Containing Russia, Again

20/01/2018 Containing Russia, Again | Foreign Affairs
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SNAPSHOT January 18, 2018
Containing Russia, Again

An Adversary Attacked the United States—It’s Time to Respond
By Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon
CONTAINING RUSSIA, AGAIN
Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-01-18/containing-russia-again?cid=int-fls&pgtype=hpg 1/16
W
ith each passing week, the evidence o Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election
—and in U.S. politics and society more generally—grows. Since at least 2014, in an effort to
influence the election and undermine confidence in U.S. democracy, Russia has hacked private
American citizens’ and organizations’ computers to steal information; released that information in
ways designed to affect electoral outcomes and divide Americans; planted and disseminated disinformation in
U.S. social media, through its own state-funded and -controlled media networks and by deploying tens of
thousands o bloggers and bots; cooperated with Americans, possibly including members o Donald Trump’s
campaign, to discredit Trump’s opponent in the election; and probed election-related computer systems in
multiple states. We will never know for certain whether Russia’s intervention changed the outcome o the 2016
election. The point is that it tried.
Today, the Kremlin’s unprecedented efforts to sow and exacerbate divisions among Americans, using many of
the same tools, continue. Whereas physical attacks on the U.S. homeland, such as Pearl Harbor or 9/11, have
brought Americans together in a common cause and led them to bolster defenses, an assault on the American
sense o national unity could weaken the institutions and shared beliefs that are critical to enduring security
and success. Growing domestic strife and diminishing trust in national institutions represent as great a threat
to the United States as any traditional national security concern, with the exception o a nuclear attack.
Russia’s geopolitical challenge to the United States is also growing. Since Vladimir Putin returned to the
presidency in 2012, Moscow has invaded and annexed Crimea; occupied parts o eastern Ukraine; deployed
substantial military forces and undertaken a ruthless bombing campaign in Syria to prop up President Bashar
al-Assad; significantly expanded its armed forces; run military exercises designed to intimidate eastern
European governments; interfered in eastern European political systems; and threatened to cut off gas to the
most energy-dependent European states. Putin is a career intelligence officer who is deeply hostile to
democratic change anywhere near Russia, paranoid about what he believes to be U.S. efforts to oust him, and
resentful o American domination o the post–Cold War world. He seems to have made it a personal priority to
weaken the United States and counter American influence wherever he can.
In the face o such a comprehensive challenge, strong new measures are needed to protect U.S. society from
further intervention and punish Russia for attacking the United States. This response should not be confined to
measures guarding against further election meddling. Moscow will cease and desist only i it concludes that it is
paying a major price in matters important to it, including in the area o European security.
Having worked since the end o the Cold War to build more constructive U.S.-Russian relations (Blackwill in
the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations, Gordon in the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama
administrations), we come only reluctantly to the conclusion that the United States needs to confront Russia
more forcefully. As it did during the Cold War, Washington should continue to interact with Moscow and to
cooperate with it whenever cooperation is in the U.S. interest. But the United States cannot stand by when an
adversary not only adopts an agenda o countering U.S. influence throughout the world but also strikes directly
at the heart o American democracy.
DROPPING THE BALL
Considering the gravity and consequences o the Russian intervention, the U.S. response has been grossly
inadequate. The Obama administration was slow to realize the full extent o the Russian operation and, when it
did, was reluctant to react, announcing only a limited set o retaliatory measures (primarily sanctions on
selected Russian operatives) after the election was over. Before Election Day, President Barack Obama worried
that public accusations o interference would be perceived as an attempt to discredit the Trump candidacy (an
accusation Trump made anyway) and that retaliation could set off a devastating cyber-escalation—which would
disproportionately hurt the United States, given its greater openness and reliance on technology. These
concerns led the administration to avoid retaliating in a manner proportionate to the intervention or even
publicly highlighting its seriousness to the degree warranted.
The Trump administration has done even less. Far from responding to Russia’s intervention, Trump has refused
even to acknowledge that it happened, repeatedly calling the allegations a “hoax.” Throughout his campaign and
presidency, for reasons difficult to explain, Trump has demonstrated a curious affinity for Russia in general and
Putin in particular, often praising him and rarely challenging his policy positions. Whereas Trump’s default
attitude toward virtually every other country in the world is highly critical, he has consistently shown sympathy
for Russian perspectives.
Given the administration’s inaction, Congress has had to take the lead. In July 2017, it passed the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act o 2017 (CAATSA), which codified into law sanctions imposed
by previous administrations, blocking Trump from lifting them without congressional consent. CAATSA also
authorized new sanctions for use in response to cyber-intrusions; extended restrictions on Russian energy
firms; added to the list o sanctionable sectors o the Russian economy; and mandated sanctions against those
helping Russia undermine the cybersecurity o any democratic institution. Unfortunately, the administration
hasn’t used these potentially effective new tools.
CONTAINING THE THREAT

Without a more vigorous and comprehensive response, the Kremlin’s meddling will continue—and even get
worse—while other adversaries might also conclude they can attack the United States with relative impunity.
Washington needs to impose real costs on Moscow, while also enhancing defenses against future attacks and
bolstering its military commitment to European allies most threatened by Moscow’s aggressive posture.
The minimal sanctions applied thus far have failed to send a sufficiently strong message. The administration
has the tools to change that: using the authorities provided in CAATSA, it should work closely with European
partners to impose asset freezes and visa bans on additional Kremlin officials now known to be involved in
election interference and extend similar sanctions on Russian organizations active in election interference,
including “troll farms” and their funders. Last October, the Treasury Department identified entities subject to
those sanctions, including the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi, the state arms exporter Rosoboronexport,
and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The mere existence o this list will be costly to Russia, because
foreign companies will not want to risk sanctions by making “significant investments,” but the administration
should not hesitate to selectively impose sanctions i Russian activities continue. Congress has also mandated
that the Treasury Department identify corrupt Russian officials and oligarchs close to Putin by January 29 and
that it report on the impact o expanding sanctions to include Russian sovereign debt; these steps should be
☰ promptly and comprehensively implemented.
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The U.S. government also needs to strengthen its defenses against future attacks, starting with the
cybersecurity o federal networks and critical infrastructure. At the state and local levels, election boards should
keep paper backups o ballots and voter registration records and limit access to election systems to qualified
vendors. Meanwhile, campaign finance laws need to be updated to cover a broader range o online activity,
enhance transparency requirements, and prevent political spending by foreign nationals. New laws should also
require digital platforms such as Facebook to create a public database o political ads and provide users access to
information about who paid for the political ads and whom they targeted. And regulations similar to the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires transparency in lobbying, should also apply to online or media
activities. Americans advancing a foreign political influence campaign through vehicles such as RT should be
treated no differently from those being paid directly by foreign governments.
Nongovernmental efforts will also have to be part o the solution. Major social media platforms should sign on
to a voluntary code o conduct that commits them to more actively policing their networks for disinformation,
false news stories, botnets, and false-flag advertising—identifying, labeling, and, where appropriate, blocking
them. They have taken some steps in the right direction: Facebook created a portal to help people identify ads
from Russia’s Internet Research Agency, and Twitter banned advertising from RT and Sputnik. These
platforms should not try to regulate “truth,” but they can find ways to indicate when “news” sources are
confined to a very narrow group o self-referring sources—a hallmark o disinformation—so that users are
aware that what they are reading may be suspect. Bipartisan institutions—such as the German Marshall Fund’s
Alliance for Securing Democracy, which tracks Russian propaganda efforts—can also help identify and combat
disinformation. Selective declassification o evidence o Russian interference could bolster such efforts.
Finally, the administration itsel needs to make deterrence o future attacks a priority. An authoritative
administration official—CIA Director Mike Pompeo, for example—should privately convey to Moscow
Washington’s readiness to release the financial information o Russian government leaders involved in hacking
and other embarrassing information about Putin and his cronies. Credibly threatening such releases would give
Putin an incentive and opportunity to refrain from future interventions in U.S. elections. At the same time,
U.S. officials should emphasize that all these measures are defensive and not designed to change the Russian
regime—a fear Putin has harbored for years. Washington should make clear that it will continue to support free
and fair elections, freedom o speech, and the rule o law in Russia, as it does around the world. But it will
respect Russia’s sovereign right to hold those elections free o outside manipulation with illicit means—just as it
expects Russia to respect the United States’ right to do the same.
REINFORCING THE FRONTLINE
An effective response also requires transatlantic cooperation to bolster NATO’s defense and deterrence posture.
That means maintaining at least the current level o U.S. forces—approximately 60,000 active-duty personnel
—currently deployed in Europe, but also going further. An additional U.S. armored combat brigade should be
permanently stationed in Poland, along with multinational battalions in the Baltic states and the prepositioning
o more equipment closer to NATO’s eastern flank. NATO should also continue implementing the European
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, which involves the stationing o U.S. personnel in eastern
Europe.
On Ukraine, i Russia does not fully implement the February 2015 Minsk II cease-fire agreement or any
successor to it, the United States should expand sanctions to cover additional Russian officials and specific firms
and further limit Russian access to Western loans and technology. These sanctions should target the defense,
mining, and energy sectors, as specifically authorized in CAATSA. I Russia refuses to compromise, the United
States should further limit access to Western loans and financial services, cancel investments in existing
projects, impose sanctions on mining and machinery, and press allies to embargo all Russian military sales and
military imports from Russia. Washington should also provide additional defensive support to Ukraine,
including counterbattery radars, reconnaissance drones, secure communications, and armored vehicles. Ukraine
should not be encouraged to seek a military victory over Russia, which it cannot achieve, but with more help, it
can increase the costs o occupation for Russia.
Finally, to reduce European reliance on Russian energy, the administration and Congress should continue to
remove restrictions on U.S. oil and gas exports and encourage the construction o gas pipelines that avoid
Russia (such as from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe). And it should urge NATO
allies and other EU member states to pursue alternatives to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia, including
by facilitating purchases o liquefied natural gas from other sources.
THE NEW COLD WAR
I this package o measures sounds like a prescription for a new Cold War with Russia, it is. In launching a
major attack on the pillars o U.S. democracy, seeking to undermine social peace in the United States and
Europe, and opposing U.S. policies around the world, Russia has demonstrated that it will not be a partner,
strategically or tactically, in the foreseeable future. Putin has apparently concluded that a larger Russian
regional and global role requires the weakening o American power.
The United States needs to rise to the challenge. Trump’s own National Security Strategy concludes that
“actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy o democracies”
and that “Russia challenge[s] American power, influence, and interests.” Those conclusions are beyond dispute.
It is past time for the administration to act accordingly.

Containing Russia, Again - Foreign Affairs

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20/01/2018 Containing Russia, Again | Foreign Affairs

☰ DEIJENANE GOMES DOS SANTOS SUBSCRIBE

KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV / REUTERS

SNAPSHOT January 18, 2018

☰ DEIJENANE GOMES DOS SANTOS SUBSCRIBE

DROPPING THE BALL

CONTAINING THE THREAT

REINFORCING THE FRONTLINE

☰ DEIJENANE GOMES DOS SANTOS SUBSCRIBE

THE NEW COLD WAR

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