Margery Roana F.

Carreon

Norton Resources and Development Corp. vs All Asia Bank Corp.

GR NO. 162523 Nov. 25, 2009

Facts:
Norton entered in a Loan Agreement with All Asia Bank for the amount of P3.8M for the construction of 160 housing
units, the Home Financing Corp, as guarantor. To speed up the processing of all documents necessary for the release
of the funds, petitioner allegedly offered respondent a service/commitment fee of 320k for the construction of the
housing units or at 2k per unit. The offer having been accepted, both parties executed a MOA on the same date.

Petitioner was not able to complete the construction and failed to pay its loan obligation. HFC paid only 2.9M but
withhold the 250k. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against respondent
with the RTC. Petitioner alleged that the P320,000.00 commitment/service fee mentioned in the MOA was to be paid
on a per-unit basis at P2,000.00 per unit. Inasmuch as only 35 housing units were constructed, petitioner posited that
it was only liable to pay P70,000.00 and not the whole amount of P320,000.00, which was deducted in advance from
the proceeds of the loan.

Issue:
WHETHER THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) REFLECTS THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.

HELD:
Yes. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly provides:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony
or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement
has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which,
to all purposes, would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood
to have been waived and abandoned. None of the above-cited exceptions finds application in this case, more
particularly the alleged failure of the MOA to express the true intent and agreement of the parties concerning the
commitment/service fee of P320,000.00.

DULCE PAMINTUAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172820 June 23, 2010

TOPIC: Best Evidence rule

FACTS:
Pamintuan received from Jeremia’s a diamond ring worth P765,000.00 on the condition that it would be sold on
commission basis.
At the time she received the ring, Pamintuan signed a document entitled Katibayan, authorizing the sale of the ring
under the following express conditions: the petitioner was to sell the ring for cash and with an overprice as her profit,
and remit the full payment to Jeremias; she would not entrust the ring to anybody; and if unsold within three days,
she must return the ring, or pay for it in cash.
Pamintuan failed to remit payment for the diamond ring despite the lapse of the agreed period. Neither did she
return the diamond ring.
At the trial, Jeremia offered in evidence the Katibayan which was acknowledged by Pamintuan

ISSUE:
WON the Katibayan is admissible to establish the nature of their transaction.
HELD:
YES. Under the circumstances, the best evidence to ascertain the nature of the parties’ diamond ring transaction is
the Katibayan which is the written evidence of their agreement that should be deemed to contain all the terms they
agreed upon.
Under the parol evidence rule, no additional or contradictory terms to this written agreement can be admitted to
show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.
Thus, the terms of the Katibayan should be the prevailing terms of the transaction between the parties, not any oral
or side agreement the petitioner alleged.
In this regard that the post-Katibayan acts of the parties strengthened, rather than negated, the Katibayan terms,
particularly the petitioner’s obligation to return the diamond ring; otherwise, she would not have attempted to return
the value of the ring when the criminal complaint was filed against her, nor secured the execution of the mortgage
deed, had no such obligation existed.

Financial Building Corporation vs. Bloomfield Educational Foundation, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 164186, October 4, 2010

TOPIC: Parol Evidence

FACTS: Sometime in October 1985, Rudlin International Corporation (Rudlin) invited proposals from several
contractors to undertake the construction of a three-storey school building and other appurtenances thereto at Vista
Grande, BF Resort Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The contract was eventually awarded to Financial Building
Corporation (FBC). Rudlin and FBC executed their contract and subsequently made amendments to their Construction
Agreement dated November 22, 1985 through a Letter-Agreement which provided for completion date not later
than April 30, 1986 unless an extension of time has been authorized and approved by the OWNER and the ARCHITECT
in writing.
On June 15, 1986, the subject school building, Bloomfield Academy, was inaugurated and utilized by Rudlin. FBC
demanded payment of the balance of the adjusted contract price per its computation, but it was not heeded by Rudlin.
On March 10, 1987, FBC filed in the RTC a suit for a sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment against
Rudlin, Bloomfield Educational Foundation, Inc. (Bloomfield) and their officers, directors or stockholders.
For its part, Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, however, it qualified. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states “When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written
agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement. The term agreement includes wills.”
In the present case, Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception obtains
only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties
cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter
of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them
when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the
instrument.
Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlins evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed
to by the parties after the execution of the contract.

People v Bascugin
Facts:
Bascugin was charged with rape with homicide. On his first arraignment, With the assistance of his counsel de oficio,
Bascugin pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The prosecution presented testimonial, object, and documentary
evidence, while the defense offered no contest. The trial court adjudged him guilty of the charge beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced him to death.
In the automatic review by the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bascugin challenged the
proceedings in the trial court, specifically the invalid arraignment of Bascugin. They contended that the consultation
made by the counsel de oficio was hasty.
Bascugin was once again arraigned. With assistance from his counsel de oficio, he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution
asked the court to adopt the testimonies previously given in the first trial.Before the prosecution could rest its case,
the defense manifested that Bascugin wishes to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. The trial court set his re-
arraignment to September 29, 2003 to allow him more time to consider his plea. Upon motion of the prosecution,
Bascugin was placed on the witness stand. He affirmed that he understood the consequences of his voluntary plea,
and admitted that AAA rode his tricycle on June 4, 1999 and that he brought AAA to Brgy. XXX where he raped and
killed her.
Bascugin moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was granted by the trial court. He was re-arraigned and he pleaded
not guilty. After appreciating several circumstantial evidence, the accused was again found guilty. Moreover, he
admitted in open court that he raped and killed AAA. The CA upheld Bascugins conviction.
Issue:
WON the conviction was proper.
Held:
Yes. Bascugins confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of
a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless
prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant to
the following provisions of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [Rule 129]

SEC. 26. Admissions of a party.The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. [Rule 130]

SEC. 33. Confession.The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. [Rule 130]

Furthermore, Bascugins confession is consistent with the evidence. We agree with the trial and appellate courts
finding that the chain of events constitutes circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to support a conviction.From the
testimonies of witnesses and the physical evidence gathered, it was established that the victim was last seen with
Bascugin in his tricycle; his tricycle was seen parked near a waiting shed in the premises of which the victims personal
belongings were later found; his pieces of clothing were found positive for human blood that matches the victims;
and the medico-legal report states that Bascugin had sexual intercourse with the victim.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In the
case at bar, the circumstantial pieces of evidence enumerated by the trial court all point to Bascugin as the perpetrator
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs DOMINGO REYES

GR No. 178300 March 17, 2009

TOPIC: Extra-judicial confession

FACTS:
Defendant Reyes together with Alvin Arnaldo and Joselito Flores were charged of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide against Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao. Arnaldo surrendered to the
PAOCTF and with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, he executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his
participation as well as identified Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the
incident. He also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabout. Subsequently, agents
of the PAOCTF arrested Flores and with the assistance of Atty. Rous, he executed a written extra-judicial confession
detailing his participation and divulged the same information as Arnaldo. The prosecution adduced documentary
evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence the extra-judicial confessions of Arnaldo and Flores.

HELD:
An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person
under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of
a crime. Extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must
be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express;
and (4) it must be in writing. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial
confessions of Arnaldo and Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions
are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

Tamargo vs Awingan
G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the
perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and
that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. Columna was arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “look out” during the
shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the
contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession.
Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the
statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing so
that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he was only forced to
withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life
inside the jail. The RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the March 8,
2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the
accused for trial. CA reversed the decision.
Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was
probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. Awingan and the Antiporda’s, on the other hand, contend
that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas
HELD:
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents
in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence
aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his
or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented
to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

EMMA K. LEE VS. CA, G.R. NO. 177861, JULY 13, 2010
FILIAL PRIVILEGE

FACTS:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case
against his children.

The stepmother of the Petitioner is being requested to testify against her in a special proceeding for the deletion from
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the
same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stepmother can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules of Court

HELD:
No, the stepmother cannot invoke. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct”
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry
by her stepmother.

A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.—Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify
against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
“SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.—No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.” The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315
of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend
the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of
petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.

G.R. No. 166470. August 7, 2009.*

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE1 and
NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, respondent.

Facts: Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in
1997). Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. However, due to her “violent personality,” Lulu stopped
schooling when she reached Grade 5. upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.3
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual
administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix’s death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu’s
properties.

During the period of petitoners informal administration, some of Lulu's properties were sold leased or disposed if by
petitioners. Lulu was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly
daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.

Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that
Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been
given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu’s poor hygiene, respondent brought her
to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and
diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.8
Respondent filed a petition for guardianship and alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing
her estate because she was of weak mind but petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
During trial, lulu was presented to take the witness stand.

Issue:
Whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and
property.

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity
of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu’s attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below
average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. Where the sanity of a person
is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu
personally when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in
fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
involves questions of fact.

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU),
G.R. No. 178989 March 18, 2010

Facts
On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridges rank-and-file employees the percentage threshold required under
Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union registration had a meeting where they organized themselves into an
independent labor union, named Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU or Union),[5] elected a set of officers,[6] and
ratified[7] their constitution and by-laws. They formally applied for registration and DOLE granted them Registration
Certificate. The EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club, which Eagle
Ridge opposed, followed by its filing of a petition for the cancellation of their Reg. Cert. . Eagle Ridges petition ascribed
misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws,
the numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its officers.

Eagle Ridge contended that five employees who attended the organizational meeting had manifested the desire to
withdraw from the union. The five executed individual affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay attesting that they arrived
late at said meeting which they claimed to be drinking spree; that they did not know that the documents they signed
on that occasion pertained to the organization of a union; and that they now wanted to be excluded from the
Union. The withdrawal of the five, Eagle Ridge maintained, effectively reduced the union membership to 20 or 21,
either of which is below the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor
Code. Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the required number would be 22 or 23 employees.
Moreover, Eagle Ridge presented another Sinumpaang Salaysay of retraction dated March 15, 2006 of another union
member. The membership of EREU had thus been further reduced to only 19 or 20. This same member was listed in
the first Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay presented by the Union but did not sign it.
As a counterpoint, EREU, in its Comment, among others,[14] argued in gist:
The retraction of 5 union members should not be given any credence for the reasons that: (a) the sworn statements
of the five retracting union members sans other affirmative evidence presented hardly qualify as clear and credible
evidence considering the joint affidavits of the other members attesting to the orderly conduct of the organizational
meeting;

After due proceedings, the DOLE Regional Director, Region IV-A, focusing on the question of misrepresentation, issued
on April 28, 2006 an Order finding for Eagle Ridge, its petition to cancel Reg. Cert. being granted and EREU being
delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Aggrieved, the Union appealed to the BLR, which reversed the DOLE regional Director’s decision. Eagle Ridge
thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. It dismissed Eagle Ridge’s petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the affidavits of retraction are admissible as evidence against the Union.

HELD:
No. We hold that the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12
union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December
6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of
retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits.
The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE
Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations
which provides:

Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence. Any affidavit submitted by a party to prove his/her claims or
defenses shall be re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case
may be. Any affidavit submitted without the re-affirmation of the affiant during a scheduled hearing shall not be
admitted in evidence, except when the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein
and waives the examination of the affiant.
It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.[51] The above rule affirms the general requirement in adversarial
proceedings for the examination of the affiant by the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case,
it is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to
be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union.
For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-quoted rule, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible
as evidence against the Union in the instant case. Moreover, the affidavit and joint-affidavits presented by
the Union before the DOLE Regional Director were duly re-affirmed in the hearing of March 20, 2006 by the
affiants. Thus, a reversible error was committed by the DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director in giving
credence to the inadmissible affidavits of retraction presented by Eagle Ridge while not giving credence to the duly
re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.
Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of retraction have no probative value and at the very least cannot
outweigh the rebutting attestations of the duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS

G.R. No. 188124 June 29, 2010

TOPIC: Dying Declaration

FACTS:
Nio brought his girlfriend, Dianne, home.
On his way back, he passed by a bridge where he was stabbed and mauled.Cesar, Nios brother, was in the vicinity
when he heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about to proceed to the bridge, he met Nio and noticed that
his brother was soaked in his own blood. Nio relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An (alyas of Serenas).
Cesar immediately brought Nio to the hospital where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later. At the police station,
Cesar claimed that appellants told him that they merely took fancy on Nio.At the trial, Cesar testified against the
accused.

ISSUE:
WON the testimony of the Cesar is sufficient to prove Serenas’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:
YES. As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence
of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation.
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness;
and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of the victim communicated to Cesar.
First, the statement pertained to Nio being stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second, Nio
must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him
near the bridge. Third, the competence of Nio is unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Nios
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.

People vs. Romy Fallones y Labara, G.R. No. 190341, March 16, 2011

TOPIC: Res Gestae

FACTS: In the morning of June 29, 2004 Amalia was told by her mother to look for her sister Alice. Alice was an 18
years old girl with the mind of a 5 year old. Amalia looked for Alice all over the neighborhood until she neared the
house of Romy Fallones. As she approached the house of Fallones, she heard a familiar cry: “Tama na! Tama na!” It
was Alice’s voice. Immediately, she ran up to Fallones’ door and knocked repeatedly until Fallones opened the door.
Behind Fallones she saw Alice. Alice said:“Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.” Alice grabbed her sister who had
a bloodied shorts. They went to the barangay office where Alice was able to positively identify Fallones as the person
who sexually abused her. A rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she
heard during the incident. Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape.
On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay for she only heard the cry of
Alice but did not see the act of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Amalia is admissible despite being hearsay.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. It is exempted from the hearsay rule under the principle of Res Gestae.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately
before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important
consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated
to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur:
1) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) The statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3) The statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, the utterances of Alice “Tama na! Tama na!” were made during a startling event (when Fallones was
penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him,
uttering “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.” The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements rests on the
valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is
difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness.

RESORT HOTELS CORPORATION v DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

RHC obtained from DBP several loans, aggregating approximately P157 million, for the purpose of expanding hotel
capacities, operations and services nationwide. To secure the payment of these loans, RHC executed real estate
mortgages in favor of DBP. When the loans became due and demandable, RHC failed to pay. Sometime in the early
80S, RHC proposed to DBP that part of its obligations be converted into equity inasmuch as it was experiencing
financial difficulties.
DBP obtained shareholdings, equivalent to 55% of RHCs total stockholders equity, in exchange for the reduction of
RHCs obligation to DBP by [as] much as P47 million. As a result of the debt-to-equity conversion, DBP acquired two
(2) board seats in the eleven-member Board of Directors of RHC. Due to the balance amouting to 114M, DBP applied
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 385, also
known as The Law on Mandatory Foreclosure, mandating government financial institutions to foreclose mandatorily
loans with arrearages amounting to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation.
The foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties went through as scheduled and DBP emerged and was declared the
highest and winning bidder. The plaintiff now filed a cae to nullify the sale on the ground that it is null and void. And
after several filing of amended and supplemental complaints, the trial ensued. the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff but the CA overturned such decision.
Issue:
WON the plaintiff successfully established its claim beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
We are in complete accord with the appellate court’s HELD that the dearth of evidence presented by petitioners
inevitably failed to establish their claim that DBP did not comply with the statutory requirements on the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages. As plaintiffs before the trial court, petitioners rested the burden to prove by a
preponderance of evidence the numerous causes of action they brought against herein respondents.

Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 1 of Rule 133, unequivocally provides:

SECTION 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may
also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Petitioners are adamant, however, that it was incumbent upon respondents to prove their denial of petitioners
claims; i.e., foreclosure proceedings were validly conducted consistent with Act No. 3135.

We disagree. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The
burden of proof that foreclosure proceedings on the subject properties were not validly conducted lies with
mortgagor-party litigant claiming such. We have consistently applied the ancient rule that if a plaintiff, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

JUAN DELA RAMA vs OSCAR PAPA

GR No. 142309 January 30, 2009

TOPIC: An improperly notarized document cannot be considered a public document and will not enjoy the
presumption of due execution and authenticity.

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses dela Rama were the registered owner of a parcel of land in Calamba, Laguna which they acquired
by way of sale from Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE) as evidenced by a notarized Absolute Deed of Sale. However in
1985, the property was transferred to and retitled in the name of the spouses defendant pursuant to a notarized Deed
of Absolute Sale. The said deed of sale bears the signatures of the petitioners and the respondents, at least two
witnesses and the notarial signature and seal of Atty. William Gumtang. In relation to their forged signatures,
petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title Obtained Under Forged Deed of Sale. The trial court annulled
the deed of sale, cancelling respondents’ title and reinstating petitioners’ title.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to establish the
forgery. The RTC was chided for not applying Section 22 of Rule 132 which provided in clear terms how handwriting
must be proved. The CA also observed that the petitioners had the onus probandi to establish the forgery. In failure
to such, the CA cited the rule upholding the presumption of regularity of a notarized document.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarized 1985 Deed of Absolute Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity and due execution.

HELD:
NO. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that
the notarization was regular. In the present case, respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually
appeared before the notary public. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of sale but eliminates the
presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and subject the deed of sale to a different level if
scrutiny than that relied on by the CA.
It appears that respondents had previously laid stress on the claim that it is a common practice in real estate
transactions that deeds of conveyance are signed on separate occasions by the vendor and the vendee, and not
necessarily in the presence of the notary public who notarizes the document but they adduced nothing to support
their claim but their mere say-so. Assuming arguendo that it is the common practice, the clear requirements of law
for a proper acknowledgment may not be dispensed with simply because generations of transactions have blithely
ignored such requirements.

G.R. No. 181560 November 15, 2010

VITARICH CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CHONA LOSIN, Respondent.
FACTS: Losin was in the fastfood business, and Vitarich has been her supplier of poultry. Her account was transferred
from Davao to General Santos to newsalesmen and collectors Directo, Rosa and aybay. However, there had
beenproblems in collectin! invoices because they have chan!ed the customdeliverin! stoc"s without prior boo"in!.#he
deficiency amounted to P$%&,''', and the invoices were not deliveredto Vitarich when the three collectors left Vitarich.
Demand letters were sentto Losin, but she put up the defense that her records state that she hasoverpaid at least
P('','''. Vitarich then instituted a complaint for a sum of money a!ainst the ) collectors, which it won.Losin was not
satisfied with the result, so it interposed an appeal to the *+.#he court reasoned that Vitarich has not overturned the
prima facie casepresented by Losin, thus Losin won.Vitarich institutes the current petition for review.Losin was in the
fastfood business, and Vitarich has been her supplier of poultry. Her account was transferred from Davao to General
Santos to new salesmen and collectors Directo, Rosa and Baybay. However, there had been problems in collecting
invoices because they have changed the custom delivering stocks without prior booking. The deficiency amounted to
P921,000, and the invoices were not delivered to Vitarich when the three collectors left Vitarich. Demand letters were
sent to Losin, but she put up the defense that her records state that she has overpaid at least P500,000. Vitarich then
instituted a complaint for a sum of money against the 3 collectors, which it won.
Losin was not satisfied with the result, so it interposed an appeal to the CA. The court reasoned that Vitarich has not
overturned the prima facie case presented by Losin, thus Losin won. Vitarich institutes the current petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether there was an enough evidence to prove that Losin paid the amount complained of.
HELD: None. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC, the Court
ruled that the burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131
of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense,
or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Losin
because she alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single official
receipt to prove payment. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money and goods have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although
not exclusive. All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo,
a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich, and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking account
with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only serve as documentary records of her
business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not enough to prove payment.

PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN y DANZIL, 2010

Chain of Custody Rule; Presumption of Regularity

FACTS:
Ronaldo de Guzman y Danzil was convicted of violation of RA 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. De Guzman now
comes to this Court on a Petition for Review.
On appeal, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the mandatory
procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately
after his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the
presence of his counsel and of a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that
no photographs were taken of the seized items and of appellant.
Appellant also claimed that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Further, the failure of
the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of
R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’
duties.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the appellant warrants the reversal of the conviction.
HELD:
Yes. The appellant is hereby acquitted.
The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality when affirmed by the CA, in the absence
of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of
the case have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. Although the question of whether the degree of proof
has been met is largely left for the trial courts to determine, an appeal throws the whole case open for review. Thus,
the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if, by the evidence or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court
erred.
Elements in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs; What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti—the body or the substance of the
crime—establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.Law enforcers and public officers have the duty
to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs.The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Failure to follow the procedure mandated under Republic Act No. 9165 and Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
must be adequately explained
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt; The failure to observe the proper procedure negates the
operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers.

G.R. No. 179038. May 6, 2010.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEPH SERRANO and ANTHONY SERRANO, accused-appellants.

Facts: accused-appellants Joseph and Anthony Serrano were found guilty of the illegal sale of shabu. In arriving at its
Decision, the RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in ascribing greater
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-à-vis what it termed as “self-serving averments” of the
accused-appellants. The trial court further held that in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against the accused-appellants, the testimonies of the former are entitled to
full faith and credit.13 hence, accused appealed the case Arguing that the court erred in finding them guilty despite
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged

HELD:
Yes. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; it is self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail. Further, Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are
factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA CRUZ vs.

RAMON C. PAPA IV, in his capacity as Co-Administrator of the Estate of ANGELA M. BUTTE
G.R. No. 185899 December 8, 2010

TOPIC: Cross-examination

FACTS:
In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for cancellation of titles, recovery of
properties, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the
Dela Cruzes).
On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa (Myron), its executor, to testify on the substance of the
complaint.
At the conclusion of Myron’s testimony on that day, the court required the Estate and the latter agreed to present
Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the
defendants, would begin to cross-examine him.
However, due to illness, Myron passed away without being able to identify the originals of the documents and without
being cross-examined.
On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myron’s direct testimony.
The Dela Cruzes for their part moved to dismiss the case for failure of the Estate to prosecute it.
Later, Dela Cruzes filed a motion to strike out Myron’s testimony on the ground of failure to cross-examine him.

ISSUE:
WON Myron’s testimony should be stricken out for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him.

HELD:
YES. Having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an opportunity to cross-examine
him.
It was not the defendants’ fault that they were unable to cross-examine him.
When Myron died on August 16, 2001, the obligation to close his aborted testimony and proceed with its other
evidence remained with the Estate.
But it did nothing, prompting one of the defendants to ask the court to strike down Myron’s testimony on the ground
of the defendants’ failure to cross-examine him.
The Dela Cruzes themselves asked that the case be dismissed for the Estate’s failure to prosecute after such a long
time.
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through Myron’s testimony, it
stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for
those exhibits.
They become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the
Estate to rectify its mistakes.

Heirs of the Deceased Spouses Vicente S. Arcilla, et. al., vs. Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008

TOPIC: Alleging and Proving of Foreign Laws.

FACTS:
Teodoro filed with the RTC an application for land registration of two parcels of land. Respondent alleged that she
purchased the subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Saledated December 9,
1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father,
Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Respondent also presented as
evidence an Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of
Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of Pacifico.
In their Opposition, petitioners contended that they are the owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including the
building and other improvements constructed thereon by virtue of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses
Vicente and Josefa Arcilla. Petitioners moved to dismiss the application of respondent and sought their declaration as
the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots and the registration and issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title in their names.
The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners contended that the courts erred in their decision and
that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it held
that the certification of non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent does not require a certification
from an officer of the foreign service of the Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners contention is correct.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not
covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners contentions that the verification and certification subsequently submitted by
respondent did not state the country or city where the notary public exercised her notarial functions; and that the
MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA; that even granting that
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed
admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document is kept, proving
or authenticating that the person who notarized the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the
same.

Cavile v Litania-Hong
Facts:
This case involves a deed of partition entered into by the heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Their heirs
include, Susana, Castro, Benedicta as well as Bernardo’s children from first marriage, Simplicia, Fortunato and
Vevencia.
Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir Castor of
their aliquot shares which includes Susana. Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition.
Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in 1960, respondents, heirs of Susana,
filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages. After trial, the
RTC ruled that the petitioner spouses evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the
subject lots.
Issue:
Whether extraneous evidence in the form of an affidavit, the confirmation of extrajudicial partition, may be admitted
in evidence to vary the terms of a judicially declared valid agreement entitled deed of partition?
Held:
Yes. Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of the nature of an admission against a persons proprietary
interest. As such, the same may be admitted as evidence against Castor and petitioner spouses, his successors-in-
interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence, notwithstanding that they are
hearsay, is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further, that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.
Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses. It
must still be considered and weighed together with respondents other evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses
evidence.In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence.
Herein, despite the admission made by Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition against his own interest,
the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the
respondents

PEOPLE vs FEBLONELYBIRTH RUBIO and JOAN AMARO

GR No. 179748 October 2, 2009

TOPIC: Circumstantial evidence

FACTS:
Defendants were convicted by the RTC of Bais City for the crime of Rape with Homicide. On appeal, the appellate
court dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision by reducing the penalty to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In convicting the appellants, both the trial and appellate courts found
that circumstantial evidence sufficed to hold respondents liable. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented suffice for the conviction of the defendants.
HELD:
NO. Under the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Far from being a completed puzzle, the
circumstantial evidence adduced in the present case only serves to inculpate doubt in an unprejudiced mind as to the
real identities of the perpetrators of the crime. The glaring inconsistencies and oddities in the reactions of the
prosecution witnesses that cannot be conveniently overlooked nor easily dismissed as products of faulty memory for
they bear on credibility of testimony, which is all the more material in the determination of the existence of
circumstantial evidence.

A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that
it was the accused who committed the crime, failing which the accused must be exonerated. The prosecution failed
to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of defendants.

People v. Sitco
FACTS: Sitco and Bagtas were charged with drug pushing. Testimony of the prosecution witness, Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Alex Buan was gathered. The seized items were sent to Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination and were found
positive for shabu and marijuana. During trial, Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked
money used, the shabu confiscated from both accused-appellants, and the marijuana seized from Bagtas. Buan
explained during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-between the genuine marked money the buy-bust
team used was unavailable as it had been confiscated by a policeman named Barlin when he himself (Buan) was
arrested for violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of Buan and, mainly on that basis, convicted Bagtas and Sitco of the
crimes charged.
ISSUE: Whether the witness presented is a credible witness.
HELD: No.
To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible witness. Given his service record,
Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it
be overlooked, Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot session,
eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. It would appear, thus, that Buans had been a user. His arrest
for joining a pot session only confirms this undesirable habit.
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the well-settled rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely
on the credibility of police buy-bust operators, and that the trial courts finding on the police-witness credibility
deserves respect. Juxtaposed with this rule, however, is the postulate that when confronted with circumstances that
would support a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused, then acquittal or the least liability is in order. Buans
involvement in drugs and his alleged attempt to extort money from appellant Sitco in exchange for his freedom has
put his credibility under a heavy cloud.

PEOPLE VS. MURCIA, MARCH 9, 2010

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; CORPUS DELICTI

FACTS:

Appellant Jessie Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of arson and frustrated homicide.
The trial court found that the corpus delicti in arson, as well as the identity of the perpetrator, were established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. While there was no evidence to directly link appellant to the crime, the
trial court relied on circumstantial evidence.
Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the credibility of some witnesses and
specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio in testifying against him, especially after their fight. Appellant
submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent whole, did not prove the identity of
the perpetrator.

ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of Arson.

HELD:
Yes. Judgment is affirmed with modification.; In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of
the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long
recognized that the accused may be convicted through circumstantial evidence.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
On matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime—it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed; In arson,
the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire. (People vs. Gonzales, 560 SCRA
419 [2008])
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. vs. Uy
G.R. No. 154974. February 4, 2008.*
KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS, INC. AND LELIA CHUA SY, petitioners, vs. LORETA UY, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Loreta filed a case for annulment of real estate mortgage and related documents plus damages against
petitioners Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. (KLII) and Lelia Chua Sy (Lelia), along with Wilfredo Chua (Wilfredo) and
Magno Zareno (Magno).

Sometime in 1987, her son Jose U. Sim (Jose), her nephew Virgilio Sim (Virgilio), and Wilfredo agreed to establish a
business of buy and sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio would be the manager, Wilfredo would scout
for a financier, and Jose would provide the security for any loan. A verification from the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City4 revealed that the real estate mortgage in favor of KLII to secure a P800,000 loan was annotated on Loreta’s
titles. The copy of the document on file at the office of the Register of Deeds bore only Loreta’s signature and it was
notarized in the absence of Loreta.

Loreta and Jose thus sent telegrams to KLII and to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City requesting the setting aside
of the transaction and the denial of registration of the mortgage, respectively, but to no avail.
Concluding that the real estate mortgage, promissory note, Solidbank check and “the other documents related
thereto” were absolute nullities due to the absence of consideration and vitiated consent, Loreta prayed for their
annulment5 and for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, declaring the real
estate mortgage and promissory note null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when it evidently misappreciated the testimony of Magno Zareno
by giving it credence, contrary to the findings of [the trial court] which heard and saw him testify;
HELD:
No. Consequently, without the needed proof from the board of directors, the certificate would be considered
defective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of a corporation, like the chairman and president, may not even know
the details required in a certificate of nonforum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by the board of directors
just like any other officer or agent.”31 (Italics in the original)
The merits of the petition, however, justify the relaxation of the rule on verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping, for from a review of the records Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence that she was deceived
into signing the documents required for the release of the proceeds of the loan.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

TOPIC: Inapplicability of Rule on Electronic Evidence in criminal cases

FACTS:
Rustan and Irish became on-and-off sweethearts before Irish learned that Rustan will be getting married to another
women whom he impregnated.
Before getting married, Rustan kept in touch with Irish through cellphone.
Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768.
Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
Later, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and
with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used.
Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Rustan was then charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
The picture of the naked woman with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure was offered in evidence.
Rustan objected it on the ground that it is not authenticated by an electronic signature which is a requirement for an
electronic document to be admissible.
ISSUE:
WON the obscene picture presented in the case is admissible.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies
only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
Secondly, Rustan is raising his objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before
SC. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Lejano vs. People, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010

TOPIC: Alibi as a defense.

FACTS: On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home
in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness
Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb,
In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their
residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued and
thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the
accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in
the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As
documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from
both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay there
and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary
alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US.
ISSUE: Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the Court than
the positive identification by Alfaro.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
(1) The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and (2) The witness’ story of what
she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the
NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around the agency for sometime
as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although her testimony included
details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the
front door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that: (1) He was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (2) That it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb. This alibi
altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For,
if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not
hold altogether.

HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA v LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation against the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) alleging that they were the owners of Lot No. 6183, an
irrigated Riceland. An amended answer was filed by DAR alleging that the determination of just compensation by the
court is not necessary because respondents and the farmer-beneficiaries had already executed a Landowner-Tenant
Production Agreement and Farmers Undertaking (LTPA-FU). Also, LBP alleged that the subject land transfer claim had
been settled and extinguished by virtue of the Deed of Assignment of Rights executed by petitioners in favor of LBP
and that the said deed is the best evidence that the land transfer claim had been consummated;
Petitioners claimed that their acceptance of the offered price does not estop them from questioning the valuation
since the Deed of Assignment of Rights is not conclusive proof that their claim was extinguished
Issue:
WON court erred when it admitted the Deed of Assignment of Rights considering that the said document was not
offered in evidence by respondent
Held:
Generally, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered. Parties are required to inform the
courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter in HELD on their admissibility in case
an objection thereto is made. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the
evidence even if it has been marked and identified. However, this Court has relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the same must have been
identified by testimony duly recorded and incorporated in the records of the case.
In the instant case, the Deed of Assignment of Rights was set up by LBP as an affirmative defense in its Answer and
was incorporated in the records of the case as an annex. Petitioners however failed to question its existence or due
execution. On the contrary, they acknowledged receipt of a portion of the compensation for the property and
admitted that the Deed of Assignment of Rights appeared as an encumbrance in their certificate of title. Petitioners
failure to specifically deny under oath the existence, authenticity and due execution of the said document is
tantamount to a judicial admission of its genuineness and due execution

RICARDO BANGAYAN vs RCBC and PHILIP SARIA

GR No. 149193 April 4, 2011

TOPIC: Private document offered as authentic

FACTS:
Petitioner had a savings account and a current account with one of the branches of RCBC. Said accounts had an
automatic transfer condition wherein checks issued by the depositor may be funded by any of the two
accounts. Allegedly, petitioner signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement with RCBC in favor of nine
corporations. Petitioner contests the veracity and due authenticity of the Surety Agreement on the ground that his
signature was not genuine and that the agreement was not notarized.

In a complaint for damages filed by petitioner, the trial court dismissed said complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. It found that the dishonor of the checks by RCBC was not without good reason
considering that petitioners’ account had been debited owing to his obligations as a surety in favor of several
corporations. It also ruled that petitioner cannot raise the question as to the genuineness, authenticity and due
execution of the Surety Agreement for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s signature in the Surety Agreement is genuine, authentic and duly executed.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner failed to establish how his signature in the Surety Agreement was forged and therefore not
genuine. Before a private document is offered as authentic, its due execution and authenticity must be proved: (a)
either by anyone who has seen the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence. The burden of proof rests on the party alleging forgery.

Maria Lourdes Tamani et, al. v. Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo

FACTS: The respondent spouses filed a Complaint for quieting of title was against the petitioners, who were legal heirs
of the spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan, over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya.
Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land with an area of 776 sq. m. Based
on the TCT, respondents own 345 sq. m. of the property whereas the Spouses Tamani own the remaining 431 sq. m.
(disputed property). The spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz (Cruz) as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of Php 2,500.00. Subsequently, Cruz sold the disputed property to
respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale for the same consideration. Thus, the respondents acquired ownership
over the whole area of 776 sq. m.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring the Deed of Sale null and void and directing the RD to cancel the
TCT under the name of the respondents. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court declaring the said
documents valid.
HELD: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

COUNTRY BANKERS VS. ANTONIO LAGMAN, JULY 13, 2011

BEST EVIDENCE RULE
FACTS:
Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of
storing sacks of palay in his warehouse in Tarlac.
The approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the
bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Country Bankers. In holding Lagman and Reguine solidarily liable to
Country Bankers, the trial court relied on the express terms of the Indemnity Agreement that they jointly and severally
bound themselves to indemnify and make good to Country Bankers any liability which the latter may incur on account
of or arising from the execution of the bonds.
Lagman filed an appeal to the CA. He insisted that the lifetime of the 1989 Bonds, as well as the corresponding
Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months. According to Lagman, the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the complaint
because it was not covered by an Indemnity Agreement and it superseded the two prior bonds.
The CA ruled in favor of Lagman. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court exonerating Lagman.
HELD:
Yes. Petition granted. The decision of the RTC reinstated.
A continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, by
the Insurance Commissioner, and by the court; By law and by the specific contract involved in this case, the effectivity
of the bond required for the obtention of a license to engage in the business of receiving rice for storage is determined
not alone by the payment of premiums but principally by the Administrator of the National Food Authority (NFA).

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry; A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.
A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the
original instrument, and when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one.

G.R. No. 169985. June 15, 2011.*

MODESTO LEOVERAS, petitioner, vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ, respondent.

Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the
reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that
the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties’ Agreement. The respondent sought
the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the authenticity of the petitioner’s documents. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove that the Benigna Deed and the
Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioner’s titles. The court observed that
the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the signatures appearing in these documents. On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by HELD against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The CA gave
weight to Benigna’s death certificate which shows the impossibility of Benigna’s execution of the deed in 1969. The
petitioner argued that they do not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents,34 particularly
the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the
Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention. At the trial, the petitioner
attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which
allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of
land covered by his titles. It was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit
supposedly to reflect the parties’ true intention
Issue:
Whether the executed agreement is admissible.
HELD:
No. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure
of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement
to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident,
which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is
embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission, coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported
signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the
petitioner’s defense.
Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioner’s share the disputed property, the petitioner
obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his application for the transfer of title of his
rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the
mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioner’s claim that the partition of the subject property is
based on the parties’ actual possession.