G.R. No. 152878.

May 5, 2003
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU, BENITO SY
and ANDERSON UY,respondents.

It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute
of finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and
executor dismissal although without prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction
over the civil case as well as any residual power to order anything relative to the
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is docketed once again.

FACTS:
RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with writ of
preliminary attachment against Magwin and 4 others. The writ was partially
satisfied. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial. For about 6
months the parties tried to settle through loan restricting program but only one
of the defendants signed the agreement.
RTC Makati dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute
for unreasonable length of time. A motion for reconsideration is filed informing
the court of the on-going amicable settlement. The judgment was set aside and
the plaintiffs are directed to submit the compromise agreement.
Motion to set the case for pre-trial was filed by petitioner for the failure of the
parties to compromise. The trial court denied the motion. The CA approved the
decision and said that the order of trial court setting aside is dependent on two
conditions.
1) Submission of compromise agreement within 15 days, and
2) Failure to submit shall cause the imposition of payment of docket fees for
refilling of the case
The CA said that the order of the RTC was been set aside because a party need
not pay docket fees for refilling if the original case is revived.

ISSUE:

Whether docket fee is necessary.

HELD:

There is no substantial policy requiring petitioner to pay again the docket

fees when it had already discharge the obligation simultaneously with filing a
complaint for sum of money. The procedure in dismissed cases when refilled is
the same as it was initially filed. It is a re-enactment of the past proceedings.

The addition of second sentence “failure on part of plaintiff to submit

agreement will cause to payment of docket fee for refilling” is not a direction to
pay but a statement of event that may result in its imposition. Such payment is
not obligatory in civil cases since docket fees are deluged only after dismissal
becomes executory.

Once dismissal attained finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees
again because executory dismissal divest the trial court jurisdiction as well as
residual powers to order anything relative to the case. It would have to wait till
the case is decided again. In that case, no need to file docket fees for continuation
of hearing wont set aside order of dismissal and reinstatement of complaint.
 G.R. No. 126619
UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

Arbitration has been defined as "an arrangement for taking and abiding by
the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to
established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay,
the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.

FACTS:

This case involved Titan-Ikeda who entered into 3 construction agreement/

contract /project with Uniwide. Later Titan-Ikeda filed an action for sum of money
against Uniwide with the RTC because Uniwide allegedly failed to pay certain
claims billed by Titan after the completion of the 3 projects. Uniwide moved for
the dismissal/suspension of the proceeding for them to first undergo arbitration.
The Arbitrators issued terms of reference which was signed by the parties,
(Uniwide did not attempt to modify the TOR to accommodate its belated
counterclaim on deadlines for liquidated damages.)Titan then refiled the case
with CIAC.
CIAC Decision: Project 1: Uniwide is absolved of any liability.Project 2:
Uniwide is absolved of any liability for VAT payment and for the account of Titan,
and Titan is absolved from liability for defective construction.Project 3: Uniwide id
held liable for unpaid balance (5,158,364.63) plus 12% interest/annum and to pay
the full VAT for the additional work where no written authorization was
presented.
CIAC likewise rejected the claim on liquidated damages.
After Uniwide’s motion for reconsideration was denied by CIAC, it filed a
petition for review with CA but same was denied, thus, Uniwide filed a petition
for review under rule 45 to seek partial reversal of the decision of CA which
modified the decision of CIAC. Uniwide claims that CIAC should have applied
procedural rules such as section 5, Rule 10 with more liberality because it was an
administrative tribubal free from all rigid technicalities of regular courts because
CA held that the issue on liquidated damages should be left for determination in
future proceedings.
ISSUE:

Whether or not CIAC should have applied the Rules of Court in the arbitration
proceeding.

RULING: Rule of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration promulgated by

the CIAC contains no provision on the application of the Rules of Court to
arbitration proceedings, even in a suppletory capacity.Such importation of the
Rules of Court provision on amendment to conform to evidence would
contravene the spirit, if not the letter of the CIAC rules. This is for the reason that
the formulation of the Terms of Reference is done with the active participation of
the parties and their counsel themselves. The TOR is further required to be signed
by all the parties, their respective counsel and all the members of the Arbitral
Tribunal. Unless the issues thus carefully formulated in the Terms of Reference
were expressly showed to be amended, issues outside thereof may not be
resolved. As already noted in the Decision, "no attempt was ever made by the
[Uniwide] to modify the TOR in order to accommodate the issues related to its
belated counterclaim" on this issue.
Arbitration has been defined as "an arrangement for taking and abiding by the
judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to
established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay,
the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.
 PHILROCK, INC., petitioner, vs. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
ARBITRATION COMMISSION and Spouses VICENTE and NELIA
CID, respondents.

Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction
contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitration.
The Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat
the objective of voluntary arbitration for its own private motives. After submitting
itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein, petitioner is
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter
rendered an adverse decision.

FACTS:

A complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by the Cid spouses against
Philrock, Inc. and seven of its officers and engineers in connection with the
construction of the former's house. The same was dismissed and referred to the
CIAC pursuant to the parties’ Agreement to Arbitrate.

Due to disagreements on the issue whether moral and exemplary damages and
tort should be included along with breach of contract and the inclusion of the
seven officers and engineers therein who are not parties to the Agreement to
Arbitrate, the case was remanded to the trial court who, however, declared that it
no longer had jurisdiction. The case was remanded back to the CIAC and resumed
preliminary conferences.

Philrock argued that said Order was based on a mistaken premise that 'the
proceedings in the CIAC fell through because of the refusal of [Petitioner] Philrock
to include the issue of damages therein,' whereas the true reason for the
withdrawal of the case from the CIAC was due to Philrock's opposition to the
inclusion of its seven officers and engineers, who did not give their consent to
arbitration, as party defendants.

Private respondent Nelia Cid manifested that she was willing to exclude the seven
officers and engineers of Philrock as parties to the case so as to facilitate or
expedite the proceedings. With such manifestation from the Cid spouses, the
Arbitral Tribunal denied Philrock's request for the suspension of the proceedings.

And the proceedings therein continued with the exclusion of the seven officers.
Terms of Reference to settle the differences of the parties by an Arbitral Tribunal
was signed and later, the CIAC rendered a decision in favor of the Cid spouses.
Petitioner contested the jurisdiction of the CIAC to hear the arbitration case
due to the parties' withdrawal of their consent to arbitrate and assailed its
decision.

However, the Court of Appeals upheld the same reasoning that CIAC acquires
jurisdiction when the parties agree to submit their dispute to voluntary
arbitration which is based on the principle that once acquired, jurisdiction
remains "until the full termination of the case unless a law provides the contrary."

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CIAC could take jurisdiction over the case after the case
had been dismissed by both the RTC and the CIAC.

RULING:

YES. Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from construction contracts
entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary
arbitration. Here, the parties agreed to arbitrate in the CIAC with the issue of
exclusion of the seven officers settled. Petitioner continued participating in the
arbitration proceedings and even signed the Terms of Reference. Petitioner was
stopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
 METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. CHATHAM
PROPERTIES, INC., respondent .

Under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may
be brought to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The
grounds for the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of
facts and appeals involving mixed questions of fact and law.

FACTS:
On April 21, 1994, respondent and petitioner entered into a contract for
the construction of the Chatham House in Makati City. In April 1998, petitioner
sought to collect from respondent a sum of money for unpaid progress billings
and other charges and instituted a request for adjudication of its claims with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). Among others, the parties
submitted for CIAC's resolution the issue on whether or not petitioner failed to
complete and/or deliver the project within the approved completion date and, if
so, whether petitioner was liable for liquidated damages. After due hearing, the
CIAC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner and directed the respondent to pay
petitioner P16,126,922.91. The CIAC held that the provision of the contract
insofar as the Overall Schedule is concerned cannot be justifiably applied in the
instant case in view of the implied takeover of the project by respondent.
Accordingly, the CIAC found it unnecessary to rule on whether MCI completed
and/or delivered the project within the approved completion schedule of the
project since respondent failed to observe the antecedent acts required for the
termination of the contract, as set forth in the Construction Agreement. The CIAC,
however, found petitioner liable for liquidated damages. Based on the CIAC's
assessment, petitioner's responsibility was based on its delay in the concreting
milestone.

Respondent instituted a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the CIAC except on the matter of
liquidated damages. In its decision, the appellate court held that there was no
takeover by respondent and that petitioner exercised complete control, authority
and responsibility over the construction. The appellate court also found petitioner
liable for liquidated damages but made a contrary conclusion and declared that
petitioner was in delay based on the overall schedule of completion of the
project. Thus, it directed petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P4,935,578.31.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the same for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:

The core issue in this case is whether under existing law and rules the Court
of Appeals can also review findings of facts of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

RULING:

Hence, this instant petition for review. Petitioner alleged that the Court of
Appeals, in reviewing and reversing the CIAC's factual findings, contravened
Section 19 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008, which provides that the arbitral
award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which
are appealable to the Supreme Court.

The Court rejected petitioner's contention holding that under Circular No.
1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of
Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The grounds for the appeal are
likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of facts and appeals involving
mixed questions of fact and law. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
appeals from final orders or decisions of the CIAC is further fortified by the
amendments to B.P. Blg. 129, as introduced by R.A. No. 7902. The Court affirmed
the CIAC's findings and arbitral award. The Court found that the evidence taken as
a whole or in their totality revealed that there was an implied takeover by
respondent on the completion of the project.
 G.R. No. 169332 February 11, 2008
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS (WINS) JAPAN CO., LTD., respondent.

Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43
pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. While a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover,
it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper remedy or as a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.

FACTS:

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) entered into a licensing

agreement with World Interactive Network Systems (WINS) to distribute and
sublicense the distribution of the television service known as "The Filipino
Channel" (TFC) in Japan. ABS-CBN undertook to transmit the TFC programming
signals to WINS which the latter received through its decoders and distributed to
its subscribers. A dispute arose between the parties when ABS-CBN accused WINS
of inserting nine episodes of WINS WEEKLY into the TFC programming. ABS-CBN
claimed that these were "unauthorized insertions" constituting a material breach
of their agreement. WINS filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the arbitration
clause of its agreement with ABS-CBN. It contended that the airing of WINS
WEEKLY was made with petitioner's prior approval. It also alleged that petitioner
only threatened to terminate their agreement because it wanted to renegotiate
the terms thereof to allow it to demand higher fees. It also prayed for damages
for petitioner's alleged grant of an exclusive distribution license to another entity,
NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).The parties appointed Professor Alfredo F.
Tadiar to act as sole arbitrator.The arbitrator found in favor of World Interactive
Network Systems. ABS-CBN filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court or, in the alternative, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the same Rules, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction. WINS, on the other hand, filed a petition for confirmation
of arbitral award before the RTC of Quezon City. The CA dismissed ABS-CBN’s
petition for lack of jurisdiction. It stated that as the terms or reference (TOR) itself
provided that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and unappealable and that no
motion for reconsideration shall be filed, then the petition for review must fail. It
ruled that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over questions relating to
arbitration. It held that the only instance it can exercise jurisdiction over an
arbitral award is an appeal from the trial court's decision confirming, vacating or
modifying the arbitral award. It further stated that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper in arbitration cases only if the courts refuse
or neglect to inquire into the facts of an arbitrator's award.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a party in a voluntary arbitration dispute may avail of,

directly in the CA, a petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition to vacate the
award in the RTC when the grounds invoked to overturn the arbitrator’s decision
are other than those for a petition to vacate an arbitral award enumerated under
RA 876.

HELD:

The assigned errors reveals that the real issues calling for the CA's
resolution were less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised by the
arbitrator and more about the arbitrator’s appreciation of the issues and evidence
presented by the parties. Therefore, the issues clearly fall under the classification
of errors of fact and law — questions which may be passed upon by the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner cleverly crafted its assignment of
errors in such a way as to straddle both judicial remedies, that is, by alleging
serious errors of fact and law (in which case a petition for review under Rule 43
would be proper) and grave abuse of discretion (because of which a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 would be permissible).

Section 24 of RA 876 clearly provides that the RTC must issue an order
vacating an arbitral award only "in any one of the . . . cases" enumerated therein.
Under the legal maxim in statutory construction expressiouniusestexclusioalterius,
the explicit mention of one thing in a statute means the elimination of others not
specifically mentioned. As RA 876 did not expressly provide for errors of fact
and/or law and grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds for a petition for review
under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, respectively) as grounds
for maintaining a petition to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC, it necessarily
follows that a party may not avail of the latter remedy on the grounds of errors of
fact and/or law or grave abuse of discretion to overturn an arbitral award.

Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43
pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. While a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover,
it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper remedy or as a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.

Nevertheless, although petitioner's position on the judicial remedies

available to it was correct, we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the CA. The
remedy petitioner availed of, entitled "alternative petition for review under Rule
43 or petition for certiorari under Rule 65," was wrong.

Time and again, we have ruled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
The petition is DENIED.
 G.R. No. 152878. May 5, 2003
ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (OSPA),OCCIDENTAL LEYTE
FARMERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (OLFAMCA), UNIFARM MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (UNIFARM) and ORMOC NORTH DISTRICT
IRRIGATION MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (ONDIMCO),Petitioners,
-versus-
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Sixth Division), HIDECO SUGAR
MILLING CO., INC., and ORMOC SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., Respondents

The formal requirements of an agreement to arbitrate are therefore the

following: (a) it must be in writing and (b) it must be subscribed by the parties or
their representatives. To subscribe means to write underneath, as ones name; to
sign at the end of a document. That word may sometimes be construed to mean
to give consent to or to attest.

FACTS:

Petitioners are associations organized by and whose members are

individual sugar planters (Planters). Respondents Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc.
(Hideco) and Ormoc Sugar Milling Co, Inc. (OSCO) are sugar centrals engaged in
grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by numerous individual sugar
planters, who may or may not be members of an association such as petitioners.

Petitioners assert that their relationship is governed by milling contracts. To

buttress this claim, petitioners presented representative samples of the milling
contracts. Petitioners claimed that respondents violated the Milling Contract
when they gave to independent planters who do not belong to any association
the 1% share, instead of reverting said share to the centrals. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a twin petitions with the RTC for Arbitration under R.A.
876, Recovery of Equal Additional Benefits, Attorneys Fees and Damages, against
HIDECO and OSCO.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of action
because they had no milling contract. The RTC convinced that there is an existing
milling contract between the petitioners and respondents and issued a Joint
Order denying the motion to dismiss, declaring the existence of a milling contract
between the parties, and directing respondents to nominate two arbitrators to
the Board of Arbitrators.
 Upon denial of the motion of the respondent, respondents elevated the
case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA held
that petitioners neither had an existing contract with respondents nor were they
privy to the milling contracts between respondents and the individual Planters. In
the main, the CA concluded that petitioners had no legal personality to bring the
action against respondents or to demand for arbitration. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it too was denied. Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper.

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing.

RULING:

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to challenge the judgment of the CA under Section 1 of Rule 65
states:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental relief as law and justice
require. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)

The instant recourse is improper because the resolution of the CA was a

final order from which the remedy of appeal was available under Rule 45 in
relation to Rule 56. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is
precisely that there should be no appeal. It is elementary that for certiorari to
prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
must likewise be satisfied.] The proper mode of recourse for petitioners was to
file a petition for review of the CAs decision under Rule 45.

Even assuming that all the petitioners were able to present milling
contracts in favor of their members, it is undeniable that under the arbitration
clause in these contracts it is the parties thereto who have the right to submit a
controversy or dispute to arbitration.

Under section 4 of R.A. 876 provides that the formal requirements of an

agreement to arbitrate are the following: (a) it must be in writing and (b) it must
be subscribed by the parties or their representatives. This claim has no leg to
stand on since petitioners did not sign the milling contracts at all, whether as a
party or as a representative of their member Planters. The individual Planter and
the appropriate central were the only signatories to the contracts and there is no
provision in the milling contracts that the individual Planter is authorizing the
association to represent him/her in a legal action in case of a dispute over the
milling contracts.

Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are indeed representatives of

the member Planters who have milling contracts with the respondents and
assuming further that petitioners signed the milling contracts
as representatives of their members, petitioners could not initiate arbitration
proceedings in their own name as they had done in the present case. As mere
agents, they should have brought the suit in the name of the principals that they
purportedly represent. Even if Section 4 of R.A. No. 876 allows the agreement to
arbitrate to be signed by a representative, the principal is still the one who has
the right to demand arbitration.