Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
[No. L-4963. January 29, 1953] upon his death, such renunciation cannot be
1. MARIA USON, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARIA entertained for the simple reason that future
DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, and FAUSTINO can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 6th ed.,
NEBREDA, JR., defendants and appellants. 123; Osorio vs. Osorio, et al., 41 Phil., 531).
3.ID.; ID.; DONATIONS BY
1.DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; HUSBAND AND WIFE; DECEASED; ESSENTIAL FORMALITIES
RIGHTS OF LAWFUL WIFE AS AFFECTED BY THE NEW OF DONATION.—Assignments, if any, made by the
CIVIL CODE.—The right of ownership of the lawful deceased of real property for which there was no
wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil material consideration, should be made in a public
Code took effect became vested in her upon his document and must be accepted either in the same
death, and this is so because of the imperative document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil
provision of the law which commands that the Code). Assignments or donations which lack this
rights of succession are transmitted from the essential formality have no valid effect.
moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil Code;
Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the Instance of Pangasinan. Martinez, J.
illegitimate children of the deceased can not be The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
asserted to the Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the
new Civil Code provides that rights which are declared BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
for the first time shall have retroactive effect even This is an action for the recovery of the ownership
though the event which gave rise to them may have and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the
occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan,
only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested filed by Maria Uson agakist Maria del Rosario and her
or acquired right of the same origin. four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador,
and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor
2.ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE MADE BY age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
LAWFUL WIFE; FUTURE INHERITANCE, NOT SUBJECT Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino
TO CONTRACT.—Although the lawful wife has Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
expressly renounced her right to inherit any future involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common- effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this
law wife background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda
532 died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at
532 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED the time passed from the moment of his death to his
Uson vs. Del Rosario, et al. only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs
lands thus depriving her of their possession and to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor
enjoyment. as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
Defendants in their answer set up as special delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
public document whereby they agreed to separate as Uson over the lands in question became vested.
husband and wife and, in consideration of their The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by relinquished her right over the lands in question
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
to inherit any other property that may be left by her property that her husband may acquire and leave upon
husband upon his death (Exhibit 1). his death in the deed of separation they had entered
After trial, at which both parties presented their into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for
respective evidence, the court rendered decision the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p.
without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41
interposed the present appeal. Phil., 531).
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff- But defendants contend that, while it is true that
appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, however, under the new Civil Code which became in
was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, rights of natural children and are entitled to the
successional rights which the law accords to the latter As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her de-
(Article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and ceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity
because these successional rights were declared for the or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question
first time in the new code, they shall be given to the minor children for the reason that they were
retroactive effect even though the event which gave acquired while the deceased was living with their
rise to them may have occurred under the prior mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat
legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code). the wrong she has done to them, this much can be
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we
referred to provides indeed that rights which are are of the opinion that said assignment, if any,
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
even though the event which gave rise to them may inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
so only when the new rights do not prejudice any public document and must be accepted either in the
vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old
article provides that "if a right should be declared for Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has
the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, not been followed, it results that the alleged
even though the act or event which gives rise thereto assignment or donation has no valid effect.
may have been done or may have occurred under the Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
prior legislation, provided said new right does not without costs.
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
same origin." As already stated in the early part of this Monte-mayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, J J., concur.
decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the Judgment affirmed.
death of her late husband and this is so because of the 2 577
imperative provision of the law which commands that VOL. 46, AUGUST 18, 1972
the rights to succession are transmitted from the
De Borja vs. Vda. de de Borja
moment of death. (Article 657, old Civil Code).
No. L-28040. August 18, 1972.
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO,JOSE DE
favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
BORJA, admin-istrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA,MATILDE DE
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as
Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees, vs. TASIANA distribution of the said estate among the heirs before
VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Ad-ministratrix of the the probate of the will.
Testate Estate of Francisco de Bor-ja, appellant. Remedial law; Testate and intestate
proceedings; Settlement entered into by heir in his
No. L-28568. August 18, 1972. individual capacity does not need court approval.—
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE F RANCISCO DE Where the compromise agreement entered into by and
B ORJA,TA-SIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special between the various heirs in the personal capacity, the
Administratrix appellee, vs. JOSE DE BORJA, same is binding upon them as individuals, upon the
oppositor-appellant. perfection of the contract, even without previous
No. L-28611. August 18, 1972. authority of the Court to enter into such agreement.
TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, as Administratrix The only difference between an extrajudicial
of the Tes-tate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja, compromise and one that is submitted and approved
plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE DE BORJA, as by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa execu-tion proceedings.
Tangco, defendant-appellant. Civil law; Succession; Heir may sell her hereditary
rights to co-heir.—As owner of her individual share, an
578 heir could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED chose, including another heir of the same defendant.
De Borja vs. Vda. de de Borja Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided
Civil law; Wills; Remedial law; Testate and for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code.
intestate pro. ceedings; Rule of nullity of extrajudicial Same; Same; Case at bar, agreement does not
settlement prior to probate of will inapplicable to case compromise status of heir and her marriage.—A
at bar.—The doctrine of Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 contract which describes one of the heirs as “the heir
Phil. 479, which holds that the presentation of a will and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,” in
distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when itself is a definite admission of such heir’s civil status
the decedent left a will is against the law and public in relation to the decedent. There is nothing in the text
policy, is not applicable where the clear abject of the of the agreement that would show that this recognition
settlement was merely the conveyance by the heir of of Ong-singco’s status as the surviving spouse of
any and all her individual share and interest, actual or Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of
eventual, in the estate of the decedent and not the the cession of her hereditary rights.
Remedial law; Compromise; Inability of parties to declarants Fran-cisco de Borja and his executor-widow,
draw new agreement does not annul a prior one.—The Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater
inability among the heirs to reach a novatory accord probative weight than the self-serving statement of
can not invalidate the original compromise among Francisco. Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of
them and any of the latter is justified in finally the conjugal character of the Hacienda now in dispute
seeking a court order for the approval and enforcement has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof.
of such compromise.
Civil law; Contracts; Party who caused the delay in L-28040
the enforcement of a contract cannot complain of
subsequent devaluation of currency amd increase of APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance
price of land.—In her brief, Ongsingco also pleads that of Rizal (Branch I). Cecilio Muñoz-Palma, J.
the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-
agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of
appellee.
the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de
that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed
Borja.
price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
her attempts to nullify the agreements she had
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
formally entered into with the advice of her counsel.
And as to the devaluation of our currency, what we L-28568
said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, 33 SCRA, 554, that
“estates would never be settled if there were to be a APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the of Nueva Ecija. Cuevas, J .
values of currency and properties of the estate,” is
particularly apposite in the present case. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Remedial law; Evidence; Case at bar. self-serving Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-
statement of decedent overpowered by several appellee.
admissions against interest.—It may be true that the Pelaez, Jdtandoni & Jamir for oppositor-
inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant are not appellant.
conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in 580
question; but as already noted, they are clear 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
admissions against the pecuniary interest of the De Borja vs. Vda. de de Borja
L-28611 property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a
conjugal asset of the community with his first wife,
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains
of Rizal (Branch X). Mariano, J. exclusively to his testate estate, which is under
administration in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee. _______________
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David
Guevara for de-fendant-appellant. 1 She died during the pendency of these appeals,
being substituted by Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr.,
REYES, J.B.L., J.: administrator of her estate (S. C. Resolution, 27
February 1970). It is uncontested that Francisco de
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an
Borja, upon the death of his wife Josef a Tangco on 6
appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special
October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will
adminis-tratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866
Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its
will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, “Testate
de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in
Estate of Josefa Tang-co, Jose de Borja,
1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
Administrator”.
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954,
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator
Jose became the sole administrator of the testate
Jose de Borja from the disapproval of the same
estate of his mother, Jose Tangco. While a widower
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance
Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a
of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding
second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco’s
No. 832, entitled, “Testate Estate of Francisco de
death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the
Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955,
Administratrix”.
she was appointed special administratrix. The validity
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by
of Tasiana’s marriage to Fran-cisco was questioned in
administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the
said proceeding.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil
Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala The relationship between the children of the first
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive
with several court suits and counter-suits; including THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties
the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain herein to terminate and settle, with finality, the
pending determination in the courts. The testate various court litigations, controversies, claims,
estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with
more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication
end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of
was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco,
“[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tang-co,” agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to
and “[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de enter into and execute this agreement under the
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. following terms and conditions:
de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis 1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion
Panaguiton, Jr.” The terms and conditions of the portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala,
compromise agreement are as follows: Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate
“AGREEMENT Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal),
more specifically described as follows:
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and ‘Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la
between jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as la Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la
_________________ Familia Maronilla’
2 Annex A, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-28040, pp. with a segregated area of approximately 1,313
16-21. AND hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total
by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent
Jr. P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as
pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano, and
WITNESSETH
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana
considered as full and complete payment and Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. 5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana
No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for
Doñation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors,
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and
depend upon the receipt of full payment discharge any and all manner of action or actions,
of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, ‘Poblacion.’ 3. cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of
That Tasiana Ongsinco Vda. de de Borja hereby money, accounts, damages, claims and demands
assumes payment of that particular obligation whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had,
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the or now have or may have against each other, more
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case
P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share No. 3033, CFI-Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel
the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fistal of Rizal,
more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of the intention being to completely, absolutely and
Jalajala, ‘Poblacion’ from the payment to be made to finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or
this Agreement and paid directly to the Development partially, directly or indirectly, from the
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of administration, settlement, and distribution of the
Francisco de Borja. assets as well &s liabilities of the estates of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala ‘Poblacion’ is de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
hereby authorized to pay directly Tasiana Ongsingco Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely
Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the
under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of
receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles The genuineness and due execution of the
and documents belong-ing to Francisco de Borja which compromise agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by
issue in turn the corresponding receipt thereof. Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs
cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the
the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned same involves a compromise on the validity of the
under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana
of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has
of the Jalajala property ‘Poblacion’, otherwise, the non- ceased to have force and effect.
fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12
NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
THEREAFTER. Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court’s decision in
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 PhiL 479, wherein the
here-unto set their hands in the City of Manila, Court’s majority held the view that the presentation of
Philippines, this 12th of October, 1963.” a will for probate is mandatory and that the
On 16 May 1968, Jose de Borja submitted for Court settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by
No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity
No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate by
in both instances. The Rizal court approved the agreement between heirs, upon the facts that “(if) the
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all
declared it void and unenforceable Special of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja and legal representatives . . .” The will of Francisco de
appealed the Rizal Court’s order of approval (now Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court
Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the
validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in
governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased creditor or legatee And as a hereditary share in a
person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately
also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, from the moment of the death of such causante or
in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines,
expressed the view that if the parties have already Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with
divided the estate in accordance with a decedent’s will, requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
they have divided the estate in a different manner, the the actual extent of such share is not determined until
probate of the will is worse than useless. the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course,
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
examination of the terms of the agreement between However, the aleatory character of the contract does
Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of the coetaneous agreement that the numerous
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco— litigations between the parties (the approving order of
“shall be considered as full—complete payment— the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec.
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by
Tangco, xxx and to any properties bequeathed or the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if
Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.” This provision evidences It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that
beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana
not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no Ong-singco was his compulsory heir under article
attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore,
de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco no execution except in compliance with a judicial
de Borja’s last will and tes- compromise.
_______________
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the
3 Also: Osorio vs. Osorio Steamship Co., 41 Phil. agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its
531; Baun vs. Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil. 654; Barretto vs. performance, the same was intended to have a
Tuason, 59 Phil 845; Cuevas vs. Abesamis, 71 Phil. resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In
147; Jayme vs. Gamboa, 75 Phil. 479; Iballe vs. Po. support of such contention, it is averred that such a
4 Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279; Jakosalem vs. limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in
Rafols 73 Phil. 628. tament, and would exist even if similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the
such will were not probated at all. Thus, the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto,
prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except
established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can that the consideration was fixed at P600,-000
not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39-46)
Borja. and which contained the following clause:
“III. That this agreement, shall take effect only upon
Since the compromise contract Annex A was the consummation of the sale of the property
entered into by and between “Jose de Borja personally mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein
Tangco” on the one hand, and on the other, “the heir owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely,
and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property
Borja”, it is clear that the transaction was binding on mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt
both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within
of the contract, even without previous authority of the the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this
Court to enter into the same. The only difference agreement will become null and void and of no further
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is effect.”
submitted and approved by the Court, is that the
latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. Ongsingco’s argument loses validity when it is
2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point: considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank “this d ay of O ctober
1963”; and while signed by the parties, it was not This brings us to the plea that the Court of First
notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because
Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of
Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore Josefa Tangco pend-ing settlement in the Rizal Court,
transcribed that of the total consideration of P800,-000 but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose
to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the “pro estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of
rata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja’’ which corresponds to circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by
the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the
that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as
contract entered into with Jose de Borja under date 12 already shown, that eventual share she owned from
October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and the time of Francisco’s death and the Court of Nueva
supersede the separate unformalized agreement with Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her
the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it
resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is
1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088
formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover of the present Civil Code:
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja’s the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
coheirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de provided they do so within the period of one month
Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed of the vendor.”
part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not
be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a
Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 not be forbidden.
days counted from the finality of the order now under Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract
appeal, for the carrying out by the parties of the terms with Jose de Borja (Annex “A”) is void because it
of the contract. amounts to a compromise as to her status and
marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is various reasons restated in the opposition to the
without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the Court’s approval of Annex “A” (Record on Appeal, L-
agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex “A”) describes 20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of
her as “the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
de de Borja”, which is in itself definite admission of her the probate of Francisco de Borja’s will, as required by
civil status. There is nothing in the text of the this Court’s Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex
agreement that would show that this recognition of “A” involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco’s status
Ongsingco’s status as the surviving spouse of as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of
Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of which objections have been already discussed. It was
the cession of her hereditary rights. natural that in view of the widow’s attitude, Jose de
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or
as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction
order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. and enforcement of Annex “A”, since the latter step
832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining
157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October final remedy. That the attempt to reach another
1963 (Annex “A”) had been abandoned, as shown by settlement failed is apparent from the letter of
the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Ongsingco’s counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
1964, had declared that “no amicable settlement had L-28040; and it is more than probable that the order of
been arrived at by the parties’’, and that Jose de Borja 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964
himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that referred to the failure of the parties’ quest for a more
the proposed amicable settlement “had failed to satisfactory compromise, But the inability to reach a
materialize”. novatory accord can not invalidate the original
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable compromise ‘(Annex “A”) and justifies the act of Jose
settlement referred to in the order and motion above- de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its
mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 approval and enforcement from the Court of First
October 1963, which already had been formally signed Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described,
and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed
the record discloses is that some time after its within 120 days from the finality of the order, now
formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to under appeal.
back out from the compromise agreement, pleading
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted favor of its conjugal character established by Article
in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should 160 of the Civil Code.
be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of We are of the opinion that this question as between
First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot
reversed. and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568),
time elapsed in the appeal has affected her upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco’s
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the eventual share in the estate of her late husband,
agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the
the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is accompanying reciprocal quitclaims between the
that her delay in receiving tha payment of the agreed parties. But as the question may affect the rights of
price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still
her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex “A”) she imperative.
had formally entered into with the advice of her It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of
counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in jointly by Fran-cisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and
Di-zon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 Marcelo de Borja, and their title thereto was duly
SCRA 554, that “estates would never be settled if there registered in their names as co-owners in Land
were to be a revaluation with every subsequent Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil.
the estate”, is particularly opposite in the present case. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section
whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper
marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De
husband’s private property (as contended by his second Borja vs. De Borja, 101 Phil. 911, 932).
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part The lot allotted to Francisco was described as—
of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa “Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N.
Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was Marcelo de Borja, O. Laguna de Bay; containing an
adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410.” (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja
Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Inventory that, as executor of ihe estate of his
Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josef a deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special
Tangco (Francisco de Borja’s first wife), seeking to Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of
have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit “2”); and again, in the
private property of Francisco, while in his answer Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in
defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit “7”). Similarly, the
it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor
Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an
presumption established by Article 160 of the inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit “3”) listing
Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the the Jalajala property among the “Conjugal Properties
Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that: of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco”.
“Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of
wife.” Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an
inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for under the heading “Conjugal Property of the Deceased
damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which
as for attorney’s fees. After trial, the Court of First are in the possession of the Administrator of the
Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in
that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Instance of Rizal” (Exhibit “4”).
Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and
property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his the fact that they are plain admissions against interest
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to made by both Francisco de Borja and the
be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
then appealed to this Court. proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts,
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question conjugal community, the Court below declared that the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de
property, but the private exclusive property of the late Borja, since probate courts can not finally determine
Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the questions of ownership of inventoried property, but
following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that
Francisco de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit “F”) Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original
that— Hacienda with his own private funds, for which reason
“He tornado posesion del pedazo de terreno ya that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) property, but as exclusive property of the buyer,
adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de pursuant to Article 1396 (4) of the Civil Code of 1889
Jalajala, Rizal).” and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
“The following shall be the exclusive property of each
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of spouse:
Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been
bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
amount P25,-100 was contributed by Bernardo de
Borja and P15,000.00 by Marcelo de Borja; that upon “(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money
receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial of the wife or of the husband.” We find the conclusions
treasurer for realty taxes in the sum of P17,000, of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place,
Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son witness Gregorio de Borja’s testimony as to the source
of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain
Bernardo’s assent to the proposal, Marcelo issued a hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value,
check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
that the amount would represent Francisco’s had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of
contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
witness further testified that— Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead
“Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement
to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a itself is improbable, since there was no need or
bachelor and which he derived from his business occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio
transactions.” (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the
13-15) (Italics supplied) P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality
is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio’s
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco’s testimony.
sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the
As to Francisco de Borja’s affidavit, Exhibit “F”, the No error having been assigned against the ruling of
quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly the lower court that claims for damages should be
demonstrate that the “mi terreno personal y exclusivo ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for
(Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal)” refers precisely to the the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same
Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and requires no pronouncement from this Court.
4) disclose that there were two real properties in IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed
Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
m., assessed at P44-600, and a much bigger one of No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved
1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and
de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana
affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit “F”) refer to? In Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
addition, Francisco’s characterization of the land as Concepcion,
“mi terreno personal y exclusivo” is plainly self- C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo
serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross , Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,
examination. JJ.,concur. Fernando, J., did not take part.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by
defendant-appellant (Exhibits “2”, “3”, “4” and “7”) are Order in Case No. L-28040 affirmed; those in Cases
not conclusive on the conjugal character of the Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 reversed and set aside.
property in question ; but as already noted, they are Notes.—On the matter of the share of the heir before
clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the fined liquidation of the estate.—The participation of an
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, heir in an estate under judicial administration,
Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater although indeterminable before the final liquidation of
probative weight than the self-serving statement of the estate, may be attached and sold. While ordinary
Francisco (Exhibit “F”). Plainly, the legal presumption execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in
in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de order to avoid interference with the possession by the
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been court, yet the sale made by an heir of his share in an
rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the inheritance, subject to the result of the pending
appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
de Jala-jala (Poblacion) declared property of the administration and, is therefore, valid, with the
conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josef a understanding, however, that it would be effective only
Tangco. as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon
the partition of the property under
administration. Borja vs. Mencias, L-20609, November proceedings in action which survives death of said
29, 1967, 21 SCRA 11331135. plaintiff.—While it is true that a person who is dead
Whatever rights, interest, and participation belong cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
to respondent in the real properties under judicial heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
administration in the special proceedings—which have Same; Same; Duty of attorney upon death of
been properly levied upon pursuant to the writ of party.—The Rules of Court prescribes the procedure
execution issued in the civil case—may be sold in whereby a party who died during the pendency of the
accordance with law, with the understanding that the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule
sale is not of any definite and fixed share in any 3 of the Rules of Court “whenever party to a pending
particular property, but only of what might be case dies x x x it shall be the duty of his attorney to
adjudicated to respondent upon the final liquidation of inform the court promptly of such death x x x and to
the estate. The sale, once made, shall be submitted to give the name and residence of his executor,
the probate court with jurisdiction over the special administrator, guardian or other legal
proceedings for proper consideration upon the final representatives.”
liquidation of said estate. Id., p. 1135. ___________________
3 * FIRST DIVISION
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were 4. Aniceta Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died
heard jointly, the following facts were established: ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B.
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
husband and wife (the latter having predeceased the following children:
former), were survived by their eight (8) children,
namely, 1. a.Aniceta Ocampo Castro
Jose Ma. Borromeo 2. b.Ramon Ocampo
Cosme Borromeo 3. c.Lourdes Ocampo
Pantaleon Borromeo 4. d.Elena Ocampo, all living, and
Vito Borromeo 5. e.Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased),
Paulo Borromeo survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.
Anecita Borromeo
Quirino Borromeo and 5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo,
Julian Borromeo died before the war and left the following children:
1. a.Marcial Borromeo 7. hh.Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
2. b.Carlos Borromeo, who died on Jan. 18, 1965,
survived by his wife, Remedios Alfonso, and his 1. c.Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam. 2. d.Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6,1946
3. c.Asuncion Borromeo 3. e.Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923,
4. d.Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948. but survived by his children:
5. e.Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
6. f.Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925. 1. aa.Maria Borromeo Atega
2. bb.Luz Borromeo
The last three died leaving no issue. 3. cc.Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito 4. dd.Rosario Borromeo
Borromeo, died before the war and left the following 5. ee.Fe Borromeo Queroz
children:
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of
1. a.Exequiel Borromeo, who died on December the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the following,
29,1949 to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of
2. b.Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, the deceased Vito Borromeo:
leaving the following children:
1. 1.Jose Cuenco Borromeo
1. aa.Federico Borromeo 2. 2.Judge Crispin Borromeo
3. 3.Vitaliana Borromeo
177 4. 4.Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 177 5. 5.Salud Borromeo
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo 6. 6.Asuncion Borromeo
7. 7.Marcial Borromeo
1. bb.Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 8. 8.Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
85) 9. 9.The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
2. cc.Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
3. dd.Jose Borromeo The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate
4. ee.Consuelo Borromeo estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and
5. ff.Pilar Borromeo 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
6. gg.Salud Borromeo
shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was
heirs. already barred by the order of the court dated April 12,
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal
the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court
agreement of partition of the properties of the dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for
trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to
same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato
At- changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the
178 estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose
ty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo,
deceased in the way and manner they are divided and Patrocinio BorromeoHerrera, Marcial Borromeo,
partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo
further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam.
and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to
fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
portion. motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court,
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take
Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver
that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was
Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same
of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs is void having been executed before the distribu-
made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of 179
the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 179
legitime like all other forced heirs. As an Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was tion of the estate and before the acceptance of the
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent
of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. for lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement
court concluding that the five declared heirs who was brought out.
signed the waiver agreement assigning their It is further argued by the petitioner that the
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the document entitled "Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
estate of Vito Borromeo. cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo,
denied on July 7, 1975. is without force and effect because there can be no
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
annul and set aside the trial court's order dated been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs
December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato intend to
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo 180
and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion f or 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
reconsideration. Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid,
respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a the person must be certain of the death of the one from
money claim against the decedent but a claim for whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
properties, real and personal, which constitute all of inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were
the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs not certain of their right to the inheritance until they
who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
claim of the private respondent under the waiver uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is
agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which
to that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He directs heirs, devisees, and legatees to signify their
alleges that the claim of the private respondent under acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the
the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time court has issued an order for the distribution of the
allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only estate.
sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,
of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
(April 30, 1969), the approval of the agreement of there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir
partition and an order directing the administrator to before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What
partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere is required is that he must first be certain of the death
of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of
points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed
document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less,
waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was time may elapse from the moment of the death of the
already dead as well as of their rights to the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself. hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial retro acts to the moment of the death, in accordance
court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested,
hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio
took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The
properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in
partition of the properties of the estate needing 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was
approval of the court because it was executed in the issued only in 1969.
course of the proceedings. He further maintains that In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of
the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are
remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge
same. of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53
hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging right or advantage must be shown clearly and
to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by convincingly, and when the only proof of intention
fiction of law continue the personality of the former. rests in what a party does, his act should be so
Nor do such properties have the character of future manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent
property, because the heirs acquire a right to to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
succession from advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his
181 conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v.
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 181 Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo The circumstances of this case show that the
signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their others, signed a document entitled Deed of
rights. Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967, Fortunato, Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
the amicable settlement of the case. In that participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for
(8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same
personal and real, including all cash and sums of date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and
money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned
October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of
any action then pending in the Court of First Instance Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in
of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration
them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of
respondent recognizes and concedes that the Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
petitioner, like Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15,
182 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED on March 24, 1969.
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold
the other signatories to the waiver document, is an that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that
the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court
Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as
now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of
there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-
and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer 18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the
to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to lower court filing claims or petitions alleging
them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in
executed an Agreement on how the estate they exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or
inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court
Partition was approved by the trial court on August extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the right was not only null and void ab initio but was
settlement of inexistent.
183 With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 183 appellants contend that without any formal pleading
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the
the estate. approval of the waiver agreement and without notice
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the to the parties concerned, two things which are
trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby SET necessary so that the lower court would be vested with
ASIDE. authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the
G.R. No. 55000 validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and
Appeals from an order of the Court of First Instance of without asking for the requisite pleading. This
Cebu, Branch II, dated December 24, 1974, declaring resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of
the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. December 24, 1974, which approved the validity of the
41171 valid. The appellate court certified this case to waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this
this Court as the questions raised are all of law. constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the 184
waiver agreement but they also question the 184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo. The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by
The appellants argue that when the waiver of waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato
hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document
Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by
any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the virtue of the same act, they lost their rights because
deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right the rights from that moment on became vested in
was only acquired and owned by them on April Fortunato Borromeo.
10,1969, when the estate was ordered distributed. It is also argued by the appellee that under Article
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to
is no such contract of waiver of hereditary right in the be declared as heir first before he can accept or
present case because there was no object, which is repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he
hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to
said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time
of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, various properties in consideration for the heirs giving
the signatories to the waiver document were certain to the respondent and to
that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were 185
also certain of their right to the inheritance as shown VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 185
by the waiver document itself. Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14)
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July
because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already
jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts waived or sold their hereditary rights to the
that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an respondent.
order specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver The agreement on how the estate is to be
document to submit their comments within ten days distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the
from notice and setting the same for hearing on deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation
September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all
claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no argue against the purported waiver of hereditary
question of title to property and, therefore, the probate rights.
court can decide the question. Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have
The issues in this case are similar to the issues already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court
raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this case, acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction
are contesting the validity of the trial court's order extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo settlement of the estate.
under the waiver agreement. The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of G.R. No. 62895
hereditary rights can not be validated. The essential A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul
elements of a waiver, especially the clear and M. Sesbreno, representative of some of the heirs-
convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, distributees, praying for the immediate closure of
are not found in this case. Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both
settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate heirs motions were grounded on the fact that there was
nothing more to be done after the payment of all the
obligations of the estate since the order of partition the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all
and distribution had long become final. incidents previously set in his court in an order dated
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and
failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid motions, restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals
petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo filed a petition for enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30,
respondent judge to terminate and close Special 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Proceedings No. 916-R. Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
was due to pending motions to compel the petitioner, Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its
as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus
in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased
that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance in the way and manner they are divided and
of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and
the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9
186 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and reserved
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED for attorney's fees.
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco
for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G.R. No.
merit. Hence, this petition. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following
respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28, 1972 circumstances:
for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot
be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory 1. 1.The court's determination of the market value
and accounting because the latter motion was filed of the estate in order to segregate the 40%
only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then reserved for attorney's fees;
Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to 2. 2.The order of December 24, 1974, declaring
decide or resolve a case or matter within three months Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9 of
from the date of its submission. the estate because of the waiver agreement
The respondents contend that the motion to close signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group
the administration had already been resolved when
which is still pending resolution by this Court 1. 1.G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting
(G.R. No. 41171); aside the Order of the trial court dated
3. 3.The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco December 24, 1974;
Borromeo to 2. 2.G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for
review seeking to modify the decision of the
187 Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 187 disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo Burgos from further hearing the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the
1. render his accounting; and remand of the case to the Executive Judge of
2. 4.The claim of Tarcela Villegas for 1/2 of the the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling;
estate causing annotations of notices of lis and
pendens on the different titles of the properties 3. 3.G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to
of the estate. restrain the respondents from further acting on
any and all incidents in Special Proceedings
Since there are still real properties of the estate that No. 916-R because of the affirmation of the
were not yet distributed to some of the declared heirs, decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending in G.R. No. 63818." the trial court may now
resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its terminate and close Special Proceedings No.
resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the 916-R, subject to the submission of an
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, to expedite inventory of the real properties of the estate
the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and an accounting of the cash and bank
and ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco deposits by the petitioner, as co-administrator
Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of of the estate, if he has not yet done so, as
the estate and to render an accounting of cash and required by this Court in its Resolution dated
bank deposits realized from rents of several properties. June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed deliberate speed.
in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in: 188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
G.R. No. 63818 contempt because, among others, Atty.
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding
and Petra O. Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in Judge stands to receive 'fat commission' from
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty.
presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being
the judge from further acting in Special Proceedings declared in contempt of court with the dim
No. 916-R. The movants alleged, among others, the prospect of suspension from the practice of his
following: profession. But obviously to extricate himself
xxx xxx xxx from the prospect of contempt and suspension,
Atty. Sesbreno chose repproachment and
1. "6.To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et
Antigua filed a motion for the production of the al., who, together, continued to harass
certificates of title and to deposit the same with administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the
ready inspection of interested buyers. Said xxx xxx xxx
motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its
order of October 2, 1978 which, however, 1. "9.The herein movants are informed and so they
became the subject of various motions for allege, that a brother of the Hon. Presiding
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L.
contended that as owners they cannot be Antigua.
deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons 2. "10.There is now a clear tug of war between
advanced by Atty. Antigua. In view of the Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the
motions for reconsideration, Atty. Antigua sale of the entire estate or to buy out the
ultimately withdraw his motions for production individual heirs, on the one hand, and the
of titles. herein movants, on the
2. "7.The incident concerning the production of
titles triggered another incident involving Atty. 189
Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 189
herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
Amelinda B. Talam. In connection with said
incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which 1. other, who are not willing to sell their
the Hon. Presiding Judge considered direct distributive shares under the terms and
conditions presently proposed. In this tug of In the appellate court, the private respondents
war, a pattern of harassment has become alleged, among others, the following:
apparent against the herein movants, xxx xxx xxx
especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
harassments employed by Atty. Antigua et al. 1. "16.With all due respect, petitioners regret the
are the pending motions for the removal of necessity of having to state herein that
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has
subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which shown undue interest in pursing the sale
seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al.
account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon.
other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of
hereof. More harassment motions are expected Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
until the herein movants shall finally yield to 2. "17.Evidently, the proposed sale of the entire
the proposed sale. In such a situation, the properties of the estate cannot be legally done
herein movants beg for an entirely independent without the conformity of the heirsdistributees
and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of because the certificates of title are already
said incidents. registered in their names. Hence, in pursuit of
2. "11.Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco
sit and take cognizance of this proceeding, P. Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell
including the incidents above-mentioned, he is the entire property based on the rationale that
liable to be misunderstood as being biased in proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will
favor of Atty. Antigua, et al. and prejudiced earn interest more than the present income of
against the herein movants. Incidents which the so called estate. Most of the heirs-
may create this impression need not be distributees, however, have been timid to say
enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo) their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by
petitioner
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge
Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration 190
having been denied, the private respondents filed a 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
preliminary injunction before the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to stand Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo.
up and refusethe proposal to sell clearly favored by Similar claims by the other lawyers were
respondent Hon. Francisco P.Burgos. resolved by respondent after petitioners
refused the proposed sale." (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
"20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its
the merits of the shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or
Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in the prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P.
court below which smack of harassment against the Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the
incidents, petitioners respectfully contend that it is transmission of the records of the case to the Executive
highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R reraffling.
by reason of the following circumstances: A motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the appellate court on April 11, 1983. Hence,
1. "(a)He has shown undue interest in the sale of the present petition for review seeking to modify the
the properties as initiated by Atty. Domingo L. decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as
Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of it disqualifies and in-
respondent. 191
2. "(b)The proposed sale cannot be legally done VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 191
without the conformity of the heirs- Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
distributees, and petitioners have openly hibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing
refused the sale, to the great disappointment of
the case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and
respondent. orders the remand of the case to the Executive Judge
3. "(c)The shotgun motion of Atty. Antigua and of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
similar incidents are clearly intended to harass The principal issue in this case has become moot
and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco and academic because Judge Francisco P. Burgos
Borromeo in order to pressure him into
decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
acceding to the proposed sale. sometime before the latest reorganization of the
4. "(d)Respondent has shown bias and prejudice judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its merits
against petitioners by failing to resolve the for the guidance of the judge to whom this case will be
claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In
Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that Judge order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by
Burgos has never shown unusual interest in the Domingo L. An-
proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in 192
favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at tigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979.
administrator to sell so much of the properties of the During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr.,
estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers- offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees
claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos presumably to cover up the projected sale initiated by
would have been unreasonable because his orders Atty. Antigua.
against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as On March 2, 1979, or two days after the
administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner Domingo
the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be
They claim that the respondent court should also have required to file an inventory when he has already filed
taken judicial notice of the resolution of this Court one to account for cash, a report on which the
directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement administrators had already rendered; and to appear
and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted
finally, they state that the disqualification of Judge by Judge Burgos. It was also prayed that
Burgos would delay further the closing of the subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,
is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose
case. Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo
had been harassed, countered that Judge Burgos Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana
appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion
estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a
out to make an accounting of what he was supposed to request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to
have received as rentals for the land upon which the the Manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., Inc.;
Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for
February, 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces twelve years, he had not done anything towards the
tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo. closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by
a subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of the bank, petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos
the Register of Deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at
of Deeds for the Province of Cebu, and to Jose Cuenco 15 million pesos.
Borromeo. The allegations of the private respondents in their
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty. Gaudioso motion for inhibition, more specifically, the insistence
V. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at
Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty. P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected,
Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the
filing a motion for relief of the administrator. part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request case of Bautista v. Rebueno (81 SCRA 535), this Court
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to private stated:
respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and "x x x The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust
produce all the owners' copies of the titles in the court and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself
presided over by Judge Burgos. above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of
Consequently, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well
subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative
Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court. but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be
193 legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 193 circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo honest actuations and probity in favor of either party,
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
1979 but on May 14, 1979, before the date of the careful self-examination. He should exercise his
hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts
private respondents' motion for reconsideration and of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the
the motion to quash the subpoena. Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify
It was further argued by the private respondents himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his
that if Judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.
disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there What is more important, the ideal of impartial
would be a miscarriage of justice because for the past administration of justice is lived up to."
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private The petitioners further argue that the present
respondents is based on sound reasons. As earlier status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R requires only
stated, however, the petition for review seeking to the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate claimants who were individually hired by their
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the In- be legally charged against their respective clients and
194 not against the estate.
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED On the other hand, the respondents maintain that
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo the petition is a dilatory one and barred by res
testate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the judicatabecause this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No.
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the 54232directed the respondent Judge to expedite the
Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate.
for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself has They claim that this resolution, which was already
become moot and academic. final and executory, was in effect reversed and
G.R. No. 65995 nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in its
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from case—ACG.R. No. SP-11145—when it granted the
further acting on any and all incidents in Special petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and
Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking
petition and G.R. No. 63818. They also pray that all further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as
acts of the respondents related to the said special well as ordering the transmission of the records of the
proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983,
declared null and void and without force and effect which was ap-
whatsoever. 195
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 195
set for hearing all incidents in Special Proceedings No. Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
916-R, including the reversion from the heirs- pealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review
distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties (G.R. No. 63818).
already titled in their names as early as 1970, We agree with the petitioners' contention that
notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but
before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818. of the individual heirs who individually hired their
respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order
of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly directing the Executive Judge of the Regional
excessive amount of 40% of the market value of the Trial Court of Cebu to reraffle the case shall be
estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and implemented;
paid should be deleted. 4. (4)In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the GRANTED. The issue seeking to restrain
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting
grant the petition. in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC;
WHEREFORE, 5. (5)In G.R. No. 62895, the trial court is hereby
ordered to speedily terminate the close Special
1. (1)In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
respondent judge dated December 24, 1974, submission of an inventory of the real
declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the properties of the estate and an accounting of
estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order the cash and bank deposits
dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the 196
aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
for being NULL and VOID; Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo
2. (2)In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court
declaring the waiver document valid is hereby 1. by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as
SET ASIDE; required by this Court in its Resolution dated
3. (3)In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby June 15, 1983; and
DENIED. The issue in the decision of the 2. (6)The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969,
Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying segregating 40% of the market value of the
and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken
P. Burgos from further hearing Special and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED.
Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and The lawyers should collect from the
academic. The judge who has taken over the heirsdistributees who individually hired them,
sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall attorney's fees according to the nature of the
immediately conduct hearings with a view to services rendered but in amounts which should
terminating the proceedings. In the event that not exceed more than 20% of the market value
the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the of the property the latter acquired from the
order of the Intermediate Appellate Court estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,
Fernan (Chairman), No part. I appeared as CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
counsel for one of the parties. ORFINADA, respondents.
In G.R. Nos. 41171 and 55000, orders set aside; G.R. Remedial Law; Actions; Party-in-interest; Pending
No. 63818, petition denied; G.R. No. 65995, petition the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
granted. without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in
Notes.—Although it is true that final orders in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with
probate cases partake the nature of a judgment in the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code.—
rem, binding upon the whole world, it does not follow Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the
therefrom that said final orders, like any other heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring
judgment or final order, cannot within the statutory suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
period of prescription, be annulled upon the ground of accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
extrinsic fraud. (Vda. de Serrano us. Court of Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are
Appeals, 33 SCRA 865.) transmitted from the moment of the death of the
In extrajudicial partition, court approved is decedent.” The provision in turn is the foundation of
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court the principle that the property, rights and obligations
of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person
persons, by the mere act of assignment and are transmitted through his death to another or others
desistance. (Gutierrez us. Villegas, 5 SCRA 313.) by his will or by operation of law.
Same; Same; Same; Court recognized the legal
——o0o—— standing of the heirs to represent the rights and
properties of the decedent under administration
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED pending the appointment of an administrator.—Even if
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals administration proceedings have already been
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004.* commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the
EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of
UNGOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this
ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to
represent the rights and properties of the decedent City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow,
under administration pending the appointment of an respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married
administrator. on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children
who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and Orfinada, Alfonso “Clyde” P. Orfinada, Nancy P.
resolution of the Court of Appeals. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Albino (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.4
V. Gonzales for petitioners. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the
decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
_______________
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who
* SECOND DIVISION. became a part of his life when he entered into an
55 extra-marital relationship with her during the
VOL. 419, JANUARY 13, 2004 55 subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica,5 Alberto and
Rowena.6
Rivera, Perico & David Law Office for private
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James
respondents.
and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29,
TINGA, J.: 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property
of the estate pending the appointment of an _______________
administrator is the issue in this case. 1 Rollo, pp. 17-20.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 2Id., at pp. 21-22.
45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the 3Id., at p. 95.
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 4Ibid.
42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as 5 The Complaint for Annulment/Rescission of the
itsResolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of a Deceased
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Person dated December 2, 1995 contains an allegation
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died
under paragraph 9 that Veronica is not one of the
without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal
illegitimate children of the decedent Alfonso P.
and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan
Orfinada, Jr. by Teodora Riofero but of one Alonzo City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42,
Orfinada. Dagupan City.9
6 Rollo, p. 95. On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed
56 their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the defense that the property subject of the contested
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving properties originally belonging to the parents of
the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were
Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the
Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. decedent had managed to register them in his
63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora name.11Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense
Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest
Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in
also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a view of the pendency of the administration
loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed
Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on
Mortgage over the properties subject of the the aforesaid ground.
extrajudicial settlement.7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso “Clyde” _______________
P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of 7Id., at pp. 95-96.
Administrationdocketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before 8Id., at p. 96.
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that 9Id., at pp. 28-37.
letters of administration encompassing the estate of 10 CA Rollo, p. 38.
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.8 11Id., at p. 10.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed 12Id., at p. 38.
a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra 13 Rollo, pp. 107-108.
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
57
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
VOL. 419, JANUARY 13, 2004 57
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals
and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent
absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the
in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative
reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16 defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of from the Rules of Court, thus:
Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. _______________
42053.17Petitioners averred that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order
14 CA Rollo, pp. 113-116.
15Id., at pp. 32-34.
which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground
16Id., at pp. 39-40.
that the proper party to file the complaint for the
17Id., at pp. 1-12.
annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
18Id., at p. 7.
of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not
19 Rollo, pp. 17-20.
the respondents.18
20Id., at pp. 21-22.
The Court of Appeals rendered the
21Id., at p. 124.
assailed Decision dated January 31, 1997, stating
19
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid 51765, 269 SCRA 1, 12 (1997).
on the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing 24Supranote 22.