Wilfred P.

Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004


Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.

Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions:

(1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
(2) Even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA
04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc.

On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and
GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Issues:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the
President of the Philippines.

Ruling:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.

Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947),
jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
by birth.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was
born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
(5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and
the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer.

The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commission of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292


Facts:
This is  a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest
and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.

Petitioner herein applied for  a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she desired to take
a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a period of one
month.

When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1,
000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order
her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action
for injunction with preliminary injunction.

During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English
or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.

Issues:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines.

Ruling:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely,
reads.

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might herself be
lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.

Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalised," what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she
must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age,
residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the
Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of
real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal 
local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.

In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that
she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a
fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise,
an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4:

1. Person opposed to organized government or affiliate with any associations or group

of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period
of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of  a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does
not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: In re: Mallare 59 SCRA 45


Facts:
Mallare’s father Esteban was the illegitimate child of a  Chinese  father and
a Filipino mother, and believed himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer, but his
admission to the bar was revoked because his citizenship was questionable.

Issues:
Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding that Esteban was a Filipino
because his mother was not married to his Chinese father. Furthermore, when Mallare
came of age, he registered as a voter and exercised his right of suffrage. The Court
considered these acts to be enough to show that Mallare had elected Filipino
citizenship, without needing any formal declaration on his part.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Aznar vs. COMELEC and Osmeña, 185 SCRA 1990 


Facts:
On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen.
    
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate
issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an
American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a
Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the
Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and
Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.
 
Issues:
Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot
be presumed.

Ruling:
Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino
Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;  
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the
foreign country.

The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any
of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine
citizenship. The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no
retroactive effect.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245

Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that
he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos
during the Martial Law era.

Issues:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He

claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated
that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop
his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

Case: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC; 257 SCRA 727

Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was
disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-
assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation.

Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast
in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to
have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most
Wilfred P. Alfeche

number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post
due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.

Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to
qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or
be elected to or hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said
petition is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of
existing jurisprudence?

Ruling:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2)
by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state
a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age
(at least 35 years old  on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation  and on  the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his office began, he was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold  office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to
be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually.  In other words, the law's purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the
area he seeks to govern — and  not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the
previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of  filing of his
application.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

3) No. The Constitution  has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective provincial  officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6)
days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.

4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a
second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Bengzon vs. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 14280, May 7, 2001


Facts:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said election.

Issues:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Ruling:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
Wilfred P. Alfeche

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: CO vs. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991


Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, decided in favor of the private
respondent. Hence, the instant case.

Issues:
1.)    Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.)    Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.)    Whether Ong is a resident of Samar.

Ruling:
1.)      Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no
denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the
power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

2.)      Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose Ong Chuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from
China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose Ong Chuan
took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born
Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.

3.)      Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The
domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar.  Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the
residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
Wilfred P. Alfeche

Topic: Articles on Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution/ New
Automation Law as Amended/ Dual Citizenship Act, RA 8171
Case: Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals 


Facts:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and
was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of
BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that
his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several
federal charges against him.

Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with

the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported
or detained by the BID.

Issues:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only
person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her
Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his
minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the
time of filing of the petition for repatriation.