10.

Test the two hypotheses: H1 – Countries with high level of military threat, the largest intelligence services
belong to the military. H2 – Countries with low level of military threat have domestic/security be the largest
intelligence services.
Intelligence systems will develop and operate differently based on variables unique to whatever

nation the intelligence services serve such as: system of governance, technological acumen, and strategic

culture et al. These factors shape the common objective underlying all nation’s intelligence services – to

augment or further interests, influences and agendas. Interests, influences and agendas differ based on

variables particular to individual states. However, war and the threat therein is a consideration intrinsic to

any nation, being one of the most fundamental responsibilities of a state.

Military affairs are thus a universal factor influencing any state’s intelligence services. This leads

to a hypothesis based on the rational actor model of a state: (A) States with high military threat levels

have military intelligence predominate. (B) States with low military threat levels have domestic/security

(civilian) intelligence predominate. I will be testing this hypothesis with an amendment to (A): If

military intelligence is not predominant, the leading civilian intelligence will hybridize into a

paramilitary-civilian service where the boundaries of military and civilian/domestic-security blur.

This requires defining a few terms. What constitutes high vs low military threats? This paper

considers the threat to be a synthesis of the military threat’s chance to occur and severity of the threat to

the state. To better understand this synthesis, consider an informal matrix of likelihood and severity of

threat, both quantified into a 1-5 number and added together:

1. Minimal chance military threat occurs / Minimal severity of threat.

2. Limited chance military threat occurs / Mild severity of threat.
3. Moderate chance military threat occurs / Moderate severity of threat.
4. High chance military threat occurs/ High severity of threat.
5. Near guarantee military threat occurs / Existential severity of threat.

To contextualize this:
 A chance of 1 is a 2018 Polish-Hungarian war against the EU, a chance of 3 is a US/Israeli-
Iranian War in the next 3-7 years, and a chance of 5 is a Polish-German war from the perspective
of April 1939.
 A severity of 1 is the Aden Emergency’s threat to Britain, a severity of 3 is Pakistan losing a
Kashmiri war pre-nuclear weaponry, a severity of 5 is Cold-War-Gone-Hot or Israel losing the
1948 war.

The closer to 10 the cumulative score registers, the higher the military threat. A state can face an

existential threat yet have this threat matrix tempered by a more limited likelihood. Conversely, a state

can face a high likelihood of military threats yet have this threat be on their peripheral and of little impact.
 Additionally, threat severity needs to be considered on the basis of credibility, with threat chance

influencing threat severity. The threat chance of the USA to Mexico today is minimal, yet if that threat

was actualized clearly the USA can easily wipe out the Mexican government or state. It would be foolish

however to categorize the military threat of the US to Mexico as 6 (minimal chance, existential severity) –

that severity potential is there, but the likelihood is infinitesimal.

There is also the question of ‘large/largest’ for the intelligence department. I stress the word

predominate over large(st). Staff-size and funding are highly important metrics, yet a simple one page

statistical list would answer this hypothesis if we only consider physical or financial size. This paper will

consider equally pertinent issues of an intelligence services: frequency or reliance of use, what and how

much jurisdiction they have, political influence (if present), importance in overall national strategies and

policies, and relationship vis-a-vis competing intelligence services of their respective state.

This hypothesis will be disproven if the evidence suggests military threats do not ‘martialize’

state intelligence with either the military intelligence predominating or leading civilian intelligence to

para-militarize. Case studies analyzed will cover a range of states from multiple religious, ideological and

geographical backgrounds. It will aim to address two states of high military threat (Israel, Pakistan), one

state of medium-high military threat (USA), one state of low-medium threat (Britain) and two states of

low threat (Sweden and Ireland).

Israel is a useful starting point, as she offers one of the strongest arguments for this hypothesis.

Born of war in 1948, she is surrounded by hostile neighbors who have explicitly called for her

destruction. On the informal threat-matrix described earlier Israel began with a solid 8-10 cumulative

score from 1948 until the Camp David accords of 1978 brought peace with Egypt. Likelihood of conflict

remains high, and severity is moderate (Hezbollah) to high (Syria or Iran) to existential (Nuclear Iran).

She has fought both conventional wars with near military parity as well as asymmetrical conflicts.

Looking into the future, former head of IDI Amos Yadlin (2006-2010) considers the increasing
asymmetrical threat ‘to the home front [will] be greater than the conventional state-to-state wars of

Israel’s past.’1 By every measure, Israel’s intelligence should be predominated by the military – and it is.

Israeli intelligence is divided into three agencies – the Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI/Aman),

Mossad, and Israel Security Agency (Shabak). The IDI are part of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),

providing “Israel’s national intelligence evaluation” including collections, analysis and operations

pertinent to all matters of national and military security.2 Their military nature is reinforced by the chain

of command routed through the chief of staff of the IDF and in turn to the defense minister.3

Shabak and Mossad represent the ‘civilian’ or security side of Israeli intelligence, answering to

the prime minister directly.4 Mossad deals in “covert activities abroad” which further Israeli interests and

protect Israelis/Jews internationally, as well as supporting the IDI/IDF and Shabak.5 Shabak in turn is a

counterterrorism and counterintelligence corps, the latter both within and without of Israel.6

In staff, Aman is estimated to have 7,000 personnel to Mossad’s 1,200 and Shabak’s 5,000.7 As

of 2017 the combined budget of Shabak and Mossad is 7.5 billion shekels (~2.2 billion USD), Shabak

estimated to have the larger percentage.8 Aman’s specific budget is uncertain however under Defense

Minister Moshe Ya’alon (resigned 2016) they received priority funding over any other IDF department.9

Aman’s staff size is 483% greater than Mossad and 40% than Shabak and draws an allotment from a 2016

1
Major General Amos Yadlin, “IDI Faces the Challenges of Tomorrow,” in Israel’s Silent Defenders: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli
Intelligence, ed. Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2012), 7.
2
Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid, introduction to Israel’s Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, edited by Amos
Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2012), 3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
“Intelligence Community (Mossad & Israel Security Agency pages),” Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), accessed
December 10th, 2017, http://www.iicc.org.il/?module=category&item_id=19.
6
Ibid.
7
“Mossad,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Intelligence Resource Program, accessed December 10th, 2017,
https://fas.org/irp/world/israel/mossad/index.html ; “Aman – Military Intelligence,” FAS: Intelligence Resource Program, last modified 2003,
accessed December 10th, 2017, https://fas.org/irp/world/israel/aman/index.html ; Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly Jr, To Protect and Defend:
US Homeland Security Policy (NYC, New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), chapter 6 ‘Homeland Security in a Comparative Perspective’,
section Israel sub-section practices page unknown.
8
Chaim Levinson, “Israel Doubled the Budgets of Shin-Bet and Mossad in 12 Years to $2.4 Billion,” Haaretz, May 5th, 2017, accessed
December 10th, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.787481
9
Amir Rapaport, “Revolution in the Intelligence Agencies,” IsraelDefense, April 19th, 2014, accessed December 10th, 2017,
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/revolution-intelligence-agencies
defense budget of 69.7 billion.10 There is no question Aman’s funding is far greater than Mossad or

Shabak.

These cover the ‘largeness’ of Israeli intelligence services. What then of the other variables to

suggest preponderance? Firstly there is the question of jurisdiction. As noted earlier by Gilboa and Lapid,

Israel is unique in the military authority of national intelligence contrary to most other nations. The IDI’s

military director is the supreme intelligence office in Israel, “determ[ing] and direct[ing] Israel’s security

and foreign policies” with the Prime Minister and government.11

Aman is given the widest range of intelligence responsibilities and tasks vis-a-vis her sister

agencies. She is responsible for HUMINT within Israel and adjacent territories with the field-

interrogation-corps known as Unit 504.12 Aman’s Unit 8200 is Israel’s SIGINT corps.13 Imaging

intelligence is also predominated by Aman, including satellite collections.14

Israel continues to face a high military threat, both of an asymmetrical nature yet also

increasingly by once asymmetrical foes who have increasingly adopted sophisticated technologies.

Military predominance continues concurrent with this military threat despite the increased presence of

terrorism more suitable to the Shabak and Mossad.

Pakistan, for all its differences to Israel, is another highly suitable case study for this hypothesis.

She has fought four wars with India, a state with greater demographic and military power than Pakistan.

The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war cost Pakistan slightly over half of its total population and land-mass with

the secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan).15 India continues to loom large in Pakistani military-

intelligence fears. 16 Militancy has risen as an existential threat, culminating recently in a Pakistani

Taliban 2009 territorial expansion reaching 60 miles from the capital of Islamabad.

10
Shmuel Even and Eran Yashiv, “The Defense Budget for 2017-2018,” INSS Insight No. 880 (December 2016), accessed December 10th, 2017,
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/defense-budget-2017-2018/
11
Gilboa and Lapid, Israel’s Silent Defender, 3.
12
“About Unit 504,” Intelligence 10 Association, accessed December 10th, 2017, http://www.modiin10.org.il/Page-3.html
13
Brigadier General (Res.) Hanan Geffen, “SIGINT in the Service of Intelligence,” in Israel’s Silent Defenders: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of
Israeli Intelligence, ed. Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2012), 197.
14
Brigadier General Eli Pollak, “VISINT in Israeli Intelligence,”in Israel’s Silent Defenders: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence,
ed. Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2012), 236.
15
C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 261.
16
PTI, “India is biggest threat to Pakistan: Bajwa,” The Hindu
 Add to this the virulent provincial secessionism threatening to balkanize Pakistan and it is clear

Pakistan scores high on the military threat matrix, in the range of 7-10. Chance of a war with India

remains moderate to high despite nuclear deterrence with frequent border skirmishes, and any such war

risks monumental severity. Chance of war with irregular forces like the Pakistani Taliban or Baluchi

separatists is near guaranteed, and the severity ranges from manageable insurgencies/terrorism to collapse

of state authority in the provinces or even an ISIS-style expansion to Islamabad.

Pakistan clearly faces a high military threat and her military’s intelligence should predominate. It

does, albeit with a twist. The conventional Directorate for Military Intelligence (MI) is the secondary

intelligence force – the hegemon is the Inter-Service-Agency (ISI). Ostensibly the ISI is an independent

and parallel agency, answering to the prime minister directly instead of the defense minister, with a

budget separate to the military’s.17

Yet every single ISI director has come from the military and the majority of senior leadership is

held by active-duty soldiers.18 Her interests are typically shared by the military, with which there is a

better (if not always perfect) relationship compared to ISI’s relationship with the avowedly civilian

Intelligence Bureau (IB), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). However autonomous the ISI is, it

represents the hegemony of a militarized (if not purely military) intelligence service.

The ISI are widely reported to be the largest intelligence agency in staff and budget. Hassan

Abbas cites estimates of intelligence service employees at 20,000 for the ISI and 3,500 and 2,000 for the

FIA and IB respectively.19 Kiessling considers the ISI’s core at four to five thousand and higher numbers

an over-estimate, but it is certain the ISI have a far greater manpower potential than their civilian

counterparts. 20 MI staff size is uncertain yet certain to eclipse the civilian intelligence agencies given the

preeminence of the army in the Pakistani state.

17
Ankit Panda, “Pakistan Expands Defense Budget,” The Diplomat, June 12th, 2014, accessed December 11th, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/pakistan-expands-defense-budget/
18
Hein G. Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) Of Pakistan (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2016), 170-171.
19
Hassan Abbas, “Internal Security Issues in Pakistan: Prospects of Police and Law Enforcement Reform,” in Pakistan at the Crossroads:
Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (India: Penguin Random House, 2016), page not available, accessed
December 11th, 2017 from google books, [link]
20
Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline, 171.
 Funding further demonstrates the military preponderance in Pakistani intelligence. The

Intelligence Bureau’s 2017-2018 budget is 4.76 billion Pakistani Rupee or 44.2 million USD.21 The

Federal Investigation Agency’s 2014-2015 budget was 1.6 billion rupees (14.8 million USD).22 The ISI’s

2014-2015 budget allotted 161.2 billion Pakistani Rupees (1.5 billion USD) to the agency.23 It is unclear

how much of the 2014-2015 budget for the army (3.4 billion USD) was allotted to the MI.

The trend of martial intelligence hegemony persists in policies and practices of Pakistan’s

intelligence. Since the 1980s the ISI have dominated intelligence activities of the Pakistani state, playing

the pivotal role of intelligence in foreign and domestic endeavors. The ISI serves to coordinate

intelligence among the three military branches (hence inter-service), collect foreign and domestic

intelligence including surveillance, conduct counterintelligence and general operations within and without

Pakistan.24 Wet-work as well as arresting is within the ISI’s purview.

The Intelligence Bureau and FIA represent the civilian arm of Pakistani intelligence, and

subsequently have a far more stymied jurisdiction and responsibilities. The FIA is comparable to the FBI

with responsibilities of law enforcement centering on crime and terrorism.25 Pakistan’s IB similarly

focuses on police matters and counterintelligence, with an eye towards political and social

influence/manipulation.26 Neither have anywhere near the reach or reliance in state policy as practiced by

the ISI and MI, who have a far greater leverage against and autonomy from the political administration.

It is pertinent to address the elephant (or eagle) in the intelligence room – the United States. This

theory must hold up in testing against the state with one of the largest and most robust intelligence

agencies in the world.

21
Staff Reporter, “Govt eschews sharing details of IB budget,” The Nation, May 28th, 2017, accessed December 11th, 2017,
http://nation.com.pk/28-May-2017/govt-eschews-sharing-details-of-ib-budget
22
Supreme Court of Pakistan, Criminal Review Petition No.47/2015 In/and Crl.P.578/2014, August 21st, 2015, page 1. Accessed December 11th,
2017, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Crl.R.P._47_2015.pdf
23
Panda, “Pakistan Expands Defense Budget.”
24
Global National Security and Intelligence Agencies Handbook: Vol I, Strategic Information and Contacts (Washington, DC: International
Business Publications, 2015), 165.
25
Abu Rashid Jafri, “Public Service Ethics in Pakistan,” Public Administration in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, ed. Meghna
Sabharwal, Evan M. Berman (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 2013), 432.
26
Peter Lyon, “Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), in Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO,
2008), 84.
 Classifying the United States on the threat matrix is difficult. The threats faced by the US have

drastically changed since 1945, with the primacy of conflict with the Soviet Union front and center from

1949-1991. In this regard the military threat facing the USA was a solid 5 in severity, all but promising

any military threat’s actualization would lead to existential nuclear war. Questions on threat chance are

more ambiguous.

Hindsight bias encourages the mitigating role of deterrence and mutually assured destruction as

making the Soviet threat limited (a 2 on the matrix). Reluctance for escalation was a constant

consideration of the USSR and US. Neither was bellicose or flippant in wanting a conflict whose severity

was cataclysmic. Soviet experts in US intelligence, like Colonel Graham Vernon in 1979, found the

Warsaw Pact/Soviets highly unlikely to seek a conventional war in Europe short of extreme

circumstances. 27

Therefore, we can safely count the cumulative military threat posed by the USSR as that of 7 –

existential in severity but limited in likelihood. Additional threats to the US in the form of terrorism and

rogue nations like Iran or North Korea fall close to this rating. North Korea is a high but not existential

severity (4) with a limited to moderate chance (2-3) to total 6-7. Terrorism ranges from highly likely to

guaranteed (4-5) but also scales from minimal to moderate severity (1-3) and totals 5-8.

This kind of moderate-high score suggests military intelligence may not predominate in the

unilateral fashion of a high-threat state like Israel, yet should not be an irrelevant presence. More than

likely civilian-security agencies will display a hybridized paramilitarization.

America’s sheer volume of intelligence agencies encourages both dealing with individual

agencies as well as grouping them on a military-security axis. 50 U.S. Code § 3003 of the National

Security Act of 1947 defines National Intelligence Programs (NIP) as constituting intelligence services

and tasks defined by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the President or non-military

agencies like State department, CIA or FBI. Of the NIP, the CIA clearly stands out as the leading agency.

27
Colonel Graham D. Vernon, “Soviet Options for War in Europe: Nuclear or Conventional?” (National Security Affairs Monogram Series 79-1,
National Defense University Research Directorate, Washington, DC, February 5 th, 1979), page 17. Accessed December 10th, 2017,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a064245.pdf
Her staff dwarfs that of the FBI and other NIP agencies’ intelligence departments. Military Intelligence

Programs (MIP) meanwhile deal with intelligence exclusively for supporting military operations.

The NSA, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency are an

outlier, with Mark Lowenthal counting them as both NIP and MIP.28 The NSA and DIA in particular

feature a greater mix of civilian and military staff/obligations/command-and-control. The NSA belongs to

the DOD yet answers to the DNI, the DIA answer to the Secretary of Defense yet are independent of the

conventional military command-and-control. Much like the Pakistani ISI, these two services blur the line

of civilian-security and military.

Declassified statistical information is difficult to come by, but there are estimates with regards to

staffing the most important NIP and NIP-MIP hybrid services:

 The CIA’s manpower is estimated at 20,000 as of 2013.29

 NSA staff is estimated at 35,000 to 50,000.30
 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has upwards of 16,500 on staff, a mix of civilian
and soldier.31
 The FBI had 4,245 counterintelligence agents as of 2016.32
 US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) have a staff of 17,500.33
 Air Force Intelligence has a staff of around 17,000.34

Invariably the sheer size of the military and unique demands of operational military intelligence

means MIP agencies may have more staff in subordinate positions – INSCOM for instance has ~18

intelligence brigades. This makes the staffing picture not entirely clear as military intelligence may have

more employees yet their functions constitute a much narrower and brief tactical level of intelligence.

Budgetary analysis can help augment the military/civilian-security (NIP) disparity. There are no

declassified assessments on an agency by agency basis. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) does

28
Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy 3rd Edition (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006), 49.
29
Ibp Inc, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Handbook – Strategic Information, Activities and Regulations (Washington DC: International
Business Publications, 2013), 99.
30
Elias Groll, “By the numbers: The NSA’s super-secret spy program, PRISM,” Foreign Policy, June 7th, 2013, accessed December 11th, 2017,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/07/by-the-numbers-the-nsas-super-secret-spy-program-prism/
31
Defense Intelligence Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed December 11th, 2017,
http://www.dia.mil/About/FAQs/
32
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit: Performance and Resource Table,” FY 2017
Authorization and Budget Request to Congress, February 2016, accessed December 11th, 2017,
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/821341/download
33
Meloney Bagwell, “INSCOM welcomes Maj. Gen. Christopher Ballard as the new commanding general,” Army, June 28th, 2016. Accessed
December 11th, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/170545/inscom_welcomes_maj_gen_christopher_ballard_as_the_new_commanding_general
34
Air Force, “Air Force ISR Agency,” US Air Force, August 10th, 2007, accessed December 11th, 2017, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104553/air-force-isr-agency/
however disclose the difference of National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence program

budgets: $53.0 billion to the NIP and 17.7 Billion to the MIP in 2016.35 This is a remarkable disparity,

even allowing for at least two NIP agencies blurring the lines of military/civilian (NSA/DIA). It sharply

contradicts the hypothesis; given the US has a moderate-high military threat index.

Quantitative size is only part of deterring intelligence services predominance. What of

jurisdiction? The United States has a rigid delineation of foreign and domestic activity, and this restraints

both military and security/civilian intelligence.

Military intelligence is overwhelmingly excluded from ever practicing intelligence work

domestically due to legislation like the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The CIA, the most muscular of the

NIP agencies, is likewise restrained by the foundational National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent EO

12333. The hybrid NIP/MIP NSA can operate domestically and internationally but with greater domestic

restraint. Altogether civilian-security intelligence has greater jurisdiction than military intelligence. The

latter is almost entirely foreign-oriented; the former is entrusted to domestic and foreign activities.

Despite her domestic handicaps, the CIA prevails as the agency entrusted with the widest range of

responsibilities and tasks. She is the primary HUMINT intelligence service.36 Much like Aman, the CIA

is the primary advisory/analyst intelligence body and similarly conducts her own IMINT and SIGINT

independent of sister intelligence services.

CIA para-militarization of capabilities has steadily increased since early endeavors in 1950s

Korea and Tibet. In 1960 she could only drop Tibetan rebels with supplies to fight the Chinese.37 In

Vietnam she was able to conduct covert operations with clandestine air support, until in 1964 she had to

35
ODNI News Release, “DNI Releases Appropriated Budget Figure for 2017 National Intelligence Program,” Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, October 30th, 2017, accessed December 11th, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1810-dni-releases-
appropriated-budget-figure-for-2017-national-intelligence-program
36
Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Pentagon’s Spies,” from The National Security Archive, Washington DC: George Washington University National
Security Archive, updated July 6th, 2015, accessed December 11th, 2017. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB520-the-Pentagons-
Spies/
37
Peter Harcelrode, Fighting Dirty: The Inside story of covert operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden (London, UK: Cassell & Co,
2001), 192
share operational activities with the military’s MACV took over their task.38 And of this year now the

CIA has unilateral authority to launch drone strikes independently of the military.39

America has generally faced a moderate-high military threat index, in the range of 6-7 on the

informal threat matrix. Yet her premiere ‘generalist’ agency participating in a myriad of intelligence

disciplines does not belong to the military as the Israeli Aman or Pakistani ISI do. Instead the CIA, her

predominant intelligence corps, has proceeded to para-militarize. Other major national intelligence

programs like the DIA and NSA represent a similar blur of military and civilian-security.

I do not consider this a failure of the hypothesis – rather, the ambiguity is to be expected from a

country with a medium range to their military threat index. The US does not have a purely high or purely

low threat index; therefore the military and civilian-security intelligence services achieve a relative parity.

This theory will hold if states with a low military threat index correspondingly have the civilian-security

intelligence unilaterally predominate. Ambiguity like in the case of the US will suggest military vs

civilian-security predominance is linked to something other than military-threat levels.

To better isolate ancillary variables from the United States, the United Kingdom serves as a

valuable case study of a country with a low-moderate military threat. Britain has not faced a war of

severity since 1945. She did face the Soviet military and nuclear threat, but the coalition nature of NATO

and US preponderance in such affairs meant the United States took the league. How the Soviet threat

manifest to the British is in the Russian’s avowed policy of supporting “anti-colonial ‘liberation’

movements in the British empire”. This was a battle of prestige and influence, not existential survival.40

The decline of her empire and relinquishing of superpower status to the Americans further

diminished the responsibilities of being a global power. Put simply, the military threat of a situation like

Vietnam or the Iranian revolution was far greater to the United States than the military threat of the

Dhofar Rebellion or Falklands to the British.

38
Ibid, 456-458.
39
Rebecca Savransky, “Trump gives CIA power to launch drone strikes: report,” The Hill, March 13th, 2017, accessed December 11th, 2017,
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/323808-trump-gives-cia-power-to-launch-drone-strikes-report
40
Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (NYC, New York: The Overlook Press,
2013), 116.
 On the informal threat-matrix, Britain post 1945 has had a minimal to moderate chance of

military threat occurrence (1-3) and a minimal to moderate severity of threat (1-3) with only the IRA and

The Troubles constituting a moderate threat. The wide variation of threats constitutes a military threat

index of 2-6, generally falling in the 3-5 range on average. Therefore military intelligence should be

subordinate to a security-civilian intelligence system in Great Britain post WW2.

The primary intelligence services of Great Britain are MI5 (Security Service), Government

Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service), and Defense Intelligence

(DI). Senior within the intelligence system is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), noted as the primary

analytical and coordinating intelligence body.

MI5 and MI6 originated as military intelligence (hence the appellation) yet were separated from

the military command in a 1931 intelligence reform. 41 Lingering ‘military ethos’ began to decline in MI5

starting in the 1930s, and the Foreign office eroded military influence and protectionism of MI6 after

1945.42 Walton notes the JIC steadily ‘civilianized’ since the end of WW2 and the emergence of the Cold

War, with military control of the body shifting to civilian ministers.43 The GCHQ have always been a

civilian entity since its conception in 1921. 44

In terms of staff (as of 2015): MI5 employed 4037, MI6 employed 2479, GCHQ employed 5564,

and Defense Intelligence employed 3697. 45 The same Parliamentary report on page 10 defines the

cumulative MI5/MI6/GCHQ budget in 2014-2015 as 2.6 billion pounds, compared to DI’s individual

budget of 325 million pounds. Assuming for an equal ~33.3% cut of the cumulative budget,

MI5/MI6/GCHQ each receives 866 million. Any of the three departments would need to receive a

marginal 12.5% of the cumulative intelligence budget in order to have as little funding as DI receives.

These metrics clearly demonstrate a disproportionate manpower and funding advantage of the civilian-

security agencies vis-a-vis military intelligence.

41
Chariman Brinson and Richard Dove, A Matter of Intelligence: MI5 and the surveillance of anti-Nazi refugees 1933-1950 (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 2014), 9.
42
Ibid ; Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (NYC, New York: Touchstone, 2000), 34.
43
Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets, xxvii.
44
Ibid, 19.
45
British Parliament, “Annual Report 2015-2016,” Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament HCC 444, 11/12/14/16.
 Of course budget and manpower is only part of an intelligence service’s positioning. Yet in

matters of jurisdiction and responsibilities DI continues to be eclipsed. In the United States and Israel

military intelligence serves an integral role in national SIGINT operations through NSA and Aman

respectively – in Britain post 1945 non-military SIGINT is the purview of GCHQ.

DI also does not gain special jurisdiction in overseas territories despite the military nature of

certain colonial conflicts. During the cold war special corps within colonial police branches, largely

supported by MI5, were the ones to perform the fundamental ‘groundwork of intelligence gathering’.46

The DI was left with little more than conventional military intelligence considering MI6 had seniority in

foreign, non-colonial HUMINT tasks and GCHQ in foreign and domestic SIGINT and ELINT. During

the Cold War this led to the atrophying of the DI as the majority of military threats faced by Britain were

of a paramilitary, asymmetrical nature – most notably the Argentines and Egyptians at Suez.

Britain generally corresponds to the hypothesis, having faced a lower military threat score post

WW2 and correspondingly having civilian-security intelligence predominate. Defense intelligence ceased

to be a high priority during “low intensity conflicts and peace-enforcement operations” which constituted

the threats Great Britain faced during the Cold War and after.47

Lastly, we should consider a state which scores extremely low on the threat matrix. Ireland and

Sweden are suitable case studies, both having long tenures of state-to-state peace and avoidance of any

‘sovereign wars’ (where they were not part of some international coalition or UN peace keeping).

Violence in Northern Ireland never constituted the level of a military threat, being instead an issue of

terrorism. There was a minimal chance of Soviet aggression against Sweden given its neutrality and the

invariability of a wider World War or nuclear-exchange if the Soviets invaded a Western European state

(NATO or otherwise). On the threat-index they rank a 2-4. Unfortunately, the evidence becomes more

ambiguous with these low-threat countries.

46
Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets, xxix.
47
Philip H.J. Davies, Myron Varouhakis, Neveen Abdalla, “Defense Intelligence in the UK: anagency for inquiry within and beyond the ‘3 mile
limit’,” Intelligence and National Security, Volume 31 Issue 6, 2016, introduction abstract, accessed December 12th, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1115236
 Sweden, since 1937, has had its military-constituted Defense Staff predominate as the national

intelligence service.48 The Defense Staff, recently reconstituted MUST in 1994, serves as Sweden’s

primary foreign intelligence service and chief analyst/advisor to the Swedish government and military.

Her jurisdictions cover the gamut of intelligence activities including SIGINT and HUMINT.

It is not possible to acquire the budget and staffing details of the Defense Staff/MUST. It is

possible to compare the purely civilian Swedish Security Service with the hybrid FRA in charge of

SIGINT work (FRA is civilian but operates under the Defense Ministry much like the NSA). The FRA

has 700 employees on a budget of 100 million.49 The civilian Swedish Security Service (Säpo) had a 2015

budget of 135.6 million USD, with approximately 1,100 staff.50 Given the greater volume of tasks and

responsibilities of MUST/Defense Staff, there is no question at a minimum the cumulative total of the

three MUST departments eclipses the Säpo.

Until 1973 the Defense Staff had authority to conduct domestic intelligence.51 From 1938 until

1945 the Military also had exclusive responsibility for domestic security and counterespionage via the

General Security Service (GSS). Since then the National Police have re-asserted their primacy as the

domestic security and counter intelligence/terrorism/subversion agency. 52

It is tempting to conclude the military control of domestic intelligence 1938-1945 as proof of the

thesis – the military threat of the Nazis and Soviets led to a martialization of intelligence. This would

secure the hypothesis if not for the continued aberration of military hegemony in foreign intelligence and

SIGINT. Swedish military supremacy in this field persisted regardless of changes to the military threat

index. The United States since 1949 has always invested the civilian CIA with foreign-intelligence

supremacy, and the British have utilized the civilian GCHQ for SIGINT work since 1921 along with

48
Michael Fredholm, “Guide to the Study of Intelligence: Sweden’s Intelligence Services,” The Intelligencer, Journal of U.S. Intelligence
Studies, Volume 21, Number 2 Summer 2015, 56. Accessed December 12th, 2017,
https://www.afio.com/publications/FREDHOLM%20Sweden%20Intelligence%202015%20Sep%2001%20FINAL.pdf
49
Hugh Eakin, “The Swedish Kings of Cyberwar,” The New York Review of Books, January 19th, 2017, accessed December 12th, 2017,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/01/19/the-swedish-kings-of-cyberwar/
50
Swedish National Financial Management Authority, “Letter of Appropriation,” Swedish National Financial Management Authority, December
22nd, 2014, accessed December 12th, 2017, https://www.esv.se/statsliggaren/regleringsbrev/?RBID=16592 (translated) ; Swedish Security Service,
“Yearbook 2014,” Swedish Security Service, March 2015, accessed December 12th, 2017, page 10,
http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4c7cab6d1465fb27b01f1a/1426682274489/Arsbok2014_webb_slutgiltig.pdf (translated)
51
Ibid, 59.
52
Ibid, 59.
increasingly civilianizing their MI5/MI6 intelligence. If these high military threat states trusted their

civilian intelligence with such tasks, why did Sweden not?

Nor can we dismiss Sweden as a rogue exception because of the example of Ireland. Ireland was

not a NATO member and even in the case of WW3 Ireland’s only threat vis-a-vis Moscow was fallout

from an irradiated Great Britain. From independence onward the military threat of a British takeover of

Ireland rapidly vanished, and the violence of Northern Irish loyalists constituted a paramilitary or terrorist

threat. Ireland faced little military threats. Yet like Sweden, Ireland’s military intelligence constitutes a

more ambiguous picture than one of total civilian-security predominance.

It is the military’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (G2 branch) which constitutes the national

intelligence service.53 G2 handles foreign intelligence coordination with British, American and other

nation’s intelligence.54 The Irish military intelligence G2 also has no major domestic restrictions and

‘liase[s] extensively with other national agencies, in particular the An Garda Síochána.”55 The National

Police (An Garda Síochána) do conduct their own domestic intelligence work, chiefly counterespionage

and counterterrorism.56

Paradoxically at least in budget Irish military intelligence is terribly underfunded at an estimated

1 million USD in 2013.57 The National Police’s specific intelligence budget is not available, but the

collective budget in 2014 was 1.3 billion euros or 1.5 billion USD.58 National Police intelligence efforts

would have to be allotted less than 1% of the budget to be eclipsed by the G2’s budget.

Staff is less helpful as numbers specific to the intelligence department of the military or police are

unavailable. As a whole, the National Police field 15,000 employees to the Irish Military’s 10,000. Just

how much the G2 for the military or the police’s intelligence services constitutes is unclear.

53
Elizabeth Purdy, PH.D, “Irish Intelligence Services,” Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, ed. Rodney Carlisle (Abingdon,
Uk: Routledge, 2015), 332.
54
Ibid.
55
Annual Report 2010, “Defense Policy, Military Advice and Corporate Services,” Irish Department of Defense and Defense Forces, 2011. Page
43. accessed December 12th, 2017,
http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/documents/Annual_Reports/ar_2010_en.pdf
56
An Garda Síochána, “Security and Intelligence,” An Garda Síochána: Ireland’s National Police Service, accessed December 12 th, 2017,
http://www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=40
57
Courtney Falk, “Security in the Irish Information Technology Sector,” ECCWS2015-Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Cyber
Warfare and Security 2015, ed. Nasser Abouzakhar, page 55. Accessed December 12th, 2017, [link]
58
Irish Government, “Part IV Estimates for Public Services 2015,” Incorporating Summary Public Capital Programme, Table 1, accessed
December 12th, 2017, [link]
 This leaves the thesis irrevocably challenged. The theory held high military threat perception

meant intelligence predominated by the military – low military threat perception meant intelligence

predominated by the civilian-security establishment. This was proven with countries of high military

threat like Israel and Pakistan – their military intelligence was undisputed hegemon.

The United States had a moderate-high military threat index and it correspondingly had an

intelligence system with a kind of parity between the civilian and military – the CIA was the strongest

civilian agency yet had increasingly para-militarized, while the premiere SIGINT agency of the NSA was

a hybrid of civilian staff and military command and control via the DOD and Director of the NSA. Britain

in turn was a lower-moderate threat index and it featured an overwhelmingly civilian-dominated

intelligence system. The biggest and most funded agencies were all civilian, and said agencies had de-

militarized after the preeminent German threat of 1914-1945 abated.

The low military threat cases of Sweden and Ireland complicated the picture. Both delegated

foreign intelligence to a military agency when Britain and the United States did not. Even Israel

prioritized foreign intelligence in the civilian Mossad agency. Both had military intelligence enabled to

conduct domestic intelligence, although Sweden’s ceased since the 1970s. Swedish military intelligence

manpower appears likely to far outstrip her civilian Säpo, though the Irish curiously fund their military

intelligence on a shoestring budget.

Why did the thesis fail with low-threat countries? Erroneous threat-matrix scoring can’t explain

the intelligence preponderance of Sweden’s military. West Germany and Britain both had civilian-

security intelligence predominate, and both faced far greater threats vis-a-vis the USSR – both as

members of NATO, West Germany as the inevitable path of Soviet aggression and Britain as a nuclear

threat to the USSR.

It is possible that low or high military threats encourage the use of military intelligence over a

specialized civilian corps. If the threat is high, the military prevails due to the existential threat. If the

threat is low, there is little motivation to invest in a sophisticated civilian intelligence corps when the

military has the suitable acumen and experience to fulfill this function. If the threat is middle, then
civilian agencies can be specialized to take over tasks the military intelligence handle in a high or low

threat environment.

Ultimately, this thesis should not be discarded wholesale but rather calibrated and tailored to

achieve a more accurate conclusion. There is a strong correlation of high military threat to high military

intelligence predominance or the militarization of civilian intelligence. What must be analyzed is why the

theory falls apart on low-military threat countries. Additional information might also better demonstrate

power-differentials between civilian and military intelligence in these low-threat countries.

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