Article 6 Section 13

-Zandueta vs. De la Costa

-Adaza vs. Pacana
Sec.14
-Puyat vs. De Guzman
-Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Sec. 16
-Santiago vs. Guingona Jr.
-Avelino vs. Cuenco
-Arroyo vs. De Venecia
-Osmena vs. Pendatun
-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
-Paredes jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
-De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan
-U.S. vs Pons
-Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez
-Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
Sec. 17
-Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
-Angara vs. Electoral Commission
-Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
-Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
-Bondoc vs. Pineda
Chavez Vs Comelec
-Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
-Palparan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Sec. 18
-Daza vs Singson
-Coseteng vs. Mitra
-Guingona vs. Gonzales
Sec. 21
-Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
-Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks
-Arnault vs. Balagtas
-Senate vs. Ermita (Section 22)
-Gudani vs Senga
-In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio
-Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Section 22)
-Garcillano vs. House of Representatives
Section 13
Adaza vs. Pacana
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on
March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same
elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March
27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19,
1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his
oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the
duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office,
Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said
office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires
on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in
France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had
been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume
his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . .
.”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is
not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on
May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the
various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered
on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this
provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he
was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Section 14
Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the lone
district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the
declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved
for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and
personnel conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between
the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the
more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing
in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is actually based on a broader and more
equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-based
anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3
justices members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s
jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the
HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

HELD: However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time
in his memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond
what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays
primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private
respondent’s belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of
evidence (consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves.
By having done so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results of the
revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as “precinct-level
document-based evidence.” This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly
proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules.
Section 16
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan
On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act
was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to
be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information,
Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned
for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After
a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter
moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office.
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.

HELD: The Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.” On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : “SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of
benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.”
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which
he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis
in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as,
that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out
in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
Section 16
-De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente
Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the
Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through
counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13
August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from
notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P.
Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B.
Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure;
and Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of
R.A. 3019.

Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by
the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does
not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed
by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member.

Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing
witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members
of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of
the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch.

Section 17
Pimentel vs HRET
Facts:
Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction were filed before the court that the
respondents be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET
and CA to include part-list representatives in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and
Sec 17 and 18, Art VI.Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of which are party-list
representatives (PLR), the petitioners put forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted
and be replaced by PLR nominees.

Issues:

(I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because no party-list representatives are members thereof.

(II) Whether the refusal of the HRET and CA to reconstitute themselves to include party list
representatives constitute a grave abuse of discretion.

Held

The court dismissed the case on the following grounds:

(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because:

a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members will occupy the seats allotted to the
House in HRET and CA. And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their own
nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and not the Supreme Court) in
accordance with the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.

b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed to meet the requirements set forth
for judicial review. The petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA
and neither were they nominees to take the seat.

(II) There was likewise no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by HRET and CA because under Sec
17 and 18 of Art VI, the HRET and CA are deprived of any power to reconstitute themselves.

(III) The instant petitions must fail because of the new set of district and party-list reps elected in the
House. It cannot be resolved based on the "present composition" of the House as presented by the
petitioners.
Palparan VS Hret
G.R. No. 189506

Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for themembers of the House of Representatives. Respondents filed with HRET petition for quo
warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan. According to the respondents, Palparan
was not eligible to sit as a party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Palparan's contention:
HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was
elected. He was just a nominee and any question involving his eligibility was an internal concern of
Bantay. HRET: Dismissed petition against Bantay on the ground that the issue of the ineligibility or
qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-
List System Act but HRET upheld its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.
Palparan moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition for special civil action of
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Palparan as nominees of Bantay party-list organizations who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007elections.HELD: Yes. Palparan pointed out that
the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization
that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates
them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House, the resolution of the
dispute is taken out of its hand. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.***[

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec.9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his
term shall be allowed to continue until expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of the petitioner Palparan claim that
the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a “bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent.” But the court did not decide on the issue of eligibility of Abayon and
Palparan because it is HRET to interpret the above stated provision.
SECTION 21
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by Edgardo Angara.
Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said. Respondent is is one
of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify
before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing
any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be
rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the
respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
Resolution No. 166.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance
of Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege
speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO
THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK,
WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed
by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper.
Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position,
particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the
legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those
invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be
issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch
List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners,
through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper
authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the
accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court
cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.

Issue: petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign
securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

Ruling: Contention is UNTENABLE.

P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being)
conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in
petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply
“to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This
fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged
the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
In Arnault vs. Nazareno, “the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who possess it.”
The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and its committees in
this wise –
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of each other’s
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to
the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or
deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the
principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of
the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of
the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
In this case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was “in aid of collection” is a direct challenge
against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt
citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.
the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary
to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to
testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines
are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondent’s summons by leaving the
country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a
court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners’
intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.
Section 21
Gudani vs Senga
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so
by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power
as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere
with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the
armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
SECTION 21
-In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the
purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation.
SECTION 21
-Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the
2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio
Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a
favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was
played during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a
petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such
petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further
conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of
the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized
documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to
further proceed with their investigation?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by

arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate’s internet web page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through
the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the
Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process of
law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules
through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was
only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the
constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to
conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.