ADM. CASE No.

3319 June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos
L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital
union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he
begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa
City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of
June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and
alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought
things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui
had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent
did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted
to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law
practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she
was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim,
respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to
give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the
crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by
the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the
latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in
1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established
by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of
husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause
for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does
not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the
foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission
10 wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered
and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was
married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to
complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by
Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage
certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what
appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession;
and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know
that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that
there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with
her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for
her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui
got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a
picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and
ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she
acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private
security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in
good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with
Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated
that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s
because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact
of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission
does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to
another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988).
She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio,
Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion
rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of
legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent
fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what
it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman
from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried.
Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve
no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of
respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant
as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a
lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of
good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice.
Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in
1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in
the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the
Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena
refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.

Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one
night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation,
they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she
jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the
case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.

In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu.
He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise
Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church
wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.

Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured
her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child
on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also
attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to
contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.

In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there
only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted
when she returned to Davao.

Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported
the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he
repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been
accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on
his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the
father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary
action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to
the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the
flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with
one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a
thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:

(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused
to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married
another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince
her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See
Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).

(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila,
and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).

(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs.
Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished
his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade
her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar
(Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).

(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual
congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married.
She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa
vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).

(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina:
"You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and
thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100
Phil. 586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman
separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206,
where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in
frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him
with impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint
for disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See
Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29,
1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with
Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding
her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I")
to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against
Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and
while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to
finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they
met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent
stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and
needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant

At 5:33:46 pm - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

replied by respondent

at 6:16:11 pm - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

(Does this mean I cannot see you

anymore)

sent by complainant

at 6:17:59 pm - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of the situation.

Follow-up message

Sent by complainant

At 6:29:30 pm - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t have relationship with her.
Replied by respondent

At 6:32:43 pm - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry. Its not
taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)

Follow up message

by respondent

at 6:42:25 pm - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you still see me so I
can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may
4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri.
Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February
2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of
Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and
kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he
dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against
respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since
she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order
dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her
husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time
they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation,4 recommending the
imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of
conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity
that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in
the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In
Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of
this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly
pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right
cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast
holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the
following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so
we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes
then she arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she
said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food
and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after
discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go so I
stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me
just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and
Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use
of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said
good night. She went down the car, that’s it.
ADVINCULA VS MACABATA

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to?
Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left
cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed
her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman
who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to
the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman
into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled
that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for
the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for
thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held
that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good
moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore,
disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27
forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on
the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual
relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla
sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a
major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a
more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number
of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are
to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the
Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of
the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those
acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to
such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of
the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client,
kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing
on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly
subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However,
respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, vs. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly
immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad
Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27,
1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified
in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when
his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown,
Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and
cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a
laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and
F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at
the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified
five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he
went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of
Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live
with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their
violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with
his professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not
answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and
his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang
Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant, vs.ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred
that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then
Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual
intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel
register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said
respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of
the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are
getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,
complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno;
that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked
the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his
overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent
pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that
when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual
intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party
together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant
refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was
already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to
comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has
refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that
he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He,
however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off,
following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of
introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the
complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the
right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this
Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the
Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on
the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that
hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that
respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she
wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to
come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to
comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The
fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958
(Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy
of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and
Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November,
1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the
complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp.
249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of
him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not
present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if
he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may
assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken
as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be
restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50
O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of
the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform
themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either
moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not
only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.