HEARSY EVIDENCE RULE – TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

GO VS PEOPLE AND HIGHDONECOMPANY, LTD.

G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal. The accused allegedly defrauded Highdone Company Ltd.
Represented by Li Luen Ping by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to Ping to
the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the
premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone in Mariveles, Bataan, executed
a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less
in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth
and in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he
could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC
granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.
Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before
the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for
reconsideration, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA which denied petitioners' motion.

Issue:

Whether or not the MeTC infringed the constitutional right of the petitioners to a public trial in allowing the taking of the
deposition of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia.

Held:

Yes. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is covered under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where
the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The
requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct
court testimony.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably
be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

The Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the
MeTC of Manila. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet
the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved
for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien
who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main
witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such
witness.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - IOTA OF EVIDENCE (CIRCUMSTANTIAL)

EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015

Facts:

The Information charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The accused entered the house of
Carmencita De Guzman by destroying the backdoor of the house, and once inside, take, rob and carried away several things.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that a certain Adriano Marquez witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of
De Guzman while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez,
whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio
as the culprit. De Guzman requested the police that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based
on the account of Marquez.

An operation was conducted by police accompanied by Marquez. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle
and identified Eduardo Celedonio. The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo
Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, where were the stolen items. Celedonio
then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where the police saw some of the stolen items. PO1 Roque
asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was
informed of his constitutional rights.

After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court) citing as his ground the
alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer.

Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the
insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered
inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him. The CA,
however, affirmed the RTC in toto.

Issue:

Whether the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that the petitioner’s guilt was
proven based on circumstantial evidence?

Held:

No. Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as
the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant’s participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. 16

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.17

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an unbroken
chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011

Facts:

P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU received an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the
illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving
Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo. The police led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe". Thru
a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw
"Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Upon gaining entrance, PO3
Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand, after being informed of such
authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out.
PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as
Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II,
Bagumbong, Caloocan City.

The RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision
convicting petitioner for illegal possession of a dangerous drugs in Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.

Issue:

Whether the police surveillance team sent to determine the veracity of a Camp Crame memorandum of shabu trading activity
at Caloocan city, which converted their mission from surveillance to a raiding team, can validly make an arrest and search
without a valid warrant having been first obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction?

Held:

Yes. At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in Sec. 2 : The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However, a settled exception to the right
guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require
a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to
operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly
arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the
arresting officer.