1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT.
14, 2017
PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS
CESAR BENGZON VS FRANKLIN DRILON
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.
Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and
members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a
need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the
ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition
with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v.
Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The
Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional
budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges
and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by
the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion
of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme
Court neither does the president have the power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others.
This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill
in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line
item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not
veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She
merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the
justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to
the other departments of the government.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA
446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall
be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which
have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated
on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a
publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed
some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in
Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29,
1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the
view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership,
and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the
Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be
effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as
the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent
with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after
its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
ARNAULT V. NAZARENO, G.R. NO. L-3820, JULY 18, 1950
DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the
government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and
Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate
sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest
Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge
the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million
proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate
and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination?
3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed
by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which
is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xx
x circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer
which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of
which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal,
and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to
that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be
determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already
indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show
that every question propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it
be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is
within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to
perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are
performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would
be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to
say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life
to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which
does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power
to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke
his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction
was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There
is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged
is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for
the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is
not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination
must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the
facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. .
. The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that
he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the
protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert
his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all
the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is
justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question.
ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS
Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955
Ponente: Labrador
Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in
contempt as a punitive measure.
FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault
against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was
incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person
with whom he transacted business in relation to a government
purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the
companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the
Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or
refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.
4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess
D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with
Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of
the resolution states:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL
HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the
said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was
committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and
confinement, said power and authority having been held to be
coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said
Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had
withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements
made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above
referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and
an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they
to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the
Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and
ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of
sufficient stubbornness and malice;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault
and ordered his release.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-
imposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of
the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review
the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the
Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and
continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he
gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner
“has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”,
clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still
trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated
unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault
satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its
investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action
that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the
right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise
of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative
process. The Judicial department has no right or power or
authority to do this, in the same manner that the legislative
department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation
of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that
would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke
are when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of
the legislative discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly
punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the
resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious
and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses.
This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must
be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which
to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative
department should not be constrained to look to the courts
whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every
act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject
to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and
absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary
power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is,
reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to
give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby
5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent.
With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
JOSE BENGZON, JR. VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE
203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The
Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When
not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife
together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some
of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege
speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned
corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate
on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee.
After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the
committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case
against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and
malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege
hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be
granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech
of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation
of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to
find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa,
had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36
or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in
aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is
to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ERMITA
495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative
Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate
the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he
and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials
of executive departments who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by
the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited
by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded
with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on
the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid
of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought
to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour.
The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power,
and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22
refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then
to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is
only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance
of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances
of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress
is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself
or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that
of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of
duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of
legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Read full text
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are
valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials
and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
CAMILO SABIO VS RICHARD GORDON
504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation –
public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum
was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to
be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry
has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power
of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information
to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between
GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt
of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate
v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his
claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and
public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-
making process” and, that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that,
he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No. 170338,
23 December 2008
31JUL
FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry on
the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped
communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their
non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates
internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is a substantial compliance of the
constitutional requirement of publication.
RULING
NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
8 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
OTHER POWERS: OVERSIGHT
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
undue delegation of power; separation of power
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted
to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of
rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction
as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the
power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of
RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed
from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target
by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It
will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to
fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has
been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight
committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things
in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power,
it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect
to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization
of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the
revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the
law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
2.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State
exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
9 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court
has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public
interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this
case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to
exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law
may be considered moot and academic.
ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS
( Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for
President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections
[G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
Facts:
Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring
null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee.
The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist
from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules
of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment
sine die(w/o date fixed)
on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular
session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and
the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to
2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes
on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the
expiration of ... Congress.
ISSUE:
WON the Joint Committee performing election canvass even
after the termination of congress’ session is constitutional.
RULING:
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year
on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session
for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days
before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call
a special session at any time. Contrary to petitioner's argument,
however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did
not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the
regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain
to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative
sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening
of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President
to call a special session at any time).Section 4 of Article VIII
provides that "[t]he
Term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly,
Section 7 provides that"[t]he Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years.
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30,
2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present
legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal
existence. "The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may
have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its
non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of
both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section
4, Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly
elected President and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die
until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For
only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is
it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it
retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its
purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its
non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly
elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board of
Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it
referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing
the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio
10 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO;
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
9:55 PM
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a
close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was
brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January
18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students
from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from
the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since
the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from
office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino
presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that
while the Aquino government was a government spawned
by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973
Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the
office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The
Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession
of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all
these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court
held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of
the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned
from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure (the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim
to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another).

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and

serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada
and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace,

which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable
issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

HELD:
11 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
EXCEPTION TO THE PROHIBITION FROM HOLDING
ANOTHER OFFICE
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members
of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s
manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation
to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
DELA CRUZ V. COA
November 29, 2001
ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR.,
SOLEDAD EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL,
HELENA HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH
FRANCIA, CARMELLA TORRES, JOB DAVID, CESAR
MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL, ALICE TIONGSON,
REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPE LIM, NERISSA
SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO
QUIMBO, TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO, as
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY FROM THE PERIOD COVERING 1991-1996,
petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its
COMMISSIONERS, respondents.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
NATURE: Certiorari under ROC 65. Action arising from a COA
disallowance
FACTS
 Office involved: National Housing Authority (NHA)
 Officers involved: Officials of various Cabinet-level
departments who sat on the NHA Board as alternates
of the Cabinet secretaries who were ex-officio
members of the NHA Board, by virtue of PD 757§7 (the
NHA Law) [THE ALTERNATES].
 Sep. 19, 1997 – In compliance with the ruling in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the
Commission on Audit (COA) issued a memorandum
stating that EO 284 had been declared unconstitutional
insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies,
and assistants to hold other offices; and directing its
designated auditors in all national government offices
to:
o immediately cause the disallowance of
additional compensation/remuneration given
to and received by government officials
affected by the decision’s ruling on the
multiple position rule
o effect the refund of such payments from the
time the decision became final on Feb. 22,
1991
 Oct. 23, 1997 – NHA Resident Auditor Salvador
VASQUEZ thus issued a Notice of Disallowance
against the payment of representation allowances and
per diems to the Cabinet members who were ex-officio
members of the NHA Board and/or their alternates who
actually received such payments.
o The total amount disallowed was P276,000,
covering the years 1991-1996.
 On behalf of the alternates who received the disallowed
allowances and per diems, NHA Chairman of the Board
Dionisio dela Serna appealed the disallowance on the
ground that the SC issued a resolution in the CLU case
clarifying that the multiple position rule does not cover
other appointive officials whose rank was Assistant
Secretary or lower; and that the alternates were all
ranked Assistant Secretary or lower.
 Sep. 22, 1998 – COA denied the appeal.
o COA conceded that the alternates were
indeed ranked Asec. and lower, but ruled that
they were sitting on the NHA board by virtue
of authority derived from the office of the
Cabinet secretaries they were representing.
As such they are mere agents and their right
to receive benefits flows from their principals.
Since their principals were barred from
receiving remuneration from the NHA under
the multiple position rule, so should the
agents. The spring cannot rise higher than its
source.
 The alternates filed the present petition with the SC
ISSUE (HELD): W/N the disallowance of the remuneration for
the alternates of the ex-officio members of the NHA Board is
valid (YES)
RATIO
 Under §7 of the NHA Law, the following Cabinet
Secretaries are mandated to sit in the NHA Board:
o Secretary of Public Works, Transportation,
and Communications
o Secretary of Finance
o Secretary of Labor
o Secretary of Industry
o Executive Secretary
o NEDA Director-General
12 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
 While the alternates are not these officials, they are
their alternates, and still under §7, their “acts shall be
considered the acts of their principals”.
 CLU v. Executive Secretary is controlling: “The
prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of said officials' office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise `any other
office' within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials.”
 On the term ex-officio: “The term ex officio means
`from office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an `authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position.' Ex officio likewise
denotes an `act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office.' An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. x x x”
 On the right to receive remuneration for an ex
officio position: "The ex officio position being actually
and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that
if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of
the Monetary Board as an ex officio member thereof,
he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy
in monetary banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem
or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution."
 CAB: Petitioner officials who are on the NHA Board as
ALTERNATES of the Cabinet members and ex-officio
members of the NHA are prohibited from receiving
additional compensation. To rule otherwise would be
giving the alternates a better right than their principals.
The alternates cannot receive the compensation to
which their principals are not entitled to in the first
place.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
[ G. R. NO. 156982, SEPTEMBER 08, 2004 ]
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, PETITIONER,
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO,
DIRECTOR IV, NCR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND
ERNESTO C. EULALIA, RESIDENT AUDITOR, NATIONAL
AMNESTY COMMISSION. RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a
government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson,
three regular members appointed by the President, and the
Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC
meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were
paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on
October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed
on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives
amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to
June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment
intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an
appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection
by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely
connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon
a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to
claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive
the salary of the position.
13 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
EXECUTIVE POWER
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three
year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines.
The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The
executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is
meant by executive power although the same article tackles on
exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing
power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
G.R. No. 189028 ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 701
SCRA 269
ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA
decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists
Award. There were three deliberations for determining the
nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names
was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos,
Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were
issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and
private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former
President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her
own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to
grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right
to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents
was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive
Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and
Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening
process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational
scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads
right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to
confer him standing in this case.
14 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political
Agency Doctrine]
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the
memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of
DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12
Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The
memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order
issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize
the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It
is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize
the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter
ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.
CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268
which granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent
to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and
financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years
pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken
by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO
268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without
prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1,
000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the
valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental
power and authority are exercised and implemented through
him. His power includes the control of executive departments as
provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,
modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate
in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government for the
equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only
exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the
heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from
the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
So, too, is his control of executive departments.
15 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017
HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED VS SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
Commercial Law – Corporation Law – Foreign Corporation –
License Requirement
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a
public bidding made by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a modern
marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
The SBMA Board of Directors already declared HPPL as the
winner but later on, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding
however, HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders.
Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA
from conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an
injunction case against SBMA.
HELD: No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring
HPPL as the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable.
Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the SBMA are
subject to the approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the
Board of SBMA is under the control and supervision of the
President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration made by
the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign
corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands. It did not register here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated
transaction. The conduct of bidding is not an isolated
transaction. It is “doing business” here in the Philippines. The
Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, “doing” or
“engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines is a
case to case basis. It has often been held that a single act or
transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a
corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises
some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or
volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act
cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign
corporation’s intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business”
because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage
in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but
an exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or existence.
Therefore, HPPL has done business here without license. It
cannot now sue in the Philippines without license because its
participation in the bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a
foreign corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines
to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to
enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the
regulation of their activities in this country.
NEA VS COA
Petitioner National Electrification Administration is a GOCC
created under PD 269. NEA is charged with the responsibility of
organizing, financing and regulating electric cooperatives
throughout the country. Government employee salaries were
raised via a Joint Resolution of Congress, urging the President
to revise the existing compensation. This was made into a 4-
year program. In 1996, President Ramos issued EO 389 to
implement the final year salary increases authorized by the joint
Resolution. EO 389 called for a 2-tranche salary increase: one
on January 1, 1997, and another on November 1, 1997.In
January 1997, NEA implemented the salary
increases. However, they implemented such increase in a
single lump sum beginning January 19, 1997 (NEA accelerated
the implementation by paying the second tranche starting
January 1 instead of November 1). The Commission on Audit
issued a Notice of Suspension and Notices of Disallowance. The
Notices of Disallowance were appealed by NEA, but rejected the
COA en banc. The decision of COA was then challenged in the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disallowing
the increased salaries
–
NO2)
Whether or not NEA is allowed to accelerate the
implementation of the salaries depending on the availability
of funds
–
NO
HELD:
No, the Commission on Audit did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion. Neither is NEA allowed to accelerate
the implementation.
On NEA’s accelerated implementation
The Court ruled that such acceleration was not in accordance
with the law. NEA claimed that RA8250 (GAA of 1997) was their
legal basis. However, such law was not self-
executory. Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not
constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend
the appropriated amounts as they wish. Itemization of the
Personal Services (the appropriation used by NEA) is prepared
after the enactment of the GAA, and requires the approval of the
President. The execution of the GAA is subject to a program of
expenditure to be approved by the President, which will be the
basis for the fund release. No portion of the appropriations in the
GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase, unless
authorized by law. Salary increases are subject to the approval
of the President.
In essence, the mere approval of Congress of the GAA does not
make the funds automatically available for spending
instantly. The funds must still be collected during the fiscal year.
NEA also argues, from Sec 10 of EO 389, that GOCCs are
exempted from the rule. The Court rejected this argument, for
only GOCCs with insufficient funds are exempted. There is no
rule that allows those with sufficient funds to accelerate their
schedule. There is no express or implied authorization. NEA
also argues that such acceleration was allowed in a Memo of
the Office of the President. However, SC pointed out that the
accelerated implementation is also allowed upon the approval of
the Department of Budget and Management, upon meeting
certain terms and conditions. NEA did not comply by seeking
approval from the DBM. The Court pointed out that NEA cannot
assail the authority of the President to issue EO 389. The
Administrative Code gives the President such power. Joint
Resolution 01 has also acknowledged such authority.
On the DBM’s approval of NEA’s proposed budget
16 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO OCT. 14, 2017

Once the proposed budget was approved by the DBM, it is

submitted to Congress for evaluation and inclusion in the
appropriation law. This authorization does not include the
authority to disburse.
On the
President’s control of all executive departments

Art 7, Sec 17
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.”

The Supreme Court held that

The presidential power of control over the executive branch
of government extends to all executive employees from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This power is self-
executing and does not require statutory implementation. It
cannot be limited nor withdrawn by the Congress.

All other executive officials must implement in good faith the

President’s directives and orders. The case would not have
arisen had NEA complied in good faith with the directives and
orders of the President.

NEA’s reasons in disregarding the President were patently

flimsy, even ill-conceived.