Supreme Court of the Philippines

109 Phil. 1022 Commented [a1]: A worker died in his workplace while driving
away a puppy from his employer’s house. The puppy had bitten him
and caused his death. The WCC issued a resolution awarding

G.R. No. L-14827, October 31, 1960 compensation for the death of Santos Romeo. Awarded to his heirs.

CHUA YENG, PETITIONER, VS. MICHAELA ROMA, AND HER MINOR

CHILDREN GUADALUPE, PILAR, ROSARIO, CORNELIO AND
GERAKDO, ALL SURNAMED ROMEO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation

Commission, dated September 17, 1958, and its resolution en banc, dated
December 4, 1958, awarding compensation for the death of Santos Romeo.

The appeal raises issues of fact and of law, but since findings of fact by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission are final, if supported by substantial
evidence, (Batangas Transportation Co., vs. Galicano Rivera, et al., supra., p. 175;
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Consunto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and since the record
shows that such evidence is not wanting, this Court will consider the case on the
facts as found by the commission.

Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956, working for petitioner as cargador in
loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu
City. In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer,
Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the
warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out
of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said house and
while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried nsh inside an open
cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying "tse," but as the puppy still
continued to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with his hand to drive it away,
in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June 26,
1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the
puppy was not owned by petitioner.
Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the
laborer can not be considered to arise "out of and in the course" of his
employment.

We find no merit in this contention. The rule is well established that-

"Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee
while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical
demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental
to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are
generally held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the
employment." (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236, p. 742, citing numerous cases.)

That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual
place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously
quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place
through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking
water at the warehouse.

Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish
away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent
activity. We do not regard such act as a voluntary deviation from his duties,
considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that
would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was
motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire" to protect the latter's
property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as
such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee's
'own property from an apparent danger, is compensable (in re Brightman, 107
N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There, it was said:

"the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has
happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the
master, but that which the ordinary-man required to act in such an emergency
might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty."

Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the worker
was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an
activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the interest of
his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of
assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger,
was compensable (Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305, December 15,
1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a truck to pick up a
sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was caught between the
wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise, the death of a worker
who tried to recover a piece of board which had fallen into a molasses tank, and
died from the deadly fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp.,
G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling factor considered
by the court was the fact that the employee was acting in the interest of the
employer.

To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water
but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances
that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not
prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a
puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of
reasonable disposition. As has been said-

"* * * he was doing a thing1 which a man while working may reasonably do-a
workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe,
and he may reasonably pick it up again." (Ramos vs. Poblete, supra,, citing
M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)

By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to
satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some
fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to
make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away.

At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under
which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no
adequate and. sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that
petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back
of the warehouse; that this well was out of order at the time of the incident, so
that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to
get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been
avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of
work.
Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line
with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should
be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc.,
vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et
al., L-13130, October 31, 1959).

Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, and
Paredes, JJ., concur.

Decision and resolution affirmed.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

119 Phil. 204

G.R. No. L-22135, December 27, 1963

VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTATION CO., PETITIONER VS. THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of the Workmen's Compensation

Commission in the case of Exaltation Barrion et al. vs. Visayan Stevedore
Transportation Company (WCC Case No. R07-757).

It appears that Graciano Gutana was a laborer of petitioner in its stevedoring business at the
Pulupandan wharf in Occidental Negros, at a daily salary of P4.60. Sometime in May 1958,
petitioner undertook the loading of sugar on the Japanese ship "Hiyeharu Maru" then anchored
about two miles from the coast of Pulupandan, and Gutana was one of the more than seventy of
its laborers assigned to do the loading.

In the afternoon of May 19, 1958, after having rendered the usual eight hours of work, the
laborers were given time off to take their evening meal before working overtime, as it was the
purpose of the employer to finish the loading of the sugar as soon as possible. After taking their
meal on board the ship, Gutana and some of the laborers had to answer the call of nature by the
left side of a barge tied along the right side of the Japanese ship, in view of the insufficiency of
the sanitary facilities on board. After relieving himself, and as he was standing and buttoning up
his pants, the raft "Narwhal" came along the right side of the barge and bumped it, causing it to
hit the right side of the Japanese vessel. As a result, Gutana was pinned by the end of the hatch
cover of the barge against the side of the vessel, thereby suffering physical injuries which
resulted in his death.

Petitioner's foreman at the premises immediately notified the latter of the fatal accident, and
petitioner shouldered all the funeral expenses.
A claim for compensation for the death of Gutana was filed by the widow of the deceased and
their children on September 1, 1958, and petitioner controverted it in its answer filed on the
29th of the same month.

After hearing, the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Bacolod City, rendered a decision
awarding death compensation to the claimants in the total amount of P4,000.00, plus attorney's
fees and costs. Petitioner appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Commission which, in turn,
affirmed the decision just mentioned in its resolution of October 15, 1963, the latter being now
the subject of appeal.

The' first question raised by petitioner is that the claim for compensation had prescribed having
been filed more than three months after Gutana's death. We find petitioner's contention to be
without merit. The cage is covered by the provisions of Section 24, Workmen's Compensation Act
No. 3428, as amended, which dispenses with, the requirement of filing a claim for compensation
if the employer had voluntarily made compensation payments. Under Section 8 of the same act,
burial expenses are considered as part of the death benefits due to the heirs of a deceased
laborer. It appears in this case that petitioner had voluntarily paid the burial expenses in
connection with the burial of Gutana. Consequently, the late filing of the claim for compensation
is not fatal.

Petitioner likewise contends that the death of Gutana was due to his notorious negligence. On
this matter, we are of the opinion, as was the Workmen's Compensation Commission, that the
facts established by the evidence do not support petitioner's contention. Due to the number of
laborers engaged in the loading works the sanitary facilities on board the "Hiyeharu Maru" were
gendered inadequate, thus compelling some of the laborers to answer the call of nature by going
down a barge tied along the right side of the ship. The deceased Gutana was among those who
was forced to resort to this uncomfortable way of relieving himself. Moreover, in the
circumstances of this ease, it is but logical to consider the barge as an extension of the premises
where the laborers were working. As already stated, they, took their evening meal on board the
ship and were supposed to resume their work (overtime work) a reasonable time thereafter. As,
because of this, they were not free to leave the vessel, the accident must be deemed to be one
arising out of, or in the course of employment.

Promises considered, we find the petition under consideration to be without

merit, and the same is hereby dismissed.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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BELLOSILLO VS CITY OF MANILA, GR. NO. 34522, NOVEMBER 9, 1931
BATANGAS TRANSPO. CO. VS VDA. DE RIVERA, L-7658, MAY 8, 1956
 Supreme Court of the Philippines

110 Phil. 532

G.R. No. L-15978, December 29, 1960

DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION, PETITIONER VS. HON. N.
BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission:

On September 29, 1957, the truck of Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying
some lumber from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally overturned on the
road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together with his son,
Vicente Soriano Jr.

His widow, Flavia A. Soriano, Claimed compensation on November 11, before

the Regional Office No. 8, at Davao, of the Department of Labor. Having
found the driver guilty of notorious negligence, the hearing officer denied
compensation.

On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation saw differently. He

found no such negligence, and awarded compensation. Fifteen days after
receiving copy of such award, the Davao Gulf moved for reconsideration by the
Commission as a whole. It happened, however, that there was a rule of the
Commission which provided:

"Sec. 3. Disposition of Appeal.—The Commissioner to whom an appealed case

is assigned by the Chairman shall decide the same on its merit. Either appellee
or appellant, or both, may seek the reconsideration of tile decision of a
Commissioner by the Commission en banc within 10 days from receipt of said
decision."
So, pursuant to such rule, the Commission denied the motion for being out of
time.

Now, this petition for mandamus seeks .to compel the Commission to decide its
motion on the merits, petitioner contending that its motion to reconsider had been
filed on time, because the law allows "fifteen days" for appeal, under sec. 50,
Republic Act No. 772. The rule is void, asserts herein petitioner, because it
shortens the period specified by law. We think it clear, however, that the section
cited by petitioner refers to appeals from Workmen's Commission to this Court.
Maybe the Commission rule holds that when no appeal to it from the decision
of one Commissioner is made in ten days, the latter's opinion becomes the
decision of the Commission. From which an appeal may be taken to this Court
within fifteen days from notice, as by statute provided.

Nevertheless, without ruling on this matter, we have chosen to act in accordance

with the second alternative of the petition before us; to regard it as a petition for
review of the compensatory award.

According to the decision, the facts were these:

"Vicente Soriano since 1947 until his death on September 29, 1957, was
employed as a driver of the respondent corporation, earning P5.00 a day or
P30.00 per week. In the early morning of the last mentioned date, said Vicente
Soriano together with his assistant Mario Bariquit, and one Rodolfo Mapa,
another employee of the respondent corporation, loaded his truck with lumber
from the sawmill to be brought to the company yard in Davao City. Then
Vicente Soriano brought the truck to the gasoline station owned and operated
by the respondent within its sawmill compound, and filled the truck with
gasoline (60 liters). A delivery receipt for the lumber was issued by the
dispatcher and the truck was allowed to proceed to Davao City. On the way, the
truck did have passengers—Vicente Soriano's wife and 3 minor children, his
assistant, Mario Bariquit and 6 laborers who hitched a ride in the truck.

Sitting beside Vicente Soriano was Vicente Soriano, Jr., then Mario Bariquit,
Conchita, a daughter of Soriano, and Mrs. Flavia Aliwasag de Soriano. The truck
was loaded with about one hundred (100) pieces of rough lumber. Sitting on the
load of rough lumber were the aforementioned laborers of the Davao Gulf
Lumber Corporation.
"At about 10:30 a.m., same date, when they were near the house of Ex-Sgt.
Oxales, PC, at Nalagos, Davao City, driver Vicente Soriano stopped the truck
because they heard an unusual sound from under the rear portion thereof.
Soriano, together with Mario Bariquit, descended from the truck and decided to
investigate. They then dismantled the rear axle of the vehicle and seeing no
defect therein, they returned the parts to their respective places and then
proceeded with their trip. At about 11 o'clock that same morning, after having
passed Nalagos crossing, policeman F. Macias of Davao City, signalled the truck
to stop because he wanted to ride, but seeing no place to sit in the truck, he gave
up the idea and told the truck driver to proceed.

After the truck had run about a period of 20 minutes along the descending road,
at Km. 30, Nalagos, Davao City, the gear of the truck went out of order
rendering the gear shift useless. The truck was rapidly gaining speed and Vicente
Soriano finding that the brakes would not function, ordered the persons riding
atop the load of lumber to jump off the vehicle.

At this instance Mario Bariquit pulled, the handbrake so as to stop the truck but
it did not function. Vicente Soriano stepped on the clutch pedal and
manipulated the transmission in order to switch to low gear but to no avail.
Vicente Soriano was able to guide the truck from Km. 30 to Km. 29 at Nalagos,
Davao City. But Vicente Soriano, Jr. became scared and jumped into the arms
of his father who lost control of the vehicle, which then bumped Km. Post #29
and a pile of big stones about one (1) meter in diameter by the right side of the
road causing the truck to somersault. As a result of the impact, the new cable
about one half inch in diameter with which the load of lumber was tied was cut
and the pieces of lumber were strewn on the road. Vicente Soriano, Sr. and his
son, Vicente Soriano, Jr. were killed instantly."

On the basis of the above, the ^Commissioner ordered the Davao Gulf Lumber
Corporation to pay. The latter insists the accident was due to the deceased's
reckless negligence, and points out to the findings of the hearing officer. The
latter, it must be stated, imputed notorious negligence to the driver because:

"1. Preceding the accident the truck was running 40 to 50 kilometers per hour;

2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep slope and the curve of the road
was very near the accident;
3. That the machine of the truck was very defective as the truck that met the
accident has no more brakes at the time it was going down at a distance of 5
kms;

4. That the trip in question was personal to meet the relative of the wife of the
deceased and the loading of the lumber on that day Sunday was never
authorized by the respondent nor any of its representatives. (Pp. 3-2 s.t.n.) (P. 8
s.t.n.)

5. That the trip was made solely at the instance of the deceased;

6. That the dump truck that met the accident was not registered in the Motor
Vehicle Office as the same must be utilized only in carrying slabs inside the
sawmill compound; so that its brakes are not in good condition and unworthy to
be taken to the public highway;

7. That despite the defective condition of the truck the deceased (Vicente
Soriano Sr.) still drove the truck until he met the accident;

8. That the members of his family were all seated in the front seat and
immediately preceding the accident his Jr. jump into his arms as a consequence
of which he lost control of the steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post.
(Affidavit of Mario Bariquit). (Exh. 7-B)"

In our opinion, the truck was running fast just before overturning because it was
then on a slope, and (as declared by the Commission) the "gear of the truck
went out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would
not function." As to the fourth and fifth circumstances, the Commissioner's
decision says the Company consented to or authorized the trip.

Concerning the non-registration of the truck in the Motor Vehicle' Office, and
its defective condition—there is no finding that the driver knew this at the time
of driving. Registration of the vehicle was npt his concern.

As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in

violation of company regulations, it is not certain that it caused the accident. [1]
Indeed, as his wife and. children were present, this driver must, have been
extremely careful—not reckless. What happened must, have been unforeseen, it
may only be blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor transport, or to
"accident," for which the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in
the course of the deceased's regular duties as driver. (Sec. 2, "Act No. 3428 as
amended by Republic Act 772.)

The death was, consequently, compensable. The Commission and this Court
find no notorious negligence.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Marinduque Iron Mines vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 99 Phil.,

[1]

480; 53 Off. Gaz. (17) 5611.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

99 Phil. 480

G.R. No. L-8110, June 30, 1956

MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO
MAMADOR AND GERONIMO MA. COLL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee's award of
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.
Only the right to compensation is disputed; not the amount.

"It appears," says the award, "that on August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo.
Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other
laborers of the respondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents
Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one
Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their
place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another
truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in
the death of said Mamador and injury to the others."

Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the

heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing
however, to the latter.

In his first proposition petitioner challenges the validity of the

proceedings before the Commission, asserting it had not been given the
opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. According
to respondents,
"The records show that pursuant to a request made by.this Commission on
March 28, 1953 to investigate the above entitled case, the Public Defender of
fioac, Marinduque, notified respondent Geronimo Ma. Coll and the general
manager of the respondent company, Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in
an investigation, first on May 12, 1953, when neither of them appeared, and the
second on May 29, 1953, when only Mr. Geronimo Ma. Coll appeared. The
sworn testimony of Mr. Ma. Coll was then taken down in a question and
answer .method. On August 18, 1953, thru Referee Ramon Villaflor, this
Commission wrote the respondent company to comment on the enclosed copy
of the sworn declaration ,of Ma. Coll. The respondent company, thru its
Vice President, denied its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended. In an investigation conducted on February 8, 1954 by the
undersigned referee, the respondent company thru Mr. Lenze who was assisted
by counsel, was allowed to examine the records of the case including the sworn
declaration of Ma. Coll and was given all the opportunity to rebut the same
by additional evidence."

In our opinion, petitioner's grievance does not rest on any sound basis,
because it was given notice, and therefore had the chance, to examine (and
cross-examine) the witnesses against it. The statute even permits
the Commissioner (or his referee) to take testimony without notice (section
48 Act 3428 as amended) provided of course such ex parte evidence is
reduced to writing, and the adverse party is afforded opportunity to examine
and rebut the same which was done in this instance.

Anyway we are not shown how its failure to cross-examine the witnesses
prejudiced the petitioner's position.

In its second proposition, petitioner maintains that this claim is barred by

section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was
prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an
amicable settlement was concluded between "said heirs and Macunat.

Section 6 provides as follows:

"Sec: 6. Liability of third parties.—In case an employee suffers an injury for

which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his
employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for
damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed
and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such
compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured
employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided,
That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess
of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the
injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the
expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by
the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the
employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissable as evidence in
any damage suit or action."

It is the petitioner's contention that Criminal Case No.

1491 and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to
sue the third person, such election having the effect of releasing
the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages
against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs
did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered
by the court. At any rate, we have already decided in Nava vs. lnchausti Co.[1]
that the indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the "other
person" does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation.[2]

As to the alleged "amicable settlement," it consists of an

affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador's widow promised "to
forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the
authorities for prosecution." Upon making such promise—petitioner argues —
she elected one of the remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from
the other remedy (against the employer). The contention may not be
sustained, inasmuch as all the widow promised was to forego the offender's
criminal prosecution. She did not promise to waive the civil action
for damages. Note further that a question may be raised whether she could
bind the other heirs of the deceased.

The most important aspect of this appeal, is the effect of the deceased's having
violated the employer's prohibition against laborers riding the haulage
trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer's "notorious
negligence" which, under the law, precludes recovery. The Commission has
not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the employer
does not point out in the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador
knew the prohibition, said the referee, "can we truthfully say that he boarded the
fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the danger, if any at all,
that an ordinary prudent man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even
in the presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of
course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his life. Nowhere in the
records of this case can we find the slightest insinuation of that desire."

There is no doubt that mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon
is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is
not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this
particular instance because there was the
employer's prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute
negligence? Many courts hold that violation of
a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider
the circumstances.

However there is practical unanimity in *the proposition that violation of a rule

promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be
evidence of negligence. (C. J. S., Vol. 65, p. 427.)

This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn't be of a greater

obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly
considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; but it declared that
under the circumstances, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with
negligence. Correctly, it is believed,. since the prohibition had nothing to do
with personal safety of the riders.

Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not overrule in this
certiorari proceeding.

Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely

was not "notorious" negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same
thing as "gross" negligence[3] —implying "conscious indifference to
consequences" "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and
probably result in injury" "utter disregard of consequences." (38 Am. Jur.,
691.) Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's haulage truck
couldn't be gross negligence, because as the referee found, "no danger or risk
was apparent."
There being no other material point raised in the petition for review, the award
of compensation is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.

[1] 57 Phil., 751.

[2] See Balajadia vs. Province of Iloilo, G. E. No. 41979 October 1934.
[3] To Justice Malcolm "notorious" negligence is stronger in significance than

"gross" negligence. (56 Phil., 547.)

MONTEMAYOR, J.;

I concur in the result. I believe that the injury suffered herein was not in the
course of the employments, neither did it arise out of it, but this question does
not seem to have been raised below or in the appeal.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

255 Phil. 724

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 51543, June 06, 1989
EMILIA VDA. DE INGUILLO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE),
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A review is sought herein of the Decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission (ECC) affirming that of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits filed by the widow of a public
school janitor, who died of cancer of the esophagus and pneumonia.

Petitioner's husband, the late Enrique V. Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as
a janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo, Manila. He was in the
government service for thirty-one (31) years.

From 24 February to 5 June 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's Memorial

Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid,
accompanied by chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and productive
cough." He died on 20 June 1978, at the age of 52, the cause of death being
attributed to "Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal
Edenocarcinoma with Bone and Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia" (Certificate of
Death, Annex "A", Petition).

The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo, filed a claim for death benefits with the
GSIS. The claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death, cancer of
the esophagus, is not an occupational disease. A motion for reconsideration of
the GSIS decision having been denied, claimant-petitioner appealed to
respondent ECC.

On 9 August 1979 respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed
petitioner's claim.

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner's position is anchored on the provisions of the Workmen's

Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule on controversion, the presumption
of compensability, and the principle of aggravation.

Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in the hospital from 24
February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and that he later died on 20 June 1978, and
absent any evidence as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor
Code that becomes the governing law. As specifically provided in Article 208 of
said Code, its provisions cover "injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on
or after January 1, 1975." The recent case of Rosales vs. ECC (G.R. No. 46443,
June 28, 1988) implemented that provision when it held that "in workmen's
compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the
claimant contracted his illness."

The concepts relied on by petitioner under the former Workmen's

Compensation Act, therefore, have ceased to apply, having been expressly
discarded under the compensation scheme in the new Labor Code (Sarmiento
vs. ECC, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

We come now to the primary issue, that is, whether or not the death of
petitioner's husband is compensable under the Labor Code.

Article 167(I) of the Labor Code defines compensable "sickness" thus:

"(I) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease

listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and
approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment (PD 1368, May 1, 1978)
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
further amplifies:

"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."

Definitely, "esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and cervical metastasis” can

not be considered as an occupational disease since it is not one of those listed
under Annex "A" of the mentioned Rules. In the recent case of Raro vs.
Employees’ Compensation Commission (G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989), it
was held that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable.
It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s
employment appears to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government Service
Insurance Systems (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988), this Court further
elucidated that unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by
specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos
dust, etc.) we can not conclude that it was the employment which increased the
risk of contracting the disease.

We note, however, that respondent ECC failed to adequately take into

consideration that there was another cause of death, which was "pneumonia,"
Under the same Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational disease "under all the
following conditions:"

“(a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling
during the course of employment, also industrial injury to the chest
wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes
and other deleterious substances in the place of work.

“(b) There must be a direct connection between the offending agent or

event and the worker's illness.

“(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours)
and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should at least be
twenty-four (24) hours after the injury.
 “(d) The patient must present one of the following findings within a few
days of the accident:

(1) Severe chill and fever.

(2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side.
(3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration.
(4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rates" (ECC Resolution No. 432
dated July 20, 1988).

Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing

of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of
breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some of the
above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by itself can also be a killer
disease (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th ed., pp. 802-804).
Further, a review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that they
included the regular use of "deleterious substances" such as muriatic acid, the
fumes from which are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls
and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also
performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping
school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy
objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs,
as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing him to occasional
"wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains. The combination of all these,
coupled with the fact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed and
congested area characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must
have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The
risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased by his working
conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability.

While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to consider pneumonia

compensable do not concur, there is substantial compliance therewith, added to
the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in
the interest of the working man, who has less in life, and in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta
vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-55464, November 12, 1981, 109
SCRA 209).

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and

public respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner and/or her heirs the
proper benefits for the death of Enrique V. Inguillo, plus attorney's fees of ten
(10%) percent of the amount recoverable. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

236 Phil. 556

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47521, July 31, 1987
CAROLINA CLEMENTE, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH DAGUPAN CITY)
AND EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission in ECC Case No. 0509 which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the claim for death
benefits filed by Carolina Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente.

The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the memorandum for the
respondent Government Service Insurance System, as follows:

"Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor
in the Department of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic, Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the
Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his
ailment of 'nephritis', as per medical certification of his attending physician, Dr.
Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as
portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease.
"On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees’ compensation
under the Labor Code, as amended.
"On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the
ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration
the nature of his work and/or (sic) or were not in the least causally related to his
duties and conditions of work.
"On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial
of her claim, stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the
course of employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work.
Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic
(Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin
diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed
to his ailment of Hansen's disease. Citing further the cases of Seven-Up
Bottlinq Co., of the Phil., v. Rimerata, L-24349, December 24, 1968 and Avana
v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968. Petitioner stated that her husband's
ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his direct
contact with persons suffering from this ailment.
Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS, on April 11,
1977, reiterated its previous denial of her claim.
"On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the
GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner’ claim for review by the ECC.
"On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS’ action of denial
and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC Case No.
0509).
"Respondent ECC'S decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments
are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of
causal connection; and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had
already contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment. In the exact
words of the ECC:

" 'In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed as occupational
diseases, appellant herein must prove that such ailments were caused by
deceased's employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased
by his working conditions in order to be compensable.

"'A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will disclose that
appellant failed to submit the required proof of causation. There is no
substantial proof in the record from which we could draw the conclusion that
indeed the nature of deceased's employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic could be traced as the direct cause of his ailment. Hence, in the absence
of such evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on appeal the findings of the
respondent System.
"'On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to his
employment in this office, was already suffering from his ailment of Hansen's
disease. This proves that his working conditions did not increase the risk of his
contracting the same. If at all, his employment merely aggravated his ailments.
Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a pre-existing illness, a rule under the
old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation under the new law. Thus,
the cases cited by the appellant cannot be raised as authorities to support her
claim."

"Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision." (pp. 76-78, Rollo)

There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions of the Labor Code,
as amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor Code and Section 1(b) Rule III
of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92, 96).

As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of
the Rules as occupational diseases, the petitioner bases her claim under the
theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin
diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the
deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to freely mix with its
patients. She claims that it was during this time that he was attacked by other
dreadful diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis.

On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission

contends that the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the
deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his employment. It maintains that
the deceased merely had a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated
possibly by the nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on
record showing that the nature of the deceased's employment was the direct
cause of any of his illnesses.

The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with the views
of the respondent Commission. It, however, argues that it should be dropped
as a party respondent in this case. It claims that the petitioner has no cause of
action against it, the subject of judicial review being the adverse decision of the
respondent Commission.

We rule for the petitioner.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (144 SCRA 421, 426),

we held that:

"Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San
Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better
Building, Inc., v. Pucan, 135 SCRA 62). There are no stringent criteria to
follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626, is merely substantial
evidence which means, ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion' (Cristobal v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must
show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is
brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law
requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation
(Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the hypothesis on which the
workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be
disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a
working connection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118
SCRA 67; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra).
Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, supra).

In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain the petitioner's

view. The records disclose that in resisting the petitioner's claim, the
respondent Commission cited the following medical authorities:

"Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency
and retention in the blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia).
Renal insufficiency may be due to (1) nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis,
polycystic kidney disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE, polyarteritis,
amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular necrosis resulting
from transfusion reaction, shock, burns, crushing injuries, or poisons; (3)
sulfonamides precipitated in the kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis
resulting from extreme alkalosis, diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive
heart failure may result in azotemia, or may predipitate (sic) severe uremia in the
presence of already damaged kidneys.
Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The Merk Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy;
M.S. & D. Research Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258.
"Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by increased connective tissue
that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing
liver functions. Etiology, Incidence and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs
chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing
if not a primary etiology factor. The role of alcohol is not clearly established.
Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases
malnutrition by providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has
been produced in animals by diets low in protein and specifically low in choline.
The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis. Chronic poisoning
with carbon tetrachloride or phosporus produces changes similar to those from
portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely nodular, scarred and dense. Microspic
section shows parenchymal degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or
scar tissue and areas of regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early
states.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy: M.S. &
D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p. 928.
"Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the liver
destroying the parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell and bile duct elements.
It develops most frequently in the previous cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of
patients with post necrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma than those with portal
alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and regenerative
processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60%
or more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of
hemochromatosis seems particularly liable to hepatomas as high a fraction as
20% of patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause.
Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill; N.
Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072.
"Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease characterized by
both cutaneous and constitutional symptoms and the production of various
deformities and mutilations. The causative organism is an acid fast rod.
Mycobacterium leprae, first described by Hansen in 1874. The mode of
transmission is obscure, although infection by direct contact appears likely. The
disease is found predominantly in tropical and sub?tropical Asia, Africa, and
South America. It is endemic in the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the
Philippines and Puerto Rico.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy;" M.S. &
D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847.

The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS
Manager Employees’ Compensation Department, in his letter dated February 4,
1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows:

"Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or kidneys. It

usually follows previous streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory
tract. Because of this, it is always thought that nephritis is the result of an auto-
immune or allergic reaction to infection, usually streptococcal." (Rollo, p. 20)

The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory of increased
risk. We note that the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy,
etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it
is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of persons
with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the
skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat (Miller and
Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, (1972), p. 530).

On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to nephritis are believed
to be as follows:

"Table 294-1
"Causes of acute glumerulonephritis
"Infectious diseases
“A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis
“B. Non-Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis
“1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, 'Shunt nephritis,' sepsis, pneumococcal
pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphillis, meningococcemia
“2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps, measles, varicella,
vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus
“3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis"
(Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633)

The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and
bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different
illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that had
been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the
course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to the
dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical
practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely
increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court
has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is
not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social
justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982;
and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It
clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that,
as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee
(Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277).

The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an existing ailment
but point out that aggravation is no longer a ground for compensation under the
present law. They contend that the compensable factor of increased risks of
contracting the disease is not present in this case.

The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able
to enter the government service more than ten years before he became too ill to
work and at a time when aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no
evidencee to show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing
disease liable to become worse.

The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the

contracting of the disease due to increased risks become more plausible. When
there are two or more possible explanations regarding an issue of
compensability that which favors the claimant must be chosen.
We also do not find merit in the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be
dropped as a party in this case. This Court has passed upon this issue on several
occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, (111 SCRA 413, 419) this Court citing La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held:

xxx xxx xxx

"x x x [T]his Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the ultimate
implementing agency of the ECC's decision, is a proper party in this case. The
fact that this Court chose to require respondent GSIS to comment is an
indication that it is a necessary party. It must be noted that the law and the rules
refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules." (at p. 793).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby

SET ASIDE and the respondent Government Service Insurance System is
hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:

1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00)as death

benefits; and

2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00)

as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

234 Phil. 23

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48664, May 20, 1987
GLICERIA C. CASUMPANG, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM AND BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission in ECC Case No. 0713 entitled "Gliceria C. Casumpang v. Government
Service Insurance System (Bureau of Prisons)" which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for death benefits
of Gliceria C. Casumpang, widow of the late Jose Calumpang.

The assailed decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is as

follows:

"The questioned decision denied the claim for compensation originally filed by
the deceased appellee, Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the
Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm,
Zamboanga City. Upon its conversion to a claim for income benefits for death
following the demise of said Jose Casumpang due to Cancer of the Stomach, the
claim is now being prosecuted (sic) on appeal to this Commission by the herein
appellant-widow, Gliceria Casumpang.
"The System's denial of the appellant's claim was predicated on the ground that
the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's
nature of occupation as Prison Guard. This is the gist of the System's letter-
denial dated August 5, 1976, reiterated in its resolutions dated October 4, 1976
and August 18, 1977, respectively, therein further denying the requests for
reconsideration of the appellant.

"The preponderance of mandatory legal postulate requiring proof of causation

once an ailment upon which a claim is based is not considered an occupational
disease as defined and understood under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, would subserve the respondent System's findings that the above-titled
claim is not compensable. The conclusion of the respondent System cannot be
faulted. From even the cursory reading of the record, the evidences (sic) submit-
ted by the appellant in support of her claim would fail to indicate that the cause
of death is an occupational disease, noting further thereon that the work of the
deceased did not involve handling of wood products such as those of wood
workers, loggers, carpenters and employees of plywood, pulp and paper mills.
Neither did these evidences (sic) measure up to the substantial and positive
evidence requirement for a determination of compensability, since there is no
showing that the risk of contracting gastric carcinoma was increased by the
deceased's working conditions.

"The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed once the

ailment is shown to have supervened in the course of employment cannot be
accorded merit. The doctrine of presumptive compensability which was then
expressly provided under the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is
not recognized under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the present law
on employees' compensation. In the latter law, proof of causation by the
claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the presumption of
compensability.

"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant claim dismissed." (Original Records,
Decision of ECC).
The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not cancer of the stomach is an
occupational disease and hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended.

This case falls under the New Labor Code, which fact is admitted by the
petitioner herself (Calumpang's Petition for Certiorari, p. 3).

After a close perusal of the records of the case, nowhere does it appear that Jose
Casumpang contracted his disease or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are
no medical findings, reports, affidavits or any indication that he was suffering
from any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code which by
liberal interpretation may have worked in his favor.

There is no dispute that prior to his demise, Jose Casumpang had ruptured
duodenal ulcer with generalized peritonitis. This condition according to medical
findings on record, worsened into cancer of the stomach which disease finally
caused his death. The former ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976.
In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis and melena which began
in November 1975. In other words, all of his ailments were after January 1,
1975.

It is Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore, which is applicable in

this case and not the Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is important to determine which law is applicable.

Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as amended,
the claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was then legally
presumed that the illness arose out of the employment, under the presumption
of compensability (Tortal v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA
211).

However, under the new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption of
compensability have been stricken off by the lawmaker as grounds for compen-
sation (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52).

Under Article 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section 1 (b), Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92).

Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease
considering the decedent's employment as prison guard.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:
"x x x In ECC Resolution No. 247-A dated April 13, 1977, cancer of the
stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels was considered
occupational only among woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters,
loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. The
complained illness is therefore not compensable under the first ground provided
in the Labor Code.

"Under the second ground for compensability, it should be shown that an illness
is caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions. In her letter dated December 6, 1977 to respondent
ECC (Annex B), petitioner claims that her deceased husband escorted inmates
to work in the hinterlands of San Ramon; that at times he was overtaken by rain;
that he had to work at night in case of prison escapes, and that he missed his
meals owing to the nature of his duties. It should be noted however, that said
conditions do not bring about cancer of the stomach. On the ailment of Jose
Casumpang, the GSIS found that the evidence (you have) submitted are not
sufficient for us to establish that his ailment is the direct result of your
occupation or employment as Prison Guard in the Bureau of Prisons,
Zamboanga City (GSIS letter dated August 5, 1976, supra.) This was reiterated
by the GSIS in its letter dated October 4, 1976 denying a request for
reconsideration. Thus: 'On the basis, (however), of the papers and evidence on
record which you have submitted, it appears that you have not established that
your employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the
ailment'. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the adverse conditions mentioned
above had direct causal connection with his job which would develop into
cancer of the stomach." (Rollo, pp. 125-126)
The case of Aninias v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (83 SCRA 806) cited
by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar as the former case applied
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner's arguments more properly
apply to claims falling under the old law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Government

Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission
denying the claim are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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