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VIVIAN YUCHENGCO,
ADOLFO M. DUARTE, MYRON C. PAPA, NORBERTO C.
NAZARENO, GEORGE UY-TIOCO, ANTONIO A. LOPA, RAMON B.
ARNAIZ, LUIS J.L. VIRATA, and ANTONIO GARCIA, JR.
Petitioners, versus MIGUEL V. CAMPOS, substituted by JULIA
ORTIGAS VDA. DE CAMPOS,[1] Respondent.
G.R. No. 138814 | 2009-04-16
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
10. IPOs are shares of corporations offered for sale to the public,
prior to the listing in the trading floor of the country's two stock
exchanges. Normally, Twenty Five Percent (25%) of these shares
are divided equally between the two stock exchanges which in
turn divide these equally among their members, who pay
therefor at the offering price.
In the case at bar, although the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-
94-4678 does allege respondent's right to subscribe to the IPOs
of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices,
and petitioners' obligation to continue respecting and observing
such right, the Petition utterly failed to lay down the source or
basis of respondent's right and/or petitioners' obligation.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Per Resolution of 24 October 2001.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Hilarion L.
Aquino, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-36.
[3] Rollo, p. 144.
[4] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 2, Section 2.
[5] Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 465, 490-491 (1996).
[6] Rollo, pp. 50-52.
[7] Bailey v. Miller, 91 N.E. 24, 25, Ind. App. 475, cited in 37A Words and Phrases 363.
[8] Civil Code, Article 1156.
[9] Lawyer's Journal, 31 January 1951, p. 47.
[10] Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, G.R. Nos. 58507-08, 26 February 1992, 206 SCRA 567, 579-
580.
[11] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[12] A distinction, however, should be made between Municipal Law and Public International Law. Custom
is one of the primary sources of International Law, and is thus a source of legal rights within such sphere.
[13] Arco Metal Products Co., Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU, G.R. No. 170734,
14 May 2008, 554 SCRA 110, 118.
[14] Rollo, p. 95.
ANG YU ASUNCION, ARTHUR GO AND KEH TIONG, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BUEN REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 109125 | 1994-12-02
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
"'SO ORDERED.'
'SO ORDERED.'
'2. That the VENDEE shall pay the Documentary Stamp Tax,
registration fees for the transfer of title in his favor and other
expenses incidental to the sale of above-described property
including capital gains tax and accrued real estate taxes.'
"On July 16, 1991, the lessees wrote a reply to petitioner stating
that petitioner brought the property subject to the notice of lis
pendens regarding Civil Case No. 87-41058 annotated on TCT No.
105254/T-881 in the name of the Cu Unjiengs.
"The lessees filed a Motion for Execution dated August 27, 1991
of the Decision in Civil Case No. 87-41058 as modified by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21123.
'The gist of the motion is that the Decision of the Court dated
September 21, 1990 as modified by the Court of Appeals in its
decision in CA G.R. CV-21123, and elevated to the Supreme Court
upon the petition for review and that the same was denied by
the highest tribunal in its resolution dated May 6, 1991 in G.R. No.
L-97276, had now become final and executory. As a
consequence, there was an Entry of Judgment by the Supreme
Court as of June 6, 1991, stating that the aforesaid modified
decision had already become final and executory.
'SO ORDERED.'
'SO ORDERED.'
"On the same day, September 27, 1991 the corresponding writ of
execution (Annex C, Petition) was issued". 1
Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been
decreed under a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot
justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under
a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it
sanction an action for specific performance without thereby
negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the
perfection of contracts. 11 It is not to say, however, that the right
of first refusal would be inconsequential for, such as already
intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given, for
instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 1912 of the Civil
Code, can warrant a recovery for damages.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C. J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
---------------
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 32-38.
2. Roque vs. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741; Agustin vs. CA, 186 SCRA 375.
3. See People's Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777.
4. Delta Motor Corporation vs. Genuino, 170 SCRA 29.
5. See Art. 1459; Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc. vs. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948.
6. It is well to note that when the consideration given, for what otherwise would have been an option,
partakes the nature in reality of a part payment of the purchase price (termed as "earnest money" and
considered as an initial payment thereof), an actual contract of sale is deemed entered into and enforceable
as such.
7. Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982.
8. Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc., vs. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948.
9. Article 1319, Civil Code, provides:
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. (Emphasis supplied.)
10. It is also essential for an option to be binding that valuable consideration distinct from the price should
be given (see Montilla vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 167; Sps. Natino vs. IAC, 197 SCRA 323; Cronico vs. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., 78 SCRA 331).
11. See Article 1315 and 1318, Civil Code; Madrigal & Co. vs. Stevenson & Co., 15 Phil. 38; Salonga vs. Ferrales,
105 SCRA 359).
12. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
13. The decision referred to read:
In resume, there was no meeting of the minds between the parties concerning the sale of the
property. Absent such requirement, the claim for specific performance will not lie. Appellants' demand for
actual, moral and exemplary damages will likewise fail as there exists no justifiable ground for its award.
Summary judgment for defendants was properly granted. Courts may render summary judgment when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 815). All requisites obtaining, the decision of the court a quo is
legally justifiable.
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal unmeritorious, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
but subject to the following modification: The court a quo in the aforestated decision, gave the plaintiffs --
considering the mercurial and uncertain forces in our market economy today. We find no reason not to grant
the same right of first refusal to herein appellants in the event that the subject property is sold for a price in
excess of Eleven Million pesos. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals (1994)
G.R. No. 109125 | 1994-12-02
Facts:
Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go (Asuncion et al.
or “the tenants”) are lessees of residential and commercial
spaces in Ongpin Street,Binondo, Manila owned by Bobby Cu
Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan (Cu-Unjiengs or “the
owners”).
On November 15, 1990, while the case was pending in the CA,
the Cu Unjieng spouses sold the property to Buen Realty and
Development Corporation for a sum of P15 Million.
Consequently, a new title (TCT) was issued in the latter's name.
(a) The negotiation covers the period from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract
to the time the contract is concluded (perfected).
Option Contract
6. An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be
sold and the price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable
consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may
properly be termed a perfectedcontract of option. This contract
is legally binding, and in sales, it conforms with the second
paragraph ofArticle 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
11. Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been
decreed under a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot
justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under
a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it
sanction an action for specific performance without thereby
negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the
perfection of contracts.
12. It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal would
be inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an
unjustified disregard thereof, given, for instance, the
circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, can
warrant a recovery for damages.
Facts:
July 29, 1987: An amended Complaint for Specific Performance was
The RTC found that Cu Unjiengs’ offer to sell was never accepted by
the petitioners (Ang Yu) for the reason that they did not agree upon
the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no
contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court. This decision was brought to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari which subsequently denied the
appeal on May 6, 1991 “for insufficiency in form and substance”.
(Referring to the first case filed by Ang Yu)
November 15, 1990: While the case was pending consideration by
this Court, the Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale
transferring the subject petitioner to petitioner Buen Realty and
Development Corporation.
Petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation, as the new
owner of the subject property, wrote a letter to the lessees
demanding that the latter vacate the premises.
August 30, 1991: the RTC ordered the Cu Unjiengs to execute the
necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of
plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the
consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of petitioners’ right
of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued
in favor of the buyer. The court also set aside the title issued to Buen
Realty Corporation for having been executed in bad faith. On
September 22, 1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
Issue: WON Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue
of the notice of lis pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the
name of Buen Realty, at the time of the latter’s purchase of the property
on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs. NO
Held:
Right of first refusal is not a perfected contract of sale under Article
1458 of the Civil Code
In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an
innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed
a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
The proper action for violation of the right of first refysal is to file an
action for damages and NOT writ of execution
The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed,
has merely accorded a “right of first refusal” in favor of petitioners (Ang
Yu et. al). The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than
what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us,
petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor
the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the
judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in
a proper forum for the purpose.
Unconditional mutual promise to buy vs. Accepted unilateral promise
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is
made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the
parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted.
Art. 1479. . . .
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for
a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported
by a consideration distinct from the price. (1451a)
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The
optionee has the right, but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option
is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the
option, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are
then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.
Separate Opinions
COOPER, J., dissenting:
This action was brought by Don Francisco Martinez against
Don Pedro Martinez, the appellant, for the recovery as owner of
two certain vessels, the steamship Balayan and the schooner
Ogoño.
The plaintiff brings the suit for himself and in representation
of his deceased wife, alleging that the ships were bought with
funds belonging to the community estate.
The defendant in his answer claims that he is the exclusive
owner of the ships, basing his right to such ownership upon their
registration in his name in the office of the Captain of the Port,
and further, that the ships were purchased with his individual
money.
The first assignment of error is that "the court erred in
adjudging the ownership of the property of the ships Balayan
and Ogoño to Don Francisco Martinez, the latter not having
presented written documents of the acquisition of said ships nor
certificates of incsription in the registry."
1. This assignment of error raises the question of the
sufficiency of the proof to sustain the judgment of the court
below and requires an examination of the evidence taken in the
court below and a trial of the questions of fact as to the
ownership of the property.
Section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in
the hearings upon bills of exceptions in civil actions and special
proceedings, the Supreme Court shall not review the evidence
taken in the court below nor retry the questions of fact except
as in that section provided, which are in the following cases:
(1) Where assessors have sat with the judge and both assessors
are of the opinion that the findings of fact and judgment are
wrong and have certified their dissent.
(2) Upon the ground of the discovery of new and material
evidence.
(3) Where the excepting party files a motion in the Court of First
Instance for a new trial upon the grounds that the findings of fact
are plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence and the
judge overrules the motion and die exception was taken to his
overruling the same.
There was no motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance,
not is it contended that this case falls within either of the other
exceptions.
It is insisted that while this court will not review or retry
questions of fact, yet if it appears from the findings of fact as
contained in the decision of the lower court that the facts do not
justify the judgment or conclusions of law the case will be
reversed for a new trial.
There was no exception taken to the judgment, the exception
being only such as is inferred from the presentation and
allowance of the bill of exceptions.
This is not sufficient to justify this court in entertaining such
objection; the rule is that were a judgment is entered not
warranted by the findings the proper remedy is by application to
the court in which it is entered to correct or vacate the judgment,
and unless the action of the court has been thus invoked the
petition will not be considered on appeal. (Scott vs. Minneapolis
R. R. Co., 42 Minn., 179).
But had the exception been properly taken an examination of
the findings clearly shows that the judgment is sustained by
them. The following findings of fact were made by the lower
court and are contained in the judgment, to wit: "I am of the
opinion that Don Francisco Martinez, for himself and in
representation of his wife, is the actual and true owner of said
steamship and schooner and has exercised over them acts of
ownership and dominion, and that these ships were bought with
the funds by him furnished. With respect to the fact that the
steamship and schooner may have been registered in the name
of the defendant, Pedro Martinez, it is my opinion that this fact
can not be considered as prejudicial to the true right of the
plaintiff."
An analysis of this finding will show that it consists of the finding
of, first, an ultimate fact, that is, that the plaintiff D. Francisco
Martinez is the actual and true owner of the steamship and
schooner, the property in controversy; second, the probative
fact that he has exercised over them acts of ownership and
dominion and that these ships were bought with funds furnished
by him, and, third, the probative fact that the ships were
registered in the name of the defendant, Pedro Martinez.
The majority of the court regard the first finding ---- that is, that
the plaintiff is the actual and true owner of the property in
controversy ---- as a statement of law and not a finding of fact,
and have rejected it as a finding of fact. In reversing the case for
a new trial the decision is based upon the finding that the vessels
are registered in the name of the defendant, and it is said that it
must be assumed that the defendant has a title to the vessels as
without it they could not be so registered.
The conclusion I reach is the reverse of that reached by the court.
The finding of the plaintiff's ownership of the vessel and
schooner is not a conclusion of law, but is the finding of an
ultimate fact in the case, and was the proper and the only finding
that could have been made. As stated in the opinion, the ultimate
question in the whole case was, Who owned this property?
The supreme court of Minnesota has passed upon the precise
question in the case of Common vs. Grace (36 Minn., 276). The
finding of the lower court in that case was that "John Grace was,
at the time of his death, the owner in fee simple of the real
estate." The appellant made a request in the court below for
additional findings. Upon the refusal of the lower court to make
such additional findings it was assigned as error on appeal.
Mitchell, J., says: "The facts required to be found are the ultimate
facts forming the issued presented by the pleadings and which
constitute the foundation of a judgment and not those which are
simply evidentiary of them. The court is not required to find
merely evidentiary facts or to set forth and explain the means or
processes by which it arrived at such findings. Neither evidence,
argument, nor comment has any legitimate place in the findings
of fact. The test of the sufficiency of the findings of fact by a
court, we apprehend, is, Would they answer if presented by a
jury in the form of a special verdict, which is required to present
the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence, and not
the evidence to prove them, and to present those conclusions of
fact so that nothing remains to the court but to draw from them
conclusion of law? In the case at bar the finding of fact that John
Grace was, at the time of his death, the owner in fee simple of
the real estate in question was the ultimate fact upon which the
decision of the case depended. It covered the only issue in the
case, and was a sufficient foundation for a judgment in favor of
defendants. It could only be arrived at upon the hypothesis that
the deeds in dispute were duly executed, and the finding
necessarily implied and included this."
In the case of Daly vs. Socorro (80 Cal., 367) it is said: "The
appellant further contends that the cause should be reversed
because the court failed to find upon certain other issues
presented. His right to maintain the action was based wholly
upon his ownership and right of possession, and these being
found against him it is immaterial to him whether the court found
as to other facts or not, as the judgment must have been against
him whatever the other finding might have been."
The finding of the court that the ships were registered in the
name of the defendant is the finding only of a probative or
evidentiary fact, that is, it is the finding simply of evidence
tending to prove the ultimate fact, to wit, the fact of ownership.
The various means of proving this ultimate fact is the evidence.
Thus, a bill of sale is evidence of ownership. The possession of
property is prima facie evidence of ownership, and so perhaps is
the registry of ship evidence of the ownership of the person in
whose name it is made; but while it is evidence tending to prove
ownership, there may be other evidence in the case totally
destroying its value, such as a sale and conveyance of the ship by
the owner or person in whose name it is registered made
subsequent to the date of the registration; title by prescription
as against the party in whose name the ship is registered; by
proof that the party in whose name the ship is registered held
the title simply as agent of the party claiming ownership. For this
reason the finding that the vessels are registered in the name of
the defendant is inconclusive and is entirely insufficient as a
finding of fact.
The finding of fact must be such as includes the entire issue or
the ultimate fact to be proven, and in this case, as is stated in the
opinion, the ultimate question in the whole case was who owned
this property. The lower court has responded to this issue by
saying that "while the ships are registered in the name of the
defendant that this fact can not be considered as prejudicial to
the direct ownership of the plaintiff. That D. Francisco Martinez,
the plaintiff, for himself and in representation of his wife, is the
actual and true owner of said ships and has exercised over them
acts of ownership and dominion."
There is not conflict in the findings, for, as stated by the lower
court, the ship may be registered in the name of the defendant
and still be owned by the plaintiff. But, if any such conflict exists,
then the finding of the ultimate fact that the ownership is with
the plaintiff.
Either one of the contracts are perfectly legal and both are
authorized respectively by articles 1451, 1740, and 1753, and those
following, of the Civil Code. The fact that the parties have agreed
at the same time, in such a manner that the fulfillment of the
promise of sale would depend upon the nonpayment or return
of the amount loaned, has not produced any charge in the nature
and legal conditions of either contract, or any essential defect
which would tend to nullify the same.
So ordered.
Separate Opinions
WILLARD, J., dissenting:
This contract violates the fundamental principle of the
Spanish law, which does not permit a debtor, at the time he
secures a loan of money, to make an agreement whereby the
mere failure to pay the loan at maturity shall divest him
irrevocably of allow his interest in the specific property
mentioned in the agreement without any right on his part to
redeem or to have the property sold to pay the debt. (Civil Code,
arts. 1859, 1872, and 1884.) I therefore dissent.