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LENINGRAD ’41
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6 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
Leningrad, 1941:
Manstein’s Truly “Lost Victory”
T
he German siege of Leningrad
tied down an entire army group
from late 1941 until 1944; the
roots of that situation stretch back to
the decisions made in the opening
stages of Operation Barbarossa, the
initial German lunge into the Soviet
Union. Reading contemporary accounts
of it, one gets the sense the German
high command assumed they had all
the time they needed to complete all
subsidiary operations. Thus they could
choose to besiege Leningrad rather than
assault it, concentrate almost all their
armor to pocket and then take Kiev, and
somehow still make a final and decisive
plunge for Moscow. That switching
of priorities laid the groundwork for
their overall failure in the east.
The initial plan for Barbarossa
precluded making Moscow a major
objective; rather, Leningrad, the Ukraine
and the Don Basin were the primary
targets. Hitler chose the former for its
political significance and the latter for
its economic resources. He considered
Moscow merely a geographic location,
and perhaps a trap in the same manner
its capture had led to the doom of
Napoleon and his Grande Armee in 1812.
The dilemma worsened when the
invaders couldn’t bring themselves to
stick to any single objective. Over the
summer of 1941 in the midst of the
greatest challenge the Wehrmacht had
yet faced, the German high command
Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb
was divided by acrimonious debate over
objectives. The result was Hitler decided
to first divert Army Group Center’s
panzers to supporting operations in the
north and south, and then switching
them back for a drive on Moscow.
The reasons for those changes in the
plan have been debated endlessly since
World War II, but whether Moscow was a
viable (or singly decisive) German objec-
tive in 1941 isn’t the issue here. What’s
critical is: at the moment the Germans
had an opportunity to take Leningrad
via a concerted panzer drive in late sum-
mer, Army Group North’s mobile forces
were switched elsewhere. The indecision
in front of Leningrad was symptom-
atic of that overall German shortfall in
Barbarossa: lack of a consistent strategy.
The actual decision to turn to
Moscow was implemented on 16
September, over the objections of
Army Group North’s commander,
Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb. Four
days earlier, von Manstein himself
had been transferred to command
Eleventh Army in Army Group South,
with the mission of taking the Soviet
fortress-city of Sevastopol. With the
panzers as well as Manstein gone,
all opportunity to take Leningrad by
coup de main was effectively ended.
In execution, the kind of operations
run by the Germans relied on the
panzer corps commanders to move on
their own initiative to take advantage
of opportunities as they presented
themselves, sometimes in defiance of
higher echelon directives to wait for
the infantry to come up in support. But
the situation on the eastern front in
1941 saw a trend toward over-control
by OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres,
the Army High Command, which
was responsible for conducting
operations). Objectives deep within the
USSR were assigned to panzer group
commanders but then switched.
Corps commanders found themselves
in turn being ordered to switch their
axes of advance back and forth across
the front, causing increased wear on
vehicles and dissipating momentum.
Added to that was the decision
by Hitler to withhold the output of
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 7
by Joseph Miranda
German armored fighting vehicle
(AFV) production. Instead of being
used to replace losses suffered in the
Soviet Union, the new tanks were to be
used to create a new group of panzer
divisions that were to be committed
to post-Barbarossa campaigns. That
decision was predicated on defeating
the Soviet Union by the end of 1941, yet
such a solution required concentrat-
ing all panzer forces in the east.
At the same time, the German gener-
als and field marshals failed to form a
united front in terms of presenting Hitler
with reasonable objectives for the 1941
campaign. Thus, without consistent
leadership, the invasion was bound to
achieve less than optimal results both
generally and in its particulars. The deci-
sion-making process of the German high
command for Leningrad demonstrates
that phenomenon. The idea for a siege
of Leningrad, rather than an all-out
attack, was discussed as if it were going
to take place in a strategic vacuum, one
in which it would be the only major
operation occurring on the front.
There were still other factors
involved. The German high com-
mand, including Hitler, wanted to
avoid the mass casualties that had
been typical of the battles of World
War I. The underlying fear was large
casualty returns would lead to the
kind of home front collapse — and
revolution — which had knocked
Erich von Manstein
the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and
German Empires out of the Great War.
Hitler also had geo-strategic consid-
erations for wanting to avoid a major
fight inside Leningrad. Such a contest
could’ve easily burned out numerous
divisions in house-to-house fighting in
a city where the communists were sure
to fight fanatically. Moreover, Leningrad
would be difficult to maneuver past
and around. Unlike other Soviet cities
captured in 1941, such as Smolensk
and Kiev, enveloping Leningrad
8 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
would’ve been difficult to impossible.
The Finns, co-belligerents with the
Germans in the war against the USSR,
had reaffirmed their refusal to move
against the city, due to their 20-year-old
pledge to the Soviet government never
to threaten it. That secured the city’s
northern flank for the defense, though
the Soviets still deployed some forces
there to keep an eye things. To the east
and southeast, Lake Ladoga, the Valdai
Hills, and the marshes between them
further restricted deep maneuver. Any
fight for the city would therefore have
inevitably come down to a frontal
assault, the very type of operation the
blitzkrieg was intended to avoid.
War & Psychological War
The quick and relatively inexpensive
German victories prior to Barbarossa
had an immense psychological impact
around the world, one that was further
played up in their propaganda. Perhaps,
though, its most decisive effect was
on those in the German high com-
mand itself, who came to believe the
Wehrmacht could undertake virtually
any task that could be set for it.
Transcripts of conversations at
Fuehrer headquarters record Hitler’s
astonishment at how quickly and
cheaply the campaigns in Poland,
France and the Balkans were won.
The French campaign was the crucial
turning point. Many in the German high
command, including Hitler, had been at
least guardedly pessimistic about gain-
ing a decision in the west in 1940. When
the Wehrmacht subsequently overran
France in a few weeks, it came as almost
as much of a surprise to the German
high command as it did to that of the
Allies. If the armies of France and Britain
could be defeated so handily — armies
that had held out so stubbornly for
four years in 1914-1918 — then surely
the Red Army — heir to the defeated
army of the Czar, and which had
displayed such incompetence in the
recent Winter War with Finland — could
be expected to be easily trounced.
Much of the power of the Wehrmacht
came from projecting itself as a force
capable of winning quick victories,
thereby overturning the experiences of
1914-18 and, for that matter, of other
such protracted contests as the Russian
and Spanish Civil Wars. One symptom of
that belief was revealed in Hitler’s reac-
tion to the large numbers of casualties
the German airborne arm suffered in
taking the island of Crete a few weeks
before Barbarossa opened. They were
sufficient to cause him to suspend
airborne operations indefinitely. Thus
the elite German paratroopers would
fight in the Soviet Union only as regular
infantry, with some units showing
up in front of Leningrad in that role
late in 1941. Had Hitler not made that
decision, we might here be evaluating
the impact of a German airborne
force seizing objectives ahead of the
panzers advancing into the USSR.
Indeed, the Soviet fear of just such an
assault led them to construct many
anti-paratrooper defenses behind the
lines of their Leningrad position.
That cancellation goes to Hitler view-
ing the airborne arm as a psychological
as much as a military instrument: in
1940 it had been especially useful in
spreading panic in the Allied rear areas,
with rumors of massive numbers of
paratroopers descending sometimes
reaching hysteric proportions. Crete
showed that psychological effect was
no longer there, and Hitler therefore
lost interest in the airborne. What
that also indicates is the Wehrmacht
needed to go through a fundamental
change in its doctrine in 1941, though
it wasn’t all that evident at the time.
Hitler also saw Leningrad as a
politico-psychological objective. It
was the spiritual home of bolshevism,
and in that regard Leningrad’s capture
might prove to be a catastrophic blow
to Stalin’s regime. At the same time,
though, there was no certainty that
would occur. For one, the Soviets had
moved their capital from Petrograd
(as Leningrad was called until 1924) to
Moscow. They did so precisely because
they could see the old capital was
militarily vulnerable. Moscow, with its
far inland location and central position
at the nexus of rail lines from all over
the country, was more defensible and
better situated to dominate the vast
expanse of the communist realm.
Of course, the German problem
wasn’t simply their failure to prosecute
a consistent strategy in their 1941
campaign. For any strategy to have
worked, the Soviets would’ve had
to have been incapable of offering
sustained resistance. Unfortunately for
the Germans, that wasn’t the situation.
The Soviets
The shortfalls of the Workers and
Peasants Red Army (as the Soviet
armed forces were known at the time)
have been analyzed many times
before in these pages. Briefly, Soviet
military leadership had been wrecked
by Stalin’s pre-war purges. Those killed
or imprisoned included innovative
thinkers who’d attempted to lay the
groundwork for a Red Army mobile
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 9
warfare doctrine in the mid-30s. On top
of that, the Soviets were going through a
reorganization when Barbarossa began.
Mechanized corps, which looked like
powerful armored formations on paper,
were actually still in the early stages of
being built up from small tank units.
They lacked trained staffs, combined-
arms training, and even the most
rudimentary logistics. Conditions in the
other combat arms were little better.
Red Air Force crews generally
lacked more than five hours in their
planes, and there was no doctrine for
independent air operations. Added
to that were the initial Luftwaffe air
strikes that devastated the Soviet
air force on the ground. Indeed, the
initial reports to Berlin about enemy
aircraft destroyed were considered to
be exaggerations and weren’t believed
until the Luftwaffe sent observers to
captured airfields to count the wreckage.
Yet the Red Army had strengths.
One was it had an effective system
for mobilizing reserves. That allowed
the Soviets to send new armies to the
front to replace formations that had
been shattered or destroyed. Quality of
training was certainly an issue among
those hastily assembled reserves, but
the Soviets had the advantage insofar
as the Germans were overextending
their own lines of communication
as they advanced; meanwhile the
Soviets were falling back on their own
sources of logistics and replacements.
Soviet deception measures prior
to Barbarossa had also kept German
intelligence in the dark about the true
size of the Red Army. The Germans had
expected to engage 200 Soviet divisions
during 1941. By the time they began
the drive on Moscow they had indeed
met that number of divisions and
defeated them; however, the Soviets
simply added newly mobilized units to
the front. They would have some 360
divisions available throughout 1941.
Added to that were the large numbers of
Soviet armored vehicles, another thing
the Germans didn’t anticipate, as well
as the high quality of the new models
among those tanks, such as the T-34.
Nor did the Red Army defend pas-
sively. Throughout the 1941 campaign
it launched numerous counterattacks.
At one time during Army Group North’s
drive on Leningrad (15-18 July), von
Manstein’s 56th Motorized (Panzer) Corps
found itself cut off by counterattacking
Soviet forces, and only deft maneuver
and hard fighting retrieved the situation.
That led to a steady attrition of German
manpower and materiel. As early as 26
 July, von Manstein had reported to Gen.
Friedrich Paulus, the OKH quartermas-
ter, that losses were critical enough to
warrant his units being pulled out of the
line for refit. Manstein recommended
the foot-mobile infantry be used to
push the Reds back in the meantime,
and then recommit his replenished
panzers to exploit to Leningrad.
The campaign was thus already
degenerating into an infantry battle.

Bringing up the Rear

The Germans are popularly pictured

as having fought a mechanized war. In
reality, though, of the 130 or so German
divisions involved in Barbarossa, only 34
were mechanized insofar as their entire
establishment was lifted via tracked or
wheeled vehicles: 19 panzer divisions
and another 15 motorized infantry.
Fourth Panzer Group, the mechanized
formation assigned to Army Group
North, had in its order of battle for 22
June 1941 three panzer and four motor-
ized infantry divisions. The motorized
divisions lacked organic armor; so, in
effect, the army group had about half
the strength the Germans used for
their much shorter 1940 drive through
the Ardennes, yet they were expected
to race all the way to Leningrad.
As the Germans drove east, then,
vehicles were lost to wear and tear, the
abysmal state of the Soviet roads and
enemy action. The trucks, which were
vital for hauling men, guns and supplies,
were perhaps hardest hit by wear
and tear. German industry lacked the
capacity to quickly replace those losses,
and that meant the army was losing its
mobility, even if tank and infantry casu-
alties weren’t as yet necessarily crippling.
With the loss of trucks, the
logistical organization that supported
the army — and which isn’t usually
shown on order of battle charts — was
also being lost. Each panzer and
motorized division had some 3,000
motor vehicles, and they required
several hundred more trucks at army
and theater levels to bring up supplies
and replacement parts while returning
casualties and damaged equipment.

10 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

 The Rise & Rise of Manstein

Following the conquest of Poland in October 1939, the committed piecemeal to counter a Soviet offensive on that front.
Germans turned their attention to the war in the west against The Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad in late 1942 saw
France and Britain. To deal with that situation, Franz Halder, chief Manstein back in the south, this time commanding the hurriedly
of staff of OKH, came up with a scheme that amounted to little organized Army Group Don. With it, he made a desperate attempt
more than a reworked version of World War I’s Schlieffen Plan. to relieve the trapped Sixth Army, which failed but succeeded in
The idea was the Germans would advance through the north of retaking Kharkov in March 1943. He was at Kursk commanding the
the Low Countries, capture the Channel ports, and then engage southern German pincer, and his panzers may have been on the
the main Allied armies somewhere near the Somme River. verge of achieving the needed breakthrough (depending on who you
Unlike the Schlieffen Plan, Halder’s idea wasn’t intended believe) just before the overall operation was called off by Hitler.
to produce a decisive victory. Germany lacked the element of In the ensuing Soviet offensives, he advocated trading space for
strategic surprise that it had in 1914; the Allies in 1940 were time while building up reserves to launch flanking counterattacks
planning to counter-move into Belgium the moment the Germans into the Red Army spearheads. That approach more and more
advanced. Rather, the 1940 plan’s objective was to cheaply conflicted with Hitler’s “no retreat” outlook, eventually leading
establish a viable front in northern France and then gain a favor- to Manstein’s forced retirement on 30 March 1944. He sat out
able negotiated peace from that position of strength. the rest of the war, though Hitler recognized his service with
That plan was dropped for two reasons, one of which was a staff a Knight’s Cross. While aware of the Stauffenberg bomb plot
officer carrying a copy of it was in an aircraft that strayed over Allied against Hitler, Manstein decided to neither join it nor reveal it to
lines. The plane went down, and the officer was captured along with Himmler. At the end of the war he surrendered to the British.
the plan. The real problem, though, came from the fact Hitler and After World War II he did a few years in prison for war crimes:
several of his generals weren’t happy moving ahead with any scheme as a high-level commander, he was held responsible for scorched
that didn’t at least allow for decisive victory in the field. They wanted earth policies and the mistreatment of civilians in the Soviet Union.
to win before the Reich ran out of resources to run its war machine. Even so, never having been a member of the Nazi Party, he was
The needed alternative was provided by Erich von Manstein, more politically acceptable in the postwar world than other senior
chief of staff in Army Group South during the Polish campaign and officers, and he became a military advisor to the West German
by then with Army Group A in the west. The Manstein Plan, as government. He is also famous for his book, Lost Victories, which
it came to be known, was to concentrate the bulk of the panzer gives his view on his role in the war. The book became popular
divisions in the center (instead of the far right), and drive through among military readers, as Manstein not surprisingly advocated
the Ardennes. Since the Allies were expected to move into wars should be run by professional soldiers and not politically
Belgium as soon as operations began in earnest, those panzers oriented amateurs — such as his former chief, Hitler.  ★
would be able to attack into their flank, break through there, and
cut them off. Hitler liked that, since it coincided with his own
ideas about the mass use of panzers. (Manstein credited his plan
to a team effort between himself and various staff officers.)
The plan proved a runaway success. The drive through the
Ardennes, supported by the Luftwaffe, outflanked the Allied
armies in Belgium. That led to their falling back to the Channel and
evacuating via Dunkirk. The French forces outside the deflating
coastal enclave fell back toward Paris. The Germans entered the
French capital on 14 June and France surrendered on the 22nd.
Oddly, von Manstein himself commanded only an
infantry corps during the 1940 campaign. After Hitler had
accepted his plan, Halder transferred him out of pique. Even
so, Manstein’s operational vision had been vindicated, and he
also proved effective as a corps commander, moving quickly
and hitting hard even while commanding foot soldiers.
Hitler rewarded him with command of 56th Motorized (Panzer)
Corps for Barbarossa in 1941. He moved aggressively at first,
but Leningrad proved to be beyond his grasp, though potentially
not his reach. That is, had he continued to drive forward on his
own initiative when he reached a position just a few miles
outside the city in mid-July, there’s little doubt he would’ve
thereby inescapably pulled the rest of the army group along
with him, thus short-cutting the higher level indecision over
the matter that ultimately led to the historic siege.
Hitler nevertheless continued to believe in Manstein, and
promoted him to head Eleventh Army for its assault into the Crimea
and against the fortress of Sevastopol within it, which he captured
only after months of hard fighting. Later in 1942 he took Eleventh
Army north for a renewed assault on Leningrad, but that operation
(Nordlicht) was canceled when those divisions ended up being Erich von Manstein

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 11

As those trucks were being shot up,
wrecked and burned out, it meant
the overall ability to conduct mobile
operations was being undermined.
The attrition also impacted the
Luftwaffe, which was a vital part of the
blitzkrieg. The German Air Force high
command hadn’t planned for a long war.
One aspect of that was a failure to build
up adequate stockpiles of replacement
parts to keep aircraft flying during long
and intensive operations. By the end of
1941 the spare parts situation was at a
crisis. Among other things it reduced
the operational rate of Luftwaffe
aircraft. That rate is the percentage of
aircraft that can, on average, fly at any
given time. Aircraft down for overhaul,
maintenance or repair obviously
aren’t going to be flying missions.
12 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
One of the factors that had given
the Luftwaffe an impact beyond its
numbers came from the fact it had
previously been able to maintain a
high operational rate. It also had a high
sortie rate, meaning each German
aircraft could fly several missions in the
time a single opposing Red Air Force
plane could fly one. That produced, to
use the modern term for it, a “combat
multiplier,” but the Luftwaffe couldn’t
maintain that operational tempo in
the USSR. Wear and tear on aircraft,
combat losses, and then the effects of
the Russian winter, reduced the number
of planes ready to fly. Operational rates
went from 70 percent down to 40.
What all that meant was the
Germans had to win a decisive victory
in late 1941 or — as the events of the
next four years demonstrated — they
likely wouldn’t be able to do so at
all. They therefore really couldn’t
afford not to take Leningrad, or any
other major objective for that matter,
as quickly as possible. The actual
outcome of the war emphasized the
irony: the Germans suffered far more
casualties in the ensuing years of
combat on the eastern front than they
would’ve risked by a direct assault on
Leningrad when they had the chance.
Conclusions
By the time the Germans reached
Leningrad, a certain amount of inertia
had already crept into their operations.
Their strength had begun to be dis-
sipated by logistical and operational
issues as well as by the Soviet resistance.
Still, despite all that, the Germans likely
could’ve taken Leningrad in 1941. They
still had several advantages. There were
some logistical factors working in favor
of Army Group North. The distance from
the East Prussian frontier to Leningrad
was less than that to Moscow. That
reduced the length supply lines would’ve
had to run. The Germans also used
shipping in the Baltic Sea to supplement
their land-based logistics. At the same
time the people of the Baltic States
were generally pro-German, which
provided a secure rear area compared
to the growing menace from partisans
elsewhere in the occupied USSR.
While Hitler stated his aversion
to urban warfare when it came to
Leningrad, he proved willing to order
just such operations on other parts
of the front. The siege of Sevastopol,
begun in late 1941, turned into a
protracted series of assaults in which,
ironically enough, the transferred
von Manstein commanded the Axis
forces. Later, in 1942, Hitler was more
than willing to order a massive fight
for Stalingrad in a battle at the end of
German lines of communication.
In the end, of course, the Germans
chose to not assault Leningrad in 1941
when they might’ve been able to take it.
Instead, they tied down an entire army
group besieging the city for the next
two and a half years. An early seizure
of Leningrad would’ve freed those
divisions for operations elsewhere. That
still might not have meant a German
capture of Moscow in 1941; however,
since that operation failed to take the
Soviet capital in the actual event, the
Germans would still likely have ended
Barbarossa with a much more viable
line than they got historically.  ✪
Sources
Conner, Albert & Robert Poirier. Red Army Order of Battle.
Novata, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Van Creveld, Martin.
Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.
London: Cambridge University, 1977.
Davies, W. J. K. German Army Handbook.
New York: Arco, 1977.
Dear, I.C.B., ed. The Oxford Companion to World War II.
Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1995.
Glantz, David. The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-45.
Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas: 2002.
Goure, Leon. The Siege of Leningrad.
Stanford: Stanford University, 1962.
Kislitsyn, N. & V. Zukbakov. Leningrad Does Not Surrender.
Moscow: Progress, 1989.
Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von. Lost Victories.
Chicago: Regnery, 1955.
Murray, Williamson.
Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945.
Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell: 1986.
Salisbury, Harrison. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad.
DeCapo: 2003.
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 13
Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
W
hen first playtesting
Leningrad ’41 (L41), we found
the Germans couldn’t make
the penetrations they were able to
pull off historically on the eastern
front of 1941. We tossed around all
kinds of alternatives, but finally
developer Ty Bomba hit on the right
one: put Luftwaffe Strike Phases at
the start of every German player turn.
This allows the Germans to open
holes in the Soviet lines the panzers
can then exploit. That change in
the sequence proved both simple
and effective, and more operatively
realistic than the more complicated
solutions we’d been considering.
The alternative history assumption
behind L41 is the Germans decided to
go for the city in the early summer of
1941 instead of dithering and having
the situation end up a siege. It’s a
“what if” scenario, but one that’s close
to reality and shows the differences
between the Wehrmacht and Red Army
during Operation Barbarossa.
I based the system on that of my ear-
lier Manila ’45 design, but there are criti-
cal differences. One is that in L41 both
sides have units arriving throughout
the course of the game. Reinforcements
are randomly generated; so each
game will be different. The battle thus
becomes a kind of urban meeting
engagement in which both players
have to make critical offensive and
defensive commitments: engage now
with forces committed piecemeal, or
wait to build up and fight when, maybe,
it will prove to be too late. It’s a classic
military challenge for both players.
I built many quantitative and
qualitative factors into the system. The
Wehrmacht was at its peak at this time
in the war; the Red Army was near its
low point. The Soviets suffered from a
lack of training, abysmal logistics and
the after-effect of Stalin’s purges; yet
somehow they managed to hang on.
The Germans’ edge is modeled
in a couple ways. One way is that
14 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
German maneuver units are bat-
talions while those of the Red Army
are largely regiments. Effectively, that
gives each German regiment three
“steps,” since it takes three “hits” to
destroy one, while a Soviet regiment
can be knocked out with one blow.
You have to move all the units of one
sub-command before moving to the
next one, which represents various com-
mand-control issues when fighting in
this kind of environment. It forces both
players to think about how they actu-
ally deploy their formations. German
commands are mainly divisions (8th
Panzer, 3rd Motorized, 269th Infantry, SS
Totenkopf, SS Polizei and a battlegroup
from 7th Paratroop), plus support
formations from 56th Panzer Corps.
In general, all the units of a German
division can fire together at the same
target at the same time. The exception
is the SS divisions, which weren’t yet
trained sufficiently to fight as a single
large formation at that time in the war.
The Soviets are effectively divided
into two large forces: 42nd Army, hold-
ing the city, and the Leningrad Front
Reserve, which is organizing off-map
and is being sent in to its relief. The
Soviets are limited in the number
of units that can concentrate their
fire, representing their poor level of
command-control and leadership.
Then there is the issue of tactical
intelligence. German artillery can fire
anywhere on the map within range.
That represents their numerous
reconnaissance aircraft flying over the
battlefield. The Soviets have to have
a spotting unit on the ground to fire
indirect artillery missions and, to make
matters worse, many of their artillery
regiments can only conduct direct fire.
That represents Red Army doctrine at
the time, as well as its lack of forward
observers. It makes for a critical dif-
ference in how both players employ
their overall force mix, and it gives the
German player an edge in what can be
an otherwise difficult situation — racing
a panzer corps into a major city.
Another systemic change in L41 from
its parent game was the elimination of
some of the die roll modifiers applied
to combat in M45. That game’s DRM
approach was another case of more
turning out to be less. Players found
themselves involved in a lot of number
juggling with die roll additions and sub-
tractions that often canceled each other.
We’ve now got a faster-playing game
without detracting from its realism.
There are no supply rules as such,
but that doesn’t mean logistics aren’t a
factor. For instance, movement is one
function of logistics. The Germans have
a higher standard movement allowance
than do the Soviets, reflecting superior
logistics and organization. Given that
game turns each represent three days,
movement factors represent mission
orientation and the ability to deploy in
an urban environment under fire rather
than a measure of absolute mobility.
The map has various objective
hexes, representing in some cases
logistical centers and in other cases
strongpoints and command centers.
Soviet reinforcements are in part a
function of how many of those hexes
are held by the Red Army. There is thus a
reason to fight it out for the Kirov Works
and the Badayev Warehouses. Players
have to trade short-term costs in unit
losses against the longer-term value of
reinforcements and victory points. That
can turn things into a real meat grinder,
as would later be seen at Stalingrad.
There is also the human dimen-
sion. Both sides get leaders who can
overcome command limits. The trick
is having your leader at the right
place at the right time in order to
make an important difference. The
Germans have von Manstein; the
Soviets have Zhukov and Zhdnov.
The latter managed to throw together
a defense in the desperate hours of
the summer of 1941 while smoking a
carton of cigarettes a day. Now’s your
chance to step into their boots.  ✪
Leningrad ’41
Leningrad ’41: What If Manstein Attacked? (L’41), designed by Joseph command control, leaders, fanaticism, gunboats, the cruiser Aurora,
Miranda, is a two-player alternative history wargame of intermediate the Komsomol, the metro, and optional German airborne assault.
complexity that simulates a hypothetical German attempt to seize the To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
city of Leningrad in late July through August 1941. The assumption is this issue send your name and address along with:
Manstein, rather than pausing for two weeks as he did historically, simply
charged ahead into the city immediately upon crossing the Luga River. $30 US Customers
To control complexity and present an overall-force-commander’s-view $36 Canadian Customers
of the battle, the game uses a tactically scaled map and units of $38 Overseas Customers
maneuver coupled with an operationally scaled game turn length. The
German player is generally on the offensive, trying to clear the Soviet All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
defending force from the city prior to the end of the game. L’41 uses the CA residents add $1.98 sales tax.
system originally created for our earlier published Manila’45 game.
Each game turn equals three days. Each hexagon on the map represents Send to:
0.3 miles (0.5 km) from side to opposite side. The units of maneuver Decision Games
for the Germans are mainly battalions, while those for the Soviets ATTN: WaW Game Offer
range from battalions to regiments and brigades. Thus each unit may PO Box 21598
represent anywhere from 100 to 5,000 men and their equipment. Bakersfield, CA 93390
Special rules cover such things as: fog of war, replacements,
reinforcements, defensive fire, indirect fire, combat air support,
The Battle That
Won’t End:
Operation Anvil/Dragoon,
August 1944
by John D. Burtt

16 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

Great Debate
I
n the early morning hours of
15 August 1944, 396 aircraft of
the Provisional Troop Carrier
Air Division, loaded with over 5,500
American and British paratroops,
arrived over the Mediterranean coastline
of France and began dropping them
on the town of Le Muy. The paradrop,
combined with commando landings
on the islands of Cos, Levant, and other
sites on the coast, was the opening
step in the invasion of southern
France. That invasion, Operation
Dragoon, originally advocated by
the American high command and
opposed by their British counterparts,
was controversial from its inception in
late 1943 and remains so to this day.
The seeds of the debate rested with
the differing war strategies pursued by
the US and Great Britain. In a nutshell,
US planners wanted to invade northern
France as soon as possible in order to
make a concentrated thrust straight
into Germany, fully defeat that nation,
and then turn full attention on the
Japanese. The British wanted to attack
the Germans only peripherally at first,
thereby stretching and systematically
weakening Hitler’s resources, prior to the
climactic — and much later — landing
in northern France and subsequent
drive to Berlin. The focus of most
of those arguments over strategy
during 1942–43 came to center on the
role of the Mediterranean front.
When the US entered the war its high
command had no intention of becoming
deeply involved in the Mediterranean
theater, where the British had by then
already been fighting indecisively for
over two years. Under the guidance of
their chairman, Gen. George Marshall,
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were ada-
mant in their opposition to deepening
the distraction of that secondary theater.
Only after Tobruk fell to the Germans
in May 1942, creating a true crisis for
the British, did the Americans agree to
enter that arena via Operation Torch in
November 1942 — but even then it took
a direct presidential order to override
the ongoing concerns of the generals.
May 1943’s Trident conference cen-
tered on the subject of further moves,
since the Axis in Tunisia were finally
collapsing and the invasion of Sicily was
already scheduled. The cross-Channel
attack was by then planned for 1944,
but no one wanted to give the Germans
a 12-month respite. The Americans,
however, didn’t want to invade Italy; so
one of the options they suggested was
an invasion of the Mediterranean coast
of France. They believed such a move
would add the major ports of Toulon
and Marseilles for logistics, bolster
the Free French, who were by then
solidly in the Allied camp, and force the
Germans to defend France on a second
strategic axis. Unspoken, but clear, was
the American wish to forestall further
large-scale action in the Mediterranean.
Only as a compromise, then, did
Italy became the chosen path, and
in September 1943 the US Fifth and
British Eighth Armies went ashore
there and began a tortuous drive
up the boot. A month later, those 18
Allied divisions were being opposed
by 25 German divisions and the
campaign devolved into a stalemate.
The southern France option was
again discussed at the Quadrant
conference in Quebec. Marshall’s chief
planner, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower,
put together a scheme involving three
divisions landing there, codenamed
Anvil, to be launched concurrently with
the Overlord invasion in the north.
That plan was taken to Cairo, where
the Allies continued to disagree prior
to the “Big Three” summit meeting
in Teheran. There Stalin put himself
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 17
solidly on the side of the Americans
in the debate, insisting on Overlord
for May 1944 with Anvil as a second
pincer. The Soviet leader condemned
every other option as being “strategi-
cally indecisive.” Despite that apparent
decision for Anvil, however, events soon
overtook the seeming consensus.
British Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery, placed in charge of further
Overlord planning, began to make
extensive changes that would require
far more resources, especially in landing
craft, for the invasion. In Italy, mean-
while, Churchill demanded and got a
poorly planned end-run amphibious
assault in January 1944 at Anzio. Its aim
was to break the Italian stalemate, but it
succeeded only at upping the ante in it.
By March the Allies were readying
another major assault on the Germans
in Italy, and confidence was high
enough for the commander of Allied
forces in the Mediterranean, British
Gen. Sir Henry M. “Jumbo” Wilson,
to suggest other options be prepared
for the Italian theater once Rome
fell, including the possibility of an
amphibious assault into northern Italy
in Istria, at the head of the Adriatic Sea.
The Anvil controversy therefore arose
again, as the Americans felt Wilson’s
suggestion, which would’ve involved all
Allied forces in the Italian theater, was
actually aimed at taking the US into the
Balkans. Despite the growing argument,
Eisenhower realized Anvil, at least if
it were to be run concurrently with
Overlord, was really no longer an option:
there were too few amphibious resourc-
es and troops; so Anvil was shelved.
In June, with Rome liberated and the
Allies just ashore in northern France, the
debate reemerged. Wilson and his sub-
ordinate, Gen. Sir Harold R. Alexander,
commander of Allied forces in Italy,
proposed continuing the drive north in
Italy with all their forces. Breaking into
 the Po valley in strength, they argued,
Allied Order of Battle would allow a drive west into France or
northeast into Austria. Supporting their
United States Seventh Army — Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch plans were Ultra intercepts indicating
the German units in Italy were losing
US VI Corps — Maj. Gen. Lucius Truscott strength: they had only two of 15
3rd Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. John E. O’Daniel divisions in good shape, with 12 rated
7th Infantry Regiment at under strength by 20 percent. Other
15th Infantry Regiment intercepts indicated the targeted region
30th Infantry Regiment was important to Hitler. In one such
756th Tank Battalion message the Fuehrer warned that Allied
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion possession of the Po valley was a “devel-
36th Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. John E. Dalquist opment that would have immeasurable
141st Infantry Regiment military and political consequences.”
142nd Infantry Regiment Eisenhower then resurrected
143rd Infantry Regiment Anvil as a way to quickly get badly
191st Tank Battalion needed ports into operation in France,
645th Tank Destroyer Battalion since Normandy’s only major port,
45 Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles
th
Cherbourg, remained in German hands.
157th Infantry Regiment The US Joint Chiefs concurred, if only
179th Infantry Regiment to stay out of southeastern Europe.
180th Infantry Regiment British frustration was eloquently laid
753rd Tank Battalion out by Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, chief of
636th Tank Destroyer Battalion the Imperial General Staff, who wrote:
“To satisfy American shortsighted-
First French Army — Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny ness we have been led to agreeing
to the withdrawal of our forces from
1st Division Blindee the Mediterranean for a nebulous
Combat Command 1 second front and have emasculated our
2nd Regiment de Cuirassiers offensive strategy! It is heartbreaking.”
3rd Zouaves battalion With the British and US staffs
Combat Command 2 increasingly at loggerheads, the
3rd Regiment de Cuirassiers d’Afrique debate moved upstairs to Churchill
1st Zouaves battalion and Roosevelt. In a series of telegrams
1 Division des Forces Francaise Libre
st
that became increasingly strident,
1st Regiment de fusiliers marins (Reconnaissance) Churchill argued Anvil wouldn’t draw
1st Brigade Germans away from Normandy whereas
2nd Brigade continued large-scale operations in Italy
4th Brigade would do so. “Hitler’s anxieties over the
3rd Division d’Algerienne Po valley,” he stated, “would be relieved”
3rd Regiment de Spahis Algeriens (Reconnaissance) if Anvil were performed at the expense
3rd Regiment de Tirailleurs Algeriens of the forces in Italy. He therefore begged
7th Regiment de Tirailleurs Algeriens Roosevelt “not to make a complete
9th Division d’lnfanterie Coloniale ruin of our great affairs in Italy.”
Regiment d’lnfanterie coloniale du Maroc (Reconnaissance) Roosevelt sided with his command-
4th Regiment de Tirailleurs Senegalese ers. He reasoned that: 1) they’d promised
6th Regiment de Tirailleurs Senegalese Stalin a southern French invasion; 2)
13th Regiment de Tirailleurs Senegalese the Free French wouldn’t back further
Italian operations; 3) any diversion
7th Regiment de Chasseurs d’Afrique, tank destroyers toward the Balkans remained strategi-
8th Regiment de Chasseurs d’Afrique, tank destroyers cally dubious; and 4) US elections
1st Groupement de Tabors Marocain were coming up and any operations
2ndGroupement de Tabors Marocain not in direct support of Overlord
3rd Groupement de Tabors Marocain wouldn’t go over well with the voters.
Though “deeply grieved” by
First Allied Airborne Task Force - Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick Roosevelt’s decision, Churchill
British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade relented. Orders for troop withdrawals
US 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Italy for Anvil went out and final
US 550th Glider Infantry Battalion plans were made, including a name
US 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion change to Dragoon, due to concerns
US 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion about earlier security lapses. Even so,
Churchill continued his arguments
★ behind the scenes almost to the day
the invasion convoys left Italy.

18 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

Allied Ground Forces
Despite the acrimonious debate
over the invasion, and the temporary
cancellation of it, operational planning
for it had actually gone on uninter-
rupted starting in January 1944, when a
“planning group” was quietly set up in
Algiers. With members of army, navy and
air force staffs contributing, under the
codename “Force 163,” a complete and
well laid out plan was soon evolving.
US Seventh Army was assigned
the lead role in the invasion. Lt. Gen.
Alexander Patch, available after a suc-
cessful corps command in the Pacific,
was chosen to lead it. His Dragoon force
had four primary groupings within it:
three US divisions, four Free French
divisions, some airborne and other
specialist units, and a hodgepodge of
in-country French partisans lumped
together under the title “French
Forces of the Interior” (FFI).
The three US divisions were all vet-
erans of the Italian campaign and would
operate under the command of VI Corps
headquarters, led by Anzio veteran Maj.
Gen. Lucius Truscott, one of the most
aggressive field commanders of the war.
His three divisions were: 3rd Infantry
(Maj. Gen. John E. O’Daniel), 36th
Infantry (Maj. Gen. John E. Dalquist),
and 45th Infantry (Maj. Gen. William W.
Eagles). The three units were standard
triangular organizations of three infantry
regiments, each with three battalions,
plus supporting reconnaissance and
artillery assets. In addition, each division
was assigned an independent tank
battalion and a tank destroyer battalion.
One significant departure from
normal organization was ordered
by Truscott prior to the invasion.
Though he had been assigned Combat
Command 1 (sometimes called CC
Sudre, for its commander Brig. Gen.
Sudre) from French 1st Division Blindee
(Armored), his discussions with the
French led him to believe he would lose
that asset to their control shortly after
landing. So he assigned his deputy corps
commander, Brig. Gen. Fred W. Butler,
to put together a provisional armored
group as soon as they were ashore.
The French divisions assigned to
Seventh Army for the invasion were
also part of the high-level strategic
debate. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, overall
leader of the Free French, and Gen.
Henri Giraud, commander-in-chief
of the non-Gaullist Free French forces
in North Africa, were ostensibly co-
leaders in the Comite Français de la
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 19
Liberation Nationale (Committee of
French National Liberation), what was
to become the de facto government
of the liberated portion of France.
De Gaulle, in order to further
secure his leadership status, pressured
everyone who would listen to him to
take part in the Anvil planning. It had
been Giraud, however, who negotiated
with Roosevelt for the equipment to
rearm French troops. Both therefore
agreed — reluctantly — to initially
subordinate their forces to Seventh Army,
organized into two corps with a total
of four divisions. Those units would
be under the subordinate command
of Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. His
infantry divisions were organized and
equipped like triangular US divisions,
except for the 1st, which used the British
brigade system for its subordinate
units. The French armored division
followed the newer “combat command”
organization used by US divisions
of that type and was fully equipped
with M4 Sherman medium tanks.
In addition to those primary
organizations, the French also attached
two tank destroyer regiments, armed
like their American cousins with
M10 tank destroyers, and three
Groupement de Tabors Marocains
(ethnic Moroccan mountain infantry).
A Moroccan group was essentially a
regiment made up of three battalions,
each with three companies.
To provide a further edge for the
invasion force, Force 163 planned to
use airborne troops to drop behind the
beaches to disrupt German movement
and block the reinforcement of their
beach defense. Under the command
of Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick, the
First Allied Airborne Task Force included
British 2nd Parachute Brigade — the
only British ground troops used in
Anvil/Dragoon — and the US 517th
Parachute Infantry Regiment, bolstered
by three additional battalions of para-
chute and glider troops and artillery.
In addition to that ad hoc airborne
division, several commando units
were to be use to secure the flanks
of the landing. They included 1st
Special Service Force, the French
African Commando Group, and a
small French Naval Assault Group.
The fourth part of the force was
the maquis of the FFI. Though lumped
together under the FFI umbrella,
below
An F6F-5 Hellcat of VF-74 being launched from the deck of USS Kasaan Bay (CVE-69)
during the invasion of southern France, Operation Anvil Dragoon, in August 1944.
20 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
the resistance was in reality a loose
collection of fragmented organiza-
tions, all generally at odds with each
other due to political or leadership
conflicts. Various resistance groups
included the Armee Secrete, made up
of Gaullist forces; the Franc Tireurs
et Partisans (FTP), led by the French
Communist Party; and the Organization
of Resistance de Armee (ORA), made
up of former Vichy regular troops.
Specifically, there were some 500
main force maquis, most from the
FTP, in the Drome Department, which
encompassed the area between the
Rhone River and the Italian border
where the invasion was planned, along
with some 1,500 sedentaires or part-time
fighters. Those partisans had compiled a
record of over 300 attacks during the 17
months prior to the invasion. Most were
sabotage efforts against infrastructure,
but they also had a psychological effect
on the lower-quality German troops
occupying the region. Heading up the
department were two former French
officers, codenamed L’Hermine and
LeGrand. Compounding the commu-
nication and command problems with
them was the fact maquis departments
were part of larger military regions,
each with their own commanders. The
military region R-1, headquartered
in Lyon, was run by two ORA men
codenamed Bayard and Faisceau.
Allied Air & Naval Forces
Naval support would came from
the Western Naval task Force, com-
manded by US Adm. Henry K. Hewitt,
who also commanded Eighth Fleet.
As they sailed for the beaches, Hewitt
had over 885 ships carrying 1,375
landing craft under his command.
For the naval part of the invasion, he
established four primary task forces.
• Task Force 84 (Alpha Force),
commanded by Rear Adm. Frank
J. Lowry aboard the Coast Guard
cutter Duane, was tasked with
delivering 3rd Infantry Division to
the beaches at Cavalaire (Alpha Red)
and Pampelonne (Alpha Yellow).
Fire support for Alpha came from
 HMS Ramilles and the French
battleship Lorraine, plus some
cruisers and destroyers. All totaled,
TF84 had 124 ships carrying almost
30,000 troops and 3,300 vehicles.
• Task Force 85 (Delta Force), com-
manded by US Rear Adm. Bertram
J. Rodgers aboard the amphibious
force command ship Biscayne, had
the job of putting ashore 45th Division
between Pointes des Sardinaux
and Pointe de la Garonne. US
battleships Texas and Nevada, along
with some US and French cruisers
and destroyers, provided support.
Rodger’s command had 135 ships for
31,000 troops and 3,400 vehicles.
• Task Force 87 (Camel Force), com-
manded by US Rear Adm. Spencer S.
Lewis aboard attack transport USS
Bayfield, had the difficult job of deliv-
ering 36th Division to the beaches in
the Golfe de Frejus and Rade d’Agay
at the mouth of the Argens River,
the most heavily defended portion
of the invasion sector. It was also
the most important, as the Argens
valley not only led directly into the
interior, it had the only port and
airfield in the immediate area at
Frejus. The battleship Arkansas and
supporting cruisers were the gun
line for direct fire. Lewis had 106
ships carrying the 30,000 troops
from 36th Division and the 4,600
men of Combat Command Sudre.
• Task Force 88, under Royal Navy
Rear Adm. Sir Thomas Troubridge,
contained nine escort carriers and
accompanying destroyers: USS
Tulagi and Kasaan Bay, and HMS
Khedive, Emperor, Searcher, Purser,
Attacker, Stalker and Hunter. The
escort carriers held 224 aircraft,
mostly Seafire and Hellcat fighters.
Air support was provided by US
Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville’s XII Tactical
Air Command, based in Corsica. It
included 12 squadrons of B-25s (57th
Bombardment Wing), four squadrons
of A-20s (47th Bombardment Wing),
21 fighter squadrons (15 P-47 and six
P-38), 11 squadrons of RAF Spitfires,
and four squadrons of Free French Air
Force pilots flying P-47s and Spitfires.
Thus some 2,100 aircraft flew in sup-
port from the island’s 14 airfields.
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 21
Final Plan
The plan that finally evolved was
a daylight assault by the three US
divisions. A massive five day air bom-
bardment (Operation Nutmeg) would
first target everything of military value
in the area: coastal defenses, airfields,
bridges, radar stations and rail lines.
Special forces and commando groups
were to be landed on the flanks of the
invasion to eliminate gun positions and
seal off those approaches. In particular,
1st Special Forces Group had the task
of securing the islands of Cros and
Levant, which had batteries that could
otherwise enfilade the landing sites.
The 5,500 paratroops would be
dropped predawn around the town of
Le Muy, with another 4,700 glider-borne
troops in follow-on waves, to seal off
the Argens valley and help take Frejus.
Finally, scheduled for 8:00 a.m. on 15
August, the three divisions of VI Corps
would land line-abreast along a 45 mile
stretch between Cavalarie-sur-Mer on
the left to Antheor Bay on the right.
Once the beachhead was established
the French would land and take the

German Order of Battle
19th Army
Gen. Friedrich Wiese
IV Luftwaffe Field Corps — Gen. Peterson
716th Infantry Division (in transit)
198th Infantry Division (–)
189th Reserve Division (–)
LXXXV Corps: Gen. Kniess
Elements, 198th Division
Elements, 198th Division
244th Infantry Division
LXII Corps — Gen. Neuring
242th Infantry Division
148th Infantry Division
19 Army Reserve
th
11th Panzer Division
157th Reserve Infantry Division
338th Infantry Division (in transit
Gen.
Friedrich
Wiese
22 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
lead in the drive west to Toulon and
Marseilles, the primary focus of the
whole operation. The Americans would
seal off any incursions from Italy, cover
the French right and move northwest
toward the Rhone River. Eventually
all units would strike north to contact
Allied forces pushing out of Normandy.
Truscott’s VI Corps expected to come
up against a German force of about 10
battalions, with 50 tanks and 14 self-
propelled guns supporting the 80-plus
coastal guns along the invasion site. By
the fourth day German resistance was
expected to rise to five full divisions,
including a full panzer division with 200
tanks. That quick reaction, something
Truscott had experienced at Anzio, led
him to prioritize the resupply of tank,
artillery and small arms ammunition
over that of gasoline for the vehicles.
That bias would have a major impact
on the way the battle evolved.
German Plans & Forces
The opposition would come from
German Army Group G, commanded
by Col. Gen. Johannes Blaskowitz, but
it would be a far different enemy than
the one they would’ve faced if Dragoon
had been launched when it had been
originally planned. Much of the army
group’s strength had been siphoned off
to help deal with the crisis in Normandy.
Army Group G consisted of two
armies. First Army, under Gen. der
Infantrie Kurt von der Chevallerie,
defended the Bay of Biscay shore
area. Nineteenth Army, under Gen.
der Infantrie Friedrich Wiese, had the
responsibility of defending the other
400 miles of Mediterranean coastline
stretching from Spain to Italy. Wiese had
three corps and about 10 divisions to
attempt that imposing task. Originally,
Wiese had been given 9th Panzer and
the 2nd SS (Das Reich) Panzer Divisions
as part of his mobile reserves, but
they’d long since been transferred to
Normandy. All he had left in that regard
was Gen. Wend von Wietersheim’s 11th
Panzer Division, a high quality unit,
but one at half strength in terms of
its equipage. Infantry had also been
degraded. Wiese had lost three good
units to the battle in the north. He had
two divisions regrouping after previous
losses, and one training division.
Providing support for the infantry
and armor were paltry naval and air
assets. Naval support was limited to
five destroyers, plus torpedo boats and
patrol craft at Marseilles and Toulon.
Air support consisted of 30 Me-109
fighters, 65 Ju-88 bombers and 30
Do-17 bombers. Overall the Luftwaffe
was outnumbered 20:1 in aircraft.
Wiese’s LXII Corps (Gen. der Infantrie
Ferdinand Neuring) would receive
the brunt of the invasion, with 244th
Infantry Division at Marseilles, 242nd
Infantry Division at Toulon, and 148th
Infantry Division covering the left
flank to the Italian border. West of the
Rhone were three incomplete infantry
divisions and 11th Panzer. Movement to
the invasion site would be hampered
by the destruction of the Rhone
bridges and other sabotage, compli-
ments of the French underground.
Landings
Before dawn on 15 August, the aerial
armada began dropping the Airborne
Task Force. Their goal was a concentrat-
ed insertion around the town of Le Muy.
Because of fog, however, the drop didn’t
go well, scattering paratroops over a
wide stretch. By dawn only about 60 per-
cent of the paratroopers had regrouped
near their targets. Two groups in par-
ticular didn’t land anywhere near where
they were supposed to have ended up.
Most of 3rd Battalion/517th landed 25
miles to the east. One company, A/509th,
landed south near the town St. Tropez,
where the enterprising paratroops
combined with the FFI’s Brigade des
Maures to attack that town, capturing a
good part of it. Despite the poor drop,
however, the paratroops accomplished
what they’d been intended to do: cut
off German communications and
block reinforcement, especially from
LXII Corps headquarters, located
seven miles northwest of Le Muy.
At 8:00 a.m. the beach landings
started. The 3rd Division’s goal was to
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 23
secure the St. Tropez peninsula on the
invasion’s left flank. The 7th Infantry
landed at Alpha Red Beach southwest
of St. Tropez, followed closely by 30th
Infantry. On Alpha Yellow, 15th Infantry
landed north of the peninsula. The
3/15th made contact with the paratroops
in St. Tropez and helped finish taking
it and clearing out the peninsula.
Against weak resistance put up by the
4th (Ost) Battalion/765th Grenadiers/148th
Division, Gen. O’Daniel’s troops
quickly pushed out and west.
The 45th Division’s landings in the
center went equally as well. Against the
765th’s 1st Battalion and one supporting
artillery battalion, the 157th Infantry
landed on Delta Red and Green Beaches
while Delta Blue and Yellow saw the
180th Infantry land. Both regiments
pushed out with little difficulty, not even
needing their brother 179th Regiment,
which landed later in reserve.
On the invasion’s flank things didn’t
go as well for 36th Division. One of their
assigned beaches, Camel Red, was
directly opposite an important goal
of Truscott’s: the small port of Frejus
and its airfield. His plan called for that
port to be in Allied hands by dark, so
equipment and supply could start
coming ashore. The problem, of course,
was the Germans were equally aware
of Frejus’s value to an invader, and
they had fortified the port. Three full
battalions defended the area, protected
by strong bunkers, minefields and wire
and supported by eight 88mm guns
of the 1038th Anti-Tank Battalion.
Truscott planned to have the 141st
and 143rd Regiments land east of the
town (Camel Green Beach) on D-Day
morning and take Frejus from the rear;
he’d then land the 142nd Infantry on
Camel Red at 2:00 p.m. the same day.
The initial landings went well,
but resistance then stalled the drive
toward Frejus. Despite everything
the Allies threw at the defenses at
Camel Red — including a massed B-24
bombing run that pounded the area
with 200 tons of explosives — German

Dramatis Personae

The Allies

Alexander Patch was born in Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on 23 November 1889, the son of a cavalry officer. Accepted
into West Point in 1909, he joined the infantry after graduation in 1913. During World War I he served as a
machinegun instructor. George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, appointed Patch, as a new brigadier general, to train
troops at Fort Bragg, Georgia. Early in 1942 Patch was sent to the Pacific to organize the defense of New Caledonia,
where he formed the Americal Division. In October of that year the Americal was sent to Guadalcanal to relieve the
1st Marine Division. Later, Patch led XIV Corps on that island as they swept off the Japanese in February 1943.
Marshall then assigned Patch as commander of Seventh Army, then beginning planning to invade southern
France. He led that army from the invasion through France and into southern Germany. He returned home in
August 1945 to command Fourth Army. He achieved the final rank of full general posthumously in 1954.

Lucian Truscott was born on 9 January 1895 in Chatfield, Texas. He joined the army in 1917 and spent the
years between the World Wars in various undistinguished assignments. In 1942, as a colonel, he developed
a commando unit that later became 1st Ranger Battalion and achieved fame under William Darby.
In November 1942, by then a major general, Truscott led infantry and armor ashore in Morocco
under George Patton. He took command of 3rd Infantry Division in April 1943, as it prepared for the inva-
sion of Sicily. On Sicily his division gained fame and reputation as a top unit in Seventh Army.
In January 1944, Truscott led the 3rd ashore at Anzio, where he assumed command of VI Corps after the battle
bogged down. He led the corps in Italy before the unit was tapped for the invasion of southern France. That October
his achievements were rewarded with a promotion to lieutenant general and command of Fifth Army back in Italy,
which he led until the end of the war. He was promoted to full general by Congress in 1954 and died in 1965.

Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was born on 2 February 1889 in Mouilleron-en-Pareds. He

graduated from the Saint-Cyr Military Academy in 1911 and fought in World War I, where
he was twice wounded. He headed the French War College in the 1930s.
At the start of the Second World War he commanded 14th Infantry Division. After the armistice he commanded
Vichy troops in Tunisia until his arrest and conviction for secretly organizing anti-German forces. Escaping
prison, he fled to Algiers and was given command of French forces being organized for the Anvil-Dragoon
invasion. In September, following the termination of Anvil-Dragoon, his army was redesignated French First
Army, which he then led in the Vosges campaign. There he destroyed the Colmar Pocket, and successfully
defended Strasbourg during the German Northwind counteroffensive in January 1945. Following that defense
he led the French into Germany and Austria. He was France’s representative at Germany’s surrender in May.
After the war he became the chief of staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
later served as its military attaché in South America. Finally, in 1951, he commanded the French forces in Indochina against
the Viet Minh. He died of cancer in 1952, and France made him a Marechal de France following his death.

The Germans

Friedrich Wiese was born in 1892. He was a war volunteer in August 1914, and was commissioned a
lieutenant in 1915. Following the 1918 armistice, he served as a policeman in Hamburg until recalled to the
army in 1935. When the war broke out he commanded an infantry battalion as a lieutenant colonel, serving
in France. On the eastern front he rose in rank to lead the 39th infantry Regiment, then the 26th Infantry
Division, and finally XXV Corps. He earned a reputation for tactical skill during multiple crises. When he
was given command of Nineteenth Army in France, his initial orders were similar to those he’d heard
more than once in Russia: no withdrawal and defend to the last man. He led the army through December
1944, when he was sacked on the insistence of Heinrich Himmler. He died of old age in 1972.  ★

24 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

fire didn’t slacken. With the 142nd in ULTRA intercepts, made certain Patch Cavalry Squadron, 2nd Battalion/143rd
their boats, Task Force 87 commander and Truscott learned about the orders Infantry, two companies from the 753rd
Rear Adm. Lewis — unable to contact almost as soon as the German com- Tank Battalion, the 59th Self-Propelled
the 36th Division’s commander — made manders. The German withdrawal, as Artillery Battalion and one company
the choice to divert the 142nd to Camel well as the relative ease of the battle thus of the 636th tank Destroyer Battalion.
Green. Truscott, on hand to witness far, made Patch accelerate the campaign. Assembled at Le Muy, the 3,000-man
the afternoon landing (and curiously He had the French reinforcements force attacked north on 18 August
out of touch with Lewis and everyone begin landing, some six days ahead of with orders to cross the Durance River
else in the chain of command), was schedule. In Patch’s Field Order #2, he and move toward Grenoble. Their
furious at the diversion, and he became called on the French to take the ports objectives were Digne and Sisteron.
even more so when he later learned and Truscott to push to the Rhone. With TF Butler had the help of the
Gen. Dalquist had congratulated that the campaign began to develop on local FFI. Those guerrilla fighters
Lewis for the decision. In his memoirs, two parallel paths: the American drive provided good intelligence on enemy
Command Missions, he would write: north and the French drive to the ports. movement and, more importantly,
“It was in my opinion a grave error interdicted that movement. Butler
which merited a reprimand at least, The Americans created some friction with them by
and most certainly no congratulation.” ignoring their tactical requests: every
In the event the change delayed Truscott had expected a major FFI unit wanted its particular town
the capture of Frejus by a day, which in fight west toward the ports; however, liberated. His troop B/117 easily took
the long run had little effect. Had the with the knowledge the Germans were Digne and, by evening of the following
142nd tried to land in the teeth of those withdrawing, he started modifying his day, Butler pushed into Sisteron.
German defenses, Truscott could’ve plans. Rather than bludgeon his way Unfortunately, the message Truscott
easily lost most of the regiment. By west he decided to try to block the sent Butler that night to hold up at
nightfall of D-Day almost all of the major highway heading north, the N-7, Sisteron and await more 36th Division
invasion divisions were expanding and thus trap the retreating Germans. units didn’t reach that task force
outward well ahead of their schedules. To do that he used the ad hoc commander. Butler continued north,
armored unit he’d ordered set up prior sending teams to Gap, where they
Expansion to the battle. Task Force Butler was a captured nearly 1,000 prisoners, and
brigade-sized force consisting of 117th into the Criox Haute Pass to block any
After the landings Truscott pushed
out his troops, with the emphasis
generally west, with an eye toward
isolating Toulon and Marseille. The
3rd Division moved toward the Real
Martin and Gapean Rivers, while the
45th Division, on its right, moved more
northwest. The 36th was to relieve the
airborne and then move north.
The Germans, having failed to
stop the invasion at the water’s edge,
struggled to form a defensive line. Out
of touch with LXII Corps, LXXXV Corps
commander Gen. Weiss was given the
responsibility of establishing the inland
defense. The first line he tried to set up
failed, as the fast-moving Americans
captured Brignoles and Barjul ahead
of his reinforcing troops. He then had
them fall back toward the Rhone River,
over which 11th Panzer Division was
crossing to reach the battlefield.
As the battle flowed forward,
a major change occurred. Under
heavy pressure from the breakout in
Normandy, which was threatening to
cut off dozens of German divisions at
Falaise, Hitler finally agreed to let them
withdraw. On 17 August his orders
called for: 1) the construction of a
defensive line from Sens through Dijon
to the Swiss border; 2) most forces in
southern France were to withdraw to
that line; but 3) Marseille and Toulon
were to be held to the last man.
Bletchley Park, source of those

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 25

southern movement against him. By
the time Truscott finally reached him
with new orders to head west, Butler’s
command was scattered and starting to
run short of supplies. The combat load
structure that had prioritized ammuni-
tion over gasoline was having its impact.
Nonetheless, after spending most of the
night calling back troops, Butler headed
west and reached Crest by the evening
of the 21st. His arrival there sparked an
eight-day battle for an area that became
known as the Montelimar Battle Square.
The next day he sent troops directly
west, down both sides of the Drome
River at the top of the square, and more
troops southwest toward Montelimar,
taking Marsanne and Puy St. Martin.
He got some tanks and troops into
the Condillac Pass near the N-7 route
north, and he put down some direct
and indirect fire on that road. Though
supply issues limited his ability to
stop the flow of Germans north on the
N-7, the limited success he had sent
a clear message to the enemy: their
withdrawal route was in jeopardy.
As Butler was awaiting both
reinforcements and resupply, 11th
Panzer’s reconnaissance battalion
pushed northeast out of Montelimar
and struck the US outposts at Sauzet.
While Butler was reacting to that,
another battalion moved through the
American left and retook Puy St. Martin.
Its capture threatened a counter-
cut-off of Butler’s whole task force.
Gen. Dalquist found himself in
a quandary, with his 36th Division
scattered. He had his 143rd Regiment
already moving on Grenoble (liberated
the afternoon of 21 August), the 142nd
assigned to cover his rear at Gap, and the
141st earmarked for Butler’s reinforce-
ment. Intelligence, however, told him
the German 157th Infantry Division was
poised to come down from the north
while 11th Panzer was still concentrated
south of the Durance River. While he was
sorting his dispositions, Truscott arrived,
angry the 36th wasn’t tightly aimed at
Montelimar. He left Dalquist with spe-
cific orders, telling him: “The primary
mission of the 36th Infantry Division
is to block the Rhone Valley in the gap
immediately north of Montelimar.”
By the 23rd, Dalquist had ordered
the 143rd to move south from Grenoble
toward Valence and the northwest cor-
ner of the square; however, indecision in
that regiment’s command then delayed
that move. The 142nd moved out of
Nyons to cover the increasingly vulner-
able US southern flank. An initial thrust
out of Sauzet toward Montelimar was
thrown back, but by the evening of the
24th infantry patrols had reached the all-
important N-7 road. Dalquist reported
to Truscott he had troops on the road;
his commander interpreted that to
mean the road was closed; apparently
that’s what Dalquist thought as well.
At the same time Dalquist was
reporting his seeming success, the
Germans were reading his disposition
orders for the division, compliments of a
man Dalquist later described as a “very
stupid liaison officer,” who’d lost them
at a roadblock. Wiese used that informa-
tion to plan a 25 August counterattack,
boldly splitting his meager force into six
separate Kampfgruppen (battlegroups).
• KG Hax, consisting of two panzer
grenadier battalions and two
Luftwaffe infantry battalions, was to
clear Hill 300 directly east of the road.
• KG Wilde, consisting of one panzer
grenadier battalion, would secure
the town of La Concourde.
• KG Theime, consisting of one panzer
grenadier battalion and one replace-
ment battalion, was to assemble at
Loriol, in the northwest corner of
the box, and push east from there.
• The 11th Panzer Reconnaissance
Battalion would again go for
Puy St. Marin in the center.
• The 305th Regiment of the
198th Infantry Division was to
take and hold Condillac Pass,
a direct route to the N-7.
• The 326th Regiment was to
cross the Roubicon River in
the south and push north.
Wiese’s goal was to isolate all the
US units near his evacuation route and
then push them away from it. His plan,
however, was too complex and diverse
to be fully successful. KG Theime was the

D-class light cruiser HMS Delhi in 1942. She was launched in

1918 but shown here as an AA cruiser after refitting in 1941 at
New York with 5-5in dual purpose guns. “Delhi” was part of the
predominately British escort carrier force providing air cover and
support during the US/French South of France landings.

26 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

only force to make substantial progress;
most of the rest were delayed due to the
Germans’ own growing lack of supply
and the increasing disorganization
inherent in their overall situation. The
attacks in the south were repulsed by
heavy artillery fire, but they did succeed
in making Dalquist’s mindset more
defensive. For example, portions of
Butler’s task force counterattacked KG
Theime back toward the Rhone, but
there they stopped and went back onto
the defensive, content to simply set
up roadblocks in worried anticipation
of the Germans attacking again.
The 36th’s only offensive action
finally saw a substantial force — two
infantry companies supported by four
tanks and seven M-10 tank destroy-
ers — completely block the N-7. Even
so, that block only lasted a few hours
until an armor-and-infantry force from
11th Panzer hit it at midnight, destroying
nine of 11 US vehicles and sending
the infantry retreating into the hills.
Truscott then ordered 3rd Infantry
Division to drive toward Montelimar
from the south; essentially, though, the
battle over the German evacuation was
already winding down. Truscott nearly
relieved Dalquist over what he termed
that fight’s “disappointing results.”
The battle only netted 5,800 prisoners
while causing 2,100 German casualties,
at a cost of 1,500 US casualties. Those
numbers weren’t bad in themselves,
but the larger meaning behind them
was most of a German army had gotten
away to reconstitute and fight again.
and to push west toward Marseilles. The
French attacked on August 20 (D+5).
Toulon had a German gar-
rison of some 18,000, including 8,300
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe troops,
under the command of Rear Adm.
Heinrich Ruhfus. Strongly fortified
against a sea attack, it was less ready
to repulse a landward assault. Most
of the city fell to the 9th DIC and
1st DFL by August 26, and Ruhfus
surrendered the rest two days later.
Toulon’s capture came a week ahead
of the original Allied schedule; it had
cost some 2,700 French casualties
and bagged nearly 17,000 prisoners.
Marseille was equally unprepared
for a landward assault. Defended by
13,000 troops and led by the 244th
Infantry Division’s commander, Maj.
Gen. Hans Schaeffer, his plans were
disrupted by a civil uprising, encouraged
by the FFI, on 22 August. Expecting
to be attacked only after Toulon had
fallen, Schaeffer was unprepared
when Monsabert bypassed the suburb
strongpoint of Aubagne and penetrated
into the city with the 7th Regiment de
Tirailleurs Algeriens from 3rd DIA early
on 23 August. Four days later, Schaeffer
surrendered the city. At a cost of 1,800
casualties the French had captured
the port a month before pre-invasion
plans had envisioned that taking place.
Engineers started working on both
ports to make them ready to receive
shipping. The task was enormous, as
the Germans had carried out significant
destruction before surrendering: over
200 ships had been sunk to obstruct the
ports; mines had been laid and cranes
and landing quays destroyed. Even so,
the first Allied supply ship tied up on
15 September. Together the two ports
were soon ramped up to provide a total
of 18,000 tons of supplies per day for
the ongoing European campaign.
Further Pursuit
Following the battles around
Montelimar, Truscott pushed north
the 45th Division, trying to maneuver
around and in front of the Germans
and again cut off their withdrawal.
At times that maneuvering left US
troops overextended. The 11th Panzer
counterattacked again on 2 September,
slipping through the fragmented divi-
sion to fall on two isolated companies
of the 179th Regiment at Meximieux.
Only hard fighting by the infantry and
rear area troops drove off the Germans.
Though the Germans reported they’d

The French

While the Americans were battling

to trap the Germans moving north,
the French were operating so as to
take Toulon and Marseilles. As the
campaign had accelerated, de Lattre’s
II Corps was landed well ahead of
schedule. Their original plan was
discarded for a bolder approach.
The French reorganized themselves
into two groups. The first, under Lt.
Gen. Edgar de Larminat, chief of staff
of the Foreign Legion, consisted of the
1st DFL, 9th DIC, and the 2nd Regiment
de Chasseurs. Their goal was to take
Toulon from the east and northeast. The
second group, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Aime de Goislard de Monsabert, was
composed of his own 3rd DIA, the tank
destroyers of 7th Regiment de Chasseurs
d’Afrique, and the three Groupment de
Tabors Marocains. His mission was to
cut off Toulon from the north, send a
flanking force to attack from the west,

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 27

“destroyed a regiment,” casualties
weren’t actually that bad. The next day,
however, the 11th Panzer’s reconnais-
sance battalion caught two troops of the
117th Cavalry at Montreval and virtually
eliminated them. Truscott dismissed
that defeat, saying those units “had
been careless.” It had been his orders,
however, which pitted over-extended
armored cars and jeeps against tanks in
a renewed effort to cut off the Germans.
Patch reorganized on 3 September,
authorizing de Lattre, fresh from his
triumph at the ports, to form French
Army B (soon afterward renamed
1st French Army). De Lattre’s I Corps,
consisting of the 3rd DIA and 9th DIC,
under Lt. Gen. Emile Bethouart, then
moved north on Truscott’s right. French
II Corps, consisting of the 1st Division
Blindee and 1st DFL under de Monsabert,
stayed west of the Rhone on Truscott’s
left. Patch’s Seventh Army, with only VI
Corps under its direct control, continued
its drive north toward the Belford
Gap, gateway to southern Germany.
Ahead of them the Germans
tried hard to create solid lines of
defense, but the disorganization
of the withdrawal kept them from
doing much more than launching
a few counterattacks. In one such,
however, they caught the 4th Tunisian
Tirailleurs of the 3rd DIA at Baume-
les-dames and savaged them badly.
On 11 September an armored
patrol from French II Corps made
contact with Patton’s Third Army
north of Dijon, and three days later
Patch’s Seventh Army and de Lattres’
French Army B became part of Sixth
Army Group under Elsenhower’s
SHAEF headquarters. Operation
Anvil-Dragoon was officially ended.
28 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
Assessment Sources
Breuer, William, B. Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion
Operation Anvil-Dragoon was of the South of France. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987.
Churchill, Winston. The Second World War:
a victory for the Allies in terms of Triumph and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953.
operational results. The invasion force Clarke, Jeffrey J. & Robert Ross Smith. Riviera to the Rhine.
The United States Army in World War II:
moved some 300 miles north in 26 days, European Theater of Operations.
causing 143,000 German casualties Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993.
Ehrman, John. Grand Strategy: Vol. V, August 1943–
and capturing two key ports far ahead September 1944. London: HMSO, 1956.
of the planned schedule. Fleeing Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948.
German divisions ended the operation Funk, Arthur Layton. Hidden Ally: The French Resistance,
averaging only about 30 percent of their Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern
France, 1944. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.
authorized strengths. The cost to the Hinsley, F. H. British Intelligence in the Second World War:
Allies was only 4,500 battle casualties. It’s influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. Three,
Part II. London: HMSO, 1988.
Significantly, there were more non-battle Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States and the
casualties: another 5,200 troops. Mediterranean War, 1942–44.
Oxford, UK: St. Anthony’s College, 1996.
Opening the ports, the primary goal de Lattre de Tassigny, Jean.
of the final plan, had succeeded and, The History of the French First Army.
London: George Alien & Unwin, Ltd, 1952.
once the French railroads were repaired, Lockhart, Vincent M.
they provided significant supply for T-Patch to Victory: The 36th Infantry Division from the
Landings in Southern France to the End of World War II.
the coming battle for Germany. Canyon, TX: Staked Plains Press, 1981.
It’s often been argued, though, the Matloff, Maurice. “The Anvil Decision: Crossroads of
Strategy (1944),” from Command Decisions.
initial reason for the invasion — sup- New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959.
porting Overlord and the campaign in Mitcham, Samual W. Jr. Retreat to the Reich: The German
Defeat in France, 1944. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.
northern France — had been overtaken Steidl, Franz. Lost Battalions: Going for Broke in the Vosges,
by events. The breakthrough by the Autumn, 1944. Presidio, 2001.
Tomlin, Barbara Brooks. With Utmost Spirit: Allied
Americans during Operation Cobra (31 Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942–1945.
July), and the near-miss pocket at Falaise Lexington, KY: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2006.
Truscott, L.K., Jr. Command Missions: A Personal Story.
(14 August), actually contributed more New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1954.
to the second invasion’s success than Wilt, Alan F. The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944.
Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1981.
Anvil-Dragoon did to the first invasion’s
success. Whether Anvil-Dragoon
should’ve finally been launched
has therefore remained a debated
question among military historians.
Eisenhower was certainly satisfied
with it at the time and after, saying
“there was no development of that peri-
od which added more decisively to our
advantages or aided us more in accom-
plishing the final and complete defeat
of German forces than this secondary
attack coming up the Rhone Valley.”
Churchill saw it differently, writing:
“The army of Italy was deprived of its
opportunity to strike a most formidable
blow at the Germans and very possibly
reach Vienna before the Russians, with
all that might have followed there from.”
His comments capture the essence of
much of the criticism of the operation:
that it didn’t take into account geo-strat-
egy for the postwar era. An earlier Allied
arrival in the Danube valley certainly
could’ve provided the basis for a further
limitation on the postwar Soviet sphere
of influence in Central Europe. At
the same time, there’s no doubt the
Germans feared a continued full-blood-
ed thrust in Italy more than a second
landing in France. Keeping the Anvil-
Dragoon force in Italy could’ve led to the
much earlier decisive defeat of German
forces there, rather than merely pushing
some more of them back in France.  ✪
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30 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
 Introducing the Decision Games
Folio Game Series
The Folio Game Series provides dozens of games using the same eight-page Standard rules
(Musket & Saber for 19th century battles, Fire & Movement for WWII and modern battles) with a short
Exclusive rules sheet for each individual game to capture the unique aspects of each battle. Each game can
be played in about 90 minutes allowing for multiple games to be played in an afternoon or evening.

Chalons: The Fate of Europe | Marengo: Morning Defeat, Afternoon Victory

Leipzig: Napoleon Encircled | Chickamauga: River of Death | Stones River: Turning Point in Tennessee
Frayser’s Farm: Wasted Opportunity | Shiloh: Grant Surprised | Arnhem: The Farthest Bridge
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Cauldron: Battle for Gazala | Kasserine: Baptism of Fire | Saipan: Conquest of the Marianas
RELEASES
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Showdown: The Coming Indo-Pakistani War

CRUSAD
ER
WORLD W
Battle for To AR II BATT
bruk LES
The port-town
of Tobruk was FOLIO GA
Libya. The Axis
had been besie
the key to
ME SERI
since April 1941
Allies back into
, threatening
ging it
to push the
ES
Egypt. The Afrika
commanded korps,
by Irwin Rom
defeated the mel, had alrea
Allies’ previous dy
relieve Tobruk, attempt to
Operation Battl
new, surprise eaxe, but a

Crusader
Allied offensive
1941, Operation in November
Crusader, woul
into one of the d evolve
most chaotic
battles of the and
entire North Afric near- run
an campaign.
Crusader utilize
s the new Fire
combat syste & Movement
m that’s desig
players can augm ned so
ent their units
“support fire”
durin
battle. From mort g the course of the
with
Battle for Tobr
can receive supp
enemy positions
ars to tanks,
ort assets to
units
engage
uk
and formation
combat to deve s, allowing
lop at all levels
recon battalion, . A single
for example —
supported by perhaps
air cover — could
to assault a lone be
enemy infantry tasked
defending a key regiment
hilltop. As that
underway, the attack gets
recon battalion
itself under the may find
guns of enem
So more supp y artillery.
ort fire will be
to take the hill, necessary
but assets are
limited.
In Crusader, the
attritional desig
new Combat n of the
Results Table
true nature of simu
battles in North lates the
are typically two- Africa. Units
sided formation
can incur casu
alties, accurately s that
the realities of replicating
combat and the
losses sustained high
by both sides
actual fighting during the
around Tobru
the battle is thus k. Winn
a matter of mane ing
firepower and
asset manageme uver,
nt.

Game Conten
ts:
• 17 x 22” (43 x 56
cm) terrain map
• 100 die-cut coun
ters
• One Standard
Rules booklet
• One Exclusive for this series
Rules booklet
for this title

Crusader
PLAYERS
2

LEVEL II III X XX XXX

BATTALION
HEX SCALE
2 mi (3.2 km)
PLAYING TIME
Each counter repres
ents 1-2 hrs
formation from among an individual historical
and Commonwea the German, Italian
lth forces that fough , British COMPLEXITY
including armor t for Tobruk, •••••
regiments, anti-ta LOW
1614 infantry brigades,
recon elements,
nk battalions,
Minutes to lea
and more. SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. Quick to pla
HIGH
y. Historicall
A FOLIO SERIES
A product of
GAME
Decision Games
y Accurate.
Copyright © ,
2010. All Rights Inc.
Reserved.

1/3rd Actual Size Copyright ©

2010, Decisio
n Games, Inc.
www.decision
All Rights Reserve
d. Made & Printed
games.com in U.S.A.

Each game under $25 (most under $20)

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
32 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
 US Navy’s Yangtze
The
River Patrol, 1937–41
I
n 1937 Shanghai was the
commercial center of China, a
bustling metropolis of 3 million that
dominated the country economically.
Half of China’s international trade
was cleared through the city, in part
because of its strategic location on the
Whangpoo (Huangpu), a tributary of the
Yangtze River. The Yangtze was an artery
for trade, a waterway that reached over
3,000 miles into the vast hinterland.
Shanghai was called the “Paris of
the Orient,” as well as the “Sodom and
Gomorrah of the Orient,” and both
descriptions were accurate. The phrase
“the best of times, the worst of times”
wasn’t a high-flown literary cliché on
its crowded streets, but a day-to-day
reality. The Shanghainese liked Western
culture, which they associated with
modernity. There were more skyscrapers
in Shanghai than any other place except
Manhattan; its showcase buildings,
like the art deco Cathay Hotel, catered
to rich businessmen and Hollywood
celebrities like Charlie Chaplin.
At the same time Shanghai
was a wide-open “sin city,” where
crime flourished and vice was
widespread. Beggars swarmed the
streets; prostitution flourished and
criminal gangs controlled the opium
trade, a drug that could be ordered
via room service in many hotels. A
Chinese journalist once commented
Shanghai was a city of “48 storey
skyscrapers built on 24 layers of hell.”
The corrupt Qing (Manchu) dynasty
had been overthrown in 1911, and a
USS Oahu
by Eric Niderost
Chinese Republic established by Sun
Yat-Sen. Hopes for a peaceful and
democratic China were soon dashed,
though, and within a short time the
country dissolved into chaos. Sun
died in 1925, but his Kuomintang
(Nationalist) Party soon found a leader
in military strongman Generalissimo
Chiang Kai Shek (Jiang Jieshi).
Chang was in turn beset by
a host of internal and external
problems. Warlords, each with their
own private army, established petty
fiefdoms throughout the nation. The
Communists under Mao Zedong
agitated for power and periodically
fought Chang for control. Nearby
Japan, modern and aggressively
militaristic, waited for a chance to
subjugate its war-torn neighbor.
Enter the US
It was against that backdrop of
war and revolution the vessels of the
US Navy’s Yangtze River Patrol plied
the muddy waters of the great river
in the 1930s. The Patrol dated to the
mid-19th century, when China was
forced to open its ports to foreign
trade after its disastrous defeat at
the hands of Great Britain in the
First Opium War (1839-1842).
Shanghai was one such treaty
port, where US businessmen
and missionaries were allowed
to settle under the protection of
American, not Chinese, law. That
was “extraterritoriality,” a concept
USS Panay
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 33
much resented by the Chinese. They
also had to permit the presence
of foreign troops on their soil and
foreign warships sailing the Yangtze.
The first Yangtze patrol ship
arrived in 1854, when the steamer USS
Susquehanna nosed her way up the
great waterway. In the early years of the
20th century, then, otherwise antiquated
gunboats like the USS Villalobos and
Elcano were the backbone of the
patrol. Those vessels were spoils of war,
captured from the Spanish during the
war of 1898. They made a poor showing,
being badly ventilated, unbearably
hot in summer, under-gunned and
underpowered. In spite of those obvious
shortcomings, though, they labored
on the Yangtze for a quarter-century.
The China market looked ever
more tempting, but any increase in
business also necessitated increased
protection. So in 1913 the USS
Monocacy and Palos were purpose-built
at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard
near Vallejo, California. They were
then disassembled, transported
and rebuilt in Shanghai. They were
the first US warships constructed
specifically for service in China.
After World War I, as commerce
continued to grow, it was seen there
was a need for even newer and better
warships on the river. In 1917 the first
Standard Oil tanker reached Chungking,
1,300 miles from the coast. The Robert
Dollar Line and the America West China
Company began cargo and passenger
service up and down the broad river.
 The trouble was China was growing International Settlement his Nationalist Party, there was fear
more unstable, and it was clear the his soldiers might harm the foreign
central government could do little to The International Settlement within residents in Shanghai. President Calvin
halt depredations by warlords and Shanghai was governed by a 14-member Coolidge therefore dispatched the 4th
bandit gangs. Ships were being stopped Municipal Council composed largely Marines to Shanghai, a “temporary”
along the river and their cargoes, of Anglo-American businessmen assignment that was to last until 1941.
passengers and crew robbed. Sometimes along with a few of their Japanese In the 1930s Shanghai was a dream
foreigners would be taken and held and Chinese counterparts. Though duty station for US Marines and sailors.
for ransom. Reflecting their growing not a colony — it was technically still There were all kinds of diversions
responsibilities, the US navy gunboats Chinese soil — the city was dominated for the off-duty leatherneck or river
in China were formally reorganized by British institutions and traditions. rat — entertainments that ran the gamut
as the Yangtze River Patrol in 1922 The settlement was small: 8.73 from Sunday concerts in the park to
In 1927 six newer vessels were square miles or 5,583 acres. In a sense it bloody barroom brawls. There were
constructed, all capable of reaching was even smaller than it was on paper many bars and clubs, some respectable
Chungking in high water. The Luzon and because its Honkew (Hongkou) District, and some not so respectable, where a
Mindanao were the largest, the Oahu just across Soochow (Suzhou) Creek, serviceman could meet beautiful White
and Panay were next is size, and the was so heavily Japanese it was called Russian or Chinese women dressed
Tutuila and Guam (later renamed Wake) “Little Tokyo.” The adjoining French in form-fitting silk dresses with skirts
were the smallest. The Panay, PR-5, Settlement was even smaller, about four provocatively split to reveal shapely legs.
could be considered a typical member square miles. The French usually stayed Best of all, an ordinary Marine
of the new force. She was 191 feet long aloof from the rest of the settlement, or sailor could live like a king in
and 29 feet at the beam. Armament and after France fell to the Nazis in Shanghai, even with their meager
consisted of two 3-inch deck guns, 1940 its government declared for Vichy monthly salaries. Chinese labor was
fore and aft, and eight 30 caliber Lewis and was friendly to the Japanese. cheap and plentiful. The USS Guam’s
machineguns. The machineguns were When Chiang Kai Shek began compliment of 50 sailors, for example,
mounted amidships, port and starboard. his campaign to unify China under paid five Chinese “boatmen” to do all
the onboard dirty work. In addition,
“mess coolies” provided shined shoes
and pressed pants, while serving all the
The Asiatic Fleet food the crew could eat in the galley.
On shore it was much the same. In
Though the Yangtze River Patrol became famous, it was really just a small part the Marine barracks each squad (16
of a larger organization, the US Asiatic Fleet. In 1941 that fleet was America’s first men) had a “boy” servant to do routine
line of defense against Japanese aggression. Unfortunately, due to larger strategic tasks. Those “boys” (usually adult
considerations, it was also neglected, the USN’s “stepchild” that had to make do men), made beds, washed the laundry,
with antiquated ships and equipment. When Adm. Thomas C. Hart took command shined shoes and did general cleaning.
on 25 July 1939, he faced a deteriorating situation with resolution and courage. The Fourth Marines Club, which
Sadly, courage alone couldn’t compensate for his fleet’s glaring deficiencies. opened in 1938, was without doubt the
The Asiatic Fleet had one heavy and two light cruisers, 13 destroyers and their most opulent enlisted men’s club in
tenders, 23 large fleet-type and six small S-type submarines, three submarine the world. There was a noncoms’ bar,
tenders, two tankers, six motor torpedo boats, and six minesweepers along a privates’ bar, a three-lane bowling
with a grab-bag of coastal and river gunboats, yachts and shipyard craft alley, billiards, a gymnasium, a library,
A mere listing of vessels doesn’t fully convey the fleet’s myriad problems. The a restaurant, a movie theater and a
destroyers, for example, were World War I-vintage four-stackers. Most had been built ballroom, along with dining and private
in 1917 and 1918, causing Hart to quip they were “old enough to vote.” The admiral rooms. The building still stands today.
did have 23 modern fleet submarines, but they had a hidden problem that was going
to bedevil the silent service until mid-1943: defective exploders on their torpedoes. Sino-Japanese War
During the 1930s the Asiatic Fleet had been made a victim of an isolationist
Congress, which was too preoccupied with the economic depression to give In 1931 elements within the
attention to national defense. For instance, the flagship Houston was the fleet’s Japanese Army in China staged an
only heavy cruiser. She was a once-magnificent ship that had carried President incident that gave them the pretext
Roosevelt on several occasions; however, she had no radar and was badly in need to invade and conquer Manchuria,
of updating in many ways. At the last minute, only a few days before Pearl Harbor, China’s northernmost province. In
multi-barreled “pom-pom” anti-aircraft guns were installed, but it was a rush job. 1932 fighting broke out between the
There were even more problems. The 5-inch gun ammunition was discovered to be Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai,
defective. When the Houston did see action, as much as 70 per cent of it 5-inch shells but a truce was soon brokered
failed to explode. Its battery of 8-inch guns hadn’t been fired in a year, and requests within the city. In 1937 the Japanese
for live-ammunition drill during that time had been refused as being “too costly.” advanced again, taking Peking (Beijing)
Yet that was the fleet that had to be the first to fight an Imperial Japanese Navy that and much of northern China.
had available: 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, That was a challenge Chiang Kai
113 destroyers and 63 submarines. The Asiatic Fleet was — predictably — destroyed Shek couldn’t ignore. He decided to
in the early months of the war, but its 8,000 officers and men gave the Free World make his move in Shanghai, where
an unflinching example of devotion to duty under impossible conditions.  ★ the presence of the large foreign
community would insure the fighting
would be covered by the European and

34 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

American press. On paper the Chinese
had some 1.7 million men under
arms, but only around 300,000 were
equipped and trained for modern war.
Chang poured his best troops
into Shanghai, including the elite
87th and 88th Divisions, which were
German-trained. His intention was
to show the world, as well as the rest
of China, that his often-despised
army could fight. At the same time, he
hoped, if the Chinese put up a good
showing, the British or Americans would
intervene politically on their behalf.
Fighting began on 13 August
1937. As soon as hostilities started,
the Marines and other foreign units
took up defensive positions to
guard the International Settlement.
Reinforcements were rushed in,
including the 6th Marines.
Part of the Marine sector bordered
Soochow (Suzhou) Creek, a meandering
stream that flowed into the Whangpoo
(Huangpu). Soochow Creek became a
defensive moat separating the neutral
settlement from the fighting. The heavy
cruiser USS Augusta, flagship of the
Asiatic Fleet, was put on station just
off Shanghai’s “Bund” (waterfront).
On 20 August a Chinese or Japanese
shell landed near the Augusta, close
by a group of sailors watching a
movie outside on the well deck. The
blast scattered shrapnel far and wide,
injuring 18 and killing Seaman Freddie
J. Falgout. In a sense, then, Falgout,
a 21-year-old Louisiana native, was
America’s first World War II casualty.
The Chinese held their positions
within Shanghai for three months,
inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
Unfortunately, that resistance came
at a heavy price: China’s best divisions
were bled white. When a Japanese
thrust turned their flank, the Chinese
were forced to abandon Shanghai.
Panay Incident
The fighting continued outside the
city, with the Chinese slowly giving
ground to what had begun to seem an
inexorable Japanese advance. When
the Japanese approached Nanking
(Nanjing), then capital of China,
the US Embassy was advised by the
Chinese government to evacuate its
staff. Accordingly, Ambassador Nelson
Johnson and most of his staff left for
Hankow aboard the Luzon. The USS
Panay stayed on as a last-minute refuge,
not only for Second Secretary George
Atcheson, Jr., and the skeleton staff who
remained, but also for any American
citizens or other foreign nationals.
When the city was about to fall,
Panay finally left Nanking. Besides
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 35
embassy staff, there were a few
businessmen and journalists aboard.
Italian journalist Sandro Sandri, London
Times Far East Correspondent Colin
McDonald, and Universal Newsreel
cameraman Norman Alley were among
those sheltering on the Panay.
On Sunday, 12 December 1937,
the Panay was suddenly attacked
by Japanese planes from the 12th
and 13th Air Groups. Her skipper, Lt.
Commander James J. Hughes, was
severely wounded by the first bomb hit,
and the pilothouse was a shambles
The Panay’s executive officer,
A. F. Anders, was made speechless
because of a shrapnel wound in his
throat. Undeterred, he wrote orders
on the bulkhead, daubed in blood.
Panay’s 3-inch guns were soon out
of action, the forward one wrecked by
that first hit. The vessel’s main defense
became the 30-caliber machineguns
amidships. Unfortunately they were
mounted with shore fire in mind, not
air attack, and were hard to elevate.
It was clear to all it was a deliberate
attack, since the Japanese flew in low
and the gunboat had several large
American flags on display. There
has ever since remained the idea
ultranationalist fanatics within the
Japanese Army in China wanted to
provoke war with the US at that time.
 The Panay sank, though the
survivors managed to reach shore in
time. As they abandoned ship they
were strafed by Japanese planes. For
the next three days they hid in and
wandered through Chinese swamps,
not sure if the Japanese were going to
hunt them down. They were finally
rescued, and a quick and profuse
apology from Tokyo, coupled with
a large indemnity, averted war.
Lonely Island
For the next four years, December
1937 to December 1941, the
International Settlement came to be
described as a “lonely island,” the only
coastal area of any significance not
occupied by the Japanese. Though the
settlement was unoccupied, it was far
from peaceful. Japanese spies and thugs
prowled the streets, and violence was
commonplace. Pro-Chinese foreigners,
like J. B. Powell of the China Daily News,
were blacklisted by the Japanese. Powell
was the victim of a failed assassination
attempt, but another journalist, this
time Chinese, was murdered and his
severed head left behind as a warning.
36 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
Thanks only to Marine vigilance a
war with Japan was narrowly averted
in July 1940. Col. Saburo Muira, one of
the most rabid of Japanese nationalists,
hatched a plot to have a Japanese
general assassinated on International
Settlement soil. The intended victim,
Gen. Juzo Nishio, was unaware of Muira’s
machinations. Nishio was to attend
an official meeting in the settlement’s
Park Hotel, in the heart of the 4th Marine
defense sector. His killing would’ve
given the Japanese a pretext to take over
the International Settlement by force.
Lt Col. Eugene F. Collier
(accompanied by 25 Marines)
spotted 16 Japanese in civilian
clothes, guns bulging from under
their coats, loitering in the vicinity of
the Park Hotel. They were taken into
custody, but were uncooperative and
strongly resisted arrest. They were
then put under guard and placed in
a shed guarded by one Marine.
The prisoners tried to get away by
rushing the door. The Marine guard put
down his rifle and put up his fists. He
knocked down four of them, with three
of them losing teeth. The others were
cowed and the Marine resumed his post.
The Japanese agents were soon
released, but Tokyo protested the
episode vehemently, and for a time
it looked like the US and Japan were
on the brink of war. Tempers again
cooled, however, and the incident
was forgotten. The plot to assassinate
one of their own, and thereby spark a
war, wasn’t revealed until years later.
Withdrawal of 4th Marines
The situation changed radically
when World War II began in Europe.
The Marines dutifully manned their
sector in the International Settlement,
but by 1940 they were isolated. The
4,000 French troops in the nearby
French Concession couldn’t be counted
on for help after France’s defeat by
the Germans. The handful of Italian
troops were also of little defensive
value, since Mussolini’s Fascist
government was allied with Japan.
For a time that left the British,
but they were hard-pressed on other
fronts and withdrew their force in
August 1940. That left only about
1,000 Marines in Shanghai, and their
numbers dwindled further as time
went on as a matter of deliberate
policy. When a man was rotated home
he wasn’t replaced, because it was
foolhardy to needlessly place additional
Marines so deep in harm’s way.
US officials debated whether the
Marines should be withdrawn entirely
from China. In 1941 Col. Samuel Howard
was commander of the 4th Marines, and
Adm. William Glassford headed the
Yangtze River Patrol. Both believed the
situation was becoming untenable for
the US military in China. There were
around 300,000 Japanese troops in the
Shanghai region alone. The nearest
part of “Free China” — the China still
resisting Japanese aggression — was
roughly 700 miles away.
They therefore put together an
emergency plan that stipulated, in the
event of war, the Marines would convoy
as many trucks and cars as they could
and fight their way though to Free
China. The plan was courageous in the
best Marine tradition, but also foolhardy
and unrealistic. The US Consul in
Shanghai, Frank B. Lockhart, therefore
relayed Howard’s and Glassford’s
concerns to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull. Lockhart added that he fully
agreed with their bleak assessment.
On the other side of the debate,
Clarence Gauss, US Ambassador to
China, wanted the Marines to stay. He
was with Chiang Kai Shek’s government
in Chungking, 1,300 miles upriver
and out of touch with developments
on the lower Yangtze. A Mr. Adams,
an unknown assistant chief in the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the
State Department, then contributed a
report fully supporting Gauss, declaring
“he [Gaus] knows his China,” and
the Marines should therefore stay.
Adm. Thomas Hart next chimed in.
He was commander of the Asiatic Fleet;
so his words carried weight. “In the event
of war with Japan,” he stated firmly,
“they [the Marines in Shanghai] would
be quickly contained or destroyed,
probably without being able to inflict
even a comparable loss on the enemy.”
The State Department finally came
around and ordered the Marines
withdrawn from China. They left in
two stages. The 2nd Battalion, half the
headquarters and service company, and
half the regimental hospital, boarded
the liner President Madison on 27
November, 1941. Col. Howard and the
rest of the regiment, including the 1st
Battalion and the band, left the next day.
November 28 was a cloudy day,
though the sun did manage to make
a belated appearance. The last of the
Marines marched down Nanking Road, cowed. He gave a terse yet diplomatic
which then and today was Shanghai’s reply in which he firmly but politely
equivalent of New York City’s Fifth rejected Hasagawa’s “desire.”
Avenue. The parade was led by Howard In late 1940 Japan joined Germany
and a group of officers, and behind them and Italy in the Tripartite Pact, and
came the regimental band. The Marine moved troops into northern French
rifle companies, each man shouldering Indo-China to make sure no aid came
his Springfield, stretched out along the to China from that direction. President
road as thousands of Chinese looked Roosevelt responded by putting an
on silently. It was the end of an era. embargo on sales of scrap metal to Japan.
“We’ll all Go Up to China in the
End of the Patrol Springtime” had been a popular Asiatic
Fleet song, reflecting the time-honored
The outbreak of war in 1937 had custom of going to China to escape
signaled the beginning of the end Manila’s stifling heat. In 1940, however,
of Shanghai’s “golden age.” With the Adm. Hart ordered the withdrawal
Chinese retreating west, the Japanese of all US Navy ships in China except
soon controlled the middle and for the Yangtze Patrol gunboats.
lower stretches of the Yangtze. The As relations between the US and
great city, depending on waterborne Japan grew rockier, there was also talk
trade and access to the sea, saw a of withdrawing the Yangtze River Patrol.
precipitous drop in commerce. In December 1940 all dependents of
In the early months of that war Asiatic Fleet servicemen — some 2,000
Japanese Vice Adm. Kiyoshi Hasagawa women and children — were sent to
tried to restrict American and British the States. By that time there was no
naval patrols on the river. He sent a real reason for the Patrol to stay on. The
letter to the commander of the US Japanese, who far outgunned the Patrol,
Asiatic Fleet, Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, controlled not only the Whangpoo and
explaining the situation from Tokyo’s Yangtze Rivers but also the China coast.
viewpoint: “It is the desire of the On 7 November 1941, President
Japanese Navy that foreign vessels, Roosevelt gave his approval: all Yangtze
including warships, will refrain from Patrol vessels would be withdrawn
navigating the Yangtze except when an from China. The Panay had been sunk
understanding is reached with us.” in 1937 and remained in its watery
The letter was more like a command grave. The Tutuila was at Chunking,
to an inferior than a message between some 1,300 miles upriver in Free China,
equals, but Yarnell refused to be and would likely be unable to run the
War Plan Orange & The US Asiatic Fleet
War Plan Orange was a strategic plan that envisioned war with Japan. It had a long
gestation, the first versions appearing in the early 1900s. By the early 1930s it was assumed
Japan would start the war with the US by attacking without warning, and their logical first
target would be the Philippines, America’s largest base area in the Far East. Manila Bay
was deemed of special importance, since it was a fine harbor and the Cavite Navy Yard
was the only facility west of Hawaii capable of the maintaining and repairing large ships.
In the original strategic scenario the Asiatic Fleet and its land partner, the US Army
Forces Far East, were expected to hold out in the Philippines for six months. During
that time the US Pacific Fleet, normally based in California, would convert to a war
footing and prepare for battle. In theory the Pacific Fleet’s capital ships would move
west, destroying or severely crippling the Japanese in classic surface clashes.
But by the autumn of 1941 it was conceded within the Navy high command
that the Pacific Fleet might well take two years, not six months, to battle across the
Pacific to the Philippines. The Philippines were thus written off strategically, though
not officially or publicly. On 20 November 1941 the Navy Department informed
Adm. Hart that, in the event of war, he should “deploy his forces south,” in effect
abandoning the Philippines. It was further determined that somewhere south — perhaps
Singapore — his fleet would join forces with elements of the British and Dutch Navies.
Those combined Allied forces would then conduct a holding action until the US
Pacific Fleet could come to grips with the Japanese. Plan Orange’s many versions had one
constant: the assumption the Pacific Fleet would defeat the Japanese Navy in a timely
way. That assumption was rendered obsolete by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.  ★
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 37
gauntlet of Japanese warships without
causing another incident. It would
therefore stay where it was. The Wake
was too small to risk an ocean crossing;
it would stay behind in Shanghai as a
communication ship for the US Consul.
That left Oahu and Luzon, which
would make a run to the Philippines. It
was a 1,170-mile journey from Shanghai
to Manila, and the gunboats weren’t
designed to travel on the open ocean.
Nevertheless, Luzon and Oahu departed
Shanghai on 29 November 1941. For
the first few days they were shadowed
by Japanese warships that filled the
airwaves with harassing radio messages.
They demanded to know the mission
of the gunboats, and at one point they
tried to order the Americans to steam
to Japanese-held Formosa (Taiwan).
The Japanese vessels eventually
departed, but soon the ships faced an
even greater danger. Heavy seas began
to pound the gunboats unmercifully,
until they were rolling 30 degrees
on a side. Even so, they made it to
Manila. The USS Mindanao, sole
vessel of the South China Patrol, also
made its way there. On 5 December
1941, Adm. Yarnell sent a message to
Washington: “YANGPAT dissolved.”
38 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
8 December Postscript
Shortly before his departure for the
Philippines, Rear Adm. William Glassford
summoned Lt. Commander Columbus
D. Smith to his Shanghai office and
offered him command of the Wake. It was
a good choice. Smith, a naval reservist
recently recalled to the colors, was an
old China hand who was also a member
of the Shanghai Pilot’s Association.
Smith had the option of refusing,
because Glassford’s proposal was no
ordinary assignment. “The way I see it,”
Smith told Glassford, “I may be killed by
the Japs or I may wind up in a Jap prison.”
“That’s right,” the admiral replied.
Smith accepted the assignment,
though not without misgivings. The Wake
was to remain in Shanghai, serving as
a communication (“station”) ship for
the US Consulate there. The gunboat
would have a skeleton crew of 14, and
eight of those would be radiomen.
Wake was also stripped down to the
bare essentials, in case of capture. The
most important equipment was the
shortwave transmitter and receiving
set linking her with the outside world.
Though it was obvious US-Japanese
conflict was coming sometime soon,
there was no inkling an attack was
imminent. The Wake lay at anchor on
the Wangpoo River, opposite Shanghai’s
waterfront. Smith spent his nights
ashore in an apartment he shared
with an American insurance man.
He was sleeping soundly when,
at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of 8
December 1941, he was awakened by
his roommate who told him he had an
urgent phone call. It was from his ship’s
quartermaster, who told Smith news
had just been received Pearl Harbor
had been bombed by the Japanese.
Smith threw on his uniform and
managed to get a taxi, which barreled
down the dark streets. With a war against
the US begun, the Japanese invaded
the International Settlement. Smith’s
taxi was halted by Japanese roadblocks
several times, and each time he was
curtly told to turn back. Somehow he
managed to reach the waterfront, but
his troubles didn’t end there. He was
confronted by 20 Japanese soldiers, who
informed him his gunboat was in the
hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
The scene became somewhat
surreal. An American naval officer, in
full uniform, stood on the Shanghai
waterfront, forcefully arguing with
armed Japanese soldiers, who argued
back but made no attempt to take him
into custody. Smith was passable in
Japanese, but no amount of talk would
change their minds: they had orders he
wasn’t to be allowed to board his vessel.
Smith’s quartermaster then walked
up and gave his skipper the details of
the Wake’s earlier capture. A Japanese
boarding party composed of elite Special
Naval Landing Force troops managed
to get aboard under cover of darkness.
Since the vessel was low in the water,
with only about two feet of freeboard,
it had proved a simple enough task.
The gunboat had earlier been mined,
that is, rigged with explosives to be set
off to prevent capture. Unfortunately
the crew had been surprised before they
could set off those charges. A Japanese
SNLF officer crept close, then stood to
stick a pistol into the ribs of the man
standing watch, telling him to surrender.
The Wake thus became the only US Navy
warship captured intact in World War II.
The portion of the Yangtze Patrol that
escaped found itself in a new role as the
Inland Shore Patrol assigned to guard
Manila Bay. As the war rapidly progressed,
one by one the gunboats were sunk
by the Japanese or scuttled to prevent
capture. The crews endured three and a
half years of brutal Japanese captivity.  ✪
 The Fates of the Yangtze Patrol’s “New Six” Ships

USS Luzon
USS Luzon
(PR 7) was built in 1928 with a displacement of 560 tons, a maximum
speed 16 knots, a length of 211 feet and a complement of 82.
Armament: two 3.50 anti-aircraft guns behind shields and eight
30-caliber machineguns. Sunk in the Philippines on 5 May 1942,
she was then salvaged by the Japanese and renamed Karatsu.

USS Oahu
(PR-6) was built in 1928 with a displacement of 450 tons, a maximum
speed of 15 knots, a length of 191 feet and a complement of 65.
Armament: two 3.50 anti-aircraft guns behind shields and eight
30-caliber machineguns. Sunk at Corregidor on 4 May 1942.
USS Oahu

USS Panay
(PR 5) was the sister ship of the Oahu. She was sunk by Japanese
aircraft on 12 December 1937 between Nanking and Wuhu.

USS Guam
(PR-3) had a displacement of 370 tons, a maximum speed of
14.5 knots, a length of 159.5 feet and a complement of 50.
Armament: two 3.50 anti-aircraft guns behind shields and
eight 30-caliber machineguns. She was renamed Wake in April
1941 when her old name was given to a new cruiser back in
the States. Captured intact on 8 December 1941, she was the USS Panay
only US Navy vessel to suffer that fate in World War II. The
Japanese renamed her Tatara. After the war she was turned
over to the Nationalist Chinese and renamed Tai Yuan. Captured
by the Communists in 1949, her subsequent fate is unknown.

USS Tutuila
(PR-4) was nicknamed “Tutu.” Effectively marooned in Chungking
in Free China, she was turned over to the Chinese in January
1942. Her skipper, Lt. Commander W.W. Bowers, and his 22
USS Guam
men then began a three-month odyssey back to the States.
They flew to Calcutta, rode by rail across India to Bombay,
sailed aboard the SS President Madison to South America,
then to Trinidad in the West Indies, and finally stateside.

USS Mindanao
(PR 8) was the sister ship of the Luzon. She was nicknamed
“Fat Minda.” She was allowed to sink after suffering severe
battle damage off Corregidor on 3 May 1942.  ★
USS Tutuila

USS
Mindanao

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 39

Britain’s Special
Operations Executive
T
he origins of much of what would
later become common in guerilla
activity and terrorist actions of
our own time had an innocuous start.
In 1940, while Marshal Henri-Philippe
Petain was signing an armistice
with Nazi Germany, the British were
preparing to continue the struggle
against the Axis. Hugh Dalton, the
British Minister for Economic Warfare,
originated the idea in a letter he sent
to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. In it,
he asked permission to create “a new
organization to co-ordinate, inspire,
control and assist the nationals of
the oppressed countries who must
themselves be direct participants.”
That letter went to Winston
Churchill, who gave Dalton an enthu-
siastic directive to “set Europe ablaze.”
The organization Dalton set up became
known as the Special Operations
Executive or SOE. It was given an office
at 64 Baker Street in London and was
formally established on 22 July 1940.
It would become unofficially known
as the “Ministry of Ungentlemanly
Warfare,” and would eventually evolve
into many different roles. First, though
it was meant primarily to support
espionage and sabotage behind German
lines, it would also lead to the creation
of the British commandos, themselves
meant to provide the core of a British
insurgency if England were invaded
and occupied. By the end of the war the
SOE would have over 13,000 personnel
while supporting over a million opera-
One of the founders of the British Directorate
of Special Operations, Lord Hugues Dalton
(Hugh Dalton). The picture was taken in 1962.
40 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
tives of various kinds worldwide.
Partisan or guerilla warfare had, of
course, been in existence for millennia,
most notably in recent history in
Spain during the Napoleonic invasion
and in Mexico during the French
occupation of Napoleon III. The British,
due to their naval superiority, often
became sponsors and suppliers of
such groups, giving expert manpower
and material assistance, most notably
during World War I, when “Lawrence of
Arabia” assisted anti-Turkish rebels.
The British experience prior to
World War II, then, was that rear-area
raiding could tie up extensive man-
power to chase down a few guerillas.
Partisans could continue a war after
a regular army had been defeated.
The SOE didn’t spring up as an
organization overnight. It had deeper
origins split among three earlier orga-
nizations. The first had been created by
the Foreign Office in 1938, shortly after
Germany annexed Austria. That group
was known as Department EH, after its
headquarters in a building called the
Electra House. The Secret Intelligence
Service (MI-6), not to be outdone in the
bureaucratic expansion, later that same
month created Section D, dedicated to
investigate the use of sabotage, propa-
ganda and other unsavoury techniques
to weaken opponents. Finally, the War
Office jumped in during the autumn
of that year to create a bureau called
MI-R to “study” guerilla warfare.
Before the start of the war those dif-
ferent groups worked with few resources
and often competed directly against
each other for them. Two of them,
Section D and MI-R, soon came to share
information due to the fact their com-
manders were both majors in the Royal
Engineers, knew one another, and there-
fore came together to divide the work.
MI-R was thereafter to specialize in gue-
rilla and commando work, while Section
D would take responsibility for classic
“cloak-and-dagger” espionage. With the
outbreak of hostilities, MI-R began by
forming the Commandos, while Section
D attempted unsucessfully to block
the Danube River by having it mined.
After Dalton’s 1940 initiative,
the three organizations were for-
by David March
mally united under one commander,
Sir Frank Nelson, a Conservative
back-bencher and consul in Berne.
Recruitment & Training
Creating a partisan army in occupied
Europe, along with the required support
network of agents and supplies, wasn’t
something that could be done instantly,
but the SOE made rapid progress in
that regard. The first contacted were
the various governments in exile, since
they knew, in turn, whom to contact
within their occupied nations. That
being said, uncertainty inescapably
lay everywhere: even the most trusted
could sell out or break under torture.
It took a rare type to be willing to
join the SOE and go behind the lines,
not knowing what would happen.
At first the training of new agents
was under the command of Col. Colin
Gubbins, Director of Operations and
Training. He would later go on to
become director of all of the SOE.
Recruiters concentrated on finding
volunteers who were natives of, or who
otherwise had considerable experience
in, the countries to which they would be
sent. Often the recruits would be sent
to coordinate with the local resistance,
but at other times they would be sent
to work alone on a specific mission.
The first training center was located
at Wanbourough Manor in Guildford.
(In fact, the SOE later became jok-
ingly known as “Stately Old ‘omes of
Colin Gubbins,
Director of Operations and Training
England,” due to the number of such
impressive buildings and manors that
came to be used by the organization.)
After initial training, if a recruit were
destined for field operations, he would
be sent to the Commando School in
Arisaig, Scotland. There, and at other
installations, he would need to learn how
to use not just guns but explosives, vari-
ous tricks of the trade, radio operation,
parachuting and how to live in occupied
territory while keeping out of sight. They
were taught to strike silently and to fight
unarmed by instructors like William
E. Fairbairn and Eric A Sykes, former
inspectors known for their ruthlessness
from the Shanghai Municipal Police.
The SOE wasn’t without controversy,
with some ‘traditional’ officers resisting
and resenting the type of warfare
the SOE was prosecuting. Somewhat
surprisingly, for example, Air Chief
Marshal Charles Portal, once com-
mented about the SOE : “I think the
dropping of men dressed in civilian
clothes, for the purpose of attempting
to kill members of the opposing forces,
is not an operation with which the
Royal Air Force should be associated.”
Of course, that same officer had no
qualms about using the RAF to area-
bomb German cities, and the people
living in them, into flaming rubble.
His real complaint may simply have
been about the diversion of scarce tal-
ented personnel and resources — which
might’ve gone to his more conventional
service arm — had the SOE not existed.
Despite the controversy, the SOE
expanded to the point female agents
were brought in and used extensively.
The First Aid Nursing Yeomanry was the
first women’s group contacted to supple-
ment the manpower of the organization,
though they were first only used in
support roles, such as creating forged
documents and decoding messages
Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal
from the field. In April 1942, however,
Churchill approved the use of women
agents in the field. Thereafter, though
women were never sent in as team lead-
ers, many were sent as radio operators.
Once in the field, several did rise to be
head of their groups after their male
counterparts were killed or captured.
The types of people recruited to be
agents were selected from all walks of life
and prewar jobs. The SOE kept a partcu-
lar lookout for those with dual national-
ity, since the need to have as many
native-speakers as possible was impor-
tant in covert operations. Given that
priority, many of the agents assigned to
France and the other western European
nations were of the working class and
occasionally had criminal backgrounds.
In contrast, those assigned to eastern
Europe and the Balkans were often less
than qualified in foreign languages, since
those areas were often in open rebellion
against Axis occupying forces. Soldiers
with good diplomatic skills were needed
there, as they could be leading an
ambush one day and mediating between
opposing partisan groups the next.
Exiled or escaped members of the
armed forces of occupied nations were
of use; however, many of them were
primarily loyal to their own govern-
ment-in-exile, and could therefore
get into disagreements over mission
objectives with their English counter-
parts. To help sidestep that problem,
French Canadians came to be heavily
recruited for operations in France.
Of course, the SOE was most con-
cerned with helping to win the war, not
with diplomatic niceties. They pursued
that aim at all cost, and often the first
cost was societal convention. The SOE
field commanders were pragmatic and
dealt with all types: they would make
use of willing criminals, communists
and soldiers with bad conduct records.
Despite that approach, there was no
case where an SOE operative was found
to have simply sold out to the enemy,
though some certainly did cave in to the
pressure of torture or arrested relatives.
Equipment
Infiltrating occupied territory was
dangerous; so, before going into a coun-
try such as France, an agent would be
given a cover story and be equipped with
appropriate clothing. That clothing had
to be manufactured authentically, down
to the last stitch, after being copied from
old catalogues and photographs. Maps
to be used on assignment would be
sewn into underwear, and many agents
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 41
were given humped backs and other
such disabilities to make their disguise
more believable. Identity and ration
cards, as well as cigarettes, had to be
accurate and of the appropriately poor
quality, lest an operative be captured
for having something too good.
Boobytraps were made out of devices
that could be hidden in plain sight, like
bicycle pumps, while hand grenades
would be packed into items such as
fruit tins. When supplying resistance
forces, the SOE preferred to issue
weapons that required little training,
such as the Sten gun, or ones that could
use captured bullets. Often captured
equipment would be shipped by the
SOE to partisans, a task that became
easier after the surrender of Italy.
Some of the more unusual equipment
used by the SOE is described below.
The “S-Phone” was an ultra-high-fre-
quency duplex radio telephone invented
by two junior officers in the Royal Signal
Corps. It was composed of two transceiv-
ers, one called the “ground” and the
other the “air.” The ground set weighed
15 lbs., half again what earlier models
weighed, and was directional so it could
contact overflying aircraft. Its range was
less than a mile, and required the planes
it was attempting to contact to drop low,
which potentiallly exposed the aircraft
to ground fire. The radio set allowed SOE
forward observers to spot ground targets
for attacking aircraft, but the primary
mission was to provide SOE headquar-
ters a way to communicate with agents
in the field, to pass on instructions
and gather direct intelligence.
“Eureka” was a system of ground-
based beacons designed to assist
air-dropped deliveries to “in country”
groups. It was intended to operate along
with a matching airborne direction
finder codenamed “Rebecca.” It was
mounted on a tripod when direct
communication was required.
The Welrod pistol was a bolt-action
noise-suppressed weapon, often using
a 9 mm or .32 ACP cartridge, holding a
maximum of up to six rounds depending
on the manufacturer. It was commonly
termed the “assassin’s pistol.” It had
a ported barrel to reduce the velocity
of the bullet and gradually release the
gases in the firing chamber, thus making
A Welrod pistol
 Important Personalities
Col. David Niven (1910–1983)
David Niven was already a famous
actor when Britain declared war on
Germany in 1939. He returned home
from Hollywood to serve in the army but,
unlike many other celebrities, he didn’t
seek a billet in propaganda work. Instead,
he went for a Regular Army commission
as a lieutenant, and was assigned to a
motor transport battalion. Believing his
occupational skills could best be used
elsewhere, he interviewed for a position
with the commandos. He participated in several operations,
including helping to find an actor named M.E. Clifton James, who
had a striking resemblance to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery
and served as that officer’s double throughout the rest of the war.
Niven also became a member of the GHQ Liason Unit,
which was also known as the “Phantom Singles Unit.” It was
responsible for reporting and locating enemy positions, keeping
commanders aware of conditions on the front and, indeed,
keeping track of just where the front was when things got fluid
on the battlefield. The unit also used wireless communications
to alert air commanders of where the “bomb lines” were
located between enemy and friendly ground formations.
Roundell Cecil Palmer, Lord Selborne (1887–1971)
Roundell Palmer was minister of economic earfare
from 1942 to 1945 and de facto head of the SOE. Under his
leadership it became one of the preeminent intelligence
organizations in the world, but not without controversy.
In February 1942 he replaced the then-current head of the
SOE with Sir Charles Hambro, a close friend of Churchill. The
two of them worked well together until August 1943, when they
had a falling out over the future direction of the SOE. Hambro
felt the SOE should maintain its independence from the British
Army, while Selborne believed it should liason closely with the
military. Hambro was later found to have not passed on vital
information to Palmer, and he was therefore dismissed.
Pearl Witherington (1914–2008)
Born in France of English parents,
Pearl became the head of one of the
largest resistance groups in occupied
France. In September 1943 she was
parachuted into that country with the
codename “Marie.” There she joined
the Stationer Network and for eight
months worked for Maurice Southgate,
its head, as a courier. When the Gestapo
captured Southgate in May 1944, she
successfully reorganized the group until it
finally numbered over 1,500 resistance fighters.
42 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
Sir William “Intrepid”
Stephensen (1896–1989)
William Stephenson was a Canadian
soldier, businessman, millionaire and
spymaster, and was one of author Ian
Fleming’s inspirations for James Bond.
During World War I he achieved the
rank of captain in the Royal Flying Corps,
earning eight kills before being shot
down and captured by the Germans,
in whose hands he then remained
until the end of the war. Afterward he became a sucessful
industrialist, which put him in excellent position to aid Winston
Churchill in 1936. At the time Churchill was a back-bencher,
critical of the government’s policies. Stepheson was able to use
his business contacts to help provide Churchill with information
about some of the particulars of the Nazis’ violations of the
Treaty of Versailles — information Churchill made good use of
to help end his his time as a ‘political exile’ in Parliament.
In 1940, Churchill sent Stephenson to the US to establish
a covert group known as the “British Coordination.” His orders
were to investigate German activities in the States, protect
British interests there, and mobilize American public support
for Britain. Those instructions later broadened to coordinate
with American intelligence services. He became Churchill’s
first direct link to President Rosevelt, and was responsible for
handing over the information in the “Ultra” intelligence tran-
scripts then just beginning to be deciphered in England.
Stephenson worked without salary, and often personally
funded intelligence work. His most noted accomplishment was the
creation of “Camp X” in Whitby, Ontario. That base became one of
the main training centers for SOE agents from around the world,
eventually graduating over 2,000 of them. It also trained agents
from the American FBI, OSS and five future directors of the CIA.
Leo Marks (1920–2001)
Leo Marks was a cryptographer
who was initially refused by the MI-5
unit at Bletchley Park as not being good
enough to serve there. He was picked
up by the SOE and quickly advanced to
become their top man in that field.
It was Marks who convinced
the intelligence chiefs to drop the
traditional method of using poems as
the basis of ciphers. The poem ciphers
held an advantage in that they were
relatively easy to memorize, but that was outweighed by their
limited size and the fact the shortest ones were easily cracked.
He came up with a number of novel ways to better handle ciphers,
first replacing already used poems with original or lesser known
works. He ended up becoming something of a poet himself.
To handle encoding errors, he set up a group known as the
“indeciperables,” whose job was to translate messages that came
in from the field in a garbled state. He also introduced simpler
encoding procedures that worked to shorten transmission times,
thereby allowing for less chance of discovery in the field.  ★
it much quieter. It used fluorescent was supposed to be assigned to a single Operations
paint-marked sights to make it more occupied country, though each country
easily aimed in low light conditions. The often had more than one section in The primary purpose of the sections
weapon was manufactured in “sanitized” order to deal with different resistance was to encourage, set up and supply
form. That is, it had no markings on it groups within them. France was the resistance movements in occupied
other than a serial number placed their most splintered, having six separate countries. They would send in initial
by the SOE after they took delivery. sections operating in it. Training agents agents to make contact and establish
for each particular country was also lines of communication with local
Organization controlled by the national sections. resistance groups. Once that was done,
Additional sections were responsible those agents would begin channeling
Organizing an army of resistance for development and acquisition of supplies to the partisan group they
out of whole cloth was a huge task and, separate lines of production equipment, found most effective against the Axis.
like many organizations set up during research, analysis and administration, That wasn’t always the group that
the war, the SOE continually evolved with most sections handling their own would’ve been politically ideal.
and went through many organizational paperwork. Acquisition of dedicated The two primary points of interest
changes. The Army ran it for most of transportation also became necessary, were France and Poland. As mentioned
the war, with either an “SOE Deputy as the Royal Navy and RAF resisted earlier, France had no less than six
Chief” or an “SOE Chief of Staff” cooperation in that regard. Though the separate sections operating in it, with
acting as operational director. The was RN won its bureaucratic battles against the SOE-supported group sometimes
also an SOE Council consisting of 15 the SOE in terms of avoiding having to coming into competition with the one
heads of departments and sections. subordinate its resources to the SOE, supported by the Free French. Further,
Some civilians served on the council the Admiralty was unable to prevent there was a group dedicated to the
along with the military officers. the SOE from developing its own ship- Polish émigré community in France, and
The main sub-units within the SOE ping resources and submersible-boat another dedicated to providing escape
were called “sections.” A single section program. The RAF, after getting direct routes for downed pilots. Finally, during
orders from Churchill, dedicated two 1942 yet another group was sent to
squadrons of aircraft to the SOE for use Algiers to support operations in French
Radio Operations in infiltrating agents and supplies. colonies around the Mediterranean.
Additional SOE headquarters were Paradrops into occupied France
Wireless operations were impor- developed to manage operations were the primary means of support of
tant for sending back intelligence overseas in non-occupied areas. partisans there, with the first SOE agent
gathered behind enemy lines. SOE They became known as “missions” arriving in May 1941. The drops were
agents were issued short-wave Morse or sometimes as “forces.” mainly to provide intelligence reports via
Code radios that weighed 30 lbs. and
fit in two-foot-long suitcases. Those
radios were built to have a frequency
range from 3.5 to 16 megacyles and,
due to the constraints of technology
of that time, they needed 70 feet
of aerial to work effectively.
Analysts determined it would take
German intelligence about 30 minutes
to discover where an SOE radio was
being operated. The field agents were
therefore instructed to transmit from
isolated areas whenever possible.
In addition, they were told to always
transmit briefly, at non-standard
intervals, at various wavelenghts,
and from different places.
The final step was often to
transmit and spell certain words
incorrectly. That way, if their code
book fell into enemy hands, the
SOE in England could determine the
Germans had indeed captured it by
the correct spelling of all the words
coming through. Finally, agents
were told to try, if captured, to resist
interrogation for 48 hours, which was
considered enough time for backup
plans to be put into effect and for
other agents to get clear.  ★

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 43

radio, as well as to supply arms, sabotage
instructors and liaison officers for
guerilla groups. Over 1,000 such opera-
tives were sent in between 1941 and
mid-1944. Shortly before D-Day that was
stepped up in order to support the inva-
sion with more active and better coordi-
nated resistance, with an additional 100
commandos dropped along with 6,000
tons of equipment, weapons and explo-
sives. Finally, all French sections were
Infighting
The SOE suffered from the
infighting common to all bureaucracies.
The first victim was the Propaganda
Department, which in August 1941
was lost to the Ministry of Information.
There it eventually spun off to became
the separate Political Warfare
Executive, which was concerned with
spreading both “White” (true) and
“Black” (false) propaganda to both
Germany and the occupied countries.
One such successful operation was
a clandestine radio station set up to
criticize German military operations
and failures. German soldiers came
to believe the station had actu-
ally been set up by their own side,
so successful was it in broadcasting
rumors and bombing raid results.
Though the SOE initially cooperated
well with the Royal Navy’s Combined
Operations Headquarters, after
Vice Adm. Louis Mountbatten left
there, the two organizations fell into
disagreement. By that time the SOE had
developed its own sources of supply
and resources, including transport.
The Navy was especially annoyed
about the SOE’s parallel develop-
ment of submersible craft.
The SOE also had bitter fights
with the Foreign Office and the
Secret Intelligence Service. The FO
and SIS preferred quiet conditions
in which to gather intelligence, and
to work with important notables
within occupied countries. The SOE
was intended to cause the greatest
amount of chaos possible. It would
make deals with anyone, including
communists, which at times led to the
SIS directly undermining the SOE’s
attempts to infiltrate agents into
occupied France. Eventually the SOE
ended up taking its cues from the FO,
with the general policy of “No bangs
without Foreign Office approval.”  ★
44 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
unified in preparation for the invasion;
so there would no problems of overlap.
In Poland, unlike France, there was
no puppet government to collaborate
with the Nazis, and the Polish govern-
ment in exile was happy to cooperate
with SOE efforts. Accordingly the SOE
supported the Polish Home Army with
the establishment of a training facility
for the 605th Special Forces unit, which
came to be known as “Silent Darkness.”
To support the insertion of agents into
distant Poland, customized aircraft
were created with extra fuel capacity.
Such aircraft were part of the effort to
provide support to the Warsaw Uprising
of 1944, when the Soviet Union refused
perission for British aircraft to land
in its territory during that time.
Operations in the rest of western and
northern Europe yielded vast differences
in mission success, with the sabotage of
Norway’s heavy water facililty for Hitler’s
nuclear program being the most famous.
Most of Belgium was quickly overrun in
less than a week by Allied armies in 1944,
and the resistance there aided in the
intact capture of the vital Antwerp docks.
Operations in the Netherlands led to the
largest SOE disaster, with the Germans
able to “turn” and run the agent network
there for over a year without SOE doing
anything about it. Sadly, that was true
despite the fact chief SOE cryptographer
Leo Marks stated those agents’
transmissions had become “too perfect,”
lacking the usual errors uncompromised
operatives would routinely send.
Communism was often seen as a
second enemy for the SOE, especially
during the early part of the war when
the Nazis and Soviets still had their
pact. That was particularly true in the
Balkans, where Greece and Yugoslavia
had conflicting policies established.
The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia
in 1941 had led to the country being
divided along ethnic lines. The Croatians
supported the Nazis, while the pro-
Allied groups split between the royalist
Chetniks and the communist partisans.
The SOE initially supported the Chetniks,
but it became clear they were more
interested in fighting the communists
than the Axis. Signals intelligence even-
tually proved the Chetniks were directly
collaborating with the Italians and
Germans; so the SOE switched support
to the communists shortly thereafter.
Germany itself was considered the
most high risk place for operations to
be carried out. For the bulk of the war
it remained the purview of the Political
Warfare Executive, which made use of
black propaganda to try to undermine
German morale. As the war drew to
its end, two controversial plans were
made for work inside Germany. The
most well known was “Operation
Foxley,” a plan to assassinate Hitler,
which was eventually shelved because
the Allied high command had come
to believe Hitler was more of a help
than a hindrance to them by 1944.
The other operation, “Periwig,”
isn’t as well known. It was an attempt
by the SOE to simulate a resistance
movement inside Germany. Prisoners
were released back into Germany, under
outwardly suspicous circumstances,
in the hope the Gestapo would sweep
them up and waste resources on their
imprisonment and interrogation. Fake
wireless transmissions were broadcast
into Germany giving instructions to
non-existent resistance groups. Fake
code books and other supplies were
also allowed to fall into enemy hands to
reinforce the sham; however, none of it
worked to produce any verifiable results.
Conclusion
The end of the war led to the search
for a new mission for the SOE. Lord
Selborne, minister of economic warfare
since 1942, proposed it be used to
combat the “Russian menace” while also
taking on the “smoldering volcanoes
of the Middle East.” Anthony Eden,
then foreign minister, wanted his
ministry to take over the SOE, since
it already ran MI-6. Churchill’s
departure from the prime ministership
left the decision to Clement Attlee,
Clement Attlee
the newly elected Labour PM. left
Selborne met with Attlee who, after Violette Szabo gave wireless
reports to SOE headquarters
being fully briefed about the SOE,
that were extremely important in
promptly said he had “no intention of establishing Allied bombing targets.
controlling a British Comintern,” and
ordered the entire network shut down below
within 48 hours. The SOE formally The Violette Szabo GC monument
on Albert Embankment
ceased to operate on 15 January 1946; commemorating all those in SOE
however, 280 of its personnel were
transferred to MI-6 to become the new
“Special Operations Branch.” Some
of them were field agents, but most
came from the SOE’s training and
research staffs. They were shortly there-
after merged into MI-6, as Sir Stewart
Menzies, the head of that organization,
didn’t see a need for a separate branch.
That was an ignominious end for
an organization that had originally
been intended to “set Europe ablaze.”
Of course, that blaze never expanded
beyond a few sparks, while a lot of
British military and civilian talent was
kept tied up trying unsuccessfully to fan
those flames until the war’s end. The
SOE’s sponsors, Churchill in particular,
had simply misjudged the willingness of
civilians in the occuped countries to take
part in the ruthless kinds of activities
wartime espionage entailed. Churchill
could perhaps be forgiven for that, since
he was, above all, desperate to find some
way to strike at the heart of German
power during the first half of the war,
and the SOE seemed to promise that.
Beyond that, however, the SOE is now
sadly considered to have created at least
some of the foundational techniques
on which many later sabotage and
terrorist groups have built.  ✪

Sources

Baden-Powell, Dorothy. They Also Serve: An SOE Agent in the

WRNS. Robert Hale, Ltd., 2004.
Boyce, Frederic & Douglas Everett.
SOE — The Scientific Secrets. Sutton Publishing, 2003.
Dear, Ian. Sabotage and Subversion.
Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1999.
Foot, M.R.D. The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946.
Pimlico, 1999.
Kramer, Rita. Flames in the Field.
Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1995.
Mackenzie, William. The Secret History of SOE — 
Special Operations Executive, 1940–1945.
BPR Publications, 2000.
Stafford, David. Secret Agent: The True Story of the Special
Operations Executive. BBC Worldwide, Ltd., 2000.

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 45

The Conquerors
The Macedonians
Alexander in Persia, 334−331 BC
In the Spring of 334 B.C., young king
Alexander of Macedon with an army
40,000 strong, set out to fulfill the
centuries old dream of his countrymen
by launching the invasion of the Persian
Empire, the largest and most powerful
empire in the Mediterranean world.
The Romans
Mediterranean Expansion, 200−189 BC
A century and a half later, the Roman
Republic was just emerging from its 2nd
and most debilitating conflict with the
Mediterranean trading power — Carthage.
Philip V was on the throne of Macedon,
and his interventions in Greek politics
would soon draw Rome’s response
and eventual advance to become an
Eastern Mediterranean power.
Even after several years of conflict with
Philip, Rome would not rest. Rome found
herself again involved in an immense con-
flict — this time in Asia. The great Seleucid
King, Antiochus, threatened the very exis-
tence of Rome’s two key allies — Rhodes
and Pergamum — and threatened to
march into Europe itself on a mission of
conquest. Thus began the Syrian War.
The Conquerors is a double game
that covers both of these theatres of
conquest at a grand strategic level.
Each game in this Twin-Pack has its
own counters, rules and game map.
However, the rules of both games are
based upon the same system so that
having played one it is quite simple
to play the other. Also introduced is
an optional Tactical Battle System.
Game components include:
Two large rules books; two large
playing maps, 1,200 die-cut counters;
plus numerous player aids.
Battle for Stalingrad
In the autumn of 1942, 14 German
divisions of the Sixth Army and Fourth
Panzer Army were poised to attack
the vital city of Stalingrad. Facing the
German forces were dozens of divi-
sions and brigades of the Soviet 62nd
army. For seven weeks the Germans
would hammer at the city in a seesaw
conflict for control of the Volga River.
Battle for Stalingrad simulates the cam-
paign that would halt the German drive to
the east in the Soviet Union. The playing
map represents the terrain in and around
Stalingrad, and the colorful cardboard
playing pieces reflect the sizes and
strengths of the opposing military units.
Battle for Stalingrad is a classic game
design by noted game designer John Hill.
Game components include:
Two rule booklets (standard and optional),
600 die cut cardboard playing pieces, one
22 x 34 inch map and various player aids.

A Mighty Fortress
Between 1531 and 1555 the world
shook to the reverberations of a
struggle whose resolution was to
chart the course of Europe’s religious
and political alliances for centuries. It
was in these years that the conflicting
ideologies of Lutheran Reformation
and Catholic Counter-Reformation
inexorably drew the disparate empires,
nations, and leaders of Europe into a
maelstrom of religious war and dispute.
A Mighty Fortress simulates this major
historical conflict on a beautifully illustrat-
ed political map of Europe. Colorful card-
board playing pieces move, position. And
engage in battle upon this map through
a superimposed hexagonal grid, which
functions like a chessboard’s squares.
Game components include:
One rules booklet, 200 die cut
playing pieces, one 22 x 34 inch
map and various player aids.
Classic
History
Classic
Games
Ancient Conquest
Ancient Conquest is a classic and highly
rated multiplayer game covering at a
grand strategic level the rise and fall of
empires and peoples in the ancient near
east. Ancient Assyria, Egypt, Babylon
and the Hittites are all included, as
well as numerous other powers.
Historically, a highly accurate game,
while yet designed with elegantly
simple game mechanics; Ancient
Conquest is sure to be a favorite. A
must for any game enthusiast.
Game components include:
Full color rule booklet, one map and 200
die cut counters and numerous charts.
Coming in 2011
available from:
Decision Games
(661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390
decisiongames.com
Observation
Game PreviewPost
The Hardest Days
T
he Hardest Days (THD), designed
by John Butterfield, is a purpose-
designed solitaire wargame of
intermediate complexity covering five
critical days in the Battle of Britain,
the five days that saw the heaviest air
action in the sky over England in the
summer of 1940. Each of those days
is presented as its own scenario. THD
puts you in control of British Fighter
Command, responding to air raids
launched by the Luftwaffe, which is
controlled by the game system.
Each one-day scenario represents up
to 14 hours during which the Luftwaffe
launches raids against targets in southern
England, defended by the squadrons of
RAF Fighter Command. German raids
include bomber Gruppen (groups),
48 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
attempting to hit specific targets, sequencing of raids and the turnaround
and fighter groups protecting those of squadrons and groups during each
bombers and attacking British fighter “Raid Day,” the action is divided into
squadrons. The German goal is twofold: seven two-hour time segments, from
inflict damage on targets and destroy 0600 to 1800 hours, inclusive.   ★
squadrons to gain air superiority in
preparation for the invasion of England.
The game system controls German WaW Upcoming
strategy and tactics. You use your fighter Features
squadrons to respond to the raids in an
attempt to destroy or turn back the raid- #
18: The South Seas Campaign: 1942-43
ers and prevent their effective bombing of #
19: Hardest Days
their targets, while minimizing your own #
20: Gross Deutschland
fighter losses. Your fighter squadrons and #
21: Rhineland 36
German fighter groups may participate in #
22: Minsk 1944
several raids in a given day, while German Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
bombers, flying from distant bases, par- for previews of these issues.
ticipate in only one raid per day. To track
the passage of time, as measured by the
 WACHT am Rhein

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rp
ON 16 December 1944 the “ghost front” of the First US Army in the Ardennes suddenly erupted as 20 German divisions embarked on Hitler’s

le
dg

ON
last attack in the west. The objective was Antwerp, which provided Allied supply for the drive into Germany. Most Americans believed the

ei
nf
war against Germany would be over by Christmas; yet Hitler was convinced it could still be decided in his favor. The German armies destroyed

or
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in France were reorganized. A massive surprise against the weakly held Ardennes sector of the American front was prepared.

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! io
n.
WACHT am Rhein is a grand-tactical simulation of that enormous battle. The more than 2,380 counters represent every formation, at company and battalion
levels, which fought there, including US, German, British, French, Canadian and Belgian units. Infantry, armor, anti-tank, reconnaissance, engineer, assault
gun, howitzer, rocket, parachute, ranger, glider and headquarters units are all fully represented. The four maps are an accurate representation of the region.
Compiled from 1944 German staff maps and 1943-44 1:50,000 US Army maps, they shows all roads, trails and other types of terrain, along with all the towns
and villages that became bastions of the American defense, as well as every creek and river that couldn’t be crossed by wheeled vehicles without a bridge.

PLAYERS may use single maps for six smaller scenarios. There is also a campaign game that utilizes all four sections and portrays three
weeks (50 game turns). In that one the Germans race for the Meuse, the last hurdle before the open country leading to Antwerp, in the face
of increasing concentrations of Allied infantry, armor and air power. Extensive supply, weather and air power rules are included.

THIS edition of Wacht am Rhein presents modifications to the combat, artillery and supply systems of the first edition in order to better
depict tactical and operational warfare. For example, an “exploitation mode” has been added in order to allow mechanized units to take
advantage of breakthroughs in the enemy line. Exploitation is interleaved with the opposing player’s movement, recreating the fluid situation
that existed in the first week. Other changes include the addition of “vantage points,” which function as high ground, enabling units to spot
more effectively for artillery, as well as “constricted terrain,” which represents the channeling caused by steep gullies and ravines.

THE orders of battle have also been redone to provide an accurate depiction of the armies of both sides. Units are now in the organizations
within which they fought, not the administrative formations that were discarded due to the requirements of combat.

GAME COMPONENTS
• 4 22x34” Four Color Mapsheets
• 2,380 Die-Cut Playing Pieces
• One Rule Booklet
• One Scenario Booklet
• Assorted Player Aid Charts
• Two 10-sided Dice
• Storage Bags

GAME SCALE
• Map: 1 mile per hex
• Time: 3 Game Turns per day
• Units: Infantry and Artillery units are battalions.
Armor is depicted at the company level.
• Each strength step is equal to a company.

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
Observation Post

Movers & Shakers heroines in many of his books, but relations crisis in the last years of his life
the marriage itself ended in failure. despite his fame and riches. That is, his
Karl May: Hitler’s Favorite Author Revered for his work beginning in uncompromising pacifism went over less
1892 in the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and less well in the pro-military popular

G
erman author Karl Friedrich May eventually faced a dual public culture of pre-World War I Germany.
May (1842–1912) was never as
well known as Louis L’Amour
or Zane Grey, but today his works
are still read, particularly in Europe.
His literary creations for his novels
and short stories of the American
frontier had such colorful names as
“Old Shatterhand” (who vanquished
his enemies with his bare fists) and
the faithful Indian Chief Winnetou.
Ultimately some 80 million copies
of his works were printed in 70 books
in over 100 languages worldwide, but
May wrote about types of characters he
never actually met and places he never
actually visited. He only toured the
American West in 1908, when he was
ailing and had but a few years to live.
Nevertheless, his books enthralled
three generations of German
readers — among them Kaiser Wilhelm
II, Albert Einstein, Hermann Hesse and
Adolf Hitler. The latter claimed the idea
for his dream of eastern conquest in
Russia generated, at least in part, from
the “Manifest Destiny” movement that
took the American West from the Indians
and Mexicans. In fact, so popular a writer
did May become under the Nazis, he was
known as the “Fuhrer’s Cowboy,” and a
Karl May Museum was opened under
Party auspices. In it were displayed
exhibits extolling the “Noble American
Savage,” and guides in period-costumes
held visitors enthralled with their retell-
ings of the Shatterhand-Winnetou saga.
May’s reputation survived the end of
Nazi Germany, and today the Karl May
Festival continues to be held annually
at Bad Segeberg, near Hamburg, and
post-war German cinema versions
of his books continue to delight
audiences. At least 70 biographies
of him have been penned as well.
His life was both successful and
unhappy. For instance, the 19-year-
old wife he married when he was
34 became the inspiration for the

50 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

 Then an even greater scandal broke
when it was revealed in the press that
he’d earlier spent seven years in a
German prison on fraud and theft charg-
es, and that it had actually been in that
cell the then unknown author had begun
his career. In fact, he was only allowed
to receive his first royalty payment
upon his release from incarceration.
He introduced Winnetou in a trio
of volumes in 1893, and it was the
popularity of that character that drove
the sales that enabled him to buy a villa
in Radebeul, outside Dresden. He later
named that property after his most
famous character, the frontiersman
Old Shatterhand (Hitler’s favorite). The
house had a library filled with stuffed
exotic animals, shotguns and hookahs,
all devoted to the glorification of his
characters. It was in his library his imagi-
nation was given full rein, and his own
voracious reading included travel works
along with specialist books and lexicons.
May wrote during an era of world-
wide adventurism. Not only was there
the ongoing exploration and conquest
of the American West, but also Stanley’s
trips to Africa, and Chancellor Otto
von Bismarck’s trio of wars (1864 with
Denmark, 1866 with Austria-Hungary,
and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71)
to unite the new German Reich.
May’s German readers were thrilled
by those stirring events, and wanted to
emulate the heroes of those times, espe-
cially the German ones. Of course, many
of them actually worked in the dreary
factories of the emerging industrial
revolution, and thus May’s tales pro-
vided the perfect escapist literature they
craved. The writer had met his market.
The “Fuhrer’s Cowboy” died at age 70
on 30 March 1912, never having heard
of or met the future Nazi leader (who
was then a poor and failing artist in
Vienna), but May’s influence was felt for
decades afterward. Perhaps he realized
his broader effect, as the last words he
uttered on his deathbed were: “Victory!
Great victory! I see everything rosy red!”
—Blaine Taylor
Strategic
Backwaters
The Liberation of Vichy
Madagascar
Madagascar is an island off the
eastern coast of Africa. At 226,597 square
miles, it’s the fourth-largest island in the
world (slightly larger than France), being
some 1,000 miles long and 300 miles
across at its broadest. After a cultural
history that began in the seventh cen-
tury AD, European interaction started
around 1500 with Portuguese seafarers.
From 1774 to 1824 Madagascar was
a favorite basing location for pirates,
while the native Merina kings began to
establish hegemony over most of the
island beginning in the 1790s. British
influence, in the wake of a treaty with
the British governor of Mauritius to
abolish the slave trade in 1817, brought
increasing Christian conversion.
In 1828 Queen Ranavalona I
“the Cruel” came to power, and
over the course of her 33-year rule
outlawed Christianity and killed an
estimated 150,000 believers. France
invaded in 1883. Continuing French
operations resulted in their conquest
of northern Madagascar, specifically
Antsiranana (Diego Suarez, one of the
finest natural harbors in the world,
desired by France as a coaling station)
in 1885, and by 1890 there was full
British recognition of Madagascar as
a French protectorate. By 1895 French
forces managed to finally secure the
native capital of Antananarivo, at a
cost of over 6,000 French casualties
(only 200 from combat, the rest to
disease). The Merina dynasty formally
ended in 1896 by being sent into exile
in Algeria. That was followed by official
French annexation of Madagascar.
Prior to World War II, Madagascar
was an imperial backwater despite
its size and location. Its only claim
to fame during the early 20th century
came from the fact the Russian Second
Fleet anchored and resupplied at
Diego Suarez on its way to oblivion
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 51
at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. In
July 1940, with the assumption of
power by the government of Marshal
Petain in Vichy, Madagascar declared
its loyalty to that new regime.
The Vichy Governor General,
Armand Leon Annet, had at his
disposal approximately 8,000 troops,
of whom 2,000 were French and the
rest a mix of native Malagache and
Senegalese organized into two regi-
ments (Regiments Mixtes Malgaches),
each of three battalions. Artillery was
limited and light: 65mm mountain gun
sections in the regiments, eight coastal
batteries of World War I-era 75mm guns
along with some 80mm guns dating
from the 1870s, and all augmented
by a few old FT17 “tankettes” armed
with machineguns and 37mm guns.
Air assets came from the Group
Aerien Mixte, mostly based at the capital
but with an 11-plane detachment at
Diego Suarez. The group was divided
into two squadrons, Escadrille 565
and Escadrille 555, totaling between
them 17 Morane-406 fighters and
10 Potez-63 light bombers, along
with a small number of Potez-25 and
Potez-29 used for casualty evacuation.
Naval assets were likewise
limited, consisting of five sub-
marines, two armed merchant
cruisers and two armed sloops.
That total force was tiny in compari-
son to the size of Madagascar, and thus
it can be said the island was indefensible
and, moreover, Vichy knew it.
Great Britain, after the fall of France
in June 1940 and well into 1941, was
badly over-stretched, desperately trying
to recreate an army in the UK, fight air
and sea campaigns to preserve those
islands, and conduct a mobile campaign
in North Africa while also securing the
Middle East, India and the colonies
in Southeast Asia. Madagascar was
recognized as a potential problem by the
London government, primarily over the
concern the outstanding harbor of Diego
Suarez might fall into hostile hands.
The ruthless Japanese exploitation
of the Vichy position in Indochina, in
Observation Post
order to secure port and air facilities
there, created a fear they might also
impose on Vichy for possession
of Madagascar. The presence of
Japanese aircraft, submarines and
surface combatants would threaten
the British sea lines of communication
in the Indian Ocean between India,
Southeast Asia, the Atlantic and Suez.
The Free French were mainly
concerned with retaking French West
Africa during that time period. In
exploratory talks in mid-1941, De Gaulle
and the British concluded trying to get
the forces on Madagascar to defect to
52 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
the Allies was impossible, as they were
profoundly pro-Vichy and Anglophobic.
That didn’t stop the British from
sending a commando mission to
obtain intelligence and establish a spy
network on the island. (The most suc-
cessful British agent was Percy Mayer,
born a British subject on Mauritius
but naturalized French; he officially
represented Ford Motor Company on
Madagascar.) The mission’s initial report
stated: “The Vichy ruling elite was tough,
determined and loyal to Vichy. The
Nazis consider Madagascar to be one of
the colonies ‘most loyal’ to Vichy, and
the local natives should be considered
apathetic to any Allied propaganda as
they lack any leaders or initiative.”
The Japanese attacks in December
1941 and the subsequent fall of Hong
Kong, Malaya, Burma and Singapore
focused British attention on the
Indian Ocean, and on Madagascar
in particular. A plan was initiated in
London for an amphibious landing,
aimed primarily at taking the key port
and airstrip at Diego Suarez, leaving
the rest of the island to be secured
when circumstances permitted.
The official January 1942 “intelli-
gence appreciation” stated Diego Suarez,
on the eastern side of the narrow tip of
Madagascar, was “considered impregna-
ble from seaward, that a surprise landing
was impossible and that all approaches
were dominated by high ground eas-
ily defendable with well-sited coastal
guns in defilade from outside view.”
The port was on a narrow isthmus,
however; so if a force could be landed
on the west coast the port defenses
could be taken from the rear. The
western approaches were less well
defended, by only two light coastal
batteries and an offshore minefield,
because the French considered the
extreme navigational hazards of the
many uncharted rocks, reefs and islets,
along with unpredictable currents,
made that an impracticable route. The
British planners initially concurred
with that assessment, identifying the
western approach as too difficult. That
restricted entry to the well-defended
eastern approach. The officers in charge
of the planning therefore directed any
landing plan had to be based on the
western approach. The planning moved
back and forth on that basis under
the codename “Operation Bonus.”
Bonus, though, was almost
immediately cancelled in favor of
reinforcing India and North Africa, but
an amphibious rehearsal in Great Britain
was held in February, titled “Exercise
Charcoal.” Then, in early March 1942,
the British decrypted an intercepted
report from the Japanese ambassador
in Berlin that noted the Germans’
interest in seeing a Japanese occupation
of Madagascar. Despite covert Vichy
assurances from Adm. Francoise
Darlan that the garrison would resist
any Japanese occupation attempt,
the example of French Indochina and
Japanese advances in Burma persuaded
the British to resurrect Bonus. Unlike
previous operations, such as the failed
Dakar attack, no further coordination
was conducted with the Free French.
Taking advantage of a planned
troop convoy to reinforce Ceylon, the
29th Infantry Brigade, already trained
and aboard amphibious assault ships
in the Clyde estuary, supplemented by
the 5th Royal Marine Commando, was
designated as the invasion force. The
under-trained 17th and 13th Infantry
Brigades were provided as follow-on
forces, amphibious instruction to be
provided them by selected officers
from 29th Brigade and 5th Commando
while en route to Madagascar.
As the Home Island Fleet could
spare no significant warships, the
convoy would pick up most of its naval
support from Force H out of Gibraltar,
which included the battleship Ramillies,
the aircraft carriers Illustrious and
Indomitable, the cruisers Devonshire
and Hermione, along with 11 destroyers,
six corvettes and six minesweepers. The
whole assemblage was designated Force
121, the combined naval/ground force
was Force F, and the invasion was code-
named Operation Ironclad. The British
had thereby managed to bring together
46 ships, 86 aircraft and 14,000 soldiers.
Having departed on 23 March,
Force F began the invasion at 2:00 a.m.
on 5 May 1942. Reluctant to fire the
first shot, the destroyer HMS Lighting
silently led a flotilla of minesweepers
amid the reefs of Courrier Bay, assisted
by commandos who’d sailed in a yacht
to place lights in the channels. By
4:30 a.m. the mines were swept and
landing craft had begun to debark Royal
Marines on the beach, having taken the
few defenders by surprise. (Actually,
agent Mayer had cut the telephone line
between the coastal batteries and Diego
Suarez, leaving the French gunners
isolated and unsure what to do).
Simultaneously, 29th Brigade began
landing at beaches in Ambararata
Bay and Bassin Point. By 8:00 a.m.
most of the assault force was ashore
and advancing on Diego Suarez.
An initial and hurried effort by the
Welch Fusiliers of 29th Brigade to roll
over the defenders failed, as the by then
alert Frenchmen had manned their
defenses, which were based on two old
but well concealed forts connected by
a line of trenches a mile long and sup-
ported by anti-tank ditches, well-sited
machineguns and two concrete pill
boxes with 75mm guns. Those defenses
were flanked by mangrove swamps on
one side and by the sea on the other.
Of the five light tanks 29th Brigade off-
loaded, four were destroyed or disabled
by fire from the French 75s. A second
and more coordinated attack was put
in later in the day, but it also failed. To
top off that failure, the corvette HMS
Auricula struck a mine, sinking with
no loss of life. (She would be the only
British ship lost in the operation.)
On the morning of 6 May, carrier
air strikes and naval gunfire preceded a
brigade attack in which local penetra-
tions were made, but the overall effort
failed. Stymied, the commander of
Force 121 began plans for a night assault
to be carried out sometime between
6:00 p.m. (sunset) and 11:00 p.m.
(moonrise). Simultaneously, a landing
party of 50 Royal Marines would be
sent directly into the port, delivered by
HMS Anthony. Neither the ship nor the
Marines were expected to survive, but
it was thought they would contribute a
critical diversion. The French submarine
Beveziers was meanwhile sunk near
Diego Suarez by torpedo-bombers from
Illustrious, in what turned out to be
the pre-invasion’s only naval action.
Just after 8:00 p.m. the Anthony ran
the gauntlet of shore batteries to place
her stern against the jetty and, as the
Marines quickly disembarked, she fired
her guns to suppress French machine-
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 53
gun fire. As the Marines landed, 17th and
29th Brigades began the prepared assault.
The French defense held initially, even
though by that time they’d suffered
approximately 25 percent casualties.
The Marine diversion then actually
worked to dislocate the defense, as
those men captured the artillery
headquarters, set several fires in the
town, took the French Naval Depot
and seized large quantities of weapons.
They also found and released some 50
previously captured British soldiers,
the crew of a downed torpedo-bomber
as well as agent Mayer, who’d been
captured the day before and had been
sentenced to death for the following day.
The French began to retreat, and
by 3:00 a.m. Diego Suarez and the sur-
rounding area was in the possession of
the British. With the securing of the port
and airstrip, the British were in no hurry
to conduct further pursuit. On the 7th
and 8th the Royal Navy sank two French
submarines, the Le Heros by aircraft
from the Illustrious, and the Monge by
the destroyers Active and Panther.
The 13th Infantry Brigade was
withdrawn to India by 20 May, and
the 17th followed by 10 June. The 29th
remained at Diego Suarez until the
22nd East African Brigade arrived on 8
June. The South African 7th Motorized
Infantry Brigade came in on 24 June,
and the Northern Rhodesian 27th
Infantry Brigade landed on 8 August.
As the French didn’t surrender, but
engaged in a campaign of delay, both
the 29th and 27th Brigades conducted a
further amphibious landing at Majunga
on 10 September. Twenty-Seventh
Brigade ultimately advanced to the
capital before accepting the French
surrender on 8 November 1942.
The island was formally turned over
to the Free French on 7 January 1943.
Total casualties amounted to about
150 Vichy French killed in action, with
another 500 wounded. The British lost
107 KIA, 280 wounded, and another
233 deaths from all other causes.
— Vernie Liebl
Observation Post

Compare & Army Air Force) expansion eventually Upon the country’s entry into the
Contrast sped past that of the Navy despite war, the Navy high command thought
earlier legislative considerations. it a joke when the Army announced
US & Japanese Pilot Army commanders were at first its intention of having 50,000 pilots
Selection Methods most concerned that the siphoning trained and combat-ready by mid-
off, through lend-lease, of large 1942; however, the USAAF almost
American military planners, real- numbers of aircraft to Great Britain succeeded in achieving that quota.
izing the value of competent personnel and the Soviet Union would cut into In fact, before the end of 1943 the
in their newly developing combat air the number available for our own actual number had swollen to 83,000.
arms, spared no effort in the training immediate use, especially if either That expanding manpower reservoir
of Army, Navy and Marine pilots. of those nations fell to the Nazis, as eventually enabled the US to rotate
In-service transfers to flight training, appeared possible in 1941–1942. pilots out of action before they became
academy graduates, a large reservoir
of reservists and, early-on, a few non-
commissioned pilots, filled the ranks of
the growing Allied air fleets that were
so instrumental in winning the war.
At the time of the US entry into
the war, the Navy had a larger cadre
of trained pilots than did the Army.
That was due to the fact that in 1935
Congress had passed the Naval Aviation
Cadet Act, which had paved the way
for that service to recruit airmen from
college campuses. Those who made it
through training were commissioned
as ensigns and spent the next three
years on active duty. By the time of
Pearl Harbor, half the fleet’s aircrews
were composed of that reserve and, as
the war progressed, more and more of
those ex-collegians were promoted into
command roles as it became apparent
flying ability was more important
than an academy background.
Prior to 1942 almost all squadron
and group commanders had been
academy graduates, but it was soon
obvious that approach wouldn’t be
able to provide sufficient numbers of
trained airmen to satisfy the growing
demand. Aerial combat units therefore
came to be composed of a constantly
growing percentage of men who’d
never attended any academy, but
who’d simply joined the air services
directly. That approach worked, and
the huge US task forces than began to
overwhelm the Japanese in 1943 and
1944 were manned predominantly
by activated reservists who were well
trained and battle tested.
The US Army Air Corps (and then

54 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

terminally over-stressed. Those
returned veterans then became a valu-
able source of knowledge for the pilots-
in-training. Japanese air power was
increasingly swamped by American
air units staffed by well-trained and
periodically rotating combat personnel
in numbers they couldn’t match.
Even after 1939, when war with
the US began to appear unavoidable,
the Japanese military had remained
extremely selective in the men it
accepted for flight training. The result
was, by the time of Pearl Harbor, the
pool of trained pilots in the Japanese
air arms was still relatively small.
Among other reasons, the absurdly
high standards demanded from pilot
recruits led to Japan’s available comple-
ment of trained pilots being much
smaller than it otherwise could’ve been
when it was most needed in 1941–1942.
For example, after the war, Japanese
Ace Saburo Sakai (64 victories) recalled
that when he entered flight training
in 1937 only 75 cadets graduated out
of his class of 1,500 (five percent).
Sakai also blamed the prewar
emphasis on absurd training proce-
dures that proved not only unnecessary
but, except for a few, were virtually
impossible to pass. The grueling regi-
men included hanging from the top of
a high pole by one hand, holding one’s
breath underwater for excruciatingly
long stretches, walking long distances
on one’s hands, standing for lengthy
periods on one’s head, and diving off
an elevated platform onto the ground.
Though Sakai didn’t decry the result
of such training procedures — admit-
ting they developed an “amazing sense
of balance and muscular coordination”
in the few resultant airmen — there
was also no denying they had the fatal
result of creating only a much-too-
small cadre of graduates by the time
war came with America. Though the
men flying into combat understood
the problem and repeatedly pointed
it out to their superiors, Japan’s air
commanders were arrogantly slow to
begin discarding those fatal policies.
The Japanese Army Air Force
also suffered from the effects of that
outmoded approach, especially as
America brought to bear more and
more of its industrial and manpower
capacities. That did eventually force
Japan’s air arms to begin rushing cadets
through flight training. After the war
the chief of staff of the 51st Training
Division told his US interrogators:
[We] had approximately 2,000 pilots
with 300 hours training in 1941.
Shortages of training personnel
kept a buildup down until 1943.
By the end of 1943 we had 5,000
pilots; however, the quality of the
pilots steadily decreased as the war
progressed. Originally students had
100 hours of primary training, but
that was shortened to 30. We needed
pilots in a hurry. Also, fuel shortages
began. We assigned more and more
cadets to become instructors, and
thus instructors were not as good.
We tried to find men who were
wounded and could not fly combat
for that [instructor] role. We also
used school graduates not up to the
rigors of combat for instruction.
As mentioned, veteran US pilots,
after becoming expert combat airmen,
were rotated back to the States to
serve as instructors who continually
improved and updated the training of
the recruits. Japan rarely sent its best
pilots home to share their knowledge,
believing they were more valuable
when kept in action. That policy
resulted in cadets in the home islands
receiving second-rate instruction,
while the pool of the best airmen was
steadily whittled down by attrition.
Capt. Takeshi Mieno, director of
training for the Japanese Naval Air
Force, told American interrogators
late in 1945 that during the war his
academy’s washout rate dropped from
40 percent to five percent as the high
command came to terms with reality.
—Kelly Bell
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 55
Mysteries Revealed
Little Ship — Big Story
The USS Isabel, built as a private
yacht in 1917, was converted into a
navy patrol boat to combat German
U-boats during the Great War. Two
hundred forty-five feet long with a 28
foot beam, she was fitted with four
3-inch deck guns, torpedo tubes and
depth charge racks, and was then
sent out take part in protecting the
Atlantic trade routes. Four years after
the war she was refitted again, given a
white paint job and sent to assume a
new role as flagship of the US Asiatic
Fleet on the Yangtze Patrol in China.
Two decades later the Isabel was at
anchor in Manila Bay when her skipper,
Lt. John W. Payne, was summoned to the
office of Adm. Thomas C. Hart, there to
be given astonishing orders. It was the
morning of 3 December 1941, and the
atmosphere was charged with tension
as everyone was anticipating an attack
from the Japanese at any moment.
Within that larger context, Adm. Hart
had an impressive assignment for the
diminutive Isabel, as the following
priority order, dated 1 December,
from President Roosevelt relates:
President directs that the following be
done as soon as possible and within
two days if possible after receipt of this
dispatch. Charter three small vessels
to form a quote defensive information
patrol unquote. Minimum require-
ments to establish identity as a United
States man of war are command by
a naval officer and to mount a small
gun and one machinegun would suf-
fice. Filipino crews may be employed
with minimum number of naval
ratings to accomplish purpose which
is to observe and report by radio
Japanese movements in West China
Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be
stationed between Hainan and Hue
one vessel off the Indo-China coast
between Camranh Bay and Cape St.
Jaques and one vessel off Pointe de
Observation Post
Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by
president as one of these three but not
other naval vessels. Report measures
taken to carry out president’s views.
At the same time inform me as to
what reconnaissance measures are
being regularly performed at sea
by both army and navy whether by
air surface vessels or submarines
and your opinion as to the effective-
ness of these later measures.
That was an unusual presidential
order in several ways. First, it was
micromanagement of naval operations
to the point of dictating the armament,
crew and flagging of each vessel.
Second, it placed those vessels in
grave danger when the mission being
ordered was already being fulfilled
by more efficient and less risky aerial
reconnaissance. Finally, the instructions
and placements lead to the conclusion
the ships were expendable, yet they
were clearly also to be marked as US
56 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
men of war; so, if sunk by the Japanese,
that would constitute an act of war.
Few historians have ever believed
the president was willing to see the
Pacific Fleet destroyed in order to
gain a raison de guerre. Yet he might
conceivably have been willing to risk
sacrificing a few American officers
and Filipino crewmen to obtain an
excuse to make a declaration of war.
The Isabel set off late that day
on its mission to spy on Japanese
naval activity along the shores of
occupied French Indochina. The
official cover story was that she was
searching for a lost seaplane.
She soon encountered an unflagged
tender, presumed to be Japanese, on
a course for Davao in the Philippines.
On the morning of 5 December
she was over-flown by a Japanese
floatplane about 170 miles off the
Indochina coast. Another ship was
sighted while the floatplane kept close
watch but made no offensive move.
Fortunately the Isabel was ordered
back to Manila that evening, where
she arrived the day the war began.
The Isabel had been considered
nonessential even prior to the beginning
of hostilities. In light of that status, she
was given several dangerous missions,
including guiding ships through Allied
minefields and escorting merchantmen
through enemy controlled areas as
they fled south from the advancing
Japanese Navy. Off Java, as she was
rescuing the survivors of a torpedoed
merchant ship, a torpedo narrowly
missed her. Isabel then set out to coun-
terattack that Japanese submarine
with gunfire and depth charges. In
cooperation with a Dutch PBY, she
damaged and may have sunk it.
On 2 March 1942 the Isabel became
the last US warship to leave Java, just as
Japanese invasion troops were closing in
from both ends of the island. Japanese
cruisers and carriers were patrolling off
the south coast to catch Allied ships as
they attempted to escape. Assigned to also being less of a military threat. simply defect back to the other side.
escort the last merchant ship to leave The first actual collaborationist The Chinese collaborationist
the southern harbor of Tjilatjap, Isabel units were recruited in the aftermath armies, while massive in their numbers,
also embarked the last of the US Navy of Japan’s conquest of Manchuria ultimately had little military effect on
staff to leave the island. Evading enemy on 1931, forming the basis for the their enemies. Their great significance
submarines, carrier and land-based Manchukuan Army. By the time of the came from the fact their existence
attack aircraft, the Isabel was fortunatestart of the Second Sino-Japanese War allowed the Japanese to prolong the
to gain the safety of Australia. in 1937, the Japanese fielded about time they could maintain a position
Isabel also held the dubious 50,000 Chinese troops. During the in China. Japan’s defeat in 1945 then
distinction of being present in Pacific War (1941–45), as the Japanese saw those forces turn into recruitment
several ports during the initial Japanesewere forced to shift veteran units from pools for both KMT and Communist
bombing attacks on those places. China to the Pacific and South Asia, forces, as they prepared for the final
Those target ports included Cavite in they massively expanded the Chinese struggle to control China. The following,
the Philippines, and the Indonesian collaborationist armies from about then, were the major formations.
ports of Tandjungpriok, Surabaja 100,000 men at the start of 1942 to some
and Palembang. At Cavite, Isabel was 2 million by the end of the war in 1945. Manchukuan Army. After the
even credited with shooting down a The motivations for Chinese to Japanese invasion of Manchuria on
strafing Zero. The lucky ship served turn traitor varied widely. Some joined 18 February 1932, they began to raise
out the remainder of the war as an because of regional separatism; many an army of local conscripts to help
anti-submarine auxiliary in Fremantle, joined as part of KMT (Kuomintang them control the population. The first
Australia, before being scrapped in 1946.Nationalists Party) units that defected soldiers came from former troops of
whole-cloth to the Japanese. (Soldiers the pre-invasion ruler of Manchuria,
— Ken MacFarlane in KMT units were, in general, more Chang Hsueh-Liang. Accordingly, the
loyal to their unit commanders than early actions of the Manchukuan Army
Dirty Little Secrets to the national political and military were to suppress local anti-Japanese
leadership of the overall Chinese Army.) partisans. By 1935 the Japanese had
Chinese Collaborationist Most, though, simply joined to get a ramped up their training, kicked out cor-
Forces in World War II job in order to feed their families. rupt and unreliable officers, reorganized
The Japanese mostly used them units along Japanese lines, and provided
One of the still under-reported to garrison captured Chinese terri- Japanese equipment and “advisors” at all
aspects of World War II in Asia was the tory and to aid in counterinsurgency levels. The Japanese also provided some
fact the Japanese were able to field operations. Collaborationist units rarely heavy artillery, armor and aircraft. They
around 2 million native troops to fight fought on the front line, since it was expanded the Manchukuan Army from
for them in China. While they were feared they would defect. 80,000 men in 1935 to 500,000 in 1945.
mostly of poor quality, because of their In general, with the notable That relatively good treatment of a
massive numbers, they still contributed exception of the Manchukuan Army, collaborationist force by the Japanese
significantly to the Japanese war effort most collaborationist units were also was unusual; they undertook the
in China by providing garrison and deliberately kept at the bottom of the approach in order to bolster the defense
anti-partisan units that freed Japanese supply chain. They were poorly armed, of Manchuria against the possibility
troops to fight on the front lines. many with only melee weapons or ones of attack by Soviet armies from the
Chinese collaborationist forces captured from partisans. Units that had north. Even after all those efforts, the
varied widely in quality, from reason- defected from the KMT were allowed Manchukuan Army was still of generally
ably well equipped and well trained to keep their weapons and equipment, poor quality, with only a few regiments
Manchukuan units to Inner Mongolian but they were then given little resupply within it gradually coming to be
cavalry that was too poorly armed and from their new Japanese masters. considered combat worthy. Those rela-
motivated to have any real combat value. Some collaborationist units even tively elite units ranged from the Capital
Even before the war, starting in the fell into part-time banditry simply Guard (bodyguards of the puppet-
1920s, the Japanese had meddled in to maintain themselves. There were Emperor Pu-Yi), the Eastern Jewels Anti-
China by gaining influence with various also instances when collaborationist Bandit Regiment (itself composed of for-
regional warlords by means of offering units loaned or rented their weapons mer bandits and commanded by Yoshiko
military and economic support. The to local partisans. The Japanese didn’t Kawashima, a Manchu princess), and
Japanese did that believing a Balkanized move to stop any of that because they the Asano Brigade (White Russians
China would be easier to exploit while feared the collaborationists might then recruited to perform reconnaissance

World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 57

Observation Post
and sabotage behind Soviet lines).
In addition to fighting partisans,
then, the Manchukuan Army also
fought Soviet forces in various
border clashes. Most notably, the army
fought in the Nomonhan campaign
(May–September 1939), where they
performed poorly and suffered
3,000 casualties (with another 200
Manchukuans defecting to the Soviets).
The Manchukuan Army was
destroyed during the Soviet invasion
of Manchuria in August 1945. Its units
quickly collapsed and surrendered to
the invaders, with some even turning to
attack nearby Japanese units. By the end
of the campaign the Soviets had inflicted
70,000 casualties on the Manchukuans.
After the war some former Manchukuan
units were reorganized by the Chinese
Communists. While still of poor
quality, they were enough to aid them
in weathering the first Nationalist
attacks of the follow-on civil war.
Inner Mongolian Army. This force
was established in 1929 by Mongolian
Prince Teh Wang. Originally it was allied
to Chiang Kai Shek, but by 1936 it had
been co-opted by the Japanese, and
it took part in a rebellion within the
Inner Mongolian provinces to break
away from KMT rule. By the start of
the Second Sino-Japanese War, the
Inner Mongolian Army had expanded
to 20,000 cavalry. Armed and advised
by the Japanese, the army aided in
their conquest of Inner Mongolia and
took part in battles in North China.
By 1940, along with all other col-
laborationist armies in China except
the Manchukuan, the Inner Mongolian
Army was placed within the unified
command of the Wang Jing Wei govern-
ment (the rough Chinese equivalent
to France’s Vichy regime, though real
power still lay only with the Japanese).
From then until the end of the war
the army provided only garrison and
anti-partisan units in Inner Mongolia.
The Inner Mongolian Army was
destroyed during the Soviet invasion of
Inner Mongolia in August 1945. At that
58 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
time they fought hard enough to stall
the Red Army advance for two days.
East Hopei Army. This force was
established in 1935 by the Japanese to
serve as a “peace preservation force”
for their Chinese buffer state of East
Hopei, following clashes between
KMT and Japanese forces south of the
Great Wall in 1933. This 5,000-man
army mutinied against its Japanese
masters on the eve of the Second
Sino-Japanese War on 29 July 1937.
The mutineers rampaged across East
Hopei, massacring Japanese civilians
and temporarily disrupting the Japanese
invasion of Northern China. After a
few weeks the East Hopei Army was
destroyed and was never reorganized.
Nanking Army. By early 1939,
Japanese-occupied China had been
divided into regions controlled by
nominally independent “puppet”
governments. Wang Jing Wei had been
Chiang Kai Shek’s most influential
rival within the KMT since the days
of Sun Yat Sen. Wang had repeatedly
tried to oust Chiang as leader of the
KMT. The final break came in 1938
when, in the aftermath of a failed
assassination attempt, Wang Jing Wei
simply defected to the Japanese.
By 1940 the Japanese were trying to
undermine the KMT politically as well
as militarily. Along that line they saw
Wang as a potentially strong counter
to Chiang Kai Shek, a man who could
unite the anti-Chiang factions in the
KMT while also still remaining under
their control. To assist Wang in that
endeavor the Japanese, on 30 March
1940, reorganized all the various puppet
regimes (except for Manchukuo) under
the newly formed Nanking Government
with him as its leader. By 1945, through
defection and conscription, the Nanking
Army had around 1 million men, all
merely on garrison or anti-partisan duty.
At the end of the war in 1945,
Chiang Kai Shek took revenge on the
Nanking Government by executing
their entire civilian leadership (around
2,700 men). Wang, however, escaped
Chiang’s vengeance by dying of
natural causes on 10 November 1944.
Chiang contented himself by later
blowing up his tomb and burning his
corpse. The fighting men and military
leadership of the Nanking Army were
conscripted into the Nationalist Army
and were soon thereafter thrown into
battle against the Communists.
The Japanese also formed small air
forces and navies for the Manchukuan
and Nanking regimes. Those were
mainly for show and to bolster the
seeming legitimacy of the puppet
governments. The Manchukuan Air
Force consisted of two-dozen second-
rate Japanese aircraft (Ki-27 fighters and
Ki-21 bombers). A Manchurian airline
was also formed, and it served for both
civilian and military transport.
The Nanking Government also had a
small air force consisting of a dozen
planes (most were non-combat train-
ers, but it also boasted two Tupolev
SB bombers that had defected from
the KMT). The Manchukuan Navy
consisted of two-dozen gunboats. The
Nanking Navy was of similar size and
composition, but also had two former
KMT light cruisers, the Ning Hai and the
Ping Hai, which had been captured and
turned over by the Japanese in 1937.

— Terence Co

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World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 59

Media Reviews
Leningrad 1941-44: The Epic Siege,
by Robert Forcyzk
(Osprey Publishing, 2009).
Reviewed by Andrew Hind
F
or a period of 900 days the
Russian city of Leningrad was
besieged by forces of Germany’s
Army Group North, resulting in one
of the most brutal campaigns on the
eastern front during World War II.
Over two years, German forces stran-
gled the city by land and sea, pounded
it from the air and with artillery.
60 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011
For their part the Soviets launched
repeated and costly offensives to
relieve the city’s 2.5 million citizens
and its garrison. The result was more
than 1.5 million Soviets dead from
combat, disease and starvation, a
staggering total. Yet despite the mas-
sive casualties, the epic endurance of
the fighting men on both sides, and
the symbolism of Leningrad to the
Soviet regime, the siege has received
little attention in the West. This book,
number 215 in Osprey’s Campaign
series, aims to redress that imbalance.
Forcyzk weaves a three year saga
into a book of only 96 pages, and
still manages to go beyond a mere
retelling of events to provide strategic
and operation insight. That’s no small
feat.  The accounts of the battles are
by necessity concise, and yet readers
still come away with an appreciation
of the opposing sides’ objectives
and the challenges faced in trying to
achieve them. We grow to respect the
professional skill of the German forces
masterfully fighting a defensive battle
against increasingly overwhelming
odds, as well as the dogged determina-
tion of the Soviet soldier repeatedly
thrown into bloody battles doomed
to failure by commanders bowing
to political pressure from Stalin.
Highlights include examinations of
German defensive tactics and how
weather and terrain shaped the
campaign. Of course, as always with
Osprey’s Campaign releases, Leningrad
is lavishly illustrated with photos, maps
and three-dimensional bird’s-eye-
views of the battles as they unfolded.
The nature of the Campaign
series unfortunately works against
this book. The Leningrad siege is too
epic to comfortably fit within a single
book of less than 100 pages. Rather
than a single campaign, as is typically
covered in each book in this series,
the siege is more properly seen as a
sequence of half-a-dozen campaigns
undertaken over three years. As a
result, and despite Forcyzk’s skill at
condensing material and his mastery
of the subject, the topic would’ve been
better served by two or three volumes
allowing for greater depth. The only
other drawback is the placement of the
maps and “bird’s-eye-views.” In several
cases there was a considerable distance
between them and their related text,
resulting in much page flipping. That’s
a minor quibble, but one that nonethe-
less needlessly breaks up the narrative.
Leningrad 1941-44 is is an
outstanding book for anyone even
remotely interested in World War II.
It demonstrates remarkable depth of
analysis for its modest size. Forcyzk is
a strong storyteller who manages to
convey the savagery of the fighting.

Operation Nordwind:
Hitler’s Last Offensive in the West,
by Stephen J. Zaloga
(Osprey Publishing, 2010).
Reviewed by Andrew Hind
By 1945 strategically decisive
offensive action by the German armed
forces was no longer an option, but that
didn’t keep an increasingly delusional
Hitler from trying to get such results.
This is the story of the German
Army’s final offensive against the
Western Allies. Operation Nordwind
(Northwind) is one of the lesser known
campaigns of World War II, having been
overshadowed by the Battle of the Bulge
farther north, but Nordwind was none-
theless a serious threat to Allied opera-
tions and it makes a fascinating story.
In the waning hours of New Years
Eve 1944, the Germans launched
an offensive intended to exploit the
disruptions caused by the Ardennes
attack in Belgium. At stake was Alsace,
a border region that had been a bone
of contention between France and
Germany for the past century. The
result was a series of battles over two
Proud
Monster
deluxe
weeks that were so violent one panzer
commander called them the fiercest
ever fought on the Western Front.
While Nordwind has been well
examined in German and French
sources, English-language books on
the subject are rare. This book therefore
makes a welcome addition to World War
II literature. Zaloga does an excellent job
of recounting not only how the battle
progressed, but why it played out as it
did. He spends considerable space ana-
lyzing the depleted state of the German
Army at the end of 1944, and how politi-
cal-infighting within the Reich further
undermined the capabilities it still had.
Allied operations in Alsace were also
effected by political considerations.
When the Germans launched Nordwind,
Eisenhower wanted to withdraw the
overstretched American forces to more Experience the vastness of
defensible positions until the more Russia in this broad sweeping
crucial Ardennes situation was decided; treatment of the War in Russia.
however, to abandon the newly liberated
provincial capital of Strasbourg was This is a redesigned and
unimaginable for the French. That argu- developed edition of the original
ment resulted in a political firestorm that
Proud Monster and Death and
forced a reconsideration of the Allied
plan for dealing with the German attack.
Destruction, originally published
Zaloga also stresses the implica- in Command Magazine.
tions of Hitler’s ill-fated attack for the
Germans: Nordwind deprived them Both games have been
of the time and resources needed to retooled to work seamlessly
prepare for the battle for Germany, and as one monster game.
caused two of their field armies to be
Coming
fatally weakened. The result was seen
in Patton’s lighting advance through
SpRing 2011
southern Germany in April and
May, when German forces in that
area were no longer capable of
posing serious resistance.
I would have liked more material Visit
in the section The Battlefield Today, www.compassgames.com
perhaps at the expense of the related noW to order this game.
but separate battles for the Colmar
Pocket which followed Nordwind.
This is an excellent and concise study
on a little known yet important cam-
paign. Find room for it on your shelf.  ★
World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 61
Land Without End
The Barbarossa Campaign
Land Without End:
The Barbarossa Campaign, 1941
is a two-player, low-to-intermediate
complexity, strategic-level
simulation of the German attempt
to conquer the Soviet Union
in 1941. The German player is
on the offensive, attempting to
win the game by rapidly seizing
key cities. The Soviet player
is primarily on the defensive,
but the situation also requires
he prosecute counterattacks
throughout much of the game.
Game play encompasses the
period that began with the Germans
launching their attack on 22 June
1941, and ends on 7 December of
the same year. By that time it had
become clear the invaders had
shot their bolt without achieving
their objectives. The game may end
sooner than the historic termination
time if the German player is able to
advance so quickly he causes the
overall political, socio-economic and
military collapse of the Soviet Union.
Each hexagon on the map
represents approximately 20 miles
(32 km) from side to opposite side.
The units of maneuver for both sides
are primarily divisions, along with
Axis-satellite and Soviet corps (and
one army) of various types. The
effects of the general air superiority
enjoyed by the Germans throughout
the campaign are built into the
movement and combat rules. Each
game turn represents one week.
Players familiar with other
strategic-level east front designs
will note the unique aspects of
LWE lie in its rules governing the
treatment of supply, the capture
of Moscow, and the Stalin line.

Contents:
One 22x34” Map,
700 Die-cut Counters,
Rule Book
Retail price: $50.00

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com

62 World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011

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#17 APR–MAY 2011

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World at War 17 | APR−MAY 2011 63

HURTGEN

CO
Go
to

MIde
ci
ios
Hell’s Forest

ng
NG am
es
.c
om

SO fo
rp
THE road to the Rhine seemed open in the early fall of 1944. The German armies in France were beaten and streaming back to the Reich, pursued

le
dg
by the Allied armies. First US Army hit the Westwall on 12 September and was destined to slog through mud and rain for months against

ON ei
nf
the fortifications and German reserves thrown against them. Lack of supply served to further restrain the American advance.

or
m
at

! io
HURTGEN: Hell’s Forest is a grand-tactical simulation of that enormous campaign. The 2,240 counters represent every formation, at company

n.
and battalion levels, which fought in the battle, including US, German, British and Belgian units. Infantry, armor, anti-tank, reconnaissance,
engineer, assault gun, howitzer, rocket, parachute, ranger, glider and headquarters units are all fully represented. The two maps are an accurate
representation of the area and were compiled from 1944 German staff maps and 1943-44 US Army maps. The area portrayed shows all roads,
trails and other types of terrain in relation to their suitability for armor and infantry, along with all the villages, towns and cities that were the
bastions of the German defense, as well as every creek and river that couldn’t be crossed by wheeled vehicles without a bridge.

THERE are three scenarios representing each of the offensive periods of September, October and November. A smaller
learning scenario depicts the US 28th Infantry Division’s ordeal as it attempted to drive on the Roer River dams.

YOU may also play continuously from September to the first week of December. The challenge for the Allied player is too see if
he can reach the Rhine ahead of the historic date. Extensive supply, weather and air power rules are included.

THIS latest edition of the Grand Operational Simulation Series presents refinements to the combat, artillery and supply systems in order to better depict tactical
and operational warfare. For example, rules for “lulls” have been added to allow players to speed play during periods of inactivity. Those lulls compress play
from three turns per day to one, allowing players to cover longer intervals of historic time. Other additions feature level-two entrenchments that create bastions
in towns and cities that can better withstand barrages and ground assaults, along with rules representing the logistical nightmare faced by the Americans.

THE orders of battle have been researched in order to provide an accurate depiction of the armies of both sides.
The ad hoc nature of the German army is shown via the various rear area and replacement battalions that appear.

GAME COMPONENTS
• 2 22x34” Four Color Mapsheets
• 2,240 Die-Cut Playing Pieces
• One Rule Booklet
• One Scenario Booklet
• Player Aid Charts
• Two 10-sided Dice
• Storage Bags

SCALE
• Map: 1 mile per hex
• Time: 3 Game Turns per day
• Units: Infantry and Artillery are battalions.
Armor is depicted at the company level.
• Each strength step is equal to a company.

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com