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Concerned Citizens of Laoag City vs. Arzaga

Art. 11. Sec.1, 1987 Consti.: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and EE
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice and lead modest
lives.

Facts:
A
Issue:
WON the doctor-lawyer has the authority to sign informations as assistant city
fiscal.

Held:
Yes

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PARADO23
Sampayan vs. Daza
As a general rule, a de facto officer who in GF is in possession of an office and
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, he is entitled to emoluments for his
actual service. Hence, he cannot be made to reimburse funds and salaries
because his acts are valid as those of a de jure officer.
Facts:
Residents of a Congressional District filed a petition for prohibition seeking to
disqualify the then incumbent congressman of the same Congressional district
from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the
latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the US. They
claim that the congressman did not renounce his status as permanent resident
and thus have violated OEC.
Issue:
WON he should be disqualified as a member of the HR for violating Sec. 68 of
the OEC.
Held:
This petition has been rendered moot since the term of herein congressman has
already expired. A writ of prohibition in not intended to provide for acts already
consummated.
The jurisdiction pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
General Manager of PPA vs. Monserate
An exception to the GR is when there is a sitting de jure officer during the wrongful
incumbency of the de facto officer. In such instance, the de jure officer is entitled to the
backpay differentials from the de facto officer, and not the entire amount pertaining to
the office, as such would result in double compensation.
Facts:
An individual was appointed to the permanent position of Manager II in the Resource
Management Division of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Another who ranked second
for the position, protested the same to the PPA Appeals Board. Hence, the appointee was
replaced by the CSC and the 2nd ranker was reassigned to the position of Administrative
Officer, a position lower than that of his previous position before she was appointed as
Division Manager.
Issue:
WON the original appointee is entitled to back wages.
Held:
Yes, she is entitled to back wages.
In the case at bar, the appointee was irregularly replaced by the 2 nd ranker in her position
as Division Manager and illegally demoted to the position of Administrative Officer. To
note, the PPA Appeal Board Resolution was void for lack of evidence and proper notice to
the appointee. Thus, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as
Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due
process.
Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the
civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable,
right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution,
and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by
removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. Therefore, her position
as Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. Thus, “an appointment
to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and void ab initio.
Given such facts, though the 2nd ranker’s appointment to the contested position is void,
he is nonetheless considered as a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency. A
de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises
its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular.
Given such facts, a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto
officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though the de facto officer occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de
facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore,
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account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his
wrongful tenure.
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PARADO23
Monsanto vs. Factoran Acquittal from a crime, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is
the only ground for the reinstatement to his former position and
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits, and emoluments due to
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon him during the period of his suspension pende lite.
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
In the case at bar, as the assistant treasurer accepted the pardon, she is
Facts: deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
An assistant treasurer was convicted by the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. Therefore, she may apply for
estafa thru falsification of public documents. President Marcos, however while reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And
the case was still pending appeal, extended absolute pardon to her which she in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
accepted. By reason of said pardon, she then wrote the City treasurer requesting constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was to determine ultimately WON she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
vacant. The Ministry of Finance ruled that she may be reinstated without need of
a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon. The assistant treasurer, however, claims that the full pardon bestowed
on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government
has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension and that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension. She further claims that as the
executive clemency was extended to her was her conviction as still pending
appeal, there is no final judgment of conviction to speak of. Hence, she claims
that without such final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture
of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained “suspended.”
And that, since the pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an
acquittal because there was no offense to speak of.

Issue:
WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.

Held:
No, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position.

Pardon involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness, it does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It is prospective and not
retrospective. Hence, pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and
forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad
character, which has been definitely fixed. Therefore, pardon does not ipso
facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished

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or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon

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undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
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Garcia vs. Chair of Commission on Audit

As a general rule, Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction; however,
when acquittal in the criminal case is based on innocence, the administrative
case is also deemed dismissed and the public official should ipso facto be
reinstated and paid back wages because the separation is null and void.

Facts:
A supervising Lineman of the Bureau of Telecommunications was summarily
dismissed from service on the ground of dishonesty for the loss of several
telegraph poles. Based on such administrative action, a criminal case for
qualified theft was filed against him wherein the RTC rendered a decision
acquitting him of the offense charged. In view of the acquittal by the court, he
sought reinstatement in his former position to which the Bureau of
Telecommunications denied. Thus, he pleaded the President for executive
clemency to which he was granted. Therefore, he filed with COA a claim for
payment of backwages to which the latter denied.

Issue:
WON the supervising lineman is entitled to the payment of back wages after
having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

Held:
Yes, one-liner.

If pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence

and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. In such instance, pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the supervising lineman was found administratively liable for
dishonesty and consequently dismissed from service. However, he was later
acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very
same acts for which he was dismissed. This was the reason to which the
executive clemency was granted to him. Hence, such executive clemency
nullified the dismissal and relieved him from administrative liability.

Therefore, he need longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he

is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. This

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automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages.

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Moreover, the separation being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.
PARADO23
Central Bank vs. CSC
Authority of the CSC to approve appointment is limited to the inquiry of WON the
chosen individual possesses appropriate civil service eligibility; hence, the
authority to inquire does not include the power to revoke an appointment and
substitute another in one’s stead for such would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
Facts:
The CB appointed the Coordinating Assistant, the only next-in-rank EE, for the
vacant position of Assistant Bank Physician of the CB of the Phil. after the
qualifications of herein appointed were certified by the Promotions Board and a
representative of the CSC. The CSC, however, directed the immediate revocation
of the appointment and instead issued an appointment in favor of another.
Hence, they CB questioned the act of CSC claiming that the CSCs power is
limited to determining Won the appointee has the appropriate eligibility and
qualification and that once such qualification was certified, the CSC is duty bound
to attest to the appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC may disapprove the appointment and require the appointment of
another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position.
Held:
No, it may not. The CSC’s power is limited to inquiry. It is without doubt that CB
is vested with the power of appointment. Hence, it is given ample discretion in
the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. CSC, on
the other hand, is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing
official on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended.
The authority of the CSC is limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil Service. If the
appointee possesses the qualifications, the appointment must be approved; if
not, it should be disapproved. Thus, the CSC has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. Therefore, an appointment is essentially within the
discretion power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. In the case at
bar, the qualifications of the appointee was not disputed. The fact that she was
qualified was attested by the Promotions Board and a representative of the CSC.
Sevilla vs. Santos
Appointment and designation are two different concepts. Appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of an office; designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of
additional duties, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment or election. Thus, a mere “designation” does not confer upon
the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an
“acting” capacity only.
Facts:
An assistant City Engineer was designated as Acting City Engineer by President
Marcos to which he unhesitatingly assumed and discharged such functions and
responsibilities until the “People Power.” However, during the Freedom
Constitution, the then OIC Mayor, appointed a City Engineer and notified through
a memorandum the Acting City Engineer. However, the latter was not able to
receive it personally as he was on leave at that time. Despite such, he was
designated as an acting district engineer a few months thereafter. Nonetheless,
he was removed from that office. Hence, this petition of quo warranto against
the appointed City Engineer claiming that, being a presidential appointee, he
could not be removed from office by an OIC mayor as such is violative of his
right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON one who was appointed to an office in an “acting” capacity, may bring a
quo warranto action against the permanent appointee to the position.
Held:
No, he may not as his appointment was merely in an “Acting” capacity which is
merely temporary, one which is good only until another appointment is made to
take its place. Hence, his right to hold office was merely temporary.
Holding merely in an “acting” capacity, such constitutes as designation to which
functions are merely added. Thus, the mere designation does not confer upon
the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an
“acting” capacity.
An action for quo warranto may be commenced by “a person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.” Inasmuch as he does not aver that he is entitled to the office of the
City Engineer, CA committed no reversible error in dismissing such petition for
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quo warranto.
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Santiago vs. CoA (1991)
Except when the appointment is used in its general sense, it includes designation
Facts:
An EE in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV was assigned to the COA
Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and
detailed to the MIAA. However, pursuant to the resolution by the MIAA, it was
agreed upon that the COA would pay the P5K difference between his present
monthly salary and that of the Assistant GM, provided that he is formally
designate (not appointed) Assistant GM by the Board of Directors. After retiring,
GSIS used as basis in the computation of his retirement benefits the highest
basic salary rate received by the EE in the course of his employment. However,
COA disagreed claiming that the basis be only the original amount without the
salary differential of P5k. The OSG claims that COA was correct as the EE was
not appointed to the 2nd position but only designated thereto. The EE, however,
claims that, there is no substantial distinction between appointment and
designation.
Issue:
WON salary differential should be taken into consideration on the basis of WON
the EE was appointed merely in a designated capacity or in a permanent
appointment.
Held:
Yes, the salary differential should be taken into consideration in computing the
highest basic salary rate for purposes of his retirement benefits as the law in
question uses the term “appointment” in its general sense to include the term
“designation.” Thus, no distinction was intended between the two terms.
Therefore, for the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled
to additional compensation which should be included in his highest basic salaray
rate.
Santiago, Jr. vs. CSC (1989)
The Next-in-rank rule is not mandatory upon the appointing official but is merely
discretionary. However, such rule applies only to promotional appointment and
not to a re-organization to which the next-in-rank rule is mandatorily followed.
Facts:
The Customs Commissioner extended a permanent promotional appointment to
the Collector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III. The Collector of Customs
II filed a protest with the Merit System Promotion Board (MSPB) on the ground
that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The CSC
revoked the promotional appointment and directed instead the appointment to
the same position of the Collector of Customs II.
Issue:
WON it is mandatory that the person next-in-rank be considered for promotional
appointment.
Held:
No, there is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law
that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it
provides is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy,
if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled
by transfer or other modes of appointment.
Thus, one who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no
one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder
nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position.
Hence, in the case at bar, the promotional appointment of the Collector of
Customs I is undisturbed as the minimum qualifications and the standard of
merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing
authority.
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Lapinid vs. CSC
Authority of the CSC to approve appointment is limited to the inquiry of WON the
chosen individual possesses appropriate civil service eligibility; hence, the
authority to inquire does not include the power to revoke an appointment and
substitute another in one’s stead even if there is evidence that another possess
better qualifications than the other.
Facts:
An individual was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to the
position of Terminal Supervisor at an International Container Terminal. Such
appointment, later raised before the CSC, was contested by another claiming
preferential right thereto. The CSC found such claim meritorious and ordered the
appointment of the protestor as Terminal Supervisor.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove an appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified that the appointee, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?
Held:
No, it may not. The CSC’s power is limited to inquiry.
CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it
have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only
to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The
determination of who among aspirants within the minimum statutory
qualifications should be referred belongs to the appointing authority and not the
CSC. It cannot disallow appointment because it believes another person is better
qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
Luego vs. CSC
Authority of the CSC terminates after the inquiry.
Facts:
An individual was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor by the
Mayor. Such appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as
“temporary” subject to the final action taken in protest filed by another. The CSC found
the protestor better qualified and hence revoked the prior appointment and ordered the
appointment of the protestor as Administrative Officer. The OSG, claims that the
appointee could validly be replaced because his appointment was temporary in character
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified that the appointee, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter?
Held:
No, it may not. The CSC’s power is limited to inquiry.
The fact that it was “Approved as Temporary” did not change the character of the
appointment, which was clearly described as “Permanent.” What was temporary was the
approval of the appointment, and not the appointment itself.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended
by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee
is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the CSC has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
This fact is to be compared to a situation where the Constitution or the law subjects the
appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like the Commission on
Appointments (CoA). In such instance, the CoA could review the wisdom of the
appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the President’s choice
possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is provided for
in the CSC. On the contrary, the CSC is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of
determining WON the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the
law.
Further, the rule which states that: “whenever there are two or more EE who are next-in-
rank, preference shall be given to the EE who is most competent and qualified and who
has the appropriate civil service eligibility” is not applicable when neither of the claimants
are next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service
Decree allows vacancies to be filed by transfer of present EEs, reinstatement,
reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.
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Borromeo vs. Mariano Abas Kida vs. Senate

Appointment is not complete if the appointee refused to accept and assume Local elective officials have no hold-over capacity as their term of office is fixed;
office. therefore, their term ends on June 30, with or without a successor.

Facts: Facts:
An individual was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the 24st Judicial ARMM was created pursuant to a constitutional mandate. The Congress then
district. He qualified and took possession of the office on that date. He was later enacted an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into
appointed to the 21 Judicial District and another was appointed in his original effect the granted autonomy. Hence, the Congress enacted RA 10153 which
position. He, however, consistently refused to accept appointment to the 21 st provided for the Synchronization of Elections in the ARMM to coincide with the
District. county’s regular national and local elections. Numerous petitions were filed
assailing the constitutionality of RA 10153 on the ff. grounds, among others, that
Issue: it did not comply with the: 1) plebiscite requirement and 2) three-reading
WON the appointment was deemed complete. requirement, etc. The court, thereafter, issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of such law and ordering the incumbent elective officials of the
Held: ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided
No, it is not. by the end of their term.

A judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his
consent. Hence, as the judge did not accept such appointment, he is lawfully
entitled to the possession of such 24 th district office. The latter appointee must
be ousted from the office of the 24th district and the former be placed in
possession of the same.
Issue:
WON the court erred in ordering the incumbent officials to continue to perform
their functions despite the end of their term.
Held:
RA 10153 is constitutional; however, the holdover option is unconstitutional.
Consequently, the court erred in ordering the incumbent officials to continue the
performance of their functions despite the end of their term as local elective
officials have no hold-over capacity for the reason that their term of office is
fixed by law.

In the case at bar, since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
covered and bound by the 3-yr term limit prescribed by the Constitution;
consequently, they cannot extend their term through a holdover. Thus, the
legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of
which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond
the period as limited by the Constitution. Therefore, the term of 3 years for local
officials should stay at 3 yrs as fixed by the Consti. and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress for the Congress, as held, cannot legislate an extension
beyond the term for which they were originally elected. Corollary to such, the
term cannot be shortened also by putting an expiration date earlier than 3 years

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that the Constitution itself commands.

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