Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 41-50

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 51-60
Jeross Romano Aguilar
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO

TABACO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of
Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal
Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito
Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case
No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four
(4) cases identically read:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario
Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to Law." [1]
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following

information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for
shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario
Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito
Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained
by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim
Sgt. Benito Raquepo; which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will."[2]
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as
follows:
"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under
then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting,
at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to
maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2)
CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP,
Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have
been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of
NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his
M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of
INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company;
(3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company
with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey;
(5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor
Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were
(1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of
them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part
cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2)
the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito
Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the
lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little
bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the
4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court
noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as
described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor
Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire,
resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run
passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside
the Octagon cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the
accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat.
Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried
to pacify Tabaco telling him 'what is that happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt.
Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at
the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5)
successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw
the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco
'Mario relax ka lang' 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding their rifles
and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the
possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting
Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo.
Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to
adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on
his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right
abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did
not file their complaints."
[3]
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for
the Accused-appellant is as follows:
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the

maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan,
Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued
M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena
on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to
make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the said
cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen
in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to
why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions
that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit
would surely have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief then that they
may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the
lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on
March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at
the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a
gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known,
his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the
air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a
warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different
directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush
outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused)
rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that
when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time
thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons.
Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun
which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was
pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the
death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident, accused had to run away, out
of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame
on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo,
Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not
know at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and
the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo." [4]
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found
accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the
version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense
cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon
Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims.
For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot
the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or
others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit
arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where
there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for
the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as
valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony for after
all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence.
(Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17,
1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21,
1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349,
November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death
of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo
Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the
shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the
prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose
Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational
cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses
Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood
up from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle
towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper
portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled
Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito
Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen
who was then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering
that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen
coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC
Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco,
telling 'what is that happened again Mario,' while the latter told him 'Mario relax ka
lang keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun
assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the
gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt.
Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when
the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo." [5]
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the
cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his
possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already
empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine
that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990
session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this
gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?
A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt.
Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the
cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct.
1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused,
is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as
appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh.
'S', p. 188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case
for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses
namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen
who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and
convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and
the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo,

PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the
cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and
automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused
shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as
to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147
SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved
reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People
vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden
of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS
PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very
nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony
would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper protection
of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of
the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in
this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who,
aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule that they have
regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even
as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he
could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit
arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation.
The accused further contends that he could not have shot afore-said victims, as maybe
gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon
the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they
saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group
of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the
bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could have
been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the
group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the
accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the
gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left
portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple;
Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his
left thigh downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side
of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the
upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower
abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of
the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2,
the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the
victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from
the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on
the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and
the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at
the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing
the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility
of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the
accused stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra
testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the
debris of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to
gunshot wounds inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify
against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and
positively identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo." [6]
The dispositive part of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear
judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge
Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo
Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been
prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
victims Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount
of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for
payment of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the
accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge
Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability,
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in
case of successful collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case
insolvency.
2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused
Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10)
years and one(1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4)
months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the
heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses
incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees
in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with
117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is
peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the
said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.
4. The accused to pay the costs.
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as
amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs.
Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
SO ORDERED." (Underscoring ours)

[7]
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still
interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection
with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo
Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge
Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant
Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again,
we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-
vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are
generally not disturbed on appeal, unless there appears in the record some
[8]
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason for the rule is
[9]
eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman, thus: [10]
"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or
in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict." [11]
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to

set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses
when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the
group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically
testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court,
who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his
companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come
from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if
you know?
A: M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Three (3) shots, sir.
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
A: Successive, sir.
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right
side?
A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard
gun shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port)
arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you
returned, what did you see?
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A: Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as
you mentioned?
A: They have similarity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your
companions?
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you facing?
A: We were facing south the arena.
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: From what direction?
A: Infront of us, sir.
Q: Where was he, was he in your front?
A: He was in the first row of seats.
Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?
A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Who was that?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A: Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in
succession or automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?
A: An army man, sir.
Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say
that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir."[12]
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified,

thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat
downward, is it not?
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself
at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr.
witness?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report,
did you notice if he had a gun with him?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was
shot?
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir."[13]
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor
Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were they arranged?
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q: How many rows?
A: Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: And how about you?
A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place
where you stayed?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if
there was untoward incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: M-14, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: What did you do also?
A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to him?
A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor
Arreola?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir."[14]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the
accused Mario Tabaco?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the
first time prior to the shooting incident?
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario
Tabaco?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did
Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q: How far?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the
cockpit?
A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the
cockpit?
A: We were on the northwest.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?
A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late
Arreola on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his
gun, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor
Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were
together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco
considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in
your direct examination you immediately sought cover?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola
was dead already?
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?
A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he
was also hit.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir."[15]
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-

appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions
were corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person
of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx

Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?
A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got
down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to
hide myself, sir."[16]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went
off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside."[17]
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial

declaration of the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the
accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare
denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as
perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial and
explanation. [18]
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by

accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as
to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that
they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. [19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra

were not telling the truth when they testified that it was accused-appellant who
was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions
considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-Mayor Arreola,
testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the
assailant was on the same level as the Ex-Mayor, and the trajectory of the third
bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of entry was
higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row
which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated at
the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at
the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he
stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and
his companions and fired at them. [20]
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds
found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while
he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds
of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of exit because
he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. [21]
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's

liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified
that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking
his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit
arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit
arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-
appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario
relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in
time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed
the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on
the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge
Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his
testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other
hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at
about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of
Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit
arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the
cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant
when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban
who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was
facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt.
Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that
happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun
position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and
pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the
trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain
Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from
accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical
assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill
Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in
the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the
gun from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because
the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal position, and at
that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. [22]
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of

Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence
cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself
felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is equivalent
to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even

if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder
charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on
him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the
single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings
of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton,
respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended
by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).'
Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily
means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs.
Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of
murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4)
victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4)
murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst
of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a
complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a
single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of
Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the
accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty --- is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing
have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by
surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden
attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99
Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced
to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs.
Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide
and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito
Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable
penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense
is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is
17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and
which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day
of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of
Benito Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2'
magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the
accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16
armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5)
persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness
Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the
lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and
on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and
'R-1')."
[23]
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty
of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a
complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4)
victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive
automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)" does not hold [24]
water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the
doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama (not People vs. Dama, as cited by
[25]
the trial court), People vs. Lawas, and People vs. Pineda.
[26] [27]
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was
only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which
produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound
crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the
case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in
killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco
entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the weapon,
[28]
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle
was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several
spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated
in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the
case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto . The accused in that case
[29]
killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which,
like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical
injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article.
Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each
death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct
and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as
many offenses as those resulting from every singe act that produced the
same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter
of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the
fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing
that would connect one of them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of
pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special
mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his
finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger
which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them. [30]
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case [31]
of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is
not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case
because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides
committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have
seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the
[32]
Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply
the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act;
singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." (emphasis supplied)
[33]
The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous
burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots,
is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single
missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim
is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that:
[34]
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is [35]
misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is

impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the
case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to
the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire
cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The
accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he
has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion

perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court
in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count
of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed from should be,
as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences
of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. 47941 December 7, 1940 - MIGUEL CRISTOBAL v. ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL.
071 Phil 34:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 47941. December 7, 1940.]
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, v. ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., Respondents.
Victoriano Yamzon for Petitioner.
E. Voltaire Garcia for respondent Santos.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARDONING POWER OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE. — Paragraph 6 of section

11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:" (6) The President shall have the power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all
offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." It should be observed that there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power
be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted of
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and
must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without
there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent S is conditional in the
sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute in so far as it "restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24, 1939.)
While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does not restore
the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned judge below, in the United States
the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State and not in the hands of the
Federal Government (decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to the contrary (Jones v. Board
of registrars, 56 Miss, 766; Hildreth v. Heath, 1 I11. App., 82). Upon the other hand, the
suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act
No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead
to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the
political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C.
Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal.
The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated
as follows:chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein,
guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accessories
provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo, the
amounts P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. On appeal, this court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction.
Accordingly, he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August
18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of
the two amounts aforestated, the same was condoned by the complainants. Notwithstanding his
conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon,
Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal
president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known
as the Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property." In view of this provision, the respondent forthwith applied to His
Excellency, the President, for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939.
Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December
24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility." cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of
the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the
ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No.
357. After hearing, the court below rendered its decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph
"Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised by the
petitioner, the court declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on December 24,
1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification created by section
94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The petition for exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C.
Santos should be, as it hereby is, denied. Let there be no costs." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of
the court below on the several grounds stated in the petition.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondent to the full
enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not
apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful
exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his
sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these
propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning
power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides: jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph
"(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem pro to impose. He shall have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and
(b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It
must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result
of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment
is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left
of the consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a
e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar
as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended
December 24, 1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning
power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned judge
below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State
and not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to
the contrary (Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth v. Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon
other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no
way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105673. July 26, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO

MAGANA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more

than sufficient to convict the accused-appellant of rape with homicide. But
beyond affirming the correctness of the trial court's decision and reiterating
familiar legal doctrines, we declare that in this instance, the ruthlessness and
viciousness exhibited by appellant in carrying out his dastardly design upon a
hapless minor most certainly warrants the imposition of the severest
punishment possible. We also note with considerable frustration and anxiety
that this case is only one among a host of others, constituting a veritable
floodtide of crime and immorality which seemingly signals an unstoppable
regression to the law of the jungle, where anyone is free to grab and take
whatever he pleases.
This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 38,[1] in Criminal Case No. 6919
entitled "People vs. Antonio Magana. The trial court found the accused
(appellant herein) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of rape with homicide and sentenced him to "imprisonment for life (Reclusion
Perpetua)".[2]
The Facts
At about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, 14-year old Odette Sta. Maria left
for school, as usual taking the feeder road which is about 2 1/2 km. from Sierra
Bros. From there, she would have gotten a ride to school.
At about 7:00 a.m. that morning, Danilo De Austria saw accused-appellant
"strangling the victim" with his left arm by the side of the feeder road. De Austria
was about to untie his carabao before reporting the incident to the authorities,
but he was immediately accosted by the appellant who poked a knife at him,
threatening to kill him if the family of the victim would come to know of the
matter.
The victim's mother, Lucia Sta. Maria, got worried when at 5:00 p.m., her
daughter was not with the other kids returning from school. She and her
husband started to ask around for Odette, and learned that she did not even
make it to school that day . Together with De Austria and some neighbors, they
searched of Odette. At about 9:00 p.m., they found the body of the girl sprawled
on the ground some twenty meters from the site of that morning's incident. The
body was muddy, the face swollen, with hack wounds on the neck. Half of the
victim's body was covered with cut grass. Her skirt was raised upward; her
panty had been removed and was found near the body.
Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, Municipal
Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, showed that the victim sustained
hacking wounds on the neck, hematomas on the head, body and left arm, and
multiple laceration of the hymen. The cause of death was "shock hemorrhagic
due to the hacking wound on the neck". The time of death was estimated at
approximately 12 to 24 hours prior to the time of autopsy.
After the burial of the victim, De Austria revealed to the Sta. Marias what he
witnessed that fateful morning. Accordingly, on March 7, 1991, an Information
was filed charging appellant with rape with homicide. It reads:
"That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at

Mahawanhawan, Municipality of Labo, Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a bolo and with the use of a piece of wood, and by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with one ODETTE STA. MARIA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against the
latter's will; that on or after the commission of said offense, said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, assault, attack,
hack and hit said Odette Sta. Maria, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and
mortal wounds which were the proximate cause of the death of said Odette Sta. Maria,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
"All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense was
committed in uninhabited place being a grassy area and the victim not having given
provocation for the offense."[3]
On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
and hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view of the
suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced (sic) imprisonment for
life (Reclusion Perpetua).And, he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for her death,
THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P39,000.00) as liquidated damages, TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as moral damages and TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) as exemplary damages."[4]
Hence, this appeal.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's theory is that on that fatal morning appellant was lying in
wait for the victim, and when she passed by on her way to school, appellant
forced her to go with him by strangling or choking her and threatening her with
a bladed weapon, the same one used on De Austria. Then, he forced himself
on her.Afterwards, he hacked her neck, thereby killing her. He attempted to hide
the body of the victim by covering it with cut grass. He also threatened to kill De
Austria to prevent the latter from telling on him.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr.
Marcelito Abas, Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, Danilo De
Austria, Lucia Sta. Maria, Fe Caramoan Juanson, and Antonio Vasquez.
Dr. Abas testified that the victim sustained a hacking wound on the right side
of the neck; an incised wound above the first wound parallel to each other;
multiple hematomas of both eyes, both cheeks, left forehead, and left chin;
"multiple hematomas right chest, both scapular region (sic) of the back, left
upper extremity posterior aspect with fracture of both radius and ulna, middle
portion;" and multiple laceration of the hymen at 4, 6 and 8 o'clock.[5] Also, when
he conducted the autopsy, the victim was not wearing underwear.[6] Dr. Abas
was of the opinion that the victim died approximately 12 to 24 hours before the
post-mortem examination which was conducted at 8:30 a.m. of January 15,
1991, and that death could have occurred at about 7:00 a.m. of January 14,
1991.[7] The hacking wound, he said, was caused by a sharp instrument, but
the hematomas were inflicted with a blunt instrument. He also testified that the
multiple lacerations in the victim's hymen, which were probably inflicted just
before the hacking, indicated the possibility of rape.[8]
Danilo De Austria, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, was familiar with both the appellant and the victim. He
testified that on that fateful morning, at about 7:00 a.m., while he was walking
along the feeder road towards the ricefields in Barangay Mahawanhawan, he
espied the appellant and the victim some forty meters ahead of him.[9] He was
shocked to see appellant strangling the victim with his left arm.[10] Before he
could make a move, appellant blocked his way, poked a double-bladed weapon
at him and threatened to kill him if he told the Sta. Marias of the incident. He
said, "Yes, yes" because he was "over-frightened" of the appellant. He knew
appellant to be abusive whenever he was drunk.[11]
De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant

assaulting the victim was uninhabited, and that cries for help would go unheard;
that the person working the ricefields in that area was none other than accused-
appellant himself; and that the body of the victim was found in a grassy area
five meters from the feeder road, and about twenty meters from where the victim
was seen being strangled.[12]De Austria also revealed that some ten days after
the killing, both he and the appellant were abducted and interrogated by the
NPA, and that he heard appellant admit to the NPAs that he had raped the
girl.[13]
Lucia Sta. Maria, mother of the victim, testified that about a week before her
daughter's death, they met appellant, and Odette complained that appellant
was staring at her in a "bad way. The victim informed her that appellant would
look at her that way everytime they met.[14]
Fe Caramoan Juanson, a neighbor, testified that while she was grazing her
carabao, she saw appellant standing on the feeder road at about 6:30 a.m. that
day. Appellant, who was wearing a faded jacket, appeared uneasy, looking left
and right and towards the hinterland of the barangay, seemingly waiting for
somebody.[15] The place where she saw appellant waiting was very near the
place where the body of the victim was recovered.[16]
Antonio Vasquez, martial arts instructor of the victim's brother-in-law, spent
the night of January 13, 1991 at the house of the Sta. Marias, and left at about
6:10 a.m. the following morning to go back to Labo.He took the feeder road and
saw the appellant, whom he met many times and knew by face and whom he
positively identified in court, standing quite near the place where the victim's
body was subsequently recovered. Appellant appeared to be uneasy and was
pacing back and forth; he seemed to be looking for something. The witness
noticed that appellant wore a faded brown jacket at that time.[17]
Version of the Defense
The defense's theory consists of establishing an alibi for appellant and

implicating Danilo De Austria as the perpetrator of the crime. The following
witnesses were presented, viz., Merly Mahipos, Wilfredo Chavez, Jaime
Chavez, Jovita Paquita, and the appellant himself.
Mahipos, 35, married and a resident of Sierra Bros, testified that on January
14, 1991, at about 6:30 a.m., she and her husband were walking from Sierra
Bros to Mahawanhawan, a distance of two kilometers (about thirty minutes on
foot) they met the victim and Danilo De Austria.[18] The latter were not yet
halfway on the road to Sierra Bros and about 50 meters from the house of
Mahipos' parents. The victim was walking ahead of De Austria by about seven
(7) arms length.[19] She asked the victim why she was alone and the victim only
smiled. De Austria walked fast and carried a bolo ("sinampalok") about eighteen
inches long.[20]He was wearing a white T-shirt and black short pants. She did
not see appellant, however.
Wilfredo Chavez, 31, married, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan,
testified that at about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, while he was at home, he
saw De Austria and the victim pass by, with the victim ahead of De Austria by
about seven (7) arms length.[21] He did not see appellant that morning.
Jaime Chavez, 42, married, a farmer and likewise a resident of
Mahawanhawan, testified that on that day, at about 6:30 a.m., he was in his
house situated beside the feeder road, waiting for his co-laborers to arrive as
they were supposed to go gold panning at Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte. He saw the victim (in her school uniform) pass by, followed closely by
De Austria at about 6:30 a.m.[22] After five (5) minutes, Mahipos and her
husband passed by, going the other way. He further testified that appellant
came to his house at about 7:00 a.m. and asked that he be included in the gold
panning activity. Appellant stayed in his house for an hour and left at around
8:00 a.m. together with Kagawad Jovita Paquita to buy cigarettes at Sierra
Bros.[23] He later saw appellant in Sierra Bros at about 9:00 a.m. He also
testified that the place where appellant worked was about half a kilometer from
the place where the body of Odette was recovered.[24]
Jovita Paquita, 47, married and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that
she saw appellant at Chavez' house at past 8:00 a.m. that, morning. She and
appellant walked together to Sierra Bros. There, they parted ways.[25]
Appellant testified that on that day, after taking breakfast at about 6:30 a.m.,
he went to his mother's house (which is near the feeder road and about 50
meters from his own house[26]), where he stayed for about 15 minutes, then left
by about 7:00 a.m. to see Kagawad Jaime Chavez.[27] Chavez' house is
approximately 330 meters from appellant's house.[28] After about five minutes,
he went to the Mahawanhawan Elementary School to buy cigarettes. Unable to
buy any there, he returned to Chavez' place and thereafter went to Sierra Bros
at 8:00 a.m. He bought cigarettes at Sierra Bros, then returned to his house,
arriving there at around 9:30 a.m.[29] Later, he made copra at his parent's land,
then spent the rest of the day at his house, which is only 500 meters from the
grassy place where the body of the victim was found.[30]
The Issues
The appellant charges that the trial court erred:
"1. In failing to give due credence to the accused's defenses;
2. In giving undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses;
3. x x x (In convicting) the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
4. In convicting the accused of x x x Rape with Homicide although the prosecution

have (sic) only proven a case for Homicide;
5. In not considering that based on the evidences (sic) presented (by) both the
prosecution and the defense, it is Danilo De Austria and not the accused, who is
probably guilty of the offense charged."[31]
all of which may be summed up as questioning the trial court's assessment of

the credibility of witnesses and its appreciation of the weight and sufficiency of
the prosecution's evidence, vis-a-vis that of the defense.
The Solicitor General adds that the trial court erred when it equated life
imprisonment with reclusion perpetua in the dispositive portion of the decision.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Credibility of Appellant's Defense
We cannot agree with appellant's contention to the effect that the defense
built a more credible case than the prosecution, and that its story is consistent
with ordinary human experience. In essence, the defense's theory is that,
although appellant was in Mahawanhawan, he could not have been at the
scene of the crime that fatal morning, and that someone else (De Austria) was
present thereat.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General,[32] appellant's alibi itself showed that
he was at or very near the place where witness De Austria said he saw him at
the time of the commission of the felony. By appellant's own admission, he was
in the same barangay on the date and time when the crime occurred. The
places where appellant claimed to have gone that morning are, as found by the
trial court, "within walking, distance" of each other. Thus, the court a quo held
"x x x that despite (the) variance in testimony as to time and others, it is not
physically impossible for accused to be at the scene of the crime. x x x."
Therefore, his alibi is inherently weak and hardly credible.
In jurisprudence, alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of
the facility with which it can be fabricated.[33] Thus, courts have always looked
upon it with suspicion and have received it with caution.It is a well-settled rule
that in order for alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive, clear and
satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
accused was somewhere else.[34]
To cite only one example, this court, in People vs. Cruz,[35] computed
distances to show that, contrary to the allegation of the accused, it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime:
"x x x In the case at bar, the distance between his father's farm and the resthouse on
the other hand, and the distance between the said boundary and the resthouse, on the
other, which are 2 and 1/2 kilometers, respectively, are not such distances as were
physically impossible for accused to negotiate or traverse; in fact, per his own
testimony, he was able to travel from his father's farm to the said boundary to play
basketball that same day. Besides, the house of accused's parents where he was living
was only 200 to 250 meters away from the resthouse, which distance accused could
have easily negotiated x x x."
Aside from its inherent weakness, accused-appellant's alibi cannot

overcome the positive identification by witness De Austria of appellant as the
one strangling the victim that fatal morning.
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Hewing to the general rule in criminal law that the guilt of an accused is not
determined by the weakness of defense's case but by the strength of that of the
prosecution, appellant also tries to attack the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
Appellant points to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution are related
to the victim and one another. But then, such purported "defect" cannot be
ascribed solely to the witnesses of the prosecution.Among the witnesses of the
defense, we find that Mahipos is appellant's "kinakapatid,[36] while the
Chavezes are related to appellant by affinity,[37] and Paquita admitted that
appellant is the "godson of (her) in-law."[38]
Relationship can put the testimony of a witness in doubt, but it cannot
adversely affect credibility by itself.[39] It is a familiar rule of law that the
assessment of witnesses' credibility by the trial court is accorded great respect
because it is in the best position to observe and evaluate their demeanor at the
time they gave their testimony.[40] As will be shown later, this Court sees no
reason to rule otherwise.
Perhaps from sheer desperation, appellant advances an incredible
theory: the spouses Sta. Maria, parents of the victim, were trying to cover up
their involvement with New People's Army by blaming appellant for the
crime. Aside from failing to prove such alleged involvement, accused could not
point to any believable reason why the victim's parents would supposedly
forego seeking justice for the rape and killing of their daughter merely in order
to allay some vague suspicion about their ideological leanings.
On the other hand, it is not also logical to conclude(as accused-appellant
would have us do) that Juanson was lying because she, and not her husband,
happened to be grazing their carabao that morning when she saw appellant on
the feeder road. Likewise, the defense was too obviously clutching at straws
when they tried to fault Vasquez, who happens to be a martial arts instructor,
for not having accompanied the victim that day on her way to school. He was
only a guest of the victim's brother-in-law, not even of the Sta. Marias, and we
cannot see how he could have been held responsible in any manner for
assuring the safety of the victim.
Further, the defense contends that the testimony of De Austria is
inconsistent with logic and human experience. He testified that he saw
appellant strangling the victim, but there was no sign of strangulation according
to Dr. Abas. Also, he was threatened by appellant with a double-bladed
weapon, but no such weapon was presented in court. And instead of reporting
the strangling incident to the authorities at once, he opted to untie his carabao
first.
The Court finds that these circumstances do not destroy the credibility of De
Austria. On direct examination, he testified as follows:
"PROS. VILLAFUERTE
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, do you still recall where were you sometime on January 14, 1991, at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning?
xxx xxx xxx

A: I was walking towards the ricefield.
Q: Where?
A: On the feeder road.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While walking on the feeder road of Mahawan-hawan on that particular date and time, do
you remember if you have seen anybody on that time while walking?
xxx xxx xxx

A: Antonio Magana, sir.
Q: Who else?
A: And Odette.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. VILLAFUERTE
Q: In what manner did you see this Odette Sta. Maria and this Antonio Magana?
A: I was behind them.
Q: Behind whom?
A: Behind Odette and Antonio Magana.
Q: And what did you see?
A: I saw Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria.
Q. In what manner did you see Antonio Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria?
A: He was ahead of me and I was behind her.
Q: Do you mean to say that Odette was also walking in the feeder road?
A: When I saw the two (2) they were no longer walking.
Q: And you said that Antonio Magana was some sort of strangling Odette Sta. Maria. How
was Antonio Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria?
A: Using his left arm, sir.
Q: And that left arm was wrapped around the neck of Odette Sta. Maria?
A: Yes, sir."[41]
The absence of signs of strangulation does not change in the slightest the
fact that the victim was attacked and killed. Even though the weapon used in
the killing was not presented in court, still it does not disprove the use of force
and violence, as the fatal hack wounds on the cadaver which, according to Dr.
Abas,[42] were caused by such a weapon, sufficiently establish this point.
In People vs. Cortes, supra, this Court held that delay in reporting a crime
does not detract from the veracity of the testimony as long as it is
explained. Such delay could be ascribed to fear of reprisal or reticence to get
involved. In this case, the reason was clearly fear, as appellant threatened De
Austria with harm unless the latter kept quiet. De Austria knew the accused to
be abusive (even violent) when drunk.Furthermore, their relative ages also
provide basis for De Austria's fear. While the accused is 42 years of age,[43] De
Austria is a young man of 19 years.[44] On direct examination, De Austria stated:
"Q: And what did you do when you saw this thing that you have just said?
A: I was shocked and I did not do anything.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said that you were shocked because of what you saw, what did you do?
A: My plan was to untie the carabao and to report the matter afterwards, but he blocked my
way.
Q: What did you do when you were blocked by him?
A: He poked a double bladed weapon on me.
Q: Did he say anything to you?
A: That once the Sta. Marias knew about this thing, he was going to kill me. 'Don't expect to
live!
Q: How did you receive that message?
A: When he poked a bladed weapon.
Q: When those words were uttered to you, what did you feel?
A: Because I was overfrightened, I said, 'Yes, Yes'.
Q: Are you afraid of Antonio Magana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because when he gets drank (sic), he becomes abusive.
Q: You have personal knowledge on that?
A: Yes, sir."[45]
While the reactions of eyewitnesses to a crime may vary, and even if De
Austria's reaction may not be typical or expected of a very credible witness, still,
the same cannot be considered damaging to his credibility. The trial court
accepted his testimony and this Court sees no reason not to.
Third Issue: Case Against De Austria
In a facetious attempt to throw the blame on De Austria and to discredit him,

the defense presented witnesses who claimed that they saw De Austria trailing
the victim by a few arms' length on the feeder road that morning; one witness
added that De Austria had with him a "sinampalok" (bolo) about eighteen inches
long.
The Court cannot bring itself to believe such story. While cross-examining
De Austria, the defense tried but failed to elicit an admission that he was
courting the victim.[46] Nothing else was presented to show improper motive on
his part. Viewed against De Austria's clear and categorical testimony that he
saw appellant strangling the victim, the testimonies of the defense witnesses
merely ascribe to De Austria a vague and equivocal act which cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be made the basis for imputing to him the authorship
of the crime.
Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. This

is true of most rape and rape-cum-homicide cases. The Court, in previous
decisions, always took this into consideration.[47] In many cases, the victim,
usually the sole witness, is killed. In People vs. Masongsong,[48] we held that
rape is usually done with the least possibility of being seen by the public, as in
fact, the presence of eyewitnesses might even raise serious doubts.
The present case is no different, built as it is upon circumstantial evidence
presented through the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Abas testified that the victim
died from hack wounds on the neck and that her hymen sustained lacerations,
showing the victim was violated and violently killed. He opined that the victim
was raped before she was hacked to death. Dr. Abas approximation of the time
of death was corroborated by the testimonies of De Austria, Juanson and
Vasquez.[49] Lucia Sta. Maria testified that she found her daughter's body with
skirt raised and without underwear. De Austria positively identified appellant as
the person strangling the victim that morning. Juanson and Vasquez confirmed
that they also saw appellant looking uneasy, walking back and forth as if waiting
for somebody by the feeder road that morning .
Juanson on direct examination said:
"Q On January 14, 1991, do you recall having seen Antonio Magana?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What time on January 14, 1991 have you seen Antonio Magana?
A I could not tell exactly what time but it was in the morning of January 14, 1991.
Q Can you, more or less, approximate the time?
A To my estimate, more or less 6:30 in the morning.
Q Where did you see Antonio Magana on that date and time?
A He was standing at the feeder road."[50]
"Q You said you saw Antonio Magana standing on the feeder road while you were grazing
your carabao. What did you notice from Antonio Magana, if any?
A He was uneasy, looking both sides and looking towards the interland (sic) of the
barangay."[51]
"Q Do you know the place where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was recovered?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know when she was allegedly raped and killed?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What date was that?
A January 14.
Q 1991?
A Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q On the same day that you saw Antonio Magana seemingly waiting for somebody at about
6:30 o'clock in the morning?
ATTY. MAGANA:
Misleading, Your Honor. The witness had not testified that she has seen Antonio Magana
waiting for somebody.
FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
I did not mention any name.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
Q That place where you saw Antonio Magana in the early morning of January 14, 1991, do
you know how far is it from the very place also where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was
found on the night of same day, at more or less 6:30?
WITNESS:
A I could not give a good estimate but it is only very near where the cadaver was found.
xxx xxx xxx

Q And in the place where you said Antonio Magana was looking, was he looking in that
direction where a resident at the house where Odette Sta. Maria is residing will be
coming from?
A Yes, Sir."[52]
Vasquez on direct examination corroborates. He said:

"Q Mr. Witness, what time did you return to Labo on January 14, 1991?
A About 6:10 in the morning.
Q Did you check your watch?
A Yes, Sir."[53]
"Q In that early morning of January 14, do you recall if you have seen Antonio Magana?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A The place where I saw him on January 14, 1991, Antonio Magana was quite near the place
where we recovered the body of Odette Sta. Maria.
xxx xxx xxx

Q And what did you notice at him when you glanced at him?
A I don't understand why he is acting uneasy."[54]
Motive was established by Lucia Sta. Maria who testified that her daughter
told her one week prior to the incident that appellant would always look at her
in a "bad way" whenever they met. On direct examination she said:
"Q During the death, as a result of the death of Odette Sta. Maria, did you have any suspect
as to who could have done this to your daughter?
A I am suspecting the accused Antonio Magana because one week before she died, we met
him.
Q When you said you met Antonio Magana, what happened then?
A My daughter held my hand, and she was trembling all over.
Q What was your reaction when you noticed this to Odette?
A I asked her why she was behaving like that, she told me that Antonio Magana was staring
at her in a bad way.
Q Did you ask your daughter how she had seen the accused staring at her?
A That everytime she went to school and back home, and whenever she met Antonio
Magana, she informed me that Antonio Magana stared bad at her.
Q In other words, Odette had that fear over the looks of Antonio Magana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when she told you that, what did you tell her, if any?
A I did not mind it, sir, I said it might be natural on his part.
Q This incident happened a week before she died?
A Yes, Sir."[55]
Taken together, these pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to

convict the appellant of the crime charged, (a) there being more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference is derived having been duly
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances being such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Considered as a whole, they
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion --
that appellant was the author of the crime.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof, as excluding the possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[57] This was
sufficiently established in the case at bar.
Fifth Issue: Rape Despite Absence of Spermatozoa
The defense harps on the absence of spermatozoa during autopsy as

proving that no rape was committed.
The Court disagrees. It has been long settled that absence of spermatozoa
does not necessarily mean that rape was not committed; the slightest
penetration of the female organ is enough.[58] The lacerations of the victim's
hymen sufficiently established that sexual intercourse took place. This is further
corroborated by Lucia who saw the cadaver without underwear and with skirt
raised.
Again, we find the chain of circumstances unerringly leading to one solitary
conclusion: appellant was the perpetrator of this despicable crime.
Life Imprisonment Is Not Reclusion Perpetua

The Solicitor General points out the error of the trial court in
equating reclusion perpetua with life imprisonment when it sentenced the
accused "to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view of the suspension of the
death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced to imprisonment for life (Reclusion
perpetua) x x x."[59]
This Court distinguished between the two penalties in its previous
decisions. Recently, in People vs. Lascuna,[60] the Court noted that such
distinction have been made as early as 1948 in People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil
167. In People vs. Baguio,[61] the Court made the following differentiation:
"The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment
for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized not by the x x x Code but by special law.Reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment
which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another,
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."
At the risk of being repetitive, this Court enjoins trial judges to keep the
foregoing in mind and apply the correct penalty. We further caution them
against lapsing into the same error.
In the instant case, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the
imposition of the death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335
thereof, as amended by R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, when by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was prohibited by the Constitution
at the time the offense was committed. So too, we delete the award of liquidated
damages inasmuch as there was no pre-agreement on any such damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with modifications the assailed
Decision. We uphold the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide and the order to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for her death, twenty thousand pesos
(P20.000.00) as moral damages and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as
exemplary damages. We herewith modify the sentence imposed to reclusion
perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on
certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was
charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary
at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to
twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the
custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while
still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the
imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense
with which he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts
material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the
rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place has — jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes

en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha
de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno
de pesos plurales resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation3 and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated
from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed
upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another;
for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly
said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement. 7Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët

Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179187

Appellee, Present:
-versus- QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**and
BRION, JJ.
RENATO TALUSAN y
PANGANIBAN,
Appellant. Promulgated:
July 14, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals[1] affirmed the conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Pias City of Renato Talusan y
Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping with rape of AAA,[2] a minor of six years.
The Information filed against appellant, together with one Eljoy Salonga, reads:
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in
the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and present
whereabout is still unknown, without legal authority or justifiable motive,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry
away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6) year old, minor, of her liberty,
against her will and consent, and the said detention lasted for eight (8)
days, and while accused RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @
Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in custody of AAA and armed with a
gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of
AAA for several instances against her will and consent thereby subjecting
her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her physical and psychological
development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Salongas true identity and . . . whereabout[s] were, as stated in the Information,

unknown.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school,
appellant, who was sitting by a tree in Las Pias, pulled her aside and cajoled her into
joining him by telling her that they would go to Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew
appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible classes. Appellant brought AAA,
however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga and two
unidentified individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days
during which he abused her by inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis
before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB
went to her school to inquire. As nobody knew her whereabouts, BBB decided to
report the matter to the Las Pias City Police Station. A neighbor then informed him
that he saw appellant sitting by a tree at the same time that AAA was on her way to
school.
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A
former co-worker of appellant gave BBB an address in Imus, Cavite, prompting
BBB to report on January 22, 2004 to the Imus Police Station the disappearance of
AAA.
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was
apprehended.
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted an initial medico-legal
examination which revealed the following
Findings:
- Hymen: Deep fresh 3 & 9oclock position

- Vestibule congested
Conclusion:
- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity

- There are no ext. signs of application of any form of
trauma[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a
plea of guilty. The lower court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated questions and just as repeated
answers showing that appellant understood his plea and its consequences, the trial
court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAAs detailed account of her
ordeal is a manifestation of her honesty and forthrightness,[5] convicted appellant,
disposing in its Decision of June 7, 2004 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the

guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by his voluntary and
spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does
not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of punishment,
nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, this
Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN,
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime
of KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty because the penalty imposable is single and indivisible and this
is regardless of its presence. x x x
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of

P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and an additional amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is automatically
awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x
SO ORDERED.[6] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty
imposed. Per People v. Mateo,[7] however, the Court referred the case to the Court
of Appeals by Resolution of November 22, 2005 for intermediate disposition.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification
appellants conviction, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas City is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan
y Panganiban @ Natol @ Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole
and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following: (a) P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; and (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.[8]
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously

file their respective Supplemental Briefs if they so desired within thirty (30) days
from notice.[9] In compliance, the parties submitted their respective Manifestations
that the Appeal Briefs they had earlier filed would suffice.
In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on
the basis of an improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims, to judiciously
follow the guidelines set forth in People v. Pastor.[10]
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In Pastor, the Court, holding that there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a
trial judge must conduct a searching inquiry, nevertheless came up with the
following guidelines:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had

conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as

his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the

penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.
For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and
fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and

understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.[11]
There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry.
As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea are ascertained, as was done in the present case, the
accuseds plea of guilt is sustained. Consider the following transcript of stenographic
notes of the proceedings taken during appellants arraignment:
ATTY. CABARDO
Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.
COURT
Arraign the accused in Tagalog.
(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)
COURT
What is his plea? Hes pleading guilty?
COURT INTERPRETER
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his
plea.
Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment?
ACCUSED
A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.
Q Do you know how to read and write?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What is your occupation?
A Im a driver, Your Honor.
Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the
Criminal Information. Did you plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without
anyone forcing or intimidating you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and
consequences if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal
Information as charged?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you

fully your rights under the Constitution before you plead Guilty to the
Criminal Information?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal
Information, this Court will immediately sentence you and confine you at
the National Penitentiary?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you
will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
A No, Your Honor.

Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely
and of your own volition?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon

A. Monsod intimidate you or exert pressure on you so that you will plead
Guilty to the Criminal Information?
A No, Your Honor.
COURT
Please speak louder.
ACCUSED
A No, Your Honor.
COURT
Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you,

exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty as charged to
the Criminal Information?
A None, Your Honor.
Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004,
you kidnapped, detained one AAA, a six (6) year old minor against her
will and consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you

inserted your finger inside the vagina of the said minor for several
instances against her will?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given
to you by this Court, do you still insist and reiterate your pleading
Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged for Kidnapping with
Multiple Rape?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking
the responsibilities and I hope that you will be completely reformed.
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded
Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information, I am directing
the Prosecution to present evidence to determine the culpability
of the accused.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt
when arraigned, there is no compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for
further reception of evidence. While the Court has set aside convictions based on
improvident pleas of guilt in capital offenses, which pleas had been the sole basis of
the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether
the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses
legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction is, independently of the
plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense
charged.
In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence
presented by the prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt[13] of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[14] Thus in People v.
Larraaga[15] the Court held:
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of
the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery
with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with
homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As
earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and
that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual
confinement, restraint and rape of AAA were proven.
Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and
immaturity being generally badges of truth and sincerity,[16] declared:
Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?
A: He forced me, Your Honor.
Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did
the accused do to you?
A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not
true.
Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to
go to Jollibee, is that the understanding of the Court?
A: I did not want to, Your Honor.
Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused?
A: Nothing, Your Honor.
Q: Did you cry?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did you cry?
A: I was just crying, Your Honor.[17]
xxxx
Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your
mother and father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many nights?
A: Eight (8) nights, sir.
Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and
at the club, where else were you taken by Kuya Renato?
A: At coastal mall, sir.
Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya
Renato inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?

A: His finger, sir.
xxxx
Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?
A: I told him that it was painful. [18]
AAAs stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the
measures he took in order to recover her. And the initial medico-legal report
conducted for inquest purposes shows that AAA suffered deep fresh lacerations in
her hymen which are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the
presentation of AAAs certificate of live birth, hence, the death penalty imposed by
the trial court is in order. In view, however, of the enactment in the interim of
Republic Act 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape, and the award of moral damages even without need of
proof as it is presumed that the victim suffered moral injuries,[19] are both increased
from P50,000 to P75,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages are increased from P50,000 to P75,000. In all other
respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S.
PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the
Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col.
Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to
Quarters1 containing the following:
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters
under guard pending investigation of your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the
expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be

confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.
Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial
NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following
violations allegedly committed by petitioner:
CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN

OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the
Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million
five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June
2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos
(P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation,
Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998
Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota
Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-
300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498,
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the
Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million
five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002
and December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos
(1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names
such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-
665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his
solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty
by acquiring and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor
and disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and
exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD
ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).

knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline.
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the
transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the
ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56),
compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement for
military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention
Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-
Trial Report5 of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict
and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written
ballot 2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following
findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time
the votes was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to
forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place
the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
recommended action:
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on
Specification 1 on Charge 1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar
and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed
by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing
authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal.
Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall
be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced.
Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less
than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.
4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is
hereto attached.
In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the
military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses
of violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of
AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the
Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of
Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused
herein being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the
attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner
was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial
against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the
case of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos
Flores Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General
Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Eleven.
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T.

Gazmin, issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the
Confirmation of Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major
General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the
National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas
corpus, alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15, 2011,
but was denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
GROUNDS
A.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE
RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND
PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
B.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE
TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF
TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON
PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
C.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND
FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S
PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE,
FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE
OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the
above grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following
counter-arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE

OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS
RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE
SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S
RETIREMENT.
III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER

TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO.
408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS
CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY

THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG
due to the following:
(A)
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT,

AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT
WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY
POSTULATES.
(B)
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE
PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE
OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM
BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
(C)
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE
OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD
ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE
THE SENTENCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO
MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE
"CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING
THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE
CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19
Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to
him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the
Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
thereto, to wit:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall
be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not
otherwise subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and
2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and
he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until
the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-
settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did
not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v.
Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court
declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged
offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of
the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which
goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz. —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in
regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them
previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by
court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly
been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such
cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held
therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service
of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial
by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that
under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried
in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x"
To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen.
Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP,
the jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the
event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is
that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the
Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to
any offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the
military service.
Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:
xxxx
In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a
person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction
does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said
commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval
between services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military
status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a
regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for
example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a
dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior
to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the
offense. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or
misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and Martin v.
Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military jurisdiction
over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the violation
involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military service,
while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of
military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses committed by the military
personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand, in
the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of jurisdiction on
the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is provided
under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed
Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military
law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided,
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper
civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the
person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by
virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President may, in the interest of justice,
order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil
court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the
petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm
petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five,
confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-
martial is carried into execution, namely:
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a
sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may
be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the
field;
(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second
lieutenant; and
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder,
mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be
carried into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the
commanding general of the Army in the said field.
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority
no additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis
supplied.)
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President
directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in
view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him,
the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On
the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his
preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary,
because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of preventive
imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of
War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of
the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in appropriate
cases.
On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic
in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the
present case.
The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected to apply
criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the discipline of
military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions
created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared
unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial which tried it, was
created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid entity.
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the
same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732 of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in
which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office. This Court held:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes
the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the
above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where
words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over
the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not
hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what
we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to
Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of
Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the
following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no
relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a
court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a
court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of
special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as
adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory
oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection,"
and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense
of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General,
court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same
authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it
differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers
of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military
duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United
States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in
controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as
untrammelled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the
right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues
controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending
that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the
accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse
an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state.
(Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American
Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved
by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect
the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death
penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury
done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or
special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is
strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt,
or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict;
its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning,
and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S.
W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs.
Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and
not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in
jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton
vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded
the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court
in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above
question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the
reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of
homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for
the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest
sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-
Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.34In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War,
or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court
Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore, absent any
provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the
General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29
should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence has
been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus:
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October
2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was
sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not
served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer
appropriate.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F.
GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due
and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may
direct for a period of two (2) years is also approved.
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of
his confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year
sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official
military detention facility. However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the
1âwphi1
Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and
that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before
said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian authority on
this matter.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before
the expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall
immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining
unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.40 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same
class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In the present case, petitioner
belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights
accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of
offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore,
following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must
be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in
nature.
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the
sentence given by the court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-
martial shall be held to include:
(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of
guilty of a particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when,
in the opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a
finding of only the lesser degree of guilt;
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the
Articles of War:
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence
adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the
whole or any part of the sentence.
Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by

the military authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and
Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which the
person under sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same power
may be exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by the
President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other authority, and no approved sentence of loss of
files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President, except as
provided in Article 52.
When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the
area commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without
commuting), mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any
sentence which under those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same may
be executed. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242).
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such
is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court
finds the same to be without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy
disposition of cases.44However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether
or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.46
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the
case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the
proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of
sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the
decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by
the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,47 where, in spite of the lapse of
more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of
delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason
for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan
City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered
on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the
new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's
absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous
of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
xxxx
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches −
had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his
right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some
overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a
waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy
trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and
vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public
justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused
was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on
the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair
opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.48
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.49 In fact, the delay in the
confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
President, his sentence cannot be served.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the
above discussions. 1âwphi1
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.50 Thus,
applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should
be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set
forth by the same law.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate justice

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175929

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
ROMMEL DELA CRUZ,
Accused-Appellant. December 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MURDER is one of the odious crimes a man can commit against another. It is no
respecter of blood relations.
Accused-appellant Rommel dela Cruz seeks a reversal of his conviction by the

Court of Appeals (CA)[1] and the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[2] for murder.
The Facts
Mario Pader, Manny Viscaya and Rafael Santarin are neighbors and
friends.[3] Santarin and appellant Dela Cruz are first cousins.[4]
On August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., Santarin, Pader and Viscaya were
conversing[5] near the barangay hall in Nadurata
St., Caloocan City. Fronting the barangay hall is a street which was lighted by a
fluorescent lamp.[6] Santarin was seated between Pader and Viscaya.[7] They were
arms-length away of each other.[8] Appellant was sanding behind them,[9] at a
distance of about two (2) meters.[10]
Viscaya went to buy some cigarettes from a nearby store beside

the barangay hall[11] and returned to the place where Santarin and Pader were.[12]
Suddenly, appellant came from behind and stabbed

[13] [14] [15]
Santarin once. Santarin fell to the ground, chin first. Pader and Viscaya were
instantly shocked and were unable to move.[16]
Appellant immediately fled the scene.[17] Subsequently, people from

the barangay hall arrived and brought Santarin to the nearest hospital. [18] He,
however, succumbed to death due to the stab wound.[19]
Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI),[20] conducted an autopsy on the victims body. According to his
findings,[21] Santarin sustained one stab wound in the back[22] which was 15
centimeters deep.[23] The wound reached the left lung[24]causing his
death.[25] According to Dr. Muoz, the weapon used by the assailant was a sharp,
pointed single-bladed instrument which could either be a kitchen knife or
a balisong.[26]
On December 13, 1995, appellant was indicted for murder in an Information

that read:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMMEL DELA

CRUZ of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995 in Kaloocan

City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident

premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with a
bladed weapon on the back portion of the body one
RAFAEL SANTARIN y DELA CRUZ, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious physical injuries which injuries
caused his death upon arrival at the Ospital ng Kalookan, this
city.
Contrary to law.
Kaloocan City, Metro Manila, December 6, 1995.
(SGD.) AFABLE E. CAJIGAL

Assistant City Prosecutor[27]
Appellant evaded arrest. The long arm of the law, however, caught up with him when
he was arrested in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
When arraigned on June 7, 2000, appellant, assisted by Atty. Jimmy Edmund
Batara, pleaded not guilty[28] to the Information. Trial on the merits ensued after.
The prosecution evidence, which portrayed the foregoing facts, was supplied by the
combined testimonies of Viscaya and Dr. Muoz.
Appellants version of the events is premised on denial and alibi.[29] He

claimed that on the night of August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., he went to collect
his fees for electrical services rendered from neighbors.[30] It was about that time
when he passed by the group of Viscaya who were seated in front of
the barangay hall at Libis Nadurata, Caloocan City.[31]
Appellant did not join the group but went on his separate way. He went to the
houses of his clients to collect his fees until 8:00 p.m.[32] He did not go home to his
parents house later that evening because he was angry with them and his
siblings.[33] He slept in a parked passenger jeep that was half a kilometer away from
his parents house.[34] He woke up at 3:00 a.m.[35] and took a passenger jeep bound
for the pier.[36] He took a boat to Cebu City, arriving there the following day at
about 6:00 a.m.[37] He stayed in Cebu City for four years.[38] His family
in Cebu City was surprised to see him when he got there.[39]
Sometime in 1999, appellant returned, his family in tow, to his parents house
in Caloocan City.His mother, however, refused to accept them for her fear of trouble
because of his alleged involvement in the killing of his first cousin. [40] As a result,
he and his family proceeded to the house of his sister
at P. Zamora Street, Caloocan City.[41] His mother later allowed his wife and
children to stay in her house at Libis, but not him.[42]
Appellant proceeded to Tabang, Plaridel Bulacan[43] and stayed there for eight
(8) months.[44]He told his relatives there that his mother was keeping him away as
his life was in danger.[45] He also feared for his life because he was accused of killing
his first cousin.[46] Appellant later transferred to Aliaga, Nueva Ecija where he was
arrested on June 7, 1999.[47]
According to appellant, Viscaya had ill-motives in testifying falsely against

him. They had a misunderstanding sometime in 1989 after appellant meddled in a
quarrel between Viscaya and a friend. Since then, Viscaya resented him.
Appellant insisted that he is innocent. When asked why he was charged for
the killing of his first cousin, his reply was hindi ko po alam sa kanila.[48]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On February 26, 2001, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction,

disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused

ROMMEL DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Murder,
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659. Accordingly, he shall serve the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties under the law and shall pay
the costs.
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention.
By way of death Indemnity, the accused shall pay the victims heirs the amount
of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
As funeral and related expenses, the accused shall also pay the
victims heirs the amount of P20,900.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
The Branch Clerk of this Court shall now issue the corresponding
Commitment Order for the accuseds confinement at the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.[49]
By virtue of this Courts decision in People v. Mateo,[50] the Court issued a

resolution on September 6, 2004, transferring this case to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
On July 28, 2006, the CA affirmed the trial courts disposition, with
modification on the award of damages. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THESE CASES, THUS, the

appealed Decision finding the accused-appellant Rommel Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil aspect of
the case of MODIFIED to read: the accused-appellant is
hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P20,900.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs shall also be assessed against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[51]
Undaunted, appellant took the present recourse.
Issues
In his final bid to seek reversal of his conviction, appellant imputes to the trial
court the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
ACCOUNT OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ANENT THE
SUBJECT INCIDENT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III.
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
GUILTY, THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ONLY
[52]
HOMICIDE. (Underscoring supplied)
The first and second issues, being related, will be resolved jointly.
Our Ruling
I. The trial court did not err in convicting appellant. It did not also err in giving
full faith and credence to the account of the prosecution witness. Positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi. Flight is an indication of guilt.
In support of the first and second assigned errors, appellant claims that the
testimony of Viscaya leaves much to be desired. According to him, there is a gaping
hole in Viscayas testimony[53] that seriously militates against his
conviction. Although Viscaya testified about the presence of appellant at the scene
of the crime, he, nonetheless, categorically admitted that he did not see the weapon
used in stabbing the victim.[54]
The contention is untenable. The emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice
are potent aids in understanding the testimony of witnesses. The trial court has the
opportunity and is presumed to take advantage of these aids in weighing the
testimony of the witnesses. But as they cannot be incorporated into the record, this
Court has no assistance in the examination of the testimony and must, therefore, rely
upon the good judgment of the trial court.[55] Thus, in the absence of any
showing that the trial courts calibration of credibility was flawed, We are bound by
its assessment.[56]
More than that, a reading of the testimony of Viscaya would show that the
trial court did not, in any way, err in calibrating the credibility of his testimony:
MANNY VISCAYAS DIRECT EXAMINATION CONDUCTED

BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FILOMENO BAJAR
xxxx
Fiscal: On August 7, 1995 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, do you still
remember your whereabouts?
Witness: I was there at the side of the barangay hall.
xxxx
Q: Now, were you alone then or do you have companion with you on said
place?
A: Mario Pader was with me and we were talking.
Q: Who else were there, if you know?

A: We were 3 then, Rafael Santarin, Mario Pader and myself.
xxxx
Q: While the 3 of you were conversing on August 7, 1995 at

around 7:00 p.m., do you remember if any unusual incident that
transpired?
A: While we were conversing, I spotted Rommel dela Cruz on our
back.
Q: How far was Rommel dela Cruz from you when you saw him?
A: He was about two (2) meters away from us.
Q: What was he doing when you saw him for the first time in that distance
for two (2) meters?
A: He was standing there, Sir.
Q: After seeing him, what happened?

A: When I saw him coming from our back, he immediately attacked.
Q: Whom did he attack?

A: Rafael Santarin, Sir.
xxxx
Q: So, when you said attack, what actually do you mean by that?
A: Rafael Santarin was stabbed, Sir.
Q: Before we go further, this Rommel dela Cruz who was your

neighbor for 15 years, if he is in court, can you identify him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Please point to him?

A: That one, Sir.
Interpreter: The witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who

identified himself as Rommel dela Cruz?
Fiscal: How were you able to see the stabbing of the victim in this case
by Rommel dela Cruz when according to you, your back was
against him?
Witness: Because after I spotted Rommel dela Cruz from our back, I
bought cigarette and after buying cigarette, that was the time that
he stabbed the victim.
xxxx
Q: When you saw the stabbing of the victim by Rommel dela Cruz,
what was then your position in relation to Rommel and Rafael?
A: My side was facing the two.
Q: Were you still buying cigarette or, you have already bought cigarette
when you saw them?
A: I already bought cigarette, Sir.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how Rommel dela Cruz stabbed

the victim?
Interpreter: The witness is demonstrating a forward thrust using his

right hand.
Fiscal: Were the two (2) protagonists facing each other?
Witness: No, Sir.
Q: What was then the position of the victim in relation to the stabber?
A: The back of the victim was against the accused.
Q: Did you see the weapon that was used by the accused in stabbing the
victim?
A: I did not see it because the incident happened so fast.
Q: How many times did he stab the victim?

Witness: Only one, Sir.
xxxx
Q: When these people arrived and lifted the victim, where was then
the accused?
A: The accused ran away, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal: What happened to the victim after he was stabbed by the

accused?
A: He fell on the ground.
xxxx
Q: Were you investigated by the police in relation to the incident that

you saw?
A: Yes, Sir, at the District Office of the police.
Q: What did you tell the police?

A: I told them that I saw the incident.
Q: Before the stabbing of your friend by the accused, was there any
conversation that transpired between the two?
A: None, Sir.[57] (Emphasis ours)
No rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged

credible.[58]Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.[59] Thus, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony
is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone
testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.[60] Although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factorin the appreciation of evidence, preponderance
is not necessarily with the greatest number.[61]Conviction can still be had on the
basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.[62]
That Viscaya did not see the weapon used does not impair his credibility. As
he explained, he failed to see the weapon used to stab Santarin because the incident
happened so fast.[63] There is neither jurisprudence nor rules of evidence that a
witness credibility is affected if there is failure to see the weapon used in the
commission of the crime. To rule along the twisted logic of appellant could be
absurd.
Viscaya was unrelenting in positively identifying appellant as the one who

stabbed Santarin. Note that Viscaya and appellant were neighbors for about fifteen
(15) years.[64] There could have been no mistake in Viscayas identification of
appellant as the assailant. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable,
and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity
of the malefactor should normally be accepted.[65] Absent any evidence showing any
reason and motive for the witness to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[66]
Appellant has not presented any shred of evidence that Viscaya was impelled
by an improper motive in identifying him as the assailant. When appellant was asked
why he was charged with the killing of his first cousin, all he could say was hindi ko
po alam sa kanila.[67] Appellants claim that Viscaya had an evil motive in testifying
against him because they had a previous misunderstanding is too flimsy an excuse.
Appellants denial and alibi are not worthy of belief. It is an oft-quoted doctrine
that positive identification prevails over denial and alibi.[68] Alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[69]
Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that
(a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.[70] Appellant does not
dispute that he was near the scene of the crime on August 7, 1995. It was not also
physically impossible for him to have been the author of the crime, and after, hide
to avoid being prosecuted. In fact, during cross-examination, appellant explicitly
admitted that the distance from where he slept and place of the stabbing incident was
only for a short distance.Thus:
Q: You claimed in your Affidavit that you are (sic) only sleeping in the
parked jeep near the school and your distance is not even 20 meters
walk from where you were sleeping to the place of the stabbing
incident?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Less than?
A: Yes, Sir, by mere walking, one would reach the place of the incident
from the place where I used to sleep in front of the elementary school,
Sir.[71]
Another circumstance which glaringly points to the guilt of appellant is his

flight, not only from the scene of the crime, but also from the clutches of the
authorities. Flight of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining
shred of doubt on his guilt.[72] Indeed, the wicked flee,when no man pursueth, but
the innocent are bold as a lion.[73]
Consider the following:
First. On the night of the killing, appellant did not go home to his parents
house and instead slept inside a parked passenger jeep which was half a kilometer
away from his parents house. His reason was his alleged anger with his parents and
siblings. He did not, however, explain what caused his anger for his parents and
siblings which could have made his claim of not going home on that night believable.
Second. Appellant proceeded to the pier at 3:00 a.m. and took a boat
for Cebu City where he admittedly stayed for 4 years.
Third. Although he and his family returned to Caloocan City in 1999, appellant opted
not to stay in the city. He instead went to Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan where he told his
relatives that his mother was keeping him away as his life was in danger. He also told
them that he feared for his life because he was accused of killing his first cousin.
Fourth. Continuing his flight, appellant finally sought sanctuary in the house of his
relatives in Nueva Ecija where he was eventually caught.
Taken all together, these circumstances show that appellant entertained fear for what
had happened to his first cousin. This could hardly be the conduct of an innocent man.
In his supplemental brief,[74] appellant also claims that the non-presentation of

Pader as witness is tantamount to suppression of evidence.[75]
If appellant felt that the prosecution was suppressing evidence, he should have
asserted during trial his constitutional right to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf.[76] This he did
not do. Appellant cannot now be heard for the first time on appeal to complain that
he could not secure the presence of witnesses at the trial. It does not appear that he
made any effort to do so before or during the progress of the trial, or that he sought
the aid of the court to compel the attendance of his witnesses, or objected to
proceeding without them.[77]
Also, there was no necessity for the prosecution panel to present Pader as
witness for the simple reason that his testimony would have merely been
corroborative. As earlier mentioned, the testimony of Viscaya is credible of belief,
thus, any testimony of Pader would have only been a superfluity.
The elements of murder are: (1) That a person is killed; (2) That the accused
killed him; (3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) The killing is not
parricide or infanticide.[78]
Appellant claims that there was no concrete evidence proving that, indeed, treachery
was employed in committing the crime charged.[79] According to him, the
prosecution failed to present evidence that accused-
appellant has resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of killing. There
was no proof that the death of the deceased was the result of meditation, calculation
or reflection.[80]
Appellant is mistaken. There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the

accused without warning; when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim; or is, in any event, so sudden and
unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution
of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.[81] In order to sustain a finding of
treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the
employment of means ofexecution that give the person attacked not opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.[82]
Appellants attack on Santarin was so sudden and launched from behind that
the latter was caught off guard. Appellant gave the victim no opportunity to defend
himself, as the latter was innocently conversing with Viscaya and Pader. Appellants
attack was swift, deliberate and unexpected.[83] There was no slightest provocation
on the part of Santarin. Treachery is, without question, present.
It is clear from the records that appellant had pondered upon the mode or
method of his attack to insure the killing of Santarin or remove or diminish any risk
to himself that might arise from the defense that Santarin might
make. Appellant suddenly stabbed Santarin at the back, even in the absence of
provocation by the victim, to insure himself against the risk from any possible
defense that Santarin might make.
Dr. Muoz, who conducted the autopsy on Santarins corpse, also found out that
Santarin sustained one stab wound at the back portion of his body, which caused his
death. This corroborated the testimony of Viscaya that appellant stabbed the victim
once at the back.
In one case, this Court ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim
since the stabbing was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was not only unarmed,
but was unable to defend himself.[84] In another case[85]
where treachery was also appreciated, it was shown that the victims were totally
unprepared for the sudden and unexpected attack of appellant.
II. Appellant was correctly convicted of murder. There was no violation of the
right of appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.
Appellant contends that while it is not disputed that treachery was stated
in the information, nonetheless, the same was not specified therein as a
qualifying circumstance[86] in an ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what were those
qualifying circumstances.[87] Thus, assuming he is guilty, he could only be convicted
of homicide, not murder.
Appellant is building castle on sand. It is true that in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.[88] The Constitution uses the word shall, hence, the same is mandatory. A
violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged
in the Information.
The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First. To furnish the

accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction.[89]
The en banc per curiam Resolution of this Court in People v.

Aquino[90] provides for the proper way of making allegations of qualifying or
aggravating circumstances in an Information as mandated by Sections 8[91] and
9[92] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x the Court has repeatedly held even after the recent

amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, that qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. x x x
In the recent case of People v. Lab-eo, the appellant there

questioned the decision of the lower court raising the killing to
murder. The appellant there argued that he could only be convicted of
homicide since the Information merely stated that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior
strength and craft attended the commission of the offense.The appellant
also asserted that since the circumstances were merely described as
aggravating and not qualifying, he should only be convicted of the lesser
crime of homicide. On this score, the Court ruled that
The fact that the circumstances were described as

aggravating instead of qualifying does not take the
Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word qualifying or
aggravating in enumerating the circumstances that raise a
killing to the category of murder. Article 248 merely refers
to the enumerated circumstances as the attendant
circumstances.
xxxx
The use of the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances will not

add any essential element to the crime. Neither will the use of such words
further apprise the accused of the nature of the charge. The specific
allegation of the attendant circumstance in the Information, coupled with
the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the
offense as required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, is sufficient to warn
the accused x x x.
x x x The words aggravating circumstances include qualifying

circumstances. Qualifying circumstances are aggravating circumstances
which, by express provision of law, change the nature of the crime to a
higher category. The words attendant circumstances, which still appear in
Article 248 (raising homicide to murder), refer to qualifying
circumstances those aggravating circumstances that, by express provision
of law, change the nature of the crime when present in the commission of
the crime.
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

states that the
x x x qualifying and aggravating circumstances must

be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know x x x (the) qualifying and aggravating circumstances
x x x.
Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is the essential

element that raises the crime to a higher category, need not be stated in
the language of the law. With more reason, the words
aggravating/qualifying circumstances as used in the law need not appear
in the Information, especially since these words are merely descriptive of
the attendant circumstances and do not constitute an essential element of
the crime. These words are also not necessary in informing the accused
that he is charged of a qualified crime. What properly informs the accused
of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the
circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher
category.
Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. Section 8 merely requires the Information to specify the
circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the words qualifying
or qualified by to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an
offense. It is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by that raises
a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant
circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a
higher category.
xxxx
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely

require that the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant
circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These
circumstances need not be preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying,
qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It
is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to
apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare
fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the
prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances
mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving
them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the
higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper
cases.
xxxx
To guide the bench and the bar, this Resolution clarifies and
resolves the issue of how to allege or specify qualifying or aggravating
circumstances in the Information. The words aggravating/qualifying,
qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by need not be
expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are
specified in the Information. (Emphasis ours)
The Information in this case clearly forewarns appellant that without any
justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent
to kill, he did then and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab, with a
bladed weapon, on the back portion of the body, Santarin, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious physical injury which injury caused his
death.[93]These allegations, once they were proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution, qualify the killing of Santarin to murder.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Court of Appeals

Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE
OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses
"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed
presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds
being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount
of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or
in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of

Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in
full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by
Check No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the
payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-
Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference
to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The
alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to
the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
(RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo
B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their
signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For
and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the
imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969,
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake
because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice
No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged
signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on
the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber
allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez,
a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on
the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81
for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at
the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge
at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at
the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their
signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting
the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could
not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified
that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his
company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were
cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges
were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and
hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the
serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the
provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of
the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the
provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He
represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial
engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the
employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by
Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's
office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper
lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson
brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing
and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher
After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the
amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on
March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense
is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he
received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's
office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871
dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-
33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29,
1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty
of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following
penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in
the same amount; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-
one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and
executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the
personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The
lower court had issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for
the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment
of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's
brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo,
Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto
the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of
malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused
to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of
the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of
the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in
representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was
a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal
and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that
the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)
control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
motion (155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule
that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.
The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court
anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced
"malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph
3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure
because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he
(Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher
because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54
tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred
in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After
the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3,
1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts
covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1"
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding
with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when
the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the
cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As
noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office
when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the
vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received,
was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the
exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have
been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had
been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to
the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court
said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments
were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido
(Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers
inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen
meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because
the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the
treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a
crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution
show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor,
then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention
because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence
against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the
treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the
treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon
by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor
apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred
in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in
finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on
circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in
fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the
fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and
convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause
and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case
on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they
would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and
then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a
preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating
the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon,
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption
is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of
Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the
exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions
of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there
are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures
terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature
in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him
(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn
July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and
when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed.,
1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were
Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the
provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the
forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in
the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government
and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial
court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego,
is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego
signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds
of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office
(p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego
allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under
the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine
(although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the
amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers
were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction
materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from
Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on
a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation
on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial
engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the
vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the
proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received
the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in
the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh.
K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having
committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have
some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically
fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes
two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671;
People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal
treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons
worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal
funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons
mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and
bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of

malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve
offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession
of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial
treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring
with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People
vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S.
vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide
or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of
the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal
Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers
Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying
circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate
sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes
of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.
23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-
one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.
58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal
Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van
along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly
because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a
result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted
to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an
Affidavit of Complaint[1]against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information
read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of

Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica,
being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no.
NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage
and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent
manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking
the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to
person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said
vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven
and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting
to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned
amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol
suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less
that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor
for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision [3] convicting
petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
with slight physical injuries, and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay
the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen
Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.[4]
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant
suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the
resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but
imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight
Edition 1988, p. 711).Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
(People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios
book, p. 718).[5]
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and
medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief
were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to
Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent
Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. [6]
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court
of Appeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE
REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND
SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE
ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER
WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND
EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]
.........
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON

GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY
31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996,
ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT
THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON
THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME
CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING
OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN
THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIESTHROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND
NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE
THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A
SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY
IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS
DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the
title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was
not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for
such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should
have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1)
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with
damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, do not rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months,
citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious

physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and
slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
.........
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is
different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act
resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property
which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a
complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information.
She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in
their maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days
imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense;
as such, it prescribes in two months.Here, since the information was filed only on 13
January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the
offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it
prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was
already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in
relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks
motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light
offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional
Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property
and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary
procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have
tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in
its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano
v. Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was
proper for the trial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and
damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless
imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate
informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial
Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional
Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose
the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value
of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]
The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that
the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and
appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However,
she considers the OSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for
nothing there validates the complexing of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical
injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were
filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the
other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this
case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations should
have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on
the assumption that it was proper to complex damage to property through reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is
likewise inapposite, for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive
effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en
banc ruling in Zaldivia[24] favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light
felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for
the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already
prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty.
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto
mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is
incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its
maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries
is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto
menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the
penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the
exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the
penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine,
does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to
property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act
committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have
constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were
caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of
the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed
in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower
than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would
apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period
to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2
months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum
of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides
that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64.
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of
fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.[26]
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the
Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article
71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as
earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as
claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article
48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this
Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes
a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no
complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or
the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light
felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex
crime. They cannot be charged in one information.They are separate

offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001;
See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime:
the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a
separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character
of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise
it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. [28] Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint
or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty
for each of them.[29]
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. [30]
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Section 32(2)[31] thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of
the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The
question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to
which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which
was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision
correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto
mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal
courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the
latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it
is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention
was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under
that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2
months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows
that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30
days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs
because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods -- the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in

slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand,
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being
a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is
necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three
days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the
complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits.[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court
held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running of
the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that
in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6
months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities,
said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint
or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive
law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.[37] Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated
by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was
involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was
not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2
thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period
was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the
prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the
prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled
pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of
prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional
Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
December 13, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that
it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and
c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares
(Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.[1]
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening
on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting
nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head
with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus
fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino
lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something
hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened
to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they
brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered
two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified
that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home
after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-
defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he
supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back.
Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged
towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack
and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On
September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police
Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding
party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way
home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,

alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed
the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence
to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the
Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming
Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable
penalty of imprisonment of four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to
apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes
his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants
such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused
has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the

head with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of

frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and
a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Courts Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that
he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that
he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused
must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.[4]
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense

requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed
unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person
defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the
latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense
would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the
accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.[6]
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on
him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels
testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes,
merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle
of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he
suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.[7]
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that

Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with
inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one
in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnels testimony, the
prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence

deserving credence.[8]
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he
be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim,
were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent

to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly
to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill
is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.[10]
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the
impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his
victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds
he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not
fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
depth, and severity of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head
injuries are always very serious,[12] he could not categorically say that Rufinos
wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds
actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming
fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that
time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to

the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of
scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up
the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound,
but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication
that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding
of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were
estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give
antibiotics and antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that
occurred in the brain.
xxxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the
wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them
would rather go home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support

the prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical
intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he

having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty,
it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of
the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation
law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not
that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege.The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation
because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or
not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances
of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the
judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now
set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction
for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial
courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now
also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation.Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to

apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals[16] that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge
difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the

accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one
year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking
an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the
acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let
him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the
accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus
rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under
this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to
bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first
time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded
Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality
towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions.[18] As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in
his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter;
to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to
achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel
to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of
conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the
probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation
of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him
to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He
only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4
months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing
him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating
the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that
he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea
may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him
is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the

petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an

indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena
the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 51-60

Jeross Romano Aguilar

[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of

Contrary to Law." [1]

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo,

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

4. The accused to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED." (Underscoring ours)

eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman, thus: [10]

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

A: Less than a meter, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified,

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-

xxx xxx xxx

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial

Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by

2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra

Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of

Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is

has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion

071 Phil 34:

[G.R. No. 47941. December 7, 1940.]

MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, v. ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., Respondents.

Victoriano Yamzon for Petitioner.

E. Voltaire Garcia for respondent Santos.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARDONING POWER OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE. — Paragraph 6 of section

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 105673. July 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO

Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more

"That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at

On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana

Hence, this appeal.

Version of the Prosecution

De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant