Estate of K.H. Hemady vs Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
suretyship contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the
Civil Law – Wills and Succession – Transmissible Obligations
Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on
indemnity agreements (counterbonds) subscribed by distinct principals and
by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety (solidary guarantor). As a
contingent claim, Luzon Surety prayed for the allowance of the value of
the indemnity agreements it had executed. The lower court dismissed the
claim of Luzon Surety on the ground that “whatever losses may occur after
Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he
ceased to be a guarantor.”
ISSUES: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the
decedent? Are contingent claims chargeable against the estate?
HELD: Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is that
“Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.”
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts
of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive
from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to
the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776
of the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article
1311.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled — “Under the Civil Code
the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights
and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as
third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party,
touching the estate of the deceased x x x which comes in to their hands by
right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations
resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.”
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311
exists when they are ‘not transmissible by operation of law.’ The provision
makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or
obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support,
parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership and
agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or
death of the guarantor or the surety.
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his
eventual liability therefrom necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs.
The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his
estate. A contingent liability of a deceased person is part and parcel of the
mass of obligations that must be paid if and when the contingent liability is
converted into a real liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation
of the estate must be deferred until such time as the bonded indebtedness is
paid.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and
VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to
existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2
The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private
respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by
Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano,
in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven
by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose
Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4
and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident
was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial
settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer —
Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) —
Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received
P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on
March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI,
releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and
demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death
and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia
likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally
manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or
criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of
the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the
parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their
complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their
deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them
(the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be
indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by
reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of
which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The
petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The
Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to
indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for
compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and
for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the
payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child,
who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased
Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners).
10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment
of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the
petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in
their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and
assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages
being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who
suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the
appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the
appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the
tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of
proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11
Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise
shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were
made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their
favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay
the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle,
P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00
for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners
moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was
denied. 15 Hence, this petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in
holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the
aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial
settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by
payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition
arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only
question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received
the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to
whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased
are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to
receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with
respect to their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion
of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the
latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving
spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that
Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural
guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged
from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido,
seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that
the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the
damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said
purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their
deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the
extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their
child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in
favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO
SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for
petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein
in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug,
Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land
located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow
Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales
on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition
were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to
be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two
documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c)
that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the
oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for
the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty
days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the
deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective
rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted
that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of
Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4
for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her
conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of
Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled
and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon,
the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share
and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro
Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two
questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And
the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the
estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are
the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate
on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the
widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ...
.
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the
other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable
to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children
in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only
child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996
should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision
on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child,
inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes
the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary
Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate
Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art.
892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes
the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of
children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law
with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when
they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such
child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter
happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e.,
Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's
contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm
the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter
on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our
colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as
having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow
survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts.
1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child
and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to
"children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural
can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case.
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these
propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply
when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should
be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996
is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is
assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural
include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied)
: "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving
spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply
the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in
"children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will
not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children
and descendants ... .
ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-
fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem
to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate
succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-
fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets
one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if
"children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given
to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In
testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child
gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if
Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow
or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the
testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to
decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his
or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the
circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from
which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we
are not called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute,
which we are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P.,
Footnotes
G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced),
three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and,
finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that
they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled
according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted
his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation
of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the
intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since
Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo,
J.:
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in
the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her
signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she
treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for
USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan.
4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the
Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of
Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also,
one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of
being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and
that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as
such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that
Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient
reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal,
CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will.
The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the
testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly
states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator
and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of
mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree
with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”
Miciano vs. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 – Krist
Facts:
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed
a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased
opposed the said partition.
According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that
all his relatives respect his wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same
shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of the oppositor.
The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the
fact that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in
accordance with the laws of his nationality.
Issue:
WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws
WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-
oppositor
Held:
No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be
governed by Philippine Laws and those who opposed the condition of the
provisions given shall be cancelled from the disposition, the fact is that the
condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil
Code provides:
“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s national
law, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law shall
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and are valid, as
well as those favorable to herein appellant-oppositor.
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme
of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph
Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is
a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be
given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his
daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen,
insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the
California law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that
given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force
in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on
the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on
succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited
In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946
should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in
other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for
its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there
is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec.
946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference
or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of
laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having
its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California
where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his
only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel
for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for
Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied
in determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to
Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the
internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be
followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
– the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only
Matias v. Salud
L-10751, 23 June 1958
FACTS:
The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that
Gabina Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm
and shoulder of the testatrix, which made writing difficult and a painful act.
Thus, upon the insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but
since it was so painful she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the
document and the left margin at each page. The parties opposing the probate
of the will contended that the will was void due to the irregularities in the
execution thereof.
One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark can not
be regarded as the decedent’s valid signature as it does not show distinct
identifying ridgelines. And since the finger mark was an invalid signature,
there must appear in the attestation clause that another person wrote the
testator’s name at his request.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was valid.
HELD:
YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on
aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that can be expected of very
few persons; testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained
officers.
And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has
been held in a long line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and
sufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of
the article.
Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of
illness or infirmity. A thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient
signature in complying with the requirements of the article.
Beatriz Nera vs Narcisa Rimando
August 6, 2012 No comments
18 Phil 450 – Succession – What “In the presence of each other” means
When a certain will was being signed, it was alleged that the testator and
some subscribing witnesses were in the inner room while the other
subscribing witnesses were in the outer room. What separates the inner
room from the outer room was a curtain. The trial court ignored this fact in
its determination of the case as it ruled that the determination of this
specific fact will not affect the outcome of the case.
ISSUE: What is the true test of the testator’s or the witness’ presence in the
signing of a will?
HELD: The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical
condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other
sign if they choose to do so.
The Supreme Court, in this case, determined that all the parties were in the
same small room when each other signed. Hence, they were in each other’s
presence (though the facts of the case didn’t elaborate – the SC just ruled
so). The SC ruled that if some of the witnesses were really in the outer room
(a fact which was not established according to the SC) separated by a
curtain, then the will is invalid, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done “in the presence” of the witness in the outer
room.
Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:
Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will
alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and
undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it
was not executed in accordance with law.
2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom
the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted
the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with
the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806
of the NCC
HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his
having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as
witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent,
admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The
notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To
permit such situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the
attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of
the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
Garcia v. Lacuesta Digest
Garcia v. Lacuesta
G.R. L-4067 November 29, 1951
Ponente: Paras, C.J.
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan
1943. The said will was written in Ilocano dialect.
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who
wrote the name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and
the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although
under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited
in the attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed
by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the
facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD: NO the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that
Antero or the testator caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under
his express direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil Procedure. Finally,
on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not
prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious
reasons- the cross does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is
not considered as a valid signature.
Tedoro CANEDA, et al.petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and
William CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo
Caballero, respondents.
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,
already in the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament
before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and
a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things that the
testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to
Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the
probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings were
postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be
heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in
the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s
estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was
appointed by RTC which is already the probate court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testator’s will
on the ground that it was not executed in accordance with all the requisites
of law since the testator was already in a poor state of health such that he
could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that
the will is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective
since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was
of sound and disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will.
Further, they also contend that the witnesses attested and signed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial
compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before
them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution
and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the
complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should
state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will
and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
“Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein
assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well
the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What
is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be
characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used
therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations
do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in
the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the
present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the
questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the
attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of
the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
CASE DIGEST: CANEDA V. CA (222 SCRA 781)
222 SCRA 781
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children
and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and
testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies
and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom
do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of
his last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the
initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally
be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as
special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the
testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also
opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special
administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate
of the will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the
testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the
testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public
testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence
while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good
health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his
will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the
last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially
complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or
can be cured under the art. 809.
HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to
the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct
of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the
fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to
specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator
sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that
said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously
refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words” as his last will and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the
absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of the
attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence
supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate
proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not
pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there is not
substantial compliance with Article 805.
Facts:Before Enrique Lopez’ death, he executed a Last Will and
Testament. Richard Lopez, son ofEnrique filed a petition for the probate.
This was opposed by a compulsory heir, Marybeth de Leon,who contended
that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested
asrequired by law. The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to
comply with Art. 805 of theCivil Code which requires a statement in the
attestation clause of the number of pages used uponwhich the will is
written. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last
will andtestament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which
the ratification andacknowledgment are written" although the will actually
consists of 8 pages including itsacknowledgment.
Issue:Whether or not the failure to state the number of pages of the will in
the attestation clausewas fatal.
Ruling:Yes. Under Art 809, in the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improperpressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language usedtherein shall not render the will
invalid. But such rule must be limited to disregarding those defectsthat can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself. It answers questions on
whether all thepages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures
appear in each and every page; whetherthe subscribing witnesses are three
or the will was notarized. However, on the case at hand thediscrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the
presentationof evidence aliunde. The total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so inthe presence of each other, must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only checkagainst
perjury in the probate proceedings.
Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of
sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in
1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the
sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such
was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and
Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the
testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that
she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the
will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such
was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that
the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of
mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she
failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full
signature.
CASE DIGEST: AJERO V. CA (236 SCRA 488)
Published by paul on July 2, 2013 | Leave a response
Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition
in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to
probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the
identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to
comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain
dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had
not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC
were not complies with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made
on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence
does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result
in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes
and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and
814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts
of the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject
should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the
testator.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in
Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code
enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive;
no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;

2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities

prescribed by law;

3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time
the will was executed; and