1.

Statutes in General

• Legaspi v. Ministry of Finance 115 SCRA 418 


• Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile G.R.No.61388 20 April 1983 


• Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 1975 


2. Statutes distinguished from Law 


3. Statutory interpretation and construction defined and distinguished. 
Black’s

Law Definition
Henry Campwell Black, Handbook on the Construction and
Interpretation of the Laws, 1986.

• Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, L-19650, 29 September 1966. 


• Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R No. 186400 


• U.S vs Keitel, 211 U.S.370 


• Roberts v. Portland Water District, 126 A 112 
Interpretation by the

Legislature 


• Freedom from Debt Coalition et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission et al.,


G.R.No.161113, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 157. 


• Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) 


• Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 
Interpretation by the Executive
Branch 


• Abad v Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176 


• PNOC v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.109976, 26 April 2005, 457 SCRA 32.


Construction of statutes and construction of contracts compared. 


• Union Pac. R. Co. v U.S. 10 Ct. CI. 548, 577

Purpose of Statutory Construction

• Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge No. 761, 105 Phil. 983 (1959) 


• Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1936) 


II. Statutes
A. InGeneral

The constitution differentiated from Statute Statutes differentiated from Legislation

Kinds of Statutes Retroactive Statutes

• Gustavson Drilling v. Minister of National Revenue, 1 S.C.R.7 N.R 401, 1977

Temporary Statutes

• Espiritu v. Cipriano, G.R.No. L-32743, 15 February 1974 


Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to
meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was
so worded in clear and unequivocal language that “no lessor of a dwelling
unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970,
increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior
to the approval of this act.

Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only
from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law
did not by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not,
by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.

We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As
the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean
what it plainly says.

• Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines et al. v. Municipal Board of the City


of Manila et al. 


The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said

ordinance “ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio upon the
ground that the power to “declare a state of emergency … exclusively
pertains to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state of emergency” which
may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes
an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private
properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property
owners”; that the power of the City of Manila to “regulate the business of …
letting or subletting of lands and buildings” does not include the authority to
prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be
deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter.
B. Enactment of Statutes

Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution

1. Legislative Power of the Congress

• Ocena v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755 -
legislative power to amend, ratify,

repeal and enact laws

The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments

and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in
its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the
power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a
vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national
assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

• Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 
- overstepping jurisdiction for violating

rights in implementing ID system

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its

identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution

• Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 230 


ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative
must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as
far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been
done.
2. Restrictions on Legislative Power 


• Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408, 433 – Supreme Law of the Land
(Filipino First Policy)

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.

3. Procedural Requirements in enacting a law Constitutional Requirements

• Miller v. Nardo, 112 Phil 792 
- Procedural Requirements was not followed; the
approval of both house

Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid?

Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions
requiring positive and separate actions of each house. It is contrary to the
“settled and well-understood parliamentary law” which requires that the
“two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other.”

• Valderama Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Administrator 112 Phil 792

• 
Internal Procedural Rules of both Houses 


• Arroyo v. De Venecia 277 SCRA 268

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be
 raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of
the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved.

Distinguish a bill from a statute

Procedure in the passage of a bill into law

Art VI Sec. 24 1987 Constitution


Section 26(2) Art. VI 1987 Constitution

• Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

If there is a presidential certification, the requirement of three readings on

separate days, and printed copies in final form may be dispensed with
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance).

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Conference Committee Report

• Phil. Judge Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O.
207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate
Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of
the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House
and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill).
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by
such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Authentication of Bills

• Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the

certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication.The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential.

*Enrolled bill v. Journal Entry
-In case of conflict, the enrolled bill should
prevail, particularly with respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered into the legislative record.

Exception: When the Speaker and Senate President withdraw their

respective signatures from the signed bill where there is serious and
substantial discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and shown
 by the journal and that of the enrolled bill.

C. Parts of a Statute

i. Preamble

Sec 27 (1) Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

ii.

People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA, 542, 1978, People v. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663

Title of Statutes

Sec 26 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution

• Agaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil 676, 


• Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Jimenez, 15 SCRA 279 


• Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496 


• People v. Valensoy, 101 Phil. 642 


• People v. Ferrer G.R.No.L32613, 28 SCRA 382 


• Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines 17 SCRA 77 


• People v. Carlos, 78 Phil535 


• Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R.No. 186616 20 November 2009, 605 SCRA


167 


a. Purpose of title requirements

• Libares v. Executive Secretary, 9 SCRA 2616 


• Inchiong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115 


• Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Phil, 17 SCRA 77 


• Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 704 


• De Guzman v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 188, Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172, 179
b. How a title is construed

• People v. Buenviaje, 27 Phil 536 


• Alalayan v. NPCA, [supra: II, C.ii.a] 


• Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418, 1962 


• Insular v. Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA 710. 


c. Effect of Insufficiency of Title 


iii. iv.

v. vi. vii.

Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Jimenez, [supra: II,C.ii.a] Enacting Clause
Body of the

Statute
People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535

Separability Clause
Greenblatt v. Golden, 94 So 2d 355, 59 ALR2d 877

Repealing Clause
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 278 U.S, 235 73 ed. 287

Effectivity Clause

D. Bills originating from the House of Representatives

1987 Constitution

• Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44 


• Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 


• National Electrification Administration v. COA, G.R.No.143481 


• Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 


Article VI, Section 25[1], 1987 Constitution

• Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [supra, II.D] 


• Province of Batangas v. Romulo 


• Bengzon v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 133 


Article VI, Section 25[2], 1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 25[3], 1987
Constitution Article VI, Section 25[4], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[5], 1987 Constitution • Araullo v. Aquino, G.R.No.209287

Article VI, Section 25[6], 1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 25[7], 1987
Constitution

Article VI, Section 27[1], 1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 27[2], 1987
Constitution

• Bengzon v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 133

Article VI, Section 29[1], 1987 Constitution

• Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 


• Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R.No.208566 


Article VI, Section 29[2], 1987 Constitution

• People v. Fernandez, CA-G.R.No.1128, 29 May 1948 


• Orden de Predicadores v. Metropolitan Water District, 44 Phil 292 


• Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201