CASE DIGEST ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ELECTION LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AND ELECTION LAW

CASES
11. VINZONS-CHATO vs FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.
525 SCRA 11, Gr. No. 141309, December 23, 2008

Chapter 1 12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DPWH, COA ET. AL. vs

1. US vs DORR, 2 Phil 339
Gr. No. 1051, May 19, 1903
2. BACANI vs NACOCO, 100 Phil 468
Gr. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956
CARLITO LACAP, 517 SCRA 255, Gr. No. 158253
March 2, 2007
13. LORNA MEDINA vs COA, 543 SCRA 684
Gr. No. 176478, February 4, 2008

14. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE

3. CENTRAL BANK vs CA, 63 SCRA 431 PHILIPPINES vs COMELEC, Gr. No. 159139
Gr. No. L-33022, April 22, 1975 March 28, 2006

4. C & C CORP vs NAT'L WATERWORKS & SEVERAGE

AUTHORITY, 21 SCRA 990, Gr. No. L-27275
November 18, 1967

5. ARATUC vs COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251

Gr. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979

6. ASTURIA'S SUGAR CENTRAL vs COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS, 22 SCRA 622, Gr. No. L-19337, September 30,
1969

7. CHIONGBIAN ET. AL. vs ORBOS, 245 SCRA 253

Gr. No. 96754, June 22, 1995

8. MACEDA vs ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD,

192 SCRA 363, Gr. No. 95203-05
December 18, 1990

9. UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES vs MARTINEZ

56 SCRA 154, Gr. No. L-31152, March 27, 1974

10. PEREZ ET. AL. Vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Gr. No. 166062, September 26, 2006

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US vs DORR
2 Phil 339, Gr. No. 1051, May 19, 1903
Facts:
The defendants were charged of scurrilous libel against
the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands because of an editorial it published in the issue
of “Manila Freedom”. The defendants were convicted for said
offense basing upon Section 8 of Act. No. 292 of the Commission.
Defendants then appealed for reversal of judgment made by the
lower courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the editorial published by the defendants
directed towards the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Held:
No, the editorial was not directed towards the
government itself but towards the aggregate of individuals who
were administering the government at that time.
“We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the
term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by
which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of
action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state,
or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By
"administration, again, we understand in modern times, and
especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those
persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government"
and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that
"government" is often used for "administration."”
In this case, the editorial published by defendants where
directed towards the personnel of the Commission whom they
described as "notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character". This as being ruled out by the Supreme Court
was an attack not to the government system but to the aggregate of
individuals by whom the government is being administered.
The final judgment of the convictions of the defendants
was reversed by the Supreme Court acquitting the defendants with
costs against the officials.
BACANI vs NACOCO
100 Phil 468, Gr. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956
Facts:
Plaintiffs are court stenographers of the CFI of Manila.
During the pendency of a civil case of said court, entitled Francisco
Sycip vs. NACOCO, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala,
counsel for NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to
Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to
Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per
page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor
General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the
recovery of the amounts paid.
The Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse
said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of
Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question.
The Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier
of the DOJ to deduct from the salary of Bacani the amount of P25
every payday and from the salary of Matoto the amount of P10
every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of
these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the
NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section
16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the
CFI of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity within the
purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
and, hence, is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No. It is not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the
scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”.
To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may
be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action
which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2
Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national
government, has reference to what our Constitution has established
composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of
government are exercised.
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These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only
by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely
optional.
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public
works, public education, public charity, health and safety
regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles
deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for
the public welfare those things which private capital would not
naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these
things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp.
19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there
are functions which our government is required to exercise to
promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which
are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it
may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization
of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to
promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as
the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on
the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and
formal characteristics of a private corporation under the
Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these
corporations perform certain functions of government make them
a part of the Government of the Philippines?
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for
the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National
Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the
better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far
as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may
sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of
the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government
entity through which the functions of the government are exercised
as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms
through which political authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are
what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government and which are governed
by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to
be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause
prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
CENTRAL BANK vs CA
63 SCRA 431, Gr. No. L-33022, April 22, 1975
Facts:
Defendant Central Bank of the Philippines awarded to
private respondent Ablaza Construction the contract for the general
construction of its various proposed regional offices, including the
Central Bank regional office building in San Fernando, La Union.
CB allowed the Ablaza to commence the contruction work
without any formal, written contract.
CB then failed and refused to continue with the project
unless the plans were modified and the agreed contruct price was
lowered, contending that its action was in compliance with the
policy of fiscal restraint declared by then new president of the
Philippines and with latter’s memorandum circular no. 1.
Ablaza sued for damages arising from breach of contract
before the CFI of Rizal, which ordered the CB to pay damages. It was
also affirmed by the CA.
CB claimed that there was no perfected contract in this
case because there was no showing of compliance with a specific
requirement that there must be a certification of availability of funds
by the Auditor General.
Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that “Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. — Except
in the case of a contract for personal service or for supplies to be
carried in stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the
National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be
entered into or authorized until the Auditor General shall have
certified to the officer entering into such obligation that funds have
been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for
expenditure on account thereof. When application is made to the
Auditor General for the certificate herein required, a copy of the
proposed contract or agreement shall be submitted to him
accompanied by a statement in writing from the officer making the
application showing all obligations not yet presented for audit which
have been incurred against the appropriation to which the contract
in question would be chargeable; and such certificate, when signed
by the Auditor, shall be attached to and become a part of the
proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be
available for expenditure for any other purposes until the
Government is discharged from the contract in question.”
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Issue:
Whether or not the CB is considered part of the National
Government.
Held:
No. Section 607 specifically refers to "expenditure(s) of the
National Government" and that the term "National Government"
may not be deemed to include the Central Bank.
Under the Administrative Code itself, the term "National
Government" refers only to the central government, consisting of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
government, as distinguished from local governments and other
governmental entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the
terms "The Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or
"Philippine Government", which are the expressions broad enough
to include not only the central government but also the provincial
and municipal governments, chartered cities and other government-
controlled corporations or agencies, like the Central Bank.
Central Bank is a government instrumentality. But it was
created as an autonomous body corporate to be governed by the
provisions of its charter, Republic Act 265, "to administer the
monetary and banking system of the Republic."
(Sec. 1) As such, it is authorized "to adopt, alter and use a
corporate seal which shall be judicially noticed; to make contracts;
to lease or own real and personal property, and to sell or otherwise
dispose of the same; to sue and be sued; and otherwise to do and
perform any and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry
out the purposes of this Act. The Central Bank may acquire and hold
such assets and incur such liabilities as result directly from
operations authorized by the provisions of this Act, or as are
essential to the proper conduct of such operations."
(Sec. 4) It has capital of its own and operates under a
budget prepared by its own Monetary Board and otherwise
appropriates money for its operations and other expenditures
independently of the national budget. It does not depend on the
National Government for the financing of its operations; it is the
National Government that occasionally resorts to it for needed
budgetary accommodations.
Under Section 14 of the Bank's charter, the Monetary
Board may authorize such expenditures by the Central Bank as are in
the interest of the effective administration and operation of the
Bank." Its prerogative to incur such liabilities and expenditures is not
subject to any prerequisite found in any statute or regulation not
expressly applicable to it.
Relevantly to the issues in this case, it is not subject, like
the Social Security Commission, to Section 1901 and related
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code which require
national government constructions to be done by or under the
supervision of the Bureau of Public Works. (Op. of the Sec. of Justice
No. 92, Series of 1960)
For these reasons, the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code invoked by the Bank do not apply to it. The
contract entered into by the bank in this case, is not within the
contemplation of Sec 607 of the RAC, which clearly refers to an
expenditure by the national government.
C & C CORP vs NAT'L WATERWORKS & SEVERAGE AUTHORITY
21 SCRA 990, Gr. No. L-27275, November 18, 1967
Facts:
The main issue in this appeal is, whether or not the call for
bids for the supply of steel and centrifugal cast iron pipes for the
waterworks projects in Manila and suburbs, and in the cities of
Davao and Iloilo, the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA) violated the provisions of Republic Act 912, section 1 of
which provides as follows: Sec. 1. In construction or repair work
undertaken by the Government, whether done directly or through
contract awards, Philippine made materials and products, whenever
available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose as
equally well as foreign made products or materials, shall be used in
said construction or repair work, upon the proper certification of the
availability, practicability, usability and durability of said materials or
products by the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and/or his
assistants.
San Pablo Waterworks System filed a complaint on 19 July
1965, alleging that the NAWASA had started to negotiate: for direct
purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes (CCI) for the improvement
of the San Pablo Waterworks System in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 912 and the law on public biddings, excluding the C & C
Commercial. The court rendered a partial decision dismissing the
complaint insofar as the San Pablo Waterworks System was
concerned and dissolving the preliminary injunction issued
thereunder. This partial decision has become final.
Davao Metropolitan Waterworks, on 10 August 1965, the
plaintiff filed a (First) supplemental complaint seeking to restrain the
NAWASA from proceeding with the award of the project in Davao,
alleging that in specifying steel pipes for the project, which is
admittedly imported material, without giving preference to locally
produced asbestos cement pressure pipes manufactured by the
plaintiff, violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. The Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Iloilo Waterworks System, on 8 September 1965, almost
three (3) years after the date of the bidding, the C & C Commercial
Co. filed a (Second) supplemental complaint; seeking to restrain the
NAWASA from formalizing or implementing the award on the
aforesaid Iloilo project for the supply of 18-inch steel pipes, alleging
that in specifying steel pipes for the particular project, the NAWASA
has violated the provisions of Republic Act 912 which requires the
purchase of Philippine made materials and products which
are available, practicable and usable locally, like plaintiff's product
— asbestos cement pressure pipes — in construction and repair
undertaken by the government. The record is not clear when the
restraining order under the second supplemental complaint was
issued, although the NAWASA alleges that a restraining order was
issued under date of 10 September 1965, which fact has not been
traversed by the plaintiff.
Manila and Suburbs Waterworks System filed a
(Third) Supplemental complaint seeking to restrain the NAWASA and
its representatives from holding the balding under the
aforementioned notice to bid, averring identical facts as those
alleged in the previous supplemental complaints, that the call for bid
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for steel pipes for the Manila project and suburbs violates the
provisions of Republic Act 912.
The court rendered a decision finding and concluding that
the act of the NAWASA in specifying steel pipes for the project of
the city of Manila and its suburbs, and in awarding the contracts for
the supply of steel pipes in the cases of the Davao and Iloilo
Waterworks System, constituted a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 912.
Appellant argued that the provisions of Republic Act 912
were applicable only to construction or repair works undertaken by
the Government. That since the NAWASA, though a public
corporation, is not a municipal corporation or agency of the State
empowered to regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or
city, nor one of the various arms of the government through which
political authority is made effective in the Islands, consequently, the
NAWASA should not be included within the meaning of the term
"Government" as used in the law.
Issue:
Whether or not NAWASA should be included within the
meaning of the term government.
Held:
Yes. The court ruled that the NAWASA, like any other
corporation exercising proprietary or governmental functions should
be deemed embraced within the term "Government" found in
Republic Act 912, and in the repair or construction of their works or
projects or the purchase of materials therefor, local materials should
be given preference when available, practicable and usable.
Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defining the
term "Government" which is heavily relied upon by the appellant
recognizes an exception: "when a different meaning for the word or
phrase is given a particular statute or is plainly to be collected from
the context or connection where the term is used." In this context of
the law, the term "government" without any qualification as used in
Republic Act 912, should be construed in its implied sense and not in
the strict signification of the term "Government of the Philippines"
as the political entity through which political authority is exercised.
ARATUC vs COMELEC
88 SCRA 251, Gr. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979
Facts:
On 1978, election for the position of Representative to the
Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The
cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII
which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato.
Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then
being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City
and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the
whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results.
A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election
Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the
complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978,
the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the
objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the
eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected.
Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution
declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having
obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates
interposed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
No. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by
the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant
to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review" shall be
on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has
decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions refer
not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation
proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently
thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11,
Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city official" (Section 2(2).)
“As the Superior administrative body having control over
boards of canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the
Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry
beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such
actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred
by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of
direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in
Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled
postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body
or office having supervision and control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points
raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to bear in
mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978,
"the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and
supervision on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly,
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Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the
procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the
actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to
in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such
as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as
an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for
there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but
from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in
administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any
supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter
is supposed to do or ought to have done.
ASTURIA'S SUGAR CENTRAL vs COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
22 SCRA 622, Gr. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969
Facts:
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the production
and milling of centrifugal sugar for export, the produced sugar was
being placed in container known as jute bag which were not locally
made. Thus, in 1957, it made two importations of jute bags.
There were 44,800 jute bags in the first importation, and
75,200 in the second importation. These importations were made
free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner’s
filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond conditioned
upon the exportation of jute bags within one year from date of
importation.
The first was imported on January 8, 1957 and the second
on February 8, 1957. But it only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute
bags that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within
three years from their importation contrary to the Administrative
Order 66 and 389 issued by the Bureau of Customs.
Due to the petitioner’s failure to show proof of the
exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from
their importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay
the amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and
special import tax due thereon, which amount paid under protest.
The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had
paid, on the ground that its request for extension of the period of
one year was filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute
bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the
arrival of the vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the
picketing of the Central railroad line.
Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in
the form of a draw back under section 106(b) in relation to section
105(x) of the Tariff and Custom Code. On June 21, 1960, the
collector of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment
denying the claim for refund. Because of this judgment the
petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who upheld
the decision of the Collector.
Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the Court
of Tax Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs.
Issue:
Whether or not interpretation or construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or
other Administrative Agencies be given consideration, in the case at
bar, the Bureau of Customs.
Held:
Yes. Considering that the statutory provisions in question
(Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Actof 1909 and Sex. 105(x) of the
Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous
judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of
"judicial respect for administrative construction " would, initially, be
in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give
consideration to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state.
Where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the statute, the rule is that courts will give consideration
to the construction by administrative or executive departments of
the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical
construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the
executive department or other agency charged with its
administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the
highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate
weight in determining the meaning of the law especially when the
construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the
enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and
Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to
several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.
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 CASE DIGEST ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ELECTION LAW
CHIONGBIAN ET. AL. vs ORBOS
245 SCRA 253, Gr. No. 96754, June 22, 1995
Facts:
In 1968, RA 5435 was passed, "authorizing the President of
the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization
(Commission), to reorganize the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government,
including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or
controlled by it."
The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government."
Commission created under the law was required to submit
an integrated reorganization plan to the President who was in turn
required to submit the plan to Congress as the law provided that any
reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon
the approval of Congress.
Commission prepared an integrated reorganization plan,
dividing the country into 11 administrative regions, which was
approved in 1972.
Congress passed RA 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), calling for a
plebiscite – 13 provinces and 9 cities. 4 provinces voted for creating
ARMM .
Art. 19, Sec. 13 of RA 6734 states that the provinces and
cities that do not vote for inclusion in the ARMM shall remain in
existing administrative regions, provided, however, that the
President may merge existing regions
President Aquino passed EO 429, “Providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao”.
Petitioners contended the said EO and wrote to Aquino,
but the Reorganization went on as planned, which prompted the
petitioners to file the case in the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the power to "merge" administrative
regions is executive in character. Or Whether or not the President
may merge existing regions.
Held:
Yes. The power to “merge” administrative regions has
traditionally been logged with the President. Congress has provided
a sufficient standard to guide the President in the exercise of
aforementioned power.
As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [Sec. 4, Art. 10 of the
Constitution]."
Also, there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power
in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative
regions by the President is pursuant to authority granted to her by
law.
In conferring on the President the power "to merge the existing
regions" following the establishment of ARMM, Congress merely
followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972 (as a result of
RA 5345).
The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only
the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments, which the law requires should have regional
offices.
The regrouping is only done on paper and for administrative
purposes. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may
simply be gathered or implied Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
With respect to the power to “merge existing administrative
regions”, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying
the grant to the President in RA 5435: "To promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue
programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business."
MACEDA vs ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
192 SCRA 363, Gr. No. 95203-05
December 18, 1990
Facts:
Upon the outbreak of the Persiqn Gulf conflict on August
1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their
respective applications on oil price increase. ERB then issued an
order granting a provisional increase of 1.42 php per liter. Petitioner
Maceda filed a petition for prohibition seeking to nullify said
increase.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Energy Regulatory Board
is valid.
Held:
Yes. Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to
make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the
application. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary
restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments
that “the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its
decision,” except that there is no law at present authorizing the
same. The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the
legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions of the
ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still “ an
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administrative body under the Office of the President whose
decisions should be appealed to the President under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” especially on a
matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives
of almost all Filipinos.
UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES vs MARTINEZ
56 SCRA 154, Gr. No. L-31152, March 27, 1974
Facts:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
preliminary injunction, relative to the orders of respondent
Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations which in effect
held that the determination of whether or not a charge of unfair
labor practice, investigated by the Prosecution Division of said court,
should be dismissed outright because of any fatal defect of form or
substance is the exclusive prerogative of said Presiding Judge, to the
exclusion of the court en banc, on the theory that the function
involved in such determination is not judicial but purely
administrative and hence entrusted to his exclusive administrative
authority as head of said court.
University of Nueva Caceres Guardians Union filed with
the Bicol branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an
unfair labor practice charge against petitioners accompanied by the
joint affidavit of Benito de la Paz and George Offemaria.
At the hearing of said charge before the prosecutor of the
CIR, petitioners moved to dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) it is
not verified; (2) it does not specify the particular provisions of
Section 4 (a) of the Industrial Peace Act, RA 875, as amended,
supposed to have been violated, and (3) the supporting joint
affidavit contains "falsities, misstatements and improbabilities on
points otherwise material to the charge."
Respondent Presiding Judge denied the petition for
reconsideration, admitted the amended charge and directed the
Court Prosecutor to set the said amended charge for preliminary
investigation.
The present petition was filed charging said respondent
with having acted in excess of jurisdiction in acting on a matter
addressed to and within the jurisdiction of the CIR en banc and of
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the dismissal of the charge
upon the grounds invoked by them.
Respondent Judge contended that the function of
overseering the Prosecution Division of the CIR in its work of filing
and dismissing charges of unfair labor practice was purely
administrative in nature and falls within his exclusive competence
was without merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation of charges
for unfair labor practices is exclusive prerogative of the presiding
judge.
Held:
No. It is true that reference to the court in the law must be
construed to mean the Presiding Judge and not the court en banc
when the action contemplated is purely administrative in character,
but, precisely, the point missed is that, as already explained, the
Industrial Peace Act does not consider the investigation by the CIR,
either by itself or thru an agent, as an administrative matter but a
judicial one like the preliminary investigations in election and anti-
subversion cases.
Preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor
practices is not the exclusive prerogative of the presiding judge, but
belongs to the court itself.
“Under the old IPA, preliminary investigatons
conducted by the CIR are judicial in nature, unlike preliminary
investigations conducted by prosecutors in criminal cases which are
administrative in character.”
PEREZ ET. AL. Vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Gr. No. 166062, September 26, 2006
Facts:
Municipal Mayor of San Manuel, Pangasinan, Salvador
Perez and the municipal treasurer, Juanita Apostol conspired and
confederated with one another, committed the crime charged in
relation to and taking advantage of their official functions, and
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause the purchase of one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00
acquisition by personal canvass which is in violation of Secs. 362 and
367 of R.A. 7160, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of
San Manuel, Pangasinan.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation. Assistant Special Prosecutor Warlito Galisanao
prepared a Memorandum. New Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo
crossed out both actions. Supplemental Memorandum, Assistant
Special Prosecutor III Galisanao recommended an amendment of
the Information, instead of a withdrawal thereof.
In the earlier memorandum, there is no unanimity of
conclusion as far as the reasonableness of the purchase price of the
computer set is concern[ed]. However, the circumstances of its
acquisition clearly indicate that the public officials involved gave the
supplier, Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center, a private party,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence by
paying much more than the prevailing price for a comparable
computer set in the market.
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This time around, Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
approved the Supplemental Memorandum and, pursuant thereto,
Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao filed a Motion for Leave to
File Amended Information dated 12 March 2004. The Amended
Information, which again charges petitioners Perez and Apostol for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in the first assailed
resolution. There having been no arraignment yet and the pre-
maturity of the amendment is of the prosecution’s risk, the motion
to Amend the Information is granted. The Amended Information
submitted by the prosecution is admitted. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Petitioners alleged that the amendment of the
Information and the admission of the Amended Information was
premature, since the Ombudsman has not yet acted with finality on
the Memorandum.
Respondent People’s alleged that compliance with the
specific instructions of the Ombudsman was merely an internal
matter and the alleged failure to heed the specific instructions of the
Ombudsman is speculative.
Petitioners countered that the doctrine of qualified
political agency does not apply to the Office of the Ombudsman,
since the latter was an apolitical agency, and was far different from
the bureaucracy to which said doctrine applies.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are correct in countering
that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Held:
Yes. Under the Administrative Code of 1987: “Supervision
and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct
the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
x x x”
Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of
qualified political agency, wherein the acts of a subordinate bears
the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by
the latter. Thus, taken with the powers of control and supervision,
the acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of their
duties are presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until
the President alters, modifies, or nullifies the same. By arguing that
"[w]hat is important is that the amended Information has not been
withdrawn, and or recalled by the Honorable Ombudsman, [a] clear
showing that the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of the Special
Prosecutor in signing the Amended Information," respondent People
claims that the doctrine of qualified political agency should be
applied as well to the relationship between the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor.
The doctrine of qualified political agency was adopted in
our system of government on the following pronouncement of this
Court in Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior: “…that under the
presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. “
While we do not underestimate the quantity of work in
the hands of the Office of the Ombudsman, the same simply does
not measure up to the workload of the Office of the President as to
necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the
Ombudsman. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman could very
well make a general delegation of powers to the Special Prosecutor,
if it is so desired. An examination of the office orders issued by the
Ombudsman, however, reveal that there had been no such intention
to make a general delegation.
Indeed, a statute granting powers to an agency created by
the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement
of the purposes and objectives for which it was created. Yet, the
Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his power
of control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to authorize the
filing of informations in the first instance. This is because while the
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case
has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer
the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that
the informations may not be dismissed, without the approval of the
said court
VINZONS-CHATO vs FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.
525 SCRA 11, Gr. No. 141309, December 23, 2008
Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which
provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
“55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos per pack.”
Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule,
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured
by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed,
these cigarette brands were already covered.
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In a case filed against Liwayway with the
RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss
that respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority.
She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for
lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to
the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office.
Held:
Yes. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages
that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a
charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code,
civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
grossnegligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness
or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 ofthe Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course
of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public
officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, ornegligence; or (2) where
the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DPWH, COA ET. AL. vs
CARLITO LACAP
517 SCRA 255, Gr. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
Facts:
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modifications, ruling by the
RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages
filed by Lacap against RP.
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated
Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-
qualified.
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting
of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works and
purchased materials and labor in connection with.
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final
investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed according
to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH.
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA
disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as
contractor having expired.
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then
responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566)
does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after
expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly
prohibits or declares void such a contract.
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First
Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made
to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued.
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since
respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District
Auditor to disapprove the claim.
Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996
denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order
dated May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the
defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of non-suability of the State.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial
action was premature since the proper remedy was to appeal the
District Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to
Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the
COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim
against the government under Section 2(1), Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.
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Issue:
Whether or not exhaustion of administrative remedies
apply in this case.
Held:
Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply,
because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law. Said question at best could be resolved
only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision
on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes.
The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to
a court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which
are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are
not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention
is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l)
in quo warranto proceedings. Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to
the present case.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license
at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for
completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the
COA disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and,
under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy
available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the
District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of
exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific
performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
LORNA MEDINA vs COA
543 SCRA 684, Gr. No. 176478, February 4, 2008
Facts:
The Commission on Audit (COA) audited the cash and accounts
handled by Lorna Medina (Medina) as Municipal Treasurer of
General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite and the audit team, headed by
Eufrocina Mawak, discovered a total cash shortage of
P4,080,631.36.
Medina was ordered to restitute the shortage but she failed to
comply.
COA filed an administrative case with the Deputy Ombudsman
charging Medina with grave misconduct and dishonesty.Medina
filed a Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper raising affirmative
defenses.
Deputy Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez (Fernandez) approved
the recommendation of the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer to dismiss petitioner from service; the decision noted
Medina's supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and position
paper despite due notice.
Later, Medina filed an urgent motion stating that she complied
with the directive to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and
prayed that the decision be reversed based on her defenses.
Fernandez denied the motion; he acknowledged he made a
mistake in saying that Medina failed to file a counter-affidavit and
position paper but still affirmed the previous order because none of
the defenses exculpate Medina from the cash shortages;
furthermore, Medina’s failure to produce the cash shortage created
the presumption that she appropriated the funds for personal use.
Medina sought reconsideration on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence consisting of her petition for reconsideration of
the audit report which petition was still pending with the audit team
and letters to the provincial auditor of Cavite questioning the audit.
Fernandez denied the motion for reconsideration because the
request for re-audit is not newly discovered evidence and he denied
the request for a formal investigation on the ground that petitioner
was afforded due process when she filed her counter-affidavit and
position paper.
On appeal, the CA held that Medina was not entitled to a
formal investigation and it affirmed the Fernandez's factual finding
that she was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
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Petitioner, in invoking her right to due process, on one hand,
insisted that she was entitled to a formal investigation, citing the
Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 48
(2) and (3).
On the other hand, in support of its argument that the
propriety of conducting a formal investigation rests on the sound
discretion of the hearing officer, respondent COA, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), relied on Administrative Order No. 07,
as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Rule III, Section
5, governing the procedure in administrative cases filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The validity of Administrative Order No. 07, Rule III,
Section 5 is not in dispute. However, petitioner argues that said
provision is inferior to the provision in the Administrative Code
which entitles the respondent to a formal investigation if he so
desires.
Issue:
Whether or not the A.O. No. 07 governs this case.
Held:
Yes. On various occasions, the Court has ruled on the
primacy of special laws and of their implementing regulations over
the Administrative Code of 1987 in settling controversies specifically
subject of these special laws. For instance, in Hon. Joson v. Exec. Sec.
Torres, the Court held that the Local Government Code of 1991, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 (A.O. No. 23) govern
administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local
officials, whereas the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of
1987 apply in a suppletory character to all matters not provided in
A.O. No. 23.The aforesaid ruling is based on the principle of
statutory construction that where there are two statutes applicable
to a particular case, that which is specially intended for the said case
must prevail.
More significantly, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explained that, “ There is no basis in law for the proposition that the
provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local
Government Code on execution pending review should be applied
suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is
nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory
application. xxx xxx xxx And while in one respect, the Ombudsman
Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government
Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with
public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case
must prevail over the other. In the instant case, the acts attributed
to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative
disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President under the
Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman
under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner
was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which
should govern his case.”
Thus, as between the Administrative Code of 1987 and
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the latter governs in this case which involves an
administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
and which raises the question of whether petitioner is entitled to a
formal investigation as a matter of right.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of
petitioner's request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a
denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a
counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a
chance to file two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the
deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the
parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs
COMELEC
Gr. No. 159139, March 28, 2006
Facts:
On February 14, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution
directing the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) "to SHOW
CAUSE why it should not be held in contempt of court for its failure
to fully comply with the Court's directive in the January 13, 2004
Decision on the instant case, and to MANIFEST compliance with the
directive..."
In compliance with that Resolution, the OMB filed,
on February 24, 2 006, its Comment contending that it should not
be held in contempt of court. It alleged that the statement: "Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman
which shall determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public
officials (and conspiring private individuals, if any) involved in the
subject Resolution and Contract," made by this Court in the Decision,
dated January 13, 2004, should be "plainly construed as a judicial
'referral' to the OMB of a matter falling within the investigatory and
prosecutorial authority and jurisdiction of a constitutionally
independent body." It averred that being a constitutionally
independent body, it had no duty to render reports on the status,
eventual outcome and completion of its investigation on the
Comelec-Mega Pacific Consortium controversy. It alleged that the
January 13, 2004 Decision did not specifically order it to make such
reports.
OMB still repotted the actions it has taken pursuant to the
January 13, 2004 Decision in this case. It stated: "On the basis of the
Decision of this Honorable Court, then Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
Simeon V. Marcelo issued Office Order directing the then Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Research Bureau (FIRO), now known as the
Field Investigation Office (FIO), Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
an in-depth investigation on the alleged anomalies surrounding the
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award of the subject contract by the COMELEC to the MPC.
Meanwhile, the Resident Ombudsman for the COMELEC conducted
an initial investigation on the matter, and assigned to the same.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 22 January 2004, the
Supervising Resident Ombudsman for the COMELEC requested the
Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication and
Monitoring Office (PAMO), Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
the.
“On 21 January 2004, and while the FIRO was conducting
its in-depth investigation in CPL-C-04-0060 and ORO-COM-MIM-
2004-01, Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman charging the COMELEC Commissioners
with [the] alleged violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019
in connection with the nullified transaction. x x x. The complaint was
initially assigned reference number CPL-C-0089 and subsequently
docketed before the Office of the Ombudsman Central Office (OMB-
C) as OMB-C-C-04-0011-A (for its criminal aspect) and OMB-C-A-04-
0015-A (for its administrative aspect).
“Thereafter, the said cases were referred for evaluation to
the Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication and
Monitoring Office (PAMO), Office of the Ombudsman, which came
up with a proposed Order dated 22 January 2004. In a Memorandum
dated 2 February 2004, of then Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon
V. Marcelo, the proposed Order of the PAMO was referred to the
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), Office of the Ombudsman for
exhaustive legal research on the issue of whether or not the
respondents in the said cases must first be impeached before they
can be criminally prosecuted. The OLA subsequently submitted a
Memorandum dated 12 February 2004.
“In a Memorandum dated 11 March 2004, then
Tanodbayan Marcelo inhibited himself from the said cases, and
directed the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Victor Fernandez to act
in his place. On 06 April 2004, and following the inhibition by then
Tanodbayan Marcelo, Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez approved the
Memorandum dated 12 February 2004 and the Order dated 22
January 2004 in OMB-C-C-04-0011-A and OMB-C-A-04-0015-A (CPL-
C-04-0089).
“In an Indorsement dated 14 April 2004, Deputy
Ombudsman Fernandez forwarded the records of OMB-C-C-04-
0011-A and OMB-C-A-04-0015-A to the Tanodbayan, through the
Central Records Division. On 11 May 2004, the Central Records
Division forwarded the said case records to FIO for its appropriate
action. Thus, the FIO continued its fact-finding investigation relative
to CPL-C-04-0089. On 19 September 2004, Bantay Katarungan
Foundation and Kilosbayan Foundation ('KILOSBAYAN' for brevity)
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for violation
of R.A. 7080, (Anti-Plunder Law), violation of Section 3 (e), (g), (i) and
(j) and violation of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Government Officials and Employees) against the 'COMELEC
Commissioners who gave the award leading to the procurement of
Automated Counting Machines' and against 'conspiring private
individuals'.
"On 07 October 2004, and consistent with his inhibition,
then Ombudsman Marcelo also forwarded the Kilosbayan complaint
to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Consequently,
the Kilosbayan complaint was assigned a new reference number,
i.e., CPL-C-04-1720 and later docketed before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (OMB-L) as OMB-L-C-02-0922-J.
"Upon recommendation by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon's panel of investigators, OMB-C-C-04-0011-A, OMB-C-A-
04-0015-A (CPL-C-04-0089) and CPL-C-04-0060 were then set for
preliminary investigation and/or administrative adjudication.Thence,
the preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication
proceeded.
"On 17 December 2004, the officers and incorporators of
MPel who were among the respondents in OMB-L-C-04-0922-J and
OMB-L-C-04-0983-J filed before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which was
denied in an Order dated 14 January 2005. Said respondents
thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied
in an Order dated 22 February 2005. Said respondents then assailed
the Orders dated 14 January 2005 and 22 February 2005 of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, before the Honorable Court of Appeals.
"Meanwhile, in a Resolution dated 18 January 2005 issued
in G.R. No. 159139, this Honorable Court (En Banc) directed the
Ombudsman to file its Comment on the COMELEC's 'Most Respectful
Motion for Leave to Use the Automated Counting Machines in
Custody of the Commission on Elections for Use in the 08 August
2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)'. On 11 February 2005, and in compliance with said
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed its Comment dated 10 February
2005 before this Honorable Court x x x.
"In a Decision dated 26 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
88955, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by
the officers and incorporators of MPel, and affirmed the Orders of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denying the said
Motion to Suspend Proceedings in OMB-L-C-04-0922-J and OMB-L-C-
04-0983-J. The officers and incorporators of MPel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the Decision dated 26 September 2005 which
was denied by the Honorable Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 08 December 2005. The aforementioned Decision and
Resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88955 are now the subject of a Petition for Review before this
Honorable Court, which is docketed as G.R. No. 170725 and entitled
'Willy U. Yu, et al vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.'”
Thus, the OMB asserts that it has "long acted on the
referral, or complied with this Court's directive in this case, to its full
extent."
Issue:
Whether or not the OMB is correct in invoking its
constitutionally mandated independence to shield itself from the
Court's contempt powers.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the reasoning was flawed.
First. The power to punish for contempt, which is inherent
in all courts is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings; and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due
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 CASE DIGEST ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ELECTION LAW

administration of justice. There is thus, no excuse for disregarding or

disobeying an order of this Court, as this act would disturb the
orderly administration of justice.
Second. We sternly remind the OMB: this Court will not
hesitate to exercise its power of contempt against anyone (including
the OMB) who fails to observe due respect for its directives,
mandates, orders and judgments.
Third. The OMB's authority as a "competent investigatory
body" was not in any way interfered with by this Court, when it
ordered that a "copy of the January 13, 2004 Decision be furnished
to the [OMB] which shall determine the criminal liability, if any, of
the public officials (and conspiring private individuals, if any)
involved in the subject Resolution and Contract." To be sure, in
making that statement, this Court, recognized the constitutional
mandate of the OMB as "protector of the people" against erring and
abusive public officials.
We are, however, also mindful of die OMB's duty to "act
promptly on complaints x x x and x x x, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."
Deference to this Court's simple order should have prompted the
OMB to act on its responsibility to inform us of its actions regarding
this case. Thus, we strongly remind it to be more prudent in
performing its basic constitutional duty and in following the
directives of this Court.
Fourth. The Decision of this Court, dated January 13, 2004,
contained a directive, not a referral. Note the use of the words "shall
determine," which are imbued with a mandatory tenor. The
hesitation and quibbling of the OMB over this simple matter
surprises this Court, considering that, even without this express
directive, the former should have taken it upon itself to conduct
a moto proprio investigation.

*Cases are also found in the book, “Administrative Law, Law on

Local Government and Election Law” by Atty. Benedicto Gonzales,
Jr.*

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