Conflict of Laws

KITEM DUQUE KADATUAN JR.
Conflict of Laws
Atty. Steve Arellano Mercano
Chapter I
Conflict of laws definition
- is a part of municipal law which governs cases involving a foreign element

- Minor – those universal principles of right and justice which governs the courts of one state
having before them cases involving the operation and effect of laws of another state or country.
Object and Function
- To provide rational and valid rules or guidelines in deciding cases where either the parties,
events or transactions are linked to more than one jurisdiction.
Interrelated issues of Conflicts of laws
1. Adjudicatory jurisdiction
2. Choice-of-Law
3. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
Sources (among others)
1. Philippine Constitution
2. Insurance Code
3. Corporation Code
4. Public Service Act
5. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
6. Philippine Overseas Shipping Act
7. Salvage Law
8. Nationalization of Rice and Corn Industry
9. Anti-Dummy Law
10. The Patent Law
Conventions:
1. Convention on International Civil Aviation

2. Warsaw Convention
3. Convention on the Political rights of Women
4. Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women
5. Convention on the rights of the child
Hilton vs Guyot
Doctrine: No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of sovereignty from which its authority has
been derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its jurisdiction, whether by
executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another
nation, depends upon what our greatest jurist have been content to call “comity with all nations”
“COMITY” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and
goodwill, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive and judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
The judgment rendered in a foreign country is allowed the same effect only as the courts of that country allow to
the judgment of the country in which the judgment in question is sought to be executed.
Held: distinct and independent ground upon which we are satisfied that the comity of our nation does not requires
us to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France; and that ground is, the want of reciprocity, on
the part of France. The judgment is prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff’s claim
Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 1|P age

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW VS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
As to applicability As to applicability
Except in cases of violations of Human Rights, Private International law govern private
Public international principally governs states in transactions of individuals involving a foreign
their relationship amongst themselves element
As to sources As to sources
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Internal law of each state independent from any
Court of Justice namely: international law extraneous to municipal law
1. International Conventions/Treaties
2. International Customs
3. General principles of law accepted by
civilized nations
4. Judicial decisions and teachings of the
most highly qualified publicist of the
various nations
5. Ex Aequo et Bono
As to persons involved As to persons involved
States and Internationally recognized Individuals and Corporations

organizations
As to transactions As to transactions
State-to-State or Government-to-Government Private transactions between individuals

Matters
As to remedies As to remedies
1. Diplomatic protest 1. Provided by Municipal law such as resort

2. Resort to peaceful settlement of to the courts or administrative tribunals
International disputes
3. Force short of war
4. War

Chapter IV
In Analyzing a conflict of laws problem, four major questions should be considered
1. Has the court have jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant?
2. Has the court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter or is the court competent?
3. Has the suit been brought before the proper venue in cases where a foreign element is
involved?
4. Is there a statute or doctrine under which a court otherwise qualified to try the case may or may
not refuse to entertain it.
A. Basis of Exercise of Judicial Jurisdiction
a. Jurisdiction over the person – Forum-defendant contacts
Acquired through the voluntary appearance of a party and his submission to its authority
Plaintiff – acquired by the moment he invokes the aid of the court by filing a suit
Defendant- Acquire by through his voluntary appearance or by service of legal processes.
b. Jurisdiction over the res or property – Forum-property contacts

- Through seizure of the property by legal process
- By filing of a suit wherein the courts power over the property is recognized and made effective
c. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter – Determined the nature of the cause of action and relief
sought.
- Conferred by law
Gemperle vs Schenker
- Service of summons to the wife as a representative allowed the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Pennoyer vs Neff
- Presence of the defendant in the state is a prerequisite in order that a judgment personally
binding him will be valid.
International Shoe vs Washington
- He should have certain minimum contact with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
- A corporation is deemed to have consented to service and suits as implied by its presence in the
state through acts of authorized agents.
Shaffer vs Heitner
- Minimum contacts must exist between the forum, defendant and the cause of action
- Property is not the subject matter of litigation, furthermore the underlying cause of action is not
related to property
Long-Arm Statutes
- Specify the kind of contacts upon which jurisdiction will be asserted

Idonah Perkins vs Roxas
Doctrine: Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and
efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes
to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not
to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power
to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is
erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the
petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court — and the rightful exercise
— of its jurisdiction.
Facts: Eugene Perkins filed an action for recovery of a specific amount consisting of dividends payable in shares of
stocks. Benguet Consolidated Mining Corp. alleged that it withheld such shares because of an adverse claim by
herein petitioner and George Engelhard.
Eugene then amended her complaint to include Idonah and ask that such shared be adjudged without interest.
Idonah filed her answer and set up a judgment she obtained from the SC of NY declaring her the sole owner of the
stocks.
Idonah filed this petition for certiorari alleging that respondend judge roxas is about to render judgment
disregarding her constitutional rights and contrary to and annulling a valid judgment of the SC of NY which
constitutes as res judicata in all questions relating to the subject matter of the civil case.
Issue: WoN the respondent judge has jurisdiction.
Held: yes. See doctrine
B. Ways of dealing with a conflicts problem

1. Dismiss the case of lack of jurisdiction or on the ground of forum non conveniens
2. Assume jurisdiction and apply either forum or foreign law.
DOCTRINE of Forum Non Conveniens – The forum is inconvenient, the controversy may be more suitably tried
elsewhere. is a discretionary power that allows courts to dismiss a case where another court, or forum, is
much better suited to hear the case.
- Burdensome to the court

- Burdensome to the taxpayers
- Burdensome to the plaintiffs (In re: Union Carbide)
- Burdensome to the defendants
I. Dismiss the case of lack of jurisdiction or on the ground of forum non conveniens
Heine vs New York Insurance Company
Doctrine: The courts of this country are established and maintained primarily to determine controversies
between its own citizens and those having business there, and manifestly the court may protect itself
against a flood of litigation over contracts made and to be performed in a foreign country, where the
parties and witnesses are nonresidents of the forum, and no reason exists why the liability, if any,
cannot be enforced in the courts of the country where the cause of action arose, or in the state where
the defendant was organized and has its principal offices.
Facts: This is an action to recover on some 240 life insurance policies issued by the defendant in Germany to
German citizens and payable in German Marks.
Herein defendant is incorporated in New York but has an agent in Germany upon which summons may be served
as a condition for it to engage in business in Germany.
The court of NY refuses to assume jurisdiction over the case
Issue: WoN the court may refuse to assume jurisdiction
Held: Yes. Since it would cause inconvenience to the defendant, burden the court and consume months of the
courts time in disposing of the case.

In Re: Union Carbide
Doctrine: Indian courts provide a reasonably adequate alternative forum since all but a few of the plaintiffs are
citizens of India and the proof bearing the issues to be tried are located in India, such as the principal witness and
documents on the development and construction of the chemical plant.
Facts: On Dec. 1984 a devastating industrial disaster occurred resulting to the death of over 2000 people and over
200,000 injuries caused by a lethal gas leak from a chemical plant operated by Union Carbide India Limited.
Four days after the Bhopal Accident, 145 class actions suits were filed on behalf of the victims in the federal district
of the US. These were assigned to the southern district of NY.
Sometime in 1985 the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act (process of claims act) was enacted granting the Government
of India and the Union of India (UOI) the exclusive rights to represent the victims. The UOI filed in the court of NY
class action suits on behalf of the victims similar to those already filed.
UCC (Union Carbide Corporation) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens thus the Judge
granted the motion on the condition that: (1) UCC must consent to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts and
waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations
(2) agree to satisfy the Indian Court judgment, which comport with the minimal requirements of due
process
(3) be subject to discover, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in US
Thus UOI filed a suit on behalf of the claimant in the courts of India.
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal
The Respondent appealed the conditions of the dismissal
Issue: WoN the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is valid
Held: Yes,
1. all but a few of the plaintiffs are citizens of India.

2. The proof bearing the issues to be tried are located in India, such as the principal witness and documents
on the development and construction of the chemical plant.
Second Issue: WoN the conditions imposed are valid
Held: 1st condition is valid
Second condition rest on an erroneous assumption that should a favourable Indian judgment is obtained it may
not be enforceable against UCC in NY.
This is erroneous since under the New York Law a foreign judgment is final, conclusive and enforceable between
the parties to the extent that it grants or deny the recovery of a sum of money except when:
1. The tribunal that rendered the judgment was impartial or

2. Denial of due process
Third condition is invalid since it grants the plaintiff a greater and broader mode of discovery than that granted to
the defendant by Indian law.

Wing On Company vs SYYAP
Doctrine: Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed
 When the forum is the only state where jurisdiction can be obtained over the defendant and in addition
some relation exists between the parties or the forum provides procedural remedies not available in
another forum, such forum cannot resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
Facts: SYYAP is a domestic corporation organized in the Philippines, it ordered clothing materials through its New
York Agent from Wing On. The clothing materials were delivered to SYYAP on Credit.
There was a verbal agreement between them that SYYAP would pay for the cost of the merchandise and divide the
profits earned between them.
SYYAP paid a partial payment thus leaving a balance which it failed to pay including the profits earned.
Thus Wing On filed an action recovery of sum of money in the Philippines. Judgment was rendered in favor of Wing
On. Thus SYYAP appealed alleging that the court has no jurisdiction since wing on is not licensed to transact
business in the Philippines and that the court should have dismissed the case due to forum non conveniens
Issue: WoN the court a quo erred in assuming jurisdiction
Held: It is a well-established practiced in the application of the principle of forum non conveniens that Unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed
II. Assume Jurisdiction

The presence of any one of the following factors would justify the application of internal law:
1. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply
2. The proper foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved
3. The case falls with the exception to the application of foreign law.
Examples of Number 1:
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated. LEX REI SITAE
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. LEX
NATIONALE
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in
this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or
according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation
takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not
be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have
been executed.
Example of Number 2: Under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court Sec. 24 & 25
1. Attested by the person having legal custody of the record (if the record is not kept in the
Philippines it must include a certificate) or
2. Official Publication

Rule 132
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.
Rule 130
Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history,
law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court
takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
Examples of Number 3
1. When the application of the foreign law is contrary to important public policies of the forum
2. When the foreign law is penal in nature
3. When the foreign law is procedural in nature
4. When the foreign law is purely fiscal or administrative in nature
5. When the application of the foreign law would work undeniable injustice to citizens of the
forum
6. When the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum
7. When the application of the foreign law would endanger vital interests of the state
8. When the foreign law is contrary to good morals.

Fleumer vs Hix
Doctrine: The laws of a foreign country do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippines are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the U.S. The must be proved as facts
Facts: Fleumer is a special administrator of the deceased and has appealed from a decision of the court of the
Philippines denying the probate of the will of the deceased.
Fleumer argues that the law of West Virginia should govern since it is where the will was executed.
He submitted a copy of a provision of the West Virginia Code which was certified by the director of the National
Library.
Issue: WoN the court may now apply the West Virginia Code
Held: No, the requirement of the law were not met.
1. No proof that the book was published under the authority of the State of West Virginia
2. Not attested by the person having in charge of the original
3. No proof was introduced that the provision was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
4. No proof that the will was duly executed.
Philippine Trust Co. vs Bohanan
Doctrine: see held…
Facts: An order was made by the RTC of Manila admitting to probate the will of the deceased Bohanan and
ordered the executor Philippine Trust Co. to enter upon the performance and execution of its trust.
The will was distributed impairing the legitime of the wife and her two children.
Thus this petition questioning the validity of the will.
Issue: WoN the will was valid
Held: Yes, although the Nevada Law relating to testamentary succession was not proven the court took judicial
notice of it because of the fact that the court a quo admitted the specific provision of the Nevada law when the
spouse withdrew her share. Furthermore the other appellants or the children whose legitimes were prejudiced did
not dispute the provision which entitles the testator to dispose of his estate entirely.

Chapter V
Choice of Law
All choice of Law problems seek to answer two important questions:
1. What legal system should control a case where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
states?
2. What extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation?
 Prof. Arthur Von Mehren and Donald Trautman Classify these choices of law in those:
1. Which emphasize Simplicity, Convenience and Uniformity to refer to the traditional
approach
2. Those which relate to reaching appropriate results in particular cases to pertain to the
modern approacj
I. Traditional Approach
A. Vested Rights approached

- Based on the principle of:
1. Simplicity
2. Uniformity
3. Convenience
4. Predictability
5. Discourage forum shopping
- An act done in a foreign jurisdiction give rise to the existence of a right if the law of that state provides so.
This right is vested in the plaintiff is carries it with him to be enforced in any forum he chooses.
- The foreign jurisdiction referred to is the place where the occurrence of the last act which completes the
cause of action takes place
- Thus where the last act takes place in a state which does not give rise to a vested right there is nothing for
the forum to recognize and enforce.
Gray vs Gray
Doctrine: An act done in a foreign jurisdiction give rise to the existence of a right if the law of that state provides
so. This right is vested in the plaintiff is carries it with him to be enforced in any forum he chooses.
The foreign jurisdiction referred to is the place where the occurrence of the last act which completes the cause of
action takes place
Thus where the last act takes place in a state which does not give rise to a vested right there is nothing for the
forum to recognize and enforce.
Facts: Spouses Gray who are the plaintiff and defendant in the case. The Wife (elserce) filed an action for damages
for personal injuries based on torts against his husband (frank) filed in New Hampshire.
The last act occurred in Maine where the law prohibits maintaining an action against spouses.
New Hampshire law however has no such prohibition.
Issue: WoN the wife’s cause of action will prosper
Held: No. If there is no ground of action in the sovereignty where a tort is alleged to have occurred, there is none
anywhere. Whatever would be a bar to an action for tort if brought in the state of its occurrence is a bar in this
state although the matter pleaded would not be a bar if the cause of action had arisen here.
NOTES: (FULL TEXT) A New Hampshire wife injured by the negligence of her husband while driving with him in
Maine is barred from recovery against him in this state because under Maine law a wife has no cause of action for
negligence against her husband. Persons having the status of husband and wife take that status with them into a
sister state but the incidents of that status are those prescribed by the law of the place where transactions take
place.

Alabama Greath Southern R.R. Co vs Carroll
Doctrine: The question of whether a cause of action arose and existed at all or not must in all reason be
determined by the law which of the place where the injury was sustained.
Facts: Carroll an employee of Alaba RR. Co was injured in Mississippi as a result of negligence to detect a defective
link between two freight cars. The Train passed from Tennessee through Alabama then Mississippi.
Alabama law grants a cause of action to Carroll against his employer.
Mississippi law however does not give rise to a cause of action against the employer since the injury was caused by
the negligence of his fellow employee or fellow servant.
Carroll filed an action in Alabama where he is a citizen and place of domicile of employer corporation furthermore
it was the place where there contract was celebrated
Issue: WoN the action will prosper
Held: No. Since Mississippi law does not grant a cause of action. There can be no recovery in Alabama for injuries
to the person sustained in another State, unless actionable by the law of the State where received, and this rule is
not varied because the negligence which produced the casualty transpired in Alabama, where the common-law
liability of the master is modified, nor by the facts that both master and employee reside in this State and services
were required of the employee in both States.
B. Local Law Theory (Prof. Walter Wheeler Cook)
According to Cook “The power of a state to regulate within its territory has no limitation, except such as may be
imposed by its own positive law”, A court does not enforce a foreign law but a right created by its own law by
treating a case as a purely domestic case that does not involve a foreign element>
Cons: “ Lends to the “narrow minded” who may be inclined to depreciate the practical and equitable consideration
that should control the adjudication of conflict cases in favor of an exaggerated local policy on the ground that
they and the sovereign which they represent can do as they please.
C. Caver’s Principle of law Preference (Prof. David F. Caver)
- Choice of law should be governed by considerations of justice and social expediency and should not be a
result of a mechanical application of rule or principle of selection.
- Choice of law decisions should be made with reference to principles of preferences which are conceived
to provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies and afford fair treatment to the parties “who
are caught up in the hazards of conflicting state policies”
Courts should:
1. Scrutinize the event or transaction giving rise to the issue before it

2. Compare carefully the proffered rule of law and the result of its application
3. Appraise these results from the standpoint of justice between the litigants or those of broader
considerations of social policy which conflicting laws may evoke.
Cons: “Territorialist bias”. They look to the place where significant events occurred or where the legal relationship
centered.
Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 10 | P a g e

II. Modern Approach
A. Place of the most significant relationship (Prof. Willis Reese)
- Consider plurality of factors in light of choice-of-law principles such as

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the concerned states,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
In Torts the contacts to be taken into account are
1. The place where the injury occurred

2. The place where the negligent conduct occurred
3. The domicile, residence or nationality of the parties
4. The place where the relationship between the parties is entered.
In Contracts
1. The law chosen by the parties or in the absence thereof

2. The place of contracting
3. The place of negotiation of the contract
4. The place of performance
5. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.

1. Auten vs Auten
Doctrine: Grouping of Contracts or Center of Gravity theory instead of regarding conclusive the intention of the
parties or law of the place of performance it lays emphasis on the law of the place which has the most significant
contacts with the matter in dispute.
Pros: It gives to the place having the most interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues, thus
allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of a
particular litigation and give effect to the intention of the parties.
Cons: Uncertain and Unpredictable, Can practically be used to achieve virtually any result.
Facts: The defendant (husband) left England and abandoned his wife and children to live in New York.
The Plaintiff (wife) pursued her husband in order to discuss their differences and ask for support.
They executed an agreement (in New York to be paid to a Trustee in New York) where the husband would provide
£50 monthly for support on the condition the wife would not initiate any action relating to their separation.
The husband failed to give support.
The wife commenced an action for legal separation in England on the ground of adultery.
The Husband argued that the wife’s institution of the action was in violation of the condition therefore his
obligation under the agreement for support is extinguished.
Summary judgement was rendered in favor of defendant.
Issue: WoN the laws of New York or the law of England would govern.
Held: England.
1. The agreement effected a separation between British subjects,
2. who had been married in England,
3. had children there and lived there as a family for fourteen years.
4. It involves a British husband who has abandoned his wife and was in New York where the agreement was
executed merely on a temporary Visa.
5. It concerned a British wife who came to New York because she had no other way to see her husband to discuss
there differences.
6. Money is to be paid in English currency, the wife and children are understood to live in England.
7. MOST IMPORTANTLY THE AGREEMENT MERELY SUBSTITUTED THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPORT
WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE MANDATORY IN ENGLISH LAW. There is no question therefore that England jas
the greatest concern in the prescribing and governing those obligations.
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IS REVERSED. The law of England must determine whether the courts of that country
treat the commencement of a separation action as a repudiation of an earlier-made separation agreement.

2. Haag vs Barnes
Doctrine: Most significant relationship
Facts: Haag (A New York legal secretary) and Barnes (A Chicago, Illinois lawyer) has an illegitimate child.
Prior to the Child’s Birth the plaintiff went to Illinois to ask the defendant for support.
The agreement was for $275 a month support in exchange for his release from any other obligation and the parties
stipulated that the Laws of Illinois shall govern.
The law of Illinois (stated in substance that court approval of such a compromise was not required if the
agreement provided for the payment to the mother of any sum not less than $800. All of this was
repealed in 1957 and the foreign State now operates under a statute more similar to ours.)
The Law of New York however required that agreements for support involving an illegitimate child must be
judicially approved to be binding.
Thus when Haag and her child move to New York she filed an action for support. Barnes Interposed the Illinois
agreement as a bar to the instant proceeding.
Issue: WoN New York law would Govern.
Held: Illinois law should govern since it has the “Most significant relationship”
1. Both parties are designated in the agreement as being “of Chicago, Illinois”
2. The child was born in Illinois
3. The persons designated as agents for the principals are Illinois residents as are the attorneys for both
parties who drew the agreement
4. All contributions for supports always have been and are still being made from Chicago.

B. Interest Analysis (Professor Brainerd Currie)
- to resolve a choice-of-law problem the courts must look into:
1. The policy behind the laws of the involved states
2. The Interest each state had in applying its own law.
- Factual contract alone did not determine the outcome of the case unless they reflected a state policy which could
have been advance by application of the substantive state law.
- After the court analysed the policies reflected by a state law, it had to determine whether both states had a real
interest in having their law applied hence, there was a true conflict. The forum must apply the substantive law of
the interested state.
Pros: will allow the interest of the state having most relevant policies over the subject matter under litigation to
prevail
Cons: Conflicts cases were ordinarily concerned with private not governmental interests.
Unworkable since the court must decide cases on an ad hoc basis (the court must, in every case, ascertain the
purpose of each applicable local law rule in order to determine which of these rules to apply.
1. Babcock vs Jackson
Doctrine:
Facts: Babcock and Mr. and Mrs. Jackson are all residents of New York they decided to have a weekend trip to
Canada wherein they used Mr. Babcocks car.
They figured in an accident in Ontario, Canada wherein Babcock was injured.
Upon their return, Babcock instituted an action for damages against herein defendants.
New York law has no guest statute (a law that bars recovery by the passenger against the driver/owner of the
vehicle) While Ontario has a guest statute.
The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the action of the plaintiff is barred by the Guest
Statute of Ontario.
The case was dismissed
Issue: WoN New York law will apply
Held: New York law shall apply.
1. It involves parties who reside in New York

2. The automobile is garaged and licensed in New York.
3. The journey was to begin and end in New York.
4. The purpose of the guest statute of Ontario is to prevent the fraudulently actions instituted by plaintiffs in
collusion with the driver to defraud Insurance companies of Ontario, Canada.

C. Comparative Impairment (Professor William Baxter)
- The courts were asked to weigh conflicting interests and apply the law of the state whose interests would be
more impaired if its law were not followed.
D. Functional Analysis (Professor Donal Trautman and Arthur Von Mehren
- looked into:
1. the general policies of the state beyond those reflected in its substantive law and
2. to policies and values “relating to effective and harmonious intercourse between states.”
These policies include:
a. Reciprocity
b. Advancement of multistate activity
c. Protecting justifiable expectations
d. Evenhandedness in dealing with similar cases and effectiveness.
Then the court shall consider the relative strength of a state policy or POLICY WEIGHING.
Milliken vs Pratt
Doctrine: Using the Functional Analysis the court should consider whether a state reflects and “emerging” or
“regressing policy”
Facts: Daniel Pratt was a resident of Maine which under its law a spouse cannot act as surety for the other
spouse’s obligation.
Sarah Pratt (wife) applied for credit from Milliken which required that Daniel must be a guarantor for his wife.
He executed the guaranty which under Maine law is allowed.
Upon default of the spouses, Milliken sued Daniel.
The court held Daniel is liable
Issue: WoN Maine law shall goven
Held: Maine Law shall govern. Since the contract was complete when Milliken received Daniel’s guaranty and
extended such credit on the strength of such guaranty furthermore the place of Contracting was Maine.
Furthermore the restrictive policy on the right of women was on the wane in Massachusetts and in other states
and thus was not a strongly held policy.
Using the Functional Analysis the court should consider whether a state reflects and “emerging” or “regressing
policy”
D. Choice Influencing Considerations (Professor Robert Leflar)

- Five Major Choice Influencing Considerations should be taken into consideration by the court in
choice-of-law decisions.
1. Predictability of the results
2. Maintenance of interstate and international order
3. Simplification of the Judicial Task
4. Application of Better Rule of Law
5. Advancement of the forum’s governmental interests.
* The 4th choice is controversial since in actual practice the courts have always considered its own law as
“the better law”

Chapter VI
The Problem of Characterization
A. Characterization and the Single-Aspect Method
- a single element of a situation is identified in order to connect it to a particular legal community
- Foster Convenience, Simplicity and Uniformity of Results
* Modern Approach
- All factors of the case both territorial and non-territorial are analyzed in light of choice-of-law
principles
- To reach a just resolution of the case at hand.
LEX PATRIAE
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
LEX SITUS/ LEX RE SITAE
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (10a)
LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic
of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Article 1251. Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation.
There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the
payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was
constituted.
In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor. (Lex Domicilii)
If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay, the additional
expenses shall be borne by him.
These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court.

Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. (LEX LOCI INTENTIONIS)
FAMILY CODE (LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
CHARACTERIZATION
- Is defined as a process by which a court at the beginning of the choice-of-law process assigns a
disputed question to an area in substantive law.
Subject-Matter Characterization
- It is a classification by the court of a factual situation into a legal category
GIBBS VS GOVT OF PI
- It is unnecessary in these proceeding to determine the order of succession or the amount or

extent of successional rights
Substance-Procedure Dichotomy Characterization
- It is a characterization which directs the court to the extent that it will apply foreign law. If the
issue is substantive it will apply foreign law but if it is procedural it is supposed to apply the law
of the forum
Grant vs Mcauliffe
- Survival is not an essential part of a cause of action itself but relates to the procedure available
for the enforcement of the legal claim of damages.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
- It is considered substantive if the words of the law relate to forbidding of the creation of
obligation
- It is considered procedural if the words of the law relate to forbidding the enforcement of the
obligation
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
- Procedural since it barred only the legal remedy without impairing the substantive rights
involved.
However
- If it provides a shorter period for certain types of claims within a wider classification covered by
a general statute of limitations.
Specificity Test
- A statute of limitations of a foreign country is substantive when the limitation directed against
the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right.
Borrowing Statute
- A statute which bars the filing of a suit in the forum if it is already barred by the statute of
limitations in the place where the cause of action arose.

Cadalin vs POEA administrator
- To enforce the one year period decree would contravene public policy on protection to labor
ARTICLE II STATE POLICIES
- Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare.
Depecage
- Is a term for the phenomenon where different aspects of a case involving a foreign element are
governed by different systems of law
- The process of cutting up the case issue by issue in order that the court may reach a fair and
desirable decision.
Haumschild vs Continental Casualty
- The court reversed the decision declaring that the place of domicile shall determine the
question of spousal immunity.
- The place of accident governed the issue of inter-spousal immunity.

Chapter VII
The Problem of Renvoi
A. Renvoi Definition
- It is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred to by the conflict of laws rules of
the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of laws rules of which, in turn, refers the matter to the
law of the forum or a third state.
- Remission when the matter is referred back to the law of the forum
- Transmission when the matter is referred to a third state
B. Various ways of dealing the problem of Renvoi

1. If the conflict of law rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to
mean only the internal law of that state. Internal law is that which would be applied to a domestic case
that has no conflict of laws complication. The forum court in applying this internal law rejects the renvoi
2. The court may accept the renvoi and refer not just to another state’s “internal” law but to the
“whole” law which includes choice of law rules applicable in multi-state cases.
3. Desistance or Mutual Disclaimer, when the forum court upon reference to the law of a foreign state
sees that such law is limited in application to its own national and has no provision for application to
non-national is abstains from applying foreign law
4. Foreign court theory, the forum court would assume the same position taken by the foreign court,
that is if the case were litigated in the foreign court and such court would apply foreign law then the
forum court would do the same and apply foreign law and vice-versa.
* Serious disadvantage of renvoi is if both court follows the same theory there would no end to the case
since the courts would be referring it back to each other

Aznar vs Garcia
Facts: The executor of the will ratified the amount which was bequeathed to the oppositor in the will of
the decedent. The residue of the estate was given to the decedent’s legitimate daughter. The
illegitimate child or oppositor opposed the disposition stating that the testamentary provision is invalid
insofar as it deprived her of her legitime. Her opposition was grounded on Philippine laws.
The lower court ruled that since the Testator was a Citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by
his national law according to article 16 of the civil code thus he may dispose all of his property according
to his own desire.
However the illegitimate child invokes a provision of the California Code which states that: If there is no
law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person
of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Issue: What law should apply?
Held: The law of the place of domicile which is the Philippines. Since the laws of California prescribes
two sets of law one for persons domiciled in therein and another for persons domiciled in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Annesley vs Annesley
Facts: The testatrix is an English subject who according to English law is domiciled in France, however
French law does not accord this status to her since she did not comply with certain formalities according
to French law that would grant her the status of being a person domiciled in France.
She bequeathed her entire property to Miss Annesley.
The conflict of law problem arises from the fact that French law allows a person domiciled in France to
dispose only 1/3 of their personal properties by will.
Accordingly French law states that the law which would be applied in case of a foreigner who was not
legally domiciled in France is the national law of the person which in this case is British law, However
British law refers the question back to the law of domicile which according to such law is France.
Issue: What Law should apply?
Held: French law, since according to said law French law should apply in cases where the law of the
country of the deceased declares that the law of the place of domicile should govern the disposition of
movable property.
Double Renvoi
University of Chicago vs Dater
Facts: Mr and Mrs Price executed a promissory note in favor of University of Chicago.
The note and trust deed were executed in Michigan to secure collateralized properties in Chicago.
The notes were then mailed to the trust deed trustee in Michigan.
Mr. Price died. Went the payments on the loan were in arrears a collection suit was filed on the note.
Under Michigan law where it was mailed a wife has no capacity to execute a note or to enter into a
contract.
Under Illinois law however she has capacity but said law states that the law that shall govern in case of
contract is the place of performance.
Held: The place where of mailing shall govern since Illinois law referred that matter back to Michigan.

PFAU vs Trent Aluminum Co.
Facts: Plaintiff is a Connecticut domiciliary and Defendant is a New Jersey domiciliary both of the studied
in Parson College in Iowa.
Defendant agreed to drive Plaintiff somewhere in Missouri however an accident occurred in Iowa due to
the negligence of Defendant wherein Plaintiff suffered injuries.
Connecticut and New Jersey law has no guest statute thus the Plaintiff can sue the defendant to recover
for injuries suffered due to the latter’s negligence.
Iowa law however has a guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable to his passenger-
guest for ordinary negligence.
Held: This is a false conflict. Iowa law has no interest in the conflict since the application of its laws
would not advance any of its governmental interests. Therefore since there is no more conflict with the
remaining forums the plaintiff may sue the defendant.
Bellis vs Bellis
Facts: The testator was a citizen of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. He left a will
disposing of a certain portion of his property to his Wife and Illegitimate Children after that has been
complied with the residue is to be given to all his legitimate children.
The illegitimate children opposed his will stating that the testamentary provisions are invalid arguing
mainly that Article 17 prevails as the exception to article 16 par. 2 which state that prohibitive laws
concerning person their rights and property, and those which have for their object public policy, public
order and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The illegitimate children likewise state that the testator intended to that his property be governed by
two different will one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine Estate.
Issue: Won Article 16 sec. 2 does not apply for being contrary to public policy because it will impair the
legitimes of the illegitimate children
WoN a decedent may execute two wills one governed by his national law the other by Philippine law
Held: 1. NO, Article 17 refers to subject matters other than succession. It is the Legislative Intent. Article
16 par. 2 as indicated by the deletion of the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
preceding article in article 17 and the reproducing article 16 without substantial change and
furthermore the addition of article 1039 which states that the capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
2. the execution of a will of the decedent containing provisions to the effect that his will shall be
governed by Philippine law and not his National law is void for being contrary to article 16 par 2.
Contrary to law.

Chapter VIII
NOTICE AND PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
A. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
- When the court is called upon to decide a case based on a foreign law the common law practice
adopted by the Philippines is that the party whose cause of action or defense is dependent upon
the foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
- The question of foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with the rules of evidence of the state where it is presented.
- The rationale is that the judge is not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign law and is
presumed to know only domestic law
EXCEPTION:
Delgado vs Republic
1. The Supreme Court held that a court may take judicial notice of a foreign law if the court is
evidently familiar with it.
- This will arise if the foreign law is of Spanish or American origin from which Philippine law has
been derived
- Or the Judge has previously ruled upon it in other cases
B. Proof of Foreign Law
RULE 132 Sec. 24 Foreign law may be proved by presenting:
1. Official publication of the law

2. A copy of the law attested by the officer having legal custody of the record or by his deputy. If
such record is not kept in the Philippines, it must be accompanied by a certificate that such
officer has the custody
- Authenticated by the seal of the office of the Secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, vice consul, consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines.
RULE 23 of the Rules of Court
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — In a foreign state or
country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, (b) before such person
or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in
section 14 hereof.

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Escolin
Facts: The spouses Hodges made a will wherein they made reciprocal disposition of their entire estate in
their respective wills in favor of each other and the remainder to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died. Mr. Hodge was appointed executor of the will. However no liquidation was
undertaken and allegedly Mr. Hodge had renounced his inheritance from his spouse in favor of her
other heirs.
When Mr. Hodge died PCIB became the executor of his estate while Magno became the executor of the
estate of his wife.
The issue arose when the two executors did not agree as to the amount of the estate of Mrs. Hodge that
could be bequeathed by will.
According to PCIB Mrs. Hodges Estate should be only ¼ of the conjugal estate.
According to Magno there is no system of legitime hence she could have less than her share
Issue: What law should apply
Held: The case is premature since the proper Texan law was not properly pleaded and proved.
However PCIB is in estoppel in that he could no longer argue that the Estate of Mrs. Hodge should be
less than ¼ of the conjugal estate.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSOSN
Facts: Emil H. Johnson a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the US, died in Manila, leaving a
will. The holographic will was not executed in accordance with the requirement of the Philippines but
was validly executed if it was executed in the State of Illinois.
The court admitted to probate the will by taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois
The daughter of the deceased moved for the annulment of the decree of probate and commencement if
the intestate administration of the estate on the ground that the deceased is not a resident of Illinois
and the will was not probated in accordance with the law of that state
Issue: WoN the decree of probate may be annulled
Held: Although the lower was wrong in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois such error is not
available to the petitioner:
FIRST because the petition did not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is
different from what the court found
SECOND the petitioner did not include such error in his assignment of errors.
Even if the will in question is invalid this is merely a conclusion of law which is not supported by
evidence.

Effect of Failure to Plead and Prove Foreign Law
In the absence of proof of the applicable foreign law forum courts have three alternatives:
1. To dismiss the case for inability to establish a cause of action (traditional approach)
2. To assume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum (processual presumption or
presumed identity approach)
3. To apply the law of the forum
Walton vs Arabian American Oil Co.
Facts: Plaintiff is an American citizen who was injured in a car accident involving an employee of the
defendant who is likewise an American corporation.
During the Trial both the Plaintiff did not allege the pertinent Saudi Arabian Law nor did they prove or
offered to prove it.
The Judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendant since he did not took judicial notice of the Saudi
Arabian Law
Issue: WoN the judge erred
Held: The Judge was correct in not taking judicial notice of the Saudi Arabian Law since the Plaintiff had
the burden of showing to the trial court’s satisfaction, Saudi Arabian Law.
Leary vs Gledhill
Facts: Plaintiff and Defendants became acquainted when they were in the military service, due to this
the Plaintiff purchased $1,000 worth of stock from defendant.
Sometime thereafter the defendant then invited herein plaintiff in France where the former informed
the latter of his need to raise $4,000.
The Plaintiff upon his return to Germany mailed $1,500 to defendant, they did not hear of each other
again.
Plaintiff commenced an action for recovery of the alleged loan.
Defendant moved to dismissed the case on ground that among others that the proper French law was
not pleaded and proved.
Issue: WoN the cases should be dismissed
Held: No, in the absence of proof of the proper foreign law the parties acquiesce to the law of the
forum.
Zalamea vs CA
Facts: Spouses Zalamea and their daughter bought three airline tickes from the Manila agent of TWA.
The Tickets of the spouses were bought at 75% discount while that of their daughter was paid in full.
The tickets were confirmed here in Manila and again in New York.
On the date of the flight only the Father who was holding the ticket of their daughter was allowed to
board the plane since according to the airline that the flight was overbooked.
The petitioners filed an action for damages grounded upon breach of contract of carriage. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners the judgment however was reversed since according to the Appellate
court that moral damages are coverable only when there is fraud or bad faith which is absent in the case
at bar because it is an accepted practice and authorized by US law or regulation to overbook flights
Issue: WoN the CA erred
Held: Yes, the US law or regulation was never proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
courts take judicial notice of them.

Miciano vs Brimo
Facts: The testator was a Turkish citizen, the judicial administrator filed a scheme of partition which was
opposed by one of the brothers of the deceased alleging that the partition which puts into effect the
provisions of the will of the testator is not in accordance with Turkish law and does violative of article 16
of the Civil Code.
Issue: WoN the Court erred when it approved the partition of the estate according to the scheme
Held: No, the oppositor was given the opportunity to present evidence regarding the provision of
Turkish law which was violated by the provisions of the will of the descendent but failed to present it.
Thus, the court by using the Doctrine of Processual Presumption assumed that the law was the same of
that of the Philippines
Suntay vs Suntay
Facts: Jose Suntay a Filipino Citizen died in the City of Amoy Fookien Province, Republic of China, Leaving
Real and Personal Properties behind in the Philippines and a House in Amoy.
He was survived by his children of a first marriage and his wife and children of the second marriage.
An intestate proceeding was instituted and one of his children from his 1 st marriage was appointed as
administrator of the estate. Suntay’s widow on the other file a petition for the probate of a will which
however was disallowed since it was lost before the hearing.
Meanwhile the Pacific War intervened.
After Liberation Silvino Suntay son of the decedent in the second marriage claimed that he had found a
will of his father and the same was filed and probated in the Amoy District Court of Fookien.
Silvino filed a petition for the probate of the will executed in 1929 or that found in 1931 and probated in
Amoy.
The petition was disallowed hence this appeal.
Issue: WoN the court erred when in denied the probate of the will
Held: the first will could not be proved since it does not comply with Rule 76 sec. 6 of the rules of court
that its provisions must be clearly and distinctly prove by at least two credible witnesses.
With respect to the second will it must be reprobated here in our country therefore
The proponent must prove:
1. That the testator was domiciled in the foreign country

2. That the will has been admitted to probate in such country
3. That the foreign court was under the laws of said foreign country was a probate court with
jurisdiction over the proceedings
4. The probate procedure in said foreign country and proof of compliance therewith
5. The legal requirement in said foreign country for the valid execution of the will.
Since the proponent failed to prove this it can be presumed that the probate procedure is the same as
that in our jurisdiction. Since it is a proceeding in Rem there must be notice, personal or by publication,
to the parties. The evidence show that no such notice was made therefore it did not comply with the
principle followed in the probate and allowance of wills.

CIR vs Fisher
Facts: Walter Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents and was married to Beatrice
another British subject. He died in 1951 and instituted his wife as the sole heiress.
The administrator filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return and later on submitted an
amended return claiming for deductions to one-half of the entire estate.
The CIR opposed this and contended that according to the national law of the decedent all properties
acquired during the marriage pertain and belong exclusively to the husband and therefore the taxable
net estate is the whole of the decedent’s estate.
The CTA ruled that in our civil law in the absence of any pre-nuptial agreement it is presumed that the
parties have adopted the system of conjugal partnership and hence the taxable net estate is reduced to
one-half.
Issue: WoN the CTA erred.
Held: NO, CIR failed to prove the pertinent British law relied upon by it, thus it can be presumed that
British law is the same of that of Philippine law.
Board of Commissioners vs Dela Rosa
Facts: William Gatchalian an alleged Chinese was being deported for an alleged violation of the
Immigration act.
Petitioner claim that William’s Grandfather was married to a Chinese woman and China as well as his
father who was also married to a Chinese woman in China.
Petitioner argues that since William did not prove that the marriages were valid according to the laws of
China such marriages were void thus he followed the citizenship of his mother which is Chinese.
Issue: WoN William is a Chinese citizen.
Held: No, Petitioner had the burden of proving that the marriages were invalid according to Chinese law.
Due to his failure to prove the pertinent chines law, it is presumed that the law of China is the same as
that of our own law and thus according to article 26 of the Family Code.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
(17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)

C. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law
1. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply
2. The proper foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved
3. The case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule of comity
a. The foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum

b. The foreign law is procedural in nature
c. The foreign law is penal in nature
d. The foreign law is purely fiscal or administrative in nature
e. When the application of the foreign law will work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the
forum
f. When the application of the foreign law will endanger the vital interest of the state
g. When the foreign law is contrary to good morals (Contra bonos mores)
h. When the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum.
Pakistan International Airlines Corp. vs Ople
Doctrine: The foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum
Facts: Petitioner is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. They executed a contract of
employment with herein private respondents for a period of 3 years but can be extended by mutual consent of the
parties.
The contract states that it shall be governed by the laws of Pakistan and the court of Karachi, Pakistan shall have
jurisdiction over any matter arising out of said contract.
PIA terminated the respondents after only about 1 year and 4 months.
The respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses.
Petitioner’s argument: The relationship between them are governed by the terms of their contract not by the
provisions of the Labor code.
Issue: WoN Pakistan Law would apply?
Held: No, The following are the reasons:
Minimum contracts doctrine:
1. The contract is executed in the Philippines

2. Between A corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and Citizens of the Philippines
3. The contract is to be performed partially in the Philippines
4. Private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to Europe and Middle
east
Processual Presumption
1. Since the petitioner did not bother to plead and prove any contents of Pakistan law on the matter it must
be presumed that the applicable provisions of Pakistan law are the same as the of Philippine law.
The foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum
The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as
they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy."
Article II of the 1987 constitution
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.

Chapter IX
NATIONALITY
 Nationality Law Theory – it is a conflicts of law theory by virtue of which jurisdiction over the
particular subject matter affecting a person, such as the status of a natural person, is
determined by the latter’s nationality.
Governs:
1. Civil Status
2. Capacity
3. Condition
4. Family rights and duties
5. Law on succession
6. Capacity to succeed
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
- Citizenship - is the status of being a citizen, or of owing allegiance to a certain state for the privilege
of being under its protection.
- While citizenship is political in character, nationality refers to a racial or ethnic relationship.
CONVENTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE C ONFLICT OF NATIONALITY

LAWS THE HAGUE - 12 APRIL 1930
Article 1.
It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the
principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality.
Article 2.
Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined
in accordance with the law of the State.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
PRINCIPLES TO DETERMINE NATIONALITY
JUS SOLI – right to of the soil, looks to the place of the one’s birth to determine an individual’s
nationality
JUS SANGUINIS – right of blood, is a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is not
determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state.

1. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS
Talaroc vs UY
Doctrine: A person proclaimed by judicial declaration as a citizen of the Philippines cannot be deprived of their
Filipino citizenship by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto questioning the eligibility of herein respondent to hold office as
Municipal Mayor of Misamis Oriental.
the herein appellant Uy had attained the age of majority when the Constitution went into effect, and
had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public office, and to take the oath of
allegiance to the Commonwealth Government or Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner’s argument: Uy was a Chinese citizen
Respondent’s argument: were that his father was a subject of Spain that his mother ipso facto reacquired
her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband and the child followed her citizenship
Issue: WoN Uy is a Filipino citizen
Held: The decision of the lower court is reversed and the respondent and appellant declared a Filipino
citizen and eligible to the office of the municipal mayor.
On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a full-fledged
Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing
doctrine.
SEE NOTES: Cut out of the same pattern and deserving of the same consideration is the proposition that
Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon his father's death.
Notes: It may be recalled that in the case of Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, supra, the petitioner
was born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his
mother a Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895 when he went to China
and never returned, dying there about 1900. In May, 1901, Roa, was then a minor, was sent to China by
his widowed mother for the soul purpose of studying and returned in October, 1910, being then about
21 years and 3 months of age. He was denied admission by the board of special inquiry, whose decision
was affirmed by the Court of First Instance in habeas corpus proceedings.

Co vs Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
Doctrine: The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have
to elect citizenship.
Facts: Private respondents Grandfather and Father are Chinese, while his mother was Filipina, sometime
when respondent is only 9 years old his father was declared as a Filipino citizen after his father took the
oath of allegiance and a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
On 1984 respondent married a Filipina. During the 1984 and 1986 elections he registered himself as a
voter of Laoang, Samar.
In 1987 Respondent ran in the elections a representative of Northern Samar. He Won.
Thus Herein Petitioner who were among the opposing candidates filed an election protest on the
ground that Ong Jr. was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
Issue: WoN respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
Held: Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been
an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that
"when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship
for protestee by declaring him as such."

NOTES: The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person
from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA
147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire
that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was
built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr.,
November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became
the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his
parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in
the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.

2. Citizens by Naturalization
Naturalization – confers to an alien a nationality after birth by any means provided by law.
 In the Philippines naturalization is by judicial method under C.A. 473 as amended by RA 530
RA 530
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten
years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education 1 of the Philippines, where the
Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to
the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:
1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of
the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race,
in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.
 The requirement of having real property (with respect to land) worth not less than 5,000 pesos
is applicable only when the foreigner has acquired it by virtue of:
1. Hereditary succession
2. Due to the doctrine of in Pari Delicto
3. Sale to a foreigner who is subsequently naturalized
4. To a natural born citizen who had lost his citizenship to be a transferee of private land for
residential purposes as a it did not exceed 1,000 sqm whether urban or rural land

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of

persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Yu Kian Chief vs Republic

Doctrine: The term lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation means substantial gainful employment or
obtaining of tangible receipts. The trade or profession must have an appreciable margin of income over expenses.
Facts: Yu Kian Chie, a citizen of the Republic of China, presented with the CFI of Manila, on
February 4, 1960, a petition for naturalization, containing all the jurisdictional requirements, the
pertinent portion of which is hereby reproduced:
THIRD.— My trade or profession is that of an employee in which I have been engaged

since 1957 and from which I derive an average annual income of P3,000.00.
The OSG filed an opposition claiming that the petitioner failed to prove that he had lucrative income.
The lower court granted the petition therefore the OSG appealed
Issue: WoN petitioner failed to prove that the has lucrative income
Held:Yes, He only received a uniform allowance of 150 pesos a month, other sources which constitutes the 3,000
pesos or the increase in his salary were derived from bonuses and incentives depending upon the profit of the
company in which he is employed

3. Procedure for Naturalization
1. Declaration of intention.
2. Filing of Petition for citizenship.
3. After publication, hearing
4. If the petition is granted there will be a rehearing after two year from the promulgation of the
judgment
5. Taking of oath of allegiance.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. –
1. Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in
public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality,
2. and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or
more before filing their application
3. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an
alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is
actually naturalized.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in
the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during
his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.

Vivo vs Cloribel
Doctrine:
Facts: A Chinese mother and her children arrived in the Philippines as temporary visitors authorized to stay for
three months. Her a husband filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC of manila which was granted.
She filed a petition for an indefinite extension of her stay. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized the change in
their category to “special non-immigrants” for two years. However the Commissioner of Immigration refused to
accept payment of the extension fee.
She then requested the Office of the President to extend their stay for two years wherein a cabinet resolution was
issued however the Sec. of Justice ruled that such resolution had no force and effect.
They were advised to leave the country but instead they filed a petition for mandamus with injunction to
implement the previously authorized extension which was denied. She refiled it contending that they were due for
eventual conversion as Filipino citizens by virtue of her husband’s petition for naturalization.
Petitioner’s argument: his wife would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she,
herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
Issue: WoN the Chinese mother would automatically become a Filipino citizen upon naturalization of her husband.
Held: No,
As to the wife, Chua Pic Luan, she does not, under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since
she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization.3
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities that she came to the
country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for having
intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan
demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted
herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the
Philippines in her relation with the constituted government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962,
she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification of continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal. As to the foreign born minors,
Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, our pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966, 18
SCRA 713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship "if dwelling in the Philippines at
the time of the naturalzation of the parent." "Dwelling" means lawful residence. Since prior to
the time the father of respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship ...
their lawful period of stay had already expired and they had already been required to leave,
they were no longer lawfully residing here

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
Doctrine: Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to
expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino
citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same
does not posses all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has
proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under.
Issue: WoN appellant is ipso facto consider a Filipino citizen
Held: Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding,
that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

4. Loss of Philippine Citizenship
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest
himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with
any country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country:
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if
either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering
said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto,
states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period
of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment
of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in
time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality. 1
The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born
Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries or
from the United Kingdom shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law
of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty
between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired. 2
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed
in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,3
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the
provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status; 4 and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.

Frivaldo vs Comelec (1989)
Doctrine: A person must reacquire his citizenship by, naturalization, repatriation or act of congress.
Facts: JuanG. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office
in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment
of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
Issue: WoN Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
Held: No, He did not perform any categorical acts for reacquiring citizenship.
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of
the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Frivaldo vs Comelec (1996)
Doctrine: see held
Facts: (i)
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
Issue: WoN frivaldo is a citizen and if so is he qualified to serve as the governor
Held: Yes,
we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on
August 17,1994.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to

be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three

(23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least
one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.

Nationality Extra Cases:
Tecson vs COMELEC
Doctrine:
Facts: On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioners in this cases assails the citizenship of FPJ.

Issue: WoN FPJ is a citizen of the Philippines
Held: YES, (3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
NOTES: (1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition
in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit,
the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

Caballero vs COMELEC
Doctrine: naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.
Facts: Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4 were both candidates for the mayoralty
position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed
a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter
made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes
despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not properly
served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not
file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
Petitioner’s argument: Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on
September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his
Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1,
2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. 6 He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter
future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
California, and finally in Canada.
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and baptized in
Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax
certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house
therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad,
thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence
qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common
welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance
with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issue: WoN Petitioner abandoned his domicile
Held: RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. 21
The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the concerned natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of
which he is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among others, for the
qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to
be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation
of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that
he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"
but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he
had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required
for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

Chapter X
Domicile
A. Definition
Municipal Law - Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Conflicts of Law – whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning.
Domicile vs Residence
- In order that a place may be considered as a domicile of a person there must be

 Animus Manendi – Intent to stay or make it one’s domicile
 Animus Revertendi – Intent to go back
 Physical Presence
- While residence simply requires bodily presence
Elections Laws: Domicile and Residence is Synonymous
Conflict of Laws: the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for
it is a established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this distinction is very well
emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
involving stateless persons.
PURPOSE: to establish a connection between the person and a definite legal system
General Rules in Domicile
1. No person shall be without a domicile. Hence, a person’s domicile of origin prevails until he acquires a
new domicile.
2. A person cannot have two simultaneous domicile. (subject to what meaning the court may give the word
domicile)
3. To establish a connection between a person and a particular territorial unit
4. The burden of proving a change of domicile is upon whoever alleges that a change has been secured

Romualdez Marcos vs COMELEC
Doctrine: domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Facts: On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2)
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
Petitioner’s argument: She is domiciled in tacloban leyte since childhood
Respondent’s argument: to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in
order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Held: For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
37
domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Notes: There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by
any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.

CHAPTER XII
Choice of Law in Family Relations
1. Philippine Policy on Marriage and the Family
Civil Code: Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in
case of unlawful aggression.
1987 Constitution Article XV Sec 2: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
2. EXTRINSICE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

3.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Adong Cheong Seng Gee
Doctrine:
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919.
He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by
Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo
with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who
alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters
The RTC of Zamboang Held that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the Chinese Marriage but
since the son has been admitted to the Philippines he has the right to a share as a natural child.
The Son appealed.

Issue: WoN the Chinese marriage is valid
Held: NO. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity
provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

3. INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
Hague Convention on Validity of Marriages
Article 2
The formal requirements for marriages shall be governed by the law of the State of celebration.
Article 11
A Contracting State may refuse to recognise the validity of a marriage only where, at the time of the marriage,
under the law of that State -
(1) one of the spouses was already married; or

(2) the spouses were related to one another, by blood or by adoption, in the direct line or as brother and sister; or
(3) one of the spouses had not attained the minimum age required for marriage, nor had obtained the necessary
dispensation; or
(4) one of the spouses did not have the mental capacity to consent; or
(5) one of the spouses did not freely consent to the marriage.
However, recognition may not be refused where, in the case mentioned in sub-paragraph 1 of the preceding
paragraph, the marriage has subsequently become valid by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the prior
marriage.
4. EFFECTS OF MARRIAGES
Personal Relations Between the Spouses
Controlled by the National law of the parties.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Property Relations of Spouses
Controlled by
1. the internal law designated by the spouses before the marriage

2. or in the absence thereof the internal law of the state in which both spouses fix their first habitual
residence.
 Property relations where one is a Filipino whether husband or wife shall be governed by Philippine law, if
the spouses or one of them changes nationality subsequent to the marriage their property regime will
remain unchanged in accordance with the principle of immutability.
Hague Convention on Matrimonial Property Regimes
Article 3
The matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law designated by the spouses before marriage.
The spouses may designate only one of the following laws -
(1) the law of any State of which either spouse is a national at the time of designation;
(2) the law of the State in which either spouse has his habitual residence at the time of designation;
(3) the law of the first State where one of the spouses establishes a new habitual residence after marriage.
The law thus designated applies to the whole of their property.
Nonetheless, the spouses, whether or not they have designated a law under the previous paragraphs, may
designate with respect to all or some of the immovables, the law of the place where these immovables are
situated. They may also provide that any immovables which may subsequently be acquired shall be governed
by the law of the place where such immovables are situated.

Article 4
If the spouses, before marriage, have not designated the applicable law, their matrimonial property regime is
governed by the internal law of the State in which both spouses establish their first habitual residence after
marriage.
Nonetheless, in the following cases, the matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law of the
State of the common nationality of the spouses -
(1) where the declaration provided for in Article 5 has been made by that State and its application to the
spouses is not excluded by the provisions of the second paragraph of that Article;
(2) where that State is not a Party to the Convention and according to the rules of private international law of
that State its internal law is applicable, and the spouses establish their first habitual residence after marriage -
a) in a State which has made the declaration provided for in Article 5, or

b) in a State which is not a Party to the Convention and whose rules of private international law also
provide for the application of the law of their nationality;
(3) where the spouses do not establish their first habitual residence after marriage in the same State.
If the spouses do not have their habitual residence in the same State, nor have a common nationality, their
matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law of the State with which, taking all circumstances
into account, it is most closely connected.
Article 7
The law applicable under the Convention continues to apply so long as the spouses have not designated a
different applicable law and notwithstanding any change of their nationality or habitual residence.
Family Code
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses
shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
Controlled by: 1. Right to separation or divorce – National law of the spouses 2. Grounds - Lex fori or law of the
forum.
 Thus, many states refuse to recognize a foreign ground for divorce unless it corresponds with a ground
justified by forum law
Family Code
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

1. DIVORCE DECRESS OBTAINED BY FILIPINOS
 Divorce between Filipinos abroad have no validity and are not recognized in Philippine Jurisdiction
 However where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. – This provision has the effect of partial
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines. (can be obtained only by the foreign spouse)
Tenchavez vs Escano
Doctrine: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Facts: the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married
to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were
then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere
shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that
her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended
on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any
way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
Issue: WoN the divorce decree is valid
Held: he was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1,
Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art.
106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our
polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art.
17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction
where the court originally had none

Van Dorn vs Romillo
Doctrine: See held
Facts: The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of
the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property
Petitioner’s argument: Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
Respondent’s argument: respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue: WoN the respondent still has the right to the community party since judgments in violation of prohibitive
laws are not binding in the Philippines
Held: pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

Republic vs Orbecido
Doctrine: In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner’s argument: The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Respondent’s argument: For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Issue: WoN article 26(2) applies to a marriage celebrated by two Filipinos but one of them subsequently becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen then obtains a decree of divorce in a foreign country.
Held: Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.
Ratio decidendi: In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges
of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
Notes: Legislative Intent: Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

Republic vs Iyoy
Doctrine: The naturalization of a filipino spouse who applied for a decree of divorce must precede the grant of the
decree of divorce
Facts: Crasus and Fely were married and were blessed with children. Sometime thereafter Fely went to the united
states where she subsequently obtained a divorce decree in order that she may marry an American. After her
marriage with the foreigner she was subsequently naturalized. Thus Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Petitioner’s argument: I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se
constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Respondent’s argument: In his Comment to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Issue: WoN article 26 (2) is applicable
Held: According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because
at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established,
Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce,
Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
Notes: The psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must
be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Solicitor General: Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

Corpuz vs Sto. Thomas
Doctrine: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
Issue: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Held: As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this

jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless
to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Chapter XIII
Choice of Law in Property
A. Controlling Law
1. Immovables – Lex Situs
2. Movables – either: a. Lex Situs b. Lex Loci Actus c. Lex domicilii d. proper law of transfer/forum
 Mobilia Sequuntur personam – rights over movables are governed by the law of the owner’s
domicile (lex domicilii)
Notes:
Lex Situs – law of the place where property is situated
 Governs all transactions involving:
1. Sale
2. Mortgage
3. Barter
4. Exchange
5. Lease assignment
6. Any form of alienation
 Also governs issues as the effects of co-ownership
1. Quieting of title
2. Taxation
3. Registration
4. Prescription
Lex Loci Actus – law of the place where the transaction was completed
Lex Domicilii – law of the place where the owner of the property is domiciled
Proper law of transfer/forum – law of the state which has the most real connection with the transfer
 The only time the Philippine court has to settle a problem classifying property is when it is
located in a foreign country which has a law that distinguishes between real and personal
property
Codal:
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property. (333)

B. Capacity to transfer or acquire property
1. The capacity of a person to acquire or transfer real property is governed by the law of
the place where property is located (lex situs)
Llantino vs Co Liong Chong
Doctrine: sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino
citizen is valid
Facts: In 1954 the Llantino spouses leased a commercial residential lot in catanduanes to Juan Molina (AKA Co
Liong Chong) who is a Chinese National.
Juan Molina was placed in possession of the property, the Llantino spouses alleged that the lease was for a period
of 13 years and was soon to expire on 1967.
Juan Molina however informed them that he constructed a commercial building over the land and alleged that the
leased contract was for 60 years and that he was already a Filipino citizen.
The Llantinos filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of
Juan Molina ruling that the contract for 60 years is valid and in accordance with law.
The Llantinos filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WoN the lease contract was valid.
Held: Yes. The contract was a meare lease
1. a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid.
2. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of lands for residential
purposes.
The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to
its execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino
owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the
arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights, the sum of which make up
ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition, and
so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien
 HOWEVER Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject contract is
prohibited, the same can no longer be questioned presently upon the acquisition by the private
respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was held that sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen is valid
A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is nothing in it which is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained
Codal: Article XII Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use
of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Conflict of Laws

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KITEM DUQUE KADATUAN JR.

- is a part of municipal law which governs cases involving a foreign element

Object and Function

Interrelated issues of Conflicts of laws

Sources (among others)

1. Convention on International Civil Aviation

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 1|P age

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

States and Internationally recognized Individuals and Corporations

State-to-State or Government-to-Government Private transactions between individuals

1. Diplomatic protest 1. Provided by Municipal law such as resort

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 2|P age

A. Basis of Exercise of Judicial Jurisdiction

a. Jurisdiction over the person – Forum-defendant contacts

Defendant- Acquire by through his voluntary appearance or by service of legal processes.

b. Jurisdiction over the res or property – Forum-property contacts

International Shoe vs Washington

- Specify the kind of contacts upon which jurisdiction will be asserted

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 3|P age

Issue: WoN the respondent judge has jurisdiction.

Held: yes. See doctrine

B. Ways of dealing with a conflicts problem

2. Assume jurisdiction and apply either forum or foreign law.

- Burdensome to the court

Heine vs New York Insurance Company

The court of NY refuses to assume jurisdiction over the case

Issue: WoN the court may refuse to assume jurisdiction

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 4|P age

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal

The Respondent appealed the conditions of the dismissal

1. all but a few of the plaintiffs are citizens of India.

Second Issue: WoN the conditions imposed are valid

Held: 1st condition is valid

1. The tribunal that rendered the judgment was impartial or

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 5|P age

Issue: WoN the court a quo erred in assuming jurisdiction

II. Assume Jurisdiction

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 6|P age

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 7|P age

Held: No, the requirement of the law were not met.

Philippine Trust Co. vs Bohanan

Doctrine: see held…

Thus this petition questioning the validity of the will.

Issue: WoN the will was valid

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 8|P age

A. Vested Rights approached

New Hampshire law however has no such prohibition.

Issue: WoN the wife’s cause of action will prosper

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 9|P age

Alabama law grants a cause of action to Carroll against his employer.

Issue: WoN the action will prosper

B. Local Law Theory (Prof. Walter Wheeler Cook)

C. Caver’s Principle of law Preference (Prof. David F. Caver)

1. Scrutinize the event or transaction giving rise to the issue before it

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 10 | P a g e

A. Place of the most significant relationship (Prof. Willis Reese)

- Consider plurality of factors in light of choice-of-law principles such as

In Torts the contacts to be taken into account are

1. The place where the injury occurred

1. The law chosen by the parties or in the absence thereof

Kitem Duque Kadatuan Jr. 11 | P a g e

The husband failed to give support.

Summary judgement was rendered in favor of defendant.

1. The agreement effected a separation between British subjects,