
the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as
amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered
under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
"As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative
of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With
these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse
of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that
(1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to
by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes."
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director
of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). Cdpr

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to

public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded
(p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategiu that:
"In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He
must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application." (Heirs of
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application
for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is
hereby dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.

(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, [October 26, 1989], 258-
|||

A PHIL 492-497)

9. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 52518. August 13, 1991.]

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF

THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE
 PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-
appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF;

PLEADINGS CONSIDERED AMENDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Where the issues
in the case bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the
rule laid down inSarmiento, et al. vs. Capapas, et al., that declaratory relief cannot
be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts, what
attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which
is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. — There is a justiciable
controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that
the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a
justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; R. A. 3990; INTENDS UNEQUIVOCAL ABSOLUTE
TRANSFER OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP SUBJECT TO EXISTING
CONCESSIONS. — Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a
central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any." When it ceded and transferred the property to UP,
the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and,
more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its
rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and
made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession.
That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally
evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete,
or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. The proviso
regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it
means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY CONVERTED INTO A REGISTERED PRIVATE
WOODLAND OVER WHICH THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY HAS NO
JURISDICTION. — Insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its
rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to
UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further borne
out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were
likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation
No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws
and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise
provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
6. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF OWNER. — An owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing
what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right to consume the thing by its use.
As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural
fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
gets the fruits.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, that exception is made for
the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to
pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the
very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of
Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due
thereon.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J : p

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil
Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner
and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of
the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim."
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic
Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on
28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University
of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees
and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter
in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued
on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990;
asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of; and
prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose
the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it
by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the
parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for
Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned
counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of
timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc, Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a
renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by
the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been
in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling,
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the

Government on June 4, 1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has
constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the
aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in
implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: . . .;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of
the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED
PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL
PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me
by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for
the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this
College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly
in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil, province of Laguna, and
partly in the municipality of Infanta, Province of Quezon, Island of
Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found
therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which
parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Cdpr

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of September, in

the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the
aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11,
1960, Republic Act No. 3990was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which
Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University of the Philippines in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly
by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.
SECTION 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public
domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less,
located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the
precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation
791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full
ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
SECTION 3. All operations and activities carried on in the
central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or
general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and
any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and
prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded,
verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff:
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff
under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in
paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines,
instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff
within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined
in Republic Act No. 3990be performed by personnel of the
University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff on the demand of the defendants was
fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiff's lawyer
addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiff
has refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines
to the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose
of supervising the felling, cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling
any such timber cut and felled prior to removal;
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in relation to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business
Executive sent the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as
Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the
University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the
University of the Philippines gives the University full rights of dominion and
ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood
and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all
forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the
University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the
University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and
establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the
following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District
Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be
remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall
hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all
forest charges and royalties due from any logging concession at
the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the District Forester
of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive
dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued
the following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section
15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations,
forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private
woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced
when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was
ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due
and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires
for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, your queries are answered viz:.
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges
payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date
of payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood
and not the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter
quoted below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna dated April
18, 1966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest
charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land
Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing
some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view
thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over
said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest
charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.

Please take note of page '2' of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to the following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to
the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
LLjur

On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is

understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant
as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid
directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna
Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
 Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated
April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province
of Laguna to the Director of Forestry;
15. That on or about June 7, 1966, the Assistant Director of Forestry
addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as
follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to
comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of
the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside
the areas covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges;
and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law
upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and
disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the collection of
the corresponding forest charges and other fees in
connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the
claim of the University of the Philippines to have acquired the
above rights. We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by
virtue of Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to
utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and should
therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment
that we sent your client our letter of November 4, 1965 requesting
him to comment on the application of the State University for a
Special Timber License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph 14, the
Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated
June 30, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June 30, 1966
District Forester
 Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph
of your letter dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to
whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from
the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines in the Paete Land Grant to Scalers of the University of
the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of
the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines,
is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the
Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view
further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers
of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such
licensing agreements entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as
a means of smuggling forest products from the neighboring public
forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the
pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be
presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move
and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full
and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should
pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of
the Philippines; and
 2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that
said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the
Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment
Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale
the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29, 1967."
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3
June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at
the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
". . . the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no
legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of
land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing
concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the
petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and
would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the
Philippines will acquire `full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control
and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of
the property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of
a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership
thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the
donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the
property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot
be valid unless the provisions of Secs. 262 to 276 of the National Internal
Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and
the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments,
the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code,
but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason
above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is
not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a
remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the
end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the
Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes
other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the
University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration
of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines
cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole
tract of land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and
exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
 Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and
collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code."
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
"I
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A
DISMISSAL.
II
. . . WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT
EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY
THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN
SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE."
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the
parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment "granting full and
appropriate remedy on the following issues:
'1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay
forest charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest
charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled.'"

These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal
to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al., 6 that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
 "SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. . . ."
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.
A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No.
3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular
agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such
collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP
acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area.
Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner
can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded
property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile.
(c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to
it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines."
(italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain
a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations
 for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the
License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued
specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a)
The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in
the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under
Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of
forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of
Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and
removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect
from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due
and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions
relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that
petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would
acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee
of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently
incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law,
which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested
right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very
parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production
studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment
station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine
and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it
from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absoluteownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to
describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not
wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions
refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right
of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 ofR.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does
not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the
right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right
to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code,
to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 1 4 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which
has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at
the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the
Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and
other fees due thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not
grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations
of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to
perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in
favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area
covered byR.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3
June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner
for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No.
3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ ., concur.

10. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, petitioners, vs. DIRECTOR OF

FORESTRY, respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION

DELFIN, petitioners, vs. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF
MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF
JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT

LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS
RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS,
RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. —
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET,
RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration
in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish
grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
application.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of
imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters. LexLib

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners
in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades
Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of
Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in
the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to
said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever
rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also
filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters
was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants
that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the
northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was
Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the
heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants
have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition
and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application
was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted
that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and
after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the
Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest
land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively
indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a
fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing
of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the
District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as
a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even
under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years
after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for
applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have
shown.
 "'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years,
preceding the filing of the application;'
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the
applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty
(30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown
a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of
the application, he had been in
"'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain',
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants
and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result
must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt
impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions
of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had
demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that
this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always
better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest
Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby
reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception
of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed;
no more pronouncement as to costs."
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for
over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The
complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties
over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land. LLpr

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable
of registration in the names of the private applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp". Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land
in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land"
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant
petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber's
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in
1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest."
LibLex

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of

proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions
implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No.
88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest."
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number
of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes,
68 SCRA 177, 195)."
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of
the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass
upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin,
as such issues are rendered moot by this finding. Cdpr

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

(Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-27873, L-30035,

|||

[November 29, 1983], 211 PHIL 260-267)

11. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 52518. August 13, 1991.]

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF

THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-
appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF;

PLEADINGS CONSIDERED AMENDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Where the issues
in the case bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the
rule laid down inSarmiento, et al. vs. Capapas, et al., that declaratory relief cannot
be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts, what
attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which
is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. — There is a justiciable
controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that
the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a
justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; R. A. 3990; INTENDS UNEQUIVOCAL ABSOLUTE
TRANSFER OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP SUBJECT TO EXISTING
CONCESSIONS. — Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a
central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any." When it ceded and transferred the property to UP,
the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and,
more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its
rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and
made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession.
That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally
evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete,
or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. The proviso
regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it
means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY CONVERTED INTO A REGISTERED PRIVATE
WOODLAND OVER WHICH THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY HAS NO
JURISDICTION. — Insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its
rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to
UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further borne
out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were
likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation
No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws
and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise
provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
6. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF OWNER. — An owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing
what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right to consume the thing by its use.
As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural
fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
gets the fruits.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, that exception is made for
the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to
pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the
very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of
Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due
thereon.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J : p

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil
Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner
and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of
the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
 (b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim."
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic
Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on
28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University
of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees
and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter
in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued
on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990;
asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of; and
prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose
the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it
by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the
parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for
Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned
counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of
timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc, Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a
renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by
the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been
in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling,
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the

Government on June 4, 1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has
constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the
aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in
implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: . . .;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of
the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED
PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL
PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me
by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for
the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this
College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly
 in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil, province of Laguna, and
partly in the municipality of Infanta, Province of Quezon, Island of
Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found
therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which
parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Cdpr

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of September, in

the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the
aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11,
1960, Republic Act No. 3990was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which
Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University of the Philippines in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly
by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.
SECTION 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public
domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less,
located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the
precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation
791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full
ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
SECTION 3. All operations and activities carried on in the
central experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or
general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and
 any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and
prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded,
verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff:
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff
under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in
paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines,
instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff
within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined
in Republic Act No. 3990be performed by personnel of the
University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff on the demand of the defendants was
fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiff's lawyer
addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiff
has refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines
to the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose
of supervising the felling, cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling
any such timber cut and felled prior to removal;
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in relation to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business
Executive sent the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as
Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the
University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the
University of the Philippines gives the University full rights of dominion and
ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood
and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all
forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the
University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the
University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and
establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the
following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District
Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be
remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall
hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all
forest charges and royalties due from any logging concession at
the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the District Forester
of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive
dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued
the following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section
15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations,
forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private
woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced
when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was
ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due
and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires
for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, your queries are answered viz:.
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges
payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date
of payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood
and not the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter
quoted below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna dated April
18, 1966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest
charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land
Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing
some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view
thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over
said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest
charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.

Please take note of page '2' of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to the following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to
the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
LLjur

On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is

understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant
as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid
directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna
Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated
April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province
of Laguna to the Director of Forestry;
15. That on or about June 7, 1966, the Assistant Director of Forestry
addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as
follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to
comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of
the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
 (a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside
the areas covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges;
and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law
upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and
disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the collection of
the corresponding forest charges and other fees in
connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the
claim of the University of the Philippines to have acquired the
above rights. We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by
virtue of Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to
utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and should
therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment
that we sent your client our letter of November 4, 1965 requesting
him to comment on the application of the State University for a
Special Timber License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph 14, the
Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated
June 30, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph
of your letter dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to
whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from
the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines in the Paete Land Grant to Scalers of the University of
the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of
the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines,
is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the
 Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view
further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers
of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such
licensing agreements entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as
a means of smuggling forest products from the neighboring public
forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the
pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be
presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move
and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full
and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should
pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of
the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that
said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the
Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment
Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale
the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29, 1967."
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3
June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at
the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
". . . the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no
legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of
land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing
 concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the
petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and
would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the
Philippines will acquire `full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control
and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of
the property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of
a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership
thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the
donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the
property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot
be valid unless the provisions of Secs. 262 to 276 of the National Internal
Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and
the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments,
the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code,
but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason
above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is
not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a
remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the
end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the
Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes
other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the
University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration
of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines
cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole
tract of land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and
exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and
collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code."
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
"I
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A
DISMISSAL.
II
. . . WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT
EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
 FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY
THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN
SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE."
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the
parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment "granting full and
appropriate remedy on the following issues:
'1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay
forest charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest
charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled.'"

These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal
to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al., 6 that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. . . ."
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.
A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No.
3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular
agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such
collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP
acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area.
Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner
can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded
property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile.
(c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to
it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines."
(italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain
a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations
for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the
License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued
specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a)
The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in
the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under
Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of
forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of
Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and
removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect
from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due
and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions
relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that
petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would
acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee
of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently
incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law,
which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested
right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very
parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production
studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment
station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine
and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it
from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absoluteownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to
describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not
wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions
refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right
of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 ofR.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does
not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the
right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right
to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code,
to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 1 4 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which
has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at
the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the
Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and
other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not
grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations
of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to
perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in
favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area
covered byR.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3
June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner
for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No.
3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ ., concur.
(International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. University of the
|||

Philippines, G.R. No. 52518, [August 13, 1991], 277 PHIL 636-658)

12. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 88883. January 18, 1991.]

 ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN
CONSI, respondents.

Mario C .V . Jalandoni for petitioner.

Joy B . Labiaga for private respondent.

DECISION

PARAS, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside; (a)
the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R No. SP No.
13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge Ruben C. Ayson, et al." declaring that
both the petitioner and private respondent hold possessory titles to the land in
question, and (b) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet,
was located sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a
period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a
so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim
was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2,
1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I.
Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale
executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous
and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present (Rollo,
Annex "B", p. 21).prcd

Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim.
The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has
been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia
mineral claim (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a
certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon
sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not
necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It
was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house
that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private
respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his father before him
had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security
Officer of Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia
mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the
cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security guards went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the
police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against
Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon,
presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered
dismissed." (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
and Benguet, Branch VI, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p.
3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Itogon dated January 29, 1987 appealed from is hereby
reversed and set aside and a new one entered in its place ordering the
defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under him to vacate the
premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
immediately, and to restore possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
"The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and demolish
his house constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim
at Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
(Rollo, Petition, p. 4). On March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject
forcible entry action. Costs against private respondent.
 "SO ORDERED." (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
"The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural
awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding
called for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that the subject property
may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining
company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a 'squatter' as he
also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into
ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land
Law. cdphil

"Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal
footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land
in question — the petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same;
the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator and
applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is
found. But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and
beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World
War in the concept of owner and in good faith." (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-
48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner ATOK (Rollo, Annex "D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an individual's long term occupation
of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat
the rights of the owner of that claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership,
the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has
faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance
of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention
of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators,
they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired
through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public and the property of the locator. When a location of a mining claim
is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within
the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining
locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance
of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested right by virtue of his
location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues." (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes (Ibid). LibLex

On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-

in-interest has been in possession of said lot even before the war and has in fact
cultivated the same.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 288 1988, this Court held:
". . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the de la
Rosas had already been in possession of the subject property, their
possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the
property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral
land, and they are claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing
the rights of the mining locators nor where they seeking to oust them as
such and to replace them in the mining of the land . . ."

Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject
lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
"Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings."
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and
exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim while private respondent's
possession started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan
Consi, the former being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in
actual physical possession of the property. Having been deprived of this
possession by the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for
ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that
petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet dated June 16,
1989 is REINSTATED. LibLex

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera , Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part, petitioner used to be my client before my appointment
to the Court.
(Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88883, [January
|||

18, 1991], 271 PHIL 66-73)

13. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 69002. June 30, 1988.]

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMANDA
LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD
LOTA CASTILLO, CARLOS L.CASTILLO, NIEVES
KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L. CASTILLO, HIPOLITA
DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO
HERRERA, JOSE L.CASTILLO, LILLA MACEDA CASTILLO,
TERESITA L. CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Castro, Nardo, Quintanilla, Gonzales & Macatangay Law Office for

respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 2044.
The antecedental facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, are as follows:
"Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration
of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan,
Batangas, described in Plan Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755
square meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the said
Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of
Deeds at Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an
instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-
divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of
Modesto Castillo, or on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et
al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of
Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title
No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of
title were issued to Florencio L. Castillo, et al., to wit: Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 21703 (Lot 4) (and) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21704 to
FlorencioCastillo (Lot 5); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21708 to
 Carlos L. Castillo (Lot 7); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21712 to
Mariano L. Castillo (Lot 6); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21713 to
Jose L. Castillo (Lot 9); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21718 to Aida
C. Herrera (Lot 2); and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21727 to Teresita
L. Castillo (Lot 8).
"The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower
court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants
Amanda Lat Vda. deCastillo, et al., as heirs/successors of
Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots
1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had
always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters
thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of
registration as private property. Appellants herein, defendants below,
alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred
by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed;
and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership
and possession of appellants."
After trial, the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, presided over
by Honorable Benjamin Relova, in a Decision dated February 6, 1976 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 62-69), ruled in favor of herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Batangas is hereby ordered to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of
Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title
issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and
2 of Plan Psu-119166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the
state. Without pronouncement as to costs."
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, in a Decision promulgated on April 26, 1984,
reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint
(Record, pp. 31-41). Herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Record,
pp. 42-51), but the same was denied in a Resolution promulgated on October 12,
1984 (Record, p. 52). Hence, the instant petition. cdll

The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land
Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court
rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
(Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not
registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the
territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate
of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases
of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al.,
13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that 'Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the
Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same
were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since
the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the
registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as
private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
As summarized by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), the
testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioner are as follows:
"1. Rosendo Arcenas, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of
Lands since 1951, testified to the effect that Lots 1 and 2 Psu-119166,
which are the lots in question, adjoin the cadastral survey of Tanauan,
Batangas (Cad. 168); that the original boundary of the original cadastral
survey was foreshore land as indicated on the plan; that the cadastral
survey of Tanauan was executed sometime in 1923; that the first survey
executed of the land after 1923 was the one executed in 1948 under Plan
Psu-119166; that in the relocation survey of the disputed lots in 1962
under SWO-40601, said lots were annotated on the plan as claimed by
the Republic of the Philippines in the same manner that it was so
annotated in Plan Psu-119166, thus showing that the Government was
the only claimant of the land during the survey in 1948; that during the
relocation survey made in 1962, old points cannot be identified or located
because they were under water by about forty centimeters; that during the
ocular inspection of the premises on November 23, 1970, he found that 2
monuments of the lots in question were washed out by the waters of the
Baloyboy Creek; that he also found duck pens along the lots in question;
that there are houses in the premises as well as some camotes and
bananas; and that he found also some shells ('suso') along the banks of
the Taal lake (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 13-21; Feb. 16, 1971, pp. 4-36).
"2. Braulio Almendral testified to the effect that he is a resident of
Tanauan, Batangas, near the Taal lake; that like himself there are other
occupants of the land among whom are Atanacio Tironas, Gavino
Mendoza, Juliano Tirones, Agapito Llarena, etc.; that it was they who filled
up the area to make it habitable; that they filled up the area with shells and
sand; that their occupation is duck raising; and that the Castillos never
stayed in or occupied the premises (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 32-50).
"3. Arsenio Ibay, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands
since 1968, also testified to the effect that in accordance with the cadastral
plan of Tanauan, the only private claim of Sixto Castillo referred to Lots
1006 to 1008; that the Castillos never asserted any private claim to the
lots in question during the cadastral survey; that in the preparation of plan
Psu-119166, Lots 12374 and 12377 were made as reference to conform
to previously approved plans; that lot 12374 is a portion of cadastral lot
10107, SWO-86738 while Lot 22377 is a portion of Lot 10108 of the same
plan (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 115-137). LLjur

"4. Jose Isidro, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, testified to the
effect that pursuant to the order of the Director of Lands, he, together with
Engineer Rufino Santiago and the barrio captain of Tanauan, Batangas,
conducted an investigation of the land in question; that he submitted a
report of investigation, dated October 19, 1970 (Exh. H-1); that portions of
the lot in question were covered by public land applications filed by the
occupants thereof; that Engineer Santiago also submitted a report (Exh.
H-8); that he had notified Dr. Mariano Castillo before conducting the
investigation (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 137-162).
"5. Rufino Santiago, another Geodetic Engineer connected with the
Bureau of Lands, testified to the effect that on October 19, 1970, he
submitted a report of investigation regarding the land in question; that he
noted on the plan Exhibit H-9 the areas on which the houses of Severo
Alcantara and others were built; that he found that the land was planted
to coconuts which are about 15 years old; that the land is likewise
improved with rice paddies; that the occupants thereof are duck raisers;
that the area had been elevated because of the waste matters and duck
feeds that have accumulated on the ground through the years (Tsn, Nov.
26, 1970, pp. 163-196).

"6. Pablo Tapia, Barrio Captain of Tanauan, Batangas, since 1957,

testified to the effect that the actual occupants of Lots 1 and 2 are Atanacio
Tirones, etc.; that during the war the water line reached up to a point
marked Exhibit A-9 and at present the water has receded to a point up to
Exhibit A-12; that the reasons why the waters of Taal lake have receded
to the present level is because of the fillings made by the people living in
Lots 1 and 2; that there are several duck pens all over the place; that the
composition of the soil is a mixture of mud and duck feeds; that
improvements consist of bananas, bamboos and palay; that the shoreline
is not even in shape because of the Baloyboy Creek; that the people in
the area never came to know about the registration case in which the lots
in question were registered; that the people living in the area, even without
any government aid, helped one another in the construction of irrigated
rice paddies; that he helped them file their public land applications for the
portions occupied by them; that the Castillos have never been in
possession of the premises; that the people depend upon duck raising as
their means of their livelihood; that Lots 1 and 2 were yet inexistent during
the Japanese occupation; and that the people started improving the area
 only during liberation and began to build their houses thereon." (Tsn, Nov.
26, 1970, pp. 197-234)
Among the exhibits formally offered by the Government are: the Original Plan of
Tanauan, Batangas, particularly the Banader Estate, the Original Plan of PSU-
119166, Relocation-Verification Survey Plan, maps, and reports of Geodetic
Engineers, all showing the original shoreline of the disputed areas and the fact that
the properties in question were under water at the time and are still under water
especially during the rainy season (Hearing, March 17, 1971, TSN, pp. 46-47).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that Lots 1 and 2 have always
been in the possession of the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that their
possession was public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse against the whole world
and that said lots were not titled during the cadastral survey of Tanauan, because
they were still under water as a result of the eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5,
1911 and that the inundation of the land in question by the waters of Taal Lake
was merely accidental and does not affect private respondents' ownership and
possession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law of Waters. They finally
insisted that this issue of facts had been squarely raised at the hearing of the land
registration case and, therefore, res judicata (Record on Appeal, pp. 63-64). They
submitted oral and documentary evidence in support of their claim. cdrep

Also summarized by respondent Appellate Court, the testimonies of the witnesses

of private respondents are as follows:
"1. Silvano Reano, testified to the effect that he was the overseer of the
property of the late Modesto Castillo located at Banadero, Tanauan,
Batangas since 1944 to 1965; that he also knows Lots 1 and 2, the parcels
of land in question, since he was managing said property; that the
occupants of said Lots 1 and 2 were engaged in duck raising; that those
occupants were paying the Castillos certain amount of money because
their animals used to get inside the lots in question; that he was present
during the survey of the land in 1948; and that aside from the duck pens
which are built in the premises, the land is planted to rice (Tsn, April 14,
1971, pp. 62-88).
"2. Dr. Mariano Castillo, testified to the effect that the late
Modesto Castillo was a government official who held high positions in the
Government; and that upon his death the land was subdivided among his
legal heirs." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-9)
As above-stated, the trial court decided the case in favor of the government but
the decision was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
A careful study of the merits of their varied contentions readily shows that the
evidence for the government has far outweighed the evidence for the private
respondents. Otherwise stated, it has been satisfactorily established as found by
the trial court, that the properties in question were the shorelands of Taal Lake
during the cadastral survey of 1923.
Explaining the first survey of 1923, which showed that Lots 1 and 2 are parts of the
Taal Lake, Engineer Rosendo Arcenas testified as follows:
"ATTY. AGCAOILI:
Q Now, you mentioned Engineer that a subject matter of that plan
which appears to be Lots 1 and 2 are adjoining cadastral lots
of the Tanauan Cadastre, now, will you please state to the
Court what is the basis of that statement of yours?
A The basis of that statement is the plan itself, because there is here
an annotation that the boundary on the northeastern side is
Tanauan Cadastre 168 which indicates that the boundary of
the original cadastral survey of Tanauan Cadastre way back
in the year 1923 adjoins a foreshore land which is also
indicated in this plan as foreshore lands of Taal lake, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q Now, on this plan Exhibit "A-2", there are two lots indicated,
namely, Lots 12374 and 12377, what do these lots represent?
A This is the cadastral lot executed in favor of a certain
Modesto Castillo that corresponds to Lots 12374 and another
Lot 12377, sir.
Q At the time this survey plan Psu-119166 and marked as Exhibit
"A-2" was executed in 1948, were these lots 1 and 2 , already
in existence as part of the cadastral survey?
A No, sir, because there is already a foreshore boundary.
Q Do I understand from you Mr. Witness at the time of the survey of
this land these two lots form part of this portion?
A Yes, sir.
Q When again was the cadastral survey of Tanauan, Batangas,
executed if you know?
A In the year 1923, sir." (Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN pp. 15-17).
Such fact was further verified in the Verification-Relocation Survey of 1948 by
Engineer Arcenas who conducted said survey himself and reported the following:
"That as per original plan Psu-119166, it appears that Lot 1 and Lot 2,
Psu-119166 surveyed and approved in the name of Modesto Castillo is a
portion of Taal Lake and as such it appears to be under water during the
survey of cadastral Lot No. 12374 and Lot No. 12377, which was surveyed
and approved in the name of ModestoCastillo under Cad. 168. To support
 this theory is the annotation appearing and printed along lines 2-3-4-5 of
Lot 1, Psu-119166 and along lines 4-5-6 of Lot 2, Psu-119166 which
notations clearly indicates that such boundary of property was a former
shorelines of Taal Lake, in other words, it was the extent of cultivation
being the shorelines and the rest of the area going to the southwestern
direction are already covered by water level.Cdpr

"Another theory to bolster and support this idea is the actual location now
in the verification-relocation survey of a known geographic point were
Barrio Boundary Monument (BBM N. 22) is under water level quite for
sometimes as evidence by earthworks (collection of mud) that amount
over its surface by eighty (80) centimeters below the ground, see notation
appearing on verification-relocation plan previously submitted." (Re-
Verification-Relocation Survey Exhibits, pp. 64-65).
Said surveys were further confirmed by the testimonies of witnesses to the effect
that from 1950 to 1969, during rainy season, the water of Taal lake even went
beyond the questioned lots; and that the water, which was about one (1) foot,
stayed up to more or less two (2) to three (3) months (Testimonies of Braulio
Almendral and Anastacio Tirones, both residents of Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas
(Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, pp. 41-42 and Hearing of Nov. 23, 1970, TSN,
pp. 93, 98-99, respectively). In the Relocation Survey of 1962, there were no
definite boundary or area of Lots 1 and 2 because a certain point is existing which
was under water by 40 centimeters (Testimony of Engineer Arcena, Hearing of
Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, p. 20).
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be
differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which
is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on
Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a
lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea
bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership
until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion
shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the
occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with
shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself
automatically divest the land of its public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA
674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6, 1976
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED. prLL

SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Vda. de Castillo, G.R. No. 69002, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 294-
|||

304)

15. EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19570. April 27, 1967.]

JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-
appellee; DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, FERNANDO BOSUEGO
and EUGENIO SESE, defendants-appellants; MAXIMO
CALALANG, intervenor; DIRECTOR OF MINES, intervenor.

Maximo Calalang for plaintiff and appellant.

Gregorio Ejercito and Leandro L. Arguelles for defendant-appellee City of Manila.
Solicitor General for other defendants and appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. ACCESSION; RIVER BANKS OF NEW RIVER BED ARE OF PUBLIC

OWNERSHIP. — Since undeniably all beds of rivers are of public ownership (Arts.
372 and 47, old Civil Code), it follows that the banks, which form part of them, are
also of public ownership.
2. ID.; ELEMENTS OF A RIVER. — A river is a compound concept
consisting of three elements: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, (3) the banks
(Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, 6th ed., p. 75).
3. ID. ART. 553 OF CIVIL CODE OF 1889 CONSTRUED. — The public
nature of river banks obtained only by implication under Article 36 of the
Law of Waters of June 13, 1879. But with the promulgation of the Civil
Code of 1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Article 339 thereof. River banks
were declared as public property since they were destined for public use. And the
first paragraph of Article 36 of the Law of Waters of 1879 was substantially
reenacted in Article 553 of the Code. Hence, this article must also be understood
not as authorizing the private acquisition of river banks but only as recognizing the
vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the banks.
4. ID.; SIETE PARTIDAS AUTHORIZED PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF RIVER
BANKS; CASE AT BAR. — The authority for private ownership of the banks is
neither the old Civil Code nor the Law of Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas.
Unfortunately, plaintiff in the case at bar cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida
3, which provides for private ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this
jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 took effect
(Kerr & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil, 732). Since the change in the course of the river
took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could not have been
subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already been
superseded by then.
5. APPEAL AND ERROR; TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT; WHEN
BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT CASE AT BAR. — It is only when the
issues raised in the appeal are purely question of law that the Supreme Court is
bound to respect the findings of fact of the lower court, in the
absence of abuse of discretion, or patent mistake, absurdity, or impossibility. But
the amount involved here being more than P200,000 and both parties having
questioned the lower court's findings, the Supreme Court was justified in making
its own findings based on the facts as established by the entire evidence on record.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J : p

Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land — around 49
hectares in area — located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1 Upon his
death this property was inherited by his son, herein plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario,
Jr., to whom a new certificate of title 2 was issued.
During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the
western side by the San Mateo River. 3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo
and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was
further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these
safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary
flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios
and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original
bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a
lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular
strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. 4
In 1945, the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises 5 and
started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby
areas along the River. The operations eventually extended northward into this
strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War
Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S
Army paid. 6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants- appellants
and appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions and
excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint 7 for injunction and damages
against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the
Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-incharge of the plant.
It was prayed that the latter be restrained from excavating, bulldozing and
extracting gravel, sand and soil from his property and that they solidarily pay to
him P5,000.00 as damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense,
that the extractions were made from the riverbed while counter claiming with a
prayer for injunction against plaintiff — who, it was claimed, was preventing them
from operations.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively
allowed to join the litigation as intervenors. The former complained that the
disputed area was within the bed of the River so that plaintiff should not only be
enjoined from making extractions therefrom but should also be ordered to pay the
fees and penalties for the materials taken by him. On the other hand, the latter
claimed that he was authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed
area but this notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal collected from him
a sand and gravel fee which would be an illegal exaction if the disputed area turns
out to be private ownership. Answers to the two complaints in intervention were
duly filed by the affected parties.
On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and
intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the
disputed area in contravention of an agreement 8 had between the latter and the
Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their
operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. It was prayed that
plaintiff and intervenor Calalang be ordered to remove the fence and allow
defendants' men to continue their operations unhampered. Opposition to this
petition was filed by the other side, with a prayer for counter injunction. On March
23, 1954, the lower court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing
the defendants to continue their extractions from the disputed area provided a
receipt 9in plaintiff's favor be issued for all the materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional
defendants were the City of Manila, 10 the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, 11 and
Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also
converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against
the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as
those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations.
Came the separate amended answers of the several
defendants. Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that
the City Engineer acted merely as a deputyof the Public Works Director. The other
defendants 12 put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff and the
Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for damages
against plaintiff. The rest 13 renewed the same defense: that the disputed area was
part of the public domain, since it was situated on the riverbanks.
On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to
delimit the area of excavation and asked the lower court to authorize his men to
extend their operations west of the camachile tree in the disputed area. This met
vigorous opposition from plaintiff and intervenor Calalang. On May 27, 1955, the
petition was denied.
Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on the merits.
The dispositive portion provided: 14
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the
defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, to pay
solidarily the herein plaintiff the sum ofP376,989.60, as the cost of gravel
and sand extracted from plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise
hereby rendered against the defendant Provincial Treasurerof Rizal,
ordering him to reimburse to intervenor Maximo Calalang the
amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. Finally,
defendants herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting any sand or
gravel from plaintiff's property which is two-fifths northern portion of the
disputed area.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought
a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the
motions to reconsider with an order, the dispositive portion of which provided: 15
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for reconsideration
filed by plaintiff and intervenor Calalang; dismisses the complaint with
respect to defendant Cityof Manila; holds that the northern two-fifths
portion of the area in controversy belongs to the plaintiff with right to the
immediate possession thereof and hereby enjoins the defendants and
intervenor Bureau of Mines to vacate the same and to stop from extracting
 gravel thereon. The Court however hereby dismisses the case against the
defendant Bureau of Public Works and its agents and employees insofar
as the claim for money is concerned without prejudice to plaintiffs taking
such action as he may deem proper to enforce said claim against the
proper party in accordance with law.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration. The lower court stood firm on its ruling of August 30, 1957. 16
Hence, this appeal. 17 The defendants Director of Public
Works, City Engineer of Manila, and Engrs. Bosuego and Sese have also
appealed from the declaration made by the lower court that the northern two-
fifths of the disputed area belongs to plaintiff Hilario.
The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of law and
fact for resolution and adjudication. Foremost among them is this legal query; when
a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one
through private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public
ownership also? 18
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the
Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, the riverbanks are, by definition, considered
part of the riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the other hand,
plaintiff would have the question resolved in the negative. He maintains that not all
riverbanks are of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of the old Civil Code,
which governs this particular case, speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said
about the new banks; (2) Art. 372 ofthe Law of Waters which defines the phrase
"banks of a river" cannot be applied in the case at bar in conjunction with the other
articles cited by defendants since that article applies only to
banks of natural riverbeds and the present River is not in its natural bed; and (3) if
all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil Code and the
second sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have
any application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the
present Civil Code took effect, 19 the question before Us should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the
Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public
ownership — including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a
new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear.
Without any qualifications, it provides:
 "Property of public ownership is —
"1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and
that of a similar character;" (Italics supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the
riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river"
provides:
"By the phrase 'banks of a river' is understood those lateral
strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during
such high floods as do not cause inundations . . ." (Italics supplied)
The use of the words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the
law to consider the banks — for all legal purposes — as part of the riverbed. The
lower court also ruled — correctly — that the banks of the River are part of its
bed. 20 Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, 21 it follows that
the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply
because Art. 372 of the old Civil Code mentions only the new bed but omits the
banks, and that said articles only apply to natural — meaning original — bed and
banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:
"The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by
its waters during the highest [ordinary] floods." 22 (Italics supplied)
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —
"Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural
causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the new bed shall
be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the
event that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the
result of any work legally authorized for this purpose" (Italics supplied)
did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The
nature of the banks always follows that of the bed and the running waters of the
river. A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements; (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. 23 All these constitute the river.
American authorities are in accord with this view:
"'River' consists of water, bed and banks." 24
"A 'river' consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts
constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist
without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you
could sink the bed, instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf.
Remove the banks, and you have, a boundless flood." 25
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it
should either be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public
ownership, 26 it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same
nature also. As Manresa commented:
"Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte
que al decir el Codigo Civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece
que debe ir implicito el dominio publica de aquellos tres elementos que
integran el rio." 27
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements
public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407,
respectively, ofthe Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33,
par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks.
Plaintiff now equates the term "natural with the word "original" so that a change in
the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However, the
premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La Real Academia Española defines the word
natural" as follows:
"NATURAL — perteneciente a la naturaleza o coforme a la calidad o
propriedad de las cosas; nativo, originario de un pueblo o nacion; hecho
con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni compocision alguna, ingenuo y sin
doblez en su modo de proceder; di cese tambien de las cosas que imitar
a la naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que comunmente sucede, y par
eso, facilmente creible; que se produce por solas las fuerzas de la
naturaleza, como contrapuesto a sobre natural y milagroso," (Emphasis
supplied)
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the
contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the
force ofnature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition
provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only
because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always
to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to
acquire private ownership of banks under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code which
provides:
"Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan
sujetas en toda su extension y en sus margenes, en una zona de tres
metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de la
navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento." (Italics supplied)
And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in Commonwealth vs.
Gungun, 28 it was said that the private ownership of the banks was not prohibited.
His point is then neatly brought home with the proposition that it is precisely when
a river changes its course and opens a new bed through a private estate that there
can be private ownership of the banks.
A study of the history of Art. 583 will however reveal that it was never intended to
authorize the private acquisition of river banks. That could not have been legally
possible in view of the legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code
that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and
preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or
custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under
the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1384 yet. 29 Under Law 6, Title 28,
Partida 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the
Roman Law rule. 30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But
subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August
3, 1866, riverbanks became ofpublic ownership, albeit impliedly only because
considered part of the bed — which was public — by statutory definition. 31 But this
law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws left undisturbed all vested
rights then existing. 32 So privately owned banks then continued to be so under the
new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. As
Art. 73 provides:
"Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonas laterales de sus
alveos que solamente son bañadas por las aguas en las crecidas qua no
causan inundacion. El dominio privado de las riberas esta sujeto a la
servidumbre de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en el interes
general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento." . . .
(Italics supplied)
This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the
banks, on the one hand, and the policy of the law, on the other hand, to devote all
banks to public use. 33 The easement would preserve the private ownership of the
banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only
recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize
future private appropriation of riverbanks.

The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent

Law of Waters of June 13, 1879, which was principally based on the
Law of August 3, 1866. 34 Art. 36 ofthe new law, which was a substantial
reenactment of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, reads:
'Las riberas, aun cuando sean de dominio privado en virtud de antigua ley
o de custumbre, estan sujetas en toda su extension y las margenes en
una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes
general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento." . . .
(Italics supplied)
The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds and the
treatment of the banks as part of the bed. 35 But nowhere in the law was there any
provision authorizing the private appropriation of the banks. What it merely did was
to recognize the fact that at that time there were privately owned banks pursuant
to the Siete Partidas, and to encumber these with an easement for public use.
However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication. But with
the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Art.
339 thereof. Riverbanks were declared as public property since they were destined
for public use. And the first paragraph of Art. 36 of the Law of Waters of 1879 was
substantially reenacted in Art. 553 of the Code. 36 Hence, this article must also be
understood not as authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as
recognizing the vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the banks.
The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the old Civil
Code nor the Law of Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas. Unfortunately, plaintiff
cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida 3, which provides for private
ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when
the Law of Watersof August 3, 1866, took effect. 37 Since the change in the
course of the River took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could
not have been subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already
been superseded by then.
Coming to the factual issues: both parties assail the conclusion made by the lower
court that only the northern-two-fifths of the disputed area remained as plaintiff's
private property. This conclusion was apparently based on the findings that the
portion where rice and corn were found 38 in the ocular inspection of June 15,
1951, was on the northern two-fifths of the disputed area; that this cannot be a
part of the bed because of the existence of vegetation which could not have grown
underwater, and that this portion is man-made. However, there is no evidentiary
basis for these findings. The area indicated by Nos. 1 and 2 in Exh. D-1 where no
excavations had been made, appears to be more on the south-western one-
fourth of the disputed area. The American cases 39 cited by the lower court cannot
apply here. Our Law ofWaters, in defining "beds" and "banks", considers the latter
as part of the former. Those cited cases did not involve a similar statutory
provision. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not
have grown on the bed which is constantly subjected to the flow of the waters
proves the distinction between "beds" and "banks" in the physical order. However,
We are dealing with the legal order where legal definitions prevail. And apart from
these considerations, We also note the considerable difficulty which would attend
the execution of the ruling of the lower court. The latter failed to indicate fixed
markers from which an exact delimitation ofthe boundaries of the portion could be
made. This flaw is conducive to future litigations.
Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by flood
waters, cannot be considered as within the banks of the River because: (1) such
floods are only accidental, and (2) even if they are regular, the flooding of the area
is due to the excavations and extractions made by defendants which caused the
widening of the channel. 40 Defendants claim, however, that the area is always
covered by the normal yearly floods and that the widening of the channel is due to
natural causes.
There is a gravel pit 41 located along the west side of the River. This is about 500
meters long. 42 A greater part of this pit occupies a portion of the strip of land that
was sliced by the River from the rest of the Hilario estate. As shown in Exhs. D and
D-1, this strip of land is that western segment of the Hilario estate bounded on the
west by the same lines connecting stakes 23 through 27, which form part of the
western boundary of the estate, and on the east, bounded by the western
waterline of the River.
Now, the disputed area, generally speaking 43 is only that part of the gravel pit
which is within the strip of land. Its northern tip is that point where the so-called
"secondary bank" line intersects the west River waterline up north; its southern
boundary is along the line connecting stakes 23 and 24. From these two ends, the
disputed area measures approximately 250 meters long. The eastern boundary is
the western River waterline at low tide and the western boundary is the "secondary
bank" line, a line passing near stake 24 and running almost parallel to the line
connecting stakes 25 and 26. Around the later part of 1949, the disputed area was
about 150 to 160 meters wide. 44 This increased to about 175 to 180 meters by the
later part of 1950. And by January, 1953, the distance from the "secondary bank"
line to the west waterline was about 230 meters. 45
This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the gradual
movement of the River to the east. Since it entered into the Hilario estate, the River
has not stayed put. 46 Vicente Vicente, plaintiff's witness, declared 47 that after the
River changed its course in 1937, the distance between the old and the new river
sites was about 100 meters. Exh. D-2 shows that in 1943, the south end of the
River was about 5 meters southeast of stake 24. 48 Honorato Sta. Maria, another
witness for plaintiff, indicated the flow of this course with a blue line in Exh. D-
1. 49 This blue line is about 120 meters from the line connecting stakes 25 and 26,
which was also the east boundary of the old River. 50 Around 1945 to 1949, the
River was about 193 meters 51 east of this line. This measurement is based on the
testimonies of two defense witnesses 52 who stated that during that period, the
River passed along the Excavated Area and the New Accretion Area 53 sites, as
shown in Exh. 54. By the later part of 1949 up to November 1950, the west
waterline was from 248 to 270 meters 54 east of the aforesaid boundary line. And
finally in January, 1953, based on the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang; the west waterline
was from 300 to 305 meters away already. Hence, from 100 meters in 1937, the
River had moved to 305 meters eastward in 1953.
There are two questions to be resolved here. First, where on the strip of land are
the lateral borders of the western riverbank? And second, where have defendants
made their extractions?
Anent the first question, the key is supplied by Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which
defines the limits of banks of rivers —
"By the phrase 'banks of a river' is understood those lateral strips or
zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high
floods as do not cause inundations . . ."(Italics supplied)
The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral
line or strip which is reached by the waters during those high floods that do not
cause inundations. In other words, the extent reached by the waters when the
River is at high tide.
However, there is a difference between the topography of the two sides
immediately adjoining the River. The line indicated as "primary bank" 55 in Exh. 3-
Calalang, which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and has a steep grade right
at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level. The precipice
here, which is near the east waterline, is very easily detectable. But the opposite
side has no such steep acclivity. In fact, it is almost flat with the bed of the River,
especially near the water edge, where it is about 30 to 50 cms. high only. But it
gradually slopes up to a height of about 2 to 2-1/2 meters along the line indicated
as "secondary bank", which is quite far from the waterline. This "bank" line is about
1-1/2 meters higher than the level of the gravel pit and there are erosions here.
This is about 175 meters west from the November 1950 waterline, and about 100
meters west from the camachile tree. 56
During the dry season, the waterlevel of the River is quite low — about knee-deep
only. However, during the rainy season, the River generally becomes swollen, and
the waterlevel rises, reaching up to the neck. 57 However, considering the peculiar
characteristics of the two sides banking the river, the rise in the waterlevel would
not have the same effect on the two sides. Thus, on the east, the water would rise
vertically, until the top of the "primary bank" is reached, but on the west, there
would be a low angled inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the
"secondary bank" line is reached. In other words, while the water expansion on the
east is vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.
The evidence also shows that there are two types of floods in the area during the
rainy season. 58 One is the so-called "ordinary" flood, when the river is swollen but
the flowing water is kept within the confines of the "primary" and "secondary"
banks. This occurs annually, about three to four times during the period. Then
there is the "extraordinary" flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said banks,
and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen
regularly, From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods. 59 Now,
considering that the "ordinary" floods easily cover the west side — since any
vertical rise of the waterlevel on the east would necessarily be accompanied by a
lateral water expansion on the west — the "inundations" which the law mentions
must be those caused by the "extraordinary" floods which reach and overflow
beyond both "primary" and "secondary" banks. And since the "primary" bank is
higher than the "secondary" bank, it is only when the former is reached and
overflowed that there can be an inundation of the banks the two banks. The
question therefore, may be stated thus: up to what extent on the west side do the
highest flood waters reach when the "primary" bank is not overflowed?

Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent reached
by the ordinary flood waters. David Ross, a bulldozer operator at the plant since
1945, testified 60 that from 1945 to 1949, when the River was still passing along
the site where the camachile tree is located, the annual flood waters reached up
to the "secondary bank" line. These floods usually took from 3 to 5 days to recede,
during which time their work was suspended. Corroboration is supplied by Macario
Suiza, a crane operator in the plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a plant
employee since 1946. Suiza stated 61 that from 1947 to 1949, the area enclosed
within the blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B — which includes the New Accretion
Area — was always covered by water when it rained hard and they had to stop
work temporarily. The western extremity of this area reaches up to the "secondary
bank" line. Villafuerte stated 62 that in the ordinary floods when the water was just
50 cm. below the topof the "primary bank", the waters would go beyond the
camachile tree by as much as 100 meters westward and just about reach the
"secondary bank" line. Further corroboration is supplied by plaintiff's own
evidence. Exh. 1 — Calalang states that from 1947 to 1949, based on the casual
observations made by geologist David Cruz, the area between the "primary" and
"secondary" banks were always covered by the non- inundating ordinary floods.
From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated 63 that there were
still floods but they were not as big anymore, except one flood in 1952, since the
River had already moved to the east. Engr. Ricardo Pacheco, who made a
survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and who conducted actual
observations of the extent of the water reach when the river was swollen,
testified 64 that the non-inundating floods regularly reached up to the blue zigzag
line along the disputed area, as shown in Exh. 1-City Engineer Manila. This blue
line, at the point where it intersects line BB, 65 is about 140 meters west of the
waterline and about 20 meters west of the camachile tree. His testimony was
based on three floods 66 which he and his men actually recorded. Corroboration is
again supplied by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz' report, the floods in 1950
and 1951 barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy
season, the waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of the
gravel pit which used to be submerged. One cause for this was the lesser
amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951. But two floods occurred from October 16 to
28, 1952, which overflowed the whole area and inundated the banks.
From 1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the east, the flood waters
still covered the west side. 67 Testifying on the extent reached by the water during
the rainy season in 1954, Ross stated 68 that it reached up to the camachile tree
only. The last and latest data comes from Engr. Magbayani Leaño, the Engineer-
in-charge ofthe plant from August 1954. He testified 69 that as of December 1955,
when the disputed area was underwater, the water reach was about 20 meters or
less to the east from the camachile tree.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949, the
west bank of the River extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2) that
from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east, its lateral
borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and (3) that
from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward
beyond the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.
To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented two
rebuttal witnesses 70 who told a somewhat different story. However, their
testimonies are not convincing enough to offset the dovetailing testimonies of the
defense witnesses who were much better qualified and acquainted with the actual
situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses were corroborated by plaintiffs'
own evidence which contradicts the aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.
However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in question are
merely accidental and hence, under Art. 77 of the Law of Waters, 71 and following
the ruling in Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 72 he is deemed not to have
lost the inundated area. This is untenable. Plaintiff's own evidence 73 shows that
the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season. These floods can
hardly be called "accidental". The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point.
What was mainly considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating to
lakes, ponds and pools. In the case at bar, none of these is involved.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the disputed area
was due to the continuous extraction of materials by defendants which had
lowered the level of said area and caused the consequent widening of the channel
and the river itself. The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the
American period, have been made only on the strip of land west of the
River. 74 Under the "following-the nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff,
the River should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been
lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore,
it cannot be attributed to defendants' operations. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence
indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Thus, Exh. I
- Calalang shows that the movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31
meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the
erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which
increased its level from as much to .93 to 2 meters.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural widening of the
River is unfounded. Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943,
the river was only 60 meters wide as shown in Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950, it was
already 140 meters wide as shown in Exh. D. However, Exh. D-2 only shows the
width ofthe River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not
indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north. And Eligio Lorenzo,
plaintiff's own witness, admitted 75 on cross-examination that the width of the new
river was not uniform. This is confirmed by Exh. D and D-1 which show that the
new river was wider by as much as 50 percent up north than it was down south.
The 140-meter distance in Exh. D was at the widest part up north whereas down
south, near the mouth of the Bulobok River, it was only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the
scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in January 1953, the River near the same
point also, was less than 50 meters wide.
The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really
confirmed their operations within the banks of the River as alleged by them. To
resolve this, We have to find out from what precise portion in the disputed area the
defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they did not extract
indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of the parties' briefs were very
helpful but the evidence on record discloses that defendants made their extractions
only within specified areas during definite periods.
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations
only in the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the
watercourse then. This zone, marked as Exh. 2-City Engineer Manila, is about one
(1) km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However, no
extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the
"temporary bank" line. 76 These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses.
That the extractions were near the river then finds support in Vicente Vicente's
testimony 77 while Leon Angeles and Mrs. Salud Hilario confirm the fact that
defendants have not gone westward beyond the "temporary bank" line. 78 This line
is located east of the "secondary bank" line, the lateral extremity of the west bank
then.
In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along
the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the
defendants to go below — southeast of — the "Excavated Area" and the New
Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54. 79 Engr. Bosuego, testifying 80 in 1952, indicated
their areaof extraction as that enclosed within the red dotted line in Exh. D-1 which
lies on the south end of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the southeastern
boundaryof the disputed area is included. The ocular inspection conducted on
June 15, 1951, confirms this. 81 Exh. 4- Calalang shows the total
amount of materials taken from within the area from 1949 to 1951. 82 Thus, from
1950 up to 1953, although the defendants were able to continue their operations
because of the agreement between the plaintiff and the Director of Public
Works, 83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the disputed area.
On the other hand, the lateral extremities ofthe west bank then ran along a line
about 20 meters west of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area.
From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther east of the New
Accretion Area. They were working within a confined area along the west waterline,
the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east from the
camachile tree. 84 Ross indicated 85 this zone in Exh. 54 as that portion on the
southern end of the disputed area between the blue lines going through the words
"MARIKINA RIVER BED" and the red zigzag line indicating the watercourse then.
Engr. Leaño even stated 86 that they got about 80 percent of the materials from the
river itself and only 20 percent from the dry bed. The sand and gravel covered by
Exhs. LL to LL-55 were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only
corroborated by Mrs. Hilario 87 but even admitted by the plaintiff in his
opposition 88 to defendants' petition to extend their area of operation west of the
camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could not, and
have not, 89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east from said tree, which
has already been established as the lateral extremity of the west bank during the
period.

It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone

beyond the receding western extremities of the west riverbank. They have
confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from which the banks of the River
— which constitute part of the public domain — wherein they had the right to
operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that defendants have gone
beyond the limits of the west bank, as, previously established, and have invaded
his private estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from them.
As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire disputed area
as part of the riverbanks would be tantamount to converting about half of his estate
to public ownership without just compensation. He even adds that defendants have
already exhausted the supply in that area and have unjustly profited at his
expense. These arguments, however, do not detract from the above conclusions.
First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between
the "secondary bank" line and the "primary bank" line, has permanently become
partof the riverbed. What We are only holding is that at the time the defendants
made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks
then. The "secondary bank" line was the western limit of the west bank around
1945 to 1949 only. By 1955, this had greatly receded to the line just 20 meters
east of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area. All that space to the
west of said receding line 90 would still be part of plaintiff's property — and also
whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by the non-
inundating ordinary floods.
Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property
without any compensation at all. Under Art 370 of the old Civil Code, the
abandoned bedof the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part
with the other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in
proportion to the area he has lost. 91
And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's
expense. They were not responsible for the shifting of the river. It was due to
natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And defendants were extracting
from public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through
the defendants, may have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
Considering the conclusions We have thus reached, the other questions involved
in the remaining assignments of errors — particularly those apropos the
doctrine ofstate immunity from suit and the liability of defendant City of Manila —
are rendered moot.
Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside and
another judgment is hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and his
agents and employees are hereby absolved from liability to plaintiff since
they did not extract materials from plaintiff's property, but from the public
domain.
(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from the line
running parallel to the western waterline of the river and twenty meters
east from the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area measured along
line AA in Exhs. 3-Calalang, 13 and 54, and going to the west up to the
western boundaries of the Hilarioestate, is hereby declared as not
part of the public domain and confirmed as part of plaintiff's private
property. No costs.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
 (Hilario, Jr. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, [April 27, 1967], 126 PHIL 128-
|||

159)

16. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-66575. September 30, 1986.]

ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR,

ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO and MYRNA, all
surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners, vs. THEINTERMEDIATE A
PPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO,
SALOME RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO
ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES CORDERO,
CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE
PANLILIO, respondents.

Loreto Novisteros for petitioners.

Corleto R. Castro for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; PUBLIC DOMAIN; CREEKS; NOT SUSCEPTIBLE

TO PRIVATE APPROPRIATION AND ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION. —
Considering that as held inthe case of Mercado vs. Municipal
President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a recess of arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property
belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, and as public water, it cannot be registered
under the Torrens System in the name of any individual [Diego v. Court of
Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455]; and considering
further that neither the more construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out
of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or
change the nature of the creek a property of the public
domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement nulland void and of no longer
effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC CORPORATION; MUNICIPAL COUNCIL;
CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY TO PASS RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING ITS
MUNICIPAL WATERS; DUE PROCESS OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR.
— The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public
domain is a factual determination binding upon this Court. The Municipality of
Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority
to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot
be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as more
publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice
to the whole world.

DECISION

FERNAN, J : p

Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et al. filed before the then Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond
located within the four [4] parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and
95 ofthe Municipal Council of Bugallon,
Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated August
15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of
petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. Thelower court likewise held that
Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated
between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95
authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries,
including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents herein as
members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their
legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which
affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. cdll

Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon.
However, before respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of
interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding
of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting
to theCourt a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found
within their titled properties, stating therein, among other things, that "to
pursue the case, the same will not amount to any benefit of the parties,
on the other hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality
if the ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to petitioners be
recognized in their favor as it is now clear that afterthe National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out
of the land. 1
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of
an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in
dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a
creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the case
of Mercadovs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek,
defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public
water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38
Phil. 455]; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from
flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter
or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public
domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and voidand of no legal
effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain
is a factual determination binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon,
acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass,
as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said
that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as mere publication
of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole
world.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to set aside the Compromise
Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
(Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66575, [September 30,
|||

1986], 228 PHIL 525-528)

17. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-30263-5. October 30, 1987.]

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. ANDRES REYES, Presiding
Judge, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, GODOFREDO R.
EUSEBIO, URBANO C. LARA, GIL VENZUELA, RODOLFO
CENIDOZA, RAMON OROSA, AND JOSEFINA OROSA (Spouses),
THE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J : p

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of
the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI,
Pasig, Rizal dated December 16, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10047 entitled Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara vs. Director of Lands.
The dispositive portion of the questioned order reads:
"Wherefore, the orders of this court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and
August 27, 1968 are hereby set aside and the Motion to Admit Petition to
Reopen Proceedings is hereby denied."
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R.
Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the
parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for
Lot No. 1 (10.3629 hectares) and Lot No. 2 (15.2892 hectares), Psu-152606,
respectively, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After the posting of notices and
upon favorable recommendation of a representative of the Bureau of Lands, said
free patent applications were approved on June 14, 1956 as shown by the order
of approval of applications and issuance of patents. Thus, on June 16, 1956, Free
Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 were issued to respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered on
June 21, 1956 by the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration
Book for the Province of Rizal in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496, as
amended, as Original Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139, respectively. cdll

In a subsequent investigation conducted by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of

the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered that the parcels of land patented and titled
in the names of respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were
actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay. Neither were private
respondents able to occupy or possess said lots. Evidence clearly showed that
there were no signs of cultivation or of any improvement thereon.
On March 16 and March 22, 1960, respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R.
Eusebio executed separate affidavits, admitting that they have not complied with
certain requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their
patents and certificates of title cancelled (Rollo, pp.
13-14).prLL

By virtue of the findings of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of
Lands, the affidavits and the surrender of the owner's copy of the certificate of title,
the herein petitioner, represented by the Director of Lands, as plaintiff, filed
separate complaints against herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara and the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal as defendants,
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 in said court, for the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854
and Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 140 and 139 (Rollo, pp. 15-20).
Accordingly, summons together with copies of the complaints were duly served
upon all the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 as shown by the returns
(Rollo, pp. 21-22) dated August 16, 1961 submitted by the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, notwithstanding their receipt
of the summons and copies of the complaint, the defendants, herein respondents
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, failed to file their answers to the
complaint. As a result thereof and upon proper motion of the plaintiff (herein
petitioner) the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial Region, Branch II, Pasig,
Rizal, entered an order on November 25, 1961 (Rollo, p. 23) declaring defendants
(herein respondents) in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in default. On October 6,
1962, on the basis of evidence submitted by the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, rendered separate decisions * declaring null and
void Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and their corresponding Certificates
of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel
said patents and titles (Rollo, pp. 24-29) and for failure of defendants to move for
reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and executory (Rollo, p. 5).
On December 12, 1962, respondent Register of Deeds addressed separate and
identical letters to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara,
informing them of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Cases
Nos. 6747 and 6748 and advising them to surrender their owner's duplicate copy
of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 for cancellation pursuant to the
directive of the Court (Rollo, pp. 30-31). On December 27, 1962, said respondents
wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds stating that the owner's duplicate of title
called for had long been surrendered to Atty. Eduardo Javier of the Investigation
Section of the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 32).
On June 3, 1967, after the lapse of almost five (5) years, respondents Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, this time, as plaintiffs, instituted Civil Case No.
10047 against the Director of Lands, as defendant (herein petitioner) for the
annulment of the aforementioned decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, alleging as grounds therefor that the
Court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons and that the decision was
procured through fraud (Rollo, pp. 33-36).
Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly
served with summons in Civil Case No. 10047, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
7th Judicial District, Branch VI, acting upon an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara declared defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in default
and allowed the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to adduce their evidence before the
Special Clerk of Court (Rollo, p. 38).LLjur

On July 6, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch
VI, rendered a decision declaring the decision dated October 6, 1962 of the Court
of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748
null and void. The decretal portion of said decision reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision rendered in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 is
hereby declared null and void and the Director of Lands is hereby ordered
to reinstate Free Patents Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 issued in the names
of Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio respectively, and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal is likewise ordered to reinstate OCT No. 139
and 140 issued in the names of the patentees pursuant to the aforesaid
patents.
"SO ORDERED."
On March 14, 1968, a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with
Additional Parties was filed by defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, wherein it alleged that the said court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (petitioner) among
other things (Rollo, pp. 43-44). On the same day, the Director of Lands filed A
Petition to Reopen Proceedings in the same court (Rollo, pp. 45-48). The
aforestated petition averred that on July 3, 1967, even before the promulgation of
the aforementioned decision and notwithstanding the fact that their patents and
certificates of title had long been declared null and void in Civil Cases Nos. 6747
and 6748, respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 for their
respective parcels of land, executed separate deeds of absolute sale involving the
alleged lands in question in favor of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza
and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 46). Subsequently, on August 9, 1967, immediately
upon securing the certification of the Clerk of Court that the decision in the instant
case had become final and executory, respondents caused the cancellation of
Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 and the issuance in lieu thereof of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196349 and 196348, respectively, in the names
of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa. Accordingly,
on August 22, 1967, in consideration of P25,000.00 for each alleged parcel,
respondents Gil Venzuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza executed separate deeds of
transfer of rights in favor of respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina
Orosa, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196348 and
196349 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
211957 and T-211958 to respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa.
Respondents spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, in consideration of a
loan in the amount of P800,000.00 executed a deed of mortgage of the aforestated
on December 27, 1967 in favor of respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (Rollo, pp. 46-47).
On March 28, 1968, intervenors spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed
their motion for leave to intervene in opposition to the Motion to Admit Petition to
reopen proceedings with additional parties filed by the Director of Lands on March
16, 1968 (Rollo, p. 178) and the Intervenors' Opposition on the aforesaid petition
to reopen proceedings of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 181). Respondent Gil, Venzuela
filed his opposition on April 17, 1968 (Rollo, p. 104) and his Supplemental
Opposition while respondent Rodolfo Cenidoza filed his separate opposition to the
petition to reopen proceedings on June 3, 1968 (Rollo, p. 239). LLphil

The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, after consideration of the motion to
admit petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties as well as the
oppositions interposed thereto granted the motion on May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 49).
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order by the court was filed by the
intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa on May 27, 1968 (Rollo,
p. 190) while respondent Gil Venzuela filed his urgent manifestation and motion
for reconsideration on June 6, 1968 (Rollo, p. 114). On June 8, 1968, the Director
of Lands (petitioner herein) filed his opposition to the intervenors' and Gil
Venzuela's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p.
195). Consequently on June 12, 1968 the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and
Josefina Orosa filed their Intervenors' Reply to the Defendants' Opposition (Rollo,
p. 203).
On June 29, 1986, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied, in an order, the
motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenors and set the hearing on July 29,
1968 (Rollo, p. 50). A motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the Order
of June 29, 1968 and Motion for Second Reconsideration of the Order of May 8,
1960 was filed by the intervenors on July 22, 1968 (Rollo, p. 205). However this
was denied by the court in an order dated August 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 51).
Meanwhile, the intervenors filed their third motion for reconsideration of the order
of May 8, 1968 and/or Clarification and Reconsideration of the Order of August 27,
1968 on November 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 217), which was opposed by herein petitioner
in its Opposition to Intervenors' Third Motion for Reconsideration on November 23,
1968 (Rollo, p. 228).
On December 16, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the said third
motion for reconsideration, set aside its Orders dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968
and August 27, 1968 and denied the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen
Proceedings. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action
available to the Director of Lands, who has not availed of the remedies provided
by the Rules of Court or the Land Registration Court such as relief from the order
of default or appeal from judgment or review thereof, and has consequently lost
his personality when he was declared in default, and the Court, its jurisdiction to
entertain the afore-mentioned Petition to Reopen (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Hence, this petition.
Notice of lis pendens was given to the Register of Deeds on March 10, 1969 (Rollo,
p. 57). On March 11, 1969, in a resolution promulgated by this Court, the
respondents were required to file their answers and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued without bond (Rollo, p. 60). Respondents except the Register of Deeds
of Rizal were restrained from entering into any transaction in connection with
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 and specifically
prohibited the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal to accept, record, transcribe
and register any transaction concerning the free patents and certificates of title
subject matter of Civil Cases Nos. 6747-48 (Rollo, pp. 60-61).
On March 26, 1969, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa
manifested that they be furnished with a copy of the petition for certiorari so that
they may file their answer thereto (Rollo, pp. 65-66). Respondent Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank filed its answer on April 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 71-73)
while respondent Gil Venzuela and respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and
Josefina Orosa filed their answers on April 24, 1969 and April 16, 1969,
respectively (Rollo, pp. 95-103; 120-137). Respondent Rodolfo A. Cenidoza filed
his answer on May 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 236-238), but respondents patentees
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara did not file their answers.
In the Resolution of May 12, 1969, the hearing of these cases was set for June 18,
1969 (Rollo, p. 235). At said hearing, counsel for petitioner was given twenty (20)
days within which to submit its memorandum in lieu of oral argument while counsel
for respondents was granted leave to submit a reply thereto and petitioner was
allowed to submit a rejoinder (Rollo, p. 242). The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands filed its memorandum on August 16, 1969
(Rollo, p. 253). Respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their
reply memorandum on October 21, 1971 (Rollo, p. 315) while a supplemental reply
was filed by Gil Venzuela on October 30, 1971 (Rollo, p. 394). On June 26, 1987,
respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed an urgent motion to
resolve (Rollo, p. 409).LLjur

In his memorandum the Director of Lands assails the following acts of respondent
Judge as constituting grave abuse of discretion:
"A. Taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint of
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara against the Director of Lands
instead of dismissing the complaint outright.
"B. Declaring the Director of Lands in default notwithstanding non-service
of summons and a copy of the complaint upon said defendant.
"C. Setting aside and declaring null and void the two (2) previous, valid,
final and fully implemented decisions of the same Court in Civil Cases
Nos. 6747 and 6748.
"D. Granting, after two (2) previous denials thereof, the third pro
forma motion for reconsideration of respondents Orosa spouses.
"E. Denying the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings of the
Director of Lands after having previously granted said motion." (Rollo, p.
262).
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a decision which has long
become final and executed, can be annulled on the grounds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that the decision was procured
through fraud.
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants, respondents herein, Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara in
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respectively, as clearly adduced from the
evidence presented that personal service was made on them. As shown by the
Sheriff's returns, in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respondent Godofredo R.
Eusebio was duly served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 6747, while Urbano C. Lara was personally served with summons and a copy
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6748. Both services were made on August 16,
1961 upon the respondents at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal — their recorded address
(Rollo, pp. 265-266).
Apart from the fact that Deputy Sheriff Maximo de Silva enjoys the presumption
that he had regularly performed his duty, the records amply show that, contrary to
respondents Eusebio's and Lara's claim that they were completely unaware of the
proceedings, they were duly summoned in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 on
August 16, 1961; that copies of the decisions in these cases were furnished them
by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that the Register of
Deeds in separate letters informed them of the decisions in these cases and in
reply to the request of the Register of Deeds to surrender their owners' duplicate
certificates of OCT Nos. 140 and 139, they alleged in a joint letter that they had
long surrendered their owner's duplicates certificates to the Bureau of Lands
(Rollo, p. 267). Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired when he
actually receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420 [1979]). prcd

Thus, it is beyond dispute that all the proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 are regular and that the trial court rendered valid judgment on the aforestated
cases which have become final and executory and are res adjudicata. This Court
ruled in the case of (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Municipality of Makati,
135 SCRA 235 [1985]), that once judgment has become final, the issue therein
should be laid at rest. Final judgment was promulgated and a writ of execution was
issued. Respondents herein did not avail of any remedies available to them until
after five (5) long years when they filed Civil Case No. 10047 in another court.
As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355 [1975],
"Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter
related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment
is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed the nature of its duty to see to
it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the
loser is generally ministerial." A judgment whether correct or not becomes final
when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment (Malia vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 116
[1985]) and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has
become final (Vda. de Emmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The doctrine of
finality of judgment is grounded on Fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of the courts
must become final at some definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 [1987]).
Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 10047 is improper and there can be no
justification for respondent Judge's taking cognizance of and giving due course to
the complaint filed therein by respondents Eusebio and Lara against the Director
of Lands; much less his setting aside of final, executory and fully implemented
judgments resulting in the cancellation of original certificates of titles issued by
respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal. Where judgment had long become final
and executory and absent a showing that respondents were deprived of due
process or that said judgment was procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, the
judgment can no longer be set aside (Gaba vs. Castro, 120 SCRA 505 [1983]).

Moreover, the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary

principle of higher importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur 605). As this Court ruled in the case
of Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34 [1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not
annul the order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any branch even
if it be in the same judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of
the CFI either exceeds its jurisdiction (Cabigo vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949])
or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (PNB vs.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525 [1952]). Thus, in the case of Parco vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262,
this Court held that the various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-
equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of each branch, much less a
branch's order or judgment. llcd

Pertinent thereto is Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of the inferior courts as herein
provided." (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, Gil Venzuela and
Rodolfo Cenidoza contend that they are buyers in good faith. Besides the fact that
such contention is belied by the records which show that on July 3, 1967, even
before the promulgation of the decision in Civil Case No. 10047, and while their
patents and titles remained cancelled, respondents Eusebio and Lara, in
consideration of P10,000.00 paid to them for their respective parcels, executed
separate deeds of absolute sale over the lands in question in favor of Gil Venzuela,
Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 259). The Court ruled in the case
of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987]). That it is well settled that
any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and
certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of
Laguna de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and
titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and
must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public land
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This rule applies even
after the issuance of the certificate of title (Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of
Appeals, 124 SCRA 784 [1983]). A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to
perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply
to free patent secured through fraud (De Leon vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358).
Likewise, the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere
possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of
the land nor operate to change the public character of the land to private (Director
of Lands vs. Gonzales, 120 SCRA 375 [1983]).
Under the same principle, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, although
an innocent mortgagee for value, acquires no protection under the Land
Registration Law. LibLex

While it is true that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to make
an investigation of the title of the property being given as security (Philippine
National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and
that where the torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later
given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said Title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which has
acted in good faith (Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-
Villalon, supra; Penullar vs. PNB, 120 SCRA 171 [1983]), it is apparent that the
law on innocent purchasers for value does not apply insofar as non-disposable
public lands are concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby rule that: (1) the decision dated July 6,
1967 and order dated December 16, 1968 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (2)
the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 dated October 6, 1962 are
reinstated; (3) the Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel all Certificates
of Titles issued in connection with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10047; and
(4) the real estate mortgage executed by the respondent spouses Orosa in favor
of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank is SET ASIDE, but their
indebtedness must be paid to the Bank.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-30263-5, [October 30, 1987])

18. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-40912. September 30, 1976.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y. DE JESUS, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.

DECISION
MARTIN, J : p

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-
G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of
an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes. LexLib

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de

Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No.
5436) of a 33-hectare land situated in Barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now
Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as
Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer,
accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded
for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Jose Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50
per hectare. The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the
reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the
bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted
by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of
the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order
of Award, the dispositive portion of which reads: 2
"In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in
connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with
law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is hereby awarded
to the said appellant, Eugenio de Jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or
P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office Sales
Application No. 3231, covering the tract herein awarded, which is more
particularly described as follows:
Location: Central Davao, Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:
N — Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE — Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW — Public Land;
 W — Municipal Road."
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio
de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey
under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land
awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A
and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of
Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales
Application No.5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine
Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is hereby amended so
as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof,
and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded
was identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081
hectares.LibLex

On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85

withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same
for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine
Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application
was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-
B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time
the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands
Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his
Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated
in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 4 On the same date, then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent
to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of
Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64
acres, and 00 centares." 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85
and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao
City. 6 In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation
No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes
under the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied
for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of
First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land
on the strength of Proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale
applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration on the ground that his father,
Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the
Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. prcd

A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim
that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of
Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of
Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the
name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department
of Health."cdrep

The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from the
judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it
denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed,
in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area
of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the
appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical
center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances,
no costs."
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate
Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the
present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only
on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion
and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9,
1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole
lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the
registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of
Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances,
and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the Proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center. cdll

Certainly, Proclamation No. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the
recognized competence of the President to reserve by executive proclamation
alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. 10 Section
64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the President "(t)o reserve
from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or service, any land
belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law". The land reserved "shall be used for the
specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by
law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the
President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of
any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, . . . or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for . . . other
improvements for the public benefit."

2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio

de Jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2
because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director
of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the
12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate
Court to draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes
the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22
hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on
the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public
land; and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22 hectares was even
reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands.
The same area was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he
directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his
application filed on January 22, 1921 covering a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like
manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15,
1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of
agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao,
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares." Seen in
the light of Patent, and Sales Award, Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales
Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus
as 20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really
awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as
applied for by him.LibLex

However, We observe that in the public bidding of October 4, 1934, the successful
bidder, submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only
P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At
P100.50 per hectare the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10%
deposit of which amounts to P221.00 For 33 hectares, the total purchase price
would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would
be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in
that public bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65.
That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and
awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a
matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th to
10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after
the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said
site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-
5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered . . . by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and
awarded in 1934 was only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director
of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081
hectares, then only 10 hectares would have been left to applicant Eugenio de
Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares, as what was granted to him in the Sales Patent.
The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was
ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of
22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of
Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in the
Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded. LLjur

3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as
basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was
the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot
prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in
boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares,
located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the property of
Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial road and
the property by Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by
a municipal road. 16Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general
description, or that which is more certain to that which is less certain. 17 More so,
when it is considered that the series of executive proclamations (Proclamation
Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government to
reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service. cdrep

Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Government, and
most strongly against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the
grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In
general, the quantity of the land granted must by ascertained from the description
in the patent, because the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the
land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a
patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that Eugenio de
Jesus's alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land
(including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference
or pre-emptive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was converted into
"a special proprietary right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not
only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later
found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares confers
no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the
President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve
them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands,
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. 23 The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved
a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered
worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as
authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such
lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of
purchase. 24 And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved
from sale, or appropriated, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "private rights,
if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove
any private rights over the property reserved. Well-settled is the rule that unless
the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of
the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro
de Jesus legitimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed
12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming
hypothetically that the 12.8080-hectare lot was included in the original sales
application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that
the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which no acquisitive
prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as
amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense
that the military "camp site" (Lot 1176-B-2) had been donated by him to the
Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National
Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to
him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court,
in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no
Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed
of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081
hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939.
Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence
the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw
it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty
may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution
and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of such document. And the due execution of the document would be
proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was
present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery,
saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. 28 None of these
modes of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His
predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that
he executed a deed of donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at
that time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The notary public who
presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the instrument were
never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary
public and those persons who must have seen the signing of the document as
witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary
evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty donations
where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in a
public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres
that Sesinando de Jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus, showed him a copy of the
"paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting
Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de Jesus went
to his office to register a "document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary
Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed
him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, hardly
suffice to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is
imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First, none of
these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document
after its execution and delivery and recognized the signatures of the parties, nor to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution;
second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" is ambiguous as to be
synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the
deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus, were not parties to the
instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss
of the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he
testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila
thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus, in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio
de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the
Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed
for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation
cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the
existence of such donation much less official admissions thereof. LLphil

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would
anyway be void, because Eugenio de Jesus held no dominical rights over the site
when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, Proclamation No. 85
of President Quezon already withdrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however,
rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the
possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de Jesus over it. We
disagree. It is true that the gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing
or right. 31 But, the term "right" must be understood in a "proprietary" sense, over
which the possessor has the jus disponendi 32 This is because, in true donations,
there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or dimunition of his
assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary"
right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares
for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass
of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales
Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation
is therefore farfetched. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that
the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not
be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is
merely the right "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right granted to the sales
awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the
fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35Admittedly, the land applied for
may be considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the
Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public
domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, the disposition is merely provisionalbecause the applicant has still to
comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after
compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that
the patent is issued and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of
by the Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans
the irrevocable nature of donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation
of the donation.prLL

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on

July 2, 1974, and its resolution of June 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2,
Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is
hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent
motion of the petitioner for leave to construct essential hospital buildings, namely:
(a) communicable and contagious disease pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c)
physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Munoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., was designated to sit in the First Division.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40912, [September 30, 1976], 165 PHIL
|||

142-161)

20. EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28565. January 30, 1971.]

 RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. SPOUSES
FRANCISCO LAHORA and TORIBIA MORALIZON, petitioners-
appellants, vs. EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositors-appellees.

Occena & Ocampo Law Offices for petitioners-appellants.

Jose C. Mañgune for oppositor-appellee Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J : p

The spouses Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon brought the

present appeal to this Court from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao (in Land Reg. Case No. N-86), dismissing their petition with respect to
Lot No. 2228 on the ground of previous registration, said appellants claiming
that the question of the validity of a certificate of title based on a patent allegedly
obtained by fraud can be raised by them in a land registration proceeding,
contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

The records show that on 26 November 1965 herein appellants petitioned the
Court of First Instance of Davao for registration of nine (9) parcels of land located
in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay, province of Davao, one half of which
having been acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon allegedly by inheritance, and
the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse
possession in the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land is identified as
lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856, Manay Cadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands
belonging to him and his wife were included in the application for registration,
mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which was said to be already covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's wife. The Director
of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that the applicants or
their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land
sought to be registered, nor have they been in open, continuous, and notorious
possession thereof for at least 30 years.
On 14 June 1967, counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion for correction of
the number of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously referred to
as OCT No. P-6055, when it should properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise
prayed in the same motion that the petition be dismissed insofar as it includes Lot
No. 2228, for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in the name
of oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its order of 18 June 1957, which was
amended on 29 June 1967, the court granted the oppositor's motion and directed
the dismissal of the petition as regards Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having
been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land can no longer be the
subject of adjudication in another proceeding. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioners.
It may be recalled that the action filed by petition appellants in the lower court on
26 November 1965 was original registration of certain parcels of land, including
Lot No. 2228 of the Manay Cadastre. It is not here denied by appellants that said
Lot No. 2228 was the subject of a public land grant in favor of the oppositor's wife,
and by virtue of which grant or patent Original Certificate of Title No. P-6053 was
issued in her name on 21 June 1956. Appellants, however, try to make a case
against the dismissal-order of the lower court by contending that the patent issued
to oppositor's wife was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual
occupants of the land, were not notified of the application for patent therefor and
of its adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since they were the actual
occupants of the property, the government could not have awarded it to oppositor's
wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the original certificate of title
subsequently obtained by her, were null and void.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted
by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act 1 , the title
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section
38 of the said Act. 2 In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance,
the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding. 3
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of
oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants'
petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the
ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property
is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of justice precludes that
Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration
proceedings. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes,
by the issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further
registration of the same would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two
certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both certificates
should be in the name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristic
of Torrens titles, would be torn away. For this reason, this Court has ruled in
Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, that in a cadastral case the court has no
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier
case; and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void. 4 Of
course, if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the registration
proceedings, the situation would be different. 5
Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation
of the patent for intrinsic fraud the action for review of the decree should have been
filed before the one year period had elapsed. 6 Thereafter, the proper party to bring
the action would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act — the
owner and grantor, 7 and not another applicant or claimant. Furthermore, the relief
provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party, not
in another registration, for land already registered in the name of a person can not
be the subject of another registration8 , but in an appropriate action such as one
for reconveyance or reversion9 , or for damages in case the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 10
As regards the complaint against the alleged correction of the number of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228 which was erroneously stated in the
oppositor's motion as OCT No. P-6055, when it should properly be OCT No. P-
6053, it appearing that the motion was intended to rectify a clearly typographical
mistake, there is nothing irregular in the lower court's order granting the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
(Spouses Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr., G.R. No. L-28565, [January 30, 1971],
|||

147 PHIL 301-306)

21. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998.]

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented

by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, acting as a land registration court granted
a decree of registration of a parcel of land sought by herein petitioner spouses.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, on Motion of petitioners, issued an
order requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of Registration. However
the LRA refused contending that to issue decree of registration of the subject land
would result in the duplication of titles over the same, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of
the same as verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal yields that the lot in question is already covered by a TCT. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT OF REGISTRATION

DOES NOT BECOME EXECUTORY UNTIL AFTER EXPIRATION OF ONE YEAR
AFTER ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE OF REGISTRATION. — The judgment
petitioners seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible
under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to
implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does
not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree of registration. SEHaDI

2. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING IN REM; CONCLUSIVE AGAINST ALL PERSONS

INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS BRANCHES. — The LRA is
mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the
preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA
officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court and their act
is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." True, land
registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its
branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application
for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance
of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496.
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO ORDER REGISTRATION OF LAND DECREED IN THE
NAME OF ANOTHER IN AN EARLIER REGISTRATION CASE. — However, the
letters of Perez and Cortez stated that, after verification from the records submitted
by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to
register has already been issued. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another
in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be
null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking
to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, MANDAMUS; A JUDICIAL ACT CANNOT BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. — The issuance of a decree of registration is part
of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such
decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when
the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought
to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced
is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. A court
may be compelled bymandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it
for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.
As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The court has to
decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law. ASaTHc

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged

to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to
issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already
be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may
the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree? prLL

The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for
mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of
Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial
court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus: 3
"WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that
the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the
Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree
be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila."
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued
an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this
action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992
signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which
explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree: 6
"In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record,
the following comments are respectfully submitted;
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159,
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda
Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817,
as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex 'A' hereof;
 The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex 'B' hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the
name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex 'C' hereof,
per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy
is Annex 'D' hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April
15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
'E' hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or
in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with
complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To
date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex 'F' hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.

For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought

by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and
Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of
the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same
(G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . .
."
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be
dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion,
dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the
Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered: 8
 ". . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04
September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court
resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and
specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993
(the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot
subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City,
might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land
Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917."
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the
above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997, of
Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which
states: 9
"With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed
herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon.
Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision
plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia
Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of
Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is
incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision
dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in
the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs.
Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same parcel of land."
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
"Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be
compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68)."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue : Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA
"unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four reasons why the writ should
be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal right to the act being
prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform" because, as land
registration is an in rem proceeding, the "jurisdictional requirement of notices and
publication should be complied with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA
filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding
decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to "take the cudgels for the private
persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595."
Rather, it is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute
in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property
subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third, petitioners contend that
they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of "the failure of
the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified
copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition
from the holders of said titles.12 Fourth, the State "consented to its being sued" in
this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be
rendered in this case "as final and make provision for its satisfaction." 1 3
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that
the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same
land is null and void." 1 4 On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to
issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs.
Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
"Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed
in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the
interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case,
a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA
would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has
already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only
alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering
any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of
validity. As we declared in an early case, '(t)he very purpose of the
Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently
brought under a second action for registration.' The application for
registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances,
appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed
under Section 48 of P.D. 1529." (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper
remedy for three reasons.
First : Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this
petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.
That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have
unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory
until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals: 17
"It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final
and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having
become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set
aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final
and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30
should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of
registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated
25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October
1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court,
in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it."
Second : A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty,
the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene
the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system
of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to
the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance
of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative
officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings."
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified
of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said
application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which
provides: cda

"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper
for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
'To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued
to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But
any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for
value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
(As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec 39)."
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M.
Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated
that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan
Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B
of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's
refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, 19 since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. 2 0 Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
"As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title
of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas,
et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
'As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while
perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here
express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a
quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in
favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and
registered in favor of the petitioners.
'In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration
case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem.
The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on
fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration
Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable
with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the
 later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system
which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in the efficacy of the registration law."
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and
is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus,
this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
"Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,
the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party,
to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
'Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must
be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs
that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That
can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges
the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with
such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).'
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the
issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for
the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not
as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative
one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by
mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue. prcd

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question

submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against
one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by
mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment
and understanding of the law. 28
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree
of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court
deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and
to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according
to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand,
is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether
Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60)
days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is
ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether
the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law
as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, [March 11,
|||

1998], 350 PHIL 779-794)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998.]

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented

by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, acting as a land registration court granted
a decree of registration of a parcel of land sought by herein petitioner spouses.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, on Motion of petitioners, issued an
order requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of Registration. However
the LRA refused contending that to issue decree of registration of the subject land
would result in the duplication of titles over the same, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of
the same as verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal yields that the lot in question is already covered by a TCT. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT OF REGISTRATION

DOES NOT BECOME EXECUTORY UNTIL AFTER EXPIRATION OF ONE YEAR
AFTER ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE OF REGISTRATION. — The judgment
petitioners seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible
under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to
implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does
not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree of registration. SEHaDI

2. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING IN REM; CONCLUSIVE AGAINST ALL PERSONS

INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS BRANCHES. — The LRA is
mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the
preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA
officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court and their act
is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." True, land
registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its
branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application
for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance
of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496.
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO ORDER REGISTRATION OF LAND DECREED IN THE
NAME OF ANOTHER IN AN EARLIER REGISTRATION CASE. — However, the
letters of Perez and Cortez stated that, after verification from the records submitted
by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to
register has already been issued. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another
in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be
null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking
to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, MANDAMUS; A JUDICIAL ACT CANNOT BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. — The issuance of a decree of registration is part
of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such
decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when
the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought
to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced
is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. A court
may be compelled bymandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it
for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.
As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The court has to
decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law. ASaTHc

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged

to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to
issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already
be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may
the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree? prLL

The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for
mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of
Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial
court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus: 3
"WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that
the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the
Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree
be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila."
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued
an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this
action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992
signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which
explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree: 6
"In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record,
the following comments are respectfully submitted;
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159,
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda
Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817,
as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex 'A' hereof;
 The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex 'B' hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the
name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex 'C' hereof,
per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy
is Annex 'D' hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April
15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
'E' hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or
in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with
complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To
date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex 'F' hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.

For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought

by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and
Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of
the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same
(G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . .
."
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be
dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion,
dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the
Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered: 8
 ". . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04
September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court
resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and
specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993
(the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot
subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City,
might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land
Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917."
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the
above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997, of
Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which
states: 9
"With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed
herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon.
Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision
plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia
Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of
Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is
incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision
dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in
the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs.
Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same parcel of land."
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
"Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be
compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68)."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue : Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA
"unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four reasons why the writ should
be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal right to the act being
prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform" because, as land
registration is an in rem proceeding, the "jurisdictional requirement of notices and
publication should be complied with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA
filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding
decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to "take the cudgels for the private
persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595."
Rather, it is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute
in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property
subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third, petitioners contend that
they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of "the failure of
the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified
copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition
from the holders of said titles.12 Fourth, the State "consented to its being sued" in
this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be
rendered in this case "as final and make provision for its satisfaction." 1 3
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that
the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same
land is null and void." 1 4 On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to
issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs.
Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
"Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed
in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the
interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case,
a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA
would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has
already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only
alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering
any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of
validity. As we declared in an early case, '(t)he very purpose of the
Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently
brought under a second action for registration.' The application for
registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances,
appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed
under Section 48 of P.D. 1529." (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper
remedy for three reasons.
First : Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this
petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.
That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have
unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory
until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals: 17
"It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final
and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having
become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set
aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final
and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30
should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of
registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated
25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October
1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court,
in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it."
Second : A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty,
the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene
the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system
of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to
the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance
of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative
officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings."
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified
of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said
application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which
provides: cda

"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper
for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
'To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued
to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But
any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for
value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
(As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec 39)."
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M.
Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated
that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan
Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B
of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's
refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, 19 since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. 2 0 Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
"As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title
of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas,
et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
'As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while
perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here
express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a
quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in
favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and
registered in favor of the petitioners.
'In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration
case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem.
The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on
fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration
Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable
with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the
 later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system
which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in the efficacy of the registration law."
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and
is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus,
this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
"Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,
the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party,
to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
'Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must
be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs
that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That
can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges
the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with
such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).'
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the
issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for
the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not
as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative
one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by
mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue. prcd

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question

submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against
one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by
mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment
and understanding of the law. 28
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree
of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court
deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and
to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according
to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand,
is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether
Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60)
days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is
ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether
the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law
as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, [March 11,
|||

1998], 350 PHIL 779-794)

D. ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDING

22. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-39248. May 7, 1976.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HEIRS OF LUISA
VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant,LAND REGISTRATION
 COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO
CITY, defendants.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General

Octavio R. Ramirez and Baltazar Llamas for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.

SYNOPSIS

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for

Annulment of Certificate of Title alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of land
owned by defendant into two lots included an excess area of 82,127 square
meters; the Land Registration Commissioner approved said petition for subdivision
and; in view of which transfer certificate of title, which included the excess area,
were issued by the Register of Deeds. The lower court rendered judgment
cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the subdivided lots having been
further subdivided and new certificates of title issued therefor) containing the
increased area and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new ones in lieu thereof
after the increased portion had been deducted. Appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the latter certified the case to the Supreme Court since it involved purely a question
of law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding that to bring the increased area
under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Act proceedings for
registration of the land should be filed.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; PETITION FOR SUBDIVISION INCLUDES ONLY

PREVIOUSLY REGISTERED LANDS. — Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496
is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands.
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where parts of the tracts of land has not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens System, approval of subdivision plans
cannot bring said tracts of land under the operation and coverage of the Torrens
Systems. More so where the approval of the subdivision plans was without notice
to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
3. ID.; REQUISITES FOR REGISTRATION UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT.
— For an applicant to have this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to
be originally registered under Act 496, the several requisites should all be satisfied;
(1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor; (2)
Filing an application for registration by the applicant; (3) Setting of the date for the
initial hearing of the application by the Court; (4) Transmittal of the application and
the date of the initial hearing together with all the documents or other evidences
attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; (5)
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and the date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette; (6) Service of notice upon contiguous owners,
occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff; (7)
Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or
not; (8) Hearing of the case by the Court; (9) Promulgation of judgment by the
Court; (10) Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation
and registration; (11) Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission; (12) Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds; and (13) Transcription of the decree of
registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate
original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment
of the prescribed fees.

DECISION

ESGUERRA, J : p

This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final
consideration and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, alleging, among others, the following:
"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant
Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension,
Quezon City and Davao City, respectively, are included in this complaint,
the first being the public Official charged under the law with the approval
of subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is the Official
vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;
"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an
area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (525,652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;
"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots
Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
9322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on
March 17, 1967;
"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1
contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2
contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779
Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original
area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said
defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an
order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No.
9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province
of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and
thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887;
"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered
Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa
Villa-Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 3 79-B-2-B-2 and
issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille;
"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;
"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result
of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly
a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of
course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public
domain; and
"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC)
Psd-69322, wherein the excess. area of land belong to the public domain
(not private land) is null and void ab initio."
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good
faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379-
B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887
therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-
1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887". LibLex

On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the complaint. That they
admit the increase in area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in
area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of their predecessor-
in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji, and,
TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of
Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area was made in
accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille,
predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was
entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her
original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a
judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of
the subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was
approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and
that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio
Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout
the Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with
increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding
titles, or if the plans have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall
the titles and to take appropriate steps for their cancellation.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in

the case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial
court in its order of August 16, 1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their
case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the
parties reads as follows: Cdpr

"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto
the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of
facts and allege:
"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page
40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa
Villa Abrille;
"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-
69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T- 18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant,
Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto
attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently
concern by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji, a purchaser in
good faith and for value;
"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March
27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made
part hereof;
"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the
following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
 (e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision
plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part
hereof;
"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot
379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner and the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV;
"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the
registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-
B and abuts the Davao River;
"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through
their predecessor-in-interest;
"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago
as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
portion of the increase in area;
"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-
20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all the
other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236
do not contain any increase in area;
"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was
without notice to the Director of Lands."
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which
reads as follows:
 "This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted
by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin,
Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of
Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino
Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did. LLphil

"The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

xxx xxx xxx
"The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in
the name of Milagros Huang, T-20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-
20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang
Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or
82,127 square meters.
"The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to
include the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new titles under Section 44,
Act 496, as amended, filed with this Court, which was assigned to Branch
IV.
"Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy
was sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that
there was no notice to the persons interested, including the Director of
Lands, before the petition was heard.
"Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even
assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner of the land to
which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval of
subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a
registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the
inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is
stated in the title. And the approval of the Court of such subdivision plan
does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area
stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act
496 would be a valid remedy.
"The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, owners of the adjacent estate, might have
acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act
 496 should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by
continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership.
And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian
estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto
under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration
of the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of
competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has been
issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the
Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or
original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And
the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the
first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of
registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction after trial.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and
directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title
in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the
land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with
law."
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No.
47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition. cdrep

Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval
of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack
of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the
defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands
know all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the
government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of
the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer
the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the
aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is
their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of
their subdivision plan concern was well within the law, particularly the provision of
Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision
plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration
Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the
issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713
and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid
notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the
subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested
in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all
followed.
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701,
T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127
square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of
the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and
T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters
under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the
City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include
the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least,
unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in question, which is
not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a
mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their
grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area,
which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River,
under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took,
is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case,
part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meter, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval
of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all
parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have
his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under
Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:LLpr

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;
 2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together
with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of
Court to the Land Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known
to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the
notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding
Register of Deeds; and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and
the issuance of the owners duplicate original certificate of title to the
applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248, [May 7, 1976], 162 PHIL 913-929)

23. EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.]

 IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales & Fernandez for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. PROPERTY; ACCRETION; ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS ON REGISTERED LAND;

INCREMENT NOT AUTOMATICALLY REGISTERED. — An accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over
the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration
under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by
the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain
this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.

DECISION

BARRERA, J : p

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R)
reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and
dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban
Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly
occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners
of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance
from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro
Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is
identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
(the same boundary stated in the (title). Since then, and for many years thereafter,
a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of
the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a
distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered
area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964
square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil
Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also
asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents
claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the
present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a
decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and
ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to
petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision,
in part, reads:
"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was
formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of
the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the
accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land
in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary
of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet
started or began in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendants'
witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land
of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including
the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the
defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the
effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not
only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area
of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was
only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants
under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they entered upon the land. We
 could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. "2" says
that 'tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that
defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not
mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is
a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code;
Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming, arguendo, that the accretion has
been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the
law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants,
granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they
occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was
commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of
the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land
by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover,
as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the
same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of
Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person."
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,
partly stating:
"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process
of alluvion, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively
established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural
accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the water.' The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired
ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in
this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two
grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the
original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered,
the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act
No. 496, which states that 'no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began
only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not
quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of
the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration
Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description
of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court,
albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle
him to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in so far as
the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are
declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession; and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription. This Court has
held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-G. R.
No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

"We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial
court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in
possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In
1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax
declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name
of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both
owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he
has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area
thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
 "We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater
weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone
witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn,
claimed that they were the owners; that the plaintiffs did not file an action
until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land
surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed
the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458
square meters.
"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their
possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but
is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and
were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps
to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that
they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until
1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is
too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the
certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands,
in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by
accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived
by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,
that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the
process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights
only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants."
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by
us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired
the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and
Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as
they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does
not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land
is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does
not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the
title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration of
said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934)
up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of
the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence
of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not
the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive
prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitions. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
 (Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, [June 30, 1962], 115 PHIL 521-
|||

529)

24. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 73465. September 7, 1989.]

LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL,

ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED
CARNIYAN), petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL,
SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO,
FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX

RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP;
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE INDICATES TRUE AND LEGAL OWNERSHIP. — In the
case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150
SCRA 393, 401-402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax
declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership
nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true
and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Petitioners' OCT No. P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the
tax declarations (Exhibit "A", dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1" undated and Exhibit "A-2"
dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of
their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed
by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco
Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF LATER DATE NOT
DEFEATED BY TAX DECLARATION OF EARLIER DATE. — We hold that tax
declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title
which is of a later date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated
that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private
respondents' claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners'
land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.
3. ID.; ID.; A DECREE OF REGISTRATION BARS ALL CLAIMS AND RIGHTS
EXISTING PRIOR TO THE DECREE. — It is an elemental rule that a decree of
registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the
decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the
decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions
stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax
declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-
19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is
Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him,
granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name
before the issuance of OCT No. P-19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's
land.
4. ID.; OWNERSHIP; ACCESSION; ACCRETION BELONGS TO OWNERS OF
ADJOINING LAND. — The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
"To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE INCREASE IN THE AREA IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
REGISTERED EVEN IF THE LOT RECEIVING THE ACCRETION IS
REGISTERED. — The increase in the area of petitioners' land, being an accretion
left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River
does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-
17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens System.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J : p

This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15, 1985
in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo
Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-
Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
". . . , containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north,
by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south,
by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed
value of P3,520." (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; emphasis ours)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo,
Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a
complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against
herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and
Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and
docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued
by the trial court on November 12, 1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the
legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February
1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before
the outbreak of the second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before
July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under
a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of
land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan,
Isabela, more particularly described as follows: cdrep

". . . containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on

the North, by Cagayan River; on the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly
Rosa Cureg); on thesouth by Antonio Carniyan; and on the West by
Sabina Mola, . . ." (p. 2, Record)
that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No.
C-9669, also in the name of Francisco Gerardo; that upon the death of
Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the "motherland" was
succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3)
legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, one of private respondents
herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo
Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza, all
surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia
Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves
Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland"
to co-respondent Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the verbal
sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an
"Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p.
 206,Rollo); that about the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition,
their "motherland" already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three
(3) hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan
River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and or
the first week of October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate
their "motherland" together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened
by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to do so. Named defendants in
said case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando,
Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and
children, respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the complaint stated that
Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as follows:
". . . containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on
the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by Domingo Guingab; on the
south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed
value of P70.00." (p. 5, Record)
that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax
Declaration No. 13131 dated July 24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and
boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on November
25, 1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No. 15663 was
increased from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary
on the north became Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely the
original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents
is non-existent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the
owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the
land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject
land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in
possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now. LLjur

The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on
July 28, 1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual
possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982.
In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo
Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title
to the subject land and accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo
Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made permanent;
and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable
attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-
145, Rollo).

On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition
for review on the following assigned errors:
"A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded
on the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents
and not to the petitioners when the petitioners' Original Certificate of Title
No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north
by the Cagayan River.
"B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the
herein petitioners who are only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since
the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could not
have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-
2") as he died long before World War II and since the late Antonio
Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.
"C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it
wrongly ruled that petitioners have never been in possession of the land
(p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).
"D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private
respondents who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred only in
1982 and is a "gift from the Lord." (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.
The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private
respondents together with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which
is referred to in this decision as the "subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the
"subject land" which is an accretion to the registered land while private
respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their
"motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their
alleged two and a half (2 & 1/2) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four
(4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193,
194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for
purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For
their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their
Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p.
189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing
that the boundary of petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan River and not the
"motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered land was bought by the
late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956,
as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which states
that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987,
150 SCRA 393, 401-402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of
tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title
indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises. Petitioners' OCT No. P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as
against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A", dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1" undated and
Exhibit "A-2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents
in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have
been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial
that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p.
203, Rollo), which the appellate court considered as an admission by him that his
land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and that he
(Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax
declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title
which is of a later date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated
that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private
respondents' claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners'
land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which
arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA,
supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto
quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of
PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan
subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already
states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated
any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the
accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT
No. P-19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land. prLL
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of
the "subject land" but the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court
on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private
respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, ". . . the
defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation
prior to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents,
Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose
own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination,
revealed that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now
more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan
(T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic
engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan
requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to
it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an
application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984,
pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that
Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey
because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which
statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit
"20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated
August 14, 1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata
Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's
application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau
of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be
occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an
accretion to his land. It is worthy to note that none of the private respondents nor
their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and
cultivating said accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in
possession of the "motherland" through their predecessors-in-interest had not
been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent
court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that since the
"motherland" exists, it is alsopresumed that private respondents were in
possession of the "subject land" through their predecessors-in-interest since prior
to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one
of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding
their possession of the "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the trial
court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in
possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).
The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland"
claimed by private respondents is non-existent. The "subject land" is an alluvial
deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to
Article 457 of the New Civil Code: prcd

"To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only
four thousand five hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion
attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase
in the area of petitioners' land, being an accretion left by the change of course or
the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such,
it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ ., concur.

(Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73465, [September 7, 1989],

|||

258 PHIL 104-113)

25. EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-31673. June 30, 1971.]

QUIRINO FERNANDEZ, VICTORIO FABRICA, ILUMINADO

FABRICA, ARSENIO LABRICA, MARCELINO ABELLA,
RODULFO SY and RUFINO
CAUMERAN,petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, as
presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and JUAN BORROMEO, respondents.

Melquiades S. Caumeran for petitioners.

Filiberto Leonardo for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND

FORMED BY ACCRETION IS EFFECT AN ACTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF
TITLE AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION. — The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without
merit. If it be true that the lot sought to be registered "was formed by accretion
which it gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters flowing on
the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant" (now
private respondent Juan Borromeo) (Application, Annex "A" of Petition, paragraph
3), then title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Borromeo's petition
to the Registration Court "to declarehim the owner' of the lot is in effect a request
for confirmation of the title already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application.
2. ID.; SALES APPLICANTS WHO ARE BARRED UNDER THE SALES
APPLICATIONS FROM ENTERING OR IMPROVING THE LANDS APPLIED FOR
UNTIL APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATIONS BY THE LAND AUTHORITIES
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO OPPOSE THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE SAME LANDS. — The respondent court ordered the
opposition of herein petitioners to be dismissed as improper, for lack of personality
to oppose the registration independently of that of the national government after
receiving evidence that oppositors were mere sales applicants to the Bureau of
Lands and that they had been warned that they should not enter nor improve the
land object of their sales applications, prior to the approval thereof by the land
authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales applications explicitly provided
that the same conveyed no right to occupy the land prior to approval (Order of 3
December 1969 Annex "E" of Petition). Under the circumstances, We can not say
that the action of the court below was in abuse of discretion considering the rule in
Leyva vs. Jandoc.
3. ID.; ID.; IT IS A DIFFERENT STORY WHERE THERE IS NO SUCH
RESTRICTION IN THE SALES APPLICATION AND THE OPPOSITION
ALLEGES POSSESSION THAT IS OPEN, CONTINUOUS, NOTORIOUS AND
UNDER THE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP FOR AT LEAST 60 YEARS. — In the
recent case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, it was declared by this Court that
"persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have applied
with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to
oppose registration." An examination of the facts of the said case, however, not
only reveals that the subject land was already determined to be public, but that the
application was opposed by the Directors of Lands and of Forestry as well as by
the private oppositor, who likewise alleged possession that "is open, continuous
notorious and under the claim of ownership" for at least 60 years. Moreover, it was
not shown that the sales application of private oppositor therein was subject to the
restrictions on entry and improvement found in the sales applications of the
petitioners in the case at bar.
4. ID.; ID.; EVEN IF OPPOSITORS LACK PERSONALITY, THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT MAY NOT ORDER DEMOLITION OF THEIR HOUSES
AND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CONTROVERTED LAND PENDING
REGISTRATION OF THE LAND IN THE NAME OF APPLICANT AND ABSENT
COMPLAINT BY LAND AUTHORITIES REGARDING OPPOSITORS'
OCCUPANCY. — But the dismissal of the oppositions to the registration
application did not warrant the respondent court's order to demolish the houses
and improvements of herein petitioners in the controverted land. The reason is
obvious: there is as yet no decision, much less a decree of registration, in favor of
applicant Borromeo, neither is there any showing that the land authorities had
complained of petitioners' occupancy. Even if their land sales applications forbade
entry before approval, the Director of Lands could waive that condition. Only after
the land is duly registered, and a writ of possession issued after due hearing (or
alternatively, a final court order of ejectment), can oppositors below, now
petitioners in this court, be dispossessed. In ordering the demolition of petitioners'
houses at this stage of the proceedings, the respondent court acted in grave abuse
of discretion, equivalent to excess of jurisdiction, and certiorari lies to correct it.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J : p

This is special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

The antecedent facts follow:
In an application for registration dated 21 December 1967 filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch V (L. R. C. No. N-767, L.R.C. Rec. No. 34192),
respondent Juan Borromeo prayed that he be declared as the real and absolute
owner of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Pook, Talisay, Cebu, consisting of
5,897 square meters, more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (described in Original Plan Psu-234595) situated in Barrio
Pook, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, having an
area of 5,897 square meters, more or less, assessed at P70.00 as per
Tax Declaration No. 026448 and bounded as follows:
 N — Lot No. 191 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant);
E — by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller;
S — Bohol Strait or Seashore; and
W — Lot No. 2586 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant).
Respondent bases his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the New Civil
Code, 1 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed by accretion,
having been deposited therein gradually by currents of a river bordering lot Nos.
7191 and 2586 owned by him. Respondent further prayed that the Register of
Deeds be ordered to issue an original certificate of title in his name.
On 8 March 1968, petitioners herein opposed the abovesaid application on the
grounds, among others, that (a) Article 457 of the New Civil Code could not be
invoked, the disputed area having been formed by action of the sea and not by
river currents, there being no river in the vicinity; (b) that it was the oppositors who
occupied the said land openly and publicly and not respondent; and (c) respondent
Juan Borromeo is an alien, not qualified to own real properties in the Philippines.
In an order dated 28 July 1969, the Land Registration Court (LRC for short) ruled
that the petitioners-oppositors have no interest over the subject land, thereby
dismissing the opposition filed by them for lack of legal basis. However, the said
order was set aside after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by said petitioners-
oppositors. 2 In an order dated 3 December 1969, the aforesaid order of 28 July
1969 was revived, directing further the demolition of the 11 huts in the premises
built by the herein petitioners-oppositors.
Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal the aforesaid order of 3 December 1969 but
the LRC denied the appeal bond and record on appeal in its order of 14 January
1970, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory and, therefore,
unappealable. Petitioners-oppositors moved to reconsider the said order of 14
January 1970 but the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without merit. If it be true that
the lot sought to be registered
"was formed by accretion which it gradually received from the effects of
the current of the waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No.
7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant" (now private respondent Juan
Borromeo) (Application, Annex "A" of Petition, paragraph 3)
then title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines 3 from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Borromeo's petition
to the Registration Court "to declare him the owner" of the lot is in effect a request
for confirmation of the title already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application.
It is true that the oppositors averred below that the deposit was not alluvial but a
result of the action of the sea. This issue, however, is dependent on the result of
the evidence to be produced at the trial on the merits that was still to be held. The
same thing can be said of the allegation that the applicant for registration was
disqualified to acquire agricultural land. Neither of these claims can now be
inquired into at this stage of the proceedings.
The respondent court ordered the opposition of herein petitioners to be dismissed
as improper, for lack of personality to oppose the registration independently of that
of the national government, after receiving evidence that oppositors were mere
sales applicants to the Bureau of Lands, and that they had been warned that they
should not enter nor improve the land object of their sales applications, prior to the
approval thereof by the land authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales
applications explicitly provided that the same conveyed no right to occupy the land
prior to approval (Order of 3 December 1969, Annex "E" of Petition). Under the
circumstances, We can not say that the action of the court below was in abuse of
discretion, considering the rule in Leyva vs. Jandoc, 4 where this Court fully agreed
with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:
"Although the provisions of law just cited apparently authorizes any person
claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for
registration, it is our view nevertheless that the opposition must be based
on a right of dominions or some other real right independent of and not at
all subordinate to, the rights of the Government. We have examined
Soriano vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459; Roxas vs. Cuevas, 8 Phil. 469; and
Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Santo Cristo, et al., 39 Phil. 1, all of
which cases are discussed in the petition and answer, and we find that in
all these cases the interest of the oppositors were each private in nature;
otherwise stated, their interests were not in any manner subordinate to
those of the Government. While the right claimed by the petitioners herein
seemed at first blush to be directly opposed to the adjudication of
ownership to the applicant, it developed in the proceedings that their right,
that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate
to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated
upon the property in question being part of the public domain. In such
case, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the
Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically
dependent upon it. It is well-settled that the interest of the government
cannot be represented by private persons." (Emphasis supplied)

In the recent case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, 5 it was declared by this Court
that "persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have
applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality
to oppose registration". An examination of the facts of the said case, however, not
only reveals that the subject land was already determined to be public, but that the
application was opposed by the Directors of Lands and of Forestry as well as by
the private oppositor, who likewise alleged possession that "is open, continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership" for at least 60 years. Moreover, it was
not shown that the sale application of private oppositor therein was subject to the
restrictions on entry and improvement found in the sales applications of the
petitioners in the case at bar. Manifestly, the proper step for petitioners herein
would have been to urge the Director of Lands to oppose the application for
registration of the applicant Juan Borromeo.
But the dismissal of the oppositions to the registration application did not warrant
the respondent court's order to demolish the houses and improvements of herein
petitioners in the controverted land. The reason is obvious: there is as yet no
decision, much less a decree of registration, in favor of applicant Borromeo; neither
is there any showing that the land authorities had complained of petitioners'
occupancy. Even if their land sales applications forbade entry before approval, the
Director of Lands could waive that condition. Only after the land is duly registered,
and a writ of possession issued after due hearing (or alternatively, a final court
order of ejectment) can oppositors below, now petitioners in this court, be
dispossessed. In ordering the demolition of petitioners' houses at this stage of the
proceedings, the respondent court acted in grave abuse of discretion, equivalent
to excess of jurisdiction, and certiorari lies to correct it.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 3 December 1969 is declared
null and void in so far as it directed the demolition of the 11 huts of petitioners-
oppositors on the disputed premises; and the preliminary writ of injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent. Let the records be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings. Costs against private respondent Juan Borromeo.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.

||| (Fernandez v. Tañada, G.R. No. L-31673, [June 30, 1971], 148-A PHIL 596-602)

E. PERSONS WHO CANNOT FILE AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION

26. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-25914. March 21, 1972.]

 PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO.,
INC., applicant-appellant, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-
appellee.

Jose G. Flores for applicant and appellant.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro
C. Borromeo and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan, for oppositor and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC LAW; PUBLIC LAND CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SECTION

48(b) C. A. 141 AS AMENDED BY R. A. 1942; APPLICANTS POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION NOT THAT OF AN OWNER. — Applicant's possession of the land
in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been
awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of
Lands. As such applicant, appellant manifestly acknowledged that he does not
own the land and that the same is a public land under the Bureau of Lands, to
which the application was submitted. The trial court was therefore, fully justified in
concluding that applicant's possession was not that of an owner, as required by
law, and in dismissing its application for registration and confirmation of title over
a parcel of land, pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BONA FIDE CLAIM OF ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
ESSENTIAL. — Under both the original and the amended provision (Section
48(b) Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Republic Act No. 1942 amending the
former), it is essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership." Moreover, the elimination of the qualifying expression
"except as against the Government," found in said section 48(b) as originally
enacted, bolsters up the view taken by the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that the
amendment Republic Act No. 1942, must be adverse to the whole world, including
the Government.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J : p

Direct appeal taken, by Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc., from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan dismissing the former's
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land of
414.5144 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Panacan, municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan, and more particularly described in amended plan
SC-4782-AMD.
Said application, filed on February 14, 1961, relies upon section 48
of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 2061,
upon the ground that, through its predecessor in interest, appellant had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful possession of the land since
1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.
The Director of Lands opposed the application, alleging that it involves a public
land covered by appellant's sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that
the land was not awarded to appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof
as determined by an appraisal committee in July, 1950; and that appellant has no
valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely,
that of a (sales) applicant of a portion of the public domain.
In due course, the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered Judgment
sustaining the opposition of the Director of Lands and, accordingly, dismissing the
application. Hence, this appeal, upon the ground that the lower court had erred in
holding that:
1. ". . . the possession and occupation by the applicant-
appellant of the land subject of the application is not the possession
and occupation contemplated by the law (subsection [b]), Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942)."
2. ". . . the applicant-appellant's possession and occupation
of the land subject of the application did not exclude the Bureau of
Lands."
3. ". . . if the possession and occupation by the applicant-
appellant of the land subject of the application were to be considered
as falling under sub-section (b) of section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 there will be many
instances where the government will be defrauded."
4. ". . . the only remedy of applicant-appellant is to continue
with its sales application and that it cannot choose the remedy of
confirmation of title because it would be defrauding the government."
Appellant invokes section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, which reads:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
 completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
"(a) . . .
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter." 1
More particularly, appellant maintains that it is entitled to the registration applied
for pursuant to the abovequoted provision, which authorizes the confirmation of
claims of "those who . . . have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application . . ."
In this connection, the lower court had made the following findings of fact:
"Sometime on April 19, 1920 the Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Company, Inc. filed Sales Application No. 4782 over a
parcel of public land consisting of 1,024 hectares located at
Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan (see Exhs. '1' and '13-A'-status Report).
The application was given due course by the Bureau of Lands.
Sometime in December, 1930, the Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Company, Inc. requested the Director of Lands that it be
permitted to reduce the area applied for to 680 hectares because the
portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed by other,
(Exhs, '2' and '2-A'). On November 13, 1933, the Director of Lands
wrote a letter to the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company,
Inc. advising the latter that it had recommended to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00 per hectare for
the land it had applied for sale (Exh. '3'), On November 27, 1934, the
Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied
for consisting of 764.0633 hectares — setting the date of bidding for
February 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan (Exh. '4'). According
to the records, this auction sale set for February 27, 1935 did not
take place because of the request of the applicant for
postponement. On June 5, 1936, the applicant wrote to the Director
of Lands praying that its Sales Application No. 4782 be not
cancelled, in view of the demand of the Director of Lands that the
sales application be cancelled for lack of interest and that the
company may be given time to comply with the condition required by
the Bureau of Lands, (Exh. '5').
"According to Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2' and 'G-4', Tax
Declarations Nos. 342, 1414, 1425 and 1750, respectively, the
applicant had declared the land applied for, for taxation purposes.
On the face of these exhibits, the following appears: On Tax
Declaration No. 342 — 'Purchase Application'; on Tax Declarations
Nos. 1414, 1425 and 1720, appear the words 'S.A. No. 4782'. In
February 1936, the company protested to the Provincial Treasurer
that the land applied for by it be not subject to real estate taxes, (Exh.
'6').
"It also appears from the records that applicant had paid for
the necessary expenses for the survey and had cooperated with the
Bureau of Lands surveyor for the survey of the land, (Exhs. '7', '11'
and '20'). On June 13, 1939, a resurvey was ordered by the Director
of Lands, preparatory to the requirements of public bidding, (Exh.
'19').
"The land applied for was again set to be sold at a public
bidding on May 19, 1941, but the bidding was again postponed
because the applicant company requested its suspension because
it asked for the reconsideration of the appraised value set by the
Director of Lands, (Exh. '3'). On March 24, 1950, the applicant, thru
its Attorney Almario, wrote a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources asking that the appraised value be reduced.
"On July 24, 1950, pursuant to the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, a committee of appraisal
reappraised the property and fixed the price of P100.00 per hectare,
(Exhs. '10', '16', '17' and '18').
"On October 9, 1950, the applicant, thru its counsel, Atty.
Clemente C. Fontanilla, asked for the reconsideration of the
appraisal, (Exh. '18'). The Bureau of Lands stood pat.
"Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took
possession thereof partially and improved portion thereof planting
coconuts and other crops. The value of improvements are reflected
in the various lax declarations. The total area, as finally surveyed is
415.5144 hectares under Amd Plan No. Sc-4782, SWO-34910. This
plan as well as the survey was undertaken and prepared by a public
land surveyor instructed to make the survey. The land covered by
this plan is the same land applied for by the applicant under SA-
4782, and it is the same plan that was submitted by the applicant in
these registration proceedings.
 "On November 24, 1961, in reply to a subpoena issued by the
District Land Office of Palawan, the applicant thru its president,
advised the latter for the first time that he will not submit to the
investigation set because they want to wait for the result of their
application involving the present case which was filed sometime in
March, 1961." 2

It is obvious from the foregoing facts — which are not and can not be disputed in
this direct appeal, which, as such, is limited to questions of law — that appellant's
possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to
whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor
by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant manifestly
acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the application was
submitted. The trial court was, therefore, fully justified in concluding that applicant's
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law.
This conclusion is assailed upon the ground that said section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 originally provided that:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-
sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
and that Republic Act No. 1942, which became effective on June 22, 1957,
amended said paragraph (b), not only by dispensing with the requirement that
the possession begin not later than July 26, 1894, but, also, by eliminating the
phrase "except as against the Government," qualifying the possession "under
a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership" therein called for.
We find no merit in this pretense, for, under both the original and the amended
provision, it is essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership," and appellant herein had never made such claim,
except in its present application for registration, filed on February 14, 1961. All of
its acts prior thereto, including its real estate tax declarations, characterized its
possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and, consequently, as one
who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner.
Moreover, the elimination of the qualifying expression "except as against the
Government," found in said section 48(b) as originally enacted, bolsters up the
view taken by the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that the "bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership," under the amendment by Republic Act No. 1942, must
be adverse to the whole world, including the Government.
Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:
"In the mind of the Court, the possession and occupation by
the applicant company of the land sought to be registered, is not the
possession and occupation contemplated by the present law on this
matter (Subsection [b], Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will
be many instances where the government will be defrauded. If
confirmation or registration of title can be done, as it is being done
now by the applicant company, a possessor and occupant of a public
agricultural land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who
has applied for the purchase of the same will just sit on his right,
making the application pending for more than 30 years while he
possesses and occupies the land, declare the same for taxation
purposes, pay the corresponding taxes religiously and consistently,
and then after a lapse of 30 years, will abandon his sales application
and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or registration
of title. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators
when they passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their
intention, our legislators would have been a party to an act of
defrauding our government . . ."
Appellant brands this process of reasoning as "illogical" and "contrary to law,"
because, pursuant to section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by Republic Act No 2061, the benefits of section 48(b) of the former are available
not later than December 31, 1968, so that those whose possession had not as yet
lasted 30 years could not seek a confirmation of their title. We do not see the
violation of the rules of logic or of law alluded to by appellant. The fact is that, were
we to accept its own process of reasoning — which we cannot, it being contrary to
the clear and natural import of said section 48 (b), as amended — appellant could
have sought confirmation of its alleged title as early as 1942 or 1950, 3 or long
before December 31, 1968.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
(Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc. v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-
|||

25914, [March 21, 1972], 150 PHIL 801-809)

27. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 94525. January 27, 1992.]

DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) and POMPEYO MALIWAT and
AMELIA G. MALIWAT,respondents.

Napoleon M. Gamo for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT (C.A. 141); CONVERSION OF ALIENABLE

PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY; RULE. — After
deliberating on the petition, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
Lot 3, had become private land by virtue of the late Feliciano Juco's open,
continuous and exclusive occupation and cultivation thereof since 1939, which
when tacked to Maliwat's possession after February 12, 1972 (when he purchased
it) far exceeds the statutory thirty-year period for the conversion of alienable public
agricultural land into private property. The decision of the Court of Appeals accords
with the following ruling of this court: ". . . alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or thru his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act,
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period ipso jure. The above [doctrine] is a reaffirmation of the principle
established in the earlier cases of Cariño vs. Insular Government, 42 Phil.
935; Suzi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; and Herico vs. DAR, 95 SCRA 437; that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property." (Director of
Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, 376, citing the doctrine laid down in the
Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc., 146 SCRA
509, 522). ". . . The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors 'shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title' and by legal fiction,
the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. In the language of
Herico vs. DAR, supra title over the land has vested on the possessor so as to
segregate the land from the mass of the public domain. And as stressed in Suzi
vs. Razon, supra, it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sustained by the courts, an application thereunder
being sufficient." (Republic vs. De Porkan, 151 SCRA 107-108.) "As an applicant
possessor who has complied with all the necessary requirements for the grant by
the government under the Public Land Act through actual possession, openly,
continuously, and publicly, private respondent through his predecessor-in-interest
is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant
but the grant itself of the government for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by courts - an application
therefore being sufficient under the law." (Santos vs. CA, 189 SCRA 550)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TITLE THERETO, NOT DIVESTED BY THE APPLICANT'S
ADMISSION THAT THE LAND WAS PUBLIC. — Juco's admission in his free
patent application that the land he was applying for is public land did not divest the
title which had already vested in him before he filed said application on August 9,
1971. Having become private property, the land, as correctly noted by the Court of
Appeals, was "beyond the control or jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
Consequently, the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources . .
. giving him, (Juco) sixty (60) days within which to file the corresponding land
application was null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever on the already
acquired title of Juco under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Nevertheless, the decision established the fact that Juco was the actual occupant
of the land with improvements thereat."

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p

This is a petition filed by the Director of Land Management to review the decision
dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's decision
which ordered the registration of the title of a 16-hectare parcel of land in the
names of the private respondents.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the facts of this case to be as follows:
The Land Investigator/Inspector of the Bureau of Lands verified that Feliciano
Juco, his grandparents or predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, exclusive,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the land in question in the concept
of owners, for a period of twenty (20) years. Juco built a house on Lot 3 where his
family lived. He had carabaos grazing in his pasture. His brother-in-law, Gelacio
de la Cruz, owned and lived on the adjacent Lot 4.
On March 10-11, 1957, Nieves Naval de Roldan caused the whole tract of land in
Cuyambay, Tanay, Rizal, to be resurveyed as PSU-164381, by Private Land
Surveyor Francisco Agustin. Her children filed an application to purchase the
property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was placed in the name of Desiderio
Roldan. A sales application was filed by Mariano Roldan for Lot 3.
Feliciano Juco was informed of the posting in the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal, of
Mariano Roldan's sales application for Lot 3. But having no money, he failed to
participate in the bidding. Lot 3 was purchased by Bernardina Manalaysay. llcd

In 1963, with Quirino D. Villena's help, Feliciano Juco was able to obtain financial
assistance from the spouses Leon and Loreta R. Lina to protest against Mariano
Roldan's acquisition of Lot 3. He promised to sell the lot to Lina later. On July 23,
1963, a "Conditional Sale and Transfer of Right to Land" was executed by Juco in
favor of the Lina spouses.
The Lina spouses fenced Lots 3 and 4 and planted fruit trees thereon. Two (2)
years later, a Bilihang Tuluyan was executed by Juco, with his wife's consent, in
favor of Lina. The document was notarized by Teodulo Q. Bernardos (Exh. C) and
registered under Act No. 3344 on September 5, 1972.
Juco lost his protest in the Bureau of Lands, but upon appeal to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, he was, on December 18, 1969, adjudged to
have the preferential right to buy the property (Exh. O). He was given sixty (60)
days from the finality of the decision to file his own application to purchase it, which
he did on August 29, 1971 (Exh. I-Director of Lands). Shortly thereafter, Feliciano
Juco died.
Juco's wife, Pacita Resurreccion, and their children, Jimmy, Nicanor, Beatriz and
Adalia, offered to sell the property to Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the
proceedings in the Bureau of Lands but not about the earlier sale of the land to the
Lina spouses. He verified from the records that Feliciano Juco did have a
preferential right to the property, so he bought it (Exh. D). He had the deed of sale
registered (Exh. E) and he declared the land for tax purposes in his name. He
placed men on the land to take care of it (pp. 610-613, Rollo.)
Claiming to be the owners in fee simple of Lot 3, PSU-164381, with an area of
169.301 square meters, situated at Barrio Cayambay, Tanay, Rizal, the Maliwats
filed on March 20, 1977 in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, an
application for registration of the land in their names under the Torrens system. It
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-7753.
The Director of Lands (now Director of the Land Management Bureau) opposed
the application on the ground that the land is public land.
The Minister of Agrarian Reform also opposed it on the ground that the land is
reserved for agrarian reform.
On November 8, 1972, the Lina spouses filed a motion to dismiss Maliwat's
application for registration of title on the ground that the land is covered by a
homestead application of Loreto R. Lina duly filed and recorded on January 9,
1970 in the District Land Office No. 3 of the Bureau of Lands, and that it is public
land under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands, not the
court. On April 5, 1973, they amended their opposition. They claimed that they had
purchased the land from Feliciano Juco, and that hence, the title should be
registered in their names.
Another opposition was filed by one Cesar N. Roldan, claiming to be the actual
occupant of the land, that the possession was given to him by the heirs of Feliciano
Juco who died while awaiting the action of the Director of Lands on his application
for a free patent; and that he (Roldan) filed an application (for free patent) in
substitution of the deceased, Feliciano Juco.
On December 26, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees the
registration of the parcel of land subject matter of the present proceeding
and the registration of title thereto in favor of the applicants, Pompeyo
Maliwat and Amelia G. Maliwat, spouses, of age, Filipinos with residence
and postal address at Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila, who are hereby declared
the true and lawful owners in fee simple thereof.
"Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title be issued in the name of the applicants."
(pp. 123-124, Rollo.)
The Director of Lands appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV
No. 12601). On March 29, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration, filed by the petitioner, was denied, hence,
this petition for review.
The Director of Lands avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in holding that Lot 3, Plan Psu-164381 is private land, despite
overwhelming evidence including the admissions of private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, that it is a public land.
2. In applying the Bengzon (152 SCRA 369) and Acme (146 SCRA 509)
rulings on the conversion of alienable public land to private property,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the possession of Lot 3, Psu-
 164381 by Feliciano Juco and respondents spouses, Pompeyo Maliwat
and Amelia Maliwat, was not in the concept of owner; and

3. in confirming the alleged registrable right of the private respondents to

the land in question.
After deliberating on the petition, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that Lot 3, had become private land by virtue of the late Feliciano Juco's open,
continuous, and exclusive occupation and cultivation thereof since 1939, which
when tacked to Maliwat's possession after February 12, 1972 (when he purchased
it) far exceeds the statutory thirty-year period for the conversion of alienable public
agricultural land into private property. The decision of the Court of Appeals accords
with the following rulings of this court:
". . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or thru his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure.
"The above [doctrine] is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the
earlier cases of Cariño vs. Insular Government, 42 Phil 935; Suzi vs.
Razon, 48 Phil. 424; andHerico vs. DAR, 95 SCRA 437, that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property."
(Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, 376, citing the doctrine
laid down in the Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer
Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509, 522).
". . . The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors 'shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title' and by legal
fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. In the
language of Herico vs. DAR, supra title over the land has vested on the
possessor so as to segregate the land from the mass of the public domain.
And as stressed in Suzi vs. Razon, supra, it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sustained by the courts, an application thereunder being sufficient."
(Republic vs. De Porkan, 151 SCRA 107-108.)
"As an applicant possessor who has complied with all the necessary
requirements for the grant by the government under the Public Land
Act through actual possession, openly, continuously, and publicly, private
respondent through his predecessor-in-interest is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant but the grant itself
 of the government for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by courts — an application
therefore being sufficient under the law." (Santos vs. CA, 189 SCRA 550).
Juco's admission in his free patent application that the land he was applying for is
public land did not divest the title which had already vested in him before he filed
said application on August 9, 1971. Having become private property, the land, as
correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, was "beyond the control or jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands. Consequently, the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources . . . giving him (Juco) sixty (60) days within which to file the
corresponding land application was null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever
on the already acquired title of Juco under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended. Nevertheless, the decision established the fact that Juco was the actual
occupant of the land with improvements thereat" (pp. 136-137, Rollo). LLjur

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12601 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.
(Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94525, [January 27,
|||

1992])

28. EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19940. August 14, 1965.]

FERNANDEZ KIDPALOS, applicant-appellant, vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-
appellee.

[G.R. No. L-19941. August 14, 1965]

WALDO KIDPALOS, applicant-

appellant, vs. BAGUIO GOLD MINING
COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

[G.R. No. L-19942. August 14, 1965]

 NABOS VALENCIANO, applicant-
appellant, vs. BAGUIO GOLD MINING
COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

[G.R. No. L-19943. August 14, 1965]

MAGLIA CAYAPA, applicant-

appellant, vs. BAGUIO GOLD MINING
COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

[G.R. No. L-19944. August 14, 1965]

SANDO LAMPACAN, BASTEN LAMPACAN,

CONSING LAMPACAN and TOPAYNA
LAMPACAN, applicants-appellants, vs. BAGUIO
GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

Bienvenido L. Garcia for applicants-appellants.

Ponce Enrile, Siquion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo, for oppositor-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; DIFFERENT FORMS OF ACTION DOES NOT

PREVENT OPERATION OF RULE. — Difference in forms of action are irrelevant
for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different remedy
sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former
adjudication.
2. ID.; ID.; A MATTER OF DEFENSE AND NOT OF JURISDICTION. — Res
judicata is a matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
act on a second suit between the parties on the same subject matter.
3. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF FORMER JUDGMENT. — If the record of the former trial
shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.

DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p

Direct appeal from orders of dismissal of five applications for registration of land
on the ground of res judicata, by order of June 17, 1960, issued by the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City, in its cases Nos. N-40, N-41, N-42, N-43 and N-44.
The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos
Valenciano, Waldo Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang Lebos Vda. de
Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos. 457, 458, 460, 463 and
549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels
of land situated in sitio Binanga, Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet,
Mountain Province; to annul the declaration of location of certain mineral claims of
the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs;
and to recover damages from the Company. The complaint also sought to enjoin
the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of the
Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question
demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company,
claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930, asked
for dismissal of the action and damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al.,
had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter
rendered judgment, on July 31, 1958, finding that the land lay within the Cordillera
Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed
part of the public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son,
Joseph, had entered and located therein certain mining claim, subsequently sold
and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; that the latter had occupied
the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts required by the mining laws
to entitle it to mineral patents therefore until the recent World II; that after the war
the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature; that the
Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations,
although the corresponding patents were still in process at the Bureau of Mines;
that "the appellee mining company has acquired a superior title to that of the
plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation" (Rec. App., pp. 186 to
220). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the actions by
the Court of First Instance.
In view of the affirmance of the decision of the trial court by the Court of Appeals,
the plaintiffs-appellants therein resorted to the Supreme Court (G. R. Nos. L-16649
to 16653). The latter, however, declined review in a resolution reading as follows:
"In G. R. Nos. L-16649-53 (Maglia Cayapa vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.), acting on the petition for review of the
 decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on July 31,
1958, THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the same on
the ground that the issues raised are factual and have no
merit, but without prejudice to the registration proceedings
filed by petitioner before the same court regarding the
properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of
Appeals, in touching incidentally on the question of
ownership, did so without interfering with the merits of said
registration proceedings". (Italics supplied.)
While the cases were still pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had
filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration,
and moved to dismiss the applications. Proceedings were originally held in
abeyance until the appeals in the preceding cases were decided.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the
oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the
registration cases in the Court of First Instance. The latter dismissed the
applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to this Supreme Court.
They assail the order of dismissal of the Court below claiming that there could not
be res judicata because (1) the 1960 resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing
their petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision in favor of Baguio Gold
Mining Company, contained the reservation "without prejudice to the registration
proceedings filed by petitioner" (which are the cases now at bar); and (2) that the
former judgment's dispositive portion provided only for dismissal of the appellant's
previous complaint against Baguio Gold Mining Company, and it is only this
dispositive portion that is binding on the parties to the former litigation.
It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present
registration proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that
the parties are the same (the applicants-appellants Lampacan in Registration Case
No. N-44, L.R.C. Record No. N-11914, now G. R. L-19944, being the heirs and
successors of the former plaintiff Ipang Lebos Vda. de Lampacan in the preceding
law suit). It is not denied either that the former judgment of the Court of Appeals
was rendered on the merits of the case.
Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical, since
in both the appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the
land in dispute, allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While
the former cases were reivindicatory in character and the ones presently before us
are land registration proceedings, such difference in forms of action are irrelevant
for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different remedy
sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former
adjudication (Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 322; Juan vs. Go Cotoy, 26 Phil.
328; Chua Tanvs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 1;
Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture, 111 Phil. 1081, and cases cited therein). Since
there can be no registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the mining
company's title is superior to that of appellants should be conclusive on the
question in the present case.
Much reliance is placed by appellants on the statement made in this Court's 1960
resolution declining review of the former judgment of the Court of Appeals,
"without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by
petitioner before the same court regarding the properties
herein, involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals in
touching incidentally on the question of ownership, did so
without interfering with the merits of the registration
proceedings."
The words quoted merely establish that the decision in the reivindicatory action
decided by the Court should not be considered as having decided the pending
registration proceedings, since the nature of both proceedings were different, one
being a personal action and the registration being one in rem. The Court of First
Instance could not, in other words, automatically apply the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the registration proceedings. And the reason is plain: the
pronouncements of the judgment in the former case would not necessarily
preclude relitigation of the issues if res judicata is not invoked, since res judicata is
a matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a
second suit between the parties on the same subject matter (cf. Rule 16, sec. 1[f],
Revised Rules of Court). But the defense having been set up in the present
proceedings, the trial court acted properly in considering and resolving the same.
Appellants likewise argue that only the dispositive portion of a judgment concludes
the parties, and the previous adjudication was merely that appellants'
reivindicatory suit should be dismissed. We find this view unduly restrictive of the
salutary rule that issues once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated
should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the same subject
matter and cause of action. This is the substance of res judicata, without which
multiplicity of actions will be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that —

"Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that
the judgment could not have been rendered without
deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
 certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment
itself." (30 Am. Jur., p. 930).
Or, as stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
". . . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts
settled and adjudicated as to causes of action: Whitaker
vs. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326. The judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the parties as to all
points directly involved in it and necessarily
determined: Shirland vs. Union Nat. Bank, 65 Iowa, 96;
Freeman on Judgments, sec. 249.
"When a fact has been once determined in the course of
a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually
impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to
be done. The estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but
extends to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or
the groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It
is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis
on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where
a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn
only from certain premises, the premises are equally
indisputable with the conclusion':Burlen vs. Shannon, 99
Mass. 200; 96 Am. Dec. 733; Board etc. vs. Mineral Point
R. R. Co., 24 Vis. 124; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 257;
Wells on Res Adjudicata, sec. 226; 1 Herman on Estoppel,
sec. 111."
In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings in the former
judgment (that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining
company is superior to that of appellants), being the basis of the sentence of
dismissal, conclude the applicants in the present case, the previous adjudication
being final and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land
registration proceedings by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and
conformable to law.
That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on the basis of
30 years' open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as owner, instead of
requiring, as of yore, continuous adverse possession as owner since 1894, does
not help appellants at all. The vesting of title to the lands in question in the appellee
Baguio Gold Mining Company has effectively interrupted and rendered
discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these
proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the
costs.
Bengzon, C . J ., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ ., concur.

(Kidpalos v. Baguio Gold Mining Co., G.R. No. L-19940, [August 14, 1965], 122
|||

PHIL 249-256)