Topic: Principles of Constitution (II)

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA,

vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.

Petitioners: taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law

RESPONDENTS:

Salvador Mison: Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

Guillermo Carague: Secretary of the Department of Budget

 This case assumes added significance because it involves a conflict between two (2)
great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It
also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
 The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
provisions in the Constitution. (inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez)

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent

of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
 ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to
which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution; (with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints)

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; 3

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.

ISSUE: W/N the second, third and fourth groups of officers should be appointed by
the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments

RULING:

****1st Consti Principle:

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

***Court did not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. It
Referred to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it. (whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.)

Gold Creek Case applied: (2nd Consti Principle)

In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional

provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts
are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are
familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which
its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and
opinion in its adoption."

***Historical Background (Aid to Construction Applied):

In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political
history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the
1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-
trading" and similar malpractices. (“horse-trading” means negotiations with difficulties and
involving a lot of compromise)

On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power
of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

Given the above two (2) extremes, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of
other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group,
i.e., officers of lower rank.
***Proceedings of the Convention (Aid to Construction applied)/ Changes in
Phraseology):

The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The
original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:

Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
supplied]. (Almost all are appointees of President in his sole power)

When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16,
Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the
Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus- (portion of the debate)

Mr Monsod suggested: that the power of the Commission on Appointments be

limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to
the levels of bureau heads and colonels.

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes
proposed and approved by the Commission.

(1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

(2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from
the same requirement.

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:

MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on

page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and
bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to change the
phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR
 REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored
by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the
word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a
new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.

MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners,

what would be the justification of the proponent for such a
deletion?

MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite

low in the executive department, and to require further
confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of
bureaus would subject them to political influence.

MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by

deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from
merely staff directors, because the regional directors have
quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as
distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the
office.

MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the
supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner

Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete
'and bureaus on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau
directors if it is not the President?

MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but
their appointment shall no longer be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

xxxxxx

MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for

in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the
President, as a matter of fact like those of the different
constitutional commissions.
 MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.

FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE

APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the

Committee.

It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of
officers can be made by the President without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second

sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-

He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like
manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the
President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily
supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word
"also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p.
62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said
second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first
sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the
second sentence-

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers
whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the
first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.

But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention
and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those
officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by
express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are
left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in

character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed
against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor
Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].

and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in
the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers
have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked
officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by
law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the
various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No
reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.

The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a
careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of
the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is,
more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship.
The provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which
makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, thus-

3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ...

In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential
appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935
Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may,
however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in
rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments,

In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed
intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word
"President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the
power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is
already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments
need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

Moreover, the original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress, but
later on amended by PD No. 34:

Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in
accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and
the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No.
34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on
the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.

SO ORDERED.