JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY.

JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment1[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath.

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-
fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that

from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at
Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together

on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
 On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration
at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following
that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card

bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning
in what youre about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find

fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find
a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan
for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make
your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first
time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in
my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
 . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND

YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM

LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE!2[2]

Eternally yours,

NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in
April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR

ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
 the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the
Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent
and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned:
Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted
an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.5[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants

wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family,
demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
 institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until
we are together again, as now they are.6[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph

15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his
acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and
that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful

relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of
Respondents special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion

to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage
a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant
and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
 formality of the marriage contract.7[7] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the

Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as
an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the

Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold.
In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he
mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke
up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and
degrades the legal profession.10[10] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph

19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances
the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.11[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12[12] alleging that

Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth
as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a
Certificate of Live Birth13[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14[14]

dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.15[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of
a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-

Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16[16] Respondents counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San

Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18[18] dated October 26,
2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19[19] that respondent be disbarred
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
 Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the
case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala

a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND

SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21[21] of complainant before this Court, filed

pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922[22] of the Rules of Court.
 The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23[23] on the present petition of

complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24[24] The contention fails. As
the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,

2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila Standard
(Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record
which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,

respondent through counsel made the following statements to
wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect
 to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an

admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him
and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-
1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship
between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the
child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it
should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene
there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he
is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25[25] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.26[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted
such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families.

In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the

pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge

of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And
the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate28[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29[29] shows that
they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of
the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his
January 29, 2003 Affidavit30[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene

has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32[32] which is
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their

own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,

proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case
for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all
that is required.33[33] (Emphasis supplied)
 Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar

by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or

disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34[34]

 The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress

in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends
on the surrounding circumstances.35[35] The case at bar involves a relationship
between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36[36]

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that

he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact
of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient
to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.37[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough
that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an
illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics
of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably
 unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which
his license confers upon him.39[39] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice

of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring
supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.40[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of

the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41[41] on March 22,
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his
(complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant
filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case, which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on
petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting

complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as
 though no appeal has been taken.42[42] (Emphasis supplied by
complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently

declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
marriage was declared null and void.43[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.44[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing
the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant

would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish
all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje
to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married
to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.

Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a
few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital
of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the
girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point
for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
 categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.45[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were
to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge

is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case47[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48[48] held:
 Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed

on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of

the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361

ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO"

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C.

Barrozo (respondent) is taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power
to discipline members of the bar under Section 11 Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
 Factual Antecedent

Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 222 which were assigned to respondent as
Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to Valeriano,
respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for
₱20,000.00. hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to
report the matter. The Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, after being told of respondents’
demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the operation
conducted of February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI
agents receiving the amount of ₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.

As a result, a case for direct bribery3 under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code was filed against respondent before the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City. The case, however, was later on indorsed to the Sandiganbayan
as respondent was occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or higher.

After finding the existence of all the elements4 of the crime, the Sandiganbayan,
in a Decision5 dated March 17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of direct bribery and sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional maximum, as
minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor
medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. in addition, it imposed
upon him the penalty of special temporary disqualification.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 (MR) but was denied in a

Resolution7 dated September 28, 2011.

Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari8 before this

Court but was denied in a Resolution9 dated December 14, 2011 on the ground
that the Petition failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed
any reversible error in its challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise of the
Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Respondent thrice move for
reconsideration.10 the first two MRs were denied,11 while the third one was
ordered expunged from the records.12

Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment13 was issued stating that the Court’s

Resolution of denial had already become final and executor on August 16, 2012.

In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter14 dated
in August 14, 2013 from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong
Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo,"
asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita G.
Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering
that said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to
inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.

Prompted by Wat & Co.’s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) whether respondent is still connected thereat.15 in reply, the DOJ informed
OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position effective May 3,
2005.16

On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was
indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court
has yet to rule on his disbarment.

In view of the foregoing and considering that respondent’s conviction is a ground

for disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, the Court through a Resolution17 dated December 11, 2013 required
respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the
practice of law.

In his Comment18 respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can
engage in the practice of law despite his conviction. He then argued that he did
not engage in the practice of law as his act of signing the claim letter does not
constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary
consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there
is no payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between
him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of the law on his part.

Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up
with its February 20, 2015 Report and Recommendation19 recommending the
disbarment of respondent.

Our Ruling

The court adopts the OBC’s recommendation.

It must first be clarified that the issue in this case is not what respondent
essentially argued about in his Comment, i.e., whether his act of signing the claim
letter constitutes practice of law. As aptly stated by the OBC in its
recommendation and viewed from proper perspective the real issue here is
whether respondent should be suspended or disbarred by reason of his
conviction of the crime of direct bribery. Hence, the Court finds respondent’s
comment to be totally without merit as he veered away, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, from the crux of the controversy in this case.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. And with the finality of respondent’s conviction for direct bribery, the
next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that
involves moral turpitude.

To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the
same must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. [it must involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."20

In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa,21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same
question posed in this case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138
provides:

Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds

therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a will disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority [to do so]. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Xxxx

[T]he crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.

COMELEC,22 we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the
crime of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by

himself or through another;

3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the

public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do;
and
 4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act
or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes
a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he
owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by
the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary o the accepted rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.23

Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is

a ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an
attorney.

The Court is mindful that a lawyer’s conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe
penalty of suspension. As held, the determination of whether an attorney should
be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound
judicial discretion.24 here, however, the circumstances surrounding the case
constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the
OBC.

It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime respondent
was an assistant public Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of
extorting money from a party to a case handled by him does not only violate the
requirement that cases must be decided based on the merits of the parties
respective evidence but also lessens the people’s confidence in the rule of law.
Indeed
Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.1âwphi1 Lawyers in
public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice,25

Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath
as a government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his
qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as an
attorney.

As a final note, it is well to state that:

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of

justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at
large] may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to
rid [the] profession of odious members.26

WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of the Decision be
attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

CORONA, J.:
 This is a complaint for disbarment49[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie

Labiano, convinced his clients50[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance51[3] and expeditious collection on their
claims.52[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and
sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit53[5]

of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his
lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead,
in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling
card:54[6]
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821

Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
 CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the

printing and circulation of the said calling card.55[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.56[8]
 Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,57[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0258[10] and other canons59[11] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as
stated in Section 27, Rule 13860[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any
repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but
we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent

into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
 Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including
the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of
the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL

USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.61[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent
or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
of service to which every member of the bar is called.62[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT

DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.63[15] Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.64[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)65[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.66[18]
 Complainant presented substantial evidence67[19] (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well
as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later

admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless

seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word
that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating

Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.68[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.69[21] Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot
escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as

borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception
is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as
filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that

the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.70[22] It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.71[23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than
that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity
to the clients cause.72[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes

malpractice73[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers.
Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.74[26]
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the

prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
 A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner.
A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.75[27] For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law
lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.76[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was
dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage
of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court
is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for
the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules

1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to
all courts.

SO ORDERED.

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian

Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14
February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted

marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of
Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent
had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations
(in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6
January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the
Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the
examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar
Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his
application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good
moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he
became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the
Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7
June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6).
Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October
1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he
could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having
indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to
my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with
the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred
that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose
out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining
from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter
No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August
1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this

time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid

marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and
making a mockery of our marriage institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is

already married in his application to take the bar exam.

c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification

he submitted to the Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me

into signing of the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his
explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss,
when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me
to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and
relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to
withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated

and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent
after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was
grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not
love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was
actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the
celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer,
and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they
were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised
Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in
shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional
and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to
any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned,
Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his
studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from
the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that
the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the
same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He
could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as
husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly
believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor
General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be
exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the
hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making
inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed
before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of
his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant,
we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material
fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01,
Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides:
"A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him
outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good
moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status
as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage
under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from
the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent
can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is
that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character
under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty
in connection therewith has been regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various

pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally
married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he
denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21)
contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears
that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were
merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment
in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation"
(pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to

Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage
and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the
marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not
to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this
case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it
was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F,"
Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that
he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is,
for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent
had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish
to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he
would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-
pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No.
2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been
lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is

not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by
Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of
an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy

to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until
further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who
shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO vs. ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO

 RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of

Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a
manner befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed
with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent
Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The
charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva

Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to
inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino
Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been
remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva
Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either
party in Civil Case No. 784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been
transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals
should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the
court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of
Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go
to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant
replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you
claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting
your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied,
It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.

Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand
the record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to
notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision.
Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon?
Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then
turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The
banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC,
Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.[4]

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed
his finger at complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek
haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill
feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at
respondents words but still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir.
Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he again
shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her

office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that
her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to
command full respect from her staff.[6]

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an
Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed
the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said
employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed
by complainant on 25 September 2003.[8]

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit

his answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18
June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed
with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847
before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the
complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC
and the complainant reassured him of the same.
 Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on
that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident,
the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these
records were returned to the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However,
on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be
submitted for resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that
the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from
physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings
as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his
public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the

next hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent
personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be

reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional
duties shall be dealt with more severely.[14] The IBP submitted to this Court a
Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.[15]
 At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of
record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been
easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the
decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record
a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records
were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of
record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach

upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
 Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil
Case No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the
counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case

No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his
voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only
was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a
woman and in front of her subordinates.

As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized

that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the
public estimation and erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03,
Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public
or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness

and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
 Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They
must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all times.[18]

As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did

not categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy
narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents

uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the
same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having
filed a case against respondent pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such
claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty.
Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the

fact that respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had
accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from
his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say
and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be
undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.
 The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting
interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorable performance of professional duty.[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of

TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana
(Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides,
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B.
Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property
subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an
ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel.
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in
Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-
Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal
assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him
ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a
lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284
and that his signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as
Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that
while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000,
there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that
notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent
to Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only
excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that
the notices and pleadings would not reach him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez),

Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs failure to endorse pleadings and notices of
Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly
refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she
actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente.
The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in
November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of
Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003,
Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes
allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address
without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As
regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the
IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to
submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he
reserved his right to submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for
not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmentes suspension to six
months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the
NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with
standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not
written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-
168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly

assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from
the practice of law.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized

practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding
ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6

The Court explained:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the
Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No.
9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela
Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and
that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out
by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003.
Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court
notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No.
9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge
Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still
representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the
preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have
been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no
access to the files in Busmentes office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,

submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer
submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by
Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that
Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The
IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other documents signed by
Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to
Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a
letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29
August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by
Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and
he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire
about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9
submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO

F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI
Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which
have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her
sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before
Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned
in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be
taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and
we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she
was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F.
Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any
pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those
 were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the
following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the

truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are

absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful

statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which
is not so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we
never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in
the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to
ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to
represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed
her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us
paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP,
modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law

for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant,

vs.
PEDRO B. CARRANZA

FERNANDO, J.:

The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so appropriately

put, is a privilege burdened with conditions. 1 A lawyer is called upon by virtue of
his oath of office to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
... [and to] conduct (himself) as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity ... to the courts ..." 2 The
question, one that has an element of novelty, is whether respondent Pedro B.
Carranza, duly admitted to the practice of the law, did get entangled in the
complexity of the strands in the web of obligation such an oath imposes? More
specifically, did he manifest the utmost fealty to the trust reposed in him as an
officer of the Court by taking all necessary measures to avoid the court being
misled, even if such were the result not of design but of inadvertence?

A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for
deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of
the falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of
his client to the effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or
descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the
deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, father of the
complainant, he introduced the same in evidence. 3

Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an
answer. Thereafter, on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the
matter that the aforesaid Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in
evidence only to prove the fact of such transfer of the property in question to his
client, respondent having "no hand in the making of said affidavit nor of the
petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay City." 4

On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein
both complainant and respondent were duly heard. The issue in the opinion of
the then Solicitor General, the Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a member of this
Court, as set forth in his report of March 18, 1968, is whether respondent
"consented in violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court."

It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the
preparation of the Petition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation
does not appear from the evidence presented in this case. The Petition was
subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one Atty. A. Mendoza, while the
Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay before Notary Public Ernesto V.
Ventura. The foregoing documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court,
Sorsogon...." 5
 It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very
meticulous about the petition" because there was neither private nor
government opposition thereto; that if he had intended to deceive the court by
virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to answer his questions at
the cadastral hearing to conform to the controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of
Adjudication concerning the statement reproduced from the tax declaration that
the decedent left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs
except the affiant...." 6

There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands,
there is no apparent causal link between the falsehood and the fact that
respondent is the lawyer handling the cadastral case at the Sorsogon end." 7
Nonetheless, while recognizing the absence of evidence that such falsehood in
the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the report would hold
him liable for discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates are
involved "certainly warranted a greater exercise of diligence on respondent's
part." 8

Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to
read the entirety of the affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to
clear up doubts and inconsistencies." 9 For he could have been aware of the family
litigations between his client and complainant which are rooted in successional
rights...." 10 If only for the above fact then, as stated in the report, "he should
precisely have taken the bother to read the entirety of the Affidavit of
Adjudication when the cadastral case was heard on January 17, 1966...." 11

From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor
General Antonio Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero:
"If he did not, he cannot be relieved from the consequences of his acts as a
lawyer, and disclaim responsibility therefor. To allow respondent relief from his
duty is to ignore what is obvious from the nature of the litigations in which he
entered his appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit
proves that he did not properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to
present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with
facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to confusion and the
prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief...." 12

It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of
his oath against respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two
above officials on March 18, 1968. Respondent was charged with "violation of his
oath of office, [having] caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for
presenting evidence therein containing a false statement inconsistent with facts
he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client and
complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and that]
respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of
office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of Court." 13

Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts.
He would allege in justification however "that while it is true that the ...
respondent was the counsel who appeared for the petitioner in Cadastral Case
No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of Sorsogon Cadastre, yet he had nothing to
do with the making of the petition and the annexes thereto attached; for the
same were made in Pasay City and that when (he) accepted to represent the
petitioner in the Cadastral Case mentioned above, there was no opposition from
anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands nor from the Honorable Solicitor
General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere formality. Such being the
case, the [respondent] presented the petitioner's case on January 17, 1966,
without meticulously going over the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of
Adjudication and Transfer was presented to show the fact of transfer of the land
described therein from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that
proceeding will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the
existence of an incorrect statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It
was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the doing of the falsity therein made,
since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor did
[respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing mentioned above; ..." 14
 There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then
Solicitor General Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by
respondent in thus introducing in evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and
Transfer which turned out to be false, in the preparation of which, however, he
had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously cannot be
sustained.1awphil.ñêt

Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer
must be in the negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure
to exercise greater care did result in the "confusion and prolongation of the
cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, it would be to err on, the side of undue
leniency if he would be held blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his
oath as attorney was less than entire.

Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or
inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could
conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been
admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they
owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are
likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the
court is concerned.

Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in

this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free
himself from a charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his
conduct was not wilful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.

A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be
taken lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a
failure of justice if courts cannot rely on the submission as well as the
representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this
case, even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the
court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the
responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a

repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt
with. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, through any of the district judges, is
hereby directed to administer in public the reprimand thus imposed on
respondent Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer, must be
duly informed of the date when such reprimand is to be administered.

THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, complainants, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL
PAMINTUAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On January 16, 2004, we rendered a Decision suspending for a period of one (1)
year Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, herein respondent. He was charged by the above-
named complainants with (1) gross ignorance of the law; (2) violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused; (3) arrogance, oppressive conduct, and
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (4) impropriety.

For our resolution is complainants motion for reconsideration of our Decision

praying that the penalty of one (1) year suspension we imposed upon respondent
judge be modified. Instead, we should dismiss him from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to any re-employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.

Firstly, the assailed Decision was a product of our extensive and serious
deliberation. We carefully evaluated respondents infractions before imposing
upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the service. To reconsider
our Decision sans new and compelling reason is plain flip-flopping which will
result in serious injustice to respondent. Even complainants motion for
reconsideration provides no sufficient justification. It does not raise new matters
or issues demanding new judicial determination. In other words, it is but a
reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in complainants
pleadings which we already determined and resolved before we rendered the
Decision sought to be reconsidered. The facts, the issues, and the law contained
in our Decision having remained unchanged, we find no reason why we should
reconsider it.

Secondly, the cases relied upon by complainants in pointing out that the penalty
imposed upon respondent is not commensurate to his offenses are based on
entirely different factual settings. Complainants cited the following cases:

The common thread in the above cases, which justifies the imposition of the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service upon the erring judges, is the fact
that the acts committed by respondents therein involve malice, wrongful
motives, corrupt intentions or moral depravity. Apparently, of the thirteen (13)
cases cited, eight (8) were either for gross misconduct, serious misconduct or
corruption. Five (5) cases were for gross ignorance of the law. In two (2) of these
cases, only reprimand and fine were imposed upon respondents. In the remaining
three (3), respondents were penalized with dismissal from the service because of
facts peculiar to said cases, definitely not similar to the facts in the instant case. In
Castaos vs. Escao,[15] in addition to gross ignorance of the law, respondent was
also found guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory
measure. In Lantaco, Sr. vs. Judge Llamas,[16] respondent judge repeatedly
ignored our directive for him to file comment. And in State Prosecutors vs.
Muro,[17] though respondent judge was initially dismissed, he was reinstated
upon his filing of a motion for reconsideration. It bears reiterating that in all these
cases, malice, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or wrongful intention are present.
Here, respondents questioned actuations are not tainted by any of these
incidents. Hence, we can not consider the above cited cases as precedents
applicable to his case.

Thirdly, it is not true that respondent has not shown remorse or repentance. In
his motion for reconsideration, he manifested his immediate compliance with our
Decision dated January 16, 2004 on the premise that the Supreme Court has
spoken. A truth, commonly accepted in civilized institutions, is that acceptance of
punishment often mitigates the gravity of a violation of a duty. The ultimate
commitment of ones fate to legal process means that under an obligation of
consent or a duty to support just institutions, ones breach is also substantially
lessened.[18] Although respondent judge moved for the reduction of his penalty,
the same was premised on his length of service in the judiciary. His motion merely
appealed to our compassion and understanding, thus, showing humility in his
moral judgment.

And fourthly, a more thorough review of the facts as well as the applicable
jurisprudence shows that the penalty of dismissal from the service is
disproportionate to respondent judges infractions.

The first charge of gross ignorance of the law must fail.

First, there exists a judicial remedy sufficient to correct respondent judges alleged
mistakes in the imposition of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. And second, there
is no evidence to show that he was moved by bad faith, malice, dishonesty or
corruption in imposing the penalties.

Settled is the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper
remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond
the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.[19] The law
provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities committed by the
trial court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors
or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in
application of procedural or substantive law or in appreciation or admission of
evidence) include a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial, and
appeal. On the other hand, the extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, or a
petition for change of venue, as the case may be.[20]

Today, the established policy is that disciplinary proceedings against judges are
not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the
taking of other measures against the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be
said to have opened, or closed.[21]

In the present administrative case, respondent judge is found to have repeatedly

misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in seventeen (17) cases.[22]

The records, however, show that of these seventeen (17) cases, twelve (12)[23]
are pending appeal in the Appellate Court. One (1)[24] is subject of a motion for
reconsideration before respondent judge. Two (2)[25] were decided by him on
the basis of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by both accused. And in one (1)
case,[26] we affirmed his Decision in our Resolution dated October 9, 2000.

With the foregoing circumstances, it is therefore both improper and premature

to hold respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Following
established doctrine, the pendency of the appeals is sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge.[27] The
rationale is that if subsequent developments prove respondent judges challenged
act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him after all. In
Flores vs. Abesamis,[28] we held:

Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of
civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and disposition
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound
rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not
generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if there be
a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and also
evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part
of the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. . . . (Underscoring supplied)

To declare that respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law to

criminal cases on appeal will only result to undesirable consequences, foremost of
which is the existence of conflicting decisions. The danger is heightened by the
fact that the complainants in this administrative case are not the counsel of the
accused in most of the cases mentioned but mere members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines who only sorted out respondent judges Decisions and on
the basis thereof, concluded that he erred in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[29] They neither looked at the records of the
cases nor consulted the parties concerned. As a matter of fact, during cross-
examination, they admitted that they do not know personally the facts of the
cases.

It bears reiterating that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough
that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of
his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption.[30] Here, the administrative complaint does not even assert that in
imposing the penalties, respondent judge was so motivated. In fact,
complainants failed to present positive evidence to show that he was prompted
by malice or corrupt motive in imposing the assailed penalties. Even the
records, specifically the transcript of stenographic notes, reveal nothing of that
sort.

In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.,[31] we ruled that good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. In this case,
reprimand was considered an appropriate penalty. In People vs. Serrano, Sr.,[32]
respondent Judge Pepe P. Domael allowed an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal. Although the accused did not object to the appeal interposed by the
prosecution, we held that respondent Judge Domael should have known that
granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy. However, since the acts
in question were not shown to be tainted with bad faith, fraud, or malice, they
were not considered as so gross to warrant the dismissal of respondent judge
from the service.

Indeed, the fact that herein respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the same merely constitutes an error of judgment. To reiterate, a
judicial determination or mistake based merely on errors of judgment, and
without corrupt or improper motives, will not supply a ground for removal, and
this is true although such errors are numerous.[33]

II

Anent the second charge of violation of the Constitutional rights of the accused,
complainants mentioned two cases, i.e., People vs. Baniqued[34] and Surla vs.
Dimla,[35] wherein respondent judge failed to decide pending motions within the
prescribed period.

In People vs. Baniqued,[36] respondent judge, according to complainants, took

more than one (1) year to decide the prosecutions motion for the preventive
suspension of Ceferino Baniqued. At first glance, the delay seems to be
unreasonable and attributable to respondent judge. However, a more probing
inquiry on the matter shows that the delay was due to the maneuverings of Atty.
Lauro C. Gacayan, Baniqueds own counsel and one of the complainants herein.

The records show that as early as December 2, 1997, former Presiding Judge
Ruben Costales had deemed submitted for resolution the prosecutions motion for
preventive suspension. Notwithstanding so, Atty. Gacayan filed several
pleadings[37] insisting that it was still premature to consider the incident
submitted for resolution because the mandatory pre-suspension hearing has
not yet been terminated. On August 18, 1998, the motion for preventive
suspension was again considered submitted for resolution, this time by
respondent judge. Pending resolution, Atty. Gacayan filed a demurrer to evidence
praying that the case of People vs. Baniqued[38] be dismissed for lack of evidence
to support the conviction of the accused.[39] This was followed by a supplement
to the demurrer to evidence.[40]

Obviously, the delay in the resolution of the prosecutions motion was, in the
main, due to Atty. Gacayans persistence that a pre-suspension hearing be
conducted. Not only did he file one pleading after another, he also filed a
demurrer to evidence. This only complicated the matters before respondent
judge. Naturally, if the demurrer to evidence is found to be meritorious, then the
necessary consequence is the dismissal of the motion for preventive suspension
on the ground that it has become moot and academic.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
complainant Atty. Gacayan cannot now pretend that he was not responsible for
the delay and that respondent judge deserves all the blame. As counsel of
accused Baniqued, he had resorted to all possible legal maneuverings just to
prevent the suspension of his client. He cannot now extricate himself from the
result of his legal strategies and adopt a different stance just to crucify
respondent judge. Certainly, we cannot countenance such effrontery. In Gaspar
vs. Bayhon,[41] we ruled that a judge should not be blamed for the delay in the
disposition of a case when the delay is beyond his control, especially in the
absence of any showing that it was done in bad faith and intended to prejudice
a party to the case or it was motivated by some ulterior end.

Indeed, it is extremely ironic that Atty. Gacayan is so vigorous in invoking his

clients right to speedy trial when what was delayed is the resolution of the
prosecutions motion. If there is someone who has been prejudiced by the delay, it
is the prosecution, not the accused. He has no reason to complain.

In Surla vs. Dimla,[42] allegedly it took respondent judge four (4) months to
resolve an unopposed motion for reconsideration. This appears to be Atty.
Gacayans last-ditch attempt to revive a dead case. As pointed out by respondent
judge, the case was initially dismissed for failure to prosecute. Upon plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration, the case was reinstated. Due to several subsequent
unjustified absences on the part of plaintiff, the case was again dismissed on the
same ground. No motion for reconsideration was filed until the order of dismissal
became final.[43]

III

The third charge imputes to respondent arrogance, oppressive conduct and

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. These offenses are not so grave as to
warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Complainants claim that respondent judges displayed arrogance when he

imposed time constraint on Atty. Federico Mandapats cross-examination of the
witness in People vs. Andrada. We believe otherwise. The transcript of
stenographic notes shows that respondent judge required Atty. Mandapat to
approach the bench before advising him to ask only relevant questions and not to
be repetitious. That he was required to approach the bench only proves that
respondent judge did not intend to embarrass him. And while it is true that
respondent judge limited the cross-examination to only ten (10) minutes, it was
because he (Atty. Mandapat) had already spent a considerable time cross-
examining the witness. However, his cross-examination was extended the next
day. In fact, respondent judge allowed him to cross-examine the witness without
limitation.[44]

At this juncture, it must be stressed that it is both the right and duty of a trial
judge to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
conserving the time of the court and of protecting the witnesses from prolonged
and needless examination.[45] In People vs. Gorospe,[46] we ruled that while
cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the
sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of
his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit
the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of
justice.

Anent respondent judges statement to the client of Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi not to
pay the latters attorneys fees because he did nothing but merely to seek the
postponement of the case, the same does not constitute oppression, though, I
must say, it was really uncalled for. Oppression is a misdemeanor committed by a
public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person
any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.[47] Respondent judges utterance can hardly qualify as
an act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority. Obviously, the
statement was uttered to discourage lawyers from seeking postponement of
trials. A strict judge that he is, it is understandable that he was irritated by Atty.
Dacawis request to postpone the case on the ground that his client was not
feeling well when actually, the latter was in court. Of course, there is a limit to a
judges patience and leniency. Though it is required that respondent judge
maintains a firm resolve in the face of provocations by untoward defense tactics,
and display such resolve with the appearance of dispassionate equanimity,
however, any showing of impatience or gratuitous observations left unsaid may
be tolerated to some extent. After all, as a judge, he has the obligation to remind
lawyers of their duties to the public, to their client, and to the adverse party and
his counsel, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the
court.[48]
Complainants, particularly Atty. Reynaldo Agranzamendez, lament respondent
judges conduct of ordering him to stand during the promulgation of the Decision
in People vs. Cruz[49] in which he was the counsel de oficio, thus, making him
appear to be the accused. While respondent judges actuation is irregular,
however, we believe that such offense does not justify his dismissal from the
service.

With regard to respondent judges delay in the release of the copies of the
Decisions in People vs. Cas[50] and People vs. Malapit,[51] there is no showing of
malice or bad faith on his part.

In People vs. Cas,[52] complainant Atty. Jurgenson Lagdao filed a Notice of Appeal
which states:

ACCUSED, with the assistance of counsel, hereby gives notice that he is appealing
to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Honorable Court promulgated on June
22, 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release, for being
patently contrary to law and the attending facts and circumstances. x x x

Respondent judge directed Atty. Lagdao to modify the wording of such Notice of
Appeal on the ground that the phrase a copy of which the Honorable Court has
yet to release is inaccurate considering that copies of the Decision were already
released to the parties. This is evident from the Manifestation and Explanation
filed by Atty. Lagdao quoted as follows:

THE UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED,

unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

1. That a notice of appeal from the judgment promulgated on 22 June 1999 was
filed on July 5, 1999;

2. That in said notice, it was alleged that a copy of the decision has yet to be
released by the Honorable Court;
3. That between 10:00 and 11:00 o clock in the morning of 5 July 1999, the
mother of the accused came to the office and she was assisted by Atty. Henry
Patrick Villanueva in inquiring about the decision and it was then that Atty.
Villanueva was furnished copy thereof;

4. That the notice of appeal was actually prepared and handed to one of the
clerks in the office for filing at about 8:25 in the morning of the same day.
However, unknown to undersigned counsel, the notice was filed only at about
1:30 in the afternoon for the reason that the clerk attended to several clients
and prepared reports such that it was only after taking lunch that he realized
not having filed the notice earlier;

5. That had the undersigned counsel been aware that it was only in the
afternoon that the notice was filed, then he should have corrected or changed
the notice prepared earlier to indicate receipt of the decision;

6. That to rectify the notice of appeal, undersigned counsel hereby states for the
record that a copy of the decision was received on 5 July 1999;

7. That the undersigned apologizes for what had happened and begs for the
understanding of the Honorable Court.

Clearly, respondent judge was justified in requiring Atty. Lagdao to change the
tenor of his Notice of Appeal to conform to the truth that copies of the Decision
were indeed previously released to the parties.

In People vs. Malapit,[53] respondent judge failed to release to the parties copies
of the Decision on the same day it was promulgated. There were typographical
errors in the Decision that have to be corrected by the stenographers. Atty.
Itliong-Rivera positively testified on this matter. Significantly, the delay did not
prejudice the accuseds right to appeal. In a number of cases wherein the
respondent judge committed delay in the release of decisions to the parties, the
penalty meted upon him is only reprimand. Our rulings in Dizon vs. Judge
Lopez,[54] Mangulabnan vs. Tecson[55] and Castro vs. Judge Malazo[56] are
relevant.

IV

Finally, on the appointment of Eufemio Gula as Driver I, suffice it to say that it was
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Baguio which appointed him to such
position through Resolution No. 230, Series of 1999. His item was later on
changed to Utility Worker II, through Resolution No. 298, Series of 1999,[57] upon
the request of Clerk of Court Delilah Gonzales-Munoz. The assailed appointment
was therefore beyond the control of respondent judge.

As a final word, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily a

joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to
properly perform his role in this task in the same manner that the lawyer expects
a judge to do his part.[58] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and
on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this manner
can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain effectively the
ends of justice.[59]

The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they
heeded the foregoing call. Indeed, in the last analysis, the quality of justice meted
out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers practicing in
the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among them.

While respondent judge indeed committed infractions, the absence of malice, bad
faith, fraud, or dishonesty on his part, does not warrant his removal from office.
Significantly, eleven (11) witnesses[60] who are also members of the IBP, Baguio
City Chapter contradicted complainants charges. They testified that respondent
judges integrity is above board and that he administers justice effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, complainants motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The penalty

of one (1) year suspension from office imposed upon respondent judge is
retained.
SO ORDERED.

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. VICENTE C. PONCE

This is a petition for review on certiorari77[1] from a decision78[2] and

resolution79[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA).

In 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints

against petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras,
including one for estafa against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office
docketed as I.S. No. 97-39547. In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner
had swindled him out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation.

It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for

estafa that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit,80[4]
submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter81[5] purporting to be a
belated annex to the affidavit. It was prefaced with the quotation For every
extraordinary fortune there is a great crime and the text:
 An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.
Second example is the Alcantaras.
a) Overshipment of log; b) Land grabbing;
c) Corruption of public office; d) Corporate grabbing.

The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in the sur-
rejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described as being the forefather of all the
cases he had filed against the Alcantaras. In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities
and Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce accused the
Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation.

On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against

respondent Ponce with the Makati Prosecutors Office82[6] in connection with the
aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the statements therein were
defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and
(3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because
respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter.

The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda P.

Saulog. On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution83[7] finding
probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of an information84[8] in
court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63.

However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28,
2000.85[9] This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a
privileged communication, having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor
Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-rejoinder. The
Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration86[10] but it was denied.87[11]

Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA
found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside
the latters resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case.88[12]
After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the Department of Justice,
respondent Ponce attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105.
However, we denied respondent Ponces motion for extension for time to file his
petition89[13] as well as his subsequent motions for reconsideration.

In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was decided, the
Office of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice
Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw information, which the trial court granted on
September 28, 2001.90[14] The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential
element of publicity precluded the commission of the crime of libel. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion
in an order dated March 21, 2002.91[15]

On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed
decision.

The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA, in its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that Judge Salvador had
not committed grave abuse of discretion for granting the withdrawal of the
information for libel against respondent Ponce.

The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,92[16]
has the following elements:

(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,

omission, condition, status or circumstance;
(2) publicity or publication;
(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even
a dead person and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
person defamed.

The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or not the
controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication, which would
exempt it from libel.

According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:

It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made

in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This
absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the
presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to
the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement
imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of
relevancy.

In this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to

petitioners submission, instantly shows that there was sufficient
reference to the newsletter which justified the Justice Secretary and
respondent Judge in holding that private respondent actually intended
the said article to be included as an annex attached to said pleading
and that the same was merely omitted and belatedly submitted to
Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such
sufficient reference is shown by the fact that the newsletter is about
SEC Case No. 2507 the very same case being discussed by private
respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and hence,
petitioners claim that Annex F mentioned together with Annex E, both
articles showing the devious maneuvering of petitioner in the said
case, refers to another article. And even if the supposed Exhibit F could
refer also to that article So The Public May Know, such circumstance
will not exclude the subject newsletter as an intended annex to the
said pleading as in fact private respondent explicitly mentioned
articles without stating that there were only two (2) particular articles
being referred or which of those articles caused to be published by his
counsel.

As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the

respondent Judge adopted, the newsletter containing the defamatory
statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for
estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa
involves deceit, dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in
the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the newsletter discussing the alleged
corporate grabbing by petitioner will tend to support private
respondents case of estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged
corporate grabbing will highlight or manifest petitioners propensity
for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore
no doubt that the subject newsletter is relevant and pertinent to the
criminal complaint for estafa, and hence the same comes within the
protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt
private respondent from liability for libel or damages.

In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in

judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by
resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs. Aquino,
our Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the rule that what is
relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer,
and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The
doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose.

xxx xxx xxx

Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after

it has been written, known to someone other than the person to
whom it has been written. There is publication if the material is
communicated to a third person. What is material is that a third
person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a mans
reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good
opinion which he has of himself. Our Supreme Court has established
the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official
duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of
officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter
of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication. Applying this rule by analogy to the present case, private
respondents submission of the newsletter intended as an annex to his
Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who
was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said case, does
not amount to publication for the reason that the sending of such
material was made specifically for the purpose of including the same
as evidence in the preliminary investigation. That such submission was
belatedly made does not take out the material from the absolutely
privileged communication rule. Prosecutor Bautista had a legal duty to
perform with respect to the subject communication, which is to
consider the same along with the other evidence submitted by private
respondent as complainant in I.S. no. 97-39547, in determining the
existence of probable cause for the commission of the crime of estafa
and that petitioner as accused-defendant therein should be tried for
such offense. Under the circumstances and in the lawful exercise of
private respondents right to present evidence in support of his
accusations against petitioner in the criminal complaint for estafa, We
fail to see how such submission of documentary evidence omitted
from the annexes to the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, could amount to
publication that would give rise to private respondents liability for a
libel charge especially when there is no proof of the alleged circulation
of copies of the subject newsletter except to the City Prosecutors
Office of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in the preliminary
investigation stage. Petitioners feeble argument that Prosecutor
Bautista remains a third person because the subject newsletter was
never included or formally offered as evidence, hardly convinces Us to
hold that there was actual publication for purpose of finding a prima
facie case for libel against the private respondent. He must be
reminded that the case for estafa was still at the preliminary
investigation stage and there is no requirement of a formal offer of
such documentary evidence or supporting documents to establish
probable cause (citations omitted).93[17]
 Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it
was vested with a privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the
question of whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends to statements made
in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial,
the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas94[18] makes a categorical declaration of the existence
of such protection:

It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial

proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned
and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature
have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are
proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for
crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor
or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private
person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the
same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for
defamation. (Emphasis ours)

The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no reason why we

should not adopt it.

Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as a communication made bona fide

upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest . . .
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
[in]criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable.95[19]

While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse
can lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account
will give rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy
which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice.96[20] It is as a rule
applied liberally.97[21]

The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged

communication must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter
alleged in the course of the proceedings need not be in every case material to the
issues presented but should be legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent
to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of
trial.98[22]

Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal

complaint against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and
deceit, and were disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. Liberally
applying the privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still
relevant to the complaint under investigation because, like the averments therein,
they also involved petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the September 13,
2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ELISA V. VENTEREZ, vs. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de

Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera
against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment,
Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No.

981 entitled, Sps. Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al., for
Declaration of Ownership with Damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent represented the complainants, who
were defendants in said case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC
on 25 February 2004. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent
received a copy of the said Decision on 3 March 2004.
 Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a
Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused
to do so. The 15-day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration of the MTC Decision expired on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa
V. Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for
Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the
said motion was signed by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer
did not enter his appearance.

On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied99[1] by

the MTC. Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a
Certification100[2] issued by Clerk of Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March
2004, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution101[3] was filed by the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any
comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually
granted102[4] by the MTC on 23 April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of
Execution103[5] was issued and on 26 April 2004, an Entry of Judgment104[6] was
made in the said case.

Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the

respondent filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.

Feeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant

administrative complaint against him.105[7]

In his Answer,106[8] respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon

after the Decision was rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to
file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent
averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants, Inocencia V.
Ramirez), informed him that he [was] withdrawing the case from the respondent
because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent
gave the records of the case to him. Respondent explained that after Salvador
Ramirez withdrew the case from the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the
respondent turned over the records of the case to him and the respondent ceased
as the counsel of the complainants. Respondent further alleged that the said
Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another lawyer. He denied
being furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly prepared and
filed by another lawyer engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he was
served with a copy of the denial of the said Motion by the MTC. Respondent also
clarified that the last day of the 15-day period for the perfection of the appeal is 19
March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on the respondent on 4 March
2004. Finally, respondent argued that when the respondent was served a copy of
the Motion for Writ of Execution, he immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about
said Motion but Salvador Ramirez came to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005,
when the respondent asked him to sign a Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed
by Salvador Ramirez which respondent immediately filed in court.

Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on

Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 15 February 2006.

On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted

his Report and Recommendation,107[9] finding respondent liable for gross
negligence and recommending the imposition upon him of the penalty of three
months suspension, to wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is

GUILTY of Gross Negligence and should be given the penalty of THREE
(3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.
 Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution108[10] No. XVII-
2006-457 dated 8 September 2006, approving and adopting the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence,
Atty. Rodrigo Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months.109[11]

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in

handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.110[12] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an
attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at
liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause
and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.111[13] Any dereliction of
duty by a counsel affects the client.112[14] This means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.113[15]

The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio,
Pangasinan, on 25 February 2004. Respondent admitted114[16] that he was served
a copy of the said Decision on 4 March 2004. After having received a copy of the
MTC Decision, respondent did not bother to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a
notice of appeal with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled to
engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the
MTC who did not, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing
that during this time, respondent had not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as
counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981. Respondent only formally
withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when he filed with the
MTC his Notice115[17] of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the ground
that "he was also retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days after he
received copy of the decision rendered in this case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a
representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the records of the case from
[respondent] to be given to his new counsel.

We cannot accept respondents defense that he had already withdrawn from

the case two days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly
communicated this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein
complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of
respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the
available remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate
the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.116[18] The right of
an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause
is, however, considerably restricted.117[19] Among the fundamental rules of ethics
is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.118[20] He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause.119[21] A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before
its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good
cause.120[22]

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time

from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice
to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with
the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon
the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file
an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party,
shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.121[23]

What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are
identified under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:

CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY

FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the

following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course

of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue

conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not

promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer

renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
 e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for
the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public

office; and

g) Other similar cases.

The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned.
Neither can the circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds
thus explicitly enumerated. Contrary to respondents contention, his professional
relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of
the records of the case to his clients. Respondents defense completely crumbles in
face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and,
hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent
or to terminate the latters services.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his

services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold,
unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal
will be granted by the court.122[24] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved,
the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by
the court, to do what the interests of his clients require.123[25] He must still
appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of
the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally
until there is a withdrawal of record.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel,

respondent remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981;
and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot
immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney may
only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission
of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see
to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.124[26] Respondent
did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he remains the counsel of record
for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to protect complainants
interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the case, he would
have known that he was still the counsel of record as no entry of appearance was
ever made by another counsel. It would have been easily discernible on his part
that there was no change in his status as complainants lawyer. As of that time, their
client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would have known that
the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution had been
issued under the circumstances.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect
the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of
the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant

lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the
case.125[27] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted
of reprimand,126[28] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,127[29] suspension
of three months,128[30] six months129[31] and even disbarment130[32] in an
aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-
month suspension from the practice of law is a just penalty under the
circumstances.
 WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and
adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with

the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.