CASE DIGESTS:
HOW TO READ THE CONSTITUTION
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment
proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this
case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a
second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment
provided for by law.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional,
 and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question — ; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising
from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality. There exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation
in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government.
ART II, SECTION 2: GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF
THE LAW OF THE LAND
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V DUQUE III
(PHAP VS DUQUE)
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51
(Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as
it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was
issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom
Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses
of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also
adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the
assailed RIRR.
ISSUE:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered
into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be
implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the
RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the
Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.
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HELD:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become
domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation
(mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS
and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not
been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had
been transformed into domestic law through a local
legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost
a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed
to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions
are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the
law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it as
obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The
WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member
states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority
of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature
enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk
Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding
up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well.
The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their
babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified
as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part
of int’l law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with
the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions
of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk
substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to
24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH
and respondents are prohibited from implementing said
provisions.
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio
Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents
against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements
(TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and
granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a
class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (MMDA VS
CONCERNED CITIZEN OF MANILA BAY)
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water
quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
2 I A. C. JUCO
allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public
officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore
its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving,
and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean
up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17.
Upgrading of Water Quality.–– Where the quality of
water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state
will adversely affect its best u sage, the government
agencies concerned shall take such measures as may
be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water
to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section
20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility
of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of
his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs.
On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in
the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long
as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 &
20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is
well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be
compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of
the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer
applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.
20 days – Temporary restraining order
IMBONG VS OCHOA
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s
family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
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Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
DISCUSSIONS:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined
as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the
doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title
rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just
as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be
willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The
valid portion can stand independently as law.
4 I A. C. JUCO
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a)
“conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting
the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with
this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR)
would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729
(1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is
to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved
by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict
other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can
enhance its population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH
procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the
right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of
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Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures”
is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed
to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because
the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right
of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of
the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider”
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The
“private health care institution” cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to “private health care
service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough
to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and
ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private
and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount
to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec.
17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case
or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
6 I A. C. JUCO
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty
to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing
to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court
set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral wellbeing of this nation,
especially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of
the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
7 I A. C. JUCO
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or d) The insular shelves; and
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs e) The other submarine areas
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or INTERNAL WATERS – the waters AROUND,
her religious beliefs. BETWEEN AND CONNECTING the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in ALL OTHER TERRITORIES OVER WHICH THE
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not PHILIPPINES HAS SOVEREIGNTY OR
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined JURISDICTION–includes any territory that presently
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines
health procedures without the consent of the spouse; through any of the accepted international modes of
acquiring territory.
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. Two elements:
1. The definition of internal waters (supra);
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the 2. The straight baseline method of delineating the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they territorial sea – consists of drawing straight lines
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or connecting the outermost points on the coast without
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life- departing to any appreciable extent from the general
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. direction of the coast.
8344, to another health care service provider within the Important distances with respect to the waters
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible around the Philippines
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;  Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles (n.m.)
 Contiguous Zone 12 n.m. from the edge of the
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the territorial sea
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they  Exclusive Economic Zone 200 n.m. from the
punish any public officer who refuses to support baseline
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that [includes T.S. and C.Z.]
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health NOTE: There can be a Continental Shelf without
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; an EEZ, but not an EEZ without a Continental
Shelf.
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive TERRITORIAL SEA
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious The belt of the sea located between the coast and internal
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and waters of the coastal state on the one hand, and the high
seas on the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, the low water mark.
which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining CONTIGUOUS ZONE
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires Extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea.
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) Although not part of the territory, the coastal State may
of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the exercise jurisdiction to prevent infringement of customs,
Constitution. fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.

Article I – THE NATIONAL TERRITORY EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

The national territory of the Philippines comprises: Body of water extending up to 200 nautical miles, within
1) the Philippine archipelago; which the state may exercise sovereign rights to explore,
2) all other territories over which the Philippines has exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources
sovereignty or jurisdiction THE STATE IN THE EEZ EXERCISES JURISDICTION
PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO – that body of water WITH REGARD TO:
studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of 1. the establishment and use of artificial islands,
Paris (1898), as amended by the Treaty of Washington installations, and structures;
(1900) and the Treaty with Great Britain (1930). 2. marine scientific research;
It consists of its: 3. and the protection and preservation of marine
a) Terrestrial environment
b) Fluvial
c) Aerial domains
a. including its
a)Territorial sea
b) The seabed
c) The subsoil
8 I A. C. JUCO
STATE IMMUNITY
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio;
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is
a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of
land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of
petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots
sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of
the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing
the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana),
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos
separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner
for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
The trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner
“shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith
elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes
the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf
and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal
Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its
business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy
See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be
the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is
not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary
for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission,
is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into
force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain.
It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The
fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying
the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its
complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for
the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who
feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask
his own government to espouse his cause through
diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government,
through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against
the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
9 I A. C. JUCO
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy
See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law
of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the
latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner
is DISMISSED.
MOST REV. PERDO ARIGO, ET. AL. VS SCOTT H.
SWIFT, ET AL.
FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the
port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel
in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic
Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident,
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique,
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
YES.
 Whether or not US respondents may be held
liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
YES.
 Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit
under VFA applies in this case. NO.
HELD:
Petitioners have legal standing. Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
“calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter
which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs
like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we
recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the
petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only
do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: The US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction
by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the
US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area
in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail
to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latter’s internal
waters and the territorial sea.
10 I A. C. JUCO
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio,
they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal
State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage
caused by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for
any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the
non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A
and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention
affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign
warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the
UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has
not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans”
as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal
to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement
with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly
owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing
to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view
that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.
We thus expect the US to bear “international
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our
long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital
marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
protect and preserve the marine environment as provided
in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the
present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said
treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave
the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: The waiver of State immunity under the VF A
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the
application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.
11 I A. C. JUCO
BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
RAMON GONZALES VS COMELEC
FACTS: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed.
This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held
on the same day that the general national elections shall
be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no
proper submission of the proposals to the people who
would be more interested in the issues involved in the
general election rather than in the issues involving the
plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure
adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed
the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed
by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing
amendments is a political question. No.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously
with a general election. Yes.
HELD:
I. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that
the power to amend as well as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such
powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On
the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being,
when Congress makes amendments or proposes
amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but
rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is
not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite
must only be held on a special election. SC held that
there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution
to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special,
not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows
that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification
in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes
dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special
date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare
the original proposition with the amended proposition.
BY PEOPLE THRU INITIATIVE
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)
caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local
election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD
Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the
constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems
of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of
initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and
III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that
the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law – as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include
initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to
this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . .
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-
executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-
Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2,
Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still
dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of inititative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people
cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally
guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not
provide for its implementation.
12 I A. C. JUCO
LAMBINO VS COMELEC
FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes
will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready
and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal
and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text
of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition
with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted
to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no
need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the present
petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with
13 I A. C. JUCO
the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
SUBMISSION
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971
scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was
even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then
filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed,
there will be an improper submission to the people. Such
is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.
Election here is singular which meant that the entire
constitution must be submitted for ratification at one
plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision
because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest
of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and
therefore would be unable to assess the proposed
amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the
“Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at
the same time, NOT piecemeal.
THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7,
1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA
for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his
oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935,
Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of
Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by
virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC
proclamation governs and that the EC can take
cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot
be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such
matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC
emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is
the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency
of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (ISSUES
OF POLICY)
OCAMPO VS ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President
Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).
He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the
burial.
ISSUE: Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion
in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution,
jurisprudence and the law?
HELD: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the
respondents.
It is the President's discretion to allow who should be
buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can
enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since
the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is
within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the
burial of anyone in the LNMB.
The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely
a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine.
Hence, anyone buried therein would not be treated as a
hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth
emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.
14 I A. C. JUCO
REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
PREMATURITY
PACU VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws
that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to
own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain
standards that must be followed by private schools. It also
provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban
certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
any law requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise said right,
amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU
also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not
specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to
ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable
controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered
any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education
of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact
control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of
all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational
efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or
those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part
of the power of control and regulation by the State over all
schools.
MARIANO VS COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51,
and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or
controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854. NO.
HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge
the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence
of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run
again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be
re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue.
Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
MONTESCLAROS VS COMELEC
FACTS: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed
the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and
limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more
than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette
VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK
elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the
House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February
2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and
Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone
the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March 2002
the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050
and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July
2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but
no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the
Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13
March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on
19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and
mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the
prevention of postponement of the SK election and
reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed bill is
unconstitutional.
DECISION: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This
petition presents no actual justiciable controversy.
Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged
to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent
15 I A. C. JUCO
 Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not
present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject
to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable
by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no
constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this
petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After
its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA
No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
PHILCONSA VS PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation
Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment
of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration
and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA
of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt
reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section
26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and
the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds in the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio
for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the
appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release
of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the
entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition”
which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use
savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity
funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
 whether or not the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for
the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit
(COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on
Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held: The veto power, while exercisable by the
President, is actually a part of the legislative process.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use
is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law,
not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no
undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in
other government agencies. If some government
agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain
a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these
agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618
for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for
the Department of Budget and Management’s
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision
No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien
to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
16 I A. C. JUCO
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases
of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation
item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of
Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment
to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
“congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at
bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of
the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can
be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
“inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and
3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use
of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so,
contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto
of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to
use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1)
of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find
anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny
to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing
laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain
provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme
Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President
said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines
he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry
into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.
MOOTNESS - **MOOTNESS AND ACADEMIC
LACHES means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. 25 It has also been defined as such
neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in
equity. 26
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as
such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping
upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. 27 As an equitable defense, laches does not
concern itself with the character of the defendant's title,
but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's
long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred
from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do
so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. 28
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and . . . is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
ESTOPPEL - a bar or impediment (obstruction) which
precludes a person from asserting a fact or a right or
prevents one from denying a fact. Such a hindrance is due
to a person's actions, conduct, statements, admissions,
failure to act or judgment against the person in an
identical legal case.
ATLAS FERTILIZER VS SEC. OF DAR
Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms.
Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A.
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as well as
the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued
by public respondent Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that
R.A. 6657, by including the raising of fish and aquaculture
operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating
them as in the same class or classification as agriculture
or farming violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and therefore void.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by
Congress on 20 February 1995 expressly state that
fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions
has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A.
No. 7881.
LACSON VS PEREZ
17 I A. C. JUCO
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion”
were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with
impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along
with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department
and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants
of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing
the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders,
nor were they expressing any intention to leave the
country in the near future. To declare the hold departure
orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer
for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless
arrests is premature being that no complaints have been
filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not
subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants
for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with
the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
EXEMPTION TO MOOTNESS
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some
three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in
the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring
the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that
Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et
al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted
by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
18 I A. C. JUCO
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of
the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
(2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on
the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some
three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in
the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring
the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that
Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et
al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted
by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of
the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
19 I A. C. JUCO
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
(2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on
the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
PROPER PARTY
JOYA VS PCGG
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus
may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's
suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with
Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings
and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and
cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the
Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to
the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled
and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to
the Bureau of Treasury.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and
authority to enter into an agreement with Christie’s of New
York for the sale of the artworks
RULING: On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial
review
The rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy;
that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or
legal question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2)
requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised
on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons
having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining
the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court
will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the
party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and related party.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer’s Suit:
There are certain instances however when this Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when
a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer
20 I A. C. JUCO
questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing
the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the
legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public
duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the
1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on
Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing
the preservation and disposition of national and important
cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on
the premise that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and by the people
in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They
allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling
the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right
to public property without due process of law in violation
of the Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack
basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from different
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.
The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda
R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings
legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when
they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their
silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to
them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the
revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware
were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank
Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood
to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements
of due process and just compensation. If these properties
were already acquired by the government, any
constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and
their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the
proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose
authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights
which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the
artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition.
Requisites for a Mandamus Suit
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus
filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for
a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may
be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at
bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive
duty required of respondent officials under the 1987
Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official
act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover,
petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and
appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in
this action for mandamus.
When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.
Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to
challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving
public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be
public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit
that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired
from private sources and not with public money.
Actual Controversy
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case of controversy — one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case
must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us.
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to
enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction
sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January
1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition
have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this
Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or
legal standing when paramount public interest is involved.
21 I A. C. JUCO
We find however that there is no such justification in the
petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
AGAN VS PIATCO
FACTS: On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project
and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the
NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA
6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of
People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS)
and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively,
Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive
proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to
Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue
preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections
as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed
the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal
III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government
granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain
the said terminal during the concession period and to
collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance
with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997
Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that
the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government for a period not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the
concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the
maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various service
providers to offer international airline airport services,
such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions,
cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to
several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international
airline service providers, claiming that they would lose
their job upon the implementation of the questioned
agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech,
stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts which
the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as)
null and void.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a
business affected with public interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to pay
“reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or
Terminal Complex.”
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in
times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its
police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any
business affected with public interest. The duration of the
emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long
the temporary takeover by the government would last.
The temporary takeover by the government extends only
to the operation of the business and not to the ownership
thereof. As such the government is not required to
compensate the private entity-owner of the said business
as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent
or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the
temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
compensation for the use of the said business and its
properties as the temporary takeover by the government
is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of
eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions
a situation wherein the exigencies of the times
necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare
and interest of the public which is the paramount
consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily
take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in
effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police
power. Police power is the “most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers.” Its exercise therefore must not be
22 I A. C. JUCO
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence of damage
due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation
of the business contravenes the Constitution.
CHR EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS CHR
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No.
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed”
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to
the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office
to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of
the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA
and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The
3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification System in the Government
and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization
Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and
administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from
the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution, application
or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as
to administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag,
this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are
unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the
sole power and discretion to administer the compensation
and position classification system of the national
government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter
of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the
coverage of the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, by
virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation
system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject
to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of
any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure
of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the
DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and
deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather,
the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the Board of Directors complies with the
requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s
compensation system “conforms as closely as possible
with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant
to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
23 I A. C. JUCO
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of
Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement
of more economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations, administration of compensation
and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the
DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of
positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has
previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in
no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and
the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions
with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is
silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance
with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code,
it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class
of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what
is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that
the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA,
the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under
Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the
CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those
offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely
states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions
and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant
of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While
the members of the Group are authorized to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must
be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established
under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.
24 I A. C. JUCO
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of
respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization
laws.”26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no
locus standi considering that there exists no official written
record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a
bona fide organization of its employees nor is there
anything in the records to show that its president has the
authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner,
which consists of rank and file employees of respondent
CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails
eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those
in the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s
personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA
when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither
should our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was
neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind
the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a
determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the
reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the
CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998,
which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office
and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR’s
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-
26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III,
SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the
DBM denied the same as this would change the context
from support to substantive without actual change in
functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE VS
ROMULO
Facts: Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the
National Labor Relations Commission became an agency
attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for
policy and program coordination and for administrative
supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor
Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715
declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE
for program and policy coordination only while the
administrative supervision was turned over to the NLRC
Chairman. Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003
supervision of NLRC reverted to the Sec. of Labor and
Employment. Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions
assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert
the set-up prior to RA 6715 which only Congress can do.
Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus
standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in
their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions
are exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual
members are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a
taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not
require additional appropriation for its implementation.
Issue: Whether or not the ten labour unions have legal
standing to assail the constitutionality of EO 185?
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a
citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners
have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
25 I A. C. JUCO
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it cannot be
said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and
interests considering that the scope of the authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to
the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.
CITIZEN STANDING
TANADA VS TUVERA
CHAVEZ V PEA AND AMARI
Fact: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways
entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with
the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President
Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP
and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM
ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would
later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir
especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain
(famously known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer
praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and
a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these
events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
 w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended)
JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution
 w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue
of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the
constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in
the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable
or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING
KMU LABOR CENTER VS GARCIA
FACTS: The Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released
memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within 15% above and below the official
LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus
Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare
rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine
26 I A. C. JUCO
Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they
were exorbitant and unreasonable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provincial bus operators have
authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on the
order of the LTFRB
HELD: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public
services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same.
Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given
by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non
delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute
a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy
of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their
fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators.
IBP VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in
verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised,
the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to
an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS CA
Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the
April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even
before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17,
1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph
(g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law,
with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
respondents therein from enforcing the assailed
provisions of the law.
Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed
recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their
operations for fear of being prosecuted under the
provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20)
days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment
on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition,
the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption
thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged
were its members and which it represented in the suit, and
a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i),
Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16
thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and
Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted
provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent,
27 I A. C. JUCO
Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled
workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal
protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and
Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As
the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino
workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights.
The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have
the right to seek employment abroad.
According to the respondent, the right of unskilled
workers to due process is violated because they are
prevented from finding employment and earning a living
abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are
immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled
workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed
out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected
to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the
prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad
would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to
service contractors and manning agencies to the
exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is
an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized
recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and
due process and to the "equality of the person." It is
understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but
to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters
is unconstitutional.
The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed
on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that
while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters
who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the
imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make
any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being
based on an invalid classification are, therefore,
repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being
excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section
19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed
out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of
recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic
sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act
No. 8042 is life imprisonment.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and
paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10,
paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of
attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a
licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a
finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under
the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their
relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they
committed any of the said prohibited acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period
in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter
should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could
deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to
due process. The period within which the summons and
the complaint would be served on foreign employees and,
thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would
take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local
licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving
the defense of foreign employers.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of
the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from illegal
recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal
action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion
of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated
provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that
have already been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this Act.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged,
inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action
for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as
the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having
been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not
violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law
was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police
power of the State.
In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief,
the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the
amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit
for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that
the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect
and impropriety of the petition.
On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with
a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming
the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
 Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or
not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the
writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only
P50,000; and
 Whether or not the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it.
28 I A. C. JUCO
Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse
of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified
via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face,
does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith
attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that
would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation
of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that
it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes
does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so
the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very
existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in
itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the
important and necessary task of enforcing these laws
against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in
good faith to be punishable under its laws and the
Constitution.
One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon
v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).
This presumption of constitutionality is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA
516 [1991]).
In view of petitioner's standing
The petitioners contend that the respondent has
no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit
organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as
petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed
the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of
licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed
to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles
of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said
members authorizing it to represent the said agencies
in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the
respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality
to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-
oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to
represent are profit-oriented.
The petition is meritorious. The respondent has
locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in
representation of the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended
petition. The modern view is that an association has
standing to complain of injuries to its members. This
view fuses the legal identity of an association with
that of its members. 16 An association has standing
to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct
interest if its members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of
its constituents.
We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the
respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of
promoting and supporting the growth and development of
the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and
international levels; providing, creating and exploring
employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its
general membership; enhancing and promoting the
general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to
act as the representative of any individual, company,
entity or association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes
embodied therein.
In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the
petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note
that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its
petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-
petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the
respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20
of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven
licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which
the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
In view of retroactivity
In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is
but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines
and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied
retroactively.
In view of equal protection clause
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that
licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due
process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the
mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions. Professionals
29 I A. C. JUCO
leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and
practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice
their trade.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to
invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to
support their argument that the government cannot enact
the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge
the freedom to contract.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against
undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the
object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it
is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed.
In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides
that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally
liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v.
Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation
engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he
actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment.
By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of
the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act
No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until
the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said
provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the
said provisions cannot be enjoined.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies
and their officers and employees and their relatives
employed in government agencies charged with the
enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and
imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large
scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the
Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after
trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that
licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close
shop and stop business operations because of the
assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot
be based on such conjectures or speculations. The
respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove
irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section
10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension
that, because of time constraints, its members would have
to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor
Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such
inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and
syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
employment abroad is one of the primary considerations
that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater
protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant
improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and
placement of workers for overseas employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated,
albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and
allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent
people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas
workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary
policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for
this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.
KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA
FACTS: In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which
will establish a national network system that will in turn
expand PCSO’s source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was
awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO
and PGMC as it alleged that:
 PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement
because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a
Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
 PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA
1169), is prohibited from holding and
conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity”;
 The network system sought to be built by
PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications
network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a
franchise is needed to be granted by the
Congress before any person may be allowed
to set up such;
 PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as
the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042)
does not allow it to install, establish and
operate the on-line lotto and
telecommunications systems.
30 I A. C. JUCO
  PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and
Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged
that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a
contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of
the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the
network it will build as evidenced by the nature of
the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMC’s foreign
ownership was reduced to 40% though.
On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” There is
undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC
and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between
PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the
designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant
to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own
expense shall build, operate, and manage the network
system including its facilities needed to operate a
nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and
all it does is to provide its franchise – in violation of its
charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC
is a violation of Act No. 3846.
TAXPAYER’S STANDING
ITF VS COMELEC
Facts: RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing
COMELEC to conduct nationwide computerized election
system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the
automated election system on 24 January 2003. The
bidding process commenced on the same month and out
of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC.
Although DOST’s evaluation report states that the two
obtained a number of failed marks in the technical
evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the
matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.
Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition
Issue: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?
Decision: The case at bar is a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public
interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are
allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being
“deflected to any improper use,” or when petitioner seek
to restrain “wasting of public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”
VOTER’S STANDING
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
Facts: After becoming president on January 2001, Gloria
Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista Guingona as vice-
president. After confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was
passed by the Senate calling the COMELEC to fill the
vacancy with a special election tobe held simultaneously
with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided that
the candidate garnering the 13th highest vote will serve
for the unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners, Arturo
Tolentino and Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming the winner. They contend that it is
without jurisdiction because it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in (special election)
due to this the people voted without distinction in one
election for 13 seats irrespective of term.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners have standing to
maintain suit?
Decision: In questioning the validity of special election,
petitioners assert harm classified as “generalized
grievance.” They failed to establish direct injury they
suffered from the said governmental act. However, the
Court relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised
its discretion to give due course to voter’s suit involving
the right of suffrage.
LEGISLATIVE STANDING
OPLE VS TORRES
FACTS: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone
of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of
general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23,
1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies,
who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O.
No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.
ISSUE: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE
ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
31 I A. C. JUCO
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY
THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308
INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System"
declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO
ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308
merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies
— the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O.
No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes
no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office.
Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business
with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given
this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right
and imposes no duty cannot stand.
IN VIEW OF STANDING
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance
of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not
affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on
its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation
of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System
(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
GOVERMENTAL STANDING
PEOPLE VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of
the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation
of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to
a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered
by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said
law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and
this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further,
the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an
undue delegation of legislative power
 Whether or not the said act denies the equal
protection of the laws
DISCUSSIONS:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if
it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The
32 I A. C. JUCO
probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo
in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to be
reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
Act would be in operation in the former province but not in
the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
benefits of probation in one province while another person
similarly situated in another province would be denied
those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial
boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries
of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in
which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and
every province by the affirmative action of appropriation
by all the provincial boards.

RULINGS:

The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221

constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards
must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non-
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so
protected by the constitution. The challenged section of
Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary
of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to

determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.

It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the

provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The
resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray
the salary of a probation officer, while another province
may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation
33 I A. C. JUCO