SECOND DIVISION the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial
partition which petitioner duly opposed.
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO,
SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO,
JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL
AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision
affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-
10441 converting petitioner's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and
compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr.,
and his first wife private respondent Angelina
Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr.,
Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed
Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino,
Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of
Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are
siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma.
Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No.
Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr.,
who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that
she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings
filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge
issued the assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert
Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition",
considering that the petitioner is the only
heir not amenable to a simple partition, and
all the other compulsory heirs manifested
their desire for an expeditious settlement of
the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino,
Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted
into judicial partition of the estate of
deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties
are directed to submit a complete inventory
of all the real and personal properties left by
the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial
partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning. Notify all the parties and
their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the
Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting
private respondents' motion to convert the judicial
proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition. Her
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate
court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the
"petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and
accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following
errors:
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER
UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE
PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF THE
CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances
in this case, the sole issue here is whether
respondent appellate court committed an error of
law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding
the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the
estate is possible in the instant case as no
determination has yet been made of the character
and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the
Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197
(1969), where we held that when the existence of
other properties of the decedent is a matter still to
be reckoned with, administration proceedings are
the proper mode of resolving the same.4 In addition,
petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of
being depleted for want of an administrator to
manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court
does not provide for conversion of a motion for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was,
thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be
struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so
named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails
to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,
then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint
a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule
are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which
provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. — If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed
in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of
small value. — Whenever the gross value of
the estate of a deceased person, whether he
died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten
thousand pesos, and that fact if made to
appear to the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing, which
shall be held not less than one (1) month nor
more than three (3) months from the date of
the last publication of a notice which shall
be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the
court may direct, the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay,
to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if
any there be, to determine who are the
persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among
them after the payment of such debts of the
estate as the court shall then find to be due;
and such persons, in their own right, if they
are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their
guardians or trustees legally appointed and
qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be
entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so
awarded to them respectively. The court
shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and
all orders and judgments made or rendered
in the course thereof shall be recorded in the
office of the clerk, and the order of partition
or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register's
office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights
and properties of the deceased at the moment of the
latter's death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among
themselves without need of delay and risks of being
dissipated. When a person dies without leaving
pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to
submit the property for judicial administration, nor
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this
case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age."9 With this finding, it is our
view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an
administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing
to partition yet, as the nature and character of the
estate have yet to be determined. We find, however,
that a complete inventory of the estate may be done
during the partition proceedings, especially since
the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
lower court did not err in converting petitioner's
action for letters of administration into an action for
judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the
order of the trial court converting an action for
letters of administration to one for judicial partition
has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence
procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's
order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to
the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for
partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We
have held that where the more expeditious remedy
of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or
the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings. 10 The trial
court appropriately converted petitioner's action for
letters of administration into a suit for judicial
partition, upon motion of the private respondents.
No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it found the trial court's action
procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS,
RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,
EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision1
dated March 26, 2002, and the resolution2 dated
December 17, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas,
Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Vargas,
Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99
square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by
and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester
Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas,
Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino
Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each one of them
getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign
the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes
Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4 was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the
same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed the document and their
respective shares totaling 55 square meters were
sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago
Vargas and one of respondents herein, she came to
know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the
original house built on the lot was being demolished
sometime in May 1995.5 She likewise claimed she
was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994
involving the same property had been published in
the Catanduanes Tribune.6
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to
petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the
property, with the following letter7 sent to petitioner
on her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora
Vargas,8 (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one
of the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas,
original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in
her name.
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was
executed by some of my client's co-heirs and
alleged representatives of other co-heirs, by
virtue of which document you acquired by
purchase from the signatories to the said
document, five (5) shares with a total area of
fifty-five square meters of the above-
described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client
shall exercise her right of legal redemption
of said five (5) shares as well as other shares
which you may likewise have acquired by
purchase. And you are hereby given an
option to agree to legal redemption within a
period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt
hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your
agreement within said 15-day-period, proper
legal action shall be taken by my client to
redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after
having failed to reach an amicable settlement at the
barangay level,9 Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal
Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against
petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000
which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk
of Court on May 20, 1996.10 Joining her in the
action were her children with Santiago, namely,
Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all
surnamed Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla,
heirs of the alleged primitive owner of the lot in
question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.11
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the
property, they may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale.
They likewise alleged that the 30-day period
following a written notice by the vendors to their
co-owners for them to exercise the right of
redemption of the property had not yet set in as no
written notice was sent to them. In effect, they
claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal
and binding effect on them.12
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a
decision13 in favor of petitioner, dismissing the
complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention
for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid
and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner
because the transaction purportedly occurred after
the partition of the property among the co-owner
heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could
validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover,
the MTC found that although there was a failure to
strictly comply with the requirements under Article
1088 of the Civil Code14 for a written notice of sale
to be served upon respondents by the vendors prior
to the exercise of the former's right of redemption,
this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual
knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30
days before the filing of their complaint, and their
consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of
Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally,
the MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish
by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in
purchasing the portion of the property owned by
respondents' co-heirs.15
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC
decision in a judgment dated November 25, 1999.
The matter was thereafter raised to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in
the assailed decision dated March 26, 2002,
declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and
November 15, 1994, respectively, were void and
without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the
extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs
is not binding upon respondents considering the
latter never participated in it nor did they ever
signify their consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively
notified and bound, regardless of their
failure to participate therein, by an
extrajudicial settlement and partition of
estate when the extrajudicial settlement and
partition has been duly published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial
settlement and partition does not bind
persons who did not participate therein,
whether the written notice required to be
served by an heir to his co-heirs in
connection with the sale of hereditary rights
to a stranger before partition under Article
1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed
with when such co-heirs have actual
knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day
period within which a co-heir can exercise
the right to be subrogated to the rights of a
purchaser shall commence from the date of
actual knowledge of the sale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject
property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition
was valid because the partition was duly published.
The publication of the same constitutes due notice
to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore
estopped from denying the validity of the partition
and sale at this late stage. Considering that the
partition was valid, respondents no longer have the
right to redeem the property.
Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in
good faith.
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
complaint because its subject matter was incapable
of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have
been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable
parties, the co-heirs who sold their interest in the
subject property not having been impleaded by
respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been
dismissed as it was not properly verified by
respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that
she was authorized to represent the other
respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the
petition. Moreover, the verification was inadequate
because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth
and/or correctness of the material allegations in the
petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an
ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has
already been executed19 as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs
cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third
persons even before the partition of the estate. The
heirs who actually participated in the execution of
the extrajudicial settlements, which included the
sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the
subject property, are bound by the same.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to
redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the
Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost
because respondents were never notified in writing
of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the
provision, there is a need for written notice to start
the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing
him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall
be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified
in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written
notice is indispensable and mandatory,20 actual
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice is
given of an impending or contemplated sale. The
law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time
written notice of the actual sale within which to
make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or
effect the redemption.21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular
form of written notice nor any distinctive method
for written notification of redemption, the method
of notification remains exclusive, there being no
alternative provided by law.22 This proceeds from
the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep
strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if,
as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be
undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing
and in a position to repurchase the share sold.23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve
written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs
because the latter are in the best position to know
the other co-owners who, under the law, must be
notified of the sale.24 This will remove all
uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its
perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive.25 As a result, the party
notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may
still contest the alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs
failed to comply with this requirement, there is no
legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem
the shares sold to petitioner given the former's
obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he
is a builder in good faith. Good faith consists in the
belief of the builder that the land the latter is
building on is one's own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in one's title.27 Petitioner derived his
title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was
very much aware that not all of the heirs
participated therein as it was evident on the face of
the document itself. Because the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of
Court, no particular portion of the property could
have been identified as yet and delineated as the
object of the sale. This is because the alienation
made by respondents' co-heirs was limited to the
portion which may be allotted to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of
respondents, petitioner still constructed
improvements on the property. For this reason, his
claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is
estopped from raising the same for the first time on
appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings below and sought affirmative ruling
from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the
sale to him of a portion of the subject property
embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among
heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise this defense,
he cannot, under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of
the lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule
that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any
time, an exception arises where estoppel has already
supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all
stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction
of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to
its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief
against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon
the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-
joinder of indispensable parties, similarly lacks
merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest
without whom there can be no final determination
of an action and who is required to be joined as
either plaintiff or defendant.29 The party's interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought
is so inextricably intertwined with the other parties
that the former's legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an
indispensable party is one whose interest will be
directly affected by the court's action in the
litigation. In the absence of such indispensable party,
there cannot be a resolution of the controversy
before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.30
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the
complaint filed by respondents ultimately prayed
that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the
property sold by their co-heirs. Significantly, the
right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share
in the property to petitioner is not in dispute.
Respondents concede that the other heirs acted
within their hereditary rights in doing so to the
effect that the latter completely and effectively
relinquished their interests in the property in favor
of petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the shoes
of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the
property with respondents. As a result, only
petitioner's presence is absolutely required for a
complete and final determination of the controversy
because what respondents seek is to be subrogated
to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by
respondents with the CA should have been
dismissed because the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping appended to it were defective,
citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria
Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was authorized to
represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2)
state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and
legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum
shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.32 Under justifiable circumstances, the
Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission
of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the rules.34 The co-respondents of
respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her
children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice,
the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the
petition on their behalf and as their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia.
PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA,
oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the
order of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial
administrator of the property left by the deceased
Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the
proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac for the administration of his property
(special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda.
de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein
oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix.
The said deceased left legitimate children, named
Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia
who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced
heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G.
Utulo and during the pendency of the administration
proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the
province without any legitimate descendants, her
only forced heirs being her mother and her husband.
The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife
(special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his
petition that her only heirs were he himself and his
mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only
property left by the deceased consisted in the share
due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia
Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator
of the property of said deceased. The oppositor
objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and
the appointment of the applicant as administrator.
She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left
no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said
judicial administration; but she stated that should
the court grant the administration of the property,
she should be appointed the administratrix thereof
inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant.
After the required publications, trial was had and
the court, on August 28, 1936, finally issued the
appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and
thereafter filed the record on appeal which was
certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, but these
assigned errors raise only two questions for
resolution, namely: whether upon the admitted facts
the judicial administration of the property left by the
deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent
appointment of an administrator, and whether the
appellant has a better right to the said office than the
appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of
the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that
"if no executor is named in the will, or if a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc.
This provision enunciates the general rule that when
a person dies living property in the Philippine
Islands, his property should be judicially
administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in the section, in case the deceased left
no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to
name an executor therein. This rule, however, is
subject to the exceptions established by sections
596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended.
According to the first, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of
an administrator. According to the second, if the
property left does not exceed six thousand pesos,
the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the
required publications, to proceed with the summary
partition and, after paying all the known obligations,
to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themselves pursuant to law,
without instituting the judicial administration and
the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court
repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19
Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs.
Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court
relied on the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661
of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to
all the property left by the deceased from the time
of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts.
657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs
succeeded immediately to all of the property
of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death. In the
absence of debts existing against the estate,
the heirs may enter upon the administration
of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do
so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides
how an estate may be divided by a petition
for partition in case they can not mutually
agree in the division. When there are no
debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of
an administrator in the settlement and
partition of the estate among the heirs. When
the heirs are all of lawful age and there are
no debts, there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
absence of existing debts against the estate,
the administrator has no right to intervene in
any way whatever in the division of the
estate among the heirs. They are co-owners
of an undivided estate and the law offers
them a remedy for the division of the same
among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested
the appointment of the administrator, or that
they intervened in any way whatever in the
present actions. If there are any heirs of the
estate who have not received their
participation, they have their remedy by
petition for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra,
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, and Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was
reiterated. And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra,
this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in
the following language:
Upon the second question — Did the court a
quo commit an error in refusing to appoint
an administrator for the estate of Saturnino
Fule? — it may be said (a) that it is admitted
by all of the parties to the present action,
that at the time of his death no debts existed
against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs
of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the
provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of
the Civil Code, all of the property, real and
personal, of a deceased person who dies
intestate, is transmitted immediately to his
heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil.,
546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable
Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs.
Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who
dies intestate, passes immediately to his
heirs, as owners, and there are no debts,
what reason can there be for the
appointment of a judicial administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled? In the case of
Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief
Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this
question, said: Under the provisions of the
Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death; in other
words, the heirs succeed immediately to all
of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as
if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death. In
the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it
jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do
this by mutual agreement, they also have
that privilege. The Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case
they cannot mutually agree in the division.
(Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No.
190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts there is no reason why the
estate should be burdened with the cost and
expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in
any way whatsoever in the division of the
estate among the heirs when they are adults
and when there are no debts against the
estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all
adults, their relation to the property left by
their ancestor is the same as that of any
other coowners or owners in common, and
they may recover their individual rights, the
same as any other coowners of undivided
property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann.,
502; Mcintyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187;
Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx xxx xxx
The right of the heirs in cases like the one
we are discussing, also exist in the divisions
of personal as well as the real property. If
they cannot agree as to the division, then a
suit for partition of such personal property
among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintenable where the estate is not in debts,
the heirs are all of age, and there is no
administration upon the estate and no
necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex.
Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item
of property susceptible of being held in
common which may not be divided by the
coowners. It may be of personal property as
well as of real estate; of several parcels as
well as of a single parcel, and of non-
contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or
of part only of the lands of the coowners as
well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore,
67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs.
Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs.
Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels
the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied.
We are convinced that if the courts had followed it
in all cases to which it has application, their files
would not have been replete with unnecessary
administration proceedings as they are now. There
is no weight in the argument adduced by the
appellee to the effect that his appointment as
judicial administrator is necessary so that he may
have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear
in the said intestate by the right of the
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in
proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced
heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a
forced heir and an interested and necessary party if
she were living . In order to intervene in said
intestate and to take part in the distribution of the
property it is not necessary that the administration
of the property of his deceased wife be instituted —
an administration which will take up time and
occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to
determine which of the parties has preferential right
to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the
costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee. So
ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO
SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA
SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals,
Third Division, affirming with slight modification a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half
portion of four parcels of land described in the
complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered
in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera,
administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to
recover from defendants one-half share of the
aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong
to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of
Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January,
1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006,
119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of
San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow,
Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces,
children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July
25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his
widow executed an affidavit stating that "the
deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or
respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged
natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or
nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only
person to inherit the above properties" (Record on
Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On
the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the
above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for
the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the
said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for
P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See
Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted
proceedings for the administration of the estate of
Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694,
Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as
administratrix, brought the present action on June
20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was
recorded on certificates of title covering the said
properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however,
was subsequent to the registration of the deed of
sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took
place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de
Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no
rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had
Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended
answer alleging that the complaint states no cause
of action; that if such a cause exists the same is
barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants
are innocent purchasers for value; and that the
complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious,
intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera,
declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit
"A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of
sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring
plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four
parcels of land in question, and finally declaring
that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to
said properties are terminated. The case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held
that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that
the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C",
insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is
concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same
to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it
modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B"
and "C" are null and void only insofar as the
properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that
the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it
ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law,
one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but
reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and
secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion
of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de
Leon and also his right to bring an action for the
damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia
de Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have
appealed to this Court by certiorari and have
assigned the following errors in their brief:
I legatees are all of age, or the minors are
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that
respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action
to recover her and her co-heirs' participation
to the lands in question had not prescribed at
the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the petitioners are innocent purchasers
for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the
lower court's denial of petitioner's motion
for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is
argued that as the action was instituted almost four
years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A",
was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the
same was not brought within the period of two
years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of
McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate.
— If it shall appear at any time within two
years after the settlement and distribution of
an estate in accordance with the provisions
of either of the first two sections of this rule,
that an heir or other has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation of the
such heir or such other person may compel
the settlement estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose
of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as
follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by
agreement between the heirs. — If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and
represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in
the office of the register of deeds. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if
no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the
death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted
contains two parts, the first referring to a case in
which there are two or more heirs interested in the
estate of a deceased person, and the second in which
there is only one heir. The section was taken from
Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said
Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates
Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever
all the heirs of a person who died intestate
 are of lawful age and legal capacity and
there are no debts due from the estate, or all
the debts have been paid the heirs may, by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of
them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they
may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1
and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if
there are two or more heirs, both or all of them
should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law
(Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4,
the "distributees and estate" are indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the
effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or
knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that
those who took part or had knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to
them the law is clear that if they claim to have been
in any manner deprived of their lawful right or
share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement,
they may demand their rights or interest within the
period of two years, and both the distributes and
estate would be liable to them for such rights or
interest. Evidently, they are the persons in
accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy,
the prejudice to their rights within the two-year
period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the
decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or
express provision is unreasonable and unjust that
they also be required to assert their claims within
the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or
had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of
the fundamental right to due process of law. In the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the
appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754)
provides that the order of distribution may
be had upon the application of the executor
or administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, no provision is made for notice,
by publication or otherwise, of such
application. The proceeding, therefore, is to
all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be
seen our law is very vague and incomplete;
and certainly it cannot be held that a purely
ex parte proceeding, had without notice by
personal service or by publication, by which
the court undertakes to distribute the
property of deceased persons, can be
conclusive upon minor heirs who are not
represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of
extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex
parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic
be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge
either of the death of the decedent or of the
extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. We have examined the two cases cited
by appellants and there is no similarity at all
between the circumstances on which the ruling
therein had been predicated and those of the case at
bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court
in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of
the opinion and so hold that the provisions of
Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs
from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial
partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. The case at bar
fails to comply with both requirements because not
all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals
having found that the decedent left aside from his
widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his
death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's
action is barred by the statute of limitations. The
origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon
which this contention is predicated, which is
Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the
contention. In the first Place, there is nothing
therein, or in its source which shows clearly a
statute of limitations and a bar of action against
third person's. It is only a bar against the parties
who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings
but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In
the second place, the statute of limitations is
contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190,
Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been
meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which
defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of
limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants.
The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of
the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her
affidavit of partition that the deceased left no
nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself.
Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which
has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no.
190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to
have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial
proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and
these proceedings must have been instituted soon
after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the
defendants have the burden of proof as to their
claim of the statute of limitations, which is their
defense, and they have not proved that when the
action was instituted, four years had already elapsed
from the date that the interested parties had actual
knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the
defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for
value was rejected as unfounded by the court of
Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not
have sufficient knowledge or notice of the
claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete,
deceased, over the land in question does not
find support in the evidence of record. As
regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an
admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia
de Leon and he had been living with the
latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of
the deceased who are claiming the property
are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It
is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny
Sampilo did not know the existence of said
heirs, and that he was not aware that they
were nephews and nieces, children of the
deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro
Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny
Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de
Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later
saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who
was the former's uncle, to have him prepare
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A",
and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by
which on the same date she conveyed to
Sampilo all the property which she had
adjudicated to herself, both of which she
acknowledged before said notary public,
coupled with the fact that there is no
sufficient showing that the consideration for
the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been
paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny
Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro
Tolete had other heirs who may claim the
property, and that the immediate conveyance
thereof to him was a strategem concocted to
defeat the former's rights. And as regards
Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no
notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in
the certificates of title issued to Benny
Sampilo when he acquired the property
might be true, for he purchased the property
on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis
pendens was noted on said certificates of
title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he
cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good
faith for value of the property. It is well-
settled rule in this jurisdiction that a
purchaser of registered lands who has
knowledge of facts which should put him
upon inquiry and investigate as to the
possible defects of the title of the vendor and
fails to make such inquiry and investigation
cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good
faith for value and he had acquired a valid
title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs.
Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs
against the petitioners. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and
COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by
their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia
and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and
ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July
18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante
Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28,
1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land
located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by
Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728,
000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the
name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-
Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for
Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter
of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed
by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented
by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both
parties together with their respective counsels
appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties
had come to an agreement to settle their case. The
trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing
Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the
estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the
undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona
Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in
favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify
as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond
of ₱1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12,
1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate
hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria
and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with
their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray,
Francisco’s counsel, manifested that the parties had
come to an agreement to settle the case amicably;
that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed
to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of
the parties and to prepare the project of partition for
the approval of the court. In the same Order, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo
and ordered him to make a project of partition
within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for
submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976,
Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties
are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at
an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only
respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed
to attend; that per return of the service, these three
heirs could not be located in their respective given
addresses; that since some of the heirs present
resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided
to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs
who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the
properties of the estate during the time that
Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was
administering the properties of the estate
(without appointment from the Court) as
having been properly and duly accounted for.
 2. Agreed to consider all income of the
properties of the estate during the
administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly
appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs
as having been properly and duly accounted
for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in
this proceedings demanding an accounting
from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos
Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of
the estate but instead agreed to first sell it
for the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the
condition that should any of the heirs would
be in a position to buy the properties of the
estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just
receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(₱4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the
administration expenses to be deducted from
their respective share of ₱4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-
Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all
those present in the conference of her desire to buy
the properties of the estate, to which everybody
present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty.
Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of
the Report was due to the request of respondent
Gloria that she be given enough time to make some
consultations on what was already agreed upon by
the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11,
1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed
to Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent
Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon,
provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her
share of the estate, since one of properties of the
estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their
father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued
the assailed Order10 dated December 16, 1976, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions
agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same
being not contrary to law, said compromise
agreement as embodied in the report of the
commissioner is hereby approved. The Court
hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the
deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate
in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the
payment to her of the sum of ₱36,000.00. The said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but
after all the claims and administration expenses and
the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided
equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria
for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the same had been
allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the
conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI
appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis
of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it
appeared that she was already residing in Central
Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early
termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels of land
constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo
Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of
the sum of ₱36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique
Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax
Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730,
000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of
their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled
and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129,
20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-
14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that
later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the
estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of
Columba; that some of these parcels of land were
subsequently transferred to the names of spouses
Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners
Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that
they subsequently discovered the existence of the
assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the
Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and
mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in
representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos,
namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and
Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment
of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of
Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void
and of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patently false
and irregular; that such report practically deprived
them of due process in claiming their share of their
father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares
executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized
statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever
took place for the purpose of discussing how to
dispose of the estate of their parents and that they
never received any payment from the supposed sale
of their share in the inheritance; that the report was
done in close confederacy with their co-heir
Columba, who stood to be benefited by the
Commissioner's recommendation, should the same
be approved by the probate court; that since the
report was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom
was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of
titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud
and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the
assailed order did not appear to have been furnished
a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI
was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the
sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide
the remainder of the consideration equally among
the heirs after paying all the administration
expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had
not yet been terminated as the last order found
relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as
administrator vice Gloria; that they never received
their corresponding share in the inheritance; and
that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance
with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of
their right to the property without due process of
law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud
caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents'
allegation that they discovered the assailed order
dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998
was preposterous, as respondents were represented
by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice
of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they
filed the petition for annulment within the statutory
period of four (4) years; that they have been in
possession of the six parcels of land since May 25,
1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to
the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that
no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the
assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit
in which he attested to having received his share of
the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents
were estopped from assailing the Order dated
December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the
status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and
annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the
instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well
as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent
transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses
Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN
is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon
be continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was
needed to be established was the veracity and
truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which
was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing
the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an
agreement, there was a need for all the concerned
parties to be present in the conference; however,
such was not the scenario since in their separate
sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the
decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or
conference ever happened among them; that
although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules
of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of an official duty, the same may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to
prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to
conclude that the conference was not held
accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report
never mentioned the names of the heirs who were
present in the alleged conference but only the names
of those who were absent, when the names of those
who were present were equally essential, if not even
more important, than the names of those who were
absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any
proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to
signify their consent as regards the agreed
mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there
was lack or absence of physical evidence attached
to the report indicating that the respondents were
indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the
absence of the respondents' consent, the legal
existence of the compromise agreement did not
stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared
that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten
and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco
Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as
notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a
lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be simply
presumed, since what was required was the special
authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that
a compromise agreement entered into by a person
not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void
and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19
that being a void compromise agreement, the
assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles
obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the
properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos
was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that
Columba paid the sum of ₱36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except
for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting
that he received his share of the proceeds but
without indicating the exact amount that he received;
that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete
and was not in compliance with the trial court’s
order for the administratix to execute the deed of
sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the
administratrix of the sum of ₱36,000.00; that said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but
after all the claims and administration expenses and
the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided
equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed
of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor
was said money placed under custodia legis as
agreed upon; that the Certification dated December
9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu
indicated that the case had not yet been terminated
and that the last Order in the special proceeding was
the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the
parcels of land, which included the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax
Declarations and the issuance of new Tax
Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in
favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud.
Consequently, the CA concluded that the
compromise agreement, the certificates of title and
the transfers made by petitioners through fraud
cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership
over the properties, since to do so would result in
enriching them at the expense of the respondents;
and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant
in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since
respondents were denied the opportunity to fully
litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the
aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies,
such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief,
which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24
year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of
Court - an official act which enjoys a strong
presumption of regularity - based merely on belated
allegations of irregularities in the performance of
said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court
of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed
which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower
court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners
filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of
affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the
heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and
December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits,
the affiants stated that they had no more interest in
prosecuting/defending the case involving the
settlement of the estate, since the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister
Columba, and they had already received their share
of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent
Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an
Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001, stating that
the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she
had already received her share of the purchase price
on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had
issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which
was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had
already received ₱4,000.00 in payment of his share,
which could be the reason why he refused to sign
the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor
of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the
CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA
committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved
the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of
Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is
extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily
and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved
by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The
annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that annulment of a final judgment or order
of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as
additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground
of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing
party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully
his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced
on him by the prevailing party.28 Fraud is regarded
as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the
CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it
should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the
ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due
process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs
and to prepare the project of partition for
submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place
for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioner’s Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he
caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place,
where the subject properties were located for
settlement, by sending them subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the
conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It
was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six
attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly
found, the Commissioner did not state the names of
those present, but only those heirs who failed to
attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria,
Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report,
based on the return of service, could not be located
in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would
establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented
by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the
scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs.
In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one
of the heirs, who was presumably present in the
conference, as she was not mentioned as among
those absent, had executed an affidavit30 dated
December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was
not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram
or notice of any meeting received by her. While
Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an
Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this
case, it was only for the reason that the subject
estate properties had been bought by their late sister
Columba, and that she had already received her
corresponding share of the purchase price, but there
was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her
previous statement that she was not called to a
meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an
unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting
held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of
a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the
heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at
an agreement regarding the estate properties, since
they were not even required to sign anything to
show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact,
the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the
alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the
signatures of the alleged attendees to show their
consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference
was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus,
it was imperative that all the heirs must be present
in the conference and be heard to afford them the
opportunity to protect their interests. Considering
that no separate instrument of conveyance was
executed among the heirs embodying their alleged
agreement, it was necessary that the Report be
signed by the heirs to prove that a conference
among the heirs was indeed held, and that they
conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an
officer of the court and a disinterested party and that,
under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on
Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed
that everything done by an officer in connection
with the performance of an official act in the line of
his duty was legally done, such presumption may be
overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the
instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of
the names of the persons present in the conference,
absence of the signatures of the heirs in the
Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of
evidence showing that respondents were notified of
the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the
CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of
the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7,
2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch
Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that
copies of the Commissioner’s Report were sent to
all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to
Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the
Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with
the accompanying registry receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether
heirs were deemed constructively notified of and
bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition
of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and
partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is
an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or
had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed
of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e.,
a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy,
what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was
arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's
Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show
that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the
Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report
despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs
showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the
Report despite the statement therein that only six
out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus,
effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance
to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. We find that the assailed Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack
of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions
that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings
in the trial court were duly represented by
respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for
petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-
heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through
their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January
30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer,
because his interest in the estate is represented by
the judicial administrator who retains the services of
a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the estate but also of the
heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he
represents; that when the trial court issued the
assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving
the Commissioner's Report, the parties’ lawyers
were duly served said copies of the Order on
December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification37
dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of
Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered
notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented
by counsel, service of notices of orders and
pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon
receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the
respondents could have taken the appropriate
remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief under
Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so
without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the
Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys.
Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria
and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of
the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings
filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was
Gloria’s counsel when she filed her Petition for
letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was
Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to
the petition for letters of administration and his
Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an
accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus,
the other heirs who were not represented by counsel
were not given any notice of the judgment
approving the compromise. It was only sometime in
February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax
declarations covering the parcels of land, which
were all in the name of their late mother Agatona
Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax
Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and
Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently
issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not
have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void
judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
or of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the
consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence,
while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar
failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it
cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory. In contemplation of law, that void
decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no
effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs.
Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal
in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is
attended by none of the consequences of a valid
adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot
affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded
on the void judgment are themselves regarded as
invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded
as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would
be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves
the parties litigants in the same position they were
in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said
to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be
assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.41 Consequently, the compromise
agreement and the Order approving it must be
declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that
respondents are barred from assailing the judgment
after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on
ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides
that an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from
its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains
that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular
circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and, being an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat
justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the
better rule that courts, under the principle of equity,
will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a
manifest wrong or injustice would result.44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed
order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the
petition for annulment of judgment in 2001.
Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due
process is the paramount consideration in annulling
the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to
declare the nullity of a void judgment does not
prescribe.45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment
is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it
is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of
Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said
void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to
said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are
void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI,
Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are
DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case
No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of
Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE,
CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all
surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA
RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO
TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE,
VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME
DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA,
HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO,
LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE
CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN
EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of
Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez
and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings
before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal
adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena
Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI
granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa
the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between
themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed
an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before
the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein
respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ
349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition
and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter,
the private respondents appealed said decision to
the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending,
the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the
partition of the estate of Miguel and of another
sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of
the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs
except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total
area of 224,883 square meters. These properties
were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes,
Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely
by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226
square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters
and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9,
respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the
heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of
Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to
respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in
the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were
transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and
are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel
6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose,
Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots
560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A
covering 500 square meters was transferred to
respondent Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently
transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B
with 500 square meters was transferred to
respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later
transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who
registered it under his name under TCT No. T-
11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered
under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT
No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and
subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M.
Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining
portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square
meters was bought by respondent Immaculate
Concepcion College and was registered in its name
under TCT No. T-10208.6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which
sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa
filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but
upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto
Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from
the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that
Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January
28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on
March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that
earnest efforts toward a compromise were made
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the
same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Its ruling was premised on the following
grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has
already estopped her from questioning the
validity of the partition, and since she is
already estopped, it naturally follows that
Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is
likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of
the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her
claim that the partition is null and void is
weakened by her inconsistent claim that the
partition would have been alright had she
been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for
rescission and had been filed late
considering that it was filed beyond the 4
year period provided for in Article 1100 of
the Civil Code;9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never
established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated December 20, 1994.10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts
that the following errors were allegedly committed
by the Court of Appeals in -
I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED
INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES
WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT
PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION
II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY
PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER
PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR
ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN
VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN
CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY
HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO
WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN
AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE
NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER
OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER
PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"
V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY
SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A
CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND
HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. ……FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS
NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS–APPELLEES WERE CLEAN
AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY
FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. ……FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFF–
APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT
TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF
THE DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS THAT
THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. ……AWARDING PLAINTIFF–
APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME
OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1)
whether or not the complaint for annulment of the
"Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition"
had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed
is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment
of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed
since the prescriptive period which should be
applied is four years following the case of Beltran
vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that
Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year
prescriptive period needs two requirements. One,
the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and two, the party assailing the
partition must have participated therein. Petitioner
insists these requirements are not present in her
case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites
Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we
held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent.
She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus
an heir of Miguel.13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers
were buyers in bad faith since they failed to
exercise the necessary due diligence required before
purchasing the lots in question.14 In the alternative,
petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-
owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the
provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if
the partition would be allowed. She asks for the
rescission of the said partitioning under Articles
165-175 of the Civil Code.16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of
petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they
argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina
already have their shares in the estate of Miguel
Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement
they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes
in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver
that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the
extrajudicial partition was understandable since her
status as an adopted child was then under litigation.
In any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's
heirs were adequately protected in the said
partition.17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year
prescriptive period (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the
provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not
participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently
then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11
SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial
settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may
be filed within four years from the discovery
of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place when said instrument was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondents exclusively.21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was
filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten
months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement
dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that
her action against the respondents on the basis of
fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the
applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial
settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice
thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of
all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must
be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement
and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after,
which was when publication was done in the instant
case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs.
Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the
said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not
apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is
sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge
of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together
with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil
Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot
claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's
adoption since they even filed an action to annul the
decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their
actions were valid since the adoption of Maria
Elena was still being questioned at the time they
executed the deed of partition. The complaint
seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty
six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently
a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena
from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The
decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this
factual setting, it is patent that private respondents
executed the deed of partition in bad faith with
intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74]
provides in gist that a person who has been
deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as
creditor, must assert his claim within two
years after the extrajudicial or summary
settlement of such estate under Sections 1
and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74.
Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing
so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not
apply to the partition in question which was
null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares
in the partitioned property. Under the rule,
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the
partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct
for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after
two years from its execution in 1941.25
To say that Maria Elena was represented by
Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria
Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at
the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented
her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.
Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in
equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did
not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from
buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we
are constrained to hold that this is not the proper
forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to
be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered
under the name of third parties. Well settled is the
doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally
attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised
in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No
receipts, agreements or any other documentary
evidence was presented to justify such claim for
damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.27 The same is true for moral
damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence
of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated
testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and
has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence
that damages may not be awarded on the basis of
hearsay evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the
petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages
does not mean that she will be totally deprived of
any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are
awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been
invaded or violated by defendants may be
vindicated and recognized.30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained
injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately
and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully
deprived of her legal participation in the partition of
the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3)
respondents had transferred portions of the
properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case
has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it
reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal
damages in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.31 The amount to be awarded as
such damages should at least commensurate to the
injury sustained by the petitioner considering the
concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such award
is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited
and the special reasons extant in this case.33 Thus,
the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is
proper in view of the technical injury she has
suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by
private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared
invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby
awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by
private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely,
HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO,
HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-
ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and
HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS
DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO
ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-
ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO
CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN
and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R.
CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.;
HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2
Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4
in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set
aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated
October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate
estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6
The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful
heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by
several collateral issues that complicate its
resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of
her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2)
the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly,
his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate
child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado
was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children
of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only
man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis
Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon
Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate
half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and
his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were
never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate
line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa
Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the
date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear,
however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of
the name and other circumstances of his father.16
Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist
that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage
did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took
place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without
a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and
some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein.
Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising
her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According
to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove
their assertion, petitioners point out that no record
of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming
Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to
her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other
hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3,
1919 and from then on lived together as husband
and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8,
1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and
friends to have in fact been married. To support
their proposition, oppositors presented the following
pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated
[December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo,
then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to
Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval
Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4,
004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United
States of America by Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa
Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took
into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia
Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19
the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with
one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his
own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth
in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent
as one of their children. Also, her report card from
the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo
Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that
Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They
contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died
in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings prescribed
by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death
of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition
for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he
ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death
on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without
a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the
daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition
for letters of administration of the intestate estates
of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This
petition was opposed by the following: (1) the
sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late
brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition
was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under
the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a
motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she
was the only surviving descendant in the direct line
of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was
granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married
but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents
herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was
concerned. The motion was denied on the ground
that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and
enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on
September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the
same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is
hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir
of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled
to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties
hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of
Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet
been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper
and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right
to the appointment as administratrix of the estates,
the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the
decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the
estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA
RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and
is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and
appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby
required to render an accounting of her actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which
was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and
gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest
of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners
assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On
October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the
continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of
our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must
be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial
court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs
of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be
raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by
the denial of the record on appeal upon too
technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to
raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to
delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the
APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal
from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s
May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34
partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals
amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
partition among themselves the intestate estate of
Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition
his estate in accordance with the proportion referred
to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma
S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate
of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee
of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the
sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over
to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
appointed administrator, immediately upon notice
of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond,
and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
notice of the administrator’s qualification and
posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-
adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the extent of the
shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children
of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of
administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or
non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted
to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and
presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife
was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de
Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38
attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her
as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of
no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married
to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in
the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of
the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own
witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon
to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado
and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive
proof only of the baptism administered by the priest
who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law
leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not
what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of
law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa
Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with
Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are
either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes
so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in
the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged
marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely
on the disputable presumption of marriage even in
the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with
Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2)
Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida
de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood
siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio
and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51
were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y
with another woman, C; then X and Y would be
natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from)
another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing
the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate
child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit
that
succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case
under consideration. That prohibition has for its
basis the difference in category between illegitimate
and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference
when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law,
just like legitimate children of half-blood relation.
We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding
succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should
be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the
portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all
are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado
were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they
were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972
of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in
the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the
only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still
alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who
were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with
Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than
Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is
an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such,
she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59
She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February
28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil
Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till
August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely
had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which
granted certain successional rights to illegitimate
children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory
or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of
the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the
latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two
grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed
the status of an illegitimate child from her birth
until the death of her putative father Guillermo
Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she
could have compelled acknowledgment through the
courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation:
the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action
for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66
In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the
death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s
second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s
report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo
Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new
Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears
there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that
it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the
notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was
published in the Sunday Times on September 10,
1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting
of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not
the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure
to present the original signed manuscript was fatal
to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan,
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted
in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never
came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,
which [created] between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements
must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption
is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the
person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the
claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the
new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and
nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court
to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes
an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
 next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not
rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint
administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews
and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of
kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to
reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973
affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia
shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased her,
also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled
to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its
one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia,
Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and
whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now
deceased, their respective shares shall
pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still
unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond
in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS
PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose
Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24,
20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state
a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the
following material allegations claims of the
parties which they sought to prove by testimonial
and documentary evidence during the trial of the
case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal)
married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner
Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth
to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr.,
her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6
later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal,
herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November
2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived
their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his
favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of
land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to
Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an
"Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213
in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and
in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9,
1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-
Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal
and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of
the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City
on July 23, 1996 a complaint15 against respondent
for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title
issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that
respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan
parcel of land and that she perjured herself when
she made false representations in her Affidavit of
Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s
Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name
be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new
one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the
trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling,
among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and
defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in
due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their
claims under the complaint.16 (Underscoring
supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18,
2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies
of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues
defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack
of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’
status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not
dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage
Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic)
and testimonial evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of
having a status and right to the estate of the
decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right,
or a particular fact is remedied through a special
proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court),
not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The
operative term in the former is "to establish", while
in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status
and right as putative heirs of the decedent not
having been established, as yet, the Complaint
failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is
without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do
not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of
Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically
opposed to this Court’s following ruling in Cariño v.
Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v.
Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such
cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was
promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the
appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable,
however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue
in the Cariño case was the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone
of contention between the two women both named
Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee
Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed
in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two
marriages with said two women during his lifetime,
and the only question was: which of these two
marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the
death benefits of the deceased Cariño was thus,
merely an incident to the question of which of the
two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the
case at bench is of a different milieu. The main
issue here is the annulment of title to property.
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the
deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants
and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be
the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status
and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore,
been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such
status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary
civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of
an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present
case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that
what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot
permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a
declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be
determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x21
(Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24,
2002,22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have
erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the
initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of
action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and
Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later
and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative
to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA
decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
complaint based on the above disquisition and
evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable
Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in
Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to
the court a quo the determination of the issues of
which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose
Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of
the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the
premises are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate
court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of
suits which is discouraged by this Court as a
reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts
to pass on the determination of heirship and the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that
contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had
established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is
whether petitioners have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before
they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on
March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
"owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994
that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been
titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden
Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in
turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed
a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein
respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of
the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of
action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs
of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except
the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays—that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased couple must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27
(Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court,
albeit holding that the petition was an improper
recourse, found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.
Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court
of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy
Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of
letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition
that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in
Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him
and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin
celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another
marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the
decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the
decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued
letters of administration to, on Marcosa’s request,
her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam
and his purported siblings filed a civil case before
the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam
administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R.
Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In
their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition
of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be
identical to some unresolved incidents in the special
proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial
court, following which it rendered a decision in the
civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the
two issues raised for determination was whether
they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on
whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially
correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its
conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the
identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the
persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael
Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is]
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove
the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as
children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that
"the lower court should not have declared, in the
decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
heir of the decedent, for such declaration is
improper in the [civil case], it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a
soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special
proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole
heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal
aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of
his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order
declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The
court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness.
Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia
before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal
by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said
judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by
Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether
Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery
of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court,"
this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly
procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should
not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in
a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of
Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon
"[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless [therein private
respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right
to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits
of her claim in the interest of justice," and
declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition
between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner
Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive
father was approved in the proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-
adoptive mother, following which the probate court
directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her
adoptive father to annul the project of partition on
the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and
prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver
to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of
partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the
testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to
deliver to her, among other things, the same two
lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial
court, noting the parties’ agreement to suspend
action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the
testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of
the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint
in the civil case had been decided, set said case for
trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set
aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that
in the amended complaint she, in the meantime,
filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and
validity of the project of partition insofar as she was
allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside
the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for
hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual
possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order
of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order
before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of
partition and directive that the records of the case be
sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been
"legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the
project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil.,
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24,
1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-
461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966
order of the trial court setting the civil case for
hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue
because it "involves no longer" the two lots
adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas
in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then
the determination of, among other issues, heirship
should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated,
however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to
have himself declared in the special proceedings as
co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening,
then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the
annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to
the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s
estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he did, he failed to name an executor therein.37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs
of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the
only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case –
subject of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case,
there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and
defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in
due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their
claim under the complaint.40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the
trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the
above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-
trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL,
TAIB AMEROL, DIBARATUN AMEROL,
DIBARATUN, MATABALAO, MINDALANO
DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and
MANUCAO MORO, petitioners,
vs.
MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, Branch
III, Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 1354, entitled, "Molok Bagumbaran vs.
Liwalug Amerol et al.," under Republic Act No. 5400, "as only question of
law is raised." 2
The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of an action for
reconveyance of real property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System in another's name. In other words,
what is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real
property arising from an implied or constructive trust and, corrolarily
reference. The petitioners herein, defendants in the trial court, assert that
they have ten years to bring the action, while the respondent, plaintiff in the
court below, claims the prescriptive period is four years. The trial court ruled
tor the plaintiff, now respondent.
We reverse. We hold that the prescriptive period for such an action for
reconveyance, as this case, is ten years. The point of reference is, or the
ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from, the. date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the real property.
There is no issue as to the facts, this case having been elevated to this
Court, as aforestated, on purely a question of law. Be that as it may, in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements as well as to place the question
of law in proper perspective, there is need to state the facts of the case. On
this regard, the findings of the trial court would best serve the stated
purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence submitted during the trial there is
no dispute concerning the fact relative to the Identity
of the land in litigation. It is commonly known as Lot
No. 524, Pls-126 and technically described and
bounded in the sketch (Exh. "7 "). This is the very
tract of land alleged by the plaintiff to have been
forcibly entered into by the defendants and which
plaintiff now w&s to recover possession thereof. It has
also been proven that the same lot was covered by
two free patent applications: — (l) that of defendant
Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed Amerol)
which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and
(2) that of Molok Bagumbaran which was filed on
December 27, 1954. There is also no question
regarding the fact that as to these two free patent
applications, that of plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran was
given due course as a result of which Free Patent No.
V-19050 was issued on August 16,1955 by authority
of the President of the Philippines Ramon Magsaysay,
by Jaime Ferrer, Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and duly registered with the office
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Lanao
(now Lanao del Sur) in the mm year whereupon
Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly issued,
owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished
the herein plaintiff.
This court is also inclined to believe that defendant
Liwalug Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's
free patent application on the land in question nor was
he ever notified or participated in the administrative
proceedings relative to plaintiff's free patent
application. In the meantime, since the date he
purchased the land from Mandal Tondo, said
defendant has been and up to the present in con.
tinuous occupation and cultivation of the same. His
co-defendants named in the complaint are merely his
tenants.
It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did
not take appropriate action to annul the patent and
title of the plaintiff within one year from issuance
thereof and that the first step taken by him to contest
said patent and title was a formal protest (Exh. "12", p.
408, Record) dated April 24, 1964, filed before the
Bureau of Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long years
from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff.
The second step he took was his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in the above
entitled case, which answer was filed with this court
on December 4, 1964. In said counterclaim,
defendant reiterated his stand that plaintiff secured
patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud,
wherefore, defendant prayed that said title be
annulled, or, alternatively, plaintiff be ordered to
reconvey the said land to the said defendant Liwalug
Datomanong.
First question to be resolved is whether or not the
plaintiff is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in
securing the Free Patent No. V-19050 covering the
land in question.
Upon a thorough examination of the evidence, proofs
are sufficient to support defendant's contention that
plaintiff is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. In the
first place, proofs are abundant tending to show that
since 1952 when Mandal Tando transferred the land
to said defendant, the latter occupied, took
possession thereof and cultivated the same
continuously, publicly, adversely against any claimant
and in the concept of owner up to the present; that
said defendant had introduced considerable
improvements such as coconut and coffee plantations
and other fruit trees besides his farm house, a
mosque, cassava plantation and clearing and full
cultivation of the entire area. The fact of possession
on the part of said defendant has been attested to by
competent and creditable witnesses like Mandal
Tando who conveyed the land to the defendant; Hadji
Sirad Gomandang, the barrio captain of Montay,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Hadji Rasol Maruhom and
Hadji Abdulcadir Pagayawan, both of Pialot,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur who are farmers and barrio-
mates of said defendant; and also Disomnong Dimna
Macabuat, an employee in the office of the District
Land Officer at Marawi City who had officially
conducted occular inspection and investigation of the
premises in connection with the protest of said
defendant found thereon the above-mentioned
improvements introduced by the said defendant.
What is more, on or before filing his free patent
application, plaintiff knew that the land in question
which was covered by his free patent application was
then actually occupied and cultivated by defendant
Liwalug Datomanong if not by Mandal Tando, the
original occupant. Be it remembered that Mandal
Tando had transferred to defendant Liwalug
Datomanong Twenty Four (24) hectares, more than
eleven hectares of which is (sic) outside the military
reservation and designated as Lot No. 524, Pls-126
and the rest which is in the southern portion lies within
the military reservation. Now, immediately adjacent
thereto on the south is the land claimed and occupied
by the herein plaintiff also consisting of Twenty Four
(24) hectares but wholly within the military reservation.
It appears that plaintiff declared this Twenty four
hectares for the first time on October 24, 1950 for
taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No. 1529, Record)
and stated in said tax declaration (Exhs. "8" and "8-
A," p. 414, Record) regarding the boundaries that the
adjacent owner on the north is Mandal Tando. In
other words, plaintiff had expressly recognized the
fact that Mandal Tando is an adjacent land owner
north of plaintiff's property. On February 19, 1951
herein plaintiff revised the above-stated tax
declaration and secured another (Tax Declaration No.
1794, Exh. "9" and "9-A," p. 413, Record) and still
plaintiff stated therein that his boundary land owner
on the north is Hadji Abdul Gani. 3 [a.k.a.Liwalug
Datomanong(Amerol)]. 4
 xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the aforequoted findings, very unequivocal to be sure, the
trial court denied the counterclaim of the defendants, now petitioners, for
the affirmative relief of reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Said the
court:
xxx xxx xxx
The patent of the plaintiff having been registered back
in 1955 and in contemplation of law registration
thereof is notice to the whole world and yet defendant
exerted no effort whatsoever either to annul the title or
institute proceedings for reconveyance except in his
counterclaim contained in his answer to the complaint
in this case at bar which answer and counter-claim
was filed on December 4, 1964, some nine long years
from the date of registration of the patent, defendant
unfortunately lost his right to reconveyance within the
period of four (4) years from the date of registration of
said patent. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision stated:
xxx xxx xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows: (1) declaring the herein plaintiff
the registered owner of Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and
sustaining and respecting the validity of the plaintiff's
Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 covering the
said land; (2) ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises of Lot No. 524; Pls-126 and deliver
possession thereof to the herein plaintiff under certain
terms and conditions herein below stated; (3) denying
and hereby dismissing the counterclaim of the herein
defendants and consequently the prayer to annul the
title and/or for reconveyance of the land to said
defendant Liwalug Datomanong must Likewise be
denied; (4) that before plaintiff could take possession
of said premises he must reimburse defendant
Liwalug Datomanong the total sum of Six Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Sixty-Two
Centavos (P6,752.62) which he incurred for the
necessary and useful expenses on the land in
question with the right of said defendant to retain
possession of the premises if said reimbursement be
not completely made. No pronouncement as to costs.
6
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, this petition. 7
The petitioners in their Brief 8 assign the following two errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW TOTHE EFFECT
THAT PETITIONERS RIGHT OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE FOR
VIOLATION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST PRESCRIBED AFTER FOUR
YEARS FROM THE REGISTRATION OF THE PATENT OF
RESPONDENT.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE INTRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE AS BASIS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENT INTRODUCED ON THE LAND IN GOOD
FAITH BY PETITIONERS INSTEAD OF BASING SUCH ASSESSMENT
UPON PURE AND SIMPLE GUESS WORKS AND WILD ESTIMATIONS.
The first assignment of error is well-taken as adverted to at the outset.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual
possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied
trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil Code
provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's
name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land
in question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong.
Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free
patent over the land but there was — Liwalug Datomanong. By such
fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the
property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong.
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the
name of respondent, he, even being already the registered owner under the
Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was
not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary to the
erroneous claim of the respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set
aside and put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of
Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, 10 or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all
about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription. 11 Happily, both
parties agree on this point. The seeming impediment however, is that while
the petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years, the respondent
avers that it does in only four years.
In support of his submission, the respondent invokes several cases. We
have examined the invocations and find them inapplicable. For instance,
the case of Fabian vs. Fabian, 12 relied on by the respondent, does not
square with the present case. In Fabian, the party who prayed for
reconveyance was not in actual possession and occupation of the property.
It was instead the party to whom title over the property had been issued
who occupied and possessed it. Further, the litigated property had been in
the adverse possession of the registered owner for well-nigh over twenty-
nine big years, hence, reconveyance had been irretrievably lost.
Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 13 is, likewise, inapplicable. In Miguel, the
actual occupant and possessor of the controverted parcel of land, after
having been enticed by Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public, with
promise of help, engaged and retained the services of the latter to facilitate
the issuance of a patent for the said land in his (Miguel's) favor. Thus, there
existed between the parties a relationship very much akin to that of lawyer-
client and which is similarly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite of his
compensation of one-fifth of the yearly produce of the property, still violated
the trust reposed on him and instead worked for the issuance of the patent
in the name of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor Reyes, the
property was fraudulently patented and titled in his widow's favor. The
reconveyance of the property was decreed by the Court based on "breach
of fiduciary relations and/or fraud." It was shown that the parties were
legally bound to each other by a bond of fiduciary trust, a bond lacking in
the case at bar.
Finally, the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 14 can not be availed of
because the period of prescription was not there definitely and squarely
settled. In fact, Ramirez underscores a vacillation between the four-year
and the ten-year rule. There it was stated that "an action for relief on the
ground of fraud — to which class the remedy prayed for by Paguia belong
— scan only be brought within four years after accrual of the right of action,
or from the discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed pat on that
statement, there would be merit in the respondent's presentation. But
Ramirez continues: "(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged fraud on the
part of Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance prescribes after 10
years from accrual of the cause of action, June 22, 1944, the date of
registration of the patent and of the issuance of OCT No. 282- A in his
name." 15
Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his
position and support the ruling of the trial court have a common
denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds
committed and impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all
accrued prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code. The accrual of the
cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in
Ramirez, 1944. It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the
date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited-Civil actions
other than for the recovery of real property can only
be brought within the following periods after the right
of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the
ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions
of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property. 16 The only discordant note, it seems,
is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained
by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. 18 But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190,
was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30,
1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article
1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in
the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then
resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action
for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner
Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim interposed
in his Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of
possession instituted by the respondent, has not yet prescribed. Between
August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of the issuance of
the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the respondent, and
December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription was interrupted by the
filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less than ten years.
The respondent also interposed as a deterrent to reconveyance the
existence of a mortgage on the property. It is claimed by the respondent
that reconveyance would not be legally possible because the property
under litigation has already been mortgaged by him to the Development
Bank of the Philippines. 19 This claim is untenable otherwise the judgment
for reconveyance could be negated at the will of the holder of the title. By
the simple expedient of constituting a mortgage or other encumbrance on
the property, the remedy of reconveyance would become illusory. In the
instant case, the respondent being doubly in bad faith — for applying for
and obtaining a patent and the Original Certificate of Title therefor without
being in possession of the land and for mortgaging it to the Development
Bank knowing that his Original Certificate of Title was issued under false
pretenses — must alone suffer the consequences.
Besides, given the undisputed facts, we cannot consider the mortgage
contracted by the respondent in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines as valid and binding against petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. It
would be most unjust to saddle him, as owner of the land, with a mortgage
lien not of his own making and from which he derived no benefit whatsoever.
The consequences of the void mortgage must be left between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. In no small measure the Development Bank
of the Philippines might even be faulted for not making the requisite
investigation on the possession of the land mortgaged.
Premises considered, we deemed it superfluous to rule on the second
assignment of error raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated June 3,
1970 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No.
1354 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ORDERING the respondent to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No.
P-466 in favor of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong, free of any encumbrance.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76148 December 20, 1989
ELISEO CARO, CARLOS CARO, BENITO
CARO, CARMEN CARO, BATAYOLA AND
LORENZO CARO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SERAFIN V.
RONZALES, JOSE RONZALES, JR. AND
GEMME RONZALES, respondents.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for petitioners.
Tirol & Tirol for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV
No. 01016 entitled, "Epifanio Caro, Plaintiff-
Appellant v. Serafin V. Ronsales, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees," dated January 28,
1986 affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo;
and its resolution dated September 11, 1986
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The subject matter of the present controversy
is a 260 square meter parcel of land which,
according to petitioners, is included in the
parcel of land purchased by their predecessor,
Epifanio Caro, from Simeon Gallego; but
contradicted by the private respondents by
claiming it as their own evidenced by a
certificate of title issued in their favor. We
gathered from the records that the questioned
land is the eastern portion allegedly included in
the parcel of land purchased from Simeon
Gallego. The trial court ruled in favor of the
private respondents on the grounds of estoppel,
absence of fraud in the registration of the
questioned land and prescription. This ruling
was affirmed by the respondent court. Likewise,
We affirm, based on the first two grounds but
not on the ground of prescription.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that on May 14, 1946, Simeon
Gallego bought a parcel of land from Loreto
Martinez, Presentacion Jereza, Hermenigildo
Jereza, Maria Luz Nele Jereza and Maria
Elena Jereza, situated within the poblacion of
Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras with an
area of 5,031 square meters and bounded on
the North by Jordan River, Joaquin Galve and
Custodia Jalandoni; on the East by Roman
Catholic Church and the Municipality of Jordan;
on the South by Graciana Martinez; and on the
West by Jordan River. The above-described
parcel of land was then declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6437.
This land was later on sold by Simeon Gallego
to Epifanio Caro in 1948. On May 15, 1962,
Trinidad Castem, Rolando Iranaya and Eriberto
Iranaya sold a parcel of land which they
inherited from Custodia Jalandoni, situated in
the poblacion of Jordan, Sub-Province of
Guimaras, with an area of 1,011 square meters
and bounded on the North by Jordan River; on
the East by Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Jaro; on the South by Rafael Gaylan; and on
the West by Jordan River, to Epifanio Caro.
The land was then declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4135. In
the same year, Epifanio Caro bought another
parcel of land from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan,
situated in the poblacion of Jordan, Sub-
Province of Guimaras, with an area of 1,750
square meters and bounded on the North and
East by the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni; on the
South by Simeon Gallego; and on the West by
Jordan River, and declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 3638.
In 1963, Epifanio Caro had those three (3)
parcels of land surveyed and were then
designated as Lot No. 54. When Blas
Gonzales conducted the survey, he prepared a
plan. Epifanio Caro was given a copy of the
plan and he just kept it. During that survey,
Epifanio Caro pointed the boundaries of his
parcels of land to the survey team. These
parcels of land were relocated in 1968 by the
Sirilan Surveying Company and Plan Psu-
207820 was prepared. The parcels of land of
Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No. 54
and the land claimed by the private
respondents Serafin V. Ronzales, Jose
Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme Ronzales, as Lot No.
55. Epifanio Caro had the three lots
consolidated after the survey into one lot, and
Tax Declaration No. 7688 was issued. During
the cadastral proceeding, Epifanio Caro filed
an answer for Lot 54. There is no showing
whether or not a title was issued to him.
On the other hand, the private respondents
claim that the questioned land was formerly
owned by Pascuala Lacson and was declared
in her name under Tax Declaration No. 4234.
Pascuala Lacson was married to Domingo
Ronzales. Long before World War II, private
respondents and their predessors-in-interest
had been living on the questioned land. When
Epifanio Caro bought a parcel of land from
Simeon Gallego, Jose Ronzales, Sr., his
brother Serafin Ronzales, and sister Gemme
Ronzales children of Domingo Ronzales, and
Pascuala Lacson, were already living in a
house of semi-strong materials on the
questioned land.
Sometime in 1964, another survey was
conducted. The parcels of land claimed by
Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No. 54
and the land claimed by the private
respondents was denominated as Lot No. 55.
Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot No. 54
and Purificacion Ronzales, mother of private
respondent Jose Ronzales, Jr. filed an answer
for Lot No. 55. No other person or persons filed
an answer for Lot No. 55. Consequently,
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 was
issued in the names of the private respondents,
in equal shares of 1/3 portion each on
September 17, 1970.
In June 1973, the spouses Epifanio Caro and
Paz Caro filed an ejectment case against
Augusta Chavez, Naciso Galila, Timoteo
Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and Rafael
Galotera, involving Lot Nos. 56, 59 and 60. In
1974, the spouses filed an ejectment and
illegal detainer case against Ramon
Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno and Augusta
Chavez, involving Lot No. 54.
On June 4, 1975, Epifanio Caro flied a
complaint before the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo (Civil Case No. 10235) for cancellation of
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, reconveyance,
recovery of possession and damages on the
ground of fraud. During the pendency of the
case, Epifanio Caro died, so he was
substituted by his heirs, namely, Eliseo Caro,
Carlos Caro, Benito Caro, Carmen Caro
Batayola and Lorenzo Caro.
On November 22, 1982, the trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
dismissal was affirmed by the respondent
Court of Appeals. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.
The issues may be limited to the following:
1) Whether or not the action in
Civil Case No. 10235 has
prescribed;
2) Whether or not fraud attended
the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836;
and
3) Whether or not the plaintiff in
said civil case was in estoppel.
Petitioners contend that since private
respondents do not own the questioned land,
they are mere trustees and this being the case,
prescription does not lie in an action for
reconveyance.
In this regard, the trial court held (p. 413,
Records):
An action for reconveyance on
the ground of fraud prescribes in
four (4) years from the time of the
decree of registration, for the
reason that the registration of the
decree constitutes constructive
notice to the whole world (Gerona
v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060,
May 29, 1964, citing the cases
J.M. Tuason and Co. vs.
Magdangal, G.R. No. L-15539,
June 30, 1962; Abdon v. Abella,
C.A. G.R. No. L-29846-R, August
31, 1964).
Affirming, the respondent court said (p. 29,
Rollo):
... even if a trust relationship had
existed, the right to seek
reconveyance prescribed ten (10)
years after 1948 when Epifanio
Caro was informed by the wife of
Jose Ronzales, that she inherited
the land from her grandmother
(de la Cerna vs. de la Cerna, 72
SCRA 515; Alzona vs. Calupitan,
4 SCRA 450; Carantes vs. Court
of Appeals, 76 SCRA 516). Since
there is no trust relationship
between the ancestors of and
between plaintiffs and defendants,
the same action prescribed in 4
years from the issuance of title on
September 17, 1970, because
the complaint was filed only on
June 4,1975, as ruled by the
lower court (de la Cerna vs. de la
Cerna, 72 SCRA 515).
We disagree. The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al.
v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261,
September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396
illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey
the title to real property and, corollarily, its point
of reference:
... It must be remembered that
before August 30,1950, the date
of the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how
limited.- Civil actions other than
for the recovery of real property
can only be brought within the
following periods after the right of
action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: .... An action
for relief on the ground of fraud,
but the right of action in such
case shall not be deemed to have
accrued until the discovery of the
fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present
Civil Code, we find that just as an
implied or constructive trust is an
offspring of the law (Art. 1456,
Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to
reconvey the property and the
title thereto in favor of the true
owner. In this context, and vis-a-
vis prescription, Article 1144 of
the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following
actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by
law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxxxxxxxx
(Emphasis supplied).
An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that,
illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly,
it is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over
the property. The only discordant
note, it seems, is Balbin vs.
Medalla which states that the
prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be
explained by the erroneous
reliance on Gerona vs. de
Guzman. But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June
25,1948, hence Section 43(3) of
act No. 190, was applied, the
new Civil Code not coming into
effect until August 30,1950 as
mentioned earlier. It must be
stressed, at this juncture, that
article 1144 and article 1456, are
new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code
or in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the latter being then
resorted to as legal basis of the
four-year prescriptive period for
an action for reconveyance of title
of real property acquired under
false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in
Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may
 pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to
such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any
innocent holder of the decree of
registration on the original
petition or application, ...
This provision should be read in conjunction
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Article 1456. If property is
acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property
comes.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the
trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating
Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code
with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra,
the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title. In the present case,
therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235
was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within
the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from
the date of the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, We
agree with the respondent court and the trial
court that the private respondents did not
employ any fraud in securing title to the
questioned land. A perusal of the pertinent
portions of the deposition of Epifanio Caro
supports this finding, to wit:
ATTY. TANEO:
Q Now, at the time you bought
this land from Simeon Gallego in
1948, who was residing in that
shack?
A There was no more shack, but
there was a big house.
Q And who was residing on that
big house?
A Jose and his wife and children,
and his sister.
Q Since according to you at the
time you bought this land from
Simeon Gallego there was
already that big house occupied
by Jose Ronzales and his wife,
their children and sister, did you
make any demand from them to
vacate the premises since you
have already purchased the land
from Simeon Gallego?
A I informed them that I have
already bought the lot from
Simeon Gallego, and I demanded
from them rental of the house,
because their house was already
there at the time I bought the land.
Q And what was their answer, if
any, to your demand?
A They promised me that they
will also pay the rent, or if I wish
to sell the land to them, they will
buy the same. But I told them that
I will not sell the land.
Q Now, since you told them that
you did not want to sell to them
the portion of the land occupied
by their big house, what did they,
if any, suggest to you regarding
their occupancy of the land?
ATTY. ALINIO:
We would like now to object to
this line of questioning because
this is irrelevant, immaterial, and
impertinent, not being raised in
the complaint. Not one of the
issues in this case.
ATTY. GRIJALVO:
Subject to the objection, witness
may answer.
WITNESS:
A They told me that they will just
pay the rent.
ATTY. TANEO:
Q Did you agree?
A I agreed. I consented, but they
merely promised and promised to
me, but they did not pay anything.
Q In other words you mean that
after they suggested to rent the
land and you agreed, you made
several demands from them to
pay the rentals?
A Yes, sir, I demanded from them
the rentals. But later when I
demanded from them the
payment of the rent, they told me
that it is not my land being
occupied by their house, but it is
the land of the municipality.
Q Around how many times did
you demand from them for the
payment of the rentals?
A Two times. And on the second
time you demanded for the
payment of rentals and they did
not still pay, what was their
reason, if any?
ATTY. ALINIO:
Objection, because the witness
has already answered the same
or similar questions.
ATTY. TANEO:
The witness stated that he made
around two demands for the
payment of rentals. When he
made the demand later after
there was an agreement that they
would just pay the rental, they
reasoned out that the land
occupied by their house is a
portion of the land of the
municipality. Since the witness
stated that there was a second
demand, the purpose now of the
pending question is if there was
any other reason stated by them.
ATTY. GRIJALVO:
Subject to the objection, witness
may answer.
WITNESS:
A They will not pay, because
according to them the land on
which their house stands is a
portion of the land owned by the
municipality. But actually it is my
own, and the municipality has
nothing to do with it. (pp. 207-212,
Records) ...
ATTY. TANEO:
Q The last time you stated that
you know Lot No. 55. When for
the first time did you know about
this Lot 55?
A I know this lot for the first time
when I bought this lot from
Simeon Gallego.
Q At that time did you know that
this lot already bears Lot No. 55?
A I know it because one Purit told
me that she inherited the same
from her grandmother.
Q This Purit you are mentioning,
are you referring to Purificacion
 Villanueva Ronsales, who is the
widow of Jose Ronsales?
A Yes, sir.
Q When was this when this Purit
mentioned to you about this Lot
55?
A When I bought said land. (pp.
215-216, Records)
It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1948,
Epifanio Caro was already aware of the
adverse claim of the private respondents. He
should have been vigilant of his right as the
allegedly new owner of the questioned land.
What he did was the reverse, he slept on his
rights for a number of years. In the recent case
of Bagtas v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
L-50732, August 10, 1989, We held that
considerable delay in asserting one's right
before a court of justice is strongly persuasive
of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is
human nature for a person to enforce his right
when same is threatened or invaded. Thus, he
is estopped by laches from questioning the
ownership of the questioned land. Not only that.
There is also estoppel in pais in this case
because Epifanio Caro filed his answer with
respect to Lot No. 54 only while Purificacion
Villanueva flied her answer with respect to Lot
No. 55 (see Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.,
G.R. No. L-21450, April 15,1968, 23 SCRA 29).
In addition, the trial court observed (pp. 414-
415, Records):
The Tax Declaration of the land
bought by Epifanio Caro, Exhibit
4, states that its adjacent owner
on the east is Pascual (sic)
Lacson who is the grandmother
of the defendants. When said
land was declared in the name of
Epifanio Caro in 1969, the
adjacent owner on the East is still
Pascuala Lacson, Exhibit E. The
Tax Declaration of the land
bought by Epifanio Caro from the
heirs of Custodia Jalandoni,
Exhibit 8 shows that the land in
question is not an adjacent
property. The same is true with
the Tax Declaration of the land
bought by Epifano Caro from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylan, Exhibit 9.
This clearly shows that Lot No.
55 which originally belonged to
Pascuala Lacson is a different
and distinct parcel from the lands
bought by Epifanio Caro from
Simeon Gallego, from the heirs of
Custodia Jalandoni and from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylan (sic).
While We commiserate with the petitioners
because of Epifanio Caro's lack of formal
education still, his negligence and belated
action were undoubtedly the root cause of the
present controversy:
Q Is this the same survey plan
which Mr. Gonzales gave you?
A That is the one but I have not
read it because I do not
understand English or Spanish
because I have never gone to
school (p. 217, Records).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when the cadastral
survey was conducted, did you
take occasion to verify also the
cadastral survey of your lot?
A I did not bother anymore
because I entrusted everything to
them (p. 232, Records).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you purchased the
lot from Simeon Gallego because
you said you could not read
English nor Spanish, did you ask
the help of somebody else to
explain to you the document?
A I have not asked the help of
anybody. In other words you did
not read nor understand the sale
in your favor executed by Simeon
Gallego?
A I have confidence in him
because it was prepared by the
father of the mayor.
Q Did you not inquire from
Simeon Gallego of the
boundaries of the church from
him?
A Before that I knew that the
boundaries of the lot of Loreta
Martinez was the municipal
building, a road and a church.
Q Now, before you purchase the
property from Simeon Gallego did
you not also ask the help of
somebody to examine the tax
declaration in the name of
Simeon Gallego?
A No, because I already knew
that lot was owned by Martinez.
Q And therefore, I gather from
you that you relied on your
knowledge, own knowledge when
you purchased the land from
Simeon Gallego about the
boundaries of the land?
A I relied on my own knowledge
because I know it fully well. "
Q You did not, you said, anymore
examine the tax declaration?
A I did not bother because I knew
that the lot was owned by
Martinez.
Q Did you inquire also from the
Martinezes the boundaries of
their lots?
A I did not bother because I knew
fully well because since 1909 I
was aready there in the church
(pp. 251-253, Records).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision dated January 28,1986
and the resolution dated September 11, 1986
of the respondent Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION
regarding prescription.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M.
CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ,
SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.
MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F.
MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In our society, tradition and law enshrine the
family as a basic social institution. In prose,
poetry and song, it is lyrically extolled. What a
person becomes in adulthood, for good or ill, is
attributed to the influence of the home and
family during his formative years. In the family
one imbibes desirable values and personality
traits. No matter how far one roams, he
invariably turns to his family for security,
approbation and love. Against the whole world,
members of the family stand solid as Gibraltar.
It is thus heartrending to find members of the
same family at odds with each other, each
playing one against the other.
The facts of the instant case illustrate the
inglorious and unedifying spectacle of a "family
feud." all because of a property dispute.
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael
Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot
twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2)
Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5)
Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8)
Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11)
Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945,
the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot
area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del
Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in
TCT No. 47572,1 wherein the constructed
their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate.
Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez,
Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
vesting unto himself sole ownership to the
property described in TCT No. 47572.
Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was
cancelled and TCT No. 333502 was issued
in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael
Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos"3 covering the land described in
TCT No. 33350, as well as the house
constructed thereon to three of this
children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.;
(2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private
respondents herein, to the exclusion of his
other children, petitioners herein. As a
result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was
cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in
private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents
were in actual possession of the land.
However, when petitioners learned about
the existence of TCT No. 47572, they
immediately demanded that since they are
also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they
are entitled to their respective shares over
the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts
to settle the dispute proved unavailing
since private respondents ignored
petitioners' demands.
In view of the private respondents'
indifference, petitioners, now joined by
Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991
for "Reconveyance and Partition with
Damages" before the trial court 4 alleging
that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were
fraudulent since the private respondents
took advantage of the advanced age of their
father in making him execute the said
documents.
In their Answer, private respondents argued
that petitioner's action was already barred
by the statute of limitations since the same
should have been filed within four years
from the date of discovery of the alleged
fraud.5
After due proceedings, the trial court, on
April 29, 1993, rendered its decision6 in
favor of the petitioners, in this wise:
Prescription cannot set in
because an action to set aside
a document which is void ab
initio does not prescribe. Both
the "Affidavit of Adjudication"
and the "Donation Inter Vivos"
did not produce any legal
effect and did not confer any
right whatsoever. Equally,
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
33350 and 46461 issued
pursuant thereto, are likewise
null and void ab initio.
Therefore, the inexistence of
these documents and
certificates of title is
permanent and cannot be the
subject of prescription.
Private respondents, dissatisfied with the
trial court's ruling, sought recourse before
the Court of Appeals. On April 29, 1996, the
said court reversed the trial court's finding,
thus:7
In line with the decision of the
Supreme Court in Gerona v. de
Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the
action therefor may be filed
within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have
taken place in the case at bar
on June 16, 1982, when the
affidavit of self-adjudication
was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificate of
 title (No. 33350) was issued in
the name of Rafael Marquez, Sr.
(Exhibits E and 5, page 16,
record). Considering that the
period from June 16, 1982,
when TCT No. 33350 was
issued in the name of Rafael
Marquez Sr., to May 31, 1991,
when appellees' complaint was
filed in court, is eight (8) years,
eleven (11) months and fifteen
(15) days, appellants' action to
annul the deed of self-
adjudication is definitely
barred by the statute of
limitation.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
proved unavailing.8 Hence, they are now
before this Court to raise the issue of
whether their action for reconveyance had
prescribed.
Petitioners, in contending that the action
had not yet prescribed, assert that by virtue
of the fraudulent "Affidavit of Adjudication"
and "Deed of Donation" wherein they were
allegedly deprived of their just share over
the parcel of land, a constructive trust was
created.9 Forthwith, they maintain that an
action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years.
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez
died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate
is governed by the present Civil Code.
Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory
heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners
and private respondent therein, and her
spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982,
Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate
the entire property by executing an
"Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he
is the sole surviving heir of his deceased
wife Felicidad F. Marquez. 10
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one
reason or another, misrepresented in his
unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir
of his wife when in fact their children were
still alive, and managed to secure a transfer
of certificate of title under his name, a
constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established. 11 Constructive trusts are
created in equity in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse
of confidence, obtains or holds the legal,
right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold. 12
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion,
did the action for reconveyance filed by the
petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court
of Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the isuance of the Torrens title over
the property. 13 For the purpose of this
case, the prescriptive period shall start to
run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which
was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering
that the action for reconveyance was filed
on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine
years later, it is evident that prescription
had not yet barred the action.
To bolster the foregoing position, the Court
of Appeal's reliance on Gerona v. de
Guzman, 14 is misplaced. In Amerol v.
Bagumbaran, 15 we ruled that the doctrine
laid down in the earlier Gerona case was
based on the old Code of Civil Procedure 16
which provided that an action based on
fraud prescribes within four years from the
date of discovery. However, with the
effectivity of the present Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, the provisions on
prescriptive periods are now governed by
Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or
constructive trusts are obligations created
by law then the prescriptive period to
enforce the same prescribes in ten years.
17
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land
was conjugal property of the spouses
Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the
same is to be equally divided between both
of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez
Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly
donate this portion to the respondents?
Obviously, he cannot, as expressly
provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardians and
trustees cannot donate the
property entrusted to them.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that
which does not belong to
him. 18
Be that as it may, the next question is
whether he can validly donate the other half
of the property which he owns? Again, the
query need not detain us at length for the
Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the
inherent rights of an owner is the right to
dispose of his property. 19
Whether this donation was inofficious or
not is another matter which is not within the
province of this Court to determine
inasmuch as it necessitates the production
of evidence not before it.
Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners,
we cannot grant their plea for moral
damages and attorney's fees 20 since they
have not satisfactorily shown that they
have suffered "mental anguish" as provided
in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the Civil
Code.
Similarly, the plea for attorney's fees must
likewise be denied because no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. 21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Except as to the award of attorney's fees
which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 128254 January 16, 2004
HEIRS OF POMPOSA SALUDARES
represented by ISABEL DATOR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE DATOR and
CARMEN CALIMUTAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review on
certiorari is the July 31, 1996 decision1 of the Court
of Appeals reversing the August 27, 1992 decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch
56, which in turn dismissed private respondents’
petition for reconveyance on the ground of
prescription of action.
At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of
land, known as Lot 5793, measuring 8,916 square
meters, located at Mahabang Parang, Lucban,
Quezon. The land formed part of the conjugal
properties of spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa
Saludares, known as the Tanza estate.
Pomposa died on May 1, 1923, leaving herein
petitioners, Enrica, Petra, Restituto, Amado, Delfina,
Beata, Vicenta and Isabel, all surnamed Dator, as
her compulsory heirs (hereinafter referred to as
Heirs).
On February 28, 1940, the Heirs and their father
Juan executed a deed of extra-judicial partition of
the share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate. The
settlement conferred the eastern half of the Tanza
estate to Juan and the western half to the Heirs.
Before the aforementioned partition, Juan was in
possession of the entire Tanza estate. After the
partition, the Heirs took possession of their share
and had the same tenanted by a certain Miguel
Dahilig, husband of Petra, one of the Heirs, who in
turn managed the land in behalf of the other siblings.
Juan, the father, remained in possession of his half
of the land until his death on April 6, 1940.
On December 13, 1976, Isabel Dator applied for a
free patent over the entire Tanza estate, including
Lot 5793, in behalf of the Heirs. On May 26, 1977,
after all the requirements were complied with, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon awarded Free Patent
No. 4A-2-8976 and issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-23617 in the names of the Heirs.
Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were informed by their
tenant that private respondents cut some 50 coconut
trees located within the subject lot. Thus, the Heirs
sent a letter,3 dated July 26, 1988, to private
respondents demanding an explanation for their
intrusion into their property and unauthorized
felling of trees.
On August 25, 1988, private respondents retaliated
by filing an action for reconveyance against
petitioners, docketed as civil case no. 88-121, in the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (a) they
were the owners in fee simple and possessors of Lot
No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from the
successors-in-interest of Petra Dator, one of the
heirs; (c) they were in possession of the subject land
from 1966 to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel
Dator obtained free patent OCT P-23617 over Lot
5793 in favor of the Heirs by means of fraud and
misrepresentation. Thus, private respondents prayed
for the cancellation of OCT P-23617 and the
issuance of a new title in their names.
In their answer, the Heirs denied having sold any
portion of the Tanza estate to anyone. They alleged
that: (a) they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been and were still in actual, continuous, adverse
and public possession of the subject land in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial and (b)
title to Lot 5793 was issued in their favor after
faithful compliance with all the requirements
necessary for the issuance of a free patent.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
dismissing the action primarily on the ground of
prescription of action:
More telling is plaintiff Jose Dator’s
admission that the adjacent lot which is
5794 is his and he was a cadastral claimant,
in fact, filed (sic) an application for free
patent. By and large, if Jose Dator was
personally claiming rights on the property
now denominated as Lot 5793, the Court is
intrigued and cannot see its way clear why
Jose Dator did not file any protest in the
application of the heirs of Pomposa
Saludares, neither had Jose Dator filed any
petition for review within the time frame,
instead it took them eleven (11) long years
to question the validity.
The doctrine of "stale demands" or laches is
even applicable in the case at bar. "Laches
means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable length of time, to do that
which by exercising diligence could or
should have been done earlier." (Marcelino
versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94422,
June 26, 1992)
xxx xxx xxx
The issues with respect to ownership have
already been amply discussed which brings
us to the issue as to whether or not the action
has prescribed and whether the original
certificate of title in the name of the heirs of
Pomposa Saludares is already indefeasible.
The action for reconveyance at bar was filed
on August 28, 1988 or more than eleven (11)
years from the issuance of the title, a fact
plaintiffs cannot deny. They cannot claim
ignorance that the defendants-heirs of
Pomposa Saludares are applying for a free
patent of Lot No. 5793 because notices were
sent.
xxx xxx xxx
In the absence of competent and positive
evidence that the title of the defendants has
been secured thru fraud which in the case at
bar is wanting and which would necessarily
invalidate it, the presumption is it has been
issued regularly in the absence of actual
fraud.
There being no positive evidence presented
which would establish actual fraud in the
issuance of Free Patent Title No. P-23617 in
the defendants’ name, their title deserves
recognition.
In like manner, in an action for
reconveyance after the lapse of one year
from the date of the registration, actual fraud
in securing the title must be proved (J.N.
 Tuazon Co., Inc. versus Macalindog, G.R.
No. L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
938).
The plaintiffs’ claim for reconveyance
therefore cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs ordering the dismissal
of the case with costs against plaintiffs and
declaring defendants, heirs of Pomposa
Saludares, as the rightful owners of the land.
The claim of defendants in the matter of
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses not
having been proven by concrete evidence,
the Court opts not to award the same.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial
court decision:
It is true that the Torrens title issued upon a free
patent may not be cancelled after the lapse of ten
years from the date of its registration because the
statute of limitations bars such cancellation. But this
doctrine has long been qualified thusly:
If the registered owner, be he the patentee or
his successor-in-interest to whom the Free
patent was transferred or conveyed, knew
that the parcel of land described in the patent
and in the Torrens belonged to another who
together with his predecessors-in-interest
were never in possession thereof, then the
statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens
title issued upon a free patent does not apply
and the true owner may bring an action to
have the ownership or title to the land
judicially settled and the Court in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without
ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title
issued upon the patent, may direct the
defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey
the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has
been found to be the true owner thereof.
(Vital vs. Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855,
Underscoring ours.)
In this case, there is clear evidence to show that
appellee Isabel had full knowledge that Lot 5793
had been sold to her brother-in-law Miguel Dahilig
and her sister Petra, that Lot 5793 no longer
belonged to her and to the heirs she claimed to
represent. She was signatory to the deed of sale
dated April 16, 1940 in favor of appellant. (Exh. I)
With this knowledge, there is reason to conclude
that appellant Isabel misrepresented herself and the
rest of the heirs as owners entitled to the free patent.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Reversing the August 27, 1992
decision of the court below;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon Province to cancel OCT No.
P-23617 in the name of the Heirs of
Pomposa Saludares and to issue
another for the same property in the
name of plaintiffs Jose Dator and
Carmen Calimutan;
3. Ordering appellees to pay
appellants ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos for attorney’s fees, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved by the appellate court ruling, the Heirs
filed the instant petition, assigning the following
errors:
The Court of Appeals erred in tracing the history of
the transactions involving the property way back to
the year 1923 and render judgment based on its
findings, considering that petitioners are the
registered owners of the property under a torrens
certificate of title which is conclusive,
incontrovertible and indefeasible.
The Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider
that the complaint filed by the private respondents
for reconveyance and cancellation of title before the
trial court eleven (11) years after a torrens title over
the property was issued in the name of the
petitioners (had) prescribed.6
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title, the registered owner may still be compelled to
reconvey the registered property to its true owner.
The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does
not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of
fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to
the one with a better right.7
Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of
registered property is not absolute because it is
subject to extinctive prescription. In Caro vs. Court
of Appeals,8 the prescriptive period of an action for
reconveyance was explained:
Under the present Civil Code, we find that
just as an implied or constructive trust is an
offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code),
so is the corresponding obligation to
reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and
vis-à-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the
Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by
law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
An action for reconveyance has its basis in
Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud,
the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to
such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder of the
decree of registration on the original petition
or application, x x x.
This provision should be read in conjunction
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the
trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner.
Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article
1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2)
of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title.
There is but one instance when prescription
cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed.9
In a series of cases,10 this Court permitted the filing
of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of
ten years and declared that said action, when based
on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has
not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. But
in all those cases including Vital vs. Anore11 on
which the appellate court based its assailed decision,
the common factual backdrop was that the
registered owners were never in possession of the
disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with
the better right or the legal owners of the land who
had always been in possession of the same. Thus,
the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to
prosper in those cases despite the lapse of more than
ten years from the issuance of title to the land. The
exception was based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud
or for enriching a person at the expense of
another.12
In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than
the exception which should apply.
This Court does not normally review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But
when the findings of fact of the appellate court
differ from those of the trial court, the Court in the
exercise of its power of review may inquire into the
facts of a case.
The trial court declared the Heirs as having been in
actual, open and continuous possession of the
disputed lot. On the other hand, the appellate court
ruled that it was private respondents.
Private respondents presented documents
purportedly showing a series of transactions which
led to the alleged transfer of ownership of Lot 5793
from the Heirs to them, namely: (1) a Kasulatan Ng
Pagbibilihang Lampasan, dated April 16, 1940,
wherein the disputed lot was allegedly sold by the
Heirs to their sibling Petra Dator and her husband
Miguel Dahilig; (2) an extra-judicial partition
showing that, upon the death of Miguel, his heirs
Petra, Angel, Anatalia, Catalina, Felimon and
Jacinto, inherited Lot 5793 and (3) two deeds of
sale dated December 30, 1978 and March 15,1970
wherein Felimon and Jacinto, and later Catalina,
sold their undivided shares in Lot 5793 to private
respondents.
Other than the presentation of these documents,
however, private respondents failed to prove that
they were in actual, open and continuous possession
of Lot 5793.
On the other hand, Isabel Dator, who testified for
the Heirs, vehemently denied having signed the
Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan and pointed
out the absence of the signatures of her other
siblings Vicenta, Barcelisa and Adoracion.
The Heirs likewise presented proof of payment of
realty taxes from 1956 to 1974 in the names of their
deceased parents, and from 1975 to 1988 in their
names.
More importantly, the Heirs convincingly
established their open and continuous occupation of
the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793, through
their tenant Miguel Dahilig. After Miguel’s death,
he was succeeded by Marcelo Saludares who
testified during the trial that: (a) the farm was under
the administration of Beata and Isabel Dator who
took over its management after Petra Dator died; (b)
he had been consistently tending the land since
1947; (c) he was the one who planted the various
crops and trees thereon, except for some 100
coconut trees which he explained were planted by
other people in response to the Green Revolution
project of then President Marcos.
Saludares identified each and every landmark and
boundary of the subject lot. He also enumerated all
the trees planted on the subject lot and, when asked
about the fruits of the land, he told the court that he
shared the harvest with the surviving Heirs.
In stark contrast, private respondents’ witness, farm
worker Perpetuo Daya could not identify the
boundaries of the disputed property, its adjoining
owners or recall the dates he worked and tilled the
subject lot.
Specially noteworthy was the fact that the recorded
cadastral claimant of Lot 5793, Angel Dahilig,
testified that he executed a waiver in favor of the
Heirs because they were the true owners of the
subject parcel of land.13
Furthermore, we note private respondent Jose
Dator’s declaration that he was the cadastral
claimant of and free patent applicant for Lot 5794
which was adjacent to Lot 5793. This being the case,
we find private respondents’ inaction difficult to
understand, considering that they were among those
who received notices of petitioners’ free patent
application dated January 2, 1979 from the Bureau
of Lands.14
If private respondents indeed owned Lot 5793, they
should have filed an application for free patent for it
just as they did for Lot 5794, or at least opposed the
Heirs’ application for free patent over Lot 5793, to
protect their interests. As a matter of fact, they were
aware that the Heirs’ tenant, Marcelo Saludares,
repeatedly harvested the fruits of Lot 5793.
But even assuming that private respondents indeed
validly acquired Lot 5793 in 1966 as they claimed,
they nevertheless slept on their right to secure title
thereto. Their unexplained inaction for more than 11
years rendered their demand for reconveyance stale.
Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.
The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on
their rights. This legal precept finds perfect
application in the case at bar.
Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in disregarding the ten-
year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
registered real property and in giving due course to
said action despite the lapse of more than 11 years
from the issuance of title thereto, which was clearly
barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 31,
1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated August
27, 1992, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-
MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-
COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-
PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA*
IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon
D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar
(Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda),
Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri
(Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia),
and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse
and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2 and
October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN
which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City,
Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new one
dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of
sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein
respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri
(Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her
first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely:
Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely:
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties with a total area of 296,555 square
meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte,
embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536 and P-
20551 (P-8348)7 issued on February 15, 1957,
August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and
as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and
Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7,
1979, adjudicating among themselves the said
homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱
80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a
complaint for annulment of saleof the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the
sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include
Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for
having been excluded and deprived of their
legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first
marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the
heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied
knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s
exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale
of the subject properties, and interposed further the
defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still
void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived
of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no
judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor
children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and
prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed
possession of the subject properties for 17 years,
holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling
of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge
of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties and as such, were not bound by it,
the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s
possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia
and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997,
ormore than two years fromknowledge of their
exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather
died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded
heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-
heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial
settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and
binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren,
holding that as co-owners, they have the right to
dispose of their respective shares as they consider
necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and
Douglas to be minors at that time, they were
deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to
question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso
found laches to have set in because of their inaction
for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the
following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE
"EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE
ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND
VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL
THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF
SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF
ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR
PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are
indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion
from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are
entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant
to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which
read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on
September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique
acquired their respective inheritances,9 entitling
them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate,
as follows:
9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets +
Enrique
1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
 Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering
that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded
and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not
valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a
total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the
next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of
estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10
thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply
to the partition in question which was null and void
as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule
covers only valid partitions. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of
the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in
the partitioned property. Under the rule "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity
and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null
and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
propertiesmade by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents isvalid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that
these heirs have acquired their respective shares in
the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of
her death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can
very well sell their undivided share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors
at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction. However, on
the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique
was merely clothed with powers of administration
and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in
force at the time of the execution of the settlement
and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother,
is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property
is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of
the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court
also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property
of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother,
without the necessity of court appointment, shall be
his legal guardian. When the property of the child is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
the mother shall be considered guardian of the
child’s property, with the duties and obligations of
guardians under these Rules, and shall file the
petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good
reasons, the court may, however, appoint another
suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation
of the property and the receipt of fruits according to
the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the
substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the
limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother,
as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is
granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’
prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by
Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority,15 is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and
1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter or
unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by
one who has no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person
by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It
is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified,
expressly or impliedly such as when the person
knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is
cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was
constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute
deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11,
1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed
by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and
conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji
Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7,
1979, we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore
the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far
as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"
(Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon
and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included
in this case since we do not have any intention to
file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and
acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements
constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate
and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects
existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing
the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of
Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is
not true with respect to Douglas for lack of
evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement
with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in
the homestead properties have effectivelybeen
disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can
only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and
the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more
than what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this
score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant,
which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They
were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied
constructive trust for the latter’s benefit,
conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code
which states:"if property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable
that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to ₱
5,000.0021 each or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be
returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the present action has not prescribed
in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the
CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in
Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the
extrajudicial settlement finds no application to
petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
were deprived of their lawful participation in the
subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the
Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in
trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the
cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In this
case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to
have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with
sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994
which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the
complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment
is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and
VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in
favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy
and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16
total shares of the late Enrique Neri,
Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar,
Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D.
Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos,
Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri
as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16
portions of the subject homestead properties,
covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos.
(P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-
20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique
Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D.
Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return
to the respondents jointly and solidarily the
amount paid corresponding to the 3/16
shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in
the total amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with legal
interest at 6% per annum computed from the
time of payment until finality of this
decision and 12% per annum thereafter until
fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.