It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed
property. The first survey[14] was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the
[G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998]
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO
LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO,respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592 square-meter
parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on
certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court
of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 [1] ruled in favor of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio,
adjudging them as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more
or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate
occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land
containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same under pretext of
ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the
5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest,[2] Pablo Espinosa on
August 10, 1981.
[3]
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner , asserting that no controversy had
sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico
Laurio.[4] This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in
1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioners property was the old
Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the
course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of petitioners property,
thus converting the old river into a riceland.[5]
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioners claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land remained
unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner first
declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916, [6] which showed that the land had an area
of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership
of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by
Agapito de la Cruz.[7] Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to
Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339[8] was issued in her favor. In compliance
with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale[9] on August
24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720. [10] However, the
property remained in petitioners hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to
Espinosa[11] who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 12311. [12] Consequently, the property
became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosas wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her
heirs executed an instrument denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the
5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent [13] in consideration of the
amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all
these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax
Declaration No. 2916 under petitioners name.
lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioners
allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares,
the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left
with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the
discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest [15] before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing
a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were
suspended because of the instant case.[16]
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida
Zaragoza,[17] the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The property involved
is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301 [18] and as bounded on the
North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by
Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding
share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement[19] petitioners share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that
petitioner encroached upon his (Laurios) property and declared it a part of his inheritance. [20] The boundaries were
likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South
by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong. [21] Private respondent accordingly
denied that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from
Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug[22]because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. [23]
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true and absolute
owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private respondents title and ownership over the
property and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the
same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have
outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real
property.[24] The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are
exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same
action.[25]
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action
under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding beclouded the plaintiffs title over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants
(respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern
portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same:
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorneys fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or
preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court
should declare him the true and absolute owner thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as
clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one
for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to
the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, in bad
faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which
extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary
between the properties.[26] Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a
boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private
respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the
Court are apropos:
x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the
determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some
of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners interest or title in and to said
property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership
may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the `instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in
Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. [27]
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of title, still, the
instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such
factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record
or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. [28] Upon an examination of the records, the Court
finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed the 5.5-hectare
land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were
transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosas rights of ownership over the land ceased and were
transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and
to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. [29] In the case
at bar, petitioners claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land
when he sold it to private respondents predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty
(20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership and other real
rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, this provision
of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith).[30] The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[31] For purposes of prescription, there is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. [32]
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the
trial court, the plaintiffs admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and
thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore
tantamount to bad faith.[33] To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex
dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary
acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
states that (o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Petitioners alleged possession in 1962 up to
September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This
period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, [34] the
tax declaration in his name,[35] the commissioners report on the relocation survey,[36] and the survey
plan.[37] Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over
Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper containing a
statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.[38] A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is
an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself
in severalty a part of the common estate.[39] Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it
is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. [40]
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28,
paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that
private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of
property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. [41] A survey plan not verified and approved by said
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence
without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative
value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court
cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the
parties.[42]
Similarly, petitioners tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed
ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
ownership.[43] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.[44] Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little
value in proving ones ownership. [45] Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioners tax declaration and the
commissioners report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration
No. 8717 states that petitioners property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to
the commissioned geodetic engineers survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy
of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private respondents claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration
No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the
commissioners report.
There is also nothing in the commissioners report that substantiates petitioners claim that the disputed land
was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower courts statement in its decision[46] that as reflected in the
commissioners report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of
the defendants(Exhibit 2)[47] or the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this
statement is found in the summary of defendants (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918
may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the defendants assertion
that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
misapprehended the lower courts decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorneys fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds
no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad
faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in order. [48] This pronouncement finds support in Art.
2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same
Code. This article states that (a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The moral damages are hereby
increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorneys fees is justified
because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action. [49]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 33652. February 24, 1931.]
LI SENG GIAP Y CIA., Applicant-Appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ET AL., oppositors. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Appellant.
Agustin Lukban and Marcos Coo Tauco for applicant-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Oppositor-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; PUBLIC STREET; ENCROACHMENT ON NAVIGABLE STREAM. — Under a deed purporting to
convey about 600 square meters, comprising the site of an old warehouse, the applicant in a land registration
proceeding sought to register not only said site but a parcel containing an additional area of about 2,000 square
meters. It appeared that part of this larger parcel covered a considerable area which had formerly been used for a
public street, and which, subsequent to its abandonment as such, had been taken care of by the municipal
authorities as public property. Another part of the parcel of which registration was sought consisted of an
encroachment on the waters of a navigable river, made by filling in ground previously covered at high tide by water
from the sea. Held, that the applicant had proved title only to the parcel comprising the site of the old warehouse
and was entitled to have only said site registered.
DECISION
STREET, J.:
This case involves cross appeals brought respectively by the applicant, Li Seng Giap y Cia., on the one hand, and the
Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Director of Lands, on the other, with respect to the
disposition made of lot No. 4 in expediente No. 129, G. L. R. O. Record No. 31548, of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, whereby said lot was adjudicated to the applicant with the exception of a part covered by a pier
extending into Mercedes River, in the municipal limits of Daet, which portion was declared to be Government
property. The case also involves an appeal of the same applicant, Li Seng Giap y Cia., whereby the said applicant
seeks to reverse an order of the same court disallowing its application with respect to lot 8 in the same expediente,
and declaring said property to be forest land and as such property of the Government.
The applicant deraigns its title through several parties, namely, directly from Vicente Madrigal, who acquired the
property from Urrutia y Cia., who in turn purchased it from one Francisco Arana. To go no farther back than a deed
from Madrigal to the applicant dated February 21, 1924, we note that Madrigal conveyed to the applicant a parcel of
land 39.5 yards in length by 19 yards in breadth, that is to say, a total area of less than 600 square meters. The lot
actually surveyed as lot 4 and claimed by the applicant contains 2,801 square meters, and although the description
given in the deed describes a lot running out to the pier, it nevertheless clearly appears that said description
includes land to which the vendor really had no title. In the first place, the property which was originally at the heart
of this holding is the land covered by an old bodega, indicated in Exhibit 1, of the Director of Lands. Separating that
lot from the lot now covered by plaintiff’s new camarin is the heading of a street, formerly making part of the
provincial road to Daet, but for a number of years past the road has been diverted from this head, apparently by the
erosion of the river, so that the road now passes around the old bodega instead of running between the old bodega
and the sea. But the land thus left out of the street has been taken care of by the municipality at public expense.
Evidently this parcel was no part of the land belonging to the owner of the old bodega. The particular ground
covered by the new camarin in immediate juxtaposition to the pier (pantalan) was years ago the site of a shed built
of light materials. Access to the pier was had over this lot by the public over a narrow way, but since the building of
the new camarin by the applicant, the path leading to the pier along the side of the new camarin is much restricted.
Moreover, in building the new camarin the proof shows satisfactorily that there has been an encroachment of several
meters on the waters of the Mercedes River, where the pier is built. This encroachment was effected by filling in with
rubble and building the new camarin over the extension. From the proof it is clear that at high tide the waters from
the sea came in and inundated part of the space now covered by the new camarin. It results that the applicant has
proved title only to the site of the old bodega, conforming to the space covered by lot 2 in Exhibit 1 of the Director
of Lands, and with respect to the other land now comprising lot 4 the applicant’s title is not made out.
The judgment as to lot 4 will therefore be reversed and the order for the registration of lot 4 in the name of the
applicant is vacated, with leave, however, to the petitioner to reform his plan, with the result of including therein the
lot actually covered by the old bodega, and upon the submission of such plan, the court will allow the lot to be
registered in the name of the applicant. As to lot 8 the judgment is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against Li Seng
Giap y Cia.

To deal first with lot 8 with respect to which the applicant alone appeals, we note that this lot contains an area of
more than 459 hectares. The proof shows that this property is virgin forest covered with trees and forest growth.
Some of the trees upon it are from 200 to 300 years old, and it has never been reduced to cultivation, being more
valuable for forest than agricultural purposes. In years past the Bureau of Forestry has been issuing permits to
various persons to cut wood on this tract of land, and in particular, in 1925, Esteban Abo cut trees under such a
permit on this property without being disturbed by any one.

The supposed right of the applicant is based upon a possessory information begun December 31, 1895, and
approved October 15, 1896, in the name of Rufino Mabesa. It is evident that this document cannot have the effect
conceded to a possessory information obtained within the period limited by the royal decree of February 13, 1894.
No sufficient proof is made with respect to the possession of this parcel by the applicant or its predecessors in
interest. Inasmuch also as the property is forest land, it was not susceptible of private appropriation under existing
laws, nor was its inclusion in the old possessory document justified under the prior laws, which prohibited the
alienation of forest lands. We note further that the tract in question is vastly larger than the land included in the
possessory information relied upon. The trial court committed no error in denying the application for the registration
of this lot in the name of the petitioner.

With respect to lot 4 both parties have appealed, but the appeal interposed in behalf of the applicant relates only to
the area covered by the pier (pantalan) which the trial court excluded from registration, while the appeal of the
Attorney-General, interposed in behalf of the Government, covers a respectable part of the lot 4. At the outset we
note that the appealed decision states that the Government presented no proof in support of its opposition with
respect to lot 4. This is a mistake, since the Government presented three witnesses whose testimony consists of
thirty pages of the transcription, in addition to which the Government presented several exhibits. The oversight of
the trial judge in failing to take account of this proof deprives his finding of the weight to which it would ordinarily be
entitled.
 QRSI defaulted in the payment of its mortgage indebtedness to GSIS, leading to the foreclosure of the
mortgages. The properties were sold at public auction, with GSIS emerging as the highest bidder. On 10 April 1986,
Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of GSIS.
ALEJANDRO B. TY and INTERNATIONAL REALTY G.R. No. 173158
CORPORATION, QRSI failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the one-year redemption period, allowing GSIS to
Petitioners, consolidate its ownership thereof. TCTs No. T-230070, No. T-230071, No. T-230072 and No. T-225212 were, thus,
Present: issued in the name of GSIS.

- versus - CORONA, J., Thereupon, GSIS entered into a joint venture agreement with respondent New San Jose Builders, Inc.
Chairperson, (NSJBI) for the development of the properties. NSJBI subsequently commenced construction and development works
CHICO-NAZARIO, thereon.
QUEENS ROW SUBDIVISION, INC., NEW SAN VELASCO, JR.,
JOSE BUILDERS, INC., GOVERNMENT SERVICE NACHURA, and On 8 November 1993, petitioners counsel, through a letter, demanded that GSIS and NSJBI vacate the
INSURANCE SYSTEM and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PERALTA, JJ. subject properties.
CAVITE,
Respondents. On 7 August 1994, Ty and IRC each filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud
from Real Property against respondents with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, this time impleading all respondents, QRSI,
Promulgated: GSIS, NSJBI, and the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The cases were docketed as Civil Case No. BSC 94-2 and Civil
Case No. 94-3. The cases were consolidated under Branch 20 of said court.
December 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x On 18 November 1997, the RTC of Imus, Cavite, rendered its Joint Decision dismissing the complaints.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62610 and was
DECISION raffled to the Seventh Division. On 31 January 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the Joint
Decision of the RTC. On 29 June 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Petitioners.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Hence, this Petition, wherein petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 31 January 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62610 and the Resolution of the same Court dated 29 July 2006 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration. Said Decision affirmed the Joint Decision dated 18 November 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite dismissing the separate Complaints for Declaratory Relief filed by petitioners
Alejandro B. Ty and International Realty Corporation (IRC).
The facts of the case are as follows:
I.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT GSIS, BEING A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, IS CHARGED WITH THE DUTY
TO EXERCISE MORE CARE AND PRUDENCE IN DEALING WITH REGISTERED LANDS FOR ITS
BUSINESS IS ONE AFFECTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST KEEPING IN TRUST MONEY BELONGING
TO ITS MEMBERS AND SHOULD GUARD AGAINST LOSSES AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT INVOKE
THE PROTECTED MANTLE OF LAND REGISTRATION STATUTE (ACT 496).

Petitioner Ty is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3967.Petitioner IRC, on the other hand, is the registered owner of three
parcels of land situated in the same barangay covered by TCTs No. T-1510, No. T-3617 and No. T-3618. The four
titles were issued to petitioners sometime in 1960 and 1961.
In 1970, respondent Queens Row Subdivision, Inc. (QRSI) was issued TCTs No. T-54188, No. T-54185,
No. T-54186 and No. T-54187, covering exactly the same areas and containing the same technical descriptions as
those embraced in the titles of petitioners.
II.
THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS BEING SUPERIOR TO THAT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT QUEENS
ROW, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE REMAINED UNAFFECTED AND
PETITIONERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL, MUCH LESS
PRESCRIPTION.[2]

On 29 June 1971, mortgages entered into by QRSI in favor of respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) were annotated at the back of the four titles of QRSI.

In October 1973, petitioners Ty and IRC instituted with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bacoor, Cavite four Complaints for the cancellation of the four aforementioned certificates of title of QRSI,
impleading only the latter and the Register of Deeds. GSIS was not impleaded, despite the fact that the mortgage in
its favor had already been annotated in the subject titles. The Complaints were docketed as Civil Cases No. B-44,
No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49. Petitioners did not move to have a notice of lis pendens annotated in the subject
titles.
On 8 December 1980, the CFI of Bacoor, Cavite, rendered a Decision declaring that Tys certificate of title,
TCT No. 3967, was validly issued, and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel QRSIs TCT No. 54188 for being
void. On 20 December 1985, the same CFI rendered a Joint Decision ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel QRSIs
TCTs No. T-54185, No. T-54186 and No. T-54187. Both Decisions were rendered for failure of respondent QRSI to
appear at pre-trial despite filing an Answer to the Complaints.
Innocent Purchaser for Value
In the first issue raised by petitioners, they assail the finding of the Court of Appeals that GSIS was an
innocent purchaser for value. The appellate court held:
The records clearly show that the mortgages entered into by Queens Row and GSIS
were already inscribed on the formers titles on June 29, 1971 as shown by the entries appearing
at the back of TCT Nos. T-54188, T-54185, T-54186 and T-54187, even before Civil Cases Nos.
B-44, 45, 48 and 49 were instituted. In spite of this, petitioners-appellants (plaintiffs then) did
not implead the GSIS as a party to the complaints. Moreso, no adverse claim or notice of lis
pendens was annotated by petitioners-appellants on the titles of Queens Row during the
pendency of these cases. To make matters worse, as earlier stated, petitioners-appellants, after
securing favorable decisions against Queens Row, did not enforce the same for more than ten
(10) years. By their inaction, the efficacy of the decisions was rendered at naught.

Verily, a buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property. In the instant case, the GSIS clearly had no
notice of any defect, irregularity or encumbrance in the title of Queens Row when the latter
mortgaged the subject property. Neither did GSIS have any knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should have put it on inquiry, requiring it to go [beyond] the certificate of
title. Obviously, GSIS was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith at the time it
acquired the subject property.[3]
Petitioners claim that since GSIS is a financial institution, it is charged with the duty to exercise more care
and prudence in dealing with registered lands. On this basis, petitioners conclude that GSIS cannot invoke the
protection of land registration statutes insofar as they protect innocent purchasers for value.
While we agree with petitioners that GSIS, as a financial institution, is bound to exercise more than just
ordinary diligence in the conduct of its financial dealings, we nevertheless find no law or jurisprudence supporting
petitioners claim that financial institutions are not protected when they are innocent purchasers for value. When
financial institutions exercise extraordinary diligence in determining the validity of the certificates of title to
properties being sold or mortgaged to them and still fail to find any defect or encumbrance upon the subject
properties after said inquiry, such financial institutions should be protected like any other innocent purchaser for
value if they paid a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before having notice of some other persons
claim on or interest in the property.
On this note, petitioners insist that GSIS was guilty of gross negligence in its failure to inquire and
investigate the status and condition of the property when it approved the loan of private respondent Queens
Row.[4] This allegation has no leg to stand on. Respondents allege that GSIS ascertained to its satisfaction the
existence and authenticity of the titles of its predecessor-in-interest, QRSI; and was, in fact, able to procure true
copies of the latters titles from the Registry of Deeds. [5] GSIS furthermore conducted an ocular inspection and found
that the property was not in the possession of any person claiming an interest that was adverse to that of its
predecessor-in-interest.[6] Respondents allegations are much more convincing in light of the fact that NSJBI was able
to enter the subject property by virtue of its joint venture agreement with GSIS, and was able to
commence construction and development works thereon.
Petitioners have presented absolutely no evidence to prove their allegation of fraud on the part of QRSI
and bad faith on the part of GSIS. They want us to merely conclude the same on the ground that they were able to
secure the favorable decisions they obtained in Civil Cases No. B-44, No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49. However, as
shall be discussed later, these are already stale judgments, which cannot be executed anymore. Furthermore, these
judgments were obtained ex parte,for failure of respondent QRSI to appear at the pre-trial despite filing an Answer
to the Complaints. GSIS, on the other hand, was never impleaded in these four Complaints for cancellation filed in
October 1973, despite the fact that the mortgages in GSISs favor had been annotated on the subject titles since 29
June 1971.GSIS, therefore, never had any notice of these proceedings.
Petitioners cannot expect GSIS to check the technical descriptions of each and every title in the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite in order to determine whether there is another title to the same property. There is no one to
blame for the failure of GSIS to have notice of such fact other than petitioners themselves. As stated above, they did
not implead GSIS in their actions for cancellation of title despite the fact that, at the time of the filing of the cases,
the mortgages in GSISs favor had already been annotated on the subject titles. Petitioners likewise neglected to
have a notice of lis pendens of the cancellation cases annotated on the subject titles, fueling respondents suspicions
that the former wanted their actions for cancellation to be uncontested by GSIS, the party really interested in
challenging the same.
Laches
Petitioners challenge the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding them guilty of laches for their failure to
execute the favorable decisions they obtained in Civil Cases No. B-44, No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49, arguing
that laches cannot be raised even as a valid defense for claiming ownership of registered land, more so, if titles are
tainted with fraud in their issuances.[7] Their basis for this claim is the 1950 Court of Appeals case Dela Cruz v. Dela
Cruz.[8]
We are not persuaded.
Firstly, as discussed above, while petitioners persistently harp on their allegation of fraud in the issuance
of the title of GSIS, nevertheless, they have not presented any evidence to prove the alleged fraud on the part of
either GSIS or even QRSI.
Secondly, it must be stressed that the Decisions of this Court are the only judicial decisions that form
part of our legal system. While rulings of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for lower courts, they only
apply to points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision.[9]
Thirdly, this Court has, on several occasions, already ruled that even a registered owner of a property
may be barred from recovering possession of the same by virtue of laches. Thus, in Heirs of Panganiban v.
Dayrit,[10] this Court discussed several cases wherein the principle of laches was applied against the registered
owner:
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of
property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches. Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that petitioners acquired
title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to
respondents failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v.
Catalino, this Court said that appellants passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34)
years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches
in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, we stated that while the
defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors
long continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owners right to recover
possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long
period of possession and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exerting due diligence could or should have been done earlier.[11] The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent,
and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. [12]
The Court of Appeals based its finding of laches on the fact that petitioners Ty and IRC failed to move for
the execution of the favorable ex parte judgments, which they obtained on 8 December 1980 and 20 December
1985, respectively. If we read Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court together with Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
we would see that the winning party in litigation has a period of five years from the date of entry of judgment to
execute said judgment by motion, and another five years to execute it by action. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that a motion for the execution of a final judgment or order may be filed within five years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations referred to in the above section is found in Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
 While indeed, the above provisions on extinctive prescription cannot be the basis for depriving a
registered owner of its title to a property, they nevertheless prohibit petitioners from enforcing the ex
parte judgment in their favor, which can likewise be the basis of a pronouncement of laches. In Villegas v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we held that:

But even if Fortune had validly acquired the subject property, it would still be barred
from asserting title because of laches. The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes
laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert
it. While it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation
of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners neglect in asserting their rights is likewise manifested in their failure to implead GSIS in the
four Complaints for cancellation, which they filed in October 1973, despite the fact that the mortgages in the GSISs
favor had been annotated on the subject titles since 29 June 1971. It even became more evident from the fact that
petitioners failed to have a notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject titles of the said cancellation of title cases,
leading GSIS to believe that there were no other certificates of title to the same properties when it proceeded to
foreclose the subject properties in 1986. We, therefore, find no reason to overrule the finding of the Court of Appeals
that petitioners were guilty of laches.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62610 and the Resolution of the same Court dated 29 July 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO
ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG
and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of
twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than
that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would
periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The
submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under
water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent
Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land
sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more
or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by Julian
Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the
name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired
the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45
hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square
meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now
Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P
440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . .2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964.
Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio
Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left
unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that
the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and
the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern
branch of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy
season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to
respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan
River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists,
the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked
very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot
822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307
and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and,
during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad.
Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the
property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the
outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation
compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was
dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972,
respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3
for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land
he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be
entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise
prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the
survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for
failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November 1982,
the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the defendants
and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-
964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No.
821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a
motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River,
the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821
cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially
dries up for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land)
connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of
petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the
year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even
more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of
the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is
likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn
from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that
periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan
River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it
appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No.
821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and
Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in
width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our
Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does
not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by
the current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the
eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during
summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from
September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes
swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point
would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry.
Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain
during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural,
which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the
general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the
definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is
the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that
is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the
Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot
[822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the
small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to
cultivation and uneroded.13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the
natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what
is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at
bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual
coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the
eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the
periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with
flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record.1âwphi1 Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River
referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent
Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry
months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of
the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes
not only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as
a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern
bed becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and
Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower
elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that
are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of
water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban
testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo
to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. 17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth.
However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of
Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The
words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over
the submerged portion—is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property
made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep
dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed
of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public
dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running
waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:
 La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su
relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta
agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de
dominio publico, como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los
rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que
integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1,
donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo
que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces
de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los
rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their
respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or
the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that
she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same
manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and
the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither
petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged
and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent
Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into
his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on
rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is
compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened
that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be
determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was
no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3)
requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers (or the sea coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may
claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the
river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land
to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of
factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the
aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods
that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of
flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the
strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821
resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent
Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and
1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey
showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were
accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what
the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like
slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among
other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of
the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion
coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his
(Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of
the property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his
property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No.
1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and
recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area
of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana
Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on
June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the
title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action
of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less,
had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the
year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of
the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question.
Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by
Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941.
Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the
effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of
defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with
an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that
same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered
upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins
with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does
not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New
Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code).
The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law
does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment
the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision
adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The
Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as
a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond
the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It
would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character
of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court,
albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas
Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights
conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he
has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these
provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This
Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17,
1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time
that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
 Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code,
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare. since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and
before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid
the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958,
and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but
because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by
the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an
area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is
not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs
who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff
had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken
steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their
copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor
Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had
nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to
have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession
and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon
consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the
process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their
copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are
the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The
question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by
extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a
river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is
not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question
which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of
Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.
This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.