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I.

What constitutes as “taking” in eminent domain cases

1) Asking for permission to enter a property for the purpose of construction of
a bridge [not on the property itself ], the paying of monthly rentals as a
condition for entering a property, and thereafter sending a mere request to
the owners to either sell or donate the property does not constitute as
“taking” within the meaning of the law. (Tan vs Republic 523 SCRA 203)

2) In the case of Napocor vs. Ibrahim (526 SCRA 149) the Court ruled that:
there is a “taking” in this sense when the owners are actually deprived or
dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of their property, or when they are deprived
of the ordinary use thereof. There is a “taking” in this context when the
expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for
more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a
public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof. Moreover, “taking” of the property for
purposes of eminent domain entails that the entry into the property must be
under warrant or color of legal authority.

Thus, when the expropriator entered a property without the permission or

without the knowledge of the owners (as when the former constructs sub-
terrain tunnels) and when the improvements do not contribute to increase
the value of the property, the courts will not use the valuation of the property
at the time of the actual taking but at the time the owner discovers the illegal
entry or taking; or upon the commencement of the negotiations for the
expropriation of the property.

Note:
• The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to the surface owner of
land.
• The power of eminent domain encompasses even the simple
imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned
property.
• Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owner of
the property’s normal beneficial use the expropriator is liable to pay
full compensation for the land.

Acts that can be considered as “campaigning”

• In the case of Panera vs Comelec (G. R. No. 181613, September 11,
2009) the Court ruled that: the conduct of a motorcade is a form of

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election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within
the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
o The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to
introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek
to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible
so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names
in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably,
motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to
promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.

Who are “candidates” under election laws?

• In the case of Panera vs Comelec (G. R. No. 181613, November 25,
2009) the Court ruled that: a person who files a certificate of candidacy
is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
o The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the “election
periods as x x x fixed by existing law” prior to RA 8436 and
that one who files to meet the early deadline “will still not be
considered as a candidate.”
o This ruling is based on the second sentence of Section 15 of RA
8436.
o Thus, election offenses can only be committed during the
campaign period.

II.

How to apply the state immunity doctrine to specific cases involving

the Philippine State

Step 1. Determine if the suit qualifies as a suit against the State.

 When the Republic is sued by name;
 When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
 When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the
case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but
to the government. (Republic v. Sandoval 19 March 1993)

Step 2. If it is a suit against the State, determine if there is an express

consent to be sued.
 UNINCORPORATED GOV’T AGENCIES: The State consents to be
sued on money claims involving liability arising from contract under
Act 3083. But the claim must be filed with the Commission on Audit,
under CA 327 and PD 1445.

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 INCORPORATED GOV’T AGENCIES: Express consent based on
their charter. An incorporated government agencies may be used if
its charter expressly provides that it can sue and be sued.
• Incorporated Gov’t Agencies could even be sued for torts.
 LOCAL GOV’TS: One of the corporate powers of local government
units is to sue and be sued. (See Section 22, Local Government
Code)
• They are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provides that they can sue
and be sued.

Step 3. If there is no express consent, determine if there is an implied

consent to be sued.
 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself:
• commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim
• or when it enters into a contract.
o However, this doesn’t apply when the contract
involves sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii)

Step 4. Even if there is no consent, express or implied, determine if the

case falls under the exceptions to the general rule of state immunity from
suit.
 In these cases, the State may still be sued even if it has no
consent
• a public officer may be sued to compel him to do an act
required by law;
• a public officer may be sued to restrain him from enforcing a
law claimed to be unconstitutional;
• a public officer may be sued to compel an officer to pay
damages from an already appropriate assurance fund or a
revenue officer to refund tax overpayments from a fund
already available for such purpose;
• an action may be filed to secure a judgment that the officer
impleaded may satisfy himself without the government itself
having to do a positive act to assist him;
• where the government itself has violated its own laws, the
aggrieved party may directly implead the government even
without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit, as
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an

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instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Sanders v.
Veridiano, 10 June 1988)
• The doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Amigable vs
Cuenca, February 29, 1972)

Step 5. Even if the State can be sued, determine if it is liable.

 When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give
the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability. (Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993)

Step 6. If the State is liable, determine if there can be execution against it.
• Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed,
the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. (City
of Caloocan v. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003)
• Unincorporated Gov’t Agencies: Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.
(Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993)
o Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment.
o Funds and properties of unincorporated government
agencies are exempt from execution and garnishment.
• Public funds of local governments are not subject to execution.
o There must be an appropriation as required by law (in the
form of an ordinance)
• Funds and properties of incorporated government agencies may be
subject to execution.

Step 7. If execution is not allowed, determine how recovery can be made

against the State.
• Money claims against unincorporated government agencies must
be filed with the Commission on Audit (Act 3083 in relation to CA
327 and PD 1445).

III.

PIL Doctrines laid down in

Province of North Cotabato vs Republic (G.R. No. 183591, October
14, 2008)

Construction of the term “first nation”

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The term “First Nation” is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous
peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada,
each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called “First
Nation,” hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural
“First Nations.”

The Concept of “Association” in PIL

[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily
establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining
its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence.

In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually

been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence.

Reason why MOA-AD creates a state within a state

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking,
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security
force, judicial system and correctional institutions.

The Concept of “association” vis-à-vis the 1987 Constitution

1. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the
national government.

2. The concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted

by the Constitution to any local or regional government and implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. (See Section
20, Article X, 1987 Constitution)

3. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction

other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory
for independence.

III.

Aldovino, Jr. vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
Interruption of the three term limit

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Brion, J.:
Facts:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City
for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of
office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted
the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.

Issue:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of
his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160, or the Local Government Code)?

Ruling:
General requisites for the application of the three term limit
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms

Construction of the three term limit

Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave
full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to
strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the
Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively,
these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of
limitation rather than its exception.

Construction of the word “interruption”

The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length
of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be
the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to

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no more than three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Nature of preventive suspension

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred
from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Ruling of the Court in the case at bar

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows
an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The
best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence
of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint
one since no vacancy exists.

Montebon vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 180444, April 09, 2008
Interruption of the three term limit

Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
Respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms
as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second
term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded
as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L.
Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of
municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s succession to the office of Vice Mayor interrupts
the application of the three term limit for the position of municipal councilor?

Ruling:

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Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. It is clear
therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be
considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code
makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently
unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be
considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law.
Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that
he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for
some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post
vacated.

Laceda, Sr. vs. Limena

G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008
Interruption of the three term limit

QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three
consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was elected for his
first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served
his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with
the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon ,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.

Issue:
Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new
political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.

Ruling:
While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon
and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the

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former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of
Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as
that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City.
The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City , is the same
as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are
the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their
Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held
power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806
did not interrupt Laceda’s term.

Bolos, Jr. vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 184082 March 17, 2009
Interruption of the three term limit

PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in
1994, 1997 and 2002.

In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of

Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and
won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his
post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan
position, which was until June 30, 2007.

Issue:
Can it be said that the petitioner voluntarily renounced his office?

Ruling:
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion
to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The
discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office
of barangay officials would be “[a]s may be determined by law,” and more
precisely, “[a]s provided for in the Local Government Code.” Section 43(b)
of the Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are covered
by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of
office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years.

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Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal
councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong
Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang
Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for
him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former
position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of

law. He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third
term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of
Dauis, Bohol , which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of
Punong Barangay.

Construction of the term “by operation of law”

The term “operation of law” is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia
as “a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the
effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected.” Black's Law
Dictionary also defines it as a term that “expresses the manner in which
rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere
application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party himself.”

Dizon vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 182088 January 30, 2009
Interruption of the three term limit

CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales
during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30
December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were
considered stray votes.

Issue:
What is the effect of Supreme Court decision which was promulgated a day
before the 2007 elections?

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Ruling:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from
office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day,
Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short
it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.

We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1
July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However,
because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for
the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of
Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term.

Note: If the Rivera decision was promulgated after Morales’ term then the
result would have been different.

Akbayan v. Aquino
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008
JPEPA

Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
Petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers – seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to
obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.

Issue:

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Can the petitioners, by invoking their right to information on matters of public
concern, succeed?

Ruling:
No, the negotiations between the Philippine and Japanese representatives are
protected by the deliberative process privilege.

JPEPA is a matter of public concern

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.

What is the scope of deliberative process privilege?

the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

How to overcome the executive privilege claimed by the public

respondents
The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be
overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be
made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative
process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh
balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as
"the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the
seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the
"possibility of future timidity by government employees.

Note: Diplomatic negotiations come within the ambit of executive privilege.

Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well
as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the
negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts
of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.

Note: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the

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country's sole representative with foreign nations. The Senate, as a form of
limitation to the power of the President, may concur upon the two-thirds vote
of all its Members.

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