Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics (3 Volumes)

Global Migration
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GLOBAL MIGRATION
Old Assumptions, New Dynamics
Volume 1
Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Anja Wiesbrock, Editors

Copyright 2015 by ABC-CLIO, LLC
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Global migration : old assumptions, new dynamics / Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Anja
Wiesbrock, editors.
volumes cm
Includes index.
ISBN 978-1-4408-0422-9 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4408-0423-6 (ebook)
1. Emigration and immigration—History—21st century. 2. Immigrants—History—
21st century. I. Acosta Arcarazo, Diego, editor of compilation. II. Wiesbrock, Anja,
editor of compilation.
JV6033.G55 2015
304.8—dc23 2014035460
ISBN: 978-1-4408-0422-9
EISBN: 978-1-4408-0423-6
19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 4 5
This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.

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To my wife, María.
To Thomas and Linnea.
Contents
Tables and Figures ix

Acknowledgments xi
Chapter One Global Migration Issues: Myths and Realities 1

Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Anja Wiesbrock
Part I Myth: Developed countries are being

swamped by migrants. 29
Chapter Two Migration Is Historically Normal: Europe as
Source and Destination of Global Population
Movements 31
Jochen Oltmer
Chapter Three Why Do People Migrate? A Review of the
Theoretical Economic Literature 59
Jessica Hagen-Zanker
Chapter Four Borders as Floodgates: Contesting the Myth
from Federal and Regional International
Experiences in Light of EU Free Movement 81
Sara Iglesias Sánchez
viii Contents
Part II Myth: Migration only takes place from

developing to developed countries and
serves as an escape from poverty. 101
Chapter Five Ten Myths about Migration and Development:
Revelations Involving the Mexico–United
States Experience 103
Raúl Delgado-Wise, Humberto Márquez, and
Selene Gaspar
Chapter Six Migration to the Gulf States: The Political
Economy of Exceptionalism 139
Philippe Fargues and Françoise De Bel-Air
Chapter Seven “Almost a Brazilian”: Gringos, Immigration,
and Irregularity in Brazil 167
Thaddeus Gregory Blanchette
Part III Myth: Migration is economically negative. 195

Chapter Eight Is Immigration Positive for the Welfare State?
The Case of Spain 197
María Bruquetas-Callejo
Chapter Nine Labor Migration from India to Italy:
Debunking the Myth of the Undesirable
Low-Skilled Migrant in the European Union 219
Kathryn Lum
Chapter Ten The Myth of Benefit Tourists and Welfare
Magnets: A Relationship between Social
Welfare and Free Movement in the
European Union? 251
Sergio Carrera, Katharina Eisele,
Elspeth Guild, and Joanna Parkin
About the Editors 271

About the Contributors 273
About the Advisory Board 279
Index 285
Tables and Figures
Tables
2.1 Historical Migration Types 33
2.2 Background Causes and Geographical/Temporal Specifics of
Migration as a Historical Phenomenon 35
3.1 Theories of Migration Defined by Level of Analysis 61
3.2 Theories of Migration Defined by Initiation or Perpetuation
of Migration 72
5.1 Mexico–United States Asymmetries, 1994–2012 107
6.1 National and Nonnational Populations in the GCC Countries,
1970–2010143
6.2 Total Population and Percentage of Nationals and Nonnationals
(April 2014) 145
6.3 Unemployment Rates among Nationals, Mid-2000s 146
Figures
3.1 Changes in Migration Flows over Time 75
3.2 A General Framework of Migration Decision Making 76
5.1 Mexico–United States Migration, 1840–2012 108
5.2 Labor Precarization in Mexico, 2012 111
5.3 Mexico: Labor Force Surplus, 2000–2010 112
5.4 Demographic Dividend Transfer from Latin America to the
United States, 2000–2010 116
5.5 Contribution by Ethnic Groups to U.S. Labor Force Growth,
2000–2010117
5.6 GDP Growth Contribution Based on Worker Ethnicity and
Migration Status, 2000–2010 118
5.7 Estimated Salary Differentials among Major Ethnic and Migration
Groups in the United States, 2010 119
x Tables and Figures
5.8 Contribution of Mexican Immigrants to the U.S. Treasury,

1994–2008120
5.9 Ratio between Taxes and Public Social Benefits, 2008 120
5.10 Foreign Population 25 Years or Older with Higher Education in
the United States, 2011 123
5.11 Mexican Immigrants with Higher Education in the United States 123
5.12 Mexico: Remittances, 1990–2012 125
5.13 Mexico: Cost of Education and Social Reproduction of Immigrants
Who Entered the United States between 1994 and 2008 versus
Remittances126
5.14 GDP Growth by Workforce Origin, 2007–2010 130
6.1 Percentage of Nonnationals Employed by Sector of Activity in GCC
Countries, 2012–2013 148
6.2 Employed Persons by Occupation and Nationality Group
(Kuwaitis, Asians, Arabs, Expatriates), 2012 149
6.3 Average Monthly Salaries in the Private Sector by Nationality
(Saudi/Non-Saudi) and Occupation, 2010 150
6.4 Number of Men per 100 Women in National and Nonnational
Populations of GCC Countries, 2010 151
6.5 Age Distribution of National and Nonnational Populations in GCC
Countries: A Comparison, around 2010 152
6.6 Proportion of Marriages with a Foreign Spouse by Sex, Selected
GCC Countries, 2000–2012 153
8.1 Number of Foreign Residents and Number of Residence Permits
Granted to Foreigners, 2000–2010 202
Acknowledgments
This book results from the proposal we received from Praeger in July 2011
to edit a book on migration. After some discussion we decided that what
was missing in the literature on the subject was a book addressed to a
general audience tackling the most common misperceptions and myths
on migration. Hence, we started our work with the intention of providing
a collection of essays dealing with some of the most common misconcep-
tions present in political and media discourse on the issue of migration.
With that idea in mind, all our authors were asked to clarify misrepresen-
tations on the issue or, in some cases, to dispel myths, while also keeping
an accessible tone suitable for the lay reader interested in knowing more
about such a contentious, debated, and contested issue.
Our approach has been of necessity global. We are pleased to have
gained contributors from all five continents discussing issues in more
than 50 countries. Our approach is interdisciplinary, and our authors
discuss migration from legal, political, sociological, historical, economic,
anthropological, demographic, and geographic angles. Finally, we decided
to include a combination of some of the most important and renowned
scholars in the world and some younger, promising academics who have
nonetheless already worked in their areas for a number of years. Each
author has written about issues on which he or she had already published
in academic journals, but has adopted a more approachable style, free of
the jargon usual in this type of scholarly publication.
Our thanks go first to our seven advisory board members: François
Crépeau, professor of law at McGill University in Montreal, Canada,
and current United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants; Jorge A. Bustamante, professor of sociology at the University of
Notre Dame in Indiana, United States, and former United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants; Kees Groenendijk, emeritus
xii Acknowledgments
professor of sociology of law at the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands;

Andrew Geddes, professor of politics at the University of Sheffield, United
Kingdom; Wei Li, professor of geography at Arizona State University,
United States; Aderanti Adepoju, professor of economy and demogra-
phy and chief executive of the Human Resources Development Centre in
Lagos, Nigeria; and Binod Khadria, professor of economics and education
at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
The members of the advisory board have fulfilled two central roles.
First, they have contributed ideas to the structure and list of authors in the
book. Second, each chapter in the book has been blind peer reviewed by
one of the members, thus ensuring the quality of the final collection.
We would also like to thank Alan Desmond and Kathryn Lum, who have
not only written a chapter for the book but also kindly blind peer reviewed
one chapter. Special thanks go also to Mark Provera and Anne Pieter van
der Mei, who also blind peer reviewed a chapter for the collection.
We would also like to thank the editors at Praeger who helped us
through the whole editorial process. Beth Ptalis began the project with
us and worked on it until January 2014. She was then replaced by Jessica
Gribble. Both were extremely helpful, professional, and enthusiastic and
carefully read and commented on all chapters. They have also been very
efficient in bringing the manuscript toward production and in answering
all our various questions and queries.
Finally, our understanding of migration as a global issue has bene-
fited from our various research visits at several institutions around the
world who have welcomed us with open arms for several days, weeks, or
months. Diego would like to thank the following institutions where he has
conducted research since 2009: the Centre for Migration Law at the Uni-
versity of Nijmegen (Netherlands), the Riga Graduate School of Law (Lat-
via), the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Universidad di Tella
in Buenos Aires (Argentina), the Fundação Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro
(Brazil), and the Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá (Colombia). Anja would
like to express her gratitude to Harvard Law School in Cambridge (United
States), GRITIM at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona (Spain), Jawa-
harlal Nehru University in New Delhi (India), the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg (Germany),
and Dokuz Eylul University in Izmir (Turkey).
The task of editors of a collection of essays can sometimes be an arduous
one. We are very grateful to our authors that this was not the case for the
book you hold in your hands. We have been very privileged to have deep-
ened our links with those authors we already knew in person and to have
met new colleagues through email, Skype, and in person to discuss the
Acknowledgments xiii
chapters in such varied places as Milan, Brussels, Barcelona, New Delhi,

Maastricht, Izmir, Buenos Aires, Boston, Toronto, Philadelphia, New York,
Oxford, Madrid, and Bristol. As editors we also met in Valencia in 2012
and in Oslo in 2013 to discuss the structure of the project.
It is now your task as reader to judge whether our efforts have been
meaningful and useful. We hope that this collection will serve as an intro-
ductory gate to the discussion of migration for those who may be new to
the field and as a further reference to those who have already approached
it from a particular academic discipline. Most important, we expect this
collection to tackle myths and misperceptions on these issues and to feed
into a more calm and informed discussion on such an important topic. If
we achieve that, all our work will have been fruitful.
Dr. Diego Acosta Arcarazo

Dr. Anja Wiesbrock
Bristol and Oslo
June 10, 2014
CHAPTER ONE
Global Migration Issues

Myths and Realities
Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Anja Wiesbrock
Introduction
Migration has become one of the most debated and politically contested
issues all around the globe. Migration elicits opposition and diverse reac-
tions from Singapore to Chile, from Australia to Denmark, and from South
Africa to Canada. This often becomes clear during presidential elections,
as exemplified by the 2012 elections in the United States and France, or
after particularly shocking events, like the death of migrants at the border,
become the focus of media reports and condemnation by different actors.
A few illustrations of recent developments should suffice to help explain
the importance of such a global-scale phenomenon.
In Qatar, for instance, an estimated 1.4 million migrant workers survive
in an appalling situation; many of them have even died in the building
sites for the football stadiums that will host the World Cup in 2022.1 This
has led to international disapproval and to promises by the Qatari gov-
ernment to improve labor standards2 (see the chapter by Fargues and De
Bel-Air).
Readers will find a chapter author’s name in parentheses when this introduction mentions
the global migration issues that are discussed in that author’s chapter of the book. This will
help the reader to become familiar with the contents of this collection.
2 Global Migration
In the United States, discussions have been ongoing to adopt migra-

tion reforms that would grant authorization to stay to the estimated
11 million nonnationals in an irregular situation in the country (Des-
mond); its success or failure remained an elusive question at the time of
writing.3
In Brazil, the arrival during four years of around 25,000 Haitian
nationals following the terrible earthquake that devastated the country
in 2010 has put migration in the spotlight4 (Blanchette). At the same
time, South America, or most notably the MERCOSUR regional organi-
zation, has followed the steps of the European Union and has allowed
for the free movement of people and open borders for South American
citizens since 2009 (Ceriani). A similar development can be observed in
other regions of the world, where neighboring countries aim to facilitate
movement across regional borders. This is the case for the East African
Community (ECA) and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) in Africa, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
In the European Union, following the dramatic death of 360 African
migrants after a shipwreck close to the shores of the Italian island of
Lampedusa on October 3, 2013,5 there were calls for a rethinking of
Europe’s approach toward migration and to the patrolling of its borders.6
A few months later, in February 2014, Swiss citizens voted in a referen-
dum against free movement of people between its country and the Euro-
pean Union, which resulted in a political crisis going well beyond migration
management.7
In Japan, the country’s low birthrate has suggested migration as a pos-
sible solution to its aging population, notably following a government
report warning that the population would fall from an actual 127 million
to 87 million by 2060.8 Similar discussions about the need for migrants
have taken place in places such as South Korea9 and Europe10 during the
last decade.
In Morocco, a country traditionally considered to be sending migrants,
the increasing number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa without a
right to stay led the government to launch its first-ever regularization pro-
gram in 2014.11
All these events are but a snapshot of global debates on migration. They
testify to migration’s political salience and to the variety of issues that it
touches upon, from labor rights to population decline and from regional
agreements facilitating free movement to discussions on borders and
sovereignty.
Global Migration Issues 3
Are Migrants Poor, Numerous, and a New Phenomenon?

That migration has transformed into such a hot issue is remarkable con-
sidering that, as of 2013, a mere 3.2 percent of the world’s citizens lived
outside their country of birth.12 Interestingly, even in those regions where a
group of states have decided to reciprocally grant free movement rights to
their citizens and to opt for open borders, such as is the case of the Euro-
pean Union, the number of people moving remains at that same 3 percent
of the total population (Iglesias Sánchez; Carrera et al.). Hence, contrary to
popular belief, most people (around 97 percent of the world’s population)
do not move, thus confirming migration as a very narrow exception rather
than a rule. Also, whereas the total number of international migrants has
grown in the last five decades to 232 million in 2013, its percentage as
a part of the world’s entire population has remained stable,13 despite the
fact that mobility is certainly easier in the modern era. Finally, the issue
of numbers is fertile ground for misperceptions. Indeed, they are usually
overestimated by the general population. For example, in 2013, respon-
dents in the United States guessed the percentage of migrants to be 42
percent when it was in fact 13 percent; in Turkey respondents estimated
the foreign population to be 21 percent when the actual number was 2
percent.14
Migration is certainly not a new phenomenon and has been present
through the history of humanity as a central element in social change.
Global migration on a notable scale has been a reality since Europe’s world-
wide political, territorial, economic, and cultural expansion took off in the
15th century, conspicuously in the period 1815–1930, during which 55
to 60 million Europeans moved overseas, especially to the United States
(Li and Yu), Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, and even
Siberia (Oltmer).
In opposition to certain perceptions, it is not the poorest of the poor who
migrate but rather those with access to some form of capital to facilitate the
trip, be it financial, social, or cultural15 (Massey and Pren; Delgado-Wise et
al.). Their motivations to migrate are varied and much more complex than
the desire for a higher income (Hagen-Zanker). Migrants are not isolated
actors that take decisions in a social vacuum but rather strategic ones act-
ing to improve their lives. When facing the arrival of migrants, some gov-
ernmental voices argue in favor of boosting the development of countries
of origin without considering that this may indeed lead to more migra-
tion. In fact, studies have shown that emigration goes up when countries
develop and only reduces when “countries move into high development
categories.”16 The wealthier a society is, the more people will be able to
4 Global Migration
migrate and the more people will have the qualifications and diplomas
that allow them to obtain visas.17 That is why medium-income countries
such as Mexico (Massey and Pren; Delgado-Wise et al.) or Turkey (Kaya)
are among the ones with the largest number of nationals abroad.
Globalization and Actors

Current international migration debates may be framed within the
context of transformations brought by globalization. Saskia Sassen has
famously argued that states have lost control of various global aspects,
notably of financial matters, affecting their capacity as sovereign enti-
ties capable of taking individual decisions.18 Faced with this situation,
Dauvergne points out that “migration laws and their enforcement are
increasingly understood as the last bastion of sovereignty.”19 This image is
powerful but depicts migration as a game with only two opposing actors
and interests: on the one hand, power-maximizing states trying to impede
the arrival of migrants; on the other, powerless individuals making their
way through dangerous routes by land or by sea to reach their particular
El Dorado.20
Reality is much more complex than this simplified picture. First, as
the various chapters in this collective effort epitomize, the number of
actors playing a role in migration is large and varied. Readers will find
here the importance not only of states and migrants in the regulation of
migration but also of international organizations (Iglesias Sánchez; Car-
rera et al.; Ghezelbash and Crock), unions (Gordon), security bureau-
cracies (Tsoukala), political parties (Crush and Ramachandran; Ceriani;
McMillan), civil servants (Blanchette), employers (Lum; Kaya; Garcés-
Mascareñas), universities (Sarkar and Sharma), NGOs (Fargues and De
Bel-Air), smugglers (Massey and Pren), migrant associations (Li and
Yu), think tanks (Delgado-Wise et al.), and even nonbinding consulta-
tive processes among states (Ceriani). Finally, academics also play a cen-
tral role with their research, as this collection testifies. Each of these
actors has different interests and priorities, which influence policies and
legislation and which change from country to country and evolve over
time. All of them play a role in the governance of migration, which is
usually referred to as “the norms, rules, principles and decision-making
procedures that regulate the behaviour of States.”21 Moreover, state
policies are shaped by an international legal framework, which restricts
national discretion by establishing certain fundamental rights that are
to be protected. This is in particular the case for refugees, who require
international protection, as provided for by the 1951 Geneva
Convention and other international and regional instruments. This

book concentrates on voluntary migration rather than on asylum seekers
who flee their countries because they are suffering prosecution. That
being said, in the context of mixed migratory movements, it is not
always possible to distinguish among asylum seekers, refugees, and
migrants, and several chapters in this book will be of relevance to both
categories of persons (Ghezelbash and Crock; Tsoukala; Crush and
Ramachandran).
Second, the picture that emerges from this collection is one in which
migrants have agency and react to governments’ decisions in numerous
ways. Far from depicting migrants as powerless individuals, various chap-
ters describe the tactics they adopt and their adaptation processes and
strategies. In this regard, it doesn’t matter whether the migrants are in an
irregular situation (Massey and Pren; Garcés-Mascareñas; Blanchette) or
have authorization to stay (Lum), since they influence their own destiny
rather than being passive recipients.
Third, globalization has produced two contradictory outcomes when it
comes to migration. On the one hand, we see the transformation of politi-
cal membership through the granting of rights and secure status to those
who are not nationals of the polity. This changes societies and affects issues
of belonging and national identity, which are transformed in the process
(Modood; Kochenov; Huddleston). This is the result of international
human rights treaties that grant rights without distinction to both nation-
als and foreigners. It is, however, also the consequence of decisions by
states that adopt open policies in order to attract migrants, notably inter-
national students paying higher fees for their courses (Sarkar and Sharma)
or those who are considered highly skilled (Rottas and Givens; Hercog and
Siegel). On the other hand, there is the opposite trend of the securitization
of migration, especially when it comes to those looking for international
protection as refugees (Ghezelbash and Crock; Tsoukala) or to those clan-
destinely entering or remaining in the state (Massey and Pren; Blanchette;
Garcés-Mascareñas).
The outcome of this dispute, between postnational forms of member-
ship vs. securitization, results in conflicting mechanisms of inclusion and
exclusion and in sometimes schizophrenic regimes and constant policy
change. Indeed, it is common to have various migration laws and regula-
tions adopted in short periods in any given country, and migration policies
always include a range of “incoherent and potentially contradictory laws,
measures and regulations that serve different interest groups and/or target
different migrant categories and which make them difficult to summa-
rize”22 under the generic label of restrictive or liberal.
6 Global Migration
Migration Policies: Changing Paradigms

Migration policies are constantly on the move, creating changing para-
digms that this collection identifies in its various chapters. In spite of heated
public discussions and governments’ eagerness to address the challenge of
international migration, states have been slow to respond to the changing
dynamics of global migration patterns. With the exception of the 1990 UN
Convention on the rights of migrant workers (neither signed nor ratified by
any country in the European Union or by other large receiving countries in the
world such as the United States, Australia, or Russia), there is no top-down
global multilateral framework seeking to regulate international migration.
There are, however, fast-developing regional migration governance regimes
in places such as Europe (Iglesias Sánchez; Carrera et al.) or South America
(Ceriani), which provide migrants with almost equal rights as nationals.
Whereas there seems to be a battle for recruiting highly skilled workers
around the world (Rottas and Givens), recent studies show the increasing
demand for low-skilled workers to carry out a range of essential tasks,
especially in the service industry (Lum; Bruquetas-Callejo).23 Yet, migra-
tion policies in many industrialized countries continue to be aimed at pre-
venting the entry of low-skilled migrants, who are generally wrongly
perceived as a major cause of stagnant wages and high unemployment rates
(Gordon; Lum). Migration is also certainly a major economic issue with
remittances flowing in various directions (Oda) and with different positive
or negative consequences (Delgado-Wise et al.; Hercog and Siegel).
Moreover, migration policies fail to take into account the increasing
feminization of migration. Women have not only turned into an important
category of independent labor migrants (rather than family dependents),
especially in the care sector, they have also taken on an important role in
shaping gender stereotypes and family structures (Bruquetas-Callejo).
There is also an erosion of the distinction between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving countries.24 Countries such as Brazil (Blanchette),
Argentina (Ceriani), Malaysia (Garcés-Mascareñas), Greece (Tsoukala) or
South Africa (Crush and Ramachandran) are both origin and destination
countries. Tendencies shift very quickly as well. For example, Spain, which
historically had been considered a sending country, transformed in the
1990s and the beginning of the 21st century into the second largest recipi-
ent country of migrants in the world (Bruquetas-Callejo), following only
the United States. However, due to the economic crisis in 2008, Spain has
suffered net negative migration since 2011 or, in other words, more people
leave Spain than enter it. Finally, even places such as the United Kingdom,
which would usually be considered a classical immigration country, have
large populations residing abroad. Indeed, almost five million British

nationals live abroad, according to official government data.25
Importantly, extreme right-wing and anti-immigrant parties in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere distort numbers and tend to both exagger-
ate the number of immigrants in the country and to completely neglect the
nationals who live abroad (Tsoukala). Since migrants do not usually have
the right to vote in elections, they are easily used as scapegoats. Certainly,
when migrants have the right to vote, as in New Zealand (McMillan),
political parties try to obtain their vote. Extreme right-wing and antimi-
grant parties usually claim that immigrants fail to integrate and that they
pose a threat to national identity, as if identity could be considered a
monolithic and static concept, rather than an evolving one (Delgado-Wise
et al.; Kochenov). It is interesting to see that those same parties deny that,
for example, the difficulties of British citizens abroad, whether in Spain or
Brazil, in learning the local language would pose a risk to the identity of
Spaniards or Brazilians. However, as some chapters in this book prove
(Blanchette), migrants, whether from Western countries or elsewhere, may
face the same challenges and consequently adopt the same tactics to tackle
the obstacles they face in the new place of residence.
Aims and Structure of the Book

This collection of essays aims to provide food for thought for a better
understanding of the global dynamics of migration from a variety of aca-
demic points of view: history, sociology, politics, law, economics, anthro-
pology, geography, and demography. Any study of global migration issues
benefits from an interdisciplinary perspective in order to explain such a
multifaceted reality. Equally, the book’s approach is global, and the con-
tributors and advisory board members come from all five continents. The
various chapters in the book mention and discuss topics relating to more
than 50 countries around the world.
This work is addressed to various types of audiences. First, students
approaching migration for the first time in university courses in any dis-
cipline will find here excellent introductory reading. Second, scholars
working at universities or think tanks on the various subjects involved in
the analysis of migration will have the opportunity to explore debates in
other areas before embarking on more in-depth studies. Third, the book
is also directed to those working with migration, whether civil servants
in governments or international organizations, journalists, NGO activists,
or other relevant stakeholders such as unions or business organizations.
They will all find suitable examples exploring the complexity of migration
8 Global Migration
regulation and will learn from a global comparative analysis. Finally, the
book’s approach also makes it suitable for the lay reader interested in going
beyond common assumptions and understandings on the issue but who
may not have the time or access to follow discussions taking place in spe-
cialized academic journals on migration.
Global Migration comprises three volumes including, in addition to this
introduction, 27 chapters discussing nine different myths or common mis-
representations in debates around migration. These nine myths have been
chosen for their representative character, although other myths could be
equally debated. A clarification on the meaning of myth is required at
the outset. The Oxford dictionary understands myth to mean “a widely
held but false belief or idea.” All our chapters engage with various myths
leading to false, or at least rebuttable or half-true, presumptions or misun-
derstandings about migration. The intention is always to provide different
perspectives, which may not be that readily available in the political or
media discourse. This is not surprising considering the saliency that migra-
tion has in certain political campaigns as well as the speed with which the
media attempts to explain complex issues in simple terms. Our approach
is radically the opposite, and we have asked our authors to synthesize the
research they have conducted for years in order to tackle false representa-
tions or ideas on migration and to provide a different, often unknown,
angle or perspective to those interested in having a more informed debate
on the subject. The reader will find explanations challenging usual under-
standings and capable of generating a more reasoned discussion on an
issue generating such conflicting opinions.
The Myths
Volume 1
Volume 1 includes three sections tackling three different myths, with
chapters discussing migration flows, their direction, and their effects.
Part I covers the first myth, “being swamped by migrants.” Two ques-
tions are posed at the outset: First, have people always migrated or is
this a new, recent phenomenon? Second, why do people migrate? When
following the media discussion and political discourse in industrialized
countries in recent years, it is easy to get the impression that this is the
decade of migration, that poor individuals are only waiting for their chance
to leave their countries of origin, and that we are about to be swamped
by migrants from developing countries. However, when looking at the
actual extent of migration flows, the types of migrants on the move, and
the individual’s migration decision, it becomes clear that the idea of a tidal
wave of migrants who are about to crash on our shores is nothing but
a myth. As mentioned earlier, even though international migration has
increased over the past decades, it remains the exception rather than the
rule, with only 3.2 percent of the world’s population being international
migrants.26
As Jochen Oltmer shows in his chapter, migration is far from a modern
phenomenon that only came about with the development of mass trans-
portation. In fact, when looking at the causation, forms, and consequences
of migration to and from Europe since the 16th century, we can see that
global migration on a fairly important scale has been a reality for centuries.
Moreover, migration has never been a linear process of long-term emi-
gration, but rather, processes of remigration and circular migration have
always characterized population movements. Many countries around the
world have over time changed their status from a migrant-sending coun-
try to a migrant-receiving country and vice versa. Most European coun-
tries, for example, are nowadays major immigration countries, whereas
the great intercontinental migration of the 19th and early 20th centuries
brought some 55 to 60 million Europeans to other parts of the world.
Interestingly, however, many European countries are also today large send-
ers of migrants, and the current economic downturn has increased that
tendency in places such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Ireland, to
name but a few.
Furthermore, it is a popular misconception that it is the poorest, most
desperate people that migrate. Jochen Oltmer deconstructs the myth
that it was typically the poorest and neediest in a population that would
become migrants. The historical analysis shows that not only today, but
also in the past, financial resources have been essential preconditions for
the realization of an individual project to migrate. Moreover, as Jessica
Hagen-Zanker illustrates in her chapter, a person’s decision to migrate is
often influenced by many other factors than economic considerations. She
finds that the migration process is extremely complex and involves differ-
ent motivations, not only the desire for a higher income. The migration
decision entails weighing costs versus benefits and includes issues such
as wage differentials and income concerns, but also noneconomic factors,
such as the need for security and wider considerations at the household
level. In the same vein, Oltmer shows that in the past geographical reloca-
tion was not necessarily aimed at stabilizing or improving the life situation
of immigrants in the receiving regions. Instead, the motives for migration
have always been varied, resulting from personal choices or by agreed-
upon arrangements within households.
10 Global Migration
Moreover, for most individuals migration will always be the least pre-
ferred choice when thinking about opportunities for securing and improv-
ing their livelihood. Family bonds and a close attachment to one’s own
language and culture are often strong arguments against migration. Hence,
even in the hypothetical scenario of a world with open borders and no
limits to mobility, we might not see a massive movement of people from
low-income to high-income countries. Sara Iglesias Sánchez shows that
the abolition of border controls and the existence of a right to free move-
ment do not necessarily result in large migration flows, even when bor-
ders are abolished between countries with large differences in salaries and
unemployment rates. In fact, the example of the European Union shows
that migration between countries with different economic and social con-
ditions remains low even when legal barriers to free movement disappear.
Indeed, the number of people residing in another country in the European
Union represents only 3 percent of the total population of more than 500
million European citizens. Due to its importance, the European Union
example is the subject of discussion of another chapter in the book as well
(Carrera et al.).
Part II tackles the second myth, “migration serves as an escape from
poverty from developing to developed countries.” It cannot be forgotten
from the outset that North-North flows do constitute a very important
number. For example, according to official data from the European Com-
mission, in 2012, out of the 2.1 million non-EU nationals who migrated
to the European Union, the largest number, 200,000, were U.S. citizens.27
Blanchette, an anthropologist, opens the scene by sharply reminding us
that migration takes place in several directions, including North to South.
The author uses the example of citizens from the United Kingdom, United
States, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia who are residing in
Brazil, in this case in Rio de Janeiro, to explain their difficulties in obtain-
ing visas to regularly stay in Brazil. The chapter clearly describes how
migrants from Western countries may face exactly the same problems that
are common to immigrants everywhere. These migrants fall sometimes
into an “irregular” or “illegal” situation in Brazil and need to resort to the
same strategies that are subject to heated debates in the United States or
Europe. They may either await a regularization process in order to solve
their legal status, or they may try to obtain it through other routes, includ-
ing marriage. Interestingly, the author explains how his informants do not
consider themselves to be immigrants, but rather expatriates, even when
performing medium-skilled jobs such as English language teachers.
Fargues and De Bel-Air present important South-South flows, which
are often neglected, despite the fact that more than half of all international
migration is made up of such flows. The authors introduce us to a new

region where South-South migration is extremely relevant. The six states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)28 rank as the third largest migrant-
receiving region in the world and the largest in terms of South-South
migration. Also, nowhere else in the world is the share of nationals so
small in proportion to resident populations (e.g., 68 percent in Saudi Ara-
bia but only 11 percent in the United Arab Emirates). De Bel-Air and
Fargues explain how, despite their numbers, noncitizens have little social
and no political membership in GCC countries, for Gulf countries do not
conceive of themselves as immigration countries. This chapter aims at
explaining the combination, so peculiar to Gulf societies, of such excep-
tional levels of immigration and the remarkable closure of local societies
to these flows. Through the lens of political demography, it emphasizes the
structural nature of the link between oil wealth, migration, and the social
contract in the Gulf states. The chapter concludes that the GCC countries
are now at a crossroads and faced with two choices: on the one hand, limit
the numbers and increase foreign workers’ rights or, on the other hand,
sustain high levels of immigration, especially from huge available pools
of Asian workers, but make Gulf societies more permeable to sociodemo-
graphic input from nonnationals. In both cases, the role of migration in
the Gulf states’ social contract will change radically. Through their study it
can be seen that not granting rights to migrants is an unsustainable policy
even for autocratic regimes in the Gulf states. It also represents a fascinat-
ing account of how international relations influence migration flows and
of how various actors, in this case NGOs but also international media, may
play a positive role in improving migrants’ rights in these countries.
Finally, Delgado-Wise, Márquez, and Gaspar discuss 10 myths of migra-
tion and development by taking the United States–Mexico corridor as a
case study. The authors begin by questioning contemporary migration as a
free and voluntary act benefiting countries of origin; instead, they argue
that these countries, as well as the migrants themselves, suffer severe social
and economic consequences, which go far beyond what they call “the
overemphasized positive impact of remittances.” Following a similar line
as other chapters in the book (Tsoukala; Crush and Ramachandran), the
authors denounce the scapegoating suffered by migrants and the lack of
recognition of the multiple economic, demographic, social, and cultural
contributions they make. The authors take a “southern perspective” to
unravel the nature of the context in which contemporary migration takes
place, but also to highlight some of the major features of neoliberal global-
ization and restructuring, including what they describe as an unprece-
dented onslaught against the working class (see also Gordon).
12 Global Migration
Part III addresses the third myth, “migration is economically negative.”

This section deals with the common assumption that immigration has a
negative impact on receiving countries’ economies and that migrants are
keen to exploit national welfare systems. For example, in the European
Union, the most recent enlargement and the granting of free movement
rights to citizens from former Soviet sphere of influence states have been
accompanied by fierce outcries in the media about the scandal of ben-
efit tourism.29 Moreover, low-skilled migration, in opposition to highly
skilled, is always presented as a burden and is very rarely explained as
bringing any benefit.
María Bruquetas-Callejo uses the Spanish example to dismantle the
myth that migrants’ overall impact on welfare states is negative, since
their use of welfare benefits and transfer is considered to be larger than
their contributions. She illustrates the positive contributions that the large
influx of migrants has brought to the Spanish welfare state and economy,
and shows that the arrival of immigrant workers has reinforced them and
contributed to the survival of certain productive sectors that otherwise
would have disappeared. What is more, migration has had a clear posi-
tive impact on the Spanish welfare state in spite of universal schemes that
entitle access to all residents, including immigrants in an irregular situa-
tion. In fact, migrants are underrepresented in Spanish social assistance
services. Hence, though being a country with a generous welfare state,
including high social expenses and universal access to benefits, Spain has
largely benefited from the arrival of immigrant workers.
Moreover, it is often assumed that low-skilled workers in particular
contribute negatively to a receiving state’s economy and lead to high unem-
ployment rates and increased reliance on social welfare services. Migration
policies in many industrialized countries are based on this assumption and
are therefore designed to prevent the entry of low-skilled workers with the
exception of seasonal workers with limited rights, whereas at the same
time they privilege access for highly skilled workers. Kathryn Lum chal-
lenges the discourse that low-skilled immigration is deleterious by looking
at the case of Indians working in the Italian dairy industry. She shows how
the vast majority of these low-skilled workers have successfully inserted
themselves into this sector of the Italian economy, without “stealing” jobs
from native Italians and avoiding the pattern of extreme exploitation and
irregularity present in other areas of the Italian agricultural sector. In fact,
Indians from the Punjab region have to a large extent monopolized the
cheese sector in Italy, despite the availability of labor from other immigrant
communities. They therefore make an important contribution to the Ital-
ian economy by providing a product that is not only economically impor-

tant, but also key to the Italian identity.
Migration may also have significant implications in terms of access to
social security benefits both for the individual migrant as well as for receiv-
ing societies. It is often assumed that opening up possibilities for legal
migration and free movement between countries in the developing world
inevitably brings with it a right to extensive social welfare benefits and
their exploitation by migrants. Sergio Carrera, Katharina Eisele, Elspeth
Guild, and Joanna Parkin examine the myths, misconceptions, and con-
troversies that have emerged around benefit tourism and welfare magnets
in the very specific context of the European Union. By discussing the EU
legal framework for access to social benefits as well as statistics and data on
the reliance on such benefits by nonnationals after the recent EU enlarge-
ment, they debunk the myth that the exercise of free movement rights has
led to an exploitation of social welfare systems. They point to the fact that
the scarcity of comparable data and low visibility of the data on reliance by
nonnationals on social benefits has opened the gap for myth-making and
the construction of social welfare tourism as a major policy problem. In
spite of being a major issue in policy debates across the Union, the avail-
able data and evidence fail to substantiate the link between free movement
and overburdened social welfare regimes. The overwhelming majority of
mobile EU citizens do not present a negative fiscal impact on receiving
member states. Rather, the existing research on the relation between wel-
fare and mobility of EU nationals demonstrates that the actual challenge
may be one of insufficient welfare coverage by mobile EU citizens and
barriers to their inclusion.
Volume 2
Parts I and II of Volume 2 discuss recurrent issues around migration
and how migration flows, large or small, shape policy responses. The
myths at stake here are that restrictive migration policies are, first, effective
in managing migration, and second, inevitable, in the sense that no other
suitable, more liberal alternatives exist. Both affirmations require careful
analysis and discussion.
In their seminal work Beyond Smoke and Mirrors, Massey, Durand, and
Malone show that restrictive U.S. immigration policies during the 1980s
and 1990s were largely enacted for symbolic domestic political purposes.30
Despite restrictive policy discourses, for decades the U.S. government has
been accepting the entry and residence of substantial numbers of migrants
14 Global Migration
who remain and work in U.S. territory without authorization. A similar

situation has been described by other authors in the case of Europe.31
In academic circles, these policies are often depicted as suffering from
an efficacy gap between their objectives and the extent to which they
actually determine migratory movements.32 Indeed, these policies are
usually prone to failure since they do not take into account the demand
for cheap migrant labor present in many countries (see, for example,
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas on Malaysia), and they ignore the need to open
legal channels to fulfill that demand.
Part I challenges the myth that restrictive migration policies are effec-
tive. The chapter by Massey and Pren provides an excellent account of
this paradigm and of the unintended consequences that these restrictive
policies may produce. The militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border is
presented as “one of the most expensive and colossal policy failures in
U.S. history.” The authors explain this massive policy failure step by step,
from the U.S. militarization of its border with Mexico between 1986 and
2010 to undocumented migrants’ responses in shifting their crossings to
less patrolled sectors of the border by using the services of paid border
crossing guides or coyotes. The effects of the militarization of the border are
summarized by a dramatic increase in the death rate among unauthorized
border crossers, the increasing cost of crossing the border, and the longer
stays for migrants working in the United States in order to pay off the
crossing cost. Thus, rather than having limited the number of migrants in
an undocumented situation in the United States, the border militarization
has multiplied their number so as to reach almost 12 million migrants in
an irregular situation in 2012, out of which around 6 million are Mexi-
cans.33 Most important, the likelihood of ultimately gaining entry into the
United States during a series of attempts has remained very close to 100
percent. Drawing on the open borders example in the European Union
(see chapters by Iglesias Sánchez; Carrera et al.) and comparing it to the
nonexisting free movement of people clauses in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the authors argue that “paradoxically, when it
comes to immigration flows, less restriction and more management can
yield more actual control and smaller numbers of immigrants in the long
term.”
Ghezelbash and Crock approach another restrictive and counterpro-
ductive policy: detention of asylum seekers. They investigate the rea-
sons behind the measures aimed at restricting their access in Australia,
the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. In particular, the authors
evaluate why mandatory detention has become a widespread policy tool.
In addressing this question, they provide a fascinating account of the
history of normalization of detention policy, from a temporary and

extraordinary measure used at times of crisis to a permanent tool of migra-
tion control. By dismantling a state’s justifications in favor of this policy
tool, they present it as illegitimate, not only because automatic manda-
tory detention is not in line with norms of international human rights
law, but also because detention produces several by-products, including
devastating effects on the health and well-being of detainees. Moreover,
such policies, the authors conclude, are economically unsound because of
the astronomical fiscal costs associated with them. Both chapters are note-
worthy not only because of their insightful analyses of their case studies,
but also because of the important policy lessons for other countries facing
similar challenges.
Gözde Kaya shows that restrictive migration policies that focus on tem-
porary admission often are not effective in preventing the long-term settle-
ment of nonnationals (see also chapters by Fargues and De Bel-Air;
Garcés-Mascareñas). In recent years the idea of temporary labor migra-
tion—or “circular migration”—has regained increasing popularity. It is
often perceived as a solution that is to the benefit of the sending and
receiving country as well as individual migrants. Kaya challenges this
assumption by looking at the example of Turkish migration to the Euro-
pean Union. She finds that the temporary admission schemes, the so-
called guest worker programs, did not respond to the expectations of
Turkey or the European Union. Whereas Turkey only benefited marginally
from the sending of remittances and the knowledge transfer of returning
migrants, the western European receiving states had to realize that tempo-
rary guest workers had turned into permanent settlers. At the same time,
Kaya debunks the myth of potential mass migratory flows from Turkey to
the European Union after Turkey’s eventual accession to the European
Union. On the basis of surveys measuring such potential migratory flows,
she concludes that increasing income levels and decreasing unemploy-
ment rates in Turkey are likely to prevent large migratory flows.
Part II addresses the general assumption that restrictive migration poli-
cies are always the rule; “restrictive policies towards migrants are inevi-
table.” This assertion is indeed much more complex than certain media
or political analyses would lead us to believe, since any migration pol-
icy is usually a mix of restrictive and liberal elements. In academic dis-
course, this was graphically depicted by Zolberg, who argued that the core
dilemma for the world’s major migrant destination states was how high to
build the walls and how wide to open the doors in those walls.34 There
are, of course, dramatic differences among countries, since some of them
utterly disregard migrants’ rights (see Fargues and De Bel-Air), whereas
16 Global Migration
others, such as in the examples in this section, offer innovative solutions

to complex challenges.
McMillan discusses the central issue of voting rights for nonnationals.
She explains the reasons why New Zealand allows permanent residents to
vote not only in local elections, as is becoming common in more coun-
tries, but also in national elections. McMillan argues that there are a num-
ber of historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors that are specific to New
Zealand and which help in understanding why permanent residents have
been allowed to vote since 1975. The author uses the New Zealand case to
inquire to what extent the various claims made by opponents and defend-
ers of noncitizen voting apply. The latter will usually claim that extending
voting rights promotes integration, sends a message that immigrants are
permanent members of society, and may encourage naturalization. The
former will often argue that granting voting rights may encourage foreign
governments to influence domestic politics of the countries where their
expatriate citizens are enfranchised, that immigrant minority groups may
weaken existing political parties by establishing ethnic ones, or that exist-
ing power balances may be disrupted with some parties benefiting more
from the immigrants’ vote. McMillan shows that none of these alleged neg-
ative effects have taken place in New Zealand, which is invaluable infor-
mation in a comparative perspective. Crucially, the New Zealand case is
an example of a country where major parties have consistently challenged
the comparatively low levels of anti-immigration rhetoric, notably com-
ing from the unsuccessful New Zealand First Party, preferring to com-
pete instead for the votes of new migrants. This represents a key example
deserving much greater attention because of the possible far-reaching
implications that widening the number of people allowed to vote would
have in other countries in the world.
Ceriani’s chapter brings us to Argentina and focuses on the fascinating
transformation undergone by the immigration law in that country. Argen-
tina had a very restrictive legislative framework, which had been adopted
in 1981 by the last military dictatorship that ruled the country (1976–
1983) and which had a focus on the understanding of the migrant as a
threat to society. Despite the return to democracy in 1983, the 1981 immi-
gration law remained in force, and discrimination toward migrants contin-
ued both in political discourse and in the daily administrative practices of
the national bureaucracies involved with migration. Migrants were used as
scapegoats in those years for various social challenges such as unemploy-
ment, insecurity, or poverty. This all changed in 2003 when a new law
was adopted, despite the intensification of the economic crisis at the turn
of the century. This new law, which has been considered by the United
Nations to be one of the most advanced in the world in terms of the rights
it grants to migrants, has dramatically shifted Argentina’s approach toward
migration regulation from securitization to a rights-based approach. Ceri-
ani explains the reasons that made this paradigmatic change possible and,
by doing so, tackles the well-entrenched assumption that during periods
of economic crisis, migration policies necessarily need to become more
restrictive.
Desmond’s chapter discusses the central issue of amnesties or regu-
larization procedures for migrants in an irregular situation in the United
States and Europe. Irregular migration mostly follows from the lack of
legal channels to enter or remain in a country, linked with the existence of
an unregulated job market in certain sectors. There are two main options
to deal with irregular migrants, one considered restrictive and the other
liberal: expulsion or regularization. Desmond seeks first to demolish the
myth that regularization is a seldom-used measure. In fact, he shows
that this is often instead the norm and that millions of nonnationals have
obtained a regular right to stay through these kinds of processes. Such a
widespread use of regularization itself highlights another myth: that all or
most irregular migrants are deported. Desmond provides data from the
European Union where only about 40 percent of irregular migrants are
removed. The author also offers several arguments in favor of this par-
ticular policy option and sketches some of the most common reasons for
and means of regularization in both regions. He also proposes some ideas
as to when migrants in an irregular situation should be granted a right to
stay. As mentioned in other chapters (Blanchette; Ceriani), regularization
procedures or amnesties have also been largely used in other regions of
the world and constitute, by and large, nonrestrictive means of managing
migration, challenging assumptions depicting restrictive migration poli-
cies as inevitable.
Part III discusses the topical issue of integration of nonnationals and
the intersection of immigration, integration, and culture. It challenges the
assumption that integration can be measured and that restrictive immigra-
tion policies in the form of language and integration tests are a useful tool
to promote integration. This is a multifaceted subject of the utmost impor-
tance in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, and it surfaces in many
of the discussions in the book. In Europe, integration has been a crucial
issue for policymakers and a controversial topic in public debates. Promi-
nent political figures have helped to sustain misconceptions and fears
about the integration of immigrants and the effects of increased diversity.
German chancellor Angela Merkel famously declared the death of multi-
culturalism in Germany while former French president Nicolas Sarkozy
18 Global Migration
has stated that American and British efforts to encourage diversity have
only strengthened extremism and diluted national identities.35 The myth
of the belief in the purity of the nation still exerts, however, a powerful
influence, notably in Europe, where calls for preserving national identi-
ties are on the rise.36 In the United States, as a traditional immigration
country that is characterized by the diversity of its citizens, fears of losing
U.S. “national” culture and values are less pronounced. Be that as it may,
the United States has its own share of integration debates, mostly related
to the rights of irregular migrants who have lived in the country for many
years.
The difficulty in defining what integration means has to be taken as the
starting point for any meaningful debate on the matter. Integration, what-
ever its definition, is certainly a process that takes time, and in which both
newcomers and receiving societies play a role (Oltmer; Li and Yu). Indeed,
the controversial ways in which integration is measured in Europe are the
subject of the first two chapters. Both Kochenov and Huddleston chal-
lenge the usefulness and legitimacy of language and integration tests for
family reunification (Huddleston) and naturalization (Kochenov).
In the large majority of European countries, language and integration
tests are an essential precondition for the acquisition of citizenship. Based
on his own experience of naturalization in the Netherlands, Kochenov
dismantles the myth that such integration tests preceding naturalization
are necessary and useful. He argues that the very idea of testing cultural
integration on the basis of a standardized test is incompatible with the
liberal ideology of tolerance in modern democracies. By referring to a non-
existent monoculture based on stereotyping, cultural testing marginalizes
and underlines the otherness of applicants for citizenship, who have in
the large majority of cases resided in the country for many years. This
is in spite of the fact that the rise of international migration and human
rights in recent decades has led to a universality of modern culture, which
makes it impossible for states to imagine themselves as rooted in homog-
enous monocultural societies. Within the specific context of the European
Union, language and culture tests are even less justified, as they run coun-
ter to the very idea of European integration. In particular, the concept
of EU citizenship follows a rationale that is contradictory to the member
states’ approach of linking nationality with their territory of populace. In
fact, EU citizenship aims at encouraging people to move, to benefit from
the opportunities that the internal market has to offer, and to think beyond
their nation states.
In addition to the testing of “cultural integration” preceding natu-
ralization, many countries have in recent years introduced pre-entry
language and integration tests as a precondition for family reunifica-

tion. Huddleston challenges the presumption that such tests and other
requirements for family reunification have a positive impact on migrant
integration. On the basis of findings of the Migrant Integration Policy
Index (MIPEX) for European countries as well as traditional countries
of immigration such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, he
concludes that family reunion restrictions show no signs of long-term
effectiveness for their stated integration goals. Even though pre-entry
language tests may have a slightly positive impact on integration, the
limited outcome is highly disproportionate to the great costs in time
and stress that incoming family members have to incur to pass the test.
Better formal and informal opportunities for learning and participation
await them in the country of destination. Other requirements for family
reunification, such as age limits, attachment assessments, or high income
levels and fees that are often justified by the need to foster integration are
in fact likely to have a counterproductive effect. As Huddleston shows,
such requirements do not really help reuniting families to integrate faster
into their new country of residence. Instead, they delay and limit the
number of family reunions, which is particularly worrying in the light of
immigrants’ self-reported benefits of family reunion for their family life
and integration.
Modood’s chapter discusses multiculturalism and argues that, contrary
to the declarations by many important political leaders in Europe who
consider it “dead,” it constitutes a relevant and current policy approach
to integration. The author contextualizes his chapter in the discussions
following the attacks of 9/11 and the arrival in the West of international
terrorism in the name of Islam, which have aggravated the tendency to
blame multiculturalism for being divisive and producing segregation. In
Modood’s view, the idea that multiculturalism has failed or is dead is a
myth produced by the lack of a clear understanding of what multicultural-
ism itself entails and stands for. He describes multiculturalism as a mode
of integration that tries to meet the deficits of other modes such as assimi-
lation, individualist-integration, and cosmopolitanism, and argues that it
is based on the core democratic values of liberty, equality, and fraternity/
unity.
Volume 3
Part I of Volume 3 addresses the interaction of migration and labor/
social security rights: “migrant workers cannot get equal rights.” It is
beyond doubt that migration processes have major implications not only
20 Global Migration
for the rights of migrant workers in terms of residence, employment, and

social security benefits, but also for the rights of resident workers in the
country of destination. There are, however, many misconceptions and
uncertainties regarding the complex relationship between migration and
the enjoyment of certain economic and social rights.
It is, for example, a myth that low-skilled migration to high-income
countries inevitably entails a trade-off between numbers and rights,37
implying that the admission of larger numbers of temporary migrant
workers cannot work in liberal democracies that are self-constrained by
rights and cannot therefore limit migrants’ access to core economic and
social rights. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas questions the common assump-
tion that guest worker programs may be successful in countries where
states do not face constraints in terms of migrants’ rights. By looking at
the case of Malaysia, she shows that the formula of open entry and closed
membership, where states do not restrict the entry of migrant workers but
place limits on the time of residence, position in the labor market, and
social and labor rights, only appears to work at first sight. In practice, the
effectiveness of such guest worker programs is a myth, as the costs and
limited rights associated with legal entry and stay have led many migrants
to resort to irregularity (see also Fargues and De Bel-Air).
From a workers’ rights perspective in receiving countries, it is often
argued that reinforcing undocumented workers’ rights should be of con-
cern for all workers because everyone in the job market is harmed when a
set of workers is unable to demand compliance with basic law. At the same
time, a recurrent economic argument suggests that immigrants do not
have a negative impact on resident workers’ overall wages or employment
rates, and that they are, in fact, either creating new jobs or taking jobs that
residents refuse to do. By referring to the example of the United States,
Jennifer Gordon highlights the conflict between economic arguments
relating to the benefits of migration on the one hand and workers’ rights
arguments on the other. Gordon raises the question as to why resident
workers should care about the enforcement of undocumented workers’
rights if migrants are indeed not competing with resident workers for jobs.
To tackle this conflict, she highlights that even though immigration has a
neutral or small positive effect on native workers’ wages from an overall
point of view, there may be a greater detrimental impact on certain local
areas and industries and on particular groups of residents, including the
prior wave of immigrants, workers of color, and workers with less than a
high school diploma. Moreover, she points to the role of employers in
creating categories of work that native workers are reluctant to do. What
turns certain occupations into immigrant work is not a natural evolutionary
process but a concerted effort by employers to undercut unions and reduce

wages and protections.
Part II discusses the myth that “migrants are a threat to society.” As
already debated in various other chapters in the book (Ceriani; Garcés-
Masquareñas; Fargues and De Bel-Air), migrants are sometimes singled
out as scapegoats for various societal issues and depicted as an invasion,
an infection, or an economic, identity, or social threat. The “scapegoating
mechanism” has been famously described by the French philosopher René
Girard. He suggests that when social antagonism reaches levels that
threaten society’s stability, the way out of this dangerous situation is found
in the scapegoating mechanism.38 A victim is identified as the cause of the
social tension and is therefore sacrificed in order to restore society’s peace
and serenity. Certain political groups do indeed pander to xenophobic
fears during electoral campaigns in the hope of gaining short-term politi-
cal advantages. Of course, when anti-immigrant (or far-right) parties
become part of a ruling coalition, there is a larger risk of a restrictive immi-
gration policy.39 Crucially, an even more important factor is “the reaction
of more mainstream conservative parties to the challenge of the far right’s
message.”40 In fact, it is not uncommon to see other political groups adopt
policy positions that were originally taken by the radical right and that
lend these ideas increased legitimacy,41 something that has, for example,
been seen in various European countries in the last few years.
Tsoukala opens the section by investigating the case of Greece. Her
chapter is unique in identifying a number of actors constructing migration
as a social threat, from government officials and law enforcers to opin-
ion leaders and journalists. Law enforcers have in her account an interest
in this construction in order to reposition their agencies in the security
sphere by claiming wider competencies and budgets. Private security
agencies also play a role, since they develop control technologies that
are then sold to governments in what can become a very lucrative busi-
ness. As in the case of the United States, Greece constructed a fence along
the Greek-Turkish land border that, once completed in December 2012,
pushed immigrants and asylum seekers to enter by sea, thereby causing
the death of many individuals (see also Massey and Pren). Tsoukala mas-
terfully explains how politicians have used the migration discussion in
order to divert the attention of the electorate from other serious social
and political issues, and how, following a standard scapegoating pattern,
immigrants are held responsible for what in fact is the outcome of inter-
national creditors’ instructions. Her detailed account of Operation Xenios
Zeus and its demonization of foreign sex workers is a powerful image of
how governments may stir fears through the designation of new social
22 Global Migration
enemies, usually those who are relatively politically, socially, and economi-
cally powerless.
In a related fashion, Crush and Ramachandran offer us a fascinating
account of a similar situation in South Africa. The plague of xenopho-
bia in postapartheid South Africa represents a deeply troubling reality
manifested in the hostility, discrimination, and alienation endured by
African migrants and refugees in that country, which regularly spills over
into violence with the silent complacency and often active participation
of the government, police, media, and the general public. Interestingly,
and linked to its own national history of discrimination against the black
population during apartheid, racism and xenophobia are systematically
denied by the South African government. However, as the authors clearly
explain, racism and xenophobia are, as in the case of Greece, the results
of the threat perception attached to migrants, as heightened by numerous
myths also spread by the government, including that migrants are respon-
sible for South Africa’s high crime rate, that they bring disease, or that they
steal South African jobs. In both countries, indeed, racist aggressions, even
lethal ones, against immigrants have often been seen as marginal events
that more often than not were somewhat justified by the many alleged
different problems posed for Greeks or South Africans by the arrival of
immigrants, be they regular or undocumented.
Finally, Li and Yu’s chapter provides a very important historical perspec-
tive on the discussion of discrimination suffered by migrants and their
description as a threat to society. They engage in debates on parallel lives
and social cohesion and whether segregation of immigrant communities
poses a societal threat, as is usually the subject of various discourses mainly
addressed to Muslim migrants and their descendants after 9/11. Depart-
ing from a historical perspective, Li and Yu show how white European
immigrant groups in the United States were themselves highly concen-
trated and segregated from other ethnic groups in the early 20th century.
They then analyze another historical settlement, that of Chinese migrants
in the United States. The reason for selecting this group is twofold: First,
Chinese historically had one of the most segregated settlements, such as
“Chinatowns.” Second, the first wave of Chinese immigrants in the mid-
19th century was, in the author’s view, culturally not different from today’s
Muslims in the Western world in terms of certain cultural, religious,
and language differences with the host population at that time. Li and
Yu masterfully describe the passage of Chinatowns from being the most
segregated historical neighborhoods in the United States, characterized as
racialized minority ghettos occupied by isolated, inassimilable, and per-
petual foreigners and associated with gambling, prostitution, gangsters,
and other crimes, to ethnic enclaves, ethnopolis or, in many cases, tourist
sites. Most importantly, by depicting the demographic dispersion, as well
as the socioeconomic and political ascension of Chinese in the United
States, this chapter provides an excellent example for other regions in the
world where migrants seem as inassimilable into mainstream society. Inte-
gration, whatever one may understand by it, is a process taking time, and
historical examples such as this one (see also Oltmer) are central in pro-
viding arguments in favor of more moderate debates on the matter.
Part III deals with the migration-development nexus, focusing on
the myth that migration harms the prospects of developing countries by
causing a brain drain. Even though it is beyond doubt that the exit of
a large number of workers may have negative repercussions on the send-
ing societies (Delgado-Wise et al.), the four chapters in this section show
that the relationship between migration and development is complex.
Migration can have both positive and negative consequences for economic
development in countries of origin, depending on the nature of migra-
tion and the links it establishes between sending and receiving countries.
Andrew Rottas and Terri Givens analyze migration policies toward highly
skilled migrants in Western Europe and the United States and dismantle
the myth that skilled immigration in the form of brain drain is an uncon-
ditional bad thing for developing countries sending migrants to developed
countries. They emphasize that it is misleading to look upon highly skilled
migration as a high-cost, low-benefit proposition for developing nations.
The brain drain myth not only locks developed and developing coun-
tries in unnecessary conflict, it also masks much of the potential benefits
that would come from a more cooperative global regime of highly skilled
migrants.
In fact, remittances and the return of migrants with new skills can off-
set the loss of migrants and may even lead to a brain gain. Metka Hercog
and Melissa Siegel discuss policy approaches designed to stimulate the
return of highly skilled migrants. They debunk the myth that restrictive
measures, such as limiting options for longer migration from developing
countries, are an effective tool to avert brain drain and encourage migrants’
return or other engagement in development activities in the country of ori-
gin. Instead, the authors illustrate the effectiveness of incentive measures
and in particular the opening of possibilities for longer and productive
stays for tying skilled migration with development goals.
Sarkar and Sharma equally highlight the importance of facilitating
access to permanent residence by looking at the increasingly salient phe-
nomenon of student migration. In spite of often being perceived as an
essentially temporary form of mobility, student migration is in many
24 Global Migration
cases only the first step toward permanent settlement. Receiving coun-
tries around the world are increasingly opening up possibilities for for-
eign graduates to acquire a work and residence permit, and students
consider future economic opportunities as an important factor when
choosing their educational destination. The chapter specifically analyzes
the case of student migration from India to the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia. The authors find that the movement of Indian
students is highly volatile and to a large extent dependent on the avail-
ability of work permits. Considering the important contribution to be
made by foreign students in terms of short-term financial contributions
(study fees and boarding and lodging expenditures) as well as long-term
economic gains (meeting specific labor demands in the receiving coun-
tries), education has become a highly profitable export commodity. As a
consequence, universities are using different strategies, such as educa-
tion fairs, to attract students from developing countries, and govern-
ments in receiving countries are playing a facilitating role by allowing for
easier access to work and residence permits. Interestingly, in the midst of
political debates on migration in the United Kingdom, the government
has recently moved in the opposite direction by making it harder for
foreign university graduates to obtain a work permit, something that has
been subject to tremendous criticism from universities and other organi-
zations and which has already produced a decline in the number of for-
eign students arriving.42
The sending of remittances has been seen as another important way that
migrants can contribute to economic development and alleviate poverty
in their countries of origin. Yet, as illustrated by Hisaya Oda on the basis
of the example of Pakistan (see also Delgado-Wise et al.), it is a miscon-
ception that remittances always exert positive impacts on an economy.
If remittances are relatively large compared to the size of the recipient
country’s real economy, and if remittances are used not to help fund the
living expenses of remaining family members but merely to fund short-
term speculative investment and wealth accumulation, then inflowing
remittances may in fact induce excess liquidity and thereby destabilize a
developing country’s vulnerable economy. Moreover, migration opportu-
nities and the consequent receipt of remittances are not evenly distributed
among households. In particular, Oda shows that poor households in rural
areas where employment opportunities are scarce often do not have access
to such migration opportunities. This confirms the findings of Oltmer and
Hagen-Zanker in Volume 1, Part I that it is not the poorest, most desperate
people who migrate, as financial resources are an essential precondition
for the realization of an individual project to migrate.
Conclusion
The 27 chapters in these three volumes deal with a variety of top-
ics related to the phenomenon of global migration and are written from
numerous scientific perspectives by authors from around the world. Some
chapters evaluate the size, direction, and impact of migration flows; oth-
ers focus on policies and legal frameworks regulating migratory move-
ments, while others study the debates and attitudes in receiving societies.
In spite of their diversity, all contributions to this volume show a common
trend: Migrants are not only a topical and hotly debated subject in coun-
tries around the world, they are also extremely volatile to negative public
sentiments, scapegoating, and myth-building. Discussions and policies on
migration are more often than not shaped by prejudices, wrongful pre-
sumptions, and a lack of verifiable information. This three-volume book
on global migration illustrates that this does not have to be the case. There
are numerous scholars in a variety of countries who are able and will-
ing to provide the public, media, and policymakers with well-founded,
myth-busting migration research. The chapters in this book thus provide
a starting point for more informed, balanced debates on migration and the
design of migration policies that are based on scientific evidence rather
than myths.
Notes
1. Editorial, “Death and Servitude in Qatar,” New York Times, November
1, 2013, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/opinion
/death-and-servitude-in-qatar.html?_r=0
2. Owen Gibson, “Qatar Pressed to Protect World Cup Workers as Deaths Con-
tinue to Rise,” The Guardian, May 1, 2014, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/qatar-world-cup-workers-deaths-migrant
3. Muzaffar Chishti and Faye Hipsman, “Republican Congressional Lead-
ers Shelve Immigration Reform for 2014,” Migration Policy Institute, Febru-
ary 13, 2014, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article
/republican-congressional-leaders-shelve-immigration-reform-2014
4. “Haitian Migration to Brazil: IOM Study,” International Organization for
Migration, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home
/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2013/pbn-listing/haitian-migration-to
-brazil-iom.html
5. Yves Pascouau, “People Dying at the EU’s External Borders: Can the Summit
Find the Right Answer?” European Policy Centre, October 22, 2013, accessed
May 5, 2014, http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=3839
26 Global Migration
6. Similar incidents continue to occur; most recently on May 12, 2014, a boat
carrying migrants from North Africa sank off the coast of Libya killing at least 14
people. See Elisabetta Povoledo, “At Least 14 Die as Migrant Boat Headed for Italy
Sinks off Libyan Coast,” New York Times, May 12, 2014, accessed May 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/europe/at-least-14-die-as-migrant-boat
-headed-for-italy-sinks-off-libyan-coast.html?_r=1
7. Diego Acosta Arcarazo, “The Swiss Referendum: Is Free Movement of People
in Danger in Europe?” Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), European
Commission, Monthly Brief, February 2014, Issue 71, accessed May 5, 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/see_also/n71_fev_2014.pdf
8. D. M., “The Incredible Shrinking Country,” The Economist, March 25,
2014, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03
/japans-demography#comments
9. Simon Mundy, “Head of BoK Urges Korean Immigration Reform,” Finan-
cial Times, January 14, 2013, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms
/s/0/1890fbfe-5e1f-11e2-8780-00144feab49a.html#axzz30pzN5MCn
10. European Commission, “The Demographic Future of Europe—from
Challenge to Opportunity,” COM(2006) 571 final, Brussels, October 10, 2006,
accessed May 5, 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=C
OM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF
11. Hein de Haas, “Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Tran-
sition Country?” Migration Policy Institute, March 19, 2014, accessed May 23,
2014, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-setting-stage-becoming
-migration-transition-country
12. United Nations Population Division, International Migration. Wall chart
(New York: United Nations, 2013), accessed May 5, 2014, http://esa.un.org/
unmigration/wallchart2013.htm.
13. Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration.
International Population Movements in the Modern World (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014, 5th ed.), 7–8.
14. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends. Key
Findings 2013,” accessed May 5, 2014, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/
TTrends-2013-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, 39.
15. Douglas S. Massey, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela
Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the
End of the Millennium (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).
16. Hein de Haas, “Development Leads to More Migration,” May 28, 2011,
accessed May 5, 2014, http://heindehaas.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/development
-leads-to-more-migration.html
17. Douglas S. Massey, “International Migration and Economic Development
in Comparative Perspective,” Population and Development Review 14 (1988): 383.
18. Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
19. Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for
Migration and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
20. Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis, and Charalambos Tsardanidis, eds., Eldo-
rado or Fortress? Migration in South Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999).
21. Alexander Betts, “Introduction: Global Migration Governance,” in Global
Migration Governance, ed. Alexander Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 4.
22. Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas, “The Effectiveness of Immigration
Policies: A Conceptual Review of Empirical Evidence,” Internation Migration
Institute, Oxford, Working Papers 33 (2011), 9.
23. Uri Dadush, “The Effect of Low-Skilled Labor Migration on the Host
Economy,” KNOMAD Working Paper 1, April 2014, accessed May 27, 2014,
http://www.knomad.org/powerpoints/working_papers/Effect%20of%20Low%20
Skilled%20Labor%20Working%20Paper%201.pdf
24. Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, op. cit., 16.
25. Rosemary Murray, David Harding, Timothy Angus, Rebecca Gillespie,
and Harsimran Arora, “Emigration from the UK. Second Edition,” Home Office,
November 2012, accessed May 23, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116025/horr68-report.pdf
(New York: United Nations, 2013), accessed May 5, 2014, http://esa.un.org
/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm.
27. European Commission, “Communication 5th Annual Report on Immigra-
tion and Asylum (2013),” COM (2014) 288 final, Brussels, May 22, 2014.
28. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
29. The Telegraph, “The Scandal of Benefit Tourism Must Be Tackled,” October
12, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/10373994/The
-scandal-of-benefit-tourism-must-be-tackled.html
30. Douglas Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and
Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2003).
31. Hein de Haas, “The Myth of Invasion. Irregular Migration from West Africa
to the Maghreb and the European Union,” International Migration Institute,
Oxford (2007).
32. Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas, “The Effectiveness of Immigration Poli-
cies: A Conceptual Review of Empirical Evidence,” Population and Development
Review 39 (2013): 487.
33. Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Population
Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed. New Estimate:
11.7 million in 2012,” September 23, 2013, accessed June 4, 2014, http://www
.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-st
alls-may-have-reversed/
34. Aristide R. Zolberg, “The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing
World,” International Migration Review 20 (1989): 403.
28 Global Migration
35. Spencer P. Boyer and Victoria Pardini, “Current Immigration and Inte-
gration Debates in Germany and the United States: What Can We Learn from
Each Other,” Heinrich Böll Foundation North America, July 30, 2013, accessed
May 27, 2014, http://www.boell.org/web/index-Boyer&Pardini_Immigration
-and-Integration.htm
36. Diego Acosta Arcarazo, “A Belief in the Purity of the Nation: The Possible
Dangers of Its Influence on Migration Legislation in Europe,” Studies in Ethnicity
and Nationalism 10 (2010): 234; Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
37. Martin Ruhs and Philip Martin, “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and
Guest-Worker Programs,” International Migration Review 42 (2008): 249.
38. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Continuum Impacts, 2005).
39. Marc Morje Howard, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-
National Research,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 443.
40. Ibid., 451.
41. Jens Rydgren, “The Sociology of the Radical Right,” Annual Review of
Sociology 33 (2007): 241, 255.
42. The Economist, “How to Ruin a Global Brand. Foreign Students Are Going
Off English Universities,” April 5, 2014, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www
.economist.com/news/britain/21600129-foreign-students-are-going-english-uni
versities-how-ruin-global-brand
Part I
Myth: Developed countries are being swamped by migrants.
Two questions are posed at the outset of Part I: First, have people always
migrated or is this a new, recent phenomenon? Second, why do people
migrate? When following the media discussion and political discourse in
industrialized countries in recent years, it is easy to get the impression that
this is the decade of migration, that poor individuals are only waiting for
their chance to leave their countries of origin, and that we are about to be
swamped by migrants from developing countries. However, when looking
at the actual extent of migration flows, the types of migrants on the move,
and the individual’s migration decision, it becomes clear that the idea of a
tidal wave of migrants who are about to crash on our shores is nothing but
a myth. International migration remains the exception rather than the rule,
with only 3.2 percent of the world’s population being international migrants.
Migration is far from a modern phenomenon that only came about
with the development of mass transportation. In fact, global migration
on a fairly important scale has been a reality for centuries. Moreover, this
process has never been a linear one of long-term emigration, but rather,
processes of remigration and circular migration have always character-
ized population movements. Many countries around the world have over
time changed their status from a migrant-sending country to a migrant-
receiving country and vice versa. Most European countries, for example,
are nowadays major immigration countries, whereas the great interconti-
nental migration of the 19th and early 20th centuries brought some 55 to
60 million Europeans to other parts of the world. Interestingly, however,
many European countries are also today large senders of migrants, and the
current economic downturn has increased that tendency in places such as
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Ireland, to name but a few.
30 Global Migration
Furthermore, it is a popular misconception that it is the poorest, most

desperate people that migrate. Financial resources have always been
an essential precondition for the realization of an individual project to
migrate. The migration decision entails weighing costs versus benefits and
includes issues such as wage differentials and income concerns, but also
noneconomic factors, such as the need for security and wider consider-
ations at the household level.
Consequently, for most individuals migration will always be the least
preferred choice when thinking about opportunities for improving their
livelihood. Family bonds and a close attachment to one’s own language
and culture are often strong arguments against migration. Hence, even
in the hypothetical scenario of a world with open borders, we probably
would not see a massive movement of people from low-income to high-
income countries. In fact, the example of the European Union shows that
migration between countries with different economic and social condi-
tions remains low even when legal barriers to free movement disappear.
Indeed, the number of people residing in another country in the European
Union represents only 3 percent of the total population of more than 500
million European citizens.
CHAPTER TWO
Migration Is Historically Normal

Europe as Source and Destination of
Global Population Movements
Jochen Oltmer
Introduction
Throughout the history of humanity, migration has been a central element
in social change. It is thus a myth that movement of populations between
places, including long-distance migration, is a modern phenomenon, let
alone one of the present day. It is certainly not only in the context of recently
developed mass transportation capacity that huge global migration
movements are to be identified. Historically, human populations were never
any more fundamentally sedentary than those of modern times. A further
unfounded belief is that migration in the past was a linear process, long-
term emigration from one area leading to long-term immigration into
another. In fact remigration, circular migration in various forms and
enormous fluctuations characterized local, regional, and global migration
settings in the past, as they do today. It is not and was not the case that
migrants set off into the completely unknown; on the contrary, movement
within preexisting networks, mainly of relatives and acquaintances, has
been a principal continuing feature of migration past and present. Over the
centuries, the fundamental causes, forms, and consequences of migration
have scarcely changed.
32 Global Migration
Global migration on a fairly large or large scale has been a reality since
Europe’s worldwide political, territorial, economic, and cultural expansion
took off in the 15th century. Emigration of Europeans to other parts of
the world involved only moderate numbers of individuals from the 16th
through the early 19th centuries; but from then on and into the early 20th
century it brought about far-reaching changes in population makeup, in
the Americas and the southern Pacific in particular, and also in parts of
Africa and Asia. The last years of the 19th and early years of the 20th cen-
turies saw both the highest rate of European emigration and the beginning
of Europe’s history as an immigration continent.
This chapter will outline the causation, forms, and consequences of
geographical population movements originating in Europe since the
16th century. It will also inquire into the reasons for the transformation
of Europe since the late 19th century into an immigration continent. In
doing so it seeks both to illustrate the extensive reach of European involve-
ment in the history of global migration in the modern era, and at the same
time to demonstrate that large-scale migrations over great distances belong
historically to the normal order of things.
Foundations: Migration as a Historical Phenomenon

Migration is understood here as a change of domicile, intended to
be relatively long-term, on the part of individuals, families, groups, or
even entire populations. In modern times, global population movements
involving spatial relocation have taken a number of distinct forms.1 The
most important of these are labor and settlement migration; nomadism;
migration for education, training, and cultural purposes; marital and
affluence migration; and forced migration (see Table 2.1).2 With forced
migration (flight, displacement, deportation) treated as a category apart,
it can be seen that individuals, families, and groups transfer to new geo-
graphical and social locations from motives of improved prospects for
earnings, living conditions, employment, education, training, or marriage,
or to gain access to fresh opportunities.3 Also to be viewed in this context
is the great intercontinental migration of the 19th and early 20th centuries
that brought probably some 55 to 60 million Europeans to other parts of
the world.
Geographical relocation in order to access or exploit opportunities was
not necessarily aimed at stabilizing or improving the life situation of immi-
grants in the receiving region. The motive for migration might equally
well be improvement of the situation of the migrants or their families
within the sending society, as for instance in seasonal labor migration4 or
Table 2.1 Historical Migration Types
Type Characteristics, subtypes, examples
Labor migration Migration for waged employee positions in trades,
agriculture, industry, and service sector
Education and Migration for acquisition of high school, college, and
training migration vocational qualifications (high school and college/
university students, apprentices/trainees)
Maidservant/ Migration in context of domestic services, often
domestic worker characterized by relatively close ties to employer family,
unregulated working hours, insecure wage status
Posting and Temporary transnational posting by and on behalf of
deployment organizations/corporations: “expat(riate)s”; migration of
businesspeople and traders to establish or operate overseas
branches; migration in military contexts (mercenaries,
soldiers, sailors), also of civil servants and missionaries
Journeyman Knowledge and technology transfer through migration in
migration craft trades, control instrument in commercial employment
markets through guilds
Marriage and love Change of geographical location and social context
migration motivated by marriage or a love relationship
Cultural migration Relocation to culturally attractive cities and regions (“artist
colonies,” “global cities” as cultural magnets)
Nomadism Permanent or repeated relocation for utilization of natural,
economic, and social resources by cattle ranchers, traders,
service providers, or slash-and-burn farmers
Settlement migration Migration with the goal of land acquisition for agriculture
Slave trade and Migration (deportation) for purposes of forced labor,
human trafficking i.e., work or service provision of any kind exacted under
duress from an individual
Itinerant labor Directionless labor migration: rootless itinerant workers
are most frequent in building trades (including railroad
and canal construction)
Itinerant trading Trading activities without fixed base, generally small trade,
e.g., hawkers
Affluence migration Migration of financially more or less independent individuals
mostly for climate preference or health reasons (pensioner
and senior citizen migration, “lifestyle” migration)
Forced migration Migration enforced on political, ethnic, nationalist, racial,
or religious grounds (refugees, expellees, deportees, the
compulsorily resettled)
34 Global Migration
in remigration5 occurring after years or decades of gainful employment in

another part of the world. Contrary to a widely held belief, more or less
regular remittances from migrants to homeland kin had already become
something of a mainstay for individual households, regional economies,
and even some entire national economies long before the present day.6
Within the contexts specified above, migration was part of life plan-
ning and was often involved in fundamental life (and often career) deci-
sions such as marriage, embarkation on professional training or a career,
or filling a job vacancy. Accordingly, a considerable majority of migrants
motivated by employment, training, settlement, or marriage were young.
In social constellations of this nature, the decision to migrate would result
from personal choices or by agreed arrangements within households.
However, alternative courses of action at the individual or household
level tended to be most conspicuously lacking precisely at times when
an economic, social, or environmental crisis either threatened or actually
inflicted existential disaster (see Table 2.2).
Where migration is undertaken with the aim of taking up economic and
social opportunities, the difference between sending and receiving location
is most often an economic gradient. This is by no means necessarily an
all-embracing difference in terms of economic development between two
global or continental macroregions, but in practice has frequently applied
to disparities across relatively short geographical distances affecting par-
ticular market segments. In such cases, market access—and hence taking
the opportunity to migrate—is determined by specific social characteris-
tics of individuals or family and group members, in particular gender, age,
and position in the familial cycle, career status and qualifications, and also
attributed characteristics (especially those relating to ethnicity, caste, race,
or nationality), which are not infrequently associated with privileges and
birth-acquired rights.7
Population movements from one place to another were already being
motivated and structured by communication processes long before the
Internet age began. Whether and to what extent emigration was identified
as an individual or household option depended essentially on how much
was known about destinations, routes, and modalities of migration. If labor,
educational, and settlement migrations were to attain an appreciable vol-
ume and duration, there had to be a sustained flow of dependable informa-
tion about the destination area. Modes of transmission of such information
were multifarious. A central role was played by what could be learned of
prospects for employment, training, marriage, or settlement and transmit-
ted back orally or in written form by earlier (sometimes pioneer) migrants,
whose news would derive considerable authority from ties of kinship or
Migration Is Historically Normal 35
Table 2.2 Background Causes and Geographical/Temporal Specifics of Migra-

tion as a Historical Phenomenon
Background – Perception and seizing of opportunities (labor and
settlement migration, education and vocational training
migration)
– Compulsion (flight, expulsion, deportation, mostly on
political or ideological grounds or consequence of war)
– Crisis (e.g., emigration following ruin of original
environment by human or natural agency; acute economic
and/or social distress)
– External postings by organizations and institutions
– Culture (cultural migration, affluence migration)
Spatial range – Intraregional (short-range migration)
– Interregional (medium-range)
– Transnational (not necessarily involving long distances,
but in most cases individuals who cross a border will face
significant legal implications)
– Intercontinental (great distances, in most cases involving
relatively high costs)
Direction – Unidirectional (migration to a fixed destination)
– In stages (stays en route, usually motivated by need to
earn money for continuation of journey)
– Circular (more or less regular alternation between two
locations)
– Remigration
Duration of stay – Seasonal
– One or more years
– Whole working life
– Lifelong and intergenerational
acquaintanceship with the recipients. Trustworthy information sufficient for

the genesis and implementation of a decision to migrate was in many cases
available to potential migrants only in relation to a single destination, or to
individual settlement possibilities within a limited radius of it, and/or to
specific segments of the employment or training market—which meant that
there might not have been any realistic alternative destination to consider.
The importance of information transmission through kinship and
acquaintanceship networks cannot be overstated. For 94 percent of all
Europeans who landed in North America in 1900, for example, a reunion
with relatives or friends represented either their first stopover in the New
World or their journey’s final goal.8 As a further illustrative statistic, at
36 Global Migration
least 100 million private letters from emigrants were mailed during the
period 1820–1914 from the United States to Germany, where they did the
rounds of the kin and acquaintanceship circles in the sending regions.9 In
this way, sending and receiving regions were linked by transatlantic migra-
tion networks, by communications systems held together by kinship and
acquaintanceship.
Information about the opportunities and risks attaching to emigration
and arrival as an immigrant, about target locations, travel routes, and the
mental, physical, and financial strains involved was also disseminated
orally and in writing by governmental, religious, and private organizations
and advice centers. An extremely diverse range of media also transmitted
information of significance for the migration process—from guidebooks
for emigrants of the 19th century by way of newspaper and magazine
articles to 20th-century radio and television reports. Publicly funded or
private enterprise recruitment of labor and settlement migrants—perhaps
using agents or recruiters—can be regarded as a form of knowledge trans-
fer on the issue of opportunities for migrants. Which categories of infor-
mation contributed when, how strongly, and how widely to decisions in
favor of migration and to choices of route, depended on numerous per-
sonal and collective factors that in turn depended on the situation (or
what was known about the situation) at both ends, sending and receiv-
ing. Migration decisions were thus in most cases the product of multiple
motivations: a wide range of diverse factors would determine decisions
to emigrate and/or to choose particular locations in the receiving region.
Typically there would be a bundle of closely interlocking economic, social,
political, religious, and personal factors combining in different constella-
tions and at different levels of significance.
Opportunity structures were a further factor of some importance:
migrant journeys might for instance be broken off short if a place originally
intended to serve only as a stopover should turn out unexpectedly to pre
sent new opportunities. Conversely, the intended destination might turn
out unsuitable or uncongenial, driving the migration further. Again, suc-
cess in the receiving region might enable return to the homeland, or failure
compel it. Often a planned return home was delayed until the strange new
environment had become home and the old home was no longer home.
Thus, the process of migration was always open-ended in the widest sense:
quite frequently, intention and outcome of a migration differed signifi-
cantly. One of the reasons for this was that direct migration from origin to
destination was only one of many possibilities, migrations being in many
cases undertaken in successive stages separated by stopovers, any of which
might prove in the event to be the definitive place of settlement. Migrants
might, for example, take on paid work at such interim places of sojourn,
to raise cash either for continued migration or as a first step toward settling
down right there.
Throughout the modern era, availability of work as a production fac-
tor and the geographical mobility of labor have been key elements in the
exploitation of fixed-location natural resources. Labor migration therefore
became symptomatic for expansionary and recessionary phases of the eco-
nomic cycle, the variations in volume and direction of migration reflecting
global or regional economic trends like a barometer. However, the devel-
opment of geographical population movements remained closely bound
up with the genesis of power structures and political processes: individual
and collective action on the part of migrants or potential migrants was
subject to governmental, political, and administrative influences and pres-
sures. Forced migrations, for their part, were an expression of the accep-
tance by civil power and by society of restrictions on individual freedom
and on the inviolability of the person. People reacted to armed conflicts by
moving to other regions. The belief that enforced migration can stabilize
regimes or promote political interests enjoyed wide currency in eras long
before our own.
European Expansion and Global Migration from the 16th to the 19th Centuries
The Spanish and Portuguese conquest of the Americas beginning in the
years around 1500 was initially accompanied only to a relatively minor
extent by European population movements. Even the invasion campaigns
themselves that began after Christopher Columbus first reached the Carib-
bean in 1492—and lasted only a few decades—got by with remarkably
threadbare European manpower resources. This was a result of European
technical and tactical superiority in conjunction with a successful policy
of taking advantage of internal and interstate conflicts among the indig-
enous peoples. Moreover, the Spanish and Portuguese rulers did not see
their new territories as settlement zones, but as colonies to be exploited
for economic reward. The continuing cost of maintaining colonial rule
was imposed on the dependent regions themselves; over and above that,
it became the function of the Spanish colonial empire in particular to
fund the Great Power policies that were being pursued in Europe by the
motherland.
The requisite valorization of the overseas possessions through develop-
ment and extraction of mineral resources or agrarian production called
for a large workforce. But labor was in fact in short supply, as the con-
quests had brought about a huge reduction in indigenous population. In
38 Global Migration
part this was the consequence of high death rates in the conflicts between
the locals and the conquistadores. But another factor had much greater
impact. While Africa, Asia, and Europe had been linked for thousands of
years past by migration, trading, and travel, ensuring that they were also
linked epidemiologically, this was not the case with Australia or the Ameri-
cas: as a result, the arrival of Europeans in the New World was followed
by waves of epidemics that decimated the indigenous population. Many
of the bacteria and viruses that the conquistadores, immune themselves,
had brought with them caused mortal illness among the locals. The over-
all population of perhaps 40 million in pre-Columbian times in Spanish
South and Central America is estimated to have shrunk by 1570 to about
nine million, and by 1620 to a mere four million. In the zones of early
and intensive contact between Europeans and locals, such as occurred on
some Caribbean islands, the epidemics proved so lethal that the indig-
enous population was wiped out within a few decades.10
From the late 15th through the early 19th centuries, the circumstances
indicated in rough outline above constituted the basic context for Euro-
pean migration movements worldwide. Rough calculations have produced
an estimate that about 10 million people transferred permanently to the
Americas during the period of over three centuries between Columbus’s
arrival in the Caribbean in 1492 and the year 1820. Two million of them
came from Europe; around eight million came from Africa as slaves.11
In addition to the soldiers and administrators required for establishing
and maintaining colonial rule, a large number of missionaries quit Europe.
Other roles filled by Europeans included traders, plantation owners, and
managers, but also urban craftsmen, small farmers, and a sizeable num-
ber, perhaps as many as one-third of the total, who were not free citizens
when they reached the double continent. These included the approxi-
mately 50,000 convicts transported by the British colonial power between
1718 and 1775 to its North American colonies of Virginia and Maryland;
however, a considerably larger group consisted of the European contract
workers sent out as indentured servants or engagés to boost the supply of
labor in the British and French colonies respectively. These “contract serfs”
signed on in Europe for three to 10 years’ work for an employer who paid
for the ocean crossing and for board and lodging. They were not paid;
in most cases a contract worker would be entitled to a piece of land on
completion of the contract term.
While immigrants to North America were predominantly European, the
decisive influence on South America in the whole period up to the 19th
century was migration by Africans—more precisely, by African slaves.
Reliable, broadly sourced calculations today give an estimated figure of
approximately 11 million Africans transported as slaves to the Americas

between 1519 and 1867. By the end of the 16th century, the slave trade
had shipped 266,000 Africans. For the 17th century the figure rises to 1.2
million. The peak phase came in the 18th and 19th centuries: between
1701 and 1800, 4.2 million slaves were transported from Africa to the
New World, and a further 3.4 million followed in the period up to 1867.
The slaves were sourced from West Africa and western Central Africa from
Senegal to Angola. The European slave trade in western Africa was only
part of a geographically far-reaching system of slavery and slave-trading
that took in large swathes of Africa and served destinations not only in
Africa and the Americas, but also around the Indian Ocean and in Arabia.12
In the first three centuries of European colonialism from the late 15th
century onward, approximately 8 to 9 million Europeans in all left their
continent,13 mostly as maritime and military labor migrants. Only a minor-
ity settled permanently in other parts of the world, the principal receiv-
ing area for these being the Americas. Up to the year 1600, the Spanish
colonies in the New World received about 240,000 Europeans; by 1650
the number is believed to have reached ca. 440,000. Men greatly outnum-
bered women; in 1600, of the European population of the Americas as
a whole, only a quarter were women. Spanish policy on emigration and
colonial immigration remained consistently restrictive and was controlled
exclusively from the center; the crown imposed limits on the numbers of
migrants to the American possessions, selecting on criteria of economic
usefulness and political and religious dependability. Every movement to
the colonies required a government permit. Consent was granted primar-
ily to aristocrats, farmers, and skilled workers, only rarely to other than
Spanish nationals; wherever possible, migrants were expected to travel
en famille. Between 1500 and 1650, annual migrant numbers did not
exceed 3,000. In the Portuguese-ruled areas of the Americas, the European
population in the mid-16th century amounted to between three and four
thousand, and in 1600 reached about 30,000, the increase resulting from
natural population growth as well as immigration. By 1820 the population
of Brazil had risen to some 3.5 million, of whom about two million were
of African origin, one million European and the rest mainly half-castes.
Relative to the overall population, the number of indigenous people was
extremely small.
Unlike the Spanish and Portuguese possessions, which were colonies
intended for domination and exploitation, the British colonies in the north
of the Americas were thought of from the start as settlement colonies. The
aim of British colonial policy was to increase colonial profits by admit-
ting European immigrants, regardless of their geographical origin, social
40 Global Migration
background, and religious orientation. Additionally, colonization was seen

by the political elites in the motherland as a channel for ridding the British
Isles including Ireland of inhabitants considered superfluous and as excess
population. These descriptions covered not only miscreants but paupers
and the homeless; political and religious nonconformists were allowed to
emigrate unimpeded. By 1700, a total of probably some 140,000 English
and Welsh settlers had arrived in the British North American colonies,
constituting ca. 90 percent of the total European immigrant population in
that region. During the 18th century the proportion of English and Welsh
declined in favor of Scots and Ulster Scots—that is, Scottish settlers from
the Irish province of Ulster—(together ca. 145,000 immigrants), Irish (ca.
100,000), and Germans (probably 100,000). In 1790, the year of the first
mass census taken in the newly autonomous United States of America, the
European-origin population numbered 3.9 million, of whom almost half
were of English origin, ca. 12 percent Scottish, and ca. 10 percent German.
Those of African origin made up 19 percent of the total. Contrary to what
is often assumed, however, the rise in population was by no means entirely
caused by immigration: the principal factor operating alongside continu-
ing moderate levels of immigration was the high rate of natural population
growth—compared to the European sending countries—resulting from
relatively favorable nutrition levels and the absence of epidemics.
Around the year 1800, in addition to their American presence, Euro-
pean countries were maintaining approximately 500–600 trading posts,
administrative centers, and military bases in Africa, Oceania, and Asia
(other than Siberia). However, these included only four long-established
settlements with European populations exceeding 2,000: Goa (Portu-
guese) on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent; Manila (Spanish) on
the principal island of the Philippines, Luzon; and the Dutch settlements
of Batavia (modern Jakarta) on the Indonesian island of Java and Cape
Town on the southernmost tip of Africa.14
Labor and Settlement Migration in the Context of Rapid Globalization

during the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries
From the early years of the 19th century, the numbers turning their
backs on Europe had been rising fast. The peak years came with the phase
of accelerated colonial development worldwide and economic globaliza-
tion in the last 30 or 40 years preceding the outbreak of World War I.
A minority of European intercontinental migrants took land routes and
settled predominantly in the Asian territories of the czarist empire (see
below). The majority left Europe by sea. Of the 55 to 60 million Europeans
who went to live overseas between 1815 and 1930, more than two-thirds
headed for North America; the United States dominated the statistics,
attracting over six times as many immigrants as Canada. About a fifth of
the total migrated to South America, and about 7 percent reached Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. North America, Australia, New Zealand, south-
ern South America, and Siberia, as zones of European settlement, became
“Neo Europes.”15
Settlement of the “Neo Europes” entailed displacement of the indig-
enous populations to peripheral regions, and not infrequently displayed
genocidal tendencies. It led to extensive marginalization and sometimes
the complete supplanting of the established economic and social systems,
authority structures, and cultural patterns.16 The background for increased
European migration in the 19th century, in every case, was the acceler-
ated integration of settlement regions into the global market—a develop-
ment contingent on favorable transportation conditions, which in their
turn were linked in a virtuous circle to newly developing markets in such
products that attracted high demand in continental and intercontinental
trading.
European emigration to various parts of the world increased consider-
ably over the course of the 19th century and indeed was the dominant
intercontinental population movement throughout a period of more than
a hundred years. The background was a widely experienced disparity
between population growth on the one hand and availability of paid work
on the other, a mismatch characterized by variability between regions and
also over time, not impacting on certain European regions until already
diminishing in others. Meanwhile, although modernization of agricul-
ture and, in parallel, industrialization were penetrating ever more widely
throughout Europe, these advances failed in many regions to compensate
adequately for the vigorous growth of the European population overall
from 187 million in 1800 to 266 million in 1850 and 468 million in 1913.
Driven by industrial expansion in Western and Central Europe, exports
of manufactured goods and of capital to other parts of the world had grown
rapidly since the early 19th century. This applied equally to imports of
raw materials and foodstuffs from other continents. European demand for
raw materials and foodstuffs, coupled with the investment boost resulting
from the export of European capital, generated high demand for labor in
some parts of the world and the emergence of new destinations to attract
European migrants. The ensuing influx of Europeans in these places in
turn led to the development of mass markets for European manufactured
goods, thus reinforcing the network of economic interdependence. A key
factor in the growth of European migration to overseas at this time was the
42 Global Migration
decades- or centuries-old migration history linking Europe with overseas

destinations: its pioneers supplied information on opportunities, routes,
and risks of emigrating overseas. Moreover, long-distance migration was
becoming easier as industrial development led to substantially improved
transport links within Europe and to overseas, including the migrant des-
tinations: the world was becoming smaller. It was not only journey times
that were reduced as a consequence. Costs too fell substantially.
Overseas migration was focused on the United States, far ahead of any
other destination. An enormous increase in movements had begun back
in the 1820s: about 152,000 Europeans reached the United States in that
decade, then in the 1830s about 600,000. The period from the 1840s to
the 1880s was a peak phase of immigration with about 15 million arrivals
from Europe, mostly from western, northern, and central regions: more
than 4 million Germans; 3 million Irish; 3 million English, Scots, and
Welsh; and 1 million from Scandinavia reached the United States, whose
population swelled during this half-century from about 17 million to 63
million.
Even with its high and accelerating level of immigration and high popu-
lation growth rate, North America did not experience the discrepancy
between population and work availability that affected Europe during this
period, as described above. On the contrary, the demand for labor contin-
ued to grow. The background to this was an agricultural and industrial
boom period. In 1791, to take one example, the United States’ share of
global cotton production had been about 0.5 percent, but in 1850 it
reached no less than 68 percent. Over the same period, industrial produc-
tion and the service sector both expanded so greatly that the ratio of land
workers to wage earners overall fell massively from 80 percent in 1820 to
55 percent in 1855. There was a close reciprocal relationship between
economic growth and ongoing territorial expansion beyond the 13 found-
ing states of the Union. The land area of the United States quintupled
within a few decades. In 1820 almost three-quarters of the overall U.S.
population had been living in the Eastern Seaboard states, only one-quar-
ter west of the Appalachians. By 1860, intercontinental immigration and
interregional migration within the United States had shifted the distribu-
tion so that half of the population was now to be found west of the Appa-
lachians. Population growth was fastest in the new settlement areas in the
Midwest, whose share of the country’s overall population tripled to 29
percent. By contrast, the extreme west of the United States along the Pacific
coast was still largely undeveloped: in 1860 the lands acquired by the
United States during the 1840s were home to just 2 percent of the national
population. The rise of California in particular as a receiving area for
European immigration and North American internal migration had not yet
begun.
The United States’ territorial expansion toward the west, southwest,
and south and the rapid settlement of the newly developed areas by a
population of European origin led to decimation and marginalization of
the indigenous inhabitants: Indian wars, forced-assimilation campaigns,
and large-scale deportation from land considered to have agricultural
value to remote reservations compelled them to abandon their traditional
economic systems and way of life. This westward movement of millions of
European-origin people into the newly accessible areas of North America
can be described as frontier colonization. It came to an end in the last two
decades of the 19th century and was succeeded by a phase of expansionist
policy in the United States’ colonization overseas.
Colonial expansion on the part of the United States, Japan, and—in
particular—European nations reached its zenith during the three or four
decades immediately before the outbreak of World War I, the age of high
imperialism. It was at this time that the approach generally preferred dur-
ing the preceding decades by the major European empires of maintain-
ing informal political, economic, and military control over Asian, Pacific,
African, or Latin American territories was superseded by a situation of
intensifying imperialist competition leading to progressively greater con-
solidation of formal colonial rule. The dynamic of this process culmi-
nated in the scramble for Africa of the 1880s, aimed at opening up the
last continent thus far scarcely touched by colonial sovereignty. In pursuit
of the high prestige conferred in machtpolitisch terms by colonial posses-
sions, new European rivals (Germany, Belgium, and Italy) and now non-
European contenders too (United States, Japan) squared up at different
points around the globe to Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Russia,
Spain, and Portugal, the European powers whose transcontinental empires
had been in existence for many years.
The period of intensified colonial expansion was also a time of acceler-
ated international economic network-building that transformed economic
conditions over a very wide area: the volume of world trade increased more
than threefold between the late 1870s and 1913. Agricultural and indus-
trial production and productivity grew rapidly; new markets were devel-
oped at an increased rate; raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured and
semimanufactured goods were in strong demand. The revolution in trans-
port and communications that, as already mentioned, took place during
the 19th and early 20th centuries brought about a substantial further
reduction in transportation costs, most markedly at the threshold of the
20th century. Ever more people and goods covered ever longer distances.
44 Global Migration
Communication links were rapidly extended (regular postal services; tele-

graph and telephone). Newspapers evolved into a cheap and universally
accessible source of news thanks to dramatically increasing circulations
and choice of titles. More newspapers also meant improved access to infor-
mation on prospects for settlement or work in other parts of the world.
Accelerated development of transport and communications also promoted
market development related to migration: operating worldwide and in
competition with one another, the shipping lines of Europe and North
America used the latest promotional techniques and a comprehensive net-
work of agencies to open up more and more migrant destinations and so
ensure full passenger complements for their steamships.17
The phase of accelerated worldwide colonial development and eco-
nomic globalization in the last 30 to 40 years before World War I rep-
resented the high-water mark of the global long-distance migrations of
Europeans in the 19th and early 20th centuries. At the beginning of the
19th century, 50,000 people per year, on average, had left Europe by
sea routes. The 1840s were a caesura; by the years 1846 to 1850 the aver-
age annual number of transatlantic migrants was more than 250,000,
about 80 percent of them traveling to the United States and 16 percent to
Canada. Between 1851 and 1855 this figure rose to 340,000, that is, seven
times the annual average for the early decades of that century. In terms
of destination the United States continued to dominate the field, taking
77 percent of the migrants as against 9 percent who chose Canada and
4 percent who went to Brazil. While European migration to the United
States slackened appreciably during the global economic downturn of the
late 1850s and the American Civil War of 1861–1865, it promptly regained
the level of the early 1850s once the War of Secession had ended—only
to drop back again with the new global economic downturn in the 1870s.
From the 1880s onward the peak levels of European overseas migration
were reached. In the second half of that decade, European overseas migra-
tion proceeded at an average level of almost 800,000 individuals every
year, the majority still going to the United States. The highest migration
levels of all time were attained in the 15-year period up to the outbreak of
World War I, with an annual average of over 1.3 million Europeans quit-
ting the Old World. By now only a third of the emigrants were coming
from western, northern, and central Europe, where modernized farming
methods and industrialization were employing ever-growing workforces
and pay levels had been rising. Two-thirds of the migrants now came from
the continent’s economically weaker southern regions, or from the east.
Up to 1888, the U.S. immigration authorities, for instance, counted a total
of only 150,000 immigrants entering from Russia and Austria-Hungary
together. Between 1900 and 1910 they were to register no fewer than
2.1 million immigrants from the Habsburg monarchy and 1.6 million from
the czarist empire.18
What remains widely unremarked is that transatlantic migration by
Europeans has never been exclusively one-way traffic: remigration in fact
progressively increased in proportion both to the weakening during the
19th century of the old preponderance of family migration with farm-
ing in view, and to the simultaneous rise of individual labor migration in
search of industrial jobs. During the years 1880–1930 four million people
returned to Europe from the United States, a total within which there were
some enormous disparities between different groups: only 5 percent of
the Jewish transatlantic migrants returned, but 89 percent of the Bulgars
and Serbs. The average for central, northern, and western Europeans was
around 22 percent. Overseas migration from eastern, east-central, and
southern Europe in particular, which had become the principal sending
regions as the 20th century began, became ever more rarely a matter of
permanent emigration, ever more frequently one of re- or circular migra-
tion. Half of the Italians, for example, who reached North or South Amer-
ica between 1905 and 1915 returned to Italy.19
Relative to North America, other “Neo Europes” tended to gain in sig-
nificance, in particular Australia, Brazil, and Argentina, but also notably
New Zealand, Uruguay, and Chile. Prior to 1850 the United States had
received about four-fifths of all European emigrants; in the second half
of the 19th century it was about three-quarters, and from the turn of the
century only half the total. The increased significance of destinations
other than North America was mainly the result of the opening up of
extensive new settlement zones to European farmers and of discoveries of
raw material deposits requiring large workforces for development. Three
examples—Australia, Argentina, and Siberia—will illustrate the pattern.
Australia
Immigration of Europeans to Australia had begun in 1787–1788 with
the first shipload of convicted offenders from Britain. A new destination
for deported prisoners had had to be found, as the newly independent
United States of America no longer accommodated those members of the
British underclasses who had fallen afoul of the law. By the time transpor-
tation voyages were discontinued in the late 1860s, they had brought to
Australia approximately 160,000 prisoners (of whom a very large number
were Irish); they could be employed cheaply and flexibly, and made a key
contribution to the early white development of the continent. However, not
46 Global Migration
all remained permanently in the British Australian territories, and the pro-
portion of the Australian population that they represented soon began to
decline,20 for the new century marked the beginning of Australia’s history
as a European settlement colony. In its fourth decade, from 1831 to 1840,
the total of 50,000 convicts reaching Australia as deportees was outnum-
bered by the 65,000 free immigrants; and in the immediately following
decade the figure of 105,000 for free immigrants was many times greater
than the comparable deportee figure. By the end of the 1840s, non-labor-
intensive Merino sheep-rearing and wool exports for the expanding British
textile industry had become the main sector in the Australian economy.
Throughout this period the volume of European immigration remained
moderate. In 1850, Europeans in Australia numbered about 190,000.21
However, the discovery of gold in various parts of the southern continent
during 1851 brought rapid change to the colony’s economic structure and
the dynamic of population growth: Australia became a British mining col-
ony. Within a year, the gold rush doubled the count of Europeans, bring-
ing it to over 400,000, and tripled it during the succeeding decade. That it
was Europeans alone who opened up Australia, however, is a myth. Even
in the early years substantial Chinese immigration took place: in 1857,
the goldfields of the province of Victoria were employing 24,000 Chinese
workers, and by 1861 over 3 percent of the population was Asian.22 It
took the prohibition of non-European immigration in 1901—the found-
ing year of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the date also of the Aus-
tralian constitution and elections to the first parliament—to bring about
a reduction in that percentage.23 Of the 55 to 60 million people who left
Europe between 1815 and 1930, approximately 3.5 million emigrated to
Australia.
Argentina
In large parts of Latin America too, modernization of agriculture,
development of valuable mineral resources, and increased participation
in global trade all contributed to increasing the immigration levels of
European settlers and workers. From the 1870s, Argentina advanced to
become one of the leading global exporters of beef, wheat, corn, wool, and
leather. Between 1872 and 1895 alone, cereal acreage grew fifteen-fold as
grassy steppes were transformed into arable land. Exportation of the pro-
duce was enabled by rapid development of the railways, aligned on Bue-
nos Aires as the major ocean freight terminal. Development in Uruguay,
with its expanding cattle industry, followed a largely parallel course, but
in Chile exploitation of copper and nitrates ensured that mining became
the economic main sector. All three countries became magnets for Euro-
pean immigration, and in the second half of the 19th century underwent
an intensive process of Europeanization that greatly reduced the share
of indigenous people, Creoles, and those of African origin of the over-
all population.24 Argentina was the outstanding example. In 1870 it had
1.8 million inhabitants. The years up to World War I saw the arrival of
5.5 million European immigrants, of whom some three million settled
permanently. The Argentine population numbered about 4.7 million in
1900 and a total of 7.5 million in 1914. That of Buenos Aires, the country’s
economic hub, itself grew from 180,000 to 1.5 million during this period.
Immigration figures were dominated by Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese
arrivals, together amounting to about three-quarters of the total from all
countries. In all, of the 55 to 60 million Europeans who left their own
continent between 1815 and 1930, around 6.5 million came to Argentina,
making it the next most important destination worldwide, after the United
States, for European overseas migration—though a long way after, as the
U.S. figure exceeded that for Argentina more than fivefold.25
As a consequence of high demand for seasonal workers from the
Argentine agricultural sector, the increase in permanent immigration was
paralleled by growth in seasonal immigration during specific weeks and
months of each year—an element that long remained unnoticed, because
the Atlantic crossings were considered too expensive and time-consum-
ing. Deriving its character largely from young men from Italy, who were
known as golondrinas (swallows), the new system of seasonal transatlantic
migration became established in the 1880s: helped by falling transatlantic
fare levels and progressively shorter voyage times, the golondrinas took
regular advantage of the inverted seasonal pattern in the southern hemi-
sphere, relative to the north: Italian labor migrants would earn their pay
until October or November bringing in the harvest in Italy and would
then embark for Buenos Aires, arriving in good time for the resumption of
field agriculture in late spring. They worked in South America through the
southern summer and autumn, and in February/March returned to Italy
for the northern planting time. During their peak phase between 1908 and
1912, it has been estimated, some 30,000 to 35,000 golondrinas traveled
from Italy to work in Argentina each year; other accounts even claim that
this category of migrants grew in number from 25,000 in the year 1880
to ca. 100,000 in 1914. Certainly, some golondrinas are documented as
having commuted to and fro for as long as 17 years between Argentina
and Italy. In many cases such intercontinental labor migration led to per-
manent immigration, if the opportunity arose to find more than seasonal
employment.26
48 Global Migration
Siberia
The general background to the establishment of “Neo Europes” in
South America was broadly similar to the circumstances prompting the
European settlement of Siberia—a region often disregarded in the his-
toriography of migration, being considered too inhospitable for massive
immigration by Europeans. Within this Eurasian mega-region stretching
from the Urals to the Pacific, a network of small supply points had come
into being along the rivers as early as the late 16th and early 17th centu-
ries, serving purposes of military protection and the pursuit of trade in
furs and skins. For some time thereafter, however, Siberia remained purely
a colony for exploitation. As in other colonial territories of this type, the
number of Europeans who came was small—mostly administrators and
priests, officers and soldiers, traders and trappers, sent out to do their job
and often remaining only for relatively short periods. Granting privileges
as an inducement, the czarist authorities sought to settle farmers in the
vicinity of the urban supply points, to ensure that these could be pro-
visioned. But the only locations to attract clustered farming settlements
were near Lake Baikal and in the south of the West Siberian Lowland,
adjacent to the geographical border between Europe and Asia. Even so,
the European population rose between 1709 and 1815, probably from
about 230,000 to 1.1 million, thereby outstripping the indigenous popu-
lation, whose numbers are believed to have increased from 200,000 only
to 434,000 over the same period. In the course of the next four decades,
the total population of Siberia doubled, reaching 2.9 million in the year
1858. But the caesura came in the late 19th century: the first census in the
czarist empire, in 1897, recorded 4.9 million Europeans in Siberia; and
by 1911 their numbers had reached 8.4 million. The indigenous popula-
tion, by contrast, only grew from 870,000 to 973,000. It was made up of
a number of different groups, including many nomads, who were forced
further and further away from the fertile settlement zones.
The crucial factor making for change in migration patterns was the
construction of the 5,772-mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway. The project
brought countless workers out east, and also drove a settlement corridor
all the way across Siberia. It promised to improve economic prospects in
a multitude of ways: agricultural and forestry development for vast areas,
alleviating the land shortage in the European part of the empire, and also
the means of shipping the valuable mineral resources from the interior.
Building the railroad took a quarter-century, from the laying of the founda-
tion stone in Vladivostok in the far east in 1891 to the definitive comple-
tion of the route in 1916; however, by 1903 the track had been laid from
European Russia to the western shores of Lake Baikal and from its eastern
side to the terminus in Vladivostok.
The belief that the railroad was built mainly by convicts is a myth. A
reasonable estimate is that in the peak years of construction in the late
1890s the project employed about 100,000 laborers, of whom more than
two-thirds came from outside the Siberian mega-region: from the Euro-
pean part of the czarist empire; in the Far East mainly from China, Japan,
and Korea; and in Western Siberia from Persia and the Ottoman empire.
For the more technically demanding aspects of the construction skilled
engineers were recruited from Western Europe, including sizable numbers
of Italians, almost all engaged as stonemasons. Although the state con-
struction department paid good wages, labor availability remained prob-
lematic throughout the duration of the project on account of the huge
distances and the remoteness, the resulting high cost of delivering daily
necessities, and the tough living and working conditions. Partly for these
reasons, army engineer units were deployed, and approximately 20,000
convicts were also set to work on the railroad—a figure that never reached
a majority of the workforce, as shown above.
The Trans-Siberian Railway duly fulfilled the economic expectations:
freight traffic grew exponentially. The area of intensively farmed agricul-
tural land increased more than threefold during the 15 years immediately
preceding World War I; the livestock also tripled. From the turn of the
century onward, Siberian cereal crops were traded more and more fre-
quently on Western European markets; exports of Siberian butter rose in
value from five thousand rubles in 1894 to nine million in 1897 and 67
million in 1912. Mining of gold, silver, and coal also gained in signifi-
cance. Passenger traffic too increased substantially: the numbers carried
by the Trans-Siberian climbed from ca. 417,000 (1896) to about three mil-
lion (1910). Between the start of construction in 1891 and the outbreak
of World War I in 1914 some four to five million people came from the
European part of the czarist empire to settle in Siberia. Except for short
downturns caused by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the Rus-
sian revolution of 1905–1907, immigration numbers grew year by year:
from 90,000 in the year 1892 to 223,000 in 1899 and 758,000 in 1908.
Although there was a steady stream of remigration back to the European
part of the empire, its volume remained appreciably lower than that of the
flow of new settlers.27
Awareness of settlement opportunities in Siberia spread rapidly. But
settlers heading into Asia without assistance from government agencies
mostly came from the country immediately to the west of the Urals and
already had contacts, often family members, in Siberia. It was different
50 Global Migration
for settlers from the European heartlands of the czarist empire, however,
who in most cases were reliant on government support. In 1896, to assist
these people, the state instituted the advance scout system: this enabled
families and groups of prospective migrants to send an individual repre-
sentative out in advance, tasked with researching available opportunities
and making preliminary arrangements for settlement. These individuals
were in effect state-funded pioneer migrants. The authorities also supplied
credits for the railroad fares—already discounted for settlers—and offered
favorable terms for the settlement process. Land was parceled up and allo-
cated by the authorities; on some stretches of the route, state cultivation of
arable land proceeded parallel with the line as it was built.
Over and above the settlement of Europeans in the colonial territories,
multifarious and extensive migrations were also undertaken by people of
other descent, Africans and Asians in particular, as a direct or indirect
result of Europe’s worldwide political and territorial expansion and of
the economic globalization likewise originating in Europe. Whether by
means of flight, expulsion, or resettlement, these migrations were the con-
sequence of the establishment and enforcement of colonial rule. When
they took the form of deportation, the cause was the constraint imposed
in many colonial territories to tailor agricultural production to market
preferences, or the extensive establishment of plantation economies that
were bound to remain dependent long-term on availability of abundant
labor or forced labor. As labor migrations they were the result of new eco-
nomic structures, in particular of the exploration and hurried exploitation
of deposits of raw materials important to European industrialization, the
rejigging of agriculture to produce commercial crops, the growth of urban
economic zones, or continuing infrastructural development (construction
of railroads, canals, ports). Alternatively, as agricultural settlement migra-
tions, they might result from the development of new settlement zones, for
example, by cultivating hitherto unused land, or from the opening up of
new settlement areas by conquest or purchase.
Europe as Migrant Destination since the 19th Century

During the middle third of the 20th century European transatlantic
migration as a mass phenomenon came to an end, after dominating the
global migration history of the 19th and early 20th centuries. European
overseas migration in the 1920s never exceeded 50 percent of the average
annual rates of the prewar decade. In the 1930s, under the impact of the
global economic crisis, the figures were lower still: overseas migrant regis-
trations from all parts of Europe between 1931 and 1940 totaled no more
than 1.2 million. The annual mean figure of 120,000 was lower than that
for any one of the preceding hundred years. And the outbreak of World
War II stopped transatlantic migration altogether.
After the war, the 1950s saw an upswing in transatlantic migration, but
this came nowhere near matching the volume reached in the 1920s, let
alone the peak values of the late 19th and early 20th centuries: countries
like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and (West) Germany that had
long contributed to European emigration as major sending countries were
now generally recording higher figures for immigration than for emigra-
tion. Moreover, the migrant flows from other countries formerly important
as source regions for transatlantic migration, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal,
and Greece, were now largely directed toward the expanding labor mar-
kets of the northern, western, and central European industrial nations.
As the principal actor in colonial expansion and principal exporter of
human beings to America, Africa, Asia, and the southern Pacific, Europe
had only rarely during a long period been the destination for interconti-
nental inward migration. It is true, certainly, that in Britain, center of the
world’s largest empire, the number of people of African and Asian origin
had increased to some extent at a much earlier stage, during the expansion
period from the 17th to the 19th centuries. However, the count remained
relatively small. For instance, 10,000 individuals from sub-Saharan Africa
were recorded as present in Britain in 1770; of these, half were living in
London. Elsewhere in Europe there were considerably fewer immigrants
from other continents. This changed slowly during the two decades pre-
ceding World War I, with the population of non-European origin growing
rather more rapidly. Contrary to a widely held belief, it was by no means
only members of the colonialized underclasses that came.
In fact, one principal gate of entry used by pioneer migrants to Europe
was the process of acquiring academic qualifications in the colonial career
context. Experience had shown colonial rule to be dependent for effec-
tive functioning on the aid of an extensive apparatus of native admin-
istrators—a bureaucracy that expanded vigorously with the increasing
concentration of colonial rule from the late 19th century onward. Between
the wars, more and more native administrators and military officers, many
of them trained in the major European centers, found their way to the top
positions in colonial administrations. And by no means all education-and-
training migrants from the colonies returned to their places of origin.
Decolonization after World War II in no way ended these education-
driven movements to other parts of the world: many erstwhile colonial
powers identified educational and training immigration from the now for-
mally autonomous nations as a chance to forge loyalties between future
52 Global Migration
leadership cadres and the former colonial power and in due course enlist
their help for continued influence on the political, economic, social, and
cultural life of the new states. The outcome of training colonial collabora-
tors was thus not simply a major new channel of migration into Europe,
but the emergence of specific patterns of global educational and train-
ing migration of which some survive even today, still commonly leading
to sustained periods of residence in Europe. In 1949–1950, for instance,
there were 2,000 students from sub-Saharan colonies residing in France;
three years later their number had doubled, and by the end of the decade
had doubled again to reach ca. 8,000. Around 10 percent of all high school
students from the same regions are said to have continued their education
in France. In continuance of this tradition, finally, the number of students
from sub-Saharan Africa at French universities in 2000–2001 was approx-
imately 30,000, or around a fifth of all foreign students.
A further early gate of entry for migration from outside Europe was the
shipping industry. European merchant fleets, growing rapidly as globaliza-
tion proceeded, had been recruiting Asian and African men in increasing
numbers since the end of the 19th century for the physically strenuous and
health-endangering work required below decks. These crewmen reached
the European ports, where the first small nuclei of African and Asian set-
tlement formed before and after World War I.28 For instance, seamen from
the Kru people of West Africa began in the late 19th century to number
among the population of Liverpool, London, and Cardiff, and retained
their connection with seafaring until the 1970s. The British merchant navy
recruited stokers in British India from the 1880s, and several hundred of
them were soon employed in the home country itself, in the ports or in
low-wage positions in the textile industry. Chinese seamen came to Lon-
don, Hamburg, or Rotterdam and found subsequent employment there in
transport, or opened the first Chinese drinking saloons and restaurants.
Yet a third category of Asians, Africans, and West Indians from which some
of the pioneer migrants to Europe emerged was made up of ex-servicemen
and of ex-workers in war-related industries who had been recruited by
the colonial powers in the various theaters of the two world wars; several
thousands of them remained in Europe after hostilities ended.29
However, it was not until after World War II that real mass immigration
to the European continent began, fed primarily by the process of decolo-
nization: the postwar breakup of the European colonial empires led to a
massive remigration, the return to Europe of European settlers from over-
seas. A further factor arising out of the decolonization process was the
admission of colonial collaborators as immigrants to Europe—individuals
who had either helped to sustain colonial rule by serving as administrators,
soldiers, or police officers or had been seen by the indigenous popula-

tion as symbols of extreme social or political inequality in the colonial
society. In particular, the ending of the respective global empires of the
Netherlands (in the late 1940s), France (in the 1950s and early 1960s),
and Portugal (beginning of the 1970s) precipitated large-scale population
flight and expulsions. Between the end of World War II and 1980 probably
between five and seven million Europeans came from the colonial and for-
mer colonial territories to Europe in the context of decolonization, includ-
ing many who had neither been born in Europe nor ever lived there.30
France, for example, after the ending of colonial rule in Indochina and
the beginning of the Algerian war of independence in 1954, took in, within
the space of a decade, 1.8 million people who had been uprooted in the
course of the conflicts surrounding decolonization. A still more massive
intake of migrants—in relation to the size of the motherland population—
came to Portugal as a result of the decolonization process: within a single
year, beginning in autumn 1973, nearly half a million retornados arrived
from the former Portuguese African possessions (Mozambique, Angola,
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé, and Príncipe). The dominant source
country was Angola. In the mid-1970s the retornados constituted almost
6 percent of the Portuguese population. The pressure of migration conse-
quent on the dissolution of the European colonial possessions led to a
paradoxical turn in the history of European expansion: those empires never
had a more visible presence in the European cities than during and after
decolonization.
Further large-scale postcolonial immigration to Europe by formerly
colonized peoples resulted from the close ties that in many cases still
existed between former centers of colonialist power and newly autono-
mous nations, ensuring the availability of privileged gates of entry. Of the
major European countries involved in inward migration, this applied in
particular to France and the United Kingdom, to some degree also to the
Netherlands and Belgium. Under the British Nationality Act of 1948, the
United Kingdom offered all residents of the colonies and Commonwealth
common citizenship together with freedom to enter Britain and the right
to work. It was not until the 1960s that this liberal provision began to be
retrenched.31
In the economically strongest European nations the number of immi-
grants from other parts of Europe had already increased sharply in the
context of all-out industrialization and the modernization of agriculture
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The three decades of economic
reconstruction following the end of World War II, with their high eco-
nomic growth rates and vigorously expanding employment markets,
54 Global Migration
brought renewed cross-border fluctuation of work-seekers, this time on a

substantially larger scale, still under a specific migration regime. Western,
central, and northern Europe were the destination areas sought by immi-
grants, who for their part mostly came from the Mediterranean countries.
Conclusion
Globalization, viewed as the closer knitting together of social interac-
tion and networking between individuals, societies, economies, and cul-
tural systems, has changed the world profoundly during the last 500 years.
It can be seen that areas perceived as enjoying exceptionally dynamic
global network development can very often also be described as centers
of high attractiveness for immigration. Migration is an element and a dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the tighter knitting of social interactions, a
precondition for and constituent element in the building of networks
linking individuals and collectives. In addition, migrations contribute to
transformation processes as a result of globalization—they have altered
the makeup of populations, and they have modified economic and social
structures, religious practices, and forms of artistic expression. Migration
was a key factor in globalization during past centuries, is still that today,
and is likely to remain that in the future.
It is a myth that in centuries past it was typically the poorest and needi-
est in a population that would become migrants. The reality, not only today
but in the past, has always been that financial resources are an essential
precondition for the realization of an individual project to migrate: entry
and exit formalities had to be paid for in the past as they do today; sub-
stantial fares and shipping costs were involved; agents and intermediaries
expected money, sometimes a lot of it. Also, it could never be assumed
that arrival in a receiving country would be followed seamlessly by paid
employment; this might well mean that there had to be preliminary invest-
ment, that saved capital was used up, that money had to be borrowed. For
the very poorest in society, realization of such a migration project could
never be more than a pipe dream. Innumerable research studies have
shown the evidence that poverty limited freedom of movement massively
in the past, just as it does today.
Notes
1. About global migration history: Robin Cohen (ed.), The Cambridge Survey
of World Migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Wang
Gungwu (ed.), Global History and Migrations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997);
Dirk Hoerder, Cultures in Contact. World Migrations in the Second Millennium
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Adam McKeown, “Global Migration,
1846–1940,” Journal of World History 15 (2004): 155; Patrick Manning, Migra-
tion in World History (New York: Routledge, 2005); Jan Lucassen, Leo Lucassen,
and Patrick Manning (eds.), Migration History in World History. Multidisciplinary
Approaches (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Jochen Oltmer, Globale Migration. Geschichte
und Gegenwart (München: C. H. Beck, 2012); Immanuel Ness (ed.), The
Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, 5 vols. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2013).
2. Numerous European examples for distinct forms of migration: Klaus J. Bade,
Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer (eds.), The Encyclopedia of
Migration and Minorities in Europe. From the 17th Century to the Present (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
3. Charles Tilly, “Migration in Modern European History,” in Human Migration.
Patterns and Policies, ed. William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987), 48–72.
4. Numerous examples in: Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans. Migration
in Western Europe since 1650, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2003).
5. J. D. Gould, “European Inter-Continental Emigration. The Road Home:
Return Migration from the U.S.A.,” Journal of European Economic History 9 (1980):
41–112; Mark Wyman, Round-trip to America. The Immigrants Return to Europe,
1880–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
6. Historical example: Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, “Lines of
Credit, Debts of Obligation. Migrant Remittances to Britain, c. 1875–1913,” Eco-
nomic History Review 59 (2006): 539–77.
7. For a short overview on the huge migration movements in 19th-century
Europe, which are not discussed here in detail: Jochen Oltmer, “European Labor
Migration, 19th Century,” in The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, vol. 3,
ed. Ness, 1374–81.
8. Dirk Hoerder, Jan Lucassen, and Leo Lucassen, “Terminologies and Con-
cepts of Migration Research,” in The Encyclopedia of European Migration, ed. Bade,
Emmer, Lucassen, and Oltmer, XXV–XXXIX.
9. Important correspondence edition, which conveys vividly forms and
dimensions of the transatlantic information flows: Wolfgang Helbich, Walter D.
Kamphoefner, and Ulrike Sommer (eds.), News from the Land of Freedom: German
Immigrants Write Home (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
10. An overview: Wolfgang Reinhard, A Short History of Colonialism (Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press, 2011).
11. Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter C. Emmer, “Colonialism and Migration.
An Overview,” in Colonialism and Migration. Indentured Labour before and after Slav-
ery, ed. Pieter C. Emmer (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986), 3–17, here 3.
56 Global Migration
12. Out of a variety of publications: David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman

(eds.), The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 3: AD 1420–AD 1804 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
13. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, “The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500–
1900: What the Case of Europe Can Offer to Global History,” Journal of Global His-
tory 4 (2009): 347, here 355–6; in detail on emigration from the most important
European sending countries see articles in: Nicholas Canny (ed.), Europeans on the
Move. Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
14. Eberhard Schmitt, “Globalisierung der Erde? Gedanken über die
europäische Expansion und ihre Folgen,” in Vom Welthandel des 18. Jahrhunderts
zur Globalisierung des 21. Jahrhunderts, ed. Markus A. Denzel (Stuttgart: Steiner,
2009), 15–24, here 19–20.
15. Data source for the statements here and in the following: Bade, Migra-
tion in European History, 81–117; Walter Nugent, Crossings. The Great Transatlantic
Migrations, 1870–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 27–107;
Dudley Baines, Emigration from Europe 1815–1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995); Page Moch, Moving Europeans, 147–160. Data on the extent
of European transatlantic migration are rather unreliable. This is a result of very
distinct census conditions in the countries of origin as well as in the countries
of destination. Furthermore the estimated number of unreported cases is quite
high because of the huge number of migrants, who were not interested in being
recorded in the census, not least because they wanted to escape military service
in their country of origin.
16. Concerning this see the multiperspective discussions in: Anthony Dirk
Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide. Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resis-
tance in World History (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).
17. See articles in: Torsten Feys (ed.), Maritime Transport and Migration. The
Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks (St. John’s: International
Maritime Economic History Association, 2007).
18. Short overviews on emigration from the czarist empire and the Habsburg
empire: Annemarie Steidl, Engelberg Stockhammer, and Hermann Zeitlhofer,
“Relations among Internal, Continental, and Transatlantic Migration in Late Impe-
rial Austria,” Social Science History 31 (2007): 61; Ralph Melville, “Zwischen defin-
itiver Emigration und grenzüberschreitender Migration auf Zeit: Die jüdische,
polnische und russische Auswanderung aus dem zaristischen Rußland 1861–
1914,” Studia Historiae Oeconomicae 18 (1985): 79.
19. J. D. Gould, “European Inter-Continental Emigration. The Road Home:
Return Migration from the U.S.A.,” Journal of European Economic History 9 (1980),
41.
20. Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore. A History of the Transportation of Convicts to
Australia 1787–1868 (London: Vintage, 2003).
21. Recent overview of Australian immigration history: James Jupp, From White
Australia to Woomera. The Story of Australian Immigration (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); detailed information on different immigrant groups:
idem. (ed.), The Australian People. An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their
Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
22. Philipp A. Kuhn, Chinese among Others. Emigration in Modern Times
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 142.
23. For background information: Charles A. Price, The Great White Walls Are
Built. Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836–1888 (Can-
berra: Australian National University Press, 1974); Alexander Turnbull Yarwood,
Asian Migration to Australia. The Background to Exclusion 1896–1923 (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1964).
24. On immigration and population makeup up to the early 19th century:
Linda A. Newson, “The Demographic Impact of Colonization,” in The Cambridge
Economic History of Latin America, vol. 1: The Colonial Era and the Short Nineteenth
Century, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortés
Conde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 143–184.
25. For an overview on Latin America see: Nugent, Crossings, 111–35; Blanca
Sánchez-Alonso, “Labor and Immigration,” in The Cambridge Economic History of
Latin America, vol. 1, 377–426; Eduardo José Miguez, “Foreign Mass Migration
to Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries—An Overview,” in
Mass Migration to Modern Latin America, ed. Samuel L. Baily and Eduardo José
Miguez (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), XIII–XXV; for Argentina: Alan M.
Taylor, “Peopling the Pampa: On the Impact of Mass Migration to the River Plate,
1870–1914,” Explorations in Economic History 34 (1997): 100–132; José C. Moya,
“Spanish Emigration to Cuba and Argentina,” in Mass Migration to Modern Latin
America, ed. Baily and Miguez, 9–28; Fernando J. Devoto, “A History of Spanish
and Italian Migration to the South Atlantic Regions of the Americas,” in: ibid.,
29–49.
26. Carl E. Solberg, The Prairies and the Pampas. Agrarian Policy in Canada and
Argentina, 1880–1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 95–6; Nugent,
Crossings, 104–5. Pioneer study on the establishment of specific migratory labor
markets: Michael J. Piore, Birds of Passage. Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
27. Here and in the following: Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migra-
tion. Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); James Forsyth, A History of the
Peoples of Siberia. Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 190–228; Dittmar Dahlmann, Sibirien. Vom 16. Jahrhun-
dert bis zur Gegenwart (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009).
28. Lars Amenda, “China-towns and Container Terminals. Shipping Networks
and Urban Patterns in Port Cities in Global and Local Perspective, 1880–1980,”
in Port Cities. Dynamic Landscapes and Global Networks, ed. Carola Hein (London:
Routledge, 2011), 43–53.
29. Christian Koller, “The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia
and Their Deployment in Europe during the First World War,” Immigrants &
Minorities 26 (2008): 111.
58 Global Migration
30. Here and in the following see articles in: Andrea L. Smith (ed.), Europe’s
Invisible Migrants (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003).
31. Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 111–90; Karen Schönwälder, Einwan-
derung und ethnische Pluralität. Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten
in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren
(Essen: Klartext, 2001), 367–495.
CHAPTER THREE
Why Do People Migrate?

A Review of the Theoretical Economic Literature
Jessica Hagen-Zanker
Introduction
Why do people migrate? Do they migrate to enjoy better living condi-
tions and income? If that is the case, what should the 1.4 billion or one
quarter of the population in the developing world living on less than $1.25
a day do?1 With per capita GDP in OECD countries being 46 times more
on average than in the least developed countries, would we not expect to
see a huge number of migrants from less developed countries?2 However,
according to the latest UN estimates, just 3.2 percent of the world popula-
tion are migrants.3 This figure includes North-North migrants and the
share of migrants from less developed countries is just 1.5 percent.4 Fur-
ther, one would hypothesize that the poorest are the most likely to migrate,
but in fact, this often does not seem to be the case. This chapter shows that
the decision of people to move is complex, involves more considerations
than just income differences, and is not always informed or rational.
This chapter is based on an earlier version published in J. Hagen-Zanker (2010), “Modest

Expectation. Causes and Effects of Migration on Migrant Households in Source Countries”
(Doctoral dissertation, Maastricht University), MGSoG Dissertation Series 5. Maastricht:
Boekenplan.
60 Global Migration
This chapter aims to review the spectrum of economic migration theory

from the 1950s until today and to show the differences and complemen-
tarities between the different approaches. It only considers voluntary labor
migration, thus disregarding forced migration, asylum seeking, and family
reunion. This chapter focuses specifically on the theoretical literature, but
gives a number of empirical examples to illustrate specific aspects of the
theories. It will show that the decision to migrate is multicausal, multidi-
rectional, and that migration should not be considered at a single point in
time, but viewed as an iterative, dynamic process.
While migration is as old as humanity itself, theories about migration
are fairly new. One of the early thinkers on modern migration is Raven-
stein, who—in the 1880s—based his “Laws of Migration” on empirical
migration data. This collection of empirical regularities, for example the
fact that most migrants only travel short distances, was far from a complete
theory of migration. As Arango argues, later migration models also often
focused on devising theories that explain empirical migration patterns.5
Early migration models used the physical concept of gravity and
explained migration as a function of the size of the origin and destination
population, and also looked at where people would migrate. These models
predicted migration to be inversely related to distance between the areas of
origin and destination.6 That is, Mexican migrants would be more likely to
go to the United States and less likely to go to Europe.
In the 1950s migration theories moved from purely mechanical mod-
els to more sophisticated ones. Theoretical predictions of migration flows
are first made in the dual-economy models of Lewis in the 1950–1960s,
in which migration occurs as a result of differences in the supply and
demand of labor between the rural and urban sectors. These models pre-
dicted that migration takes place as a result of industrialization and higher
urban wages and leads to growing urbanization. In other words, these
models predict that as long as incomes are higher in urban areas, people
will continue to migrate to urban areas. We will discuss a contemporary
application of this theory below.
While the early analyses look at macro-level data and often see migra-
tion as a macroeconomic equilibrating mechanism, the focus since the
1980s is on more elaborate microeconomic models. These models analyze
individual motivations to migrate, but also consider structural community-
level factors. More modern approaches link the micro and macro levels
and also broaden the factors and institutions included, for example, con-
sidering social capital. Another contribution of the more recent literature
is the differentiation between the initial causes and perpetuation—that is,
the continuation—of migration. The new economics of labor migration
Why Do People Migrate? 61
theory developed in the 1980s sees migration as a household decision and

includes a wider range of motivations regarding the decision to migrate.
This theory will be discussed in more detail. It stands out from the clas-
sical theories of migration in that it tries to model the decision-making
process more realistically by including a wide range of decision-making
factors.
The Level of Analysis

Migration theories can be classified according to the level they focus
on—that is, do they focus on people, communities, or country? Micro-
level theories focus on individual migration decisions, whereas macro-level
theories look at aggregate migration trends on country and global levels
and explain these trends with macro-level factors. The meso-level is in
between the micro and macro levels, for example, on the household or
community level, and can explain both causes and perpetuation of
migration. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the theories along the level of
analysis. As the following discussion shows, some theories fit into several
categories.
Table 3.1 Theories of Migration Defined by Level of Analysis

Micro-level Meso-level Macro-level
Migration cause: Migration cause/ Migration cause/
perpetuation: perpetuation:
Individual values/ Collectives/social Macro-level opportunity
desires/expectations, networks, structure,
e.g., improving well- e.g., social ties e.g., economic structure
being, wealth, etc. (income and employment
opportunities differentials)
Main theories: Main theories: Main theories:
• Lee’s push/pull • Social capital theory • Neoclassical
factors macromigration theory
• Neoclassical micro- • Institutional theory • Migration as a system
migration theory
• Behavioral models • Network theory • Dual labor market theory
• Theory of social • Cumulative causation • W orld systems theory
systems
• New Economics of • Mobility Transition
Labor Migration
Source: Faist (2000) and author’s elaboration.
62 Global Migration
The micro level considers the role of individual values, desires, and
expectations, such as increasing personal wealth. The meso level considers
the role of institutions that influence a migration decision or lead to a per-
petuation of migration—that is, the continuation of migration once it has
started. The macro level considers cross-country or cross-region economic
and political structures that cause migration or the perpetuation of migra-
tions. These theories will be reviewed in the next section.
Macro Theories of Migration

This section reviews four different sets of macro theories of migration
that consider differences in the economic and demographic structures of
countries to explain divergences in migration rates and why people migrate.
Neoclassical Migration Theories

The neoclassical migration theories explain migration as part of eco-
nomic development and industrialization—with a focus on internal migra-
tion and urbanization. According to these theories, internal migration
occurs as a result of geographical differences in the supply and demand
of labor, mostly between the rural traditional agricultural sector and the
urban modern manufacturing sector. The basic model7 assumes that mar-
kets function perfectly and a labor surplus in the traditional agricultural
sector will be absorbed by the modern sector. The modern sector grows
through capital accumulation and by poaching labor from the traditional
sector. Rural workers are attracted by higher wages in the urban sector,
that is, they are pulled to migrate. In these models migration occurs until
wage equalization has taken place.
Todaro and Harris8 augmented this model to account for the signifi-
cant urban unemployment that was found in many low-income countries.
They highlighted that migration is not completely risk-free, because the
migrant does not necessarily find employment upon arrival in the city.
Rural-urban migration occurs, as long as the expected real income differen-
tial is positive. Expected income is determined by the rigid, institutionally
determined urban wages and the urban employment rate. Migration costs
can also be included in the calculations. The employment rate is the prob-
ability of finding a job, that is, being selected from the pool of labor. This
probability increases over time, for example due to wider networks of the
migrants. Migration thus increases if urban wages increase or the urban
employment rate increases (ceteris paribus). The authors show that it can
be perfectly rational to migrate, despite urban unemployment, due to a
positive expected income differential.
A contemporary application of this theory could be the case of Ban-

gladesh. Bangladesh is a low-income country with just under half of the
population living below the official poverty line. Large parts of the popu-
lation are reliant on wage labor to make ends meet (for instance due to
landlessness and high population density), and this has resulted in high
internal migration from rural areas to urban centers, especially to Dhaka,
the capital. The proportion of people living in urban areas rose from 10
percent in 1975 to 28 percent in 2011.9 Millions of rural Bangladeshis
have been employed in the garment industry or peripheral industries or
services. Some studies estimate that three out of five rural migrants find
employment within a week and that unemployment among migrants in
Dhaka is as low as 4 percent.10
Thus, neoclassical migration theories have clear predictions, and while
the significance of income differentials is indisputable in labor migration
decisions, its importance is probably not as excessive as Harris and Todaro
describe it. There is lack of empirical evidence for some of the model’s
empirical predictions, such as wage equalization between the urban and
rural sectors.
Dual Labor Market Theory

The dual labor market theory11 explains migration as the result of
a temporary pull factor, namely strong structural labor demand in high-
income countries. According to this not purely economic approach,
labor markets of high-income countries are split in two and wages also
reflect status and prestige. There is a primary sector providing well-paid
and highly esteemed jobs and a secondary sector for unskilled jobs, for
example, some types of manufacturing jobs. The demand for migrant
labor stems from several factors. Due to structural inflation, there are
constant wage rises in the primary sector. At the same time wages in
the secondary sector do not rise proportionally; the relatively lower pay
makes the secondary sector unattractive to native workers. Traditional
sources of labor in the secondary sector—women and teenagers—have
become scarcer owing to demographic changes. Women have joined
the primary sector and there are smaller teenage cohorts. Further, employ-
ment in the secondary sector fluctuates according to the economic cycle,
making it unstable and uncertain work and unattractive to native workers.
This theory predicts that there is a strong demand for temporary migrant
labor in the secondary sector that acts as a pull factor to migration.
Migrants, on the other hand, are more willing to work in these low-status
jobs, because they do not consider themselves as part of the destination
society.
64 Global Migration
This model can—to some extent—explain postwar trends in many

European countries, for example, Germany. As Germany started prosper-
ing again after the Second World War, it began to face increasing labor
shortages, especially in manufacturing and services, due to demographic
echoes from the war, longer time spent in education, and cultural norms
regarding female employment. From the mid-1950s the German gov-
ernment initiated immigration of foreign workers and signed six agree-
ments with Mediterranean governments between 1955 and 1968 in order
to recruit workers.12 These agreements were highly successful: by 1970
the number of immigrants had reached 3 million (5 percent of the total
population).13
This model is important because it explains some of the postwar migra-
tion trends in Europe and the United States, but the focus is too narrow
with only one pull factor being analyzed—direct recruitment—and a rela-
tively shallow analysis of migrant decision making. While recruitment of
migrants is still common in the Gulf states and some Asia-Pacific coun-
tries, it tends to be much rarer now.
World Systems Theory

Wallerstein’s world systems theory takes a historical structural
approach. It stresses the role of disruptions and dislocations in peripheral
parts of the world that result from colonialism and the capitalist expan-
sion of neoliberal governments and multinationals.14 It thus takes account
of structural factors that other theories largely neglect. According to this
theory the capitalist expansion has had profound consequences for migra-
tion in a number of ways: first, it affects modes of production and, hence,
demand for migrant labor. Second, it affects the culture, including that
of sending countries. Third, stronger transportation, communication, and
military links penetrate peripheries. The theory hypothesizes that land
consolidation, new capitalist farming methods, and manufacturing plants
have created a socially uprooted population with weakened attachments
to their land that is more susceptible to migration. A strong immigrant
labor demand in global cities acts as a pull force for migration. According
to this theory, migration follows the dynamics of market creation and the
structure of the global economy. Recent examples of this theory are global-
ization in general and the transition of Central and Eastern Europe after
the fall of Communism. In the case of the latter, we have seen huge migra-
tion outflows from transition countries since the 1990s. For instance, in
Romania, employment within the country fell by 44 percent from 1990 to
2002 and at least 2 million people moved abroad (10 percent of the popu-
lation).15 However, it is clear that structural changes are not the only cause
of emigration from Romania. The world systems theory does not consider
individual motivations to migrate. Moreover, it does not explain the exact
mechanisms of migration.
Migration as a System Theory

Another macro-level model explaining rural-urban migration in low-
income countries is Mabogunje’s migration as a system model, in which
migration is explained as a dynamic spatial process.16 Aggregate migration
flows and interactions are modeled by analyzing a pool of rural potential
migrants that is affected by various factors in the decision to migrate. The
rural subsystem controls outflows (e.g., family or community norms) and
the urban subsystem controls inflows (e.g., through employment agen-
cies). Feedback from urban areas is channeled back to aspiring migrants,
and structural factors (called the environment) also affect migration flows
(for instance, social and economic conditions, government policies, trans-
port and communications infrastructure, etc.). The environment and sub-
systems are constantly changing, also as a result of migration flows. This
makes the system open and dynamic. The theory can also be linked to
the world systems theory, discussed above. It is important to take note of
interactions between different actors and to emphasize the dynamic nature
of migration. Nevertheless the migration system models are vague and do
not allow concrete prediction of migration trends.
Politics matter in migration theory, as migration laws and thus the right
to cross a border and to gain employment legally directly influence migra-
tion flows. According to the theories that consider the political economy
of migration, migration laws of nation states are the result of the relative
power of different interest groups. Laws may be influenced by profits (thus
linking up with Priore’s dual labor market theory), national identity, con-
siderations of national security, and the extent of multiculturalism in the
state. When specific laws have been put into place, acquired rights, laws,
or existing institutions will play an important role in shaping migration
flows, irrespective of economic considerations like the business cycle.17
Zolberg argues that political decisions affect migration flows in other ways.
For example, political reasons are a key factor in influencing certain move-
ments of people, as in the case of refugees.18 The political context is thus
an important structural factor in migration decisions.
Micro Theories of Migration

This section considers a number of micro-level theories of migration
that zoom in on the individual migration decisions and consider why
66 Global Migration
individuals decide to migrate. Lee was the first to formulate migration

in a push and pull factors framework on an individual level, looking
both at the supply and demand sides of migration.19 Positive and nega-
tive factors at the origin and destination push and pull migrants toward
(non) migration. They are hindered by intervening factors, for example
migration laws, and are affected by personal factors, for example, how the
migrant perceives the factors. The theory predicts that greater diversity
among people leads to more migration and for this reason there are high
rates of migration within the United States. This theory is more a group-
ing of different factors affecting migration, without considering the exact
causal mechanisms.
Human Capital Approach

The human capital approach is a version of the neoclassical migra-
tion theory at the micro level, based on the work of Sjaastad. Migration is
treated as an individual investment decision to increase the productivity
of acquired human capital, thus again focusing on the labor market, but
at the same time explaining the selectivity of heterogeneous migrants.20
Individuals make a rational cost-benefit calculation of the expected dis-
counted returns of migration over future time periods, migrating only
when the expected returns are positive. The expected returns depend on
the expected benefits and migration costs—both the monetary travel costs
and nonmonetary opportunity and psychological costs. The expected
benefits consist of the discounted earnings (comprising of income at the
destination and origin, respective employment probabilities, and the prob-
ability of deportation) and nonmonetary returns, for example, a preference
for the new location. The theory emphasizes that migration might lead to
occupational upgrading (i.e., investment in education by the migrant in
order to ensure better employment). The age of the migrants obviously
plays a significant factor; therefore the expected returns are discounted
over the remaining lifetime.
This model predicts that the young and educated migrate in the first
phase. Migrants are generally younger—according to this model they would
have migrated because they can expect to benefit for a longer time from
migration. It also explains why male and female emigrants often migrate to
different locations and sectors, as these have different expected benefits for
different groups. For instance Romanian male emigrants mostly migrate
to work in the Russian construction industry, whereas women mostly
work in services, for instance in Italy. It may even shed light on an urban
myth—that cab drivers often are overqualified immigrants—that appears
to be true.21 According to the human capital approach, migration could be
rational for these migrants as expected benefits (higher wages, even from
cab-driving and/or nonmonetary benefits) are likely to outweigh the costs
(which could include psychological costs, for instance the frustration of
being overqualified).
In the basic model information is freely available. This model can easily
be criticized on unrealistic assumptions; for instance we cannot assume
that potential migrants always know expected incomes at destination or
the probability of migration. Fischer, Martin, and Straubhaar therefore
propose a more advanced version of the model in which the no-risk and
asymmetric information assumptions are dropped.22 The human capital
approach is interesting and useful in explaining the selectivity of migrants,
but it is very hard to test empirically. It also disregards more important
structural factors.
Value-Expectancy Model
Another behavioral model, the value-expectancy model,23 is a cogni-
tive model in which migrants make a conscious decision to migrate based
on more than economic considerations. The potential migrant’s strength of
migration intentions depends on both the value of migration outcomes and
expectations that migration will actually lead to these outcomes. Values are
specific goals, for example wealth or autonomy. Values and expectations
depend on personal and household characteristics (e.g., education level)
and societal norms. These values do not necessarily need to be economic;
for example, security or self-fulfillment can also be important to potential
migrants. Migration depends on the strength of migration intentions, the
indirect influences of individual and societal factors, and the effects of
so-called constraints and facilitators. It also shows that migration choices
are subjectively made. There are also other similar micro-based individual
behavioral decision-making models, and these approaches also consider
noneconomic factors and societal influences, but are quite vague and still
assume rational decision making.
Theory of Social Systems

Complementary to the dual labor market theory—which proposed migra-
tion to be the result of a strong temporary labor demand—is Hoffmann-
Novotny’s approach of explaining migrations as a theory of social systems.24
According to this theory migration is a result of resolving structural tensions
(questions of power) and anominal tensions (questions of prestige). Migrants
hope to achieve their desired higher status in the destination country. How-
ever, tensions are often transformed rather than reduced. How successful
they are depends on the global distribution of different countries along
68 Global Migration
“status lines.” A migrant coming from a country with a low rank is unlikely
to achieve a high internal rank at the destination. Undercasting of migrants
takes place, which means that migrants take on the lowest position in soci-
ety, whereas lower stratum natives experience upward mobility, at least in
terms of power or income.
Similar to the dual labor market approach, this theory predicts that
migrants are more often found to be working in low-status jobs than
natives, specifically in jobs that are often classified as the 3Ds (dirty, dan-
gerous, and degrading). There are numerous examples of migrant popu-
lations around the world working in “3D jobs” in construction, services,
and manufacturing. For instance, Nepalese migrants in the Gulf states are
known to endure especially poor working and living conditions and to
have very restricted mobility.25
This theory does not exclude economic push factors for migration, but
instead places them in a wider context of other societal push factors and
also considers what happens to migrants at their destination. The theory
is consistent with empirical patterns and furthermore includes structural
factors, which most micro-level theories neglect but which is not easy to
test or apply.
Family Decision Making

A subset of micro theories of migration are those that look at fam-
ily decision making. The more traditional migration approaches focus
either on aggregate migration movements or on individuals making
migration decisions. They thus assume that individuals independently
make the decision to migrate. Sandell and Mincer, on the other hand,
view migration truly as a family decision.26 The family as a whole migrates
if their net gain is positive. If only one partner finds a (better) job at
the destination, the family only migrates if the gains of that family
member internalize the losses of the other family members. The fam-
ily migration decision is thus in essence an aggregation of individual
migration utilities.
The new economics of labor migration (NELM) theory (developed
in the 1980s by authors such as Oded Stark or David Bloom among oth-
ers27) goes one step further. This theory will be discussed at length since it
is considered a key contribution to the literature that has pulled together
difference strands of theories and manages to explain some empirical
migration trends. According to this approach decisions are often made
by household members together and for the well-being of the family as
a whole. Households also do not migrate together but rather send one
or more household members away as migrants. The NELM is the only
migration theory that explicitly links the migration decision to the impacts
of migration, with remittances being the link.28 According to the NELM a
household maximizes joint income and status, and minimizes risks. All
three aspects contribute to the migration decision of the household. Each
of those will now be discussed in turn.
Like the neoclassical migration approaches, the NELM acknowledges
that prospectively earning higher incomes matters to potential migrants.
However, it is argued than in addition relative income (or accordingly, rel-
ative deprivation) of the household also matters. “In real life it is likely that
migration decisions are influenced by both absolute and relative income
considerations.”29 Relative income can be seen as social “status,” and sta-
tus is assessed in comparison to the reference group of the household.
The reference group can be other groups in the local community, village,
town, and so on. Status is of intrinsic value to households, but it may
also translate into direct monetary benefits, as in low-income countries
informal moneylenders often lend money with implicit social status as the
collateral.
A household then gains twofold from sending a household member to
a place with higher income. If the migrant sends remittances (and assum-
ing these exceed the wage the migrant would have earned at home), the
household has a higher absolute income and at the same time also a higher
relative income (as the household moves up in the local income distribu-
tion). Both factors suggest that a household at the lower end of the income
distribution is more likely to migrate.
Are the poorest more likely to migrate? In general, the poorest and
chronic poor have lower migration rates.30 It is obvious that the poorest
and most vulnerable often do not have the labor capacity or capital to
finance migration. For instance, the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)
has estimated that the cost of undocumented migration from Mexico to
the United States was $2,663 in 2010.31 This is about five and two times
average per capita net income of the bottom two deciles in Mexico respec-
tively,32 so it is clear that it will be extremely difficult for the poorest to
afford international migration.
Stark also notes that absolute and relative income effects tend to move
in the same direction, so they are difficult to separate. Comparing two
villages, with one of the villages having a more unequal income distri-
bution, a household with a specific income might migrate in the village
with the unequal income distribution, but not in the other village, because
there the household is relatively better off. Hence, the NELM predicts that
villages with a more unequal income distribution will experience higher
overall migration. There is some empirical evidence from India and other
70 Global Migration
countries that villages with more unequal distributions (including unequal

land distribution) have higher migration outflows.33
The other major contribution of NELM is the consideration of risks,
in particular capital market failures in source areas. According to the the-
ory, households try to overcome market failures in their environment, for
example missing or incomplete credit and insurance markets. If public
social protection is also limited, the household has no means to smooth
consumption in difficult times or to make investments. As will be argued
below, migration is a way of overcoming these market failures.
The first assumption is that households are influenced by both the level
and variability (i.e., risk) of income. The basic argument is as follows: an
optimizing, risk-averse household in a low-income country wants to intro-
duce a new technology that increases the expected return from agriculture
but at the same time also increases the subjective risk. Since there are no
insurance or credit markets, the household has to solve this problem in
other ways. In order to lower the risks associated with the new technol-
ogy, the household spreads the risk by diversifying its income portfolio.
In rural areas of low-income countries nonfarm activities are often not
available as diversification strategies or they are too closely correlated to
farm activities. Therefore the household chooses another strategy, namely
sending a family member to the noncorrelated or negatively correlated
urban labor market.
It is indeed the case that in rural areas of developing countries, there
are often few options outside (subsistence) agriculture. Taking the exam-
ple of Nepal, close to 80 percent of households in a recent livelihoods
survey were engaged in agriculture, followed by casual labor for approxi-
mately 38 percent of the households.34 However, agriculture is the most
important income source for only 46 percent of households—illustrating
that agriculture is something all households are participating in, but it
does not have high payoffs. Diversification of livelihoods is challenging—
given hilly or mountainous terrain and remoteness from markets. For
households like these, migration is often the only option to bring in a cash
income. Indeed, in the same survey, 25 percent of households received
remittances.
According to the NELM, migration costs are shared between household
members and there is household coinsurance: The migrant is supported by
the family in times of need (e.g., urban unemployment), and the migrant
sends remittances home to the family for their consumption, smoothing,
and investment activities (e.g., by financing new production techniques,
investing in businesses, etc.). This arrangement is possible due to a differ-
ent time profile of risks: first the migrant is supported until a job has been
found, then the household receives remittances to make the investment.

Due to coinsurance, each party is able to participate in temporarily risky
behavior. Of course it should not be forgotten that both the family remain-
ing behind and the migrant face uncertainty about the expected returns of
their activities.35 Not only rural activities are subject to uncertainty (e.g.,
agricultural shocks, price hikes), but so are the activities of migrants (e.g.,
finding a job). That is precisely why coinsurance and diversification of
income sources is so beneficial to the household.
In order for such a cooperative equilibrium to be possible, households
must have a powerful household head that can enforce the contract, must
be altruistic, or must practice cooperation as the dominant strategy of
all household members. Other reasons why these contracts can be self-
enforcing are unstable urban labor markets, strong identification of the
migrant with the village of origin, the bequest motive, repaying education
costs, tight rural insurance markets, strong dependence on investments
for new technology,36 surveillance of the migrant at the destination, and
cultural conventions.
The family context is thus crucial in determining whether such a con-
tract is successful or not. The voluntary, implicit contract between house-
hold members is based on mutual interdependence; it is a cooperative
game, whose outcome depends on the bargaining power of different house-
hold members. Foster and Rosenzweig show that the higher the altruism
between the parties and the lower the income correlation, the more likely
risk-sharing is to occur.37 Transfers are also conditioned by past transfers,
so transfers should flow in both directions for coinsurance to work well.
The contract is designed to be self-enforcing, and in theory also includes
mechanisms to deal with principal-agent and moral hazard problems.
In conclusion, if income and/or status are low and/or risks are high and
there are market and government failures (so there are no other means
of social protection), the household may make the decision that one or
more members of the household migrates to a labor market that is nega-
tively correlated or noncorrelated with the local labor market. They thus
coinsure each other by diversifying their labor portfolio. Both the diver-
sification of income and the investment-enabling character of remittances
matter to the migration strategy. Households cooperate to achieve income
diversification and informal insurance and also benefit from intrahouse-
hold specialization (migrants/nonmigrants).
The NELM extends the migration decision to also include risk and
insurance considerations and household decision making, and links the
migration causes to the consequences. Therefore it is a more realistic
and useful theory, even though it is still quite abstract and stylized and
72 Global Migration
has a number of strong assumptions, like the rationality of households.

Furthermore, the links between the initial reasons for migration and the
consequences of migration might not always be as clear-cut as the NELM
suggests: for example, migrants that leave with the intention to remit to
start a business at home may not end up doing so because of a changed
political situation.38
Meso Theories of Migration

This section discusses meso-level theories of migration that link micro-
level decision models to the structural macro-level models. It starts with a
brief discussion of the differences between theories that focus on the imita-
tion versus the perpetuation of migration.
As Massey argues, the factors that influence the migration decision
of the first migrants in a community could be very different from the
conditions that make migration continue, that is, perpetuate.39 Migra-
tion can be argued to be endogenous and after an initial phase of pioneer
migration, migration becomes more common in a community, with more
and more people following the example of current migrants and being
helped by them until migration becomes self-sustaining. There are differ-
ent aspects that explain the perpetuation of migration, including social
capital, social networks, migration institutions, and cumulative and circu-
lar migration, and they are discussed in this section. Table 3.2 provides an
overview of the theories that focus on the initiation of migration (most of
the theories discussed in the previous section) and those that focus on the
Table 3.2
Theories of Migration Defined by Initiation or Perpetuation of
Migration
Initiation of migration Perpetuation of migration
Neoclassical macromigration theory Migration as a system
Migration as a system World systems theory
Dual labor market theory Social capital theory
World systems theory Institutional theory
Mobility transition Network theory
Lee’s push/pull factors Cumulative causation
Neoclassical micromigration theory
Behavioral models
Theory of social systems
New economics of labor migration
Source: Massey et al. (1994) and author’s elaboration.
perpetuation of migrants (this also includes some of the theories discussed

previously).
Thomas Faist emphasizes the meso level of migration,40 linking the
rational individual migration decision models to the structural macro
migration models. As argued by de Haas, the meso level can influence
both the aspiration to migrate and the actual capability to migrate, with
the latter referring to the practical help given to migrants through migrant
networks, as discussed below.41
Social relations and social capital in households, neighborhoods, com-
munities, and more formal organizations aid migrants in the migration
decision and adaptation process, so they are both a resource and an inte-
grating device. Different types of social relations imply different levels of
social capital, obligations, and outcomes. For instance, since exchange
relationships (e.g., between migrants and migration brokers) are based
on weak social ties, they usually do not imply solidarity or reciprocity
between the parties involved. Social capital can be seen as a resource that
is acquired as a result of different kinds of relationships and can be con-
verted into other types of capital (e.g., borrowing money for migration
from one’s neighbor).
Network Theory
According to the network theory, the role of social linkages and espe-
cially migrant networks on the micro or meso level is crucial for under-
standing the patterns and volume of migration once it has started. After
a pioneer period, when migrants face many difficulties, their “followers”
have better access to the destination country, as they are better informed
by the pioneer migrants. New channels of communication are established
and communities of migrants are created in the receiving country.42 New
migrants will receive help from the pioneer migrants ranging from arrang-
ing the trip to finding a job, thus making migration increasingly cost and
risk free. Empirical applications of networks can be found all over the
world, being one of the most visible aspects of migration theory, with the
biggest migration corridors being Mexico–United States, Ukraine–Russia
(and vice versa), and Bangladesh–India.
Initial destination choices come about for various reasons, but are often
related to historical ties, shared culture, or language. It is no accident that
current migration routes often follow old colonial patterns, as also high-
lighted in the world systems theory. For example, the top two countries of
origin of immigrants in France (apart from EU member states) are Algeria
and Morocco, both former colonies. Likewise, emigrants from Brazil are
much more likely to migrate to Portugal than to other (much wealthier)
74 Global Migration
European Union countries, due to the shared language—indicating that

more factors than just the income differential influence the migration
decision.
According to Guilmoto and Sandron migrant networks perpetuate
themselves due to institutionalization, path dependency, and so on, but
are also affected by external factors, for example labor market changes.43
The institutional part of a network refers to the rules and norms governing
the network that reduce the transaction and migration costs (e.g., children
sending home remittances to their parents), whereas the organizational
aspects refer to the practical help given to pioneers within the network.
As mentioned above, networks depend on path dependency and are not
necessarily the most efficient solution; a chance event happening to a pio-
neer can shape the entire network. Networks can be both a chance and a
threat to a potential migrant. Migrant networks are held in place by these
institutionalized norms, also known as social capital, but they are comple-
mented with external migrant institutions.44 These institutions—ranging
from traffickers to recruiting agents and humanitarian NGOs—also help
to perpetuate the flows of migration.
Cumulative and Circular Causation

A final meso-level theory of migration is cumulative and circular cau-
sation, which shows how migration becomes more and more common
since it has started, by sustaining itself.45 Past migration alters the context
in which current migration decisions are made by changing the socio-
economic context and macro environment of migrant households that
then affect the migration decisions of future migrants. Networks expand,
migration becomes part of local culture, and this makes migration more
and more accessible to all levels of the population. There is likely to be
lower labor demand in the areas of origin due to new, less labor-intensive
agricultural production methods brought home by migrants and land left
empty by migrants. If more educated people leave, the source regions stag-
nate, hence again increasing the returns from migration. Finally, migra-
tion can change the local income distribution, again increasing the returns
from migration. Thus, according to this theory, the more migration there
is, the more migration there will be in the future.
Of course migration does not continue indefinitely: migration net-
works become saturated, labor scarcity in the source country increases,
and migration potential is very low with only old people or children left
to migrate. At this stage migration might start to decrease, which makes
the overall migration curve an inverted U-shape (see Figure 3.1). This
last point has also been problematized by de Haas, who argues that
Figure 3.1 Changes in Migration Flows over Time.
migration-undermining feedback mechanisms (such as increasing labor scar-

city) undermine migration-facilitating feedback dynamics at later stages in
the migration process.46
A General Framework of Migration Decision Making

The above review summarized the most important economic migration
theories. Comparing and contrasting them makes it clear that they are not
necessarily conflicting, but that they can be combined in a complementary
fashion. Individual decisions are made in a specific social context that
feed back into the economic and social structural environment and affects
future migration choices.47 Figure 3.2 shows the links the different theo-
ries have and illustrates how they all explain part of the migration decision
process.
It is clear that most migrants do not make the decision to migrate in a
social vacuum and that their family is likely to have some influence. There-
fore the migration decision should be considered on a household level.
The migration decision entails weighing up the costs versus the benefits of
migration. Various factors affect the costs and benefits.
76 Global Migration
Figure 3.2 A General Framework of Migration Decision Making.
On the micro level income differences and poverty undoubtedly push

and pull potential migrants. Shocks and stresses and dysfunctional credit
markets, as well as underemployment or lack of other livelihood options
in the home country could also be reasons for migration. Questions of
power and prestige can also influence decision making, as well as other
personal goals or values. Furthermore, personal and household character-
istics (e.g., marital status, education level) are very important in explaining
the selectivity of migrants.
Looking at the meso level, migration is more likely to take place in a
context of relative deprivation, that is, in a community with higher levels
of inequality and in communities with inefficient labor and credit markets.
Migration at the meso level is also likely to be endogenous: it is more likely
to take place if migration institutions have already been established or if
migrant networks are available to the potential migrant; but the migration-
reinforcing dynamic cannot be assumed to go on indefinitely.
On the macro level the demand for labor and migration laws are crucial
in influencing the decision to migrate and the opportunities to migrate,
but are especially important in explaining the choice of migration destina-
tion. Globalization, political and cultural change, and economic develop-
ment may affect migration flows in many ways ranging from decreasing
transportation costs to changing job prospects.
Finally, migration is endogenous in a number of ways. Migration itself

has many effects that in turn also influence the decision-making process
of future migrants. Migration affects economic development in the origin
and destination countries and, therefore, changes potential push and pull
factors. For example, high migration flows might make labor scarce in
the origin community and therefore improves the job prospects of people
left behind. The people remaining behind are less likely to migrate, as the
payoffs of migration are lower. Cumulative and circular migration the-
ory explains that once migration is in place, it sustains itself. It has been
shown that migrant institutions, social capital and networks that develop
over time as more people migrate, reduce the costs and ease migration for
future migrants. Migrants send remittances home that might finance the
migration costs of future migrants.
Conclusion
This chapter has summarized the economic theories that explain why
people migrate. It is clear that migration is more complex than the desire
for a higher income and involves a range of considerations and barriers—
explaining why the 1.4 billion people in the developing world living on
less than $1.25 a day have not migrated.
As the synthesis in the previous section showed, there is not just one
theory that is “right” and there are complementarities between different
migration theories. Very broadly, the migration decision entails weighing
the costs versus the benefits of migration. The importance of wage differen-
tials or income consideration, emphasized by the neoclassical approaches,
is taken for granted in most theories and it is considered a necessary con-
dition for people to migrate. Noneconomic factors, like the need for secu-
rity, coming from the behavioral models should also be considered. It has
also been argued that coinsurance and relative deprivation affect migration
decision making as well. It is clear that a wider decision-making frame-
work on the household level is appropriate, as very few individuals are
isolated actors that take decisions in a social vacuum.
As the system theories explain, the different actors in the migration
process are not isolated but often affect one another at one point in time
(through social capital) and over time (e.g., cumulative causation). It is
therefore important to consider the different levels of migration. Struc-
tural macro-level factors affect the decisions made on the individual level.
Political institutions (e.g., migration laws), pull factors (like labor demand
in the dual labor market theory), economic development (as in the world
systems theory, NELM, or mobility of transition theory), all constrain the
78 Global Migration
migrant’s decision making progress. On a meso level social capital, institu-

tions, and networks can help or hinder migration.
Finally, migration should not be considered at a single point in time,
but seen as an iterative, dynamic process. Migration flows are endoge-
nous in a number of ways. The NELM makes it clear that the causes and
consequences of migration are linked. As the cumulative causation theory
shows, migration trends and migrant characteristics can change depend-
ing on the stage of migration. In theory, current migrants can also affect
the structural environment, for example by influencing economic devel-
opment in the origin country and in turn influencing the migration deci-
sions of future migrants.
Notes
1. Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, “The Developing World Is Poorer Than
We Thought, but No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty,” World Bank,
August 2008. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4703
2. Based on data for 2012 using World Development Indicators.
3. UN-DESA and OECD (2013), “World Migration in Figures.” Downloaded
from http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf
4. Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Militarization of the Mexico-U.S.
Border and Its Effects on the Circularity of Migrants,” in Volume 2 of this book.
5. Joaquín Arango, “Explaining Migration: A Critical View,” International Social
Science Journal 52 (2000): 283.
6. G. Zipf, “The PP/D Hypothesis: On the Intercity Movement of Persons,”
American Sociological Review 11 (1946): 677–686.
7. W. A. Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour,”
The Manchester School 22 (1954): 139–191; and G. Ranis and J. C. H. Fei, “A
Theory of Economic Development,” The American Economic Review 51 (1961):
533–565.
8. M. Todaro, “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less
Developed Countries,” The American Economic Review 59 (1969): 138–148; and
J. Harris and M. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-
Sector Analysis,” The American Economic Review 60 (1970): 126–142.
9. Annie Kelly, “Urbanisation in Bangladesh Proves a Double-Edged Sword for
Women,” The Guardian, November 5, 2012. Downloaded from: http://www.the
guardian.com/global-development/2012/nov/05/urbanisation-bangladesh-women
10. Rita Afsar (2003), “Internal Migration and the Migration Development
Nexus: The Case of Bangladesh.” Downloaded from http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF
/Outputs/MigrationGlobPov/WP-CP2.pdf
11. M. J. Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. Cam-
bridge University Press (1979).
12. R. Münz and R. Ulrich (1998), “Changing Patterns of Immigration to

Germany, 1945–1997.” Downloaded from http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/more
.php?id=69_0_3_0
13. Ibid.
14. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Academic Press, New York (1974).
15. István Horváth, “Country Profile Romania,” Focus Migration (2007), coun-
try profile number 9.
16. A. L. Mabogunje “Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migra-
tion,” Geographical Analysis 2 (1970): 1–18.
17. J. F. Hollifield, “The Politics of International Migration.” In Migration The-
ory: Talking Across Disciplines, ed. C. B. Brettell and J. F. Hollifield. Routledge, New
York (2000).
18. A. Zolberg, “International Migration in Political Perspective.” In Global
Trends in Migration, ed. M. Kritz, L. L. Lim, and H. Zlotnik. Center for Migration
Studies, New York (1981).
19. E. Lee. “A Theory of Migration.” Demography 3 (1966): 47–57.
20. L. Sjaastad, “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 70 (1962): 80–93.
21. The Globe and Mail (2012), “Overqualified Immigrants Really Are
Driving Taxis in Canada.” Downloaded from: http://www.theglobeandmail.com
/globe-debate/editorials/overqualified-immigrants-really-are-driving-taxis-in-canada
/article4106352/
22. P. A. Fischer, R. Martin, et al., “Should I Stay or Should I Go?” In Interna-
tional Migration, Immobility and Development, ed. T. Hammer, G. Brochmann, K.
Tamas, and T. Faist. Berg, Oxford (1997).
23. T. Crawford, “Beliefs About Birth Control: A Consistency Theory Analysis,”
Representative Research in Social Psychology 4 (1973): 53–65.
24. H. J. Hoffmann-Nowotny, “A Sociological Approach Toward a General
Theory of Migration.” In Global Trends in Migration, ed. M. Kritz, L. L. Lim, and H.
Zlotnik. Center for Migration Studies, New York (1981).
25. Jeevan Donini and Raj Sharma, “Structural Violence and Social Suffering among
Marginal Nepali Migrants.” Feinstein International Center, Tufts University (2013).
26. S. H. Sandell, “Women and the Economics of Family Migration,” The Review
of Economics and Statistics 59 (1977): 406–414; and J. Mincer, “Family Migration
Decisions,” Journal of Political Economy 86 (1978): 749–773.
27. Including Eliakim Katz, David Levhari, Robert Lucas, Mark Rosenzweig,
and J. Edward Taylor.
28. J. E. Taylor and P. L. Fletcher, “Remittances and Development in Mex-
ico: The New Labour Economics of Migration: A Critical Review.” Rural Mexico
Research Project 2 (2001).
29. O. Stark, The Migration of Labour. Blackwell, Oxford (1991): 145.
30. Hugh Waddington and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, “How Does Poverty Affect
Migration Choice? A Review of Literature.” Development Research Centre on
Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, Working Paper T3 (2003).
80 Global Migration
31. Massey and Pren, “Militarization of the Mexico-U.S. Border,” in Volume 2

of this book.
32. Author’s calculations using 2008 income distribution from http://www.wikipr
ogress.org/index.php/Inequality_income _distribution_in_Mexico_2000-2008
33. Arjan de Haan, Johann Kirsten, and Juliana Rwelamira, “Migration and
Rural Assets: Evidence from Surveys in Three Semi-Arid Regions in South Africa,
India and Botswana.” University of Pretoria, Department of Agricultural Econom-
ics, Extension and Rural Development, Working Papers 18060 (2003). Down-
loaded from http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/PRU/migration_and_rural_assets.pdf
34. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Pravat Upreti, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Sony KC, and
Richard Mallett, “Surveying Livelihoods, Service Delivery and Governance: Base-
line Evidence from Nepal.” Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Overseas
Development Institute (2014).
35. J. E. Taylor, “The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of
Remittances in the Migration Process,” International Migration 37 (1999).
36. Oded Stark and Robert E. B. Lucas, “Migration, Remittances, and the Fam-
ily,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (1988): 465–81.
37. A. D. Foster and M. R. Rosenzweig, “Imperfect Commitment, Altruism,
and the Family: Evidence from Transfer Behaviour in Low-Income Rural Areas,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2001): 389–407.
38. Hein de Haas, “The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoreti-
cal Inquiry,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010).
39. Douglas Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumula-
tive Causation of Migration,” Population Index 56 (1990): 3–26.
40. Thomas Faist, “The Crucial Meso-Level.” In International Migration, Immo-
bility and Development, ed. T. Hammer, G. Brochmann, K. Tamas, and T. Faist.
Berg, Oxford (1997); and Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International
Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2000).
41. Hein de Haas, “Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective,”
International Migration Review 44 (2010): 1–38.
42. J. Goss and B. Lindquist, “Conceptualizing International Labour Migration:
A Structuration Perspective,” International Migration Review 29 (1995): 317–351.
43. C. Z. Guilmoto and F. Sandron, “The Internal Dynamics of Migration
Networks in Developing Countries,” Population: An English Selection 13 (2001):
135–164.
44. J. Goss and B. Lindquist, “Conceptualizing International Labour Migration:
A Structuration Perspective,” International Migration Review 29 (1995): 317–351.
45. Douglas Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumula-
tive Causation of Migration,” Population Index 56 (1990): 3–26.
46. Hein de Haas “The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoreti-
cal Inquiry,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010).
47. Douglas Massey and Joaquim Arango, et al., “Theories of International
Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review 19 (1994).
CHAPTER FOUR
Borders as Floodgates
Contesting the Myth from Federal and
Regional International Experiences in Light
of EU Free Movement
Sara Iglesias Sánchez
Introduction
Border and immigration rules are often regarded as two closely linked
sets of measures whose main components aim at preventing individuals
from changing their places of residence and work. In their absence—the
argument goes—individuals from the poorer regions will migrate unim-
peded, collapsing the labor markets and social systems of the richer ones.
This widespread idea that a “migration without borders scenario” would
lead “to huge and unmanageable flows of migrants converging towards
developed countries”1 inspires the traditional state approach to migra-
tion, and constitutes the “myth” that will be analyzed in this chapter. The
scenario in which this myth is contested is the European Union, which
through the elimination of border controls and the generalization of free
movement rights for the citizens of its member states provides the most
successful experience of elimination of international borders and migra-
tion restrictions among independent, sovereign states.
82 Global Migration
This chapter will not delve into the second prong of the myth, regard-
ing the effects of migration in the receiving economies and societies, which
will be examined in other chapters of this volume. These lines will rather
concentrate on a more preliminary issue: concerning the effect that migra-
tion rules have on migration trends, taking the very particular example of
the European Union and its free movement regime.
In this regard, the conclusions drawn from the very specific experience
of the European Union cannot be generalized nor easily extrapolated to
other regions, but they are nonetheless valuable as an illustration of a fac-
tual and concrete experiment of free movement carried out at a quasi-
continental level. Indeed, the European Union—as a process of regional
integration that is often regarded as something close to a federal project—
is a remarkable case study with which to revisit the authenticity of many
presumptions that strongly influence international and national approaches
to migration and border control policies. Border controls have virtually
disappeared within the Schengen area, and citizens of the member states
enjoy free movement across national borders. In the following lines, this
experience of free movement in the European Union will be analyzed, pay-
ing particular attention to migration movements that have taken place
after episodes of enlargement. The example of the European Union shows
that migration between countries with different economic and social con-
ditions remains low even when legal barriers to free movement disappear.
In this regard, the levels of intra-EU mobility are often compared by the
European Commission with the higher levels of internal mobility in the
United States.2 In this regard, the different legal design of the U.S. right
to travel (the equivalent to EU free movement) does not account for the
differences in the actual patterns of internal mobility. The experience of
interstate mobility in the United States can be taken as a point of reference
to assess the experience of mobility across member states of the European
Union. Indeed, the regime of free movement, together with the protective
attitude of EU institutions to promote migration, has not given rise to mass
migration, and the levels of interstate mobility remain lower than in the
United States. A comparison of the legal regimes of free movement of these
two federal entities supports the conclusion that actual mobility of people
does not merely, and not even most importantly, depend on the abolition
of borders and on the establishment of a legal regime of free movement.
The point of departure of the chapter is therefore the need to clarify
the role of migration regulation in order to contest the myth that portrays
it as the decisive tool to control and prevent migration, in the absence of
which massive migrations toward richer countries would occur. In this
sense, the experience of internal mobility in the European Union tells us
Borders as Floodgates 83
that considerable differences in unemployment rates, salaries, social wel-

fare policies, and standards of living do not produce significant movement
of migrant workers in the absence of legal constraints to free movement.3
Against this background, the notion of “myth” adopted here goes
beyond the simplest definition of this concept as a false idea or story that is
commonly believed as true. Indeed, a second and more developed defini-
tion of the meaning of the notion of “myth” adds two important elements:
a myth also reflects a story that is thought to have fundamental impor-
tance for a community and is intertwined with historical elements.4 These
two elements are present in every myth regarding migration: we are not
just confronting common beliefs that are simply false, but convictions that
touch upon some of the most fundamental social concerns (composition
of communities, availability of employment, sustainability of social secu-
rity systems, security and crime), and that sometime reflect, to different
extents, elements of reality, even if aggrandizing and deforming them. We
will find, therefore, when examining the free movement experience in the
European Union, several elements that demonstrate that free movement
law is relevant in many respects, and that its role should not be dismissed
from the outset as an absolute fallacy, but that it should be mitigated and
brought in connection with many other factors.
A final preliminary remark is needed in these introductory lines. The
fact that concepts such as migration and migrant worker are used to refer to
intra–European Union situations may come as a surprise. The regime of
free movement and the notion of the citizenship of the Union should have
shifted the language from “international migration” to “internal mobility”
in a way that should resemble, for example, the approach to mobility in
federal states such as the United States. Nonetheless, the political and eco-
nomic reality has shown that the national approaches to intra-EU mobility
are plastic and reversible. Indeed, in times of economic crisis, the most
solid pillars of free movement law seem to crumble and political discourse
turns back to the need to reestablish borders, reintroduce controls, or even
impose migration quotas.5 From this point of view, the European Union
can be regarded as a significant case study to test the resilience of migra-
tion myths and their capacity to resuscitate the ghost of restrictive policies,
even when there is evidence of the positive effects that internal mobility
has had on the economies of the receiving countries. Indeed, postenlarge-
ment mobility (2004–2009) has given rise to an increase of almost 1 per-
cent of the GDP of the “old” EU member states that have received migrant
workers from the “new” member states.6 Moreover, recent studies have
also provided evidence regarding the lack of impact on the social systems
of the receiving states.7
84 Global Migration
Interstate Mobility in the European Union and in the United States:

What Does the Legal Framework Tell Us?
This first section offers a very brief account of the main legal threats
to mobility rights in the European Union and in the United States, in an
attempt to offer a basic overview of some of the main features of the two
systems that affect mobility rights and their limitations.
The Basic Structure of EU Free Movement

It can hardly be overemphasized that the provisions regarding free
movement constitute the hard core of the internal market and the most
substantial components of the European integration project itself. Free
movement of persons is not only one of the fundamental economic free-
doms, a pillar of the Union, but it is also conceived by its citizens as the
most important achievement of the integration process, as is repeatedly
highlighted in the Eurobarometer results.8 Indeed, the construction of
the Union as an internal market, later enhanced and complemented by
the notion of the Union as an area of freedom, security, and justice, entails
that citizens are free to reside and develop all aspects of their lives any-
where in the Union. The legal framework of free movement of persons
has consolidated since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which already created
the basic legal structure for the free movement of workers, the freedom
to provide services, and the freedom of establishment. Treaty provisions
and secondary law endowed nationals of the member states with a full
panoply of economic and social rights in all the other member states,
which do not merely include “mobility rights” (such as the rights regard-
ing exit, entry, and residence), but also access to economic activities
and the principle of equal treatment. As it is well known, the predomi-
nant orientation of free movement rights was, during the first period of
EU history, of economic character. Free movement of persons—workers,
service providers, and entrepreneurs—was considered, like free move-
ment of goods, services, and capital, to be an element with which to fos-
ter economic integration.9 Progressively, through acts of secondary law,
free movement was deprived of its exclusively economic nature, to be
extended to other sectors of the population of the member states that were
not economically active: students,10 pensioners,11 and persons that, even if
they were not covered by the economic freedoms, had sufficient economic
resources.12
This process was completed with the Treaty of the European Union,
which in 1993 introduced the citizenship of the Union as a new legal
concept creating a new status comprising different rights, among which

free movement was the central and paradigmatic component. Despite
the rather modest treaty framework of the citizenship of the Union,13 the
notion of free movement of citizens has proven to be a powerful instrument
that surmounts the purely economic approach to fundamental freedoms,
mostly when it comes to assert movement rights in connection with equal
access to social assistance benefits.14 Today, the most important instru-
ment of secondary law regulating free movement is Directive 2004/38 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004,15 which
contains and develops the rights to entry, residence, and equal treatment
for citizens of the Union and their family members within the territory of
the member states. Rights for family members are an important asset for
EU citizens exercising free movement: Directive 2004/38 ensures entry,
residence, and equal treatment rights to family members independently
from their country of nationality. This regime sometimes goes beyond the
family reunification rights that member states grant to their own nationals
who have not exercised free movement, giving place to the phenomenon
usually referred to as “reverse discrimination.” For example, EU law pro-
tects the right of a Danish national residing in Poland to be accompanied
by her Japanese spouse, whereas the situation of a Danish national resid-
ing in Denmark will be governed by Danish law, which may establish more
restrictive conditions for family reunification than those applied under EU
law to free movers. The Court of Justice, which is the institution in charge
of interpreting European law, has never declared this kind of discrimina-
tion as being contrary to EU law. Indeed, the more favorable treatment
awarded by EU law to EU citizens exercising free movement is an impor-
tant element in fostering this fundamental freedom and, in any case, if
giving rise to situations of inequality with regard to “static citizens,” is
to be addressed by the constitutional provisions of equal treatment of
member states.16
The legal framework of free movement for EU citizens has been com-
pleted by several other rules that aim at removing obstacles to free move-
ment.17 The most obvious obstacles are the physical barriers of border
controls. These barriers have been eliminated for the majority of member
states in the framework of the Schengen cooperation, which had its origin
in a process external to the treaties,18 but that was subsequently absorbed
by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 in the form of a “closer cooperation.”19
The so-called “Schengen area” has been progressively enlarged: in 2014, it
comprised all the member states but the United Kingdom and Ireland, on
the one hand, and Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, on the other.20
Moreover, other countries that are not members of the European Union
86 Global Migration
do participate in the Schengen project (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and

Liechtenstein).21
Besides border controls, the elimination of obstacles is central to the
exercise of free movement rights in the European Union. Indeed, setting
in motion a free movement regime across independent sovereign states
encounters difficulties and drawbacks that go well beyond the mere elimi-
nation of barriers to entry or residence. For this purpose, different mea-
sures have been adopted, for example, to coordinate the social security
systems,22 or to facilitate the mutual recognition of diplomas and profes-
sional qualifications.23 The Court of Justice has also declared that some
national measures and practices were not in compliance with EU law
because, even if they were not discriminatory, they entailed obstacles to
free movement.24 From these facts, it is clear that EU institutions actively
foster free movement, attempting to eliminate some of the obstacles that
in the different member states hinder or render less attractive the exercise
of fundamental freedoms.
In any case, the levels of intra–European Union mobility and the
readiness of EU citizens to exercise free movement remain modest. The
results offered by the last Eurobarometer are very telling in this respect:
even if its citizens consider free movement as the most important
achievement of the European Union, only one in four of them would even
consider exercising it.25 Against this background, the latest efforts of the
European Commission aim at fostering the exercise of this fundamental
freedom, precisely at a point when several member states are debating
the need to move toward the introduction of restrictions. Indeed, the
new Directive on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred
on workers in the context of freedom of movement aims to tackle some
obstacles that still remain in place: the noncompliance with EU law by
public authorities, the lack of awareness of employers and legal advisors,
as well as the lack of information and means to make effective the rights
of workers.26
A Brief Comparison with the U.S. Right to Travel

The experiences of internal migration in the European Union and in
the United States are not always suitable to serve as the basis for a thor-
ough comparison, due to a great number of reasons that make these two
political entities unique. Nonetheless, despite the specificities of the EU
and the U.S. legal orders, their particular historical experiences and their
dissimilar institutional and political designs, there are some basic elements
of the legal structure of mobility rights that can be highlighted in order to
bring to the fore the relative importance of the role of migration legislation
in fostering or preventing the movement of persons.
In the United States, although the Articles of Confederation explic-
itly proclaimed the right to ingress and egress from and to the different
states,27 a similar right was not explicitly inserted in the Constitution of
1787. The absence of such a provision in the Constitution has of course
never been interpreted as a denial of the existence of the right to travel,
which has rather been generally recognized as implicit in the U.S. consti-
tutional order: the right to free movement was taken for granted,28 and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed its existence and importance.29
Indeed, it has been recognized that this right is so elementary that it “was
conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stron-
ger Union the Constitution created.”30 This first element is already in stark
contrast with the situation in the European Union, in which the need to
expressly and actively regulate movement across its member states led to
an explicit and detailed regulation of the right to free movement.
Similar to the right to free movement in the European Union, the
constitutional “right to travel” in the United States, as it has clearly been
elaborated in Saenz v. Roe by the Supreme Court, is composed of differ-
ent elements. First, “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave
another State” has been considered as one of the privileges and immunities
of the citizens in the several states protected by Article IV, Section 2.31 Sec-
ond, the right to travel also gives coverage not to be discriminated against
when traveling to another state on a temporary basis. This element of the
right to travel encompasses nondiscrimination rights with regard to labor
market access,32 to have access to and to provide services,33 and other
commercial activities.34 Third, there is also a right to equal treatment once
an individual has become a new citizen of a state by establishing residence
there, and therefore presupposes the previous right to set up residence in
any state.35
These elements are present in the legal configuration of EU law, even
though they are subject to broader limitations than in the U.S. case. The
limitation contained in the fourth article of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, excluding “paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice” from the
freedom of ingress and egress to and from any state has long ago been
rejected,36 overcoming the factual obstacles developed by states to counter
the mass internal migration caused by the Great Depression.37 The possi-
bility of restricting other kinds of unwanted persons, such as criminals, has
equally been discarded.38 Nonetheless, it is not excluded that restrictions
on public health purposes through quarantine laws remain possible,39 as
the Supreme Court seems to have recognized in dicta in Zemel v. Rusk.40
88 Global Migration
In this regard, the rights to enter and exit another member state in the
European Union are subject to public order, public security, and public
health limitations, and border controls can be exceptionally reinstalled
within the Schengen area.41 Moreover, with regard to the right of residence,
EU law contemplates not only the general exceptions regarding public
order, but also establishes conditions based on the economic activities
and financial position of the individual exercising free movement rights.42
Even if these exceptions have been strictly interpreted by the European
Court of Justice, they represent a significant point of departure from the
U.S. protection of the right to travel that is ultimately explained by the
stage of integration in the European Union, which is strongly reflected
in the incipient constitutional regulation of the status of European citi-
zenship. Indeed, the member states remain the political communities in
which nationality is anchored, and the member state of origin is ultimately
responsible for its citizens without resources or who are a danger to pub-
lic policy or public security, because as long as they do not complete the
process of naturalization in the host member state, governed by national
law, they will ultimately remain foreigners there. Conversely, the design
of access to state citizenship under U.S. law,43 where state citizenship is
automatically acquired by residence, makes possible “for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other
citizens of that State.”44 As new citizens of the state they are residing in,
they will not face losing their residence rights and being sent back to their
previous state of residence.
Notwithstanding the less developed stage of federal citizenship in the
European Union with regard to the United States, EU law has a proac-
tive approach toward the promotion of interstate mobility that even sur-
passes, in some limited respects, the content of U.S. guarantees to mobility
rights. Indeed, in the European Union, the principle of equal treatment
has a powerful strength that in certain cases goes beyond the limits that
the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized to the protection
afforded by the constitutional regime of the freedom to travel. One first
example is the case of free movement of lawyers: Strumia has highlighted
that, paradoxically, even though the national laws are more diversified
in the European Union than in the United States, the EU system of
mutual recognition of diplomas has made it easier to practice law in the
different EU jurisdictions.45 It is also worth noting that the U.S. regime
allows applying higher tuition fees to students coming from other
states.46 In this regard, the European Court of Justice has declared in
the Gravier case that national measures imposing higher tuition rates
to students from other member states are against European law.47 Even
though the Court of Justice has not explicitly declared that residence
requirements for home tuition fees are contrary to EU law,48 states are
not usually successful in justifying such indirectly discriminatory require-
ments on the basis of considerations aimed at safeguarding their public
finances.49 Another example is the limitation of equal treatment in the
United States with regard to rights that are not considered to be funda-
mental, such as recreational activities.50 In this regard, the prohibition of
discrimination in the European Union is broadly understood to encom-
pass recreational activities such as admission to museums, monuments,
galleries, and so on.51
The Reality of Interstate Mobility in the United States and in the European Union
The consideration of the legal framework leads to the conclusion that
the treaties, secondary legislation, and case law in the European Union
have taken a proactive stance toward free movement, reaching a level
of protection comparable to the protection of interstate free movement
regarding equal treatment rights among citizens of different states in the
United States. The proactive attitude of the EU legal framework toward
free movement is partly rooted in historical reasons: EU free movement
has been enacted from scratch between independent states, rather than
being a natural phenomenon whose smooth functioning should be merely
defended from state intervention. This “top-down” creation has been car-
ried out by a treaty that thoroughly provides for the legal basis that has
given place to comprehensive legislation, and to a very protective and
proactive attitude on the side of the EU institutions. Whereas the United
States is at the “market maintenance stage,”52 the European Union finds
itself in the stage of “market building,”53 which entails a “more activist
intervention by ‘federal’ law.”54
Nonetheless, despite the solid legal framework for free movement in
the European Union, and the proactive approach of the EU institutions in
fostering it, mobility across the member states has traditionally been con-
siderably low. The internal mobility rates of the United States are generally
used by the European Commission as the term of comparison to assess the
relative low rates of mobility in the European Union, despite the limitations
of such a comparison. Indeed, in addition to the legal differences already
pointed out, authors usually refer to barriers that exist in the European
Union and that are not to be found in the United States, such as linguistic
barriers.55 Fiscal regimes, labor market legislation, or institutional arrange-
ments are also cited among the different elements that cannot be neglected
in any comparison.56 Other obstacles present in the European Union are
90 Global Migration
linked to recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications, as well

as to other elements that contribute to create a climate of legal uncertainty
for citizens that wish to move to another member state (access to health
care, taxation, or property rights problems, for example).57
In any case, and despite the barriers that remain in place, the levels
of mobility in the European Union are considerably small, taking into
account the very relevant differences in wages, unemployment rates,
social systems, and living conditions that existed among the EU member
states even before the 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements. The low levels
of internal mobility have traditionally been a concern for the European
Commission, since low geographical mobility does not keep up with the
benefits expected from European integration in terms of enhancing the
effectiveness of labor markets. The situation before the three last enlarge-
ments was particularly striking. For example, the European Commission
has highlighted that in the year 2000, before the latest enlargements, only
0.1 percent of the total EU population (225,000 people) changed resi-
dence between two EU member states, whereas interstate mobility in the
United States amounted to 3 percent.58
Have the Last Enlargements Transformed Free Movement Patterns in the European Union?
In 2004, 10 new countries joined the European Union, the biggest
enlargement in the history of European integration.59 Due to the magni-
tude of the enlargement and to the economic and structural differences
between the EU-15 and the new member states, most significantly the dif-
ference in wages,60 transitional periods were imposed with regard to free
movement of persons on all the new member states but Malta and Cyprus.
The enlargements that took place in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) and in
2013 (Croatia) also entailed transitional arrangements of a similar nature.
The basic legal structure of transitional periods is laid out in the Acces-
sion Treaties that contain derogations that allow member states to restrict
the free movement of workers during a certain period of time. This regime,
which can only be applied to workers but not to self-employed persons,
consists in an initial two-year period that can be extended for an addi-
tional three-year period upon notification to the European Commission.
The restrictions can be further exceptionally maintained for another two
years if a member state notifies the Commission about the existence of
serious disturbances in its labor market.61 For example, Spain, which had
already eliminated the restrictions with regard to Romania and Bulgaria
in 2009, reintroduced them in December 2011 for Romanian nationals
until the end of the seven-years period (December 31, 2013), justifying
this measure by the serious disturbances in its employment market in the

framework of the economic crisis.
The application of the transitional arrangements has differed across
member states. For example, with regard to the 2004 enlargement, the only
member states who decided to open their labor markets from the outset were
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden, and this fact had an important
effect in the distribution of postaccession mobility. The transitional arrange-
ments with regard to the 2004 accession countries expired in 2011, and
the transitional arrangements regarding Romania and Bulgaria expired on
December 31, 2013. Thirteen member states have decided to apply restric-
tions to Croatian workers in the first phase, until June 30, 2015.62
The attitude of the member states toward free movement has always
been wary, if not reticent, taking into account the economic differences
that have existed among member states since the creation of the Union.
The complete adoption of free movement of workers in the European
Economic Community was not fully implemented until 1968, and even
then, possibilities of reintroducing certain limitations were maintained
until 1992.63 Transitional arrangements were already imposed on Greece,
Portugal, and Spain, when they acceded to the European Economic Com-
munity in the 1980s. Migration flows from these countries after acces-
sion were very modest and no major migration consequences followed the
enlargement to the south: once the fears of mass migration proved to be
unfounded, the length of the transitional periods for Spain and Portugal
was reduced from seven to six years.64 The previous experience of the
southern enlargement has, to some extent, been taken into account in the
projections with regard to the expected effects of the eastern enlargement,
but this has proven to be useful only to a limited extent, given the histori-
cal features and economic situation, which are specific to each particular
enlargement.
The figures on intra-EU mobility considerably changed after the 2004
and 2007 enlargements. According to the European Commission, migra-
tion from countries of the 2004 enlargement increased by 1.1 million,
and Bulgarian and Romanian nationals residing in other member states
increased from 690,000 to 1.8 million between 2003 and 2007.65 As a
result, the overall figures on intra-EU mobility have increased: according
to Eurostat data, in 2008, just before the outbreak of the international
economic and financial crisis, 2.3 percent (11.3 million persons) of EU
citizens were residents in a member state different from their member
state of nationality.66 This figure has continued rising: at the end of 2012
EU citizens residing in another member state amounted to 14.1 million
(2.8 percent of the total population).67
92 Global Migration
This increase in migration, which has been portrayed as massive and

unprecedented by some media and commentators, seems to demonstrate
that the elimination of legal barriers to movement has had an impact
in fostering migration, removing bureaucratic and psychological bar-
riers to movement.68 Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that this
scenario still shows a relatively limited level of mobility, which contin-
ues to fall short of internal mobility rates in the United States. As Guild
and Carrera have noticed, in the United Kingdom and Ireland, states
that received the largest number of workers from the 2004 accession
countries, the numbers went from about 1 million in 2004 to 2.3 million
in 2010, which still only amounts to 0.6 percent of the population of
these states.69 On the other hand, it is important to note that free
movement has helped to bring to the surface undeclared work: many of
the workers that are reflected in the official statistics as new migrants were
already present in the labor markets, working irregularly. For example, it
is suggested that 40 percent of the workers from the 2004 enlargements
registered in the United Kingdom were already in the country before
accession.70
Another important element that should not be neglected is the fact
that free movement has made it possible that migration flows from new
member states have very rapidly accommodated to the situation ensuing
from the economic crisis. Indeed, intra-EU mobility—and mostly migra-
tion flows from states of recent accession—has rapidly and substantially
declined in the last years.71
On the other hand, the high intra-EU migration levels to the
United Kingdom and Ireland after the 2004 enlargement are not just
attributable to the establishment of a free movement regime. Indeed,
the asymmetrical application of transitional arrangements, with only the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden opening their job markets imme-
diately after the enlargement, may have diverted migration flows after
2004 toward the United Kingdom and Ireland. But other elements, such
as language, are also highly relevant, and explain, for example, the low
migration rates in Sweden even though it opened its labor market to citi-
zens of the 2004 enlargement countries at the same time as the United
Kingdom.
Concluding Remarks
The common belief that, in the absence of legal rules aimed at restrict-
ing migration, massive movement of persons will take place, has tradition-
ally proven to be untrue with regard to free movement in the European
Union, where the existence of a free movement regime has not given place
to high mobility, even in the presence of relevant divergences in salaries
and unemployment rates among the member states.
On the contrary, fostering mobility in the European Union has proven
to be a rather difficult task in which the institutions have invested time
and energy, setting in motion a very advanced and protective legal regime
that seems not to have been sufficient to motivate EU citizens to benefit
from the opportunities that free movement has to offer. The highest lev-
els of internal mobility in the United States have often been used by the
European Commission as the benchmark to arrive at the conclusion that
mobility in the European Union was relatively low. Nonetheless, when we
look at the legal regime that governs free movement in the United States,
we do not encounter structural differences that make it much more devel-
oped, protective, or proactive than the legal regime of free movement in
the European Union. Indeed, the barriers and the incentives to mobility
that make the cases of the European Union and the United States very dif-
ferent are not solely (and not even most importantly) related to the legal
regimes that govern internal migration flows, but to many other different
elements that include language, culture, traditions of mobility, citizens’
attitudes, history, economic reasons, the structure of housing and labor
markets, labor protection, and so on.
It has only been with the occasion of the later enlargements taking place
in 2004 and 2007 that intra-EU mobility has risen to a certain extent.
Even though the overall level of intra-EU mobility has not increased dra-
matically, the fact that migration has been concentrated in a few coun-
tries, together with the effects of the economic crisis, has led to a negative
perception of intra-EU postenlargement migration, which does not corre-
spond with a reality in which these migration flows have had a beneficial
economic impact on the old member states. Even in this new scenario,
in which intra-EU mobility has risen, the number of non-EU immigrants
residing in EU countries is considerably higher than the number of “EU
free movers.”
Nonetheless, even if the formal and material absence of internal borders
and the proactive policy to encourage movement has not given place to
massive and uncontrolled migration with negative consequences for the
receiving states, the need to reintroduce limitations and restrictions to free
movement is recurrently being raised in recent times in the political debate
of different member states. It seems that, despite the efforts of EU institu-
tions to demystify the reality of internal mobility or EU internal migration,
the power of myths in the European Union, which leads once more to the
resurrection of the migration restriction debate, seems to be strong enough
94 Global Migration
to prevent a definitive emergence of a truly federal approach to interstate

mobility.
Notes
1. Antoine Pécoud and Paul F. A. Guchteneire, Migration without Borders: Essays on
the Free Movement of People (UNESCO Publishing and Berghahn Books: 2007), 18.
2. Commission’s Action Plan for Skills and Mobility, COM (2002), 72 final;
speech by László Andor at Bristol University, “Labour Mobility in the European
Union—The Inconvenient Truth European Commission,” Speech/14/115, Feb-
ruary 10, 2014. See also Zuzana Gáková and Lewis Dijkstra, “Labour Mobility
Between the Regions of the EU-27 and a Comparison with the USA,” European
Union Regional Policy, Regional Focus Paper no. 02/2008.
3. Elspeth Guild, “Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls?” in Elspeth Guild
and Sandra Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration (Ashgate: 2011),
225.
4. For a debate on this definition see Ubaldo Lugli, “The Concept of Myth,”
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 6 (2014): 38.
5. On the current debate in the United Kingdom, see Elspeth Guild, “Cam-
eron’s Proposals to Limit EU Citizens’ Access to the UK: Lawful or not, under EU
rules?” CEPS Commentary, November 29, 2013, accessed April 30, 2014, www
.ceps.be/ceps/dld/8677/pdf
6. Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, “Employ-
ment and Social Developments in Europe 2011, intra-EU Labour Mobility and the
Impact of Enlargement” (European Commission: 2011), 274.
7. See the study “A Fact Finding Analysis on the Impact on the Member States’
Social Security Systems of the Entitlements of Non-Active intra-EU Migrants to
Special Non-Contributory Cash Benefits and Healthcare Granted on the Basis of
Residence,” DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, final report submitted
by ICF GHK in association with Milieu Ltd., 2013.
8. Standard Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013, “Public Opinion in the Euro-
pean Union,” first results, December 2013.
9. See, generally, Catherine Barnard, Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Free-
doms (Oxford: 2013).
10. Council Directive 93/96 of October 29, 1993 on the right of residence for
students, 1993 O.J. L 317/59.
11. Council Directive 90/365 of June 28, 1990 on the right of residence for
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activ-
ity, 1990 O.J. L 180/28.
12. Council Directive 90/364 of June 28, 1990 on the right of residence, 1990
O.J. L 180/26.
13. For an account of early criticism, see Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press: 2011), 820.
14. See, for example, Anne Pieter van der Mei, “Union Citizenship and the
‘De-Nationalisation’ of the Territorial Welfare State,” European Journal of Migration
and Law 7 (2005): 207.
15. 2004, O.J. L 158/77.
16. See extensively on this issue, Alina Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC
Law (Kluwer Law International: 2009).
17. See, with regard to workers, repealing Regulation 1612/68, Regulation
492/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on
freedom of movement for workers within the Union, 2011 O.J. L 141. On the
provision of services: Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, 2006 O.J.
L 376.
18. Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Eco-
nomic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, of 14 June 1985 and
Implementing Convention of 19 June 1990, 2000 O.J. L 239.
19. See Article 1 of the Protocol on the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the
Framework of the European Union.
20. The United Kingdom and Ireland have taken the decision to remain out-
side the Schengen area, but they participate in some acts according to the sys-
tem established by Protocol 19 to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Romania and Bulgaria
will join the Schengen area once they fulfill the requirements of the Schengen
evaluation.
21. Agreement Concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Republic
of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the Association of These Two States
to the Implementation, to Application and to the Development of the Schengen
Acquis, 1999 O.J. L 176; Agreement Between the European Union, the European
Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s Associa-
tion with the Implementation, Application and Development of the Schengen
Acquis, 2008 O.J. L 53; Protocol Between the European Union, the European
Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the
Accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement Between the Euro-
pean Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation’s Association with the Implementation, Application and Develop-
ment of the Schengen Acquis, 2011 O.J. L 160.
22. Modernizing Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC: Regulation 883/2004/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Coordi-
nation of Social Security Systems, 2004 O.J. L 166; Regulation 987/2009/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 Laying Down
the Procedure for Implementing Regulation 883/2004/EC on the Coordination of
Social Security Systems, 2009 O.J. L 284.
23. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 September 2005 on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications, 2005 O.J. L
96 Global Migration
255; Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to Facilitate the Effective

Exercise by Lawyers of Freedom to Provide Services, 1977 O.J. L 78.
24. On this case law, see Eleanor Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the EU:
Barriers to Movement in Their Constitutional Context (Wolters Kluwer: 2007).
25. Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013, European Citizenship Report.
26. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Measures
Facilitating the Exercise of Rights Conferred on Workers in the Context of Free-
dom of Movement for Workers. Not yet published in the official journal.
27. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, agreed to by Congress, Novem-
ber 15, 1777, in force after ratification by Maryland, March 1, 1781.
28. Gerald M. Rosberg, “Free Movement of Persons in the United States,”
in Courts and Free Markets, eds. Terrance Sandalow and Eric Stein (Clarendon:
1982), 275–362, 281.
29. The right to travel has been described by Justice Stevens as a right “firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). It “occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union,” United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966), and is “virtually unqualified,” Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S.1
(1978).
30. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
31. For example, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3, 230 C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823.
32. United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor
and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518 (1978).
33. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
34. Like, for example, commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948).
35. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), “a citizen of the United States
can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”
36. This possibility was initially recognized in Mayor of the City of New York
v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). This approach was definitely rejected by Edwards v.
California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941).
37. See John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (The Viking Press: 1939).
38. See Rosberg, cit. supra at 291.
39. Ibid., at 292. This author doubts whether the possibility to impose such
restrictions, recognized in the early judgments Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana
Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886) and Compagnie Francaise &c. v. Board of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902), would be maintained today.
40. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Here the Court recognized that freedom
to travel “does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be
quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would
directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or the
Nation as a whole.”
41. Article 20 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement and Regulation

562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. L 105/1.
42. Directive 2004/38 retains the classification basis for a right of residence on
the nature of economic activities (workers, students and other persons with suf-
ficient resources).
43. Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
establishes that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
44. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
45. See, at length, Francesca Strumia, “Citizenship and Free Movement: Euro-
pean and American Features of a Judicial Formula for Increased Comity,” Colum-
bia Journal of European Law 12 (2006): 713, at 747.
46. The Supreme Court recognized in dicta that “a State has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the
right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential
tuition basis,” Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), at 453. See also Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983). Affirming higher tuition fees for nonresident stu-
dents: Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S.
985 (1971).
47. Gravier v. City of Liège, case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593.
48. See, on this discussion, Anne Pieter van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons
Within the European Community: Cross-border Access to Public Benefits (Hart Pub-
lishing: 2003), 445.
49. For example, see Giersch, case C-20/12, not yet reported, with regard
to financial aid for higher education studies for children of frontier workers in
Luxembourg.
50. For example, access to hunting licenses. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commis-
sion of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). As a result, different fees are charged
in state parks for citizens and “out of staters” all across the country.
51. Commission v. Spain, case C-45/93 [1994] E.C.R. I-911; Commission v. Italy,
case C-388/01 [2003] E.C.R. I-00721.
52. Catherine Barnard, “Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the
US?” Cambridge Law Journal 63 (2009): 575, 578.
53. Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the
European Economic Constitution (Oxford: 1998), 88.
54. Barnard, cit. supra, 579.
55. Friedl Weiss and Frank Wooldridge, Free Movement of Persons within the
European Community (Kluwer: 2007), 2; Didier Fouarge and Peter Ester, Factors
Determining International and Regional Migration in Europe (European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions: 2007).
98 Global Migration
56. See Peter Ester and Hubert Krieger, “Comparing Labour Mobility in Europe
and the US: Facts and Pitfalls,” Tijdschrift van het Steunpunt WSE/Uitgeverij Acco
3–4 (2008): 94.
57. For an account of the obstacles identified by the European Commission,
see “EU Citizenship 2010 Dismantling the Obstacles to EU Citizens’ Rights,” COM
(2010), 603 final. See also, European Parliament resolution of April 2, 2009 on
problems and prospects concerning European citizenship, “Problems and Pros-
pects Concerning European Citizenship,” P6-TA (2009), 0204.
58. See the Communication from the Commission, “Commission’s Action Plan
for Skills and Mobility,” COM (2002), 72 final.
59. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus.
60. The difference in wages was even bigger than in the case of the accession
of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 1980s. DG Employment, Social Affairs and
Equal Opportunities, European Commission, “Geographical Labour Mobility in
the Context of EU Enlargement” in Employment in Europe 2008, 111, 113.
61. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “Legal Implications of EU Enlargement for the
Individual: EU Citizenship and Free Movement of Persons,” ERA—Forum 3
(2004): 355.
62. The member states applying restrictions are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, Slovenia,
and the United Kingdom. Croatia has decided to make use of its right to apply
restrictions to the workers from these countries, in application of the principle of
reciprocity.
63. Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. 257/2.
64. See, for an account of this situation, European Commission Informa-
tion Note, March 6, 2001, “The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of
Enlargement.”
65. Communication from the European Commission, “The Impact of Free
Movement of Workers in the Context of EU Enlargement. Report on the First
Phase (1 January 2007–31 December 2008) of the Transitional Arrangements Set
Out in the 2005 Accession Treaty.” COM (2008), 765 final.
66. Communication of the European Commission, “Reaffirming the Free
Movement of Workers: Rights and Major Developments,” COM (2010), 373 final.
See also Holger Bonin et al., “Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Opti-
mizing Its Social and Economic Benefits,” IZA Research Report 19 (2008).
67. Communication from the European Commission, “Free Movement of EU
Citizens and Their Families: Five Actions to Make a Difference,” COM (2013),
837 final.
68. Martin Kahanec, “Labor Mobility in an Enlarged European Union,” Discus-
sion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6485 (2012).
69. Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera, “Labour Migration and Unemployment.
What Can We Learn from EU Rules on the Free Movement of Workers?” CEPS
2012, http://www.ceps.eu (last accessed December 12, 2013).
70. COM (2008), 765 final.

71. Anne Herm and Michel Poulain, “Economic Crisis and International Migra-
tion. What the EU Data Reveal,” Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 38
(2012): 145, 148. See also Anzelika Zaiceva and Klaus F. Zimmermann, “Return-
ing Home at Times of Trouble? Return Migration of EU Enlargement Migrants
During the Crisis,” Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der
Arbeit 7111 (2012).
Part II
Myth: Migration only takes place from developing to developed

countries and serves as an escape from poverty.
There is a common assumption that migration is a phenomenon that

only takes place from South (developing countries) to North (developed
countries). This represents a very narrow picture of the complexity of the
migration flows in the world.
First, it must be mentioned from the outset that North-North move-
ments constitute a very important number of migration flows. For example,
according to official data from the European Commission, in 2012, out of
the 2.1 million non-EU nationals who migrated to the European Union,
the largest number, 200,000, were U.S. citizens.1 This migration is
not always a regular one but many times people coming from developed
countries find themselves in an irregular situation in another developed
country. A well-known example of this is the estimated 50,000 Irish in an
undocumented situation in the United States.2
Second, almost half of all international migration is made up of South-
South flows.3 These flows are, however, usually neglected in the media and
political discourse as well as in the academic literature.
Finally, migration also takes place from developed to developing coun-
tries. For instance, Blanchette’s chapter uses the example of citizens from
the United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia who are residing in Brazil to explain their difficulties in obtaining
visas. It also clearly describes how migrants from Western countries may
face exactly the same problems that are common to immigrants every-
where. These migrants fall sometimes into irregular situations and they
need to either await a regularization process in order to solve their legal sta-
tus, or they may try to obtain it through other routes, including marriage.
102 Global Migration
For example, a recent study conducted for the International Centre for
Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD) and for Brazil’s Ministry of
Labour found that 35 percent of the Spaniards and Portuguese residing in
Brazil who had been interviewed for the project and who had all arrived in
the country since 2008 were in an irregular situation.4
Notes
1. European Commission, “Communication 5th Annual Report on Immigra-
tion and Asylum (2013),” COM (2014), 288 final, Brussels, May 22, 2014.
2. USA Today, “Irish PM Raises Immigration Issue,” March 14, 2014, ac
cessed June 16, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2014/03/14/obama
-biden-enda-kenny-st-patricks-day/6417409/
3. United Nations Population Division. 2013. International Migration. Wall
chart. New York: United Nations. http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013
.htm
4. Duval Magalhães Fernandes, Maria da Consolação Gomes de Castro and
Silvana Pena Knup, “Espanhóis e Portugueses no Brasil: A Migração recente” in
ITINERIS—Proteção dos direitos dos migrantes contra a exploração, do Brasil
para Estados-Membros da União Europeia. A situação dos migrantes brasileiros
na Espanha e Portugal e de portugueses e espanhóis no Brasil: aspectos legais e
vivências (Vienna: ICMPD, 2013), 225.
CHAPTER FIVE
Ten Myths about Migration

and Development
Revelations Involving the Mexico–
United States Experience
Raúl Delgado-Wise, Humberto Márquez,
and Selene Gaspar
Introduction
Migration studies, more so than many other fields, are fraught with
myths that distort reality under a unilateral, decontextualized, reduction-
ist, and biased view of human mobility, particularly labor migration. The
dominant political and research agendas in the field tend to reproduce
much of the prevailing mythology—such as the widely disseminated ste-
reotype of contemporary migration as a free and voluntary act that essen-
tially benefits countries of origin and entails several economic and social
costs for destination countries—ignoring the context in which contem-
porary migration takes place and its root causes. They assume human
mobility is a free and voluntary act oblivious to any kind of structural
conditioning and/or national or supranational agents. In a similar way,
the multiple economic, demographic, social, and cultural contributions
made by migrants to host societies and nations are often ignored, hidden,
or even distorted, to the point where the former are portrayed as a socio-
economic burden for destination countries and even turned, in times of
crisis, into public scapegoats. In addition, these views tend to ignore the
costs and multiple implications posed by migration to countries of origin,
migrants themselves, and their families; these costs go far beyond the over-
emphasized “positive” impact of remittances.
Our work seeks to contribute to the necessary demystification of this
phenomenon, particularly regarding the relationship among migration,
development, and human rights. We are interested, above all, in build-
ing an alternative, solidly grounded, critical, comprehensive, and inclusive
vision of migration based on what we have characterized—metaphorically
and in accordance with a number of pro-emancipatory authors and schools
of thought—as a “southern perspective.”1 For this, we must first unravel
the nature of the context in which contemporary migration takes place,
highlighting some of the major features of neoliberal globalization and
restructuring, including its unprecedented onslaught against the working
class. We then analyze 10 myths on contemporary migration through the
example of the Mexico–United States migratory corridor, the world’s larg-
est. For this, we rely on a series of specifically designed strategic indica-
tors. Finally and by way of conclusion, we underscore the interests that
underlie the aforementioned mythology.
The Nature of Neoliberal Globalization: Demystifying the Ground Level

The internationalization strategy of capital that distinguishes the
current phase of capitalism, that is, so-called neoliberal globalization, is
characterized by the establishment of global networks of monopoly capital
through which large multinational corporations expand their services,
as well as productive and commercial activities via mechanisms such as
outsourcing or subcontracting to peripheral regions in search of a cheap
labor force and natural resources.2 Extractivism and neo-extractivism3
are also part of this strategy,4 which entails the establishment of export
platforms that operate as enclaves in peripheral countries. It is estimated
that around 85 million workers from the South work in these kind of
plants.5
More recently, the aforementioned internationalization strategy based
on mechanisms such as outsourcing and offshoring has extended to the
sphere of scientific and technological innovation. Through access to a
highly qualified workforce from peripheral nations, large multinational
corporations manage to lower labor costs, transfer risk and liability cover-
age, and capitalize visible benefits through the concentration of patents.6
Ten Myths about Migration and Development 105
This gives place to an expansive and pointed commodification of scientific

work with a short-term view and little social concern.7
At the heart of this process lies a basic feature of the neoliberal machine:
the massive oversupply of labor force. With the incorporation of the for-
mer Soviet Union, China, and India into the world capitalist market, labor
supply more than doubled, increasing from 1.46 to 3.1 billion workers.
To this add the overflowing and violent liberalization of the workforce that
has taken place in peripheral economies as a result of the implementa-
tion of neoliberal structural adjustment programs. In a recent article, John
Bellamy Foster, Robert McChesney, and Jamil Jonna8 estimated that the
global workforce reserve army, considering the proportion of vulnerable
employment and unemployed workers, comprises slightly over 50 percent
of the global labor class.
Global labor arbitrage has become a key element of the new global
architecture. This refers to the advantage of pursuing lower wages abroad.
The strengthening of national barriers against population mobility—vis-à-
vis the free movement of capital and a postmodern ideology that suggests
the virtual disappearance of the nation-state—is an extraordinary source
of profits. Capital “earns” enormous monopolistic returns in rich nations
by taking advantage of the relative labor immobility and subsistence and
subpar wages in much of the South. Hourly wages in China comprise only
10 percent of hourly wages in the United States whereas those in Mexico
only comprise 16 percent of those in the United States. Through labor
arbitrage, geographic asymmetries are reproduced on a broad, unforeseen
scale.9
A major and inescapable feature of neoliberal globalization is the deep-
ening of unequal development: economic, social, political, and cultural
polarization between geographical spaces and social classes are greater
than ever before in human history. This inequality is reflected in many
kinds of data; for example, the disproportionate concentration of wealth
and power in the hands of a small elite: nowadays, the richest 1 percent of
the world’s population controls 40 percent of total global assets.10
As a corollary, labor precarization has attained unforeseen dimensions.
According to 2011 data from the International Labor Organization,11 1,520
million workers (49 percent of the planet’s labor force) work in conditions
of vulnerability—that is, lack job security and have no access to minimum
rights; 910 million workers (29.4 percent) earn less than $2 per day; and
there are 203 million unemployed.
It is important to add that neoliberal globalization is facing a profound
multidimensional crisis that undermines its main sources of wealth cre-
ation—labor and nature—to the point that this can be characterized as a
crisis of civilization with a potentially catastrophic outcome. Responses to

the crisis by the governments of developed countries and international agen-
cies are greatly constrained by the fact that they are still promoting neoliberal
globalization, resulting in a short-sighted, elitist, and exclusive approach.
Instead of addressing the root causes of the crisis, they have implemented
limited strategies that seek to rescue financial and manufacturing corpora-
tions facing bankruptcy; the promotion of labor flexibilization and regres-
sive tax adjustments means that the living and working conditions of most
of the population have been negatively impacted. These measures are des-
perate attempts to maintain an ever more predatory and unsustainable form
of capitalism that prolongs the privileges and power of the ruling elite.12
It is in this context of profound social breakdown and unsustainability,
characterized by a brutal global onslaught against the working class and
nature, that contemporary migration takes place.
Ten Myths Regarding Mexico–United States Migration

First myth: North-South regional integration based on free market
principles leads to economic convergence and reduced migration.
The great myth of global capitalism is the concept of the free market.
In an attempt to maximize profits, individuals or companies flock to a
supposedly common space, the market, where, free from state interfer-
ence, they proffer goods that meet the needs of consumers. Competition
favors innovative companies that can offer products at lower prices. In the
end, such entrepreneurial freedom encourages growth and prosperity. On a
regional level, free trade agreements provide suitable contexts for economic
complementarity between countries with different levels of development
and their productive and labor sectors. Successful free trade regional inte-
gration allows for the circulation of investment, technologies, information,
goods, and work. Regional economic convergence would allow for a cer-
tain balance or complementarity between production factors.
From this perspective, espoused by international monopoly capital, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico presumably should have resulted in increased
growth, employment, and investment benefits across all three countries.
While Mexico is the relatively less developed nation, “free trade” would
apparently bring it into the first world through the adoption of a socioeco-
nomic dynamic similar to that of its trading partners. For a long time, the
country was presented as a free trade success story given its export boom,
which is still the highest in Latin America and the 10th worldwide.13
Mexico had an export platform of USD $350 billion in 2011, 80 percent

of which entailed manufactured goods.14
However, and as explained above, the global capitalist system revolves
around large multinational corporations that organize the international
production/consumption circuit via global networks of monopoly capital.
Peripheral or underdeveloped territories are subsumed by this rationale of
surplus expropriation, which ends up reducing them to mere providers
of a cheap workforce, unregulated natural resources, and areas open to
commercialization.
Mexico has faithfully followed neoliberal precepts. The apparent success
of its export model continues to be an optical illusion because, as we have
discussed elsewhere,15 what the country actually exports is its labor force.
Indeed, the export model imposed in Mexico in the context of NAFTA
comprises interrelated mechanisms that evidence the asymmetrical inte-
gration of the country’s economy with that of the United States. Table 5.1
shows these asymmetries and their significant increase under NAFTA.
Table 5.1 Mexico–United States Asymmetries, 1994–2012

Mexico United States
Asymmetries 1994 2012 1994 2012
Population (thousands) 93,055 115,640 259,753 308,827
Population growth rate 1.54 1.21 0.91 0.89
GDP per capita (current U.S. dollars) 4,540 9,240 26,820 48,450
Annual gross domestic product 717 1,747 7,031 15,011
(billions of U.S. dollars at current
prices and purchasing power parities)
Industrial production index 71.74 101.65 80.49 121.13
Spending on research and 0.29 0.48 2.48 2.9
development (% of GDP)*
Population with college degree 11.9 18.3 27.98 38.5
(% of the population aged 25 to 64)
Manufacturing wages (U.S. dollars 2.1 2.6 12 9.3
per worker-hour)
Comparative unit costs of labor in 95.2 90.4 96.3 98.6
the manufacturing industry
Remuneration rates in the n.d. 99.32 n.d. 115.28
manufacturing industry**
* 2010.
** 2011.
Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Developed with data from INEGI, ENOE 2 trimester 2012, and
Banco de Información Económica, INEGI. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1994, 1995, 2011, and 2012.
Another significant indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI)

established by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Between 1995 and 2012, the United States rose from fourth
to third place, from 0.937 to 0.933; Mexico dropped from the 51st to 61st
place, after falling from 0.77 to 0.786.16
The fact that Mexican manufacturing exports to the United States have
picked up in areas such as the automotive and some electronic and electri-
cal high-tech branches is a symptom of neoliberal problems. The secret
formula of competitive recovery has nothing to do with a new push in
technology or a premeditated industrial policy; it is simply an expression
of wage reduction in a paradoxical international environment favoring
trade.
NAFTA promoters did not only foresee economic convergence but also
a decline in migration flows that, on the contrary, have grown exponen-
tially since the decline of the 1970s import substitution model and the
takeoff of neoliberalism in 1982 (see Figure 5.1). Far from countering this
trend, NAFTA accentuated it; as we shall see, migration itself soon took on
the quality of an economic exodus, or forced displacement.
Figure 5.1 Mexico–United States Migration, 1840–2012.

Source: Compilation from Decennial Censuses, 1850–1990; Pew Hispanic Center, 1994–
2010, Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and
State Trends, 2010,” Pew Hispanic Center, February 1, 2011, accessed September 5, 2013,
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
Second myth: Neoliberal restructuring promotes progress and social well-being.

Orthodox liberalism and neoclassical economics17 have provided sev-
eral theses on development and migration to justify the adherence of
policymakers to the requirements of the neoliberal capitalist world order:
(1) development is based on economic growth, or the expansion of
society’s productive forces with a steady increase in total output, driven
by private enterprise and entrepreneurship, the productive investment
of capital, and the institution of competitive free markets; (2) the neolib-
eral or Washington agenda of macroeconomic policy reform, based on
the implementation of structural adjustment programs (particularly in
peripheral countries) leads to optimum conditions for promoting pro-
ductive investment and advancing economic growth;18 and (3) to restore
the dynamics of economic growth and place every country on a sustain-
able development path, we must combine macroeconomic “pro-growth”
policies with a new (“pro-poor”) social policy meant to reduce extreme
poverty.19
But what has in fact happened via structural adjustment programs is
that the productive apparatus of peripheral countries has been dismantled
and, in effect, rearticulated to the core economies under sharply asymmet-
ric and subordinated conditions. The direct and indirect export of labor is
a key element for conceptualizing this process. On the one hand, the indi-
rect or disembodied export of labor is associated with the establishment of
global networks of monopoly capital in the periphery through outsourc-
ing operations.20 In this case, given that the majority of the inputs are
imported and managed from abroad, the main national component in the
exported goods is the labor used in the assembly (or service or commer-
cial) processes. This kind of indirect or disembodied labor export involves
more than 85 million workers in the periphery associated with nonagri-
cultural activities.21 On the other hand, the direct export of labor via inter-
national labor migration is mainly composed of South-North (74 million)
and South-South (97 million) flows. In fact, 80 percent of all migrants
come from the periphery.22 This system moves parts of the industrial, com-
mercial, and services process to peripheral countries to take advantage
of paradises of cheap labor while placing barriers on the free mobility of
workers, particularly those moving from the southern hemisphere to the
northern one. The goal is not to prevent the emigration of large segments
of the population who cannot find accommodation in the narrow, periph-
eral domestic labor markets, but to create the conditions that ensure their
supply under the requirements, terms, and conditions that are most favor-
able to corporate interests in destination countries.
The export of the workforce in these two forms shapes a new interna-
tional division of labor that creates new enclave economies in the periph-
ery and leads to the emergence of new modalities of unequal exchange
that are much more severe than in the past: the net transfer of revenues to
the North via outsourcing operations in the South, and the South-North
transfer of the educational and social reproduction costs of the migrant
workforce.23
These circumstances not only deepen the dynamics of uneven develop-
ment across all levels, but trigger a process of capital and labor deprecia-
tion in peripheral nations that prevents them from managing their surplus
and organizing their own cycles of capital accumulation. In the case of
Mexico, neoliberal restructuring set up an export model that, given its
extremely high imported component and its extractive profile,24 becomes
a cheap workforce export model in tandem with the extractive export of
natural resources.25 The main beneficiaries of this model are the corpora-
tions linked to the export process, such as car manufacturers, maquiladoras,
mining companies, private banks, telecommunication groups, and com-
mercial, restaurant, and hotel chains. On the other hand, the affected sec-
tors include peasants and rural communities that lose possession of lands
and biodiversity, workers who are unemployed or must join the informal
market, active workers with plummeting living standards, youngsters who
cannot enter the labor market, and the general population, whose living
conditions are threatened by poverty and insecurity.
The Mexican model focuses on foreign investment as an alleged agent
of development and the supply of abundant, cheap, and disorganized
workers as the main attraction for such investment. The government has
persistently maintained low wages with the pretext of fighting inflation
but actually encouraging high profit margins for corporations established
in Mexico. Reduced wage purchasing power emphasizes the transfer of
labor’s value to capital, and the minimum wage does not cover the basic
needs of workers and their economic dependents. The “poverty” cat-
egory in Mexico includes those who earn two and up to three minimum
wages, as well as those who earn less. Between 2006 and 2012, the pur-
chasing power of the minimum wage fell 43.1 percent; this entails a
cumulative loss of 79.11 percent over the space of 25 years.26 In 2012, the
majority of workers (60.1 percent) were immersed in informal activities.
Moreover, statistics show that access to a source of salaried work is not
enough to escape poverty: 66.4 percent of workers earn less than USD
$1.7 per hour. However, the work effort has increased, for 57.5 percent
of workers labor extra hours in regard to the legal 40 hours per week;
27 percent are underemployed, working 35 or fewer hours per week.
Figure 5.2 Labor Precarization in Mexico, 2012.

Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimations based on INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y
Empleo (ENOE), Tabulados e indicadores de ocupación y empleo, www.inegi.gob.mx,
February, 2013.
Extant trends in the labor market and current legal reforms deepen job
insecurity (see Figure 5.2). This, however, does not imply a significant
expansion of formal employment in Mexico. The cumulative occupational
lag and low employment growth rates have created a redundant popu-
lation that by far exceeds the formal national labor market’s absorption
possibilities (see Figure 5.3).
Third myth: Emigration under neoliberalism is a free and voluntary act.

Conventional theories and discourses on migration present human
mobility as a free act, a family or communal decision that seeks better
job opportunities, a way of building up resources that can be invested to
improve quality of life and start a business. Migration dynamics are seen as
organized by migrants themselves through social networks that also guide
and channel them into the labor markets of the host economies. Migration
flows and their organization acquire a life of their own to the point where
they become their own cause, a cumulative movement that generates a
culture of migration: a rite of passage for young people entering working
and reproductive life, a sign of a people’s identity. This view of migration is
little more than an apology, a form of false consciousness.
In fact, the Mexican export workforce model generates an overwhelm-

ing labor reserve army, that is, a population considered redundant by
corporate capital that is ultimately forced to emigrate to access some
source of income. Figure 5.3 shows, in statistical terms, the volume of
Mexico’s economically redundant population. From 2000 to 2010, the
workforce increased by 9.6 million while formal jobs did so by a mere
2.1 million. The labor deficit over this period, without considering the
historical backlog, was 7.5 million. The excluded workforce is distributed
among the unemployed (1.5 million), informal workers (3.9 million),
and migrants (2.1 million). It is striking that the volume of generated
formal employment should be equal to the volume of migrants and that
both categories, added up (4.2 million), should be lower than the amount
of unemployed and informal workers (5.4 million). This, coupled with
previously outlined indicators of job insecurity, highlight labor precarious-
ness in Mexico.
Capitalist development under neoliberalism obeys accumulation d y
namics that lead to systemic violence and human insecurity—social
subjects are excluded from remunerative employment and deprived of
means of production and subsistence. With their material sources gone
and institutional support and social protection dismantled, these social sec-
tors are forced to emigrate. Virtually expelled from Mexican territory in con-
ditions of growing vulnerability, they constitute an important labor reserve
Figure 5.3 Mexico: Labor Force Surplus, 2000–2010.

Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimation based on the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, March Supplement, 2000 and 2010, and CEPALSTAT, Estadísticas de Empleo para
América Latina, 2000–2010.
available to the central, mostly U.S. capital. In other words, mechanisms of

unequal development produce structural conditions, such as limited and
precarious employment, insecurity, and social inequalities, which lead to the
massive migration of dispossessed and excluded population groups. Com-
pelled by the need to have access to means of subsistence or opportunities
of social mobility, large population segments are literally expelled from their
territories to relocate within their own country or abroad. Labor oversupply
and the increasing deterioration of life conditions give migrations, particu-
larly those from peripheral countries such as Mexico, the character of forced
displacements. For analytical purposes, we distinguish nine modalities of
forced migration: (1) migration due to natural disasters;27 (2) migration due
to political conflicts; (3) human trafficking;28 (4) displacement due to crimi-
nal violence;29 (5) displacement due to modernization programs; (6) internal
migration due to enclave economies;30 (7) migration due to dispossession;31
(8) migration of skilled workers;32 and (9) deportation and return.33
Fourth myth: Migration management through the balancing of the

labor markets is beneficial for all stakeholders.
Migration management34 is a key element of the dominant discourse
underlying the rationale of mainstream migration policies. These are pro-
moted by multilateral agencies and think tanks such as the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). New narratives have been
presented through the umbrella of an apparently “neutral” notion asso-
ciated with the all-embracing paradigm of “global governance.”35 These
narratives attempt to depoliticize migration, obfuscate the existence of
divergent interests or asymmetries and conflicts of power, avoid obliga-
tions imposed by international law, and promote the idea that manag-
ing migration through the equilibrium of labor markets can be beneficial
for all stakeholders: countries of destination, countries of origin, and the
migrants themselves and their families. This unrealistic, triple-win sce-
nario clearly favors the interests of the migrant-receiving countries and the
large multinational corporations (MNCs) based in such countries.
The rhetoric of migration management takes neoliberal globalization
for granted and does not consider it part of the migration, development,
and human rights problem.36 “Good migrants,” regardless of status and
conditions, are respectful of the law, flexible to market needs, and eager
to contribute to the development of their country of origin. Irregular
migration is regarded as a problem generated outside of the migrant-
receiving country and its internal motivations (corporate demand for
cheap and flexible labor) are bypassed, as is the role of the state in spawn-
ing “illegality” by limiting channels for “legal” entrance far beyond actual
labor and demographic needs.37 Temporary worker programs are one of
the best tools for regulating labor markets, especially if we ignore the fact
that guest workers are held virtually captive by employers or labor brokers
who seize their documents and exploit, discriminate, and socially exclude
them. Return policies, either forced or voluntary, assume places of origin
will benefit from the abilities, skills, and values acquired by migrants in
receiving societies. Transit countries, for their part, are meant to prevent
irregular migration flows to destination countries through the reinforce-
ment of border control activities and countersmuggling and -trafficking
efforts.
Temporary or “guest” worker programs signed between sending and
receiving countries have become mainstream immigration policy for host
nations. A vicious cycle of job precarity is played through them. They are
based on the premise of buying and selling a workforce with an expiration
date, where the import of workers is similar to that of disposable, renew-
able, natural resources; the human condition of the workers becomes
nonessential. In Mexico, this type of program goes back to the bracero
program, the H2a visas for agricultural workers, and H2b visas for other
laborers in fields such as landscaping, construction, and cleaning services.
The essential feature of these programs is that workers are tied to specific
employers and remain subject to them or a contractor. This is why this
kind of public policy is referred to as corporate-driven. Working condi-
tions in these programs are extremely poor and unsafe: working days can
be 14 hours long for pay of USD $24, in overcrowded and unsanitary liv-
ing conditions, and in case of accident, medical care is often denied. These
workers are subject to exploitation, extortion, and abuses. Once the work
cycle is over, migrants are forced to return to their country in precarious
conditions. If they protest these deplorable circumstances, governments
promote deportations. Even if temporary migrants travel by plane and
have working visas, condescending temporary work programs conceal
forms of servitude close to slavery while labor is seen as a cheap and dis-
posable resource that feeds the millionaire agricultural industries of the
United States and Canada.38 The U.S. H2a visa for temporary agricultural
workers is controlled by contractors and agricultural companies, and given
to temporary immigrant workers when a local workforce is unavailable. In
2010, 103,324 of these visas were issued; 85,692 were granted to Mexi-
cans. Employers often breach parts of the contract, such as their obligation
to cover visa costs, worker transport, and accommodation. Frauds also
include waiting lists, undue charges, “free visas,” and unfulfilled promises
of work. Because of these programs’ inconsistencies, scam artists posing as

recruiters in areas of high migration take advantage of local confusion and
steal documents and money.
The U.S. government is obsessed with sealing the southern border with
its main “business partner.” George W. Bush planned to erect a physical and
technological barrier. The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) has been in place
since 2006: it includes 1,978 kilometers of proposed border fence with
roads, different types of barriers and walls, lighting, and a high-tech detec-
tion and communication network that will monitor large tracts of land. In
addition, the Border Patrol budget has doubled (USD $3.5 billion in 2009)
and there has been an increase in the number of police officers (from 12,000
to 20,000). Forced migration in the Americas is not a problem exclusive to
Mexico; it also involves Central and South American countries (i.e., the
so-called developing nations). Mexico is a transit space for migrants from
other nations and even continents who flock to the United States. Because of
persistent human insecurity and the unrestricted operation of organized
crime, trans-migrants have become easy targets for criminals as well as for
law enforcement. Crimes include theft, rape, kidnapping, extortion, forced
labor, and murder. The U.S. southern border is among the world’s most dan-
gerous with thousands of murders on record, similar to war-torn territories.
Fifth myth: Migration implies an invasion of the receiving country.

Xenophobic postures maintain that the aliens arriving from the periph-
eries of the world economy represent a security risk, as well as a threat to
the culture and identity of the receiving countries, which are conceived as
the image of civilization. Anti-immigrant attitudes are based on racial or
ethnic prejudice and claim deep and entrenched cultural differences
between “God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the
state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of
the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority,
equality and hierarchy . . . [that] have generated the most prolonged and
the most violent conflicts.”39
The asymmetric and subordinate regional integration of the Mexican
economy with that of the United States involves a systematic transfer
of surpluses, which expand U.S. accumulation capacities and, in turn,
create an expanded demand for workers that cannot be satisfied by an
internal labor supply, regardless of demographic dynamics (incidentally,
these are going through an aging and near-zero growth phase, particularly
among the non-Latino, native white workers).40 The immigrant work-
force is required to cover that deficit. For Mexico, this means a decreased
accumulation capacity and, consequently, a surplus of workers compelled

to forcibly migrate.
The peculiarly neoliberal Mexico–United States migration system is,
in fact, a greatly consolidated labor market based on the exploitation of
cheap Mexican labor by U.S. capital and other international strategic part-
ners, including, though to a much lesser extent, Mexican capital. This
labor market spatially covers both nations. The workforce incorporated
into this market participates in a downward spiral of exclusion-inclusion-
exclusion that mainly affects the living conditions of Mexican workers.
During the first decade of this century, Latin America transferred, on
average, 10 percent of its working population (those aged between 15 and
64) to the United States. Mexico ranked fifth in proportional terms with
a total of 21 percent, behind El Salvador, Cuba, Uruguay, and Honduras
(see Figure 5.4).
Mexico is the major workforce provider for the U.S. economy inasmuch
as 21 percent of Mexican-born immigrants, added to the descendants of
Mexicans, comprise an overall 39 percent of the labor growth between
2000 and 2010 (see Figure 5.5). In fact, most of the workforce growth is
comprised of immigrants (58 percent).
Figure 5.4 Demographic Dividend Transfer from Latin America to the United
States, 2000–2010.
Sources: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimation based on CEPALSTAT, Estadísticas de América Latina y
el Caribe; and U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2000
and 2010.
Figure 5.5 Contribution by Ethnic Groups to U.S. Labor Force Growth,

2000–2010.
Sources: SIMDE UAZ. Estimations based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Population Survey, March Supplement, 2000–2010.
Sixth myth: Immigrants constitute a burden for receiving countries.

It is usually thought that immigrant contributions to the host country
are minimal or marginal and that, conversely, immigrant incorporation
into the labor market constitutes an act of “generosity” that eventually
leads to a decrease in economic productivity and loss of jobs for native
workers. The truth, however, is very different, even though it has been
concealed and distorted in public discourse and, in such a guise, tended
to negatively influence public opinion. This topic has been left off bilateral
and multilateral agendas between sending and receiving countries and,
more importantly perhaps, it has been pushed aside as a result of the deci-
sion to address the issue unilaterally by arguing that border control is a
matter of national sovereignty. Ultimately, this reflects the way in which
the doctrine of national security, which tends to criminalize migrants, has
become the benchmark for public migration policies.
The fact is that from 2000 to 2010, the main lever of growth for the
U.S. economy, at the time the largest in the world, was constituted by Latin
American immigrants and their descendants. As shown in Figure 5.6, their
contribution to national GDP was 47 percent vis-à-vis 44 percent by white
non-Latino natives.41 The group with the greatest contribution by national
Figure 5.6 GDP Growth Contribution Based on Worker Ethnicity and Migration
Status, 2000–2010.
Source: SIMDE. UAZ Estimations based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross
Domestic Product by Industry Accounts, and the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, March Supplement, 2000–2010.
origin was that of Mexican natives (16 percent), which, when added to the
contributions of Mexican descendants, reaches 29 percent.
The main economic sectors for the employment of Mexicans in the
United States have changed between 1994 and 2012. Although the num-
bers in manufacturing grew in absolute terms despite a widespread collapse
in employment in said area due to the transfer of assembly plants to coun-
tries with a cheap workforce (e.g., Mexico itself), Mexican participation in
the sector grew slightly. Meanwhile, construction became the main source
of jobs for Mexican immigrants, rising from 8.9 to 16.8 percent despite a
strong fall due to the crisis. Overall and in terms of significance regarding
economic dynamism, Mexican immigrant participation in the U.S. indus-
trial sector was 32 percent in 2012. In professional services, business, edu-
cation and health, leisure and hospitality, and commercial activities their
participation amounted to 48.5 percent, and in agriculture, even though
the participation of Mexicans only amounted to 4.9 percent, the vast major-
ity of agricultural workers were born in Mexico and mostly indigenous.42
Despite their significant contributions to the growth of the U.S. economy,
Mexican immigrants had the worst wage levels when compared to other
Figure 5.7 Estimated Salary Differentials among Major Ethnic and Migration
Groups in the United States, 2010.
Sources: SIMDE UAZ. Estimations based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Population Survey, March Supplement, 2010. BEA.
ethnic immigrant groups: –44.2 percent (see Figure 5.7). This is ominous
wage discrimination associated with the stigma of “illegality.” It must be high-
lighted that 6.5 million Mexican immigrants (55 percent) bear such a stigma.43
The fact that the Mexican workforce has the lowest U.S. earnings is
conspicuous. In global terms, we can say that Mexican labor is among the
cheapest in the world and exploited by transnational (mainly U.S.) capital
both in Mexico and the United States.
Seventh myth: Migrants constitute a fiscal burden.

Anti-immigrant discourse argues that migrants place a burden on the
host society and do not pay taxes. Part of the argument for immigration
reform espoused by the Barack Obama administration and expressed in
the stance of the Democratic Party rests on the assumption that immi-
grants in an irregular situation have not paid taxes and thus have a sort of
fiscal debt that must be paid as part of the complicated catalog of require-
ments for U.S. citizenship or residence.
Actually, the opposite is true: immigrants pay direct taxes through labor
and indirect taxes via consumption. Since the government excludes the
majority of “irregular” migrants from public goods and services, it can
be argued that, instead, the government owes a huge social debt to the
immigrant population. Figure 5.8 shows the contributions of Mexican

immigrants to the U.S. public purse: USD $13.7 billion in 1994, and
up to USD $52.7 billion in 2008. Figure 5.9 shows the disproportionate
relationship between tax contributions and public benefits received per
Figure 5.8 Contribution of Mexican Immigrants to the U.S. Treasury,

1994–2008.
Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimations based on the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, March Supplement and Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 1994–2008.
Figure 5.9 Ratio between Taxes and Public Social Benefits, 2008.
Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimations based on the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and
the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2008.
contributed dollar, where Mexican (0.4) and undocumented immigrants

(0.2) occupy the lowest positions.
In 2011, 15.2 percent of the U.S. population was considered poor. Most
of this group is comprised of Mexican immigrants (29.8 percent) and, dis-
turbingly, an even higher proportion of native, second-generation popula-
tion of Mexican origin (33 percent); as many as 72.6 percent receive no
health insurance cover from their employer and 76.3 percent lack a pen-
sion plan. The average income is a mere USD $25,722 ($14 per hour), the
lowest vis-à-vis an average of USD $42,481 ($21 per hour).
Eighth myth: Brain circulation benefits countries of origin.

Academic and political discussions on skilled migration have aban-
doned the concept of “brain drain” to replace it with the notion of “brain
circulation.” Through this shift, the pessimism and concern regarding the
emigration of skilled workers from peripheral countries to the developed
nations have been turned into rampant optimism, replacing the notion of
loss with one of gain. This shift assumes knowledge in itself is a benefit
for all, and that contact with highly qualified foreign nationals will foster
development in the country of origin, regardless of where, how, on what,
and for whom skilled migrants work. Knowledge and research agendas are
seen as neutral, as is intellectual property—that is, the appropriation of the
products of scientific/technical work—which is underestimated or simply
ignored. Moreover, the euphoria unleashed around “brain circulation” and
the establishment of rapprochement programs with “qualified diasporas”
assume innovation creates its own linkages with the productive, commer-
cial, and services sectors through processes of incubation.44
None of these optimistic assumptions have a basis in the reality of con-
temporary capitalism. To elucidate this point we must address the context
in which skilled migration, particularly from peripheral countries, takes
place. Said context is marked by a profound and global restructuring of
innovation systems led by the United States, and with large MNCs as
central agents. There are several elements that characterize this restruc-
turing, including (1) increased internationalization and fragmentation of
research and development activities; (2) the establishment of centers of
scientific cities (e.g., Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the United States, or
the new “Silicon Valleys” established in peripheral regions, mainly Asia)
where collective synergies are stimulated in order to accelerate innovation
under overt or covert corporate control strategies; (3) the expansion on the
South-North horizon of highly qualified human resources in science and
engineering; and (4) increased recruitment of a highly skilled peripheral
workforce via outsourcing and offshoring, among others.
This restructuring dynamic has set up a new geography of research and

development (R&D). Starting in 2011, the United States was displaced as
the main global investor in R&D by three Asian countries, China, Japan, and
India, which in 2013 amassed 37.1 percent of world investment.45 To this
trend is added a significant increase in the participation of foreigners in sci-
ence and engineering (S&E) in the United States.46 This, however, does not
necessarily indicate a loss of U.S. leadership. On the one hand, although
there has been an increase in offshoring activities in R&D, their presence
is still relatively limited: “About 1.5 million (77 percent) of companies’
1.9 million worldwide R&D employees worked in the United States, and
448,000 (23 percent) worked at foreign locations of U.S. companies in
2008.”47 On the other hand, the United States continues to concentrate most
of the patents generated at the world level,48 that is, the so-called triadic
patents,49 even if their generation involves an increasingly significant
percentage of immigrants.50
As a corollary of the restructuring dynamics of innovation systems, it
is possible to conceive of the incorporation of a highly skilled peripheral
workforce as a higher stage of the direct and indirect export of the labor
force that characterizes neoliberal globalization. On the one hand, a grow-
ing number of scientists and technologists are working in northern coun-
tries and, on the other, there are an increasing number of R&D platforms
(“scientific maquiladoras”) in peripheral countries associated with innova-
tion activities promoted and controlled by the large MNCs based on the
north. In this regard, by expanding the mass of scientific and technological
workers at their service, large MNCs not only accelerate and lower the cost
of innovation, but also reinforce monopoly power and control.
Mexico increasingly participates in this trend. It is the first Latin Ameri-
can provider of highly skilled migrants to OECD countries, and the sixth
in the world.51 It is also the third largest provider of highly skilled migrants
to the United States after India and the Philippines, above even China and
Korea (see Figure 5.10). As seen in Figure 5.11, over one million skilled
Mexican immigrants resided in the United States in 2012; 111,875 had
a master’s degree and 13,314 had a PhD. Note that the group of Mexi-
can immigrants with graduate degrees is equivalent to 17.6 percent of all
master’s and PhDs in the country, a proportion that far outstrips migra-
tion in general (10 percent). Moreover, this group of migrants grew at a
rate 2.3 times higher than general Mexican migration over the 2000–2010
period.52 To these we must add 60,000 highly skilled Mexican temporary
migrants.53
There is a significant segment of highly skilled migration involved in
activities related to their profession (54.7 percent is occupied in professional
Figure 5.10 Foreign Population 25 Years or Older with Higher Education in the
United States, 2011.
Survey, March Supplement, 2011.
Figure 5.11 Mexican Immigrants with Higher Education in the United States.
Survey, March Supplement, 2012.
or managerial activities, against 64.3 percent of all immigrants and 71.4

percent of natives) and, to some extent, in R&D activities in the United
States. But this is a relatively reduced group as far as Mexican migration is
concerned.54 Mexican migrants with a master’s degree occupied the sixth
place overall in a list led by India and China; the number of Mexican PhDs
came in 13th place, well under the first and second leaders, China and India.
Of all foreign immigrant groups with graduate degrees, the Mexican contin-
gent has the highest percentage of graduates in the United States (50 per-
cent), and most of them remain in that country. Another significant fact is
that Mexican graduates (with the exception of PhDs) have the lowest wages.55
Considering the relatively low proportion of the population 25 years and
older with a higher education in Mexico (a mere 30 percent compared to
more than double the amount in developed and emerging countries, includ-
ing several Latin American ones), it is clear that the notion of “brain circula-
tion” is wholly inadequate. Highly skilled migration not only implies a loss
of talent for Mexico and a significant transfer of resources, but also a waste of
training and skills ideally meant for national development; what this does is
lower labor costs for and provide natural resources to large MNCs.
Ninth myth: Migrants are agents of development and their resources,

mainly remittances, are vehicles for development.
So, why has there been a new surge of interest in migration and devel-
opment? Why do international agencies and governments of both sending
and receiving nations emphasize the potential profits of migration? Have
the real costs and benefits for countries of origin shifted radically, or is this
a question of changed perceptions?
The main emphasis has been on the rapid growth of remittances to less
developed countries.56 As economist Devesh Kapur57 points out, remit-
tances have become the new “development mantra” through a belief in the
fact that they can be channeled into economic investments to overcome
underdevelopment. Or, to put it less positively, the idea is that some of the
most exploited workers in the world can make up for the failure of main-
stream development policies.
This widespread notion of remittances is based on monetary fetishism;
money is taken for granted without being related to the modes of social
production that generate it. For orthodox discourse, the problem is to
channel the cash sent by migrants to their relatives in countries of ori-
gin and use it to promote development and stabilize national accounts.
The emphasis has been on “family remittances” as a presumed instrument
to reduce poverty because it is incorrectly assumed58 that these improve
recipients’ consumption capacity. Most remittances are essentially wage
earnings sent by workers to their financial dependents. Mexico is the larg-
est recipient of remittances in Latin America and the third one globally.
Figure 5.12, which traces remittance ups and downs, corroborates this.
Figure 5.12 Mexico: Remittances, 1990–2012.

Source: SIMDE. UAZ. Estimations based on Banco de México, Economic indicators for
several years.
In the case of Mexico, as evidenced by Alejandro Canales,59 the impact

of remittances in poverty reduction amounts to only 1.3 percent, and its
impact in reducing inequality is identically marginal: 1.3 percent.
Another, highly promoted offshoot of the dominant discourse is the so-
called community development triggered by “collective remittances” that
mix public and private investment in public works programs. The Mexican
3x1 program is considered a “success story” in this regard: even though it
entails meager resources (about 1 percent of family remittances), it is por-
trayed as a source of productive, social, and community development.60
The fact is that remittances represent a fraction of the wages earned by
migrant workers, most often in conditions of labor overexploitation, and
aim to support financial dependents in places of origin while contributing
to family reproduction. This includes the formation of a new workforce
with a high propensity to migrate (e.g., children, siblings, or other rela-
tives) and support for the elderly and sick. Remittances play an essential
role in ensuring social reproduction in conditions of poverty and social
exclusion. Overexploited migrant workers sending part of their wages to
their poor dependents caught in a spiral of family and community degra-
dation is far cry from the apologist discourse on migration.
Considering the educational level of Mexican immigrants upon initial

arrival in the United States and the implicit educational cost, we esti-
mate that, between 1994 and 2008, Mexico transferred USD $83 billion
(in 2008 prices).61 If said education had been undertaken in U.S. public
schools, the cost would have been USD $613 billion62 at constant 2008
prices over the same period. As a reference, remittances channeled to Mex-
ico and often seen as a waste of resources for the United States were only
30 percent of the educational resources transferred to the United States via
the export of the workforce.
Despite the claims made by certain international bodies and govern-
ments, there is no empirical evidence of the alleged positive effects of
Figure 5.13 Mexico: Cost of Education and Social Reproduction of Immigrants

Who Entered the United States between 1994 and 2008 versus Remittances.
Sources: SIMDE.UAZ. Estimates based on the U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population
Survey, 1994–2008; CONEVAL, Poverty Lines in Mexico; and Educational Statistics
Yearbook in Mexico, 2008.
migration and remittances as catalysts of development in countries of ori-

gin. While “successful case studies” have been proffered in an attempt to
support these claims, these usually involve self-help micro-projects that
hardly contribute to sustainable local development initiatives, let alone
national ones. In fact, the dominant discourse has been forced to take an
increasingly cautious stance. Hopes that the flow of remittances would
propel much desired development have now diminished, to the point
that, in its 2009 World Development Report, the World Bank stated: “Not
everyone chooses to migrate. Moving can be a costly, difficult, and disrup-
tive decision. . . . While the move is welfare improving for these families,
the economy may end up worse off.”63
Tenth myth: The crisis in receiving countries promotes

voluntary returns that benefit countries of origin.
At some point, President Felipe Calderón’s administration posited that
Mexican migration had been reduced to “zero” due to the solidity of the
Mexican economy, available employment, and wide coverage in health and
education. It even boasted that many migrants who had settled in the United
States were planning to return to the country.64 The year 2010 was a breaking
point for Mexican migration to the United States: after having reached a peak
of 770,000 migrants in 2000, it “stabilized” at 140,000, which gave the
appearance of balancing emigration with deportations and returns.65 How-
ever, forced migration did not fully stop because, as we argued above, return
conceals a new and even more degrading facet: forced migration by deporta-
tion, unemployment, disease, or deterioration in the quality of life. And yet,
according to INEGI, “migration to the United States picked up in the second
quarter of 2012, reaching 41.9 people per every 10 thousand inhabitants,
while entry was 14.3.”66 An explanation of this turnaround is due to a certain
reawakening of the U.S. economy, especially in the automotive and construc-
tion sectors, as well as the demand for a highly qualified workforce and
young people with training in areas including engineering, mathematics, and
IT. The renewed rise of the U.S. economy forecasts resulted in new projec-
tions of Mexican emigration to the United States—from 230,000 to 330,000
per year for 2011–2017—with an emphasis on highly skilled workers.67
The arrest and deportation of migrants is an obsession of U.S. national
security policy, carried out via U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE). The Barack Obama administration, which has benefited from
the immigrant vote in two successive elections, has toughened its immi-
gration policy against undocumented migrants, mostly Mexican-born
ones. This punitive policy has led to the arrest and deportation of recent
immigrants as well as those who settled there and contribute to U.S. pro-
duction, consumption, and public finances. Democrats and Republicans
argue that what they fight is “irregular” migration and that they are deport-
ing “criminals.”68
This punitive national security policy is “the highest priority of the fed-
eral Government.”69 The funds channeled by the White House to enforce
immigration laws surpass those allocated to the fulfillment of all other
laws (USD $14 billion): the Obama administration assigned approxi-
mately USD $18 billion to immigration control in 2012; more than half of
the ongoing federal processes are linked to violations of immigration law.70
However, Obama’s rhetoric during his reelection campaign, which earned
him the Latino vote,71 proclaimed the need for a fairer immigration policy
despite welcoming the idea that deportations provide more security to the
frightened U.S. population. In 2012, 410,000 immigrants were expelled,
many of them without any legal process.72
Between 1892 and 1997 (i.e., 105 years), 2.1 million immigrants were
deported from the United States; if the current trend holds, by 2014 the
so-called immigration-friendly Obama administration will have deported
as many people in just over six years.73 In 2011, 188,382 foreigners were
expelled: 25 percent after completing drug-related sentences, 23 percent
for various infractions, and 20 percent for breaking immigration legislation.
The deportations take place with the consent of both national govern-
ments under the Human Repatriation Program, which dates back to 2007.
Its official intention is to provide assistance to Mexicans transferring back
to their places of origin. More than 267,000 Mexicans “benefited” from
this program in 2010; more than 150,000 did so in 2011. According to
the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), of
those expelled from the United States between 2009 and 2011, 60–70
percent did not have a criminal record to justify deportation.
The deportation procedure threatens the human security of migrants.
Often, the deportees are left in the highly violent border area and become
an easy prey for criminal gangs. A perverse feature of the deportation
policy is the fact that the points of abandonment are often hundreds of
kilometers from where the migrants were captured; the apparent aim is to
split migrants from their original traffickers. For example, those arrested
in South Texas will be sent to Mexicali.
Forced return can lead to family tragedies. Most of the 2012 deportees
are parents of U.S.-born children and deportation can be a cause of family
breakdown, especially if one spouse is a legal resident.74 There are worse
cases, where both parents are deported and the children are not. At least
5,100 children live in foster homes because their parents were detained
or deported, and an estimated 15,000 children risk being separated from

their parents.75 During the first half of 2012, more than 46,000 parents
of U.S. children were deported and many of the children live in literal
abandonment.76 The biggest risk is the definitive separation of children
and parents; there are parents who do not have information about the
whereabouts of their children and, in the best of cases, assume that they
live with foster families.
Forced return directly affects thousands of Mexican and Central Ameri-
can minors, most of whom travel unaccompanied by an adult relation.
Between 2011 and 2012, the U.S. government expelled 32,653 children,
out of whom nearly 77 percent were reportedly unaccompanied. The
Mexican government has also been at work in this regard: in 2011, it
deported 4,129 children (almost all of them Central American), 2,801 of
whom were unaccompanied.77
While consenting to the U.S. deportation of Mexicans and expelling
Central Americans itself, the Mexican government has implemented a sup-
port fund for migrants: the program “For those who return” distributes
federal funds to state migration institutes to support subsistence micro-
enterprises (grocery stores, crafts, woodworking and welding workshops,
agricultural projects) in places of origin given the absence of employment
sources for returning migrants. In Zacatecas, for example, 588 projects
received 8 million pesos in 2010; the local government provides 12,500
pesos (USD $962) and the recipient contributes 2,500 pesos (USD $192)
in order to establish a micro-business.78
Critically speaking, the mass deportation of migrant labor force con-
stitutes a form of double forced migration: first, the workers are expelled
from their places of origin by unemployment and poverty; after being
exploited, they are subsequently expelled from the destination country.
From the point of view of the host country, this is a way of flushing the
labor market; the criminalization of undocumented immigrants cheapens
the costs of labor even more and intimidates workers from abroad.
In contrast, developed economies are particularly interested in retaining
a highly qualified labor force and, in general, labor sectors with high levels
of productivity. A crisis is also an important workforce flushing mecha-
nism; those considered “superfluous” comprise a “disposable” working
mass. Invariably, deported migrants are low-skilled labor and often sick
and worn, unlikely to inject new vigor into the economy of host countries.
In spite of its criminalization, detention, and deportation, the immigrant
workforce decidedly contributes to the growth of the receiving economy.
In this regard, Mexican workers have helped expand the U.S. economy in
times of crisis and have thus been and continue to be a primary source for
the generation of wealth or economic surplus. Between 2007 and 2010,

when the crisis hit the United States, workers of Mexican origin (Mexican-
born U.S. citizens) contributed 20 percent of GDP growth, a significantly
higher proportion than that of other national groups of immigrant workers
and even natives (see Figure 5.14). From this standpoint, we are left facing
a paradox: Mexican migrant workers play an important role in containing
the crisis at the expense of their further exploitation but, at the same time,
are deported and forced to return via punitive mechanisms that ultimately
serve to foster labor precarization and insecurity under the assurance that
“there are better times ahead.”
Behind these 10 myths lies a fetishization of migration that tends to
darken the power relations, class relations, and modalities of unequal
exchange (as well as imperialist domination) entailed by the relationship
between migration and development in Mexico and the United States.
Indubitably, and in spite of the particularities of the case we have outlined,
this mythology can be generalized to other migration corridors across the
world, and it is a crucial element underlying the current political and aca-
demic debate on the relationship between migration and development. To
varying degrees, international organizations such as the World Bank and
the International Organization for Migration envision remittances as an
essential tool in the development of migrant-sending, peripheral coun-
tries. They also conceive international migration management as a core
Figure 5.14 GDP Growth by Workforce Origin, 2007–2010.

Sources: SIMDE.UAZ. Estimations based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross
Domestic Product by Industry Accounts, and the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, March Supplement, 2007–2010.
element in the design and implementation of migration policies that are

apparently beneficial for all parties. The 10 myths posited in this chapter
provide an evidence-based argument against this dominant perspective.
Through them we have demonstrated that it is essentially a one-sided,
decontextualized, reductionist, and misleading perspective that overlooks
the realm of neoliberal globalization and unequal development in which
contemporary migration is embedded. It also masks most of the funda-
mental contributions made by migrants to the destination countries, and
it ignores the costs of migration for the countries of origin; costs that go far
beyond the overemphasized “positive” impact of remittances.
Notes
1. Stephen Castles and Raúl Delgado-Wise, Migration and Development: Per-
spectives from the South (Geneva: OIM, 2008); Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto
Márquez, “Strategic Dimensions of Neoliberal Globalization: The Exporting of
Labor Force and Unequal Exchange,” Advances in Applied Sociology 2 (2012): 127.
2. Humberto Márquez and Raúl Delgado-Wise, Espejismos del río de oro: dialéc-
tica de la migración y el desarrollo en México (Mexico: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2012).
3. Henry Veltmeyer, “The Political Economy of Natural Resource Extraction:
A New Model or Extractive Imperialism?” Canadian Journal of Development Studies
34 (2013): 79.
4. The environmental degradation brought about by the privatization of bio-
diversity, natural resources, and communal and national assets for the benefit
of multinational corporations is another consequence of neoliberal globalization.
Expanding and reissuing extractive forms of natural resource appropriation has
led to increased predation of ecosystems with serious consequences in terms of
pollution, famine, and disease, all of which threaten the symbiosis between nature
and society. Guillermo Foladori and Naína Pierri (eds.), ¿Sustentabilidad? Desacu-
erdos sobre el desarrollo sustentable (Mexico: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2005); Guill-
ermo Foladori, “El metabolismo con la naturaleza,” Herramienta, No. 16 (2001):
75–88; John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology. Materialism and Nature (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1999); Franz Hinkelammert and Henry Mora, Hacia una
economía para la vida. Preludio a una reconstrucción de la economía (San José: Edi-
torial Tecnológica de Costa Rica, 2008); Humberto Márquez, “Crisis del sistema
capitalista mundial: paradojas y respuestas,” Polis 9 (2010): 2.
5. Mackinsey Global Institute, The World at Work: Jobs, Pay, and Skills for 3.5 Bil-
lion People (Seoul, San Francisco, London: Mackinsey & Company, 2012).
6. Mariano Sana, “Immigrants and Natives in U.S. Science and Engineering
Occupations, 1994–2006,” Demography, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 801–20; Dar-
rell M. West, “Creating a ‘Brain Gain’ for U.S. Employers: The Role of Immigra-
tion,” Brookings Policy Brief No. 178 (2011), accessed February 27, 2013, http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/1/immigration%20
west/01_immigration_west.pdf; Nagesh Kumar and K. J. Joseph, “Export of Soft-
ware and Business Process Outsourcing from Developing Countries: Lessons from
the Indian Experience,” Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review 1 (2005): 91;
Timothy J. Sturgeon, “What Really Goes On in Silicon Valley? Spatial Clustering
and Dispersal in Modular Production Networks,” Journal of Economic Geography
3 (2003): 199; Ashok Parthasarathi, “Tackling the Brain Drain from India’s Infor-
mation and Communication Technology Sector: The Need for a New Industrial,
and Science and Technology Strategy,” Science and Public Policy 29 (2002): 129.
7. Financialization is another pillar of neoliberal globalization and entails
speculative strategies of financial capital along with the expansion of international
monopoly capital. This generates short-term profits that distort the functioning of
the so-called real economy and lead to massive fraud and recurrent crises. High
volatility and the speculative games of so-called fictitious capital accelerate the
selectivity of capitals, which in the end benefits the dynamics of capital concentra-
tion and centralization. This speculative maelstrom does not only attract large cap-
ital and savings from the so-called first world; peripheral financial resources such
as sovereign wealth funds, public budgets, pension funds, and investment funds
are also compromised. In essence, this is about resources being diverted from pro-
ductive activity or the promotion of social development to enter the world’s casino
economy with enormous costs for the majority of the population. Samir Amin,
Global History: A View from the South (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010).
8. John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, and R. Jamil Jonna, “The Inter-
nationalization of Monopoly Capital,” Monthly Review 63 (2011): 3.
9. John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, and R. Jamil Jonna, “The Global
Reserve Army of Labor and the New Imperialism,” Monthly Review 63 (2011):
20–21.
10. James B. Davies et al., “The World Distribution of Household Wealth,” in
Personal Wealth from a Global Perspective, ed. James B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
11. ILO, Global Employment Trends 2012. Preventing a Deeper Jobs Crisis (Geneva:
ILO, 2012).
12. Walden Bello, “The Capitalist Conjuncture: Over-accumulation, Finan-
cial Crises, and the Threat from Globalisation,” Third Word Quarterly 27 (2006):
1345; Humberto Márquez, “La gran crisis del capitalismo neoliberal,” Andamios
13 (2010): 57.
13. World Trade Organization, Annual Report 2011 (Geneva: WTO, 2011).
14. Secretaría de Economía, “Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior de México,”
accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad_
negocios/comercio_exterior/informacion_estadistica/Anual-Exporta.pdf.
15. James Cypher and Raúl Delgado-Wise, Mexico’s Economic Dilemma: The
Developmental Failure of Neoliberalism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Little-
field, 2011); Márquez and Delgado-Wise, Espejismos del río de oro: dialéctica de la
migración y el desarrollo en México (Mexico: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2012).
16. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Annual Report

2012 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012).
17. From the 1950s to the 1970s, economic development theories (e.g., “old
developmentalism”) followed two main approaches: (1) the orthodox or (neo)
liberal one, based on a belief in the effectiveness of the free market or laissez-faire
capitalism (growth first); and (2) the heterodox, social liberal, and structuralist
one, which argued for state agency in regulating the market for the public inter-
est (growth with equity). Both advocates of laissez-faire capitalism and Keynesian
state planning subsisted uneasily within the same paradigm: a belief that only cap-
italism provided the systemic requirements for economic and social development.
18. This agenda was based on the Articles of Agreement used to establish the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank.
19. Proponents of the Washington Consensus (dubbed by The Economist as the
Davos Consensus in the contemporary context) agree on the need for neoliberal
“structural” reform and free market capitalism. Proponents of a “post-Washington
Consensus” seek to “bring the state back in” and establish “inclusive development.”
Poverty reduction is a common goal but there is disagreement regarding how to
balance the workings and roles of the market and the state. Post-Washington
Consensus proponents say a restoration of the dynamics of economic growth and
sustainable development require a renewal of the financial architecture needed
to regulate the global operations of capital in the interest of equity (i.e., reduce
excessive destabilizing inequalities) and control of unproductive investments or
speculative capital. The Davos Consensus posits that no measures or institutional
mechanisms should be put into place to bring about a more equitable distribution
of wealth and income, instead fueling unproductive or speculative capital (global
governance).
20. Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez, “The Reshaping of Mexican
Labor Exports under NAFTA: Paradoxes and Challenges,” International Migration
Review 41 (2007): 656; Raúl Delgado-Wise and James Cypher, “The Strategic Role
of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Inte-
gration,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 615
(2007): 120–42.
21. Mackinsey Global Institute, The World at Work: Jobs, Pay, and Skills for 3.5
Billion People (Seoul, San Francisco, London: Mackinsey & Company, 2012).
22. World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011: accessed Febru-
ary 27, 2013, http://siteresources.worldbank.org.
23. Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez, “Strategic Dimensions of
Neoliberal Globalization: The Exporting of Labor Force and Unequal Exchange,”
Advances in Applied Sociology 2 (2012): 127.
24. Gregorio Vidal, “Mexico: o secundário-exportador e o aprofundamento
do subdesenvolvimiento,” Cuadernos do Desenvolvimento Vol. 6, No. 9 (2011):
383–405.
25. Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez, “The Reshaping of Mexican
Labor Exports”; Raúl Delgado-Wise and James Cypher, “The Strategic Role of
Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integra-

tion,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 615
(2007): 120–42.
26. Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mínimos, “Salario Mínimo Real” (2013),
accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.conasami.gob.mx/pdf/salario_minimo/
sal_min_real.pdf.
27. A report from Ciudadano Brando states: “The number of natural disasters
in our country has doubled in the last ten years as a result of climate change.
Mexico is listed as one of the countries most prone to disasters, as 17 states are in
areas of high seismicity or have coastal cities. Forty-eight percent of the popula-
tion (49.2 million people) live in these states, which include those with the high-
est poverty and marginalization levels (Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Guerrero).”
Accessed April 22, 2013, http://brandation.blogspot.mx/2010/10/desastres-
naturales-y-migrantes.html.
28. A disregard for the human condition degenerates into phenomena such as
trafficking and forced labor. Human trafficking is one of the worst violations of
human rights by criminal groups that profit from the prostitution and forced labor
of vulnerable individuals who are often threatened, abused, or drugged. Unfor-
tunately, said trafficking is increasingly linked to organized crime and complicit
in acts such as kidnapping, rape, extortion, and murder. According to studies by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2012), Mexico has one
of the highest rates in human trafficking, smuggling, and victim transportation
networks.
29. The violence unleashed by the “war on drugs,” a policy derived from U.S.
national security strategy, has militarized everyday life and fueled organized crime.
This entails a whole criminal complex, a “narcocapitalism” of transnational scope
that includes human, organ, arms, and drug trafficking, as well as money laun-
dering. Crime and a fierce dispute over territory rupture the already weakened
social fabric, leading to displacement alongside kidnappings, extortion, murders,
and disappearances. Guillermo Pereyra, “México: violencia criminal y ‘guerra
contra el narcotráfico,’” Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 74, No. 3 (2012):
429–460.
30. The processes of industrialization and urbanization associated with
maquiladoras and assembly lines that function as industrial transnational ter-
minals (e.g., car assembly and electronics plants) foster intense internal labor
mobility derived from a high staff turnover and insecurity prevailing in these
industrial areas, which also tend to move to other countries or regions offering
pockets of cheap labor. Susann Vallentin Hjorth Boisen, “La industria maquila-
dora y la migración interna en México,” Revista Gaceta Laboral, Vol. 15, No. 1
(2009): 5–28.
31. This includes populations excluded from productive, commercial, and ser-
vices that are obliged to move in pursuit of employment, whether in their own
country or abroad; 3.6 million changed residence between 2005 and 2010. Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Tabulados básicos
cuestionario básico. Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010 (Mexico: INEGI, 2011). In

2011, the number of Mexican migrants to the United States was 11.8 million; 6.5 mil-
lion were undocumented (Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera,
“Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less,” Pew Research Center,
Pew Hispanic Center, 2012, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.pewhispanic
.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/).
32. Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO), “La migración calificada de
mexicanos a Estados Unidos,” Migración Internacional, 22 (2007): 1.
33. This presumed “voluntary” return is due to massive deportation and the
widespread unemployment exacerbated by the crisis and precarious living con-
ditions, which make their stay in the destination country unsustainable. These
migrants are among the most vulnerable and least prepared, twice ejected from
the places in which they have resided. Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana
Gonzalez-Barrera, op. cit.
34. Martin Geiger and Antoine Pecoud, The Politics of International Migration
Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
35. Bimal Gosh, “The Global Financial and Economic Crisis and Migration
Governance,” Global Governance 16 (2007): 317.
36. Gerard Boucher, “A Critique of Global Policy Discourses on Managing
International Migration,” Third World Quarterly 29 (2008): 1461.
37. Geiger and Pecoud, The Politics of International Migration Management,
op. cit.
38. Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery. Guest Workers Programs in the
United States. Montgomery: Southern Poverty Law Center (2013), accessed February
27, 2013, http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/SPLC
-Close-to-Slavery-2013.pdf.
39. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993):
22.
40. Alejandro Canales, “Las profundas contribuciones de la migración latino-
americana a los Estados Unidos,” in Migración internacional en América Latina y el
Caribe. Nuevas tendencias, nuevos enfoques, ed. Jorge Martínez Pizarro (Santiago de
Chile: CEPAL, 2011), 257.
41. For an explanation of the methodology, see Alejandro Canales, Vivir del
norte. Remesas, desarrollo y pobreza en México (Mexico: CONAPO, 2010).
42. All these figures are based on the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey (CPS), March Supplement, 2012.
43. Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, op. cit.
44. Jean-Baptiste Meyer, “La sociología de las diásporas del conocimiento,”
in Más allá de la fuga de cerebros: Movilidad, migración y diásporas de argentinos
calificados, ed. Lucas Luchilo (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2011)
91–114.
45. Battelle, 2013 Global R&D Funding Forecast (2012), accessed Febru-
ary 27, 2013, http://www.rdmag.com/sites/rdmag.com/files/GFF2013Final2013
_reduced.pdf.
46. “Foreign-born scientists and engineers, whether educated in the United

States or abroad, are a critical part of the U.S. S&E workforce: about one in four
S&E master’s degree holders and one in three S&E doctorate holders are foreign
born. This reliance is greatest on those with engineering and math/computer sci-
ence degrees. Among them, about 40% of master’s degree holders and 50% of
doctorate holders are foreign born” (National Science Board, Science and Engineer-
ing Indicators Digest, Arlington: The National Science Board, 2012: 12).
47. Francisco Moris and Nirmala Kannankutty, “New Employment Statistics
from the 2008 Business R&D and Innovation Survey,” InfoBrief, National Science
Foundation, 2010, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
infbrief/nsf10326/nsf10326.pdf.
48. OECD, OECD Factbook 2011–2012. Economic, Environmental and Social Sta-
tistics (Paris: OECD, 2012).
49. These patents refer to “innovations that are thought to be particularly sig-
nificant or valuable [and] are patented in several countries, particularly the United
States, Europe, and Japan” (Rand Corporation, U.S. Competitiveness in Science and
Technology, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008: 28).
50. Partnership for a New American Economy, Patent Pending. How Immi-
grants Are Reinventing the American Economy (2012), accessed February 27,
2013, http://www.renewoureconomy.org/patent-pending.
51. Jean-Christophe Dumont, Gilles Spielvogel, and Sarah Widmaier, Interna-
tional Migrants in Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries. An Extended Profile
(Paris: OECD, 2010).
52. Fernando Lozano and Luciana Gandini, “La migración calificada de México
a Estados Unidos: tendencias de la década 2000–2010,” Coyuntura demográfica 2
(2012): 51.
53. Roberto Rodríguez, “Migración de personal altamente calificado de México
a Estados Unidos: una exploración del fenómeno,” Revista Electrónica de Investig-
ación Educativa 11 (2009): 1.
54. Lozano and Gandini, “La migración calificada,” op. cit.
55. RodolfoTuirán and José Luis Ávila, “Opciones de política de la migración
calificada entre México y Estados Unidos,” paper presented at the round table:
Hacia una agenda de investigación sobre migración y desarrollo para el futuro
de México, CONACYT, Academia Mexicana de Ciencias, Consejo Consultivo de
Ciencias de la Presidencia de la República, Zacatecas, Mexico, April 10, 2013.
56. Bimal, “The Global Financial and Economic Crisis,” World Bank, Global
Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration (Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006).
57. Devish Kapur, “Remittances: The New Development Mantra?” Discussion
Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004).
58. Alejandro Canales, Vivir del Norte. Remesas, desarrollo y pobreza en México
(Mexico: CONAPO, 2008).
59. Alejandro Canales, “Hacia una visión comprehensiva del nexo entre
migración, desarrollo y derechos humanos,” Migración y Desarrollo 9 (2011): 43.
60. This is not to deny the contributions made by the 3x1 program to the
home communities of certain organized migrant groups, regardless of its scope or
accountability problems.
61. This calculation is based on expenses per educational level as reported in
Informe sobre el panorama educativo de México 2008, issued by the National Insti-
tute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE), and data from the Current Population
Survey, 1994–2008.
62. This calculation is based on expenses per educational level as reported
by the National Center for Education, U.S. Department of Education, 2007, and
combined with data from the Current Population Survey, 1994–2008.
63. World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geogra-
phy, Washington, D.C.: World Bank (2009): 168.
64. Jorge Ramos, “Por empleos a México, migración ‘cero’ a EU: FCH,” El Uni-
versal, April 24, 2012, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com
.mx/notas/843239.html.
65. Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, op. cit.
66. Ana María Aragonés, “¿Migración cero?,” La Jornada, October 9, 2012, accessed
February 27, 2013, http://www.iiec.unam.mx/sites/www.iiec.unam.mx/files/en_los
_medios/201210/Aragon%C3%A9s%20La%20Jornada%20oct%209.pdf.
67. Daniel Chiquiar and Alejandra Salcedo, “Mexican Migration to the United
States. Underlying Factors and Possible Scenarios for Future Flows,” Washington,
MPI (2013), accessed February 27, 2013, http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf
/Chiquiar_Salcedo_-_Mexican_Migration_to_the_U-S-_-_Underlying_Economic
_Factors_and_Possible_Scenarios_for_Future_Flows.pdf.
68. Mark Hugo Lopez and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “High Rate of Deportations
Continue under Obama despite Latino Disapproval,” Fact Tan, Pew Research Cen-
ter, September 19, 2013: accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2013/09/19/high-rate-of-deportations-continue-under-obama-despite
-latino-disapproval/.
69. Migration Policy Institute, MPI, www.migrationspolicy.org, January 2013.
70. Julia Preston, “Huge Amounts Spent on Immigration, Study Finds,” The
New York Times, January 8, 2013, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/huge-amounts-spent-on-immigration-study-finds.html
?ref=deportation&_r=0.
71. Oscar Chacón, “Elecciones de 2012 en Estados Unidos. Peso del voto
‘latino’ y perspectivas de reforma a la política de inmigración,” Migración y Desar-
rollo 10 (2012):143.
72. Corey Dade, “Obama Administration Deported Record 1.5 Million People,”
Political News from NPR, December 24, 2012, accessed October 20, 2013, http://
www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/24/167970002/obama-administration
-deported-record-1-5-million-people.
73. Tanya Golash-Boza, “Mapping the Shift from Border to Interior Enforce-
ment of Immigration Laws during the Obama Presidency,” Social Scientists on
Immigration Policy Blog, January 25, 2013, accessed February 27, 2013, http://
stopdeportationsnow.blogspot.ca/2013/01/mapping-shift-from-border-to-interior
_7232.html.
74. Tanya Golash-Boza, Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and Deportations
in Post-9/11 America (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Mathew Coleman and
Kocher Austin, “Detention, Deportation, Devolution and Immigrant Incapacita-
tion in the US, post 9/11,” The Geographical Journal 177 (2011): 228.
75. Juan Gelman, “Obama iguala las deportaciones sumadas de más de un
siglo,” Página 12, March 17, 2013, accessed May 2, 2013, http://www.pagina12
.com.ar/diario/contratapa/13-215967-2013-03-17.html.
76. Joanna Dreby, “How Today’s Immigration Enforcement Policies Impact Chil-
dren, Families, and Communities: A View from the Ground,” Center for American
Progress, August 2012: accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.americanprogress
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DrebyImmigrationFamiliesFINAL.pdf.
77. Fabiola Martínez, “Deportan Estados Unidos y México miles de niños cada
año; la mayoría viajan solos,” La Jornada, April 17, 2013, accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/04/17/politica/018n2pol
78. Víctor Martínez, “Entrega IEM 8mdp del programa ‘Por los que regresan,’”
NTR periodismo crítico, April 18, 2011, accessed May 2, 2013, http://ntrzacatecas.com
/2011/04/18/entrega-iem-8mdp-del-programa-%E2%80%9Cpor-los-que-regresan
%E2%80%9D/.
CHAPTER SIX
Migration to the Gulf States

The Political Economy of Exceptionalism
Philippe Fargues and Françoise De Bel-Air
Introduction
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)1 rank as the third
largest migrant-receiving region in the world. They are the largest destina-
tion for migrants from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philip-
pines, Egypt, Jordan, or Yemen, which are themselves among the largest
countries of origin of migrants. Migrant flows from South Asia and the
Arab world to the Gulf states are by far the world’s largest movements of
South-to-South migration. Indeed, in spite of very high (Qatar, United
Arab Emirates) and high (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait)
Human Development Index rankings, which account for their high lev-
els of income per capita, health coverage, and education achievements,
the six Gulf states still have a number of typical stigmas of the develop-
ing South (mostly extractive economies, political authoritarianism, low
status of women, etc.). Therefore, migration originating in the Arab
and Asian south and destined to the Gulf is genuinely of the South-to-
South kind.
Since its inception in the 1930s, immigration to the Gulf has responded
to hugely imbalanced endowments of capital, to gigantic surpluses of
financial capital (oil) combined with acute deficits of human capital: that
is, a low level of industrial skills among local workers and very scarce
populations in relation with desert land in the small sheikhdoms of the

Persian Gulf shores. As a consequence, the large scale of foreign labor
imported to exploit hydrocarbon resources created unique societies in
the GCC countries. Nowhere else in the world is the share of nationals
so small in proportion of resident populations: from 68 percent in Saudi
Arabia down to only 11 percent in the United Arab Emirates in the early
2010s. Yet, despite their numbers, non-citizens have little social and no
political membership in GCC countries. As temporary contractual labor-
ers, they are expected to leave upon the termination of their employment
contracts. Long-term settlement and citizenship acquisition are not an
option, for Gulf countries do not conceive of themselves as immigration
countries. This chapter aims at explaining the combination, so peculiar
to Gulf societies, of such exceptional levels of immigration and the excep-
tional closure of local societies to these flows. Through the lens of politi-
cal demography, the chapter emphasizes the structural nature of the link
between oil wealth, migration, and the social contract in the Gulf states.
The first part of the chapter argues that migration flows to and from the
Gulf states are driven by four distinct sets of political events. These affected
oil prices and defined four phases in the Gulf states’ migration policies and
citizenship-building process. During the first phase, political allegiance
to the Gulf rulers was negotiated in return for redistribution of the oil
wealth, which conditioned citizenship. The second phase sustained this
rent-based social contract by increasingly delegating productive activities to
foreign laborers. The third phase, marked by a drop in oil revenues and
in migrants’ stocks and flows, forced rulers to renegotiate the social con-
tract by reinstating productive, nonstate labor as a privilege for citizens.
Therefore, hikes in oil prices and the ensuing fresh rise in labor immigra-
tion in the last phase (the 2000s) further affected Gulf states’ sociopolitical
cohesion. Rising nationals’ unemployment incarnated the growing politi-
cal rift between opposing citizenries on the one hand, and businesspeople
favoring cheap foreign manpower, nonnationals accepting private sectors’
low salaries and labor conditions considered demeaning for citizens, and,
mostly, local rulers unable to guarantee citizens’ income and privileged
living conditions, on the other hand.
Indeed, as is described in the second part of the chapter, the forma-
tion of dual labor markets and dual societies in the region, entailed by
the supremacy of nationals over nonnationals in the economy and poli-
tics and by the limitation of social and spatial interaction between the
two populations, was viewed as essential in the reproduction of the fragile
rentier social contract. The Kafala (sponsorship) institution, especially,
appears instrumental in enhancing foreign laborer flows, in subordinating
Migration to the Gulf States 141
them to citizens, and, consequently, in sustaining the social contract in the

region.
The Arab uprisings in GCC states targeted foreign laborers and states’
inefficiency in managing national labor markets to the benefit of nation-
als. The third section thus argues that the exceptional scale of policies
launched by local governments since 2011 (deportation of irregular for-
eign labor, regularization campaigns, voluntary workforce nationalization
policies, and labor reforms) is an attempt at gaining control over the man-
agement of labor in order to balance three sets of pressing constraints:
securing citizens’ allegiance, sustaining economic growth to absorb job
seekers, and addressing worldwide concern about breaches of migrants’
rights in the region.
The chapter concludes that the GCC countries are now at a crossroads
and faced with two choices: on the one hand, limit the numbers and
increase foreign workers’ rights (i.e., revert the “number-vs.-rights trade-
off”2 that characterized the now-outdated rentier social contract), or, on the
other hand, sustain high levels of immigration, especially from available
huge pools of Asian manpower, but make Gulf societies more permeable
to sociodemographic input from nonnationals. In both cases, the role of
migration in the Gulf states’ social contract will change radically. The data
used in this chapter are exclusively from national statistical sources from
the Gulf states.3
The Gulf: Global Connections and Migration Dynamics

Historically, the Arabian Peninsula was a region marked by population
mobility, within and outside its territory. The pilgrimage to the Islamic
holy sites of Mecca and Medina attracted to the Hejaz populations origi-
nating from the whole Muslim world, and commercial activities typical
of local economies (maritime and caravan trade, pearl industry) entailed
seasonal internal mobility as well as population exchanges between the
Peninsula and Persia, Mesopotamia, India, Southeast Asia, and East Africa.
From the 1930s to the 1970s: The Emergence of Dependency on Foreign Labor
Oil was first discovered in Bahrain (1932) and in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait (1938). In the aftermath of World War Two, rising demand for
petroleum products in the world economy could be matched by rising
supply from the Gulf states. This resulted in progressive oil “rent”4 accu-
mulation in these countries, which would radically transform their econo-
mies and societies.
From the onset of oil exploitation, it appeared that locals were too few
to meet labor demands and had no experience in industrial labor. The Brit-
ish rulers of the Arab shores of the Gulf, together with the Western com-
panies that received concessions from local sheikhs to exploit the region’s
vast oil reserves and organize workers’ recruitment, resorted to importing
workers from Western countries, from Iran, and mostly from the Indian
subcontinent. Saudi oil fields, by contrast, were first exploited by Ameri-
cans, Italians, Eritreans, and Arabs. However, the independence of India
in 1947 and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War increasingly shifted the recruit-
ment patterns toward Arab workers. In the early 1950s, all Gulf countries
started turning to the Levant, and especially to Palestinian laborers, to
meet labor needs.5
From the October 1973 War to the Gulf War of 1990–1991: Foreign Labor and the Oil Rent
As all Gulf states had achieved political independence from British pro-
tectorates in 1971, the war of October 1973 between Israel and its Arab
neighbors Egypt and Syria opened a new stage of migration to the region.
In a period of triumphant Pan-Arabism, labor migration from Arab pop-
ulation-rich to Arab capital-rich countries was regarded as a providential
avenue to cross-fertilize two disconnected assets of the Arab world, that
is, population and capital.6 Migration was viewed as a strategy toward the
accomplishment of “a single Arab nation in which Arab labor circulates.”7
Arabs became dominant among expatriates in Kuwait (50 to 65 percent
from 1965 onward). They also made up 90 percent of foreign workers in
Saudi Arabia until the late 1970s.8
Source countries, however, soon extended once again beyond the Arab
world. In the course of the October 1973 war, the price of oil per barrel
jumped to four times its price before the war, which increased the incomes
of oil-producing countries and consequently stepped up the demand for
imported labor. The oil boom resulted in a migration boom, with foreign
populations increasing almost tenfold in just 15 years, and rising 4.5 times
faster than the national populations. Between the 1973 Suez Canal War
and the 1991 Gulf War, the proportion of foreign population in the Gulf
jumped from less than 9.7 percent to 36.6 percent (Table 6.1).
With oil prices soaring, oil revenues could be transformed into mate-
rial wealth and welfare packages for Gulf nationals, and led to the emer-
gence of a class of white-collar, well-paid, unproductive state employees,
in return for citizens’ political allegiance.9 Productive work was left to
foreign laborers and its benefits were also partly transferred to nationals
through the sponsorship (or kafala) system (see below). Gulf rulers could
Table 6.1
National and Nonnational Populations in the GCC Countries,
1970–2010
Absolute numbers % %
Total Percentage of Annual growth rates
Nationals Nonnationals population Nonnationals Nationals Foreigners
1975 8,790,223 941,036 9,731,259 9.7

1990 14,281,239 8,241,381 22,522,620 36.6 3.2 14.5
2010 23,572,744 21,117,842 44,690,586 47.3 2.5 4.7
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures provided by national institutes of statistics.
launch ambitious economic construction programs, large-scale modern

public infrastructures and plants. The ultimate goal was to adapt to the
local reality, a weak demography combined with a strong wish to pre-
serve cultural identity. Mobilizing capital rather than creating permanent
employment was thus the objective.10 Capital-intensive rather than labor-
intensive industries were chosen and the construction sector created the
largest numbers of short-term jobs for foreign nationals.11 Gulf govern-
ments opted for turnkey plants ordered from foreign societies that would
hire their workers abroad.
The second oil boom of 1979 happened after a politically destabilizing
event: the Iranian revolution, in a context marked by the spread of ideolo-
gies hostile to oil monarchies (Arab nationalist, leftist, and Islamist). Arab
migrants became subjects of political concerns in Gulf states. Because they
shared a common language and culture with the local society, their exert-
ing ideological influence, voicing political and labor demands, and likely
settling in host Gulf states became increasingly feared.
Economic shifts and sociopolitical tensions resulted in employers and
governments favoring the recruitment of Asian over Arab workers. Asians
were deemed a more flexible workforce and less prone to political expres-
sion. By the late 1980s, Asian workers had outnumbered Arabs, which
signaled the end of the Pan-Arabism–backed recruitment policies.
The 1990s: Reconstructing National Societies in the Gulf

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the poor Arab support
granted to the emirate, and its eventual rescue by an external coalition, all
deepened the mistrust between Gulf regimes and Arab immigrants. The
war itself had an immediate impact on migration. Some three million12
legal immigrants were forced to leave their host countries, as they found
themselves residing in what had become overnight the opposite camp.
Nationals of countries supporting Saddam Hussein’s regime were seen as

traitors in Gulf states: 350,000 Jordanians and Palestinians were evicted
from Kuwait and about 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia. Symmetri-
cally, several hundred thousand Egyptians, whose country was part of the
U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein, had to leave Iraq. Asian work-
ers employed in Iraq and in Gulf states had to flee the insecurity created by
a war that was no concern of theirs. Additionally, about two million Iraqi
Kurds and Shias also escaped repression by the Iraqi regime and many
ended up as internally displaced persons.
The 1990–1991 Gulf War also had an indirect, long-term impact on
migration as it would entail a major shift in Gulf states’ national proj-
ects. Regimes and populations realized that even though they possessed
the most strategic resource (hydrocarbons), their dependence on labor
imports made them politically vulnerable and subject to demographic,
identity-threatening shifts. These concerns were heightened by the eco-
nomic crisis that followed the conflict. Oil revenues dwindled; astro-
nomical reconstruction bills had to be paid for with cheap oil, and states’
redistributive capacities nosedived. Suddenly, young nationals in the Gulf
were confronted with a drop in purchasing power and the emergence of
unemployment. From then on, immigrants started to be viewed as com-
petitors. Gulf states all adopted labor nationalization policies along two
lines: on the one hand, reducing the supply of the migrant workforce by
reinforcing barriers at entry and stay, and, on the other, by limiting the
demand for migrant workers by expanding the list of jobs kept for nation-
als and taxing employers who hired nonnationals.13
More importantly, the whole political conception of labor was altered
by the crisis of 1990–1991. In the same fashion that oil revenues had to
be transformed into jobs and wealth creation for the benefit of nationals,
the labor force had to be nationalized in order to serve the social contract
and tighten political cohesiveness.14 Labor in the GCC states thus became
a basic right associated with citizenship,15 hence reincorporated within the
realm of redistribution.
The 2000s and Beyond: Negotiating Economic Reform with No Political Opening
Nonetheless, the proportion of nonnationals reverted to growing every-
where in the region during the 2000s. The newest data available in early
2014 indicated that nonnationals represent almost half of the six GCC
states’ total population (Table 6.2). The proportion of foreigners ranges
between 32.4 percent of the resident population in Saudi Arabia to 88.5
percent in the United Arab Emirates.
Table 6.2
Total Population and Percentage of Nationals and Nonnationals
(April 2014)
Country Total population % Nationals % Nonnationals
Bahrain (2010) 1,234,571 46.0 54.0
Kuwait (end 2013) 4,002,815 31.3 68.7
Oman (mid-2013) 3,855,206 56.3 43.7
Qatar (2010) 1,699,435 14.3 85.7
Saudi Arabia (mid-2013) 29,994,272 67.6 32.4
United Arab Emirates (2010) 8,264,070 11.5 88.5
Total 48,141,120 51.9 48.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures provided by national institutes of statistics.
The GCC region has become the third largest migration-receiving

region in the world16 over the decade. This is shown by the region’s rank-
ing among the major remittance-sending countries in the world,17 directed
mostly to India, Pakistan, and Egypt, the three largest migrant commu-
nities in GCC countries.18 Irregular migrants are also numerous, up to
five million in Saudi Arabia alone as estimated by national authorities in
2012.19 It should be noted that irregular migrants in the Gulf states include
not only unauthorized entrants and visa overstayers as in other parts of
the world, but also a category that is specific to the region: migrants who
changed sponsor while in the territory of a GCC state.
Such patterns of workers’ inflows seem to be in opposition to the afore-
mentioned measures meant to combat nationals’ growing unemployment:
nationalization of the work force, job creation for nationals, and reduction
in the supply of migrant labor. Nonetheless, this trend is explained by the
booming of the region’s economy over the 2000s. Oil prices surged up
after 2003, leading economic growth to shoot up in the six countries.20 As
Gulf economies were opening up to foreign participation and privatiza-
tion schemes, they also started attracting rising amounts of foreign direct
investments (FDI). Massive growth and economic liberalization spurred
the undertaking of massive infrastructural projects, which gave an impetus
to easing the entry and activities of foreign investors and workers, but did
not contribute to channeling unemployed locals into the productive sector.
In effect, across the 2000s most GCC states have displayed a peculiar
combination of very high immigration rates with unemployment rates for
nationals, especially the youth (aged 15–24 years), as stated in Table 6.3
for the mid-2000s.
Females and graduates are also hard hit by unemployment, which is
actually increasing in the less affluent states in the GCC (Saudi Arabia,
Table 6.3 Unemployment Rates among Nationals, Mid-2000s

15–24 years (percent) Total population (percent)
Bahrain 20.7 5
Kuwait 23.3 3
Oman 19.6 7
Qatar 17 1
Saudi Arabia 25.9 5
UAE 6.3 2
Source: Jad Chaaban, “Job Creation in the Arab Economies: Navigating Through Difficult
Waters,” Arab Human Development Report, Research Paper Series (Beirut: United
Nations Development Program, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2010): 20.
Oman, Bahrain, for instance). In 2013 in Saudi Arabia, nationals’ over-

all unemployment rate stood at 11.9 percent (35 percent for females as
against 6.3 percent for males), and at 41 percent for those 15–24 years old
(men: 31 percent; women: 71 percent). Seventeen percent of university
graduates (BA degree and above) were also searching for a job that year
(males: 3.5 percent; females: 36 percent).
The paradox of such high unemployment levels in the third major
migrant-receiving region in the world is striking. The reasons behind this
are many. GCC populations displayed high demographic growth until very
recently: around 3.5 percent annually in 1990, down from above 4 percent
in the late 1970s in Saudi Arabia, for instance.21 This drastically limited
the redistributive capacities of the kingdom and translated into an esti-
mated 400,000 new entrants in the labor force per year by the early 2010s.
Moreover, Gulf students and professionals display low levels of technical
training and skills. They usually favor degrees in arts and humanities or
in religion, subjects that are considered ill adapted to a productive, profit-
seeking economy.
Such career choices are actually rooted in the unattractive conditions
offered by the private sector as compared to the public sector. The reap-
praisal of labor initiated in the 1990s indeed fell short; the nationalization
of the labor force did not happen; and the 2000s’ hike in oil revenues did
not translate into rewarding job creation for citizens in the productive sec-
tor, where work hours are longer, job security unguaranteed, pressure to
produce high, but salaries much lower, not sufficient for a young national
to sustain family expenditures.22
Locals thus continue seeking government employment and turn their
back on the private sector where cheaper foreign laborers are favored by
business owners. In return, improvement of labor conditions in the pri-
vate sector lags behind, for the nonnationals have no political leverage to
impose it. This blockage is one of the reasons why today’s Gulf is one of the
major migrant-receiving regions worldwide while remaining, at the same
time, the most segregated socially and demographically between nationals
and nonnationals.
GCC Dual Societies

Indeed, the very fact of having data disaggregated by nationality signals
the existence of “dual societies.”23 Other migrant-receiving regions, the
European Union or North America, more often compute migrants as “born-
abroad,” which suggests the integration of foreigners within the receiving
states’ society, and citizenry for those who are born-abroad citizens. In the
Gulf, decades of intense but temporary migration have resulted in citizens
and nonnationals growing as two separate entities without a new, mixed
population emerging from their coexistence. Nonnationals are not sup-
posed to settle permanently and integrate in the local societies: the length
of their stay is conditional to that of the labor contract. Nationals and non-
nationals are thus separated de facto and de jure in the economic, social,
and political spheres.
Nonnationals in Gulf Economies: The “Dual Labor Markets”

From the onset of oil exploitation, oil revenues were partly generated
by migrant workers. Later, as we have seen, Gulf regimes started using the
expanding oil rent to buy off citizens’ political expression in return for high
income per capita and generous welfare systems: locals’ participation in pro-
ductive activities became superfluous. For example, the 1970 population
census of Kuwait reveals a 62.9 percent rate of male economic activity among
nationals compared with 91.4 percent among foreign nationals; for women,
the gap is even bigger with only 2.1 percent of active nationals, compared
with 17.4 percent among nonnationals.24 In 2013, the gap persisted in spite
of Kuwaiti females’ entry into the labor market: 57.8 percent rate of activity
for local males, as opposed to 94.1 for foreign males; 47.4 percent of active
Kuwaiti females compared to 63.6 percent among non-Kuwaitis. In Saudi
Arabia that same year, females’ activity rates reached 16.1 percent only (30.9
percent for the most active age group, that of 30–34 years).
Citizens and foreigners are also separated in the labor market (Figure
6.1). After 1973’s oil boom, most nationals were channeled into public jobs
funded by the oil revenues that accrued directly to the public sector. By
contrast, the private sector relied mostly on foreign laborers, whose flows
were managed, until the early 2000s, by the business actors themselves.
Figure 6.1 Percentage of Nonnationals Employed by Sector of Activity in GCC

Countries, 2012–2013.
Strikingly, most recent data point at the resilience of such a segmentation.

Everywhere the private sector is overwhelmingly staffed by nonnationals
while the public sector is, by contrast, reserved for nationals, except in
Qatar, which has the smallest national population in the region.
The distribution of employed populations by activity sector and occu-
pations also emphasizes the existence of this “dual labor market”: the most
recent data (2009–2013) show that locals are overwhelmingly employed
in education and in the security apparatus (the “Public Administration and
Defense, Compulsory Social Security” sector). This sector gathers from 31
percent of all employed nationals in Bahrain to 61 percent in the UAE.
Most nonnationals, on the contrary, are involved in the construction (10.4
percent of all employed nonnationals in Kuwait to 40 percent in Oman
and Qatar) and trade sectors (12 percent in Oman to 22 percent in Saudi
Arabia). Women, especially, are domestic workers by a large majority (80
percent of all employed female migrants in Saudi Arabia, down to 53 per-
cent in the UAE).
The bulk of foreign workers are also confined to the bottom of the
occupational ladder: in Saudi Arabia 80 percent of all foreign laborers are
in semiskilled and unskilled occupations, a proportion similar to Kuwait’s,
where 41 percent of nationals are white-collar and middle-range “cleri-
cal workers.” Moreover, as Figure 6.2 shows, nationalities are clustered in
certain occupation levels. Arabs, for instance, more often occupy highly
skilled and skilled positions than Asians.
Nonetheless, in Kuwait nonnationals make up as much as 66 percent of
the “Legislators and senior officials” and the “specialists,” the two highest paid
Figure 6.2 Employed Persons by Occupation and Nationality Group (Kuwaitis,

Asians, Arabs, Expatriates), 2012.
categories of occupation (52 percent in Saudi Arabia). This actually points

out that foreign workers are at the bottom of the professional scale, as well
as at its top, yet in much smaller numbers.
Upper occupations deliver similar wages to expatriates and to locals.
However, in all other occupational categories, nationals are paid better
than expatriates: on average, Saudi workers receive three times more than
expatriate laborers (Figure 6.3).
Foreign laborers also work much longer hours than nationals: in Qatar,
employed nationals work on average 39.8 hours a week, and expatriates
51.5. The discrepancy persists within each occupation category: foreign
managers work 6 hours more a week than local ones but expatriates in
“elementary occupations” (the lowest level of occupation) would work 14
hours more than their local colleagues. It is worth noting that Qatari labor
law states a maximum of 48 hours as the weekly work load for employees.
As for female domestic laborers, they are recorded as working 57 hours a
week.25
Separate Demographics
Obstacles to Family Reunion: Preventing Long-term Settlement
According to Gulf states’ official lexicon, there are no immigrants in
the GCC. There are only guest workers, all of them destined to return
Figure 6.3 Average Monthly Salaries in the Private Sector by Nationality (Saudi/
Non-Saudi) and Occupation, 2010.
to their home countries. Indeed, data for Qatar show that half of the
resident nonnationals in the 2010 census had been staying only two years
or less.
One of the measures preventing long-term stay in Gulf countries for
most foreign workers is putting obstacles to family reunion: sponsoring
dependents in the host country is limited to expats in the upper-income
bracket. Only managerial-level professionals can apply for a family visa
in Saudi Arabia; others have only the right to visit for a specific period of
time. In Kuwait, a minimum salary of 450 Kuwaiti dinars (for workers in
the governmental sector) to 650 K.D. (workers in the private sector)26 per
month is required for a man (a wife cannot sponsor her husband) to spon-
sor his dependents, in addition to education, health, housing, and other
expenditures. Most foreign, blue-collar workers are thus financially unable
to bring their families to the Gulf, which responds to the growing popular
concern over the “demographic imbalance” in the smallest GCC states. As
a consequence, the right to live a family life, hence, to reproduce biologi-
cally in the country, is deemed a citizen’s right only, extended to fellow
Gulf countries’ citizens,27 and to a minority of foreign laborers as part of
their package deal. By contrast, foreign communities mainly grow—posi-
tively or negatively—through migration movements. However, as will be
shown below, the emergence of a large second generation of migrants—
a sign of long-term settlement—indicates that social realities differ from
what legislation provides for.
Selective Recruitment Policies and the Demographic Structure of

Expatriate Communities
Due to the wide share of infrastructural construction projects in the
region’s economic growth, a lot of migrants are hired in bulk through
recruiting agencies for specific tasks or projects. An agency in a Gulf state
would place an order to its counterpart in one of the labor-sending coun-
tries, asking for a certain number of migrants for certain occupations.28
Due to the nature of jobs in demand, migrant communities in the Gulf are
heavily distorted in terms of gender: males vastly dominate among foreign
populations in every GCC country, up to 420 men for 100 women in the
UAE; 466 in Qatar and 569 in Oman (Figure 6.4).
Also, the age structure of migrant populations appears acutely skewed
toward economically active age groups: those 15–64 years make up 80
to 90 percent of all foreign populations, while they compose no more
than 60 percent of local populations. Young age groups (0–14 years) are
proportionately small in foreign populations. As for the ones aged 65 and
more, they represent less than 1 percent of all foreign residents everywhere
(Figure 6.5).
Spatial/geographical Segregation
This demographic distortion further alienates most of the migrants
from Gulf societies: to ensure control over foreign laborers’ movements
Figure 6.4 Number of Men per 100 Women in National and Nonnational
Populations of GCC Countries, 2010.
Figure 6.5 Age Distribution of National and Nonnational Populations in GCC

Countries: A Comparison, around 2010.
and prevent their intermingling with local populations, spatial contain-

ment is the rule. In the extreme case of Qatar where foreigners made up
86 percent of the total population in 2010, the census conducted that year
revealed that more than half of the residents (54 percent), and 70 percent
of men alone, were living in labor camps.29
In Kuwait, spatial segregation by nationality group is also noticeable.
If the population in each subdistrict (mantiqa) of Kuwait-Capital gover-
norate was evenly distributed, without any nationality-based clustering,
the proportion of nonnationals in each subdistrict would be close to the
governorate’s average: 56 percent of nonnationals in the total population.
Indeed, while Kuwaitis are nowhere a majority in the population, most
subdistricts (16 out of 29) host a proportion of non-Kuwaitis within that
range (50–59 percent), while 8 of them have 90 percent or more non-
nationals in their population. Interestingly, these all-foreign subdistricts
are populated almost exclusively by males: sex ratios there range between
883 and 14,533 males per 100 females. These areas are industrial areas,
as well as military compounds, and are mainly inhabited by Asians and
by Arabs to a lesser extent. Conversely, all but one of the 16 subdistricts
inhabited by Kuwaitis display a notably “feminized” sex ratio, that is, less
than 100 males for 100 females (from 84 to 97 males for 100 females).
This suggests the presence of foreign live-in domestics, who are mainly
women, in these areas. Therefore, the presence of Kuwaitis living side by
side with nonnationals still does not necessarily signal a mixed environ-
ment, as already noticed back in the mid-1980s. As a matter of fact, the
rate of correlation between the spatial distribution of Kuwaiti citizens and

that of the Africans, who are almost exclusively women (94 percent) and
employed in domestic services (88 percent), is very high (0.95). By con-
trast, the spatial correlation between the settlement of Kuwaitis and that of
Asians is strongly negative (–0.91), which suggests a segregation between
mostly feminine, Kuwaiti-headed households districts and mostly mascu-
line, Asian and Arab workers’ settlements.
Few Intermarriages
The spatial and socioeconomic segregation between locals and foreign-
ers may explain that intermarriages are far from being the norm, in spite
of the high expatriates to nationals ratios. Yet, such mixed unions reach
up to one-fifth to one-quarter of males’ marriages, and up to 14 percent of
females’ marriages (Figure 6.6).
However, the hypothesis of Gulf societies opening through mixed mar-
riages should be put into perspective. Available data indeed suggest that
local females marrying a foreigner would overwhelmingly select their part-
ner among other GCC countries’ nationals: in 2012 in Qatar, 75 percent
of females’ mixed marriages actually happened with a non-Qatari GCC
citizen, as compared with 36 percent only for Qatari males. A similar trend
can be spotted in Saudi Arabia. If impoverished young Saudi grooms are
compelled to seek a spouse abroad due to rising bride prices, it is thus
logical that they turn to cheaper destinations than the GCC countries.30
Figure 6.6 Proportion of Marriages with a Foreign Spouse by Sex, Selected

GCC Countries, 2000–2012.
Yet, the foreign wives most often stay in their origin country and receive
visits from the Saudi husband. Gulf females, on the contrary, would seek
a husband of an equivalent standard of wealth and descent as their own.
Women have a strong stake in maintaining the purity of descent and their
feeling of ethnic belonging, as witnessed by some authors.31 They are also
at the forefront of popular debates and campaigns protesting local men’s
propensity to marry nonnationals.
No Naturalizations
Since the 1970s especially, the Gulf states only rarely granted nation-
ality to foreign residents and, with the notable exception of Bahrain in
the 2000s,32 naturalization was not employed as a strategy to increase the
size of the national citizenries. GCC countries all have an exclusive sys-
tem of paternal jus sanguinis. Sons and daughters of a national father can
be nationals but those born in the region to foreign parents will always
remain foreigners.33 Regimes and citizenries persistently oppose the natu-
ralization of foreign nationals in which they see a triple threat: to the cul-
tural identity of the nation as it is assumed that new nationals would not
share the same values as natives;34 to social stability as it is assumed that
foreign nationals would bring a working class and its potential for protest
that would threaten in the social fabric; to the economy where, as nation-
als, they would have access to all the benefits of the welfare state. Indeed,
naturalizations are limited to a few individual cases each year, 2000 in
Kuwait for example. In Saudi Arabia, naturalizations have been performed
in the past, yet they never accounted for more than 0.03 percent of the
growth rates of national populations, and became limited to spouses of
Saudi men. Therefore, the second- and even third-generation expats born
in the region to foreign and to local mothers are considered foreigners
even if they have spent all their life in one of the GCC states and foster
no ties with their country of citizenship. No data allow us to precisely
evaluate their numbers. In Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the region,
estimates range from 1 to 2 million. The figure of 30,000 third-generation
Saudi-born Indians living in the kingdom was also circulated in the press
in 2013.
The Kafala (Sponsorship): A Demographic Policy Engineering the Large Flows of Foreign
Workers and Their Sociopolitical Segregation
Gulf states’ migration patterns, which forbid nonworkers’ entry and
long-term settlement, are different from guest workers’ programs such as
the bracero and H2 programs between Mexico and the United States, or
the German Gastarbeiter Program, which were/are overlooked by states.

In Arab Gulf countries, the employment contract is issued by a sponsor
(kafeel). The kafeel may be a placement agency or a company/institution,
or any individual under the condition that he or she is a citizen of the
given GCC country. The sponsorship system has progressively become the
legal basis for all foreigners’ residency and employment in the Gulf coun-
tries, from the manual or domestic worker to the businessperson or the
investor. It requires the local employer to bear full economic, social, and
legal responsibility for the employee during the contract period (migrants’
registration in the appropriate public services and, for businesspeople or
investors, access to markets, supply, banking facilities, etc.). In return, the
kafeel also has the upper hand on salary and work conditions, as national
labor laws provisions are sporadically enforced and exclude the most sen-
sitive sectors—for instance, the domestic sector. The sponsor’s clearance
is required to leave most of the GCC countries (symbolically, the worker’s
passport is often retained by the sponsor). Until recently, switching spon-
sors was also impossible without a “non-objection certificate” from the
first sponsor. As mentioned earlier, for workers who are not in upper-
income brackets and/or in certain categories of occupations, bringing fam-
ily members depends on the goodwill of local sponsors.
In view of the sponsorship system’s characteristics, the institution of
kafala can be assimilated to what Longva calls a system of “structural
dependence” of the foreign worker vis-à-vis the employer, or kafeel, spon-
sor. Undeniably, sponsorship can be directly linked to forced labor and
trafficking of migrant workers in every country in the region. However, the
kafala holds a structural role in the definition and reproduction of citizen-
ship and the rentier social contract in GCC countries in the sense that it
sustains the high rates of increase and the segregated structure character-
izing the Gulf population.
This institution is rooted in the construction of state-society links,
ongoing since the 1930s and the first imports of foreign workers to the
region. Unskilled locals’ low wages and detrimental working and living
conditions in the industrial sector led to labor unrest as early as in 1938 in
Bahrain, and in the entire region throughout the 1950s. This context pro-
gressively fostered national workers’ movements, whose nationalist claims
were channeled through demands for employment for citizens, equal pay,
and training, as well as appropriation of mineral resources. Beyond the
issue of labor, indeed, the processes of nation-building in the region’s inde-
pendent states or the shift from protectorates of Western powers to inde-
pendent political entities granting oil concessions also spurred the need to
define who would be entitled to a share of the oil rent, hence shaping the
“nationals” as opposed to the “foreigners.”35 The kafala36 became formal-

ized in the 1950s. Saudi Arabia’s 1952 residency law, for instance, requires
every foreigner in the kingdom to have a local sponsor. Hence, the spon-
sorship system was shaped as an element of the interface between nation-
als and nonnationals, between states, business, and foreign actors.
Kafala and Number

Sponsorship plays a fundamental role in the perpetuation of the demo-
graphic imbalance in GCC countries. By facilitating the process of import-
ing manpower, the kafala contributes to swelling the volume of foreign
laborers’ population. Until the 2000s, indeed, there were few limitations
imposed by states on the number of workers hired by individuals or
companies.
Moreover, numbers are also sustained by the trade of visas. Gulf citizens
are allowed to sponsor a certain number of work visas with the intention
that they employ the foreigners they sponsor. In some cases, the local will
sponsor the foreigner’s work visa but leave the foreigner responsible for
finding employment once he has entered the kingdom. The original spon-
sor profits from selling his sponsorship rights to another employer,37 or
expects from the worker a regular fee, a share of benefits, or a participation
in the latter’s business. In 2004, the then Saudi minister of labor Dr. Ghazi
Al-Gosaibi had acknowledged that 70 percent of visas issued were actually
sold on the black market. After Gulf states started imposing administrative
limitations on individual sponsorship and requiring every worker to have
labor and residency permits, trafficking networks setting up fake compa-
nies in order to import workers, with the help of corrupt state employees
from the Interior and Labor ministries, started multiplying in the region.
Sponsorship and Separation between Locals and Foreigners

Sponsorship also shapes the structure of Gulf societies and the hierar-
chical separation between nationals and nonnationals described above in
the following manner. First, the system puts the national sponsors in the
position of economic agents: by the very fact of earning a living from the
import of workers, (1) the kafeel privatizes labor as a means of produc-
tion, which explains the high levels of inactivity among Gulf countries’
nationals; (2) the kafeel also disconnects the management of labor from
the dynamics of offer and demand. This does not only affect economic
planning; it creates large pools of available workers, which contributes to
keeping salaries low and working conditions below standard.
Second, the kafala underlies the formation of the “dual labor markets”
characterizing Gulf countries, whereby nationals suffer no competition
from nonnationals in terms of jobs, salaries, and working conditions. Due

to the segregated environment, citizens’ professional mobility is discon-
nected from their economic productivity. For the foreigners, by contrast,
the existence of kafala and the impossibility of switching kafeel bar them
from professional competition and upscale mobility: foreign workers are
thus evicted from a real labor market.
Third, the sponsorship system endows local sponsors with political
agency. Indeed, the system delegates to average citizens and businessper-
sons the responsibility for controlling and regulating the presence and
activities of foreigners in the national territory, which everywhere else is
part of the state’s prerogatives.38 This not only allows “keeping migrant
workers in check.”39 It also makes the kafeel a middleman between the
foreign worker or investor, the receiving country’s society, and the state.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, for instance, business communities emerged
as major stakeholders—alongside the state and foreign powers—for the
role they played in the management of foreign labor, as the state’s depen-
dency on merchant classes has been a general feature of the Saudi social
contract.
Consequently, the sponsorship plays a major role in the construction of
Gulf countries’ “dual societies.” By defining the nonnationals as a source of
potential income, and as aliens who are distinct from and subordinated to
nationals, the sponsorship system actually constructs the national popula-
tion. Moreover, by the very fact of barring foreigners from the possibility of
durably settling in the territory and, therefore, forbidding them to access
the benefits of citizenship, the kafala actually enhances the benefits of citi-
zenship for nationals. In that sense, the sponsorship system contributes to
constructing citizenship as a privilege.
Ongoing Changes in Migration Policies: Toward Smoothing the Structural Gap between
Local and Foreign Societies
Political Tensions and Post-Rentier Transition: New Stakes for Migration
Political uprisings, which have shaken the Arab world since the end of
2010, have not spared the Gulf monarchies, albeit some have been more
affected than others. Bahrain has been (and still was at the time of this writ-
ing) experiencing violent antiregime protests, while nowhere else has the
overthrow of rulers been called for. Oman, Saudi Arabia, as well as Kuwait
also went through popular demonstrations targeting the corruption of
ruling elites, inequality in the redistribution of resources, difficulties in
accessing employment opportunities, and stagnating salaries. Protesters
actually addressed the fact that the oil wealth did not translate into job
creation or wage increases for the nationals. In Bahrain and in Oman,
migrant workers were explicitly targeted by popular resentment. In Oman
especially, the labor issue was pointed at in connection with the migration
policy: some slogans accused Sultan Qabus’s regime of keeping employ-
ment opportunities for its allies, the inhabitants of the sultanate’s capital,
Muscat, as well as foreign laborers. Xenophobic statements even addressed
“Indian colonization” of Oman and the privileges granted to foreign man-
agers by the Omani business class, while calling for a total Omanization of
the country’s top economic functions.40 In Saudi Arabia, protests generally
focused on the low salaries granted in the private sector, as compared to
the public sector.41 In both cases, for the very facts that migrants take on
private-sector jobs and accept their conditions (much lower wages for lon-
ger hours, for instance), these workers are deemed responsible for the lack
of attractiveness in the sector. They crystallize the anger against, first, the
disengagement of states (with no compensation as regards civil liberties
and political liberalization) from the process of rentier-type redistribution
in terms of public-sector employment, and in terms of privileges such as
housing, free education, health care, and so on. Second, foreign labor-
ers also concentrate locals’ resentment against ruling elites’ corruption,
as well as local business classes and private-sector actors’ cupidity and
lack of national solidarity. Interestingly, data point to the fact that Bahrain,
Oman, and Saudi Arabia, where protests were most noticeable during the
Arab Spring and tackled, more or less directly, labor and migration issues,
are also the countries with highest unemployment levels (especially in
Saudi Arabia, the demographic heavyweight of the region), and with a
share of locals having joined the private sector, though in modest num-
bers: respectively 17.3, 13.5, and 13 percent of the employed workforce in
2010–2012. In a way similar to the pre-1950s context, the issue of labor,
therefore, continues channeling citizenship claims addressed to regimes,
against the perceived coalition of business classes’ interests and foreign
laborers.
Policies: Limiting the Supply of Foreign Labor

GCC governments all appreciated the urgency of taking actions aimed
at controlling popular discontent. The most spectacular measures, there-
fore, targeted foreign laborers. Not only were they convenient scapegoats
for the structural ills of local labor markets, but intervention in the sup-
ply of migrant workers was a way for states to display their control over
national sovereignty, yet also to exert pressure on business classes and
regain the upper hand over the design of local labor markets in order to
address the very pressing need for massive job creation in the private sec-
tor for local youths. This is especially the case in Saudi Arabia where the
challenge of massive youth unemployment is highest. Everywhere since
2010, crackdowns against irregular foreign workers have intensified. Offi-
cial discourse now assimilates irregular sojourn to criminal activity and
irregular labor to confiscation of citizens’ employment opportunities. In
Kuwait, where tensions rose over slow economic growth despite large oil
revenues, over the emergence of youth unemployment and over traffic
and facilities congestion, for which migrant workers are deemed respon-
sible, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor announced in 2012 a policy
of reducing the flow of foreigners coming to Kuwait by 100,000 every
year for the coming decade, mainly by cutting down on unskilled workers
entering the country and targeting irregular laborers. Yet the most mas-
sive among all has been the multidimensional campaign against undocu-
mented and irregular workers and residents, supervised by the ministries
of Labor and Interior of Saudi Arabia between April 3 and November 3,
2013. About five million regularizations of laborers42 have been performed
and one million are said to have left or been deported (among them at least
200,000 Yemenis and 120,000 Ethiopians). The amnesty period expired
on November 4, 2013. Since then, large-scale systematic raids on labor
sites by the Ministry of Labor and massive rounding-up operations by the
police in areas inhabited by foreigners have been conducted and 200,000
more deportations have taken place. As a consequence, business closures
multiplied.
Labor Reforms and Workforce Nationalization

Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia also engaged in voluntary workforce
nationalization programs.43 The issue of indigenization of the workforce,
periodically revived everywhere since the 1990s, was always fiercely
opposed by business communities, which claim that local workers are
costly, hard to lay off, and unwilling to engage in low-skilled tasks, while
lacking the skills, training, and, above all, labor productivity demanded by
the private sector. The most ambitious and radical of these new initiatives
is the Nitaqat (“ranges”) campaign for the Saudization of the workforce,
launched in September 2011 in Saudi Arabia. Nitaqat combines incen-
tives that encourage firms to hire Saudis and sanctions for noncompliant
ones. Based on quotas for Saudi employees in relation to industry and the
size of companies, the system classifies them by color (red, yellow, green,
and premium). Those falling within the green and premium category are
provided certain services, incentives, and facilities by the Labor Ministry.

Companies falling within the yellow and red zones that do not meet the
Saudization quotas are deprived of services, such as renewing the work
permits of their expatriate workers. Heavy fines per redundant expatriate
are also imposed. However, even if 600,000 to 750,000 job opportunities
have been created since the onset of the campaign, its efficiency is increas-
ingly questioned.44
Besides this, all countries in the region enacted a diversity of policies
(1) to increase the cost of foreign labor (higher visa fees), cap the dura-
tion of their stay, and forbid their employment in an increasing number of
economic sectors; (2) to lure local workers into the private sector (mini-
mum salary for nationals in Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, for instance);
and (3) to enforce reforms aimed at improving labor conditions in the
private and domestic sectors, under the pressure of international agen-
cies and human rights organizations:45 creation of labor courts, multilin-
gual hotlines dedicated to labor issues, mandatory health insurance for
all workers, reduction of the weekly work duration, new measures for
protecting domestic workers and ensuring timely payment of wages, and
securing of labor contracts, for instance. The institution of sponsorship,
of a crucial and structural importance in the treatment of foreign work-
ers as explained above, also underwent reforms in every GCC country.
Bahrain formally repealed the kafala in August 2009 and migrants are
now under the responsibility of the Labor Market Regulation Authority,
a governmental body. Visa trading is now deemed equivalent to human
trafficking and individual sponsorship has been limited in Saudi Arabia.
Domestic workers have been sponsored by recruitment agencies licensed
by the Ministry of Labor since mid-2012. The transfer of sponsorship
without the original sponsor’s consent is formally possible in the UAE
too. Deep reforms of the sponsorship rules have also been announced in
Kuwait and Qatar, the latter under particular international scrutiny for
human trafficking allegations, the last one to date being the scandal of
high mortality rates of Asian construction workers employed on the 2022
World Cup’s building sites.46 Interestingly, sponsorship is now also criti-
cized in Gulf public opinion as a way for businesspeople to impose low
work standards, thus creating unfair competition between local and for-
eign workers.
Imperatives of “presentation of self” on the international stage partly
motivate such labor reforms, as economic globalization, in some cases,
puts pressure on countries ignoring international standards of labor and
human rights. But the challenge for local governments is mainly to change
the work culture in GCC countries’ private sectors, as well as to secure states’
control over the labor force recruitment patterns. Their aim is to open
more attractive venues for local laborers in the private sector, against the
will of most business owners. Labor market reforms, therefore, have a lot
at stake politically for the stability of regimes. Yet also, one unintended
consequence of a success of such policies could be the erosion of the socio-
political divide between locals and foreigners.
Toward Demographic Normalization?

Indeed, despite policies against settlement, a significant number of
sojourners seem to have become settlers.47 Nonnational populations com-
prise significant numbers of children: out of 10.7 million children under
15 years of age who presently live in the Gulf, 2.4 million (22.5 percent) are
nonnationals. They still represent a minority of children in Saudi Arabia’s
and Oman’s resident populations (11–16 percent), but they are already the
majority in the United Arab Emirates (61 percent). Some of them came as
immigrants with their parents, but others were born in the Gulf. For those,
who never migrated, return migration is meaningless. Elderly nonnation-
als are also present in the GCC. Out of 924,000 persons aged 65 and more
in the region, 127,000 (14 percent) are nonnationals. The proportion of
elderly nonnationals is highest in countries where foreigners comprise the
biggest share of the total population: the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar (39 to
47 percent of all aged 65 and more). In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, foreign
elderly persons are 10 percent of the age group.
Unexpectedly, and even though the age structure of the foreign popula-
tion in the GCC countries remains strongly skewed toward the working
ages, demographic statistics suggest that some migrants may not return to
their origin countries. Some degree of demographic normalization could
be taking place in the Gulf as in all major countries of immigration.
This second generation of nonnationals represents a unique opportu-
nity to enlarge the demographic base of citizenries in Gulf states. As a mat-
ter of fact, certain measures recently passed could open the way for easing
the strict rules governing citizenship acquisition in GCC countries. In the
UAE, children of foreign fathers and Emirati mothers can now apply for
citizenship when they reach 18. In Saudi Arabia, naturalization of some
long-term, highly skilled professionals has been possible since 2004;
popular debates also call for the massive naturalization of Saudi-born
foreigners and children of Saudi mothers. Moreover, in order to enhance
the workforce’s Saudization rates, many foreign family members of Saudis
now qualify for certain advantages and statuses usually reserved to Saudis
by birth.
Conclusion
There are considerable discrepancies in the Gulf states between actual
migration trends and policies in the domain of migration. Regarding actual
trends, not only absolute numbers but also proportions of foreign nationals
in the total population and in the labor force have continuously increased
in all the Gulf states since population censuses began, with the short-lived
exception of post–Gulf War Kuwait when a slight decline in the number
of foreigners was recorded. Foreign-national populations grow not only
because migrants who enter the Gulf constantly outnumber those who
return to their countries, but also because rising numbers of migrants
durably settle in the Gulf as shown by the emergence of a sizeable second
generation of migrants. Moreover, the rigid segmentation of labor markets
along the lines of citizenship shows no clear sign of abating. Low rates of
economic activity and a high concentration in specific niches of the public
sector characterize the employment of nationals, while foreign nationals
have remarkably high rates of activity and a wide occupational distribu-
tion across professions and sectors.
In sharp contrast with the above trends in the population and labor
markets, policies devised by Gulf states have persistently aimed at increas-
ing the share of nationals in the labor force and in the overall population.
Nationalizing labor and affirming that nonnationals are guest workers,
not immigrants, has been a constant slogan for the last two decades, but
it failed in the face of other policies. Indeed, states overprotecting their
nationals in terms of wages and welfare subsidies have made the recruit-
ment of nonnationals a generalized strategy among private employers. The
sponsorship system that brings benefits to the national sponsor, who is
often the employer, has played in the same direction. At the same time,
legislations on nationality (strict jus sanguinis) and family (restrictions on
intermarriage) have kept nationals and foreign nationals in isolation from
each other, making it impossible for the national population to harvest any
significant demographic benefit from immigration.
As a result of increasing demand for foreign nationals in labor markets
and their persistent exclusion from citizenry, there is a growing gap in enti-
tlements and rights in the resident populations of the Gulf states. Those with
full citizen rights form a continuously smaller share of the total population.
Will there be a breaking point beyond which this situation will become
unsustainable? Pressures from within (in relation to growing unemploy-
ment, and therefore discontent, of young adult nationals) or from without
(international pro–human rights activism) may trigger a transition in the
migration regime of the Gulf states. But what type of change will occur is
unclear. It can be anything from diminishing numbers of migrants with no

more rights than at present, and increased rights for migrants without any
significant changes in their numbers. A middle response would consist
in designing policies that tackle the duality of societies and mitigate the
fundamental divide of citizenship through open programs of integration
and naturalization of migrants, transforming a number of foreign nationals
and their transformation into nationals. The Gulf would join the club of
other major destinations for global migrants, from North America to West-
ern Europe or Oceania, and a movement that is typically South-to-South
would gradually resemble the South-to-North kind of migration.
Notes
1. “Gulf states” as used in this chapter is synonymous with the six countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
2. Martin Ruhs and Philip Martin, “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest-
Worker Programs,” International Migration Review 42 (2008): 249.
3. Unless stated otherwise, all data quoted or used in tables and graphs in this
chapter are taken from the Gulf Labor Market and Migration (GLMM) Program’s
demographic database (http://gulfmigration.eu/).
4. A “rent” is an income earned from natural resources or trading on strategic
resources, as opposed to income earned from capital or from labor.
5. Ian J. Seccombe and Richard I. Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence in
the Gulf, and the International Oil Companies: 1910–50,” International Migration
Review 20 (1986): 548.
6. John S. Birks and Clive A. Sinclair, Arab Manpower (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1980).
7. Ismail Serageldin, et al., “Some Issues Related to Labor Migration in the
Middle East and North Africa,” The Middle East Journal 38 (1980): 626.
8. Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC
Countries” (paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on
International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, May 15–17,
2006), accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_
Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf
9. In the rentier-state theory, guaranteed income from the state, coupled with the
absence of direct tax levies in return for political allegiance to the rulers, is seen as
the oil-based rentier social contract, summed up in the aphorism “No taxation with-
out representation” (Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in The
Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani [Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionale, 1990], 89).
10. Philippe Fargues, “Pénurie de main-d’œuvre et abondance de capitaux
dans le Golfe,” in Industrie et changements sociaux dans l’Orient arabe contemporain,
ed. André Bourgey (Beyrouth, Lyon : Éditions du CERMOC, Presses Universitaires

de Lyon, 1982), 171; Philippe Fargues, Réserves de main-d’œuvre et rente pétrolière.
Les migrations de travail vers les pays du Golfe (Beyrouth, Lyon : Éditions du CER-
MOC/Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1980).
11. Nazli Choucri, Richard S. Eckaus, and Amr Mohie-Eldine, Migration and
Employment in the Construction Sector: Critical Factors in Egyptian Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Technology Adaptation Program, 1978).
12. Nicholas Van Hear, “Displaced People after the Gulf Crisis,” in The Cam-
bridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 424–30.
13. Nasra Shah, “Restrictive Labor Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf:
Implications for Sending Asian Countries” (paper presented at the United Nations
Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab
Region, Beirut, May 15–17, 2006), accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/esa
/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P03_Shah.pdf
14. Philippe Fargues, Générations arabes. L’alchimie du nombre (Paris: Éditions
Fayard, 2000).
15. See for instance Saudi Labor Law (2005), chapter II, Article 3: “Work is the
right of every citizen.”
16. George Naufal, “Labor Migration and Remittances in the GCC,” Labor His-
tory 52 (2011): 307.
17. Outward remittance flow in 2012 in US$: Saudi Arabia: 27.6 billion; UAE:
20.3 billion; Kuwait: 8.5 billion (World Bank, Migration and Development Brief
no. 19 [November 20, 2012]), accessed May 4, 2014, http://go.worldbank.org
/I4GOQ6GWE0
18. Kuwait and Bahrain are the only GCC countries publishing some data dis-
aggregated by nationality group.
19. Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in
Saudi Arabia,” Explanatory Note No. 1/2014, Gulf Labour Market and Migration
(GLMM) program of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research
Center (GRC), accessed May 4, 2014. http://gulfmigration.eu or http://www
.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/glmm/exno/GLMM_EN_2014_01.pdf
20. The GCC holds 45 percent of the currently proven world oil reserves and
hydrocarbon export receipts are a prominent source of revenue in most member
countries: 80 percent of total exports for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar in 2011
(IMF, 2012).
21. Gulf countries have always pursued pro-natalist policies, in spite of which
fertility levels have now started decreasing everywhere (Philippe Fargues, “Immi-
gration Without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-Building in the Gulf States,”
Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20 [2011]: 281–282).
22. For example: in Saudi Arabia, a teacher in private-sector primary and sec-
ondary education receives 1,800 to 2,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR), whereas the public-
sector teacher is paid 8,000 to 9,000 SAR (1,000 SAR = approx. USD $267 as of
April 11, 2013).
23. Philippe Fargues, “Pénurie de main-d’œuvre et abondance de capitaux

dans le Golfe,” in Industrie et changements sociaux dans l’Orient arabe contemporain,
ed. André Bourgey (Beyrouth, Lyon : Éditions du CERMOC, Presses Universitaires
de Lyon, 1982).
24. Philippe Fargues, “La migration obéit-elle à la conjoncture pétrolière dans
le Golfe? L’exemple du Koweït,” Documents de travail no. 10 (Paris: INED, 1987).
25. Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman exclude domestic workers from their
labor laws. Bahrain incorporated the domestic sector in its new 2012 labor law
but few guarantees are granted. Saudi Arabia adopted a regulation in July 2013
whereby domestic workers are entitled to one day off a week, one month of paid
vacation after two years, and nine hours of rest daily. The last measure actually
suggests that domestic workers could, theoretically, be asked to work up to 15
hours a day, or 90 hours a week.
26. 1,159–1,674 Euros or USD $1,598–$2,308, April 9, 2014.
27. As per the Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (chapter 2, art. 8). Zahra Babar, Free Mobility within the Gulf
Cooperation Council (Doha: CIRS, Georgetown University, 2011), 3.
28. Mizanur Rahman, “Recruitment of Labor Migrants for the Gulf States: The
Bangladeshi Case,” ISAS Working Paper no. 132 (2011), 11.
29. Labor camp or labor gathering population is defined as follows by the
Qatar Statistics Authority: A group of persons of the same gender usually staying
in housing units. They live as a group (collectively) but there is no relationship
between them and they do not form a living household. They are two to six (small
clusters) or seven or more persons (big clusters) who usually belong to one orga-
nization (company, establishment, etc).
30. Since the 1990s, the sums demanded by families and material requests associ-
ated with marriage, which has to be paid by the groom in the Arab world, have been
rising everywhere. Young Arabs (here, from Gulf countries) started seeking wives in
poorer neighboring countries (Syria, Iran, Yemen, Iraq) and even in Asian countries.
31. On Kuwait: Anh Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and
Society in Kuwait (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
32. Large-scale naturalizations of foreign Sunnis, many of them hired in
Bahrain’s security services, were performed in the 2000s (between 60,000 and
80,000, or 10 to 13 percent of the national population in 2011). By way of such
“political naturalizations,” the regime was accused of trying to reverse the Shi’ite
demographic majority in the kingdom, which it sees as a vehicle for Iranian influ-
ence in the country.
33. Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and the Nation
State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009).
34. In the UAE, moreover, the issue is that of the purity of descent (nasab), on
the basis of which citizenship was granted originally. Paul Dresch, “Debates on
Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates,” in Monarchies and Nations.
Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, ed. Paul Dresch and John
Esposito (London, New York: IB Tauris, 2005).
35. Elisabeth Longuenesse, “Les migrants dans la structure sociale des pays du
Golfe,” in Migrations et changements sociaux dans l’Orient arabe, ed. André Bourgey
(Beyrouth: CERMOC, 1985), 169; Laurence Louër, “The Political Impact of Migration
in Bahrain,” City & Society 20 (2008): 32; Laurence Louër, “The Politics of Employ-
ment Policy Reform in the Gulf State,” Les Etudes du CERI 185 bis (May 2012).
36. The sponsorship probably dates back to a pre-Islamic practice later codi-
fied by Islamic law, originally referring to the protection granted by a tribal group
to its guests and to travelers crossing its territory. In Muslim law, the term kafala
designates the fact of adopting a child or that of becoming its tutor.
37. Divya Pakkiasamy, “Saudi Arabia’s Plan for Changing its Workforce,” Migra-
tion Policy Institute (November 1, 2004).
38. Gilbert Beaugé, “La kafala: un système de gestion transitoire de la main-
d’œuvre et du capital dans les pays du Golfe,” Revue européenne des Migrations
internationales 2 (1986): 109.
39. Anh Nga Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System
in the Gulf,” Middle East Report 211 (1999): 20.
40. Jihane Safar, “La question des migrants à la lumière du printemps arabe
dans le Sultanat d’Oman” (paper presented in the conference Faits migratoires et
mouvements sociaux dans le monde arabe, Paris, Moulay Hicham Foundation,
June 2011).
41. Françoise De Bel-Air, “’Printemps arabes et gestion des migrations dans
les pays du Golfe: vers une réforme politique?” Migrations Société 24 (2012): 87.
42. Foreigners with no residency or work permits, working for an employer
other than their sponsor, or operating in a trade other than that described on their
iqama (residency permit).
43. The replacement of foreign manpower by a local one: Saudization in Saudi
Arabia, Bahranization in Bahrain, etc. In Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE the native
population is much smaller than in Oman and Saudi Arabia, and the oil revenues
per capita are higher than in the other three countries. Therefore, the challenge of
nationals’ unemployment is easily solved by incorporation into the public sector.
44. Mary Sophia, “Saudi’s Shoura Council Criticises Nitaqat System,” Gulf Busi-
ness, January 29, 2014, accessed May 3, 2014, http://gulfbusiness.com/2014/01
/saudis-shoura-council-criticises-nitaqat-system/#.U1K71_l_tu4
45. Trade unions and NGOs, national and international, did act as whistle-
blowers in certain blatant cases of migrant abuse and thus compelled govern-
ments to take some degree of action against abusive national or foreign business
owners in their countries (see supra on Qatar). Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia
are members of the WTO, for instance, which commits them to internationally
acknowledged good practices.
46. Amnesty International, The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar’s Con-
struction Sector Ahead of the World Cup (London: Amnesty International, 2013).
47. Georges Sabagh, “Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries: ‘sojourners’ or
‘settlers’?” in The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Rome: Instituto Affari Inter-
nazionale, 1990), 349.
CHAPTER SEVEN
“Almost a Brazilian”
Gringos, Immigration, and Irregularity in Brazil
Thaddeus Gregory Blanchette
Thomas babintão ingres, Memorial de todos os Extrangeiros q Vivem nas Cap.as

do Rio Grande, Parahyba, Tamaracá & Pernambuco e Bahia dos quaes se não
pode ter sospeita.
Thomas Babington, English, a Monument to all those Foreigners who live in the
Captaincies of Rio Grande, Parahyba, Tamaracá & Pernambuco and Bahia and
whom are beyond suspicion
—Brazilian codex of 1618, giving one of the earliest descriptions
of an Englishman in Brazil (Gilberto Freyre, Os Ingleses no
Brasil, 2000 [1948])
Introduction
To think about gringos as immigrants may seem to be a contradiction
in terms. For most North Americans and Europeans (and, indeed, many
Latin Americans), gringo is a quasi-racial marker associated with people
from the English-speaking North Atlantic. That English, Americans, or
Canadians could want to migrate to a country like Brazil seems almost
impossible—a reversal of the commonsense position that those countries
attract immigrants but do not export them (and especially not to Latin
America!). Nevertheless, tens of thousands of what I call “Anglo-Americans”
make their homes in Brazil and, as immigrants, find themselves facing

problems that are common to immigrants everywhere, as well as a few that
are typically Brazilian.
From a Brazilian point of view, thinking of gringos as immigrants poses
philosophical and cultural problems. Brazilians employ the term gringo
in a way that is qualitatively different from its use in other nations of the
Americas. Gringo is a marker for that which is not of us, but is among us,
which we can conditionally make our own or reject as circumstances and
interests demand. As such, Americans and British are, of course, gringos,
but so are Mexicans and even Argentineans. The term is not exclusively
applied to any one kind of foreigner (although the whiter and “less Brazil-
ian” one seems, the more likely one will be labeled a gringo).
The problem is that the concept of the gringo, as employed by Brazil-
ians, orders foreign alterity in a semi-essentialist manner. A gringo can
never be more than almost a Brazilian—a status that will be conferred upon
him by Brazilians as if it were a prize (albeit one that can be withdrawn
at any time). A gringo who is accepted as almost a Brazilian achieves that
status through the forging of personal, subjective, relational connections
to Brazilians, which almost, but not quite, remove the diacritical marker
of alterity that hangs over him. As such, the logic of gringuice runs coun-
ter to the logic of the republic, where citizenship and subjecthood, rights
and responsibilities, are demarcated by laws and the foreign can become
national by following a set of clearly delineated legal steps.
What is particularly interesting about this situation is the juxtaposition
of the logic of gringuice with vague laws that are arbitrarily interpreted by
the authorities charged with overseeing immigration. When this combina-
tion is set against the backdrop of a national mythology that proclaims
Brazil to be a paragon of tolerance, not only does it produce miscarriages
of justice as a matter of course, it makes it almost impossible for Brazil-
ian society and immigrants to perceive these injustices as systematic and
demand change. This is in frank contrast to the public and acrimonious
debates that rage over immigration law in Europe and North America.
A point that must be stressed, however, is the arbitrary nature of the
results produced by Brazil’s immigration bureaucracy. For every story I’ve
been told by an immigrant who has met with corruption, prejudice, or
incompetence, I have heard from another who has breezed through the
system or has even used illegal procedures or personal connections in
order to guarantee continued residency. The point is not that the Brazilian
immigration bureaucracy is worse than other systems in the world, but
that its operations routinely generate outcomes that cannot be predicted
according to legal rationality.
“Almost a Brazilian” 169
This chapter looks at Anglo-American immigrants to Brazil, focusing

particularly (but not exclusively) on irregular and illegal immigration.
By “irregular” immigrants, we mean those who have come into Brazil on
legitimate visas and have overstayed. “Illegal” immigrants are those who
have entered the country without a visa, had a deportation order imposed
on them but did not leave, or who are in Brazil on falsified visas. The
material presented here is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out
among American, British, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, and Irish
immigrants in Brazil over the last 14 years. It must thus be stressed that
my informants are a relatively privileged group. Most of them speak Por-
tuguese, most are white, most have university degrees, and almost all are
middle class. By and large, then, these people are hardly representative of
the most vulnerable sectors of Brazil’s immigrant population. Many of the
dilemmas and issues that they face, however, are encountered by other
immigrant groups in Brazil such as Haitians, Bolivians, or Nigerians. This
makes my informants quite interesting for, as one of them put it (when
caught up in middle of a deportation process), “if I can’t figure out a way
to stay in Brazil, who can?”
Gringos as Strangers
While my informants are gringos in the classical sense employed by the
North American media, it is important to understand that the term is used
to cover a much wider variety of people in Brazil than in Mexico.
Brazilians use gringo in very much the same way that it was originally
used in the Iberian Peninsula in the 18th century. According to the Dic-
cionario compiled by the Spaniard Esteban Terreros y Prandos in the first
half of the 1700s, the term refers to those “foreigners who have a cer-
tain kind of accent which prevents their speaking Spanish with ease and
spontaneity.”1 Unlike the case in most of the Americas, Brazilians still
employ “gringo” in this sense and not as a semiracialized term referring
to white people from historically imperialistic countries: it means, essen-
tially, “funny-speaking foreigner.” And while white U.S. Americans and
Northern Europeans are understood by Brazilians to be prototypically
gringos, the term is also applied to black and brown Americans and Euro-
peans, Mexicans, Peruvians, Argentineans, and Nigerians. Brazil’s most
popular Portuguese dictionary, in fact, even defines the word simply as
“foreigner.”2
Certain foreigners, however, are more easily identified as gringos than
others. Those who embody or perform certain identitary markers (light
skin, light-colored hair, accented or no Portuguese, blue or green eyes,
citizens of historic global empires) attract the term much more often than
those who don’t carry these marks. As Virginia, one of my Canadian infor-
mants, puts it:
My grandmother is Portuguese and I look very Brazilian [i.e., brown eyes,

black hair, very light brown or so-called “wheat-colored” skin]. So as long as
I take care to dress up and act Brazilian, people don’t spot me out. If I start
speaking Portuguese, however, they catch my accent and then I become a
gringa. Still, people then generally think I’m Argentinean or Uruguayan.
It would be wrong to believe that skin/hair/eye color or facial features

are more important here than the appropriate performance of cultural
norms: no one is “spotted out” as a gringo simply for being white and no
one avoids the marker simply for being brown or black. Likewise, Bra-
zil’s own sense of distinctiveness and historical exceptionalism as the only
Portuguese-speaking nation of the Americas means that being identified as
a “Latino” is not enough to escape the gringo label. This fact was recently
demonstrated in a working-class bar in Copacabana to a colleague of ours,
a Peruvian with distinct Native features. Much to his disgust and exaspera-
tion, the patrons of the bar kept on referring to him as “the gringo.”
“I’m Peruvian!” he insisted in Spanish. “Latino! Your brother!”
“Yes,” came the response. “A Latino gringo.”
With regards to gringo’s sociological symbolism, however, there is one
characteristic of the word that merits our particular attention in the con-
text of the present discussion. Though the gringo is not one of us, he is
certainly among us.
The term’s contemporary popular use in Brazil makes no distinction
among tourists, businesspeople, travelers, or immigrants. Historically,
however, it has been associated with foreigners who have acquired a cer-
tain degree of consistent presence. Recall that according to Terrenos y
Pando, “gringo” refers to foreigners who have an accent. This situation
presumes that they at least speak the local language to some degree. Brazil-
ian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre associates the word with foreign traders
in the Brazilian back-lands, a theory that postulates gringos savvy enough
in their comprehension of native codes that they could wander around
19th-century Brazil as itinerant merchants.3
We can thus best define gringo, then, as a foreigner engaged in a process
of approximation with Brazil.
In this sense, the Brazilian use of “gringo” can be seen as congruent with
the concept of the stranger (fremde) as proposed by sociologist Georg Sim-
mel in 1908. Simmel defines the “stranger” as that which is strange to us,
but not alien. Not all foreigners, for example, are strangers: only those who
combine movement and stability, distance and proximity. In the words of
Simmel, being a stranger is “a specific form of interaction,” different, but
not completely different:
The inhabitants of Sirius are not really strangers to us, at least not in any
sociologically relevant sense: they do not exist for us at all; they are beyond
far and near. The stranger, like the poor and like sundry “inner enemies,”
is an element of the group itself. His position as a full-fledged member
involves both being outside it and confronting it.4
The gringo—like the stranger—occupies a contradictory form of exis-

tence marked by simultaneous approximation and distance. In his inter-
actions with us, he is proximate to the degree that he shares specific
characteristics and sociability. At the two extremes of this scale, he stops
being a gringo entirely. If he becomes too proximate, forging relation-
ships that are congruent with our most intimate interests, he stops being
“strange” and becomes a member of our family. If, on the other hand, he
becomes too distant, sharing with us only the most common of general
traits (a common humanity, perhaps), he becomes simply alien and is not
seen as having any specific linkage to us whatsoever.5
Gringos, as strangers, also contain something of that which Lévi-Strauss
labeled the floating signifier, in that they represent an indeterminate value
of signification. This is where the Brazilian use of the term contrasts most
sharply with its North American use. As reported in Mexico and in the
Southwest United States, “gringo” has a very determinate value of signifi-
cation: it refers to one sort of people (white, generally U.S. American) and
is not used in a positive sense. In Brazil, it’s not so much that “gringo” is
“devoid of all meaning,” but that the term is packed with so many potential
and contradictory significations that it is necessary for an active process
of sifting, sorting, and selection of these to take place. “Gringo” ultimately
denotes an object or person that is in the process of being assimilated: it
indicates an approximation between the signifier and the strange(r). But
the term also retains an essential strangeness, in such a way that (as Lévi-
Strauss points out regarding floating signifiers), in certain circumstances,
on certain occasions, or in certain of its manifestations, it reinforces a rela-
tionship of nonequivalence between signifier and signified, to the detri-
ment of the prior complementary role.6
The group I study, English-speaking foreigners in Rio de Janeiro, is
largely made up of U.S. Americans, British, Canadians, and Australians.
Most of them are white, although approximately 10 percent are brown
or black. I focus on people who are attempting to maintain a long-term,

stable presence in Brazil, so most of my informants speak Portuguese.
They are thus almost perfectly positioned in what we might call Simmel’s
“fremde zone”: they are different enough to be strange, but not distant to
the point where they become truly alien. They are, in short, that which is
not us, but is among us.
Gringos in Brazil
Periodically, the Brazilian media looks up from grazing upon the low-
hanging fruit of the global mediascape and ponders the fact that gringos
walk among us. This, of course, is generally treated as a surprise, because
Brazil is understood to have stopped being a destination for immigrants
sometime in the mid-20th century. In fact, throughout the 1980s, 1990s,
and early 2000s, the dominant narrative regarding immigration in the Bra-
zilian media was that Brazil had gone from importing migrants to export-
ing them. These views have very recently begun to change, as it is believed
by many Brazilians that harsh anti-immigration measures in Europe and
North America and global recession have brought drastically reduced
South-to-North migratory flows, resulting, once again, in Brazil becoming
a country that imports immigrants.7
Data regarding immigration to and from Brazil present us with a more
complicated view of the issue, however. According to Brazil’s national
census and statistics bureau, the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro da Geografia e
Estatística), the number of migrants to Brazil increased 86 percent during
the 2000–2010 period over the immediately preceding decade, with the
largest portion of this flow (19.4 percent) coming from the United States.
However, this count includes Brazilians returning from overseas and the
numbers involved are, in any case, not very expressive for a country of 190
million inhabitants (268,400, or about 0.14 percent of Brazil’s popula-
tion). At the same time, the population of foreigners resident in Brazil has
been decreasing steadily since the 1970s, from a height of 1,082,745 in
1970 to 431,319 in 2010 (plus another 161,250 naturalized foreigners).8
Simultaneously, the number of work visas granted to foreigners in 2012
increased by 70.16 percent in relation to 2009 due to Brazil’s ongoing
petroleum boom.9
Depending on whom you listen to (the IBGE or the Justice Ministry’s
Foreigners’ Division), there are between 700,000 and 1.5 million foreigners
legally living in Brazil (which does not necessarily mean they have perma-
nent resident status: many of these people live in Brazil on work or study
visas).10 Researchers connected to Brazil’s National Immigration Council
(CNIg) estimate that around 2,000,000 foreigners make the country their
home—including those here illegally and irregularly.11 Recent numbers on
migration seem to be in flux, however, especially in the context of a Brazil
that wants to portray itself as an up-and-coming political and economic
dynamo. It’s thus difficult to know which statistics are trustworthy.
Whatever numbers one accepts, however, it’s hard not to come to the
conclusion that English-speakers make up a significant part of these migra-
tory flows. The United States, for example, topped all other nationalities
for work visa requests in 2012 (9,209 out of a total of 73,022). It’s also
currently third in terms of the number of its citizens currently living in
Brazil (residents or on work visas or other long-term visas), right after Por-
tugal and Japan, with 98,000 Americans in-country. And while the major-
ity of recent “migrants” counted as coming from the United States by the
IBGE are in fact returning Brazilians, more than 15 percent of this flow is
made up of U.S. Americans.12
Historically, citizens of the main English-speaking countries (whom I
gloss as “Anglo-Americans”) have made up a small but consistent and sig-
nificant part of the migratory flow to Brazil. Between 1884 and 1984, the
country took in some 5,129,507 immigrants: 87,149 of these (or 1.7 per-
cent) were Anglo-Americans.13 This places them far behind the five main
historical immigrant groups in Brazil (the Portuguese, Italians, Spanish,
Germans, and Japanese), but on a level with other groups—such as the
Armenians or Syrians—which are quite readily recognized as contributors
to the country’s ethnic melting pot.14
Anglo-Americans are generally seen as having had major political and
economic impacts upon Brazil, but curiously little cultural or “ethnic”
impact. Simplifying and synthesizing, we can say that the perception that
Anglo-Americans do not immigrate to Brazil is based on three historical
characteristics of this group:
1. The fact that it is largely composed of citizens of countries understood to be

superior to Brazil in terms of status and wealth. English and American groups
living in Brazil are often described as “colonies,” whether or not they have
the social, political, and economic resources to sustain this claim. Sociologist
Sergio Buarque de Holanda, for example, described the English presence as
made up of wealthy capitalists, “few in number,” and attributes to them the
status of “natural leaders”: “Ethnically, their influence is negligible, for the
British rarely marry out of the colony. They form a society apart, with their
own sports clubs and entertainment, their own habits and dress.”15
2. Most of the less wealthy Anglo-Americans have historically come to Brazil
as temporary technical workers. Demographer Paul Hugon, writing about
the considerable number of Americans moving through São Paulo in
the mid-20th century, describes them in the following fashion: “In most
cases, they are specialists, workers and foremen who accompany imported
machines in order to install them in our factories or in those of American
affiliates like Ford and General Motors. We can thus doubt that they are
truly immigrants, given that their stay in country is limited to performing a
given task.”16
3. They founded no major colonies, aside from a handful of exceptions, which
pretty much prove the general rule (the American colony of Americana, for
example, or Henry Ford’s failed factory city in the Brazilian Amazon).17
No less an authority than Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre (a

confirmed anglophile), however, has repudiated the stereotype that these
conditions resulted in an ephemeral or neatly encapsulated presence.
Mutatis mutandis, his words regarding the English serve for Anglo-Ameri-
cans in general:
There were English—engineers, businessmen, missionaries, doctors—

that stayed here forever. Dead, they were buried in the English cemetery,
almost always after a ceremony presided by an English pastor or priest
in an Anglican or Protestant temple. Many raised families here. . . . Some
of their children or descendants quickly became Brazilian. Others main-
tained themselves as “freshwater Englishmen” for a generation or two. . . .
Some married rich Brazilian women. . . . Others left descendants who were
not rigorously Aryan, or who were generated without the blessings of the
Church.18
In other words, while it might be true that a large portion of Anglo-

American immigrants to Brazil was made up of businessmen and techni-
cians, this does not mean that they didn’t often end up living in Brazil
for the rest of their lives. Furthermore, my own research shows that a
significant portion of these migrants were not capitalist entrepreneurs or
itinerant technicians. There’s the case of the American Girls, for example:
a burlesque dance troupe that came through town in early 1918, leav-
ing several of its members behind in Rio working as artists/prostitutes.19
There were the famous “Irish mercenaries”: in reality, a mixed bag of 2,686
men, women, and children from the Emerald Isle who put Rio on its ear
with constant alarms and excursions in the years of 1827 and 1828. They
almost took control of the city in an uprising in June of that later year and
200 of the revolt’s survivors ended up as a cadre for an agricultural colony
in Bahia.20
And what to make of the American Society of Rio de Janeiro’s claim in
1946 that one of its most important functions was “keeping the streets
clean of beach-combers and other derelicts, who bring no credit to the

American colony and who as a rule deserve little help,” a job it under-
took in conjunction with the American Consulate General and the carioca
police?21
Even today, one can discover a general division among Anglo-American
gringos living in Rio de Janeiro. On the one hand, there are the “expats”
who are paid to work in Brazil. On the other, there are the self-proclaimed
“local gringos” who work to live in Brazil. As I have pointed out else-
where,22 these two groups generally do not mix and, in fact, often look
down on each other.
The expats are usually highly trained professionals involved in the
high-tech or banking sectors of the economy. When I began my research
in 1998, they were mostly involved in telecommunications and Internet
technology. Today, they tend to be employed by the petroleum indus-
try and international finance. These people are well represented in Rio
de Janeiro and São Paulo (their main colonies) in their nation’s “official”
sociocultural support groups, such as the American Society and the British
and Commonwealth Society. They tend to be in Brazil temporarily, going
wherever their home office assigns them. In this sense, they are classic
expatriates as described by Tung23 and also the typical English and Ameri-
can migrants of which Hugon and Holanda speak. They rarely encounter
immigration issues, given that their employers are able to provide them
with work visas. Still, it is incorrect to qualify these people as “nonimmi-
grants,” being that a substantial number of them marry Brazilians, retire
to Brazil, or even leave their international employers to work for national
companies. Once an expat has struck out on her own in Brazil, she quickly
discovers that without the patronage of a major corporation, work visas
are hard to come by. Many people in this situation thus quickly become
irregular immigrants.
The local gringos, by contrast, have few marketable skills beyond their
ability to read, write, and teach in English. They come to Brazil on their
own or following a partner and take up ad hoc employment, often as
English teachers and translators. They are rarely able to acquire a work
visa and thus quickly become irregular immigrants. Their consulates
and embassies give them no support and the members of the official
societies look down on them as “beach bums” (the exact same term used
by the American Society’s representative in 1946 to describe the type of
American that the society was working to expel from Brazil). Living in
Brazil is often described by the local gringos as a “labor of love,” and this
group maintains a problematic relationship with the Brazilian federal
immigration bureaucracy.
When I first began my research into gringos in 1998, I was mostly

interested in studying the local gringos: why had these people come to
Brazil, especially when they had no guarantee of a job or any means of
sustenance once they got here? Most of them had come to Brazil follow-
ing a particular dream or fantasy (“I wanted to drum in a samba school!”;
“I wanted to explore my sexuality!”) or a Brazilian mate who needed or
wanted to return. Many had just arrived on holiday and decided that they
liked the place so much that they would stay awhile. Very few of these
people thought of themselves as immigrants, although that is what they
had become as months turned to years and their inevitable return to their
countries of origin was somehow avoided. A few did indeed return, only to
come back and thence go home again, in a seemingly never-ending round
of ping-pong migration. And then there were those who did leave—for
good, as they always said—but who would show up again at their favorite
bar in São Paulo or beach kiosk in Rio, two or three years later, claiming
things hadn’t worked out at home.
You could find gringos like these everywhere in São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. They didn’t seem substantially
different, in most ways, from similarly educated and situated foreigners in
a city like London or New York. It thus shouldn’t have been a surprise to
me, then, that I quickly discovered that these Anglo-Americans confronted
many of the same immigration issues.
Over a nine-month period of ethnographic participant-observation,
I interviewed 46 local gringos and 6 expats.24 Twelve of my informants
either had recently been or were irregularly in Brazil (seven had recently
applied for amnesty, transforming their irregular status into conditional
residency; five were still irregular).25 Eight refused to talk about their visa
situations (I later found out that three of these were illegally in Brazil, two
having had their visas revoked and a third in the country under falsified
documents; another two of the eight were irregular). Fifteen had student
or tourist visas, which legally prevented them from being employed, but
12 of these people were working just the same. Five of the 15 were illegally
extending their visas by paying a USD $500 fee to a retired member of the
Federal Police, who used his contacts to stamp their passports whenever
they came up for renewal.
In short, out of my 52 gringo informants, all of whom considered them-
selves to be “living in Brazil,” at least 29 were violating Brazilian immi-
gration law. In terms of official statistics, however, only seven of these
29 people (the ones who had recently applied for amnesty) were being
counted as “residing in Brazil” by the IBGE (the Brazilian Census) and the
Justice Ministry: 15 were what the National Immigration Council (CNIg)
would call “illegal or irregular immigrants,” although six of these were at

least nominally legal in the eyes of the state due to falsified papers.
Of course, one cannot draw any quantitative conclusions regarding the
percentage of illegal/irregular immigrants among gringos in Brazil from a
small ethnographic sampling, but the fact that more than 40 percent of
the people I interviewed had encountered serious difficulties with Brazil-
ian immigration law and more than half of them were violating it (or until
recently had been) is surely significant.
In the years following this initial study, I became a collector of gringo
stories of immigration woes. The basics of the situation were the same for
everyone. The Ministry of Justice’s Foreigners’ Division is responsible for
overseeing immigration in Brazil, with the Federal Police administering
the mechanics of deportation, visa renewal, residency, and naturalization
requests. A foreigner who enters Brazil as a tourist can stay for six months.
If she stays longer than that, she is irregular and is charged a fine for every
day over her stay. Said fine must be paid in full before she is allowed to
regularize her situation by acquiring a new visa, and it can vary, radically,
according to administrative decisions made by the Ministry of Justice. If
she is caught overstaying again, her fine is doubled. Only foreigners with a
work visa or permanent residency can be employed. Overstaying or illegal
employment are both grounds for visa revocation. If a person enters or
stays in Brazil without permission (in the form of a valid visa), he is illegal
and subject to deportation.
Unlike Britain or the United States, Brazil has little internal policing
of foreigners, so once one is in the country, it’s relatively easy to stay. In
recent years, there has been an increase in raids on sweatshops employ-
ing illegal or irregular Bolivian immigrants, but police do not raid English
schools or translation bureaus (where many irregular/illegal Anglophone
“local gringos” work). On the few occasions in which I’ve documented an
Anglo-American being arrested on a migration charge, it’s usually because
he’s angered someone enough for that person to denounce him to the
Federal Police. An excellent example of this occurred in 2000, when the
girlfriend of an American informant of mine turned him into the immigra-
tion authorities after she found out that he had been cheating on her. The
fact that the girlfriend was herself a Federal Police agent was certainly of
help in getting the police to investigate her soon-to-be ex.
Gringo immigrants tend to drift into irregularity rather than migrate to
Brazil with the intention of violating migration laws. Typically, they over-
stay tourist or student visas and only beginning to look for a way out of
their dilemma after they come to understand their situation. Alternatively,
they try to stay on after an international work contract ends, only to find
out their new would-be Brazilian employer cannot get them a work visa.
In any case, they quickly discover that they are caught in a bureaucratic
trap: they cannot regularize their situation without paying a fine (which
grows larger every day) and leaving the country. Once they do this, how-
ever, there’s no guarantee that they will ever be allowed back in.
The four most common ways of dealing with being an irregular immi-
grant in Brazil are:
1. Pay the fine, leave, and wait six months to be allowed back in again as a
tourist, hoping that one’s past irregular status will not be brought up by the
Brazilian consulate.
2. Upgrade to a different immigration status, usually a student, journalist, or
worker (until recent years, being a NGO volunteer was also an option).
3. Get married and/or have a child and apply for permanent resident status.
4. Ignore the situation, hoping that the Brazilian government grants amnesty.
It should be pointed out in this context that whether or not one needs a
visa (Brazil demands them of some countries and not of others, generally
on a reciprocal basis), one still is qualified with regard to one’s immigra-
tion status according to the same laws (i.e., as a tourist, student, worker,
resident, etc.).
Let us look at each of these strategies in turn.
Multiple Tourist Entries

One can live in Brazil for six months out of every year on a tourist visa
and many gringo immigrants have resigned themselves to doing precisely
this. This is particularly an option for those gringos who have steady, sea-
sonal work in their countries of origin. One young American I met, for
example, worked fishing in Alaska for most of the northern hemisphere’s
summer. He’d typically leave for Brazil in early December and go back to
Alaska in May. The problem with this strategy is obvious: it rigidly restricts
one’s life in Brazil to six months out of every year, followed by a six-month
enforced absence. It is very difficult to build a life in the country or solid,
enduring personal relationships on this sort of schedule.
If one has become irregular, however, and leaves the country, paying
the requisite fine, Brazil might not ever grant one a new visa. Many of my
irregular migrant informants who desired to continue living in Brazil thus
didn’t want to risk leaving and continue on in Brazil in hopes of eventu-
ally acquiring amnesty or getting married. In the meantime, however, they
have no legal status in-country.
Upgrading to a Different Immigration Status

One can attempt to upgrade one’s status from tourist to something else,
allowing one to stay on in Brazil for more than six months. “Student” is a
popular option. An immigrant has to be accepted at an accredited school
or academy for this to work, but many Portuguese-language institutes are
accredited in this sense. Thus, as long as one is paying tuition (or con-
tinues on as an accepted student in a public institution), one can stay in
Brazil. Status needs to be renewed on an annual or sometimes biannual
basis, however, and is lost upon the course’s conclusion.
Gringos can obtain worker status if they can find a Brazilian company
that’s willing to sponsor them. This company has to show, however, that
the foreigner in question has a skill set that can’t easily be met by Brazilian
workers. Unfortunately, work visas are generally a case of “he who has,
gets.” If you’re a specialist with a needed skill, then, like anywhere else in
the world, getting worker status isn’t particularly hard. Not many Brazil-
ian companies need foreign workers with degrees in cinematography or
comparative Latin American literature, however.
People who can show employment by an accredited foreign publica-
tion can apply for journalist status. Likewise, there are immigration niches
for athletes, diplomats, and missionaries. All of these require some sort
of professional credentials and the support of a recognized organization
of the appropriate sort. As such, they are closed off to most gringos. One
can also apply for status as an investor or a retiree, provided one is will-
ing to invest a significant amount of capital (at least USD $75,000) or has
a foreign-based pension plan. During my research into sexual tourism,
I discovered a community of English-speaking foreign retirees living in
Copacabana. In the 1990s and early 2000s, this was a viable option for
extending retirement benefits, given the high exchange rate for dollars and
euros. In the second decade of the 21st century, however, inflation and
a strong Brazilian Real has eaten into these gringos’ savings and many of
them have returned to their countries of origin.
In 1999, when I did my original research, one common immigration
tactic used by Anglo-American gringos was to volunteer at local NGOs
involved in charity work. This allowed them to apply for volunteer status,
which was something on a par with worker status. Since the early 2000s,
however, this loophole has been considerably tightened, to the point
where Rio de Janeiro’s English-language newspaper has recently qualified
the volunteer visa as “nearly mystical.”26
In almost all cases (permanent residency status through marriage or
children being the exception), those applying for a different or upgraded
visas must leave and reenter Brazil, usually via their country of origin. In
all cases, they must pay any fines they’ve accrued for being irregularly in
the country. Furthermore, most of the visas related above are ultimately
temporary, must be periodically renewed, and have limitations regarding
their renewal.
Marriage and Children

Marriage to a Brazilian citizen allows one to immediately apply for resi-
dency status, as does being the parent of a Brazilian child. Obviously, these
are big steps that are not taken lightly, even in the case of marriages of
convenience arranged strictly for visa purposes. One needs a partner one
can trust and a considerable amount of time and capital to arrange all
the necessary paperwork.27 Furthermore, if the marriage breaks up at any
time, for any reason (even decades later), the foreign partner is subject
to losing his or her residency status. This is in sharp contrast to U.S. law,
for example, which allows residency based on marriage to become truly
permanent after a set period of time, even after a marriage is dissolved. On
a positive note, Brazil now accepts “registered stable relationships” as the
equivalency of marriage for visa purposes, thus allowing foreign members
of same-sex couples access to residency status.
Recent changes to U.S. immigration law have generated another type of
gringo immigrant: the partners of Brazilians who have been deported from
the United States. Many Americans find that their marriage to a Brazilian
national is no longer enough to keep him or her in the country. They then
accompany their partner back to Brazil, in order to wait for some reso-
lution to the couple’s migration difficulties. Typically, these gringos then
apply for Brazilian residency while they wait.
Wait It Out
This is ultimately what many gringos caught in irregularity choose to
do. Amnesty for irregular immigrants was offered by Brazil in 1981, 1988,
1998, and again in 2009. A myth has thus sprung up that amnesty will
be offered once a decade. Waiting for amnesty has been a strategy that has
paid off for several of my more patient informants, but it has its limita-
tions. The story of Shelly, an American woman in her thirties from Cin-
cinnati, offers an example of these. I originally met Shelly in 2002. At
that time, she had been in Brazil irregularly for over two years and had
decided to wait until amnesty was offered, as her lawyer advised her that
this would happen “soon.” As things turned out, amnesty was only offered
in 2009. Shelly thus spent almost a decade without being able to go back
to the United States to visit her family.
Towards the end, I couldn’t have left, really. My fine was probably so high by
that time, I’d have never paid it off. And, while I could’ve ignored the fine, that
would mean I could never come back. If I’d have left, I’d have had to abandon
a decade’s worth of friendships and professional relationships in Brazil, go back
to the U.S. and start over. So I began to see the time spent here as an invest-
ment. The fine that piled up against me was the actual cost of my leaving the
country. And, of course, every year you’re here, your roots just sink deeper and
it becomes more and more difficult to just pack up and go somewhere else.
Shelly’s story nicely illustrates the dilemma of the gringo who decides
to wait it out. Every year spent in Brazil as an irregular immigrant makes
it harder—emotionally and economically—to leave and yet, during this
period, one is effectively in limbo, as one’s immigration status will prevent
one from doing any number of things—attending school, buying (or even
possibly renting) property, getting married, being legally employed, and so
on. Even attempting to change one’s migration status (via marriage, say)
becomes progressively more difficult as one needs to pay off one’s fines
before doing so. The fine becomes a looming factor in these calculations
because one can never truly know how much one owes until the Federal
Police revokes one’s visa for irregularity and calculates one’s fine—and the
guidelines for calculating the fine are constantly being modified by the
Ministry of Justice.
Dealing with the Federal Police

Even when an amnesty is declared, however, residency status is not
immediately granted. Amnesty is given for two years only and must be
renewed for another two years. Only four years after the original request is
granted will permanent residency finally be given to the plaintiff. In other
words, if all went well, Shelly finally became a permanent resident of Brazil
sometime in 2013, 13 years after she slipped into irregular status.
The process for amnesty is also anything but simple and straightfor-
ward. Patrick Lawson, an Irishman who went through the process in 1998,
describes its initial steps:
I went through all the paperwork to get myself legalized under the amnesty
program. Oh my God . . . You have to get these atestados [declarations that
a person is not wanted for a crime], right? They send you to one building,
then another . . . four fuckin’ delagacias [precinct houses].
So [after doing all that] I ask the cop behind the counter if I can have the
forms for amnesty.
“Sure. Do you have your passport?”
I ask him to give me the form and I’ll come back later with the passport
and hand them in. He just looks at me. “What do you think this is?”
I shrug. “A police station?”
“You need to give me your passport before you get the forms.”
So I come back the next day with my passport. I hand it to the man
behind the counter and he says “I don’t need that. Here, just take the forms.”
Particularly telling, in this sequence, is the situation regarding the

amnesty forms. The first agent didn’t want to let Patrick access the forms
until he received Patrick’s passport—which, of course, would result in the
immediate revocation of the Irishman’s visa. If Patrick had then received
the forms and found out that the amnesty didn’t apply to his particular
situation, he would have been transformed into an illegal immigrant and
would have been subject to deportation. During the 1981 amnesty, many
of the irregular immigrants who asked for the forms to request amnesty
were fined by the P.F. (Federal Police), had their visas revoked, and were
told to leave the country on penalty of deportation.28
Under such circumstances, simply going to the Federal Police with an
immigration question requires a considerable degree of faith and courage.
An example of the arbitrary attitudes and behaviors that can be encoun-
tered during attempts to regularize one’s visa status can be found in the
story of Juan Mendonza, a 32-year-old Mexican American. When Juan
upgraded his visa status to “student” three years ago, he discovered that
the federal agent with whom he was dealing refused to stamp his paper-
work for visa renewal.
The original visa had already been granted and accepted: all she needed to
do was enter the renewal request. After looking at it, she called me over:
“This isn’t right,” she shouted. “You can’t have moved to this visa without
having left the country and come back in!”
I explained that I had indeed done just that and had been living in Brazil
for two years now. I explained that the original visa was not in question, that
all that was being turned in was a visa renewal request.
She cursed and stomped out of the room to talk with her supervisor. . . .
She eventually came back out to the front desk, fuming. She then stamped
my paperwork and stuffed it all into a folder in her file cabinet.
A year later, however, Juan discovered that he was irregular: in spite

of his paperwork being accepted, it had never been forwarded to Brasilia
by the federal agent in question, apparently on her own recognizance.

Through friends in Brasilia associated with the Ministry of Justice, Juan
got his request untangled and was reinstated on a student visa. Six months
later, however, he encountered another roadblock:
I needed to get my RNE [Brazilian foreigner’s I.D. card]. I had been waiting
on mine for over 12 months, so I went in to ask about it. All I had was my
protocolo [a small slip of paper with his photo, stamped by the P.F.]. The
agent at the counter claimed that there was no record of my ever making the
request, even though that was clearly what was on my protocolo. He insisted
that I start the whole process over again, from the beginning. Instead of
fighting, I said “O.K., give me the forms,” and filled them out.
One of the boxes on the forms asks you what happened to your original
I.D. card. I had never received mine and I said so.
“Impossible,” snapped the agent. “You must have lost it. I’ll need a police
report detailing its loss.”
And with that, he reached across the counter, grabbed my protocolo out
of my hands, and ripped it into confetti.
These are the kinds of experiences that make one of my British infor-
mants declare that “Going to the Federal Police is like opening up a Kinder
Egg [a German chocolate egg with a toy surprise inside]: you never know
what you’re going to get.” While there are many well-trained federal
police working Brazil’s immigration counters, there are also far too many
agents who either do not know or simply don’t care about immigration
law. Furthermore, there is no oversight process for when these agents
make a mistake aside from a direct appeal to the Justice Ministry and the
National Immigration Council (CNIg) in Brasilia. The fact that an appeals
process exists, however, is not information that’s announced anywhere in
the Federal Police precincts of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro: in 25 years
of researching and personally dealing with Brazil‘s immigration bureau-
cracy, I have yet to see a poster, handout, or flyer informing immigrants
of their rights, or even alerting them to the fact that they have any rights
whatsoever.
But the main problem with the federal immigration bureaucracy, which
both Patrick’s and Juan’s stories highlight, is that it is conceived of as a
police responsibility, with foreigners understood as a security threat. In
other words, there’s an inherent antipathy to foreigners built into the sys-
tem, and immigrants are often presumed by Brazil’s migration bureaucracy
to be guilty until proven innocent.
Seen in this light, the problems encountered by Juan and Patrick are not
simply the result of bad bureaucracy, but of a system that seems designed
from the ground up to produce arbitrary results that can only be appealed
on an individualized basis at the highest possible level—an option that
very few immigrants even know exist. In this sense, then, Brazil’s immigra-
tion policy can be understood to be functionally dysfunctional: it inten-
tionally creates arbitrariness that can only be redressed through special
intercession on behalf of a given person.
A Case Study
But rather than enter into the many stories of immigration that I have
collected over the years, I’d like to turn to one in particular, as it illustrates
in a nutshell so many of the practices of Brazil’s immigration system and
the ways gringo immigrants deal with these. This particular case revolves
around a gringo who moved through irregular status to residency and then
tried to naturalize himself, only to find, after 16 years of life in Brazil, that
he wasn’t a legal immigrant.
I have been following Jude Thibodeaux’s struggles with the Brazilian
immigration system for several years now. Jude is a U.S. American, now in
his early forties, who has lived in Brazil for over two decades. I’ve chosen
Jude’s case as an “exemplary story” for a series of reasons. First and most
importantly, because he is what has been historically understood to be a
“good immigrant” in Brazil, following the observations made by Giralda
Seyferth:29 he’s white, not a criminal, has made every effort to assimilate
himself (by learning Portuguese and avoiding contact with other English-
speaking foreigners), is gainfully employed, and has never been illegally
in Brazil.
Second, Jude is a social scientist who has two degrees from Brazil-
ian universities and understands Brazilian immigration law. Unlike most
immigrants, he’s in a very favorable position to navigate the federal immi-
gration bureaucracy. His misadventures thus speak more tellingly of how
Brazil’s migration system works than those of a more socially marginalized
informant.
Finally, like all good case studies, Jude’s story particularizes commonly
encountered phenomena, showing how these can play out in real life.
While Jude himself is something of an exceptional immigrant, the prob-
lems he encounters are not at all exceptional and are illustrative of gringo
immigrant life in general.
Jude’s initial approximation with Brazil was highly privileged. He origi-
nally arrived in the country as a high school exchange student in 1984,
returning to Brazil in 1990 as a university student after three years of
advanced Portuguese study in the United States. As is the case with many
immigrants, he never consciously decided to immigrate: “It just sort of

happened. I extended my student visa for a year, then for two years. . . .
At the end of that time, I’d fallen in love and had a job, so I didn’t want to
go back to the U.S.”
In 1992, Jude and his then-girlfriend decided to marry in order to stabi-
lize his immigration status. This decision was spurred on by a sudden and
unexpected change in the way the Federal Police adjudicated immigra-
tion law. Jude had delayed renewing his student visa and had lapsed into
irregular status. When he arrived at the Federal Police, he was informed
that his visa had been canceled and that he had five days to leave Brazil.
As Jude recalls the situation:
Up until then, being irregular was no big deal. You paid a fine, left the coun-
try via Paraguay, and came right back in on a renewed visa. The fine had
been USD $80. This had been changed, however, to USD $20 a day with
no upper limit. The fine was doubled if you had ever been irregular before
and I had been for five days in 1985. I thus ended up owing the Brazilian
government USD $1,200, which was four months’ salary for me at the time!
Jude was told by the agent at the Federal Police immigration desk that
he should pay his fine and go to Paraguay in order to come back in on a
new visa. His girlfriend, however, was worried, and so before Jude left
Brazil, the couple registered to marry. In Paraguay, Jude discovered that
the new administrative changes also stipulated that Americans needed to
return to their country of origin in order to get a new visa:
At the Brazilian Consulate in Puerto Iguaçu, they told me that this was a
recent change and that the Federal Police in São Paulo probably hadn’t been
informed of it yet. I was lucky, however: when I showed the Vice-Consul
that I had already marked my wedding date, he took pity on me and gave
me a 15-day temporary visa. I was thus able to return to SP and get married.
The day after our marriage, I applied for residency status.
I have explored the use of marriage as a means of regularizing immigra-

tion status in Brazil elsewhere.30 In Jude’s case, an already existing intimate
relationship was transformed into a marriage due to the pressures of immi-
gration law—a solution commonly employed by immigrants the world
over. He was only able to return to Brazil for his marriage, however, due
to an arbitrary decision made by a consulate employee, which violated the
letter of Brazilian immigration law.
Jude received permanent resident status in late 1992 (“It was no big deal.
The Federal Police sent some agents around to interview our neighbors
and about a year and a half later, I became a resident”). This also allowed
him to register as a legally employed worker, thus qualifying for retirement
and social security benefits. In 2004, recently divorced from his girlfriend,
Jude began compiling the paperwork to naturalize himself as a Brazilian
citizen. “I didn’t think it would be very difficult because I’d already been
living in Brazil for 15 years, 13 of them as a permanent resident. I honestly
thought it would be a relatively cut-and-dried process.”
Before his divorce, Jude had asked the Federal Police what changes, if
any, it would bring to his immigration status: “The head of the Foreigners’
Division of the Rio de Janeiro Federal Police told me that I wouldn’t lose
residency, because I had been married for over 10 years. When I went to
turn in my naturalization request, however, I got a different story.”
The same federal police agent now claimed that Jude’s divorce had elim-
inated his residency status. Not only was his request for naturalization
denied, the Federal Police wanted to force Jude to leave Brazil.
At that point I’d been living in Brazil for more than 15 years. I was a doctoral
candidate at a federal university, a substitute professor at another university,
and a federal research fellow. According to the Federal Police, none of this
constituted “proof of a sufficient connection to Brazil to warrant continued
residency” after my divorce.
The head of the Foreigners’ Division informed Jude that, as a “favor,”

she would “archive” his naturalization request (i.e., put it into a dead file),
“guaranteeing” that it wouldn’t go forward and thus jeopardize his resi-
dency status. He immediately mistrusted the proposal. A few days later,
Jude returned to the Immigration Department, this time with legal counsel
in tow. “What happened then was very interesting”:
As soon as I introduced my lawyer, the head of the Foreigners’ Division said,

“Well, Sr. Thibodeaux has got himself a lawyer. We’re going to have to deport
him now.” Luckily, the guy I hired was excellent. “Look,” he said. “You’re
the police authorities and far be it from me to tell you your job. But if you
do move to deport my client, the first thing I’ll do is ask for a restraining
order. Then we can all talk to a judge about why you’re trying to deport a
15-year resident of Brazil who’s never been in trouble with the law.” After that,
the discussion got noticeably more cordial: “Oh, well if we had known Sr.
Thibodeaux had really wanted legal advice, we could have made some sug-
gestions.” My lawyer later told me that this was a coded request for a bribe.
After two further meetings with the Federal Police, Jude’s lawyer was
able to block the threat to his residency status and convince the police
to change their evaluation of the American’s naturalization request from

“negative” to “neutral.” In total, the process took the better part of a
year and cost Jude over USD $4,000. Finally in 2006, after a corruption
scandal had forced some changes in personnel in the Rio de Janeiro Fed-
eral Police, Jude’s request was reevaluated and sent on to Brasília, “and
that’s when the most frustrating part of the story happened.” Because the
whole process had taken over two years, Jude’s original paperwork was no
longer valid:
In December 2006, I finally received a letter from the Ministry of Justice

saying that I had 30 days to update all my [paperwork] or my process
would be archived. I called Brasília and sent letters and faxes explaining
my situation and asking for an appeal, but received no information back.
Finally, in 2009, a letter arrived saying that the Justice Ministry and the
CNIg had reevaluated my case and ruled in my favor. I was now naturalized.
The letter told me I had 15 days to report to the Immigration Division of
the Federal Police in Rio de Janeiro in order to ratify my request. There was
only one problem: the letter had been dated two months previously. When
I went down to the Feds to see what needed to be done, they told me they’d
forwarded the paperwork to the local offices of the Justice Ministry and
there—as far as I can tell—it sank without a trace.
Although incompetency and bureaucratic intransigence abounds in

Jude’s story, the main barrier he encountered both in 1992 and in 2004
was the plastic nature of Brazilian immigration law, which encourages
arbitrary behaviors on the part of the Federal Police. The law is written in
such a vague fashion that it can be interpreted in radically different ways
on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, what oversight processes exist in
the immigration bureaucracy are weak and opaque. A foreigner who is
married to a Brazilian for a period of more than five years can have her
situation reevaluated by the Justice Ministry and the CNIg if the Federal
Police decide to revoke her residency status. What the basis is for this
reevaluation, however, is not clear and the process functions in complete
“black box” fashion: one turns in one’s request and—perhaps years later—
one gets a response back. In Jude’s case, the reevaluation process ruled in
his favor, but sent him an outdated letter informing him of this, three years
after his request for reevaluation. As a result, his paperwork was lost in the
Rio de Janeiro office of the Justice Ministry.
Although the second half of Jude’s story revolves around his attempt to
naturalize himself, it should be pointed out that the agencies and person-
alities he dealt with are the same that any foreigner involved in an attempt
to forge a legal life in Brazil would deal with: the Foreigner’s Division of
the Federal Police processes all residency requests, visa upgrades, depor-
tations, and naturalization processes. The agents who attempted to extort
Jude are the same people who failed to send Juan’s visa renewal request
on to Brasília and who tried to trap Peter into turning in his passport as a
prerequisite for receiving amnesty forms. In other words, in many ways,
Judes story illustrates the normative functioning of the Brazilian immi-
grant bureaucracy.
Conclusion: Gringos and Cordiality

A movement to change Brazil’s immigration laws began to coalesce in
September 2005, and a bill modifying the Foreigners’ Statute (the law regu-
lating Brazil’s immigration system) was finally sent before Congress in July
2009. Discussion continues around how Brazil can adopt an appropriate
migration legal framework. Meanwhile, according to anthropologist and
congressional researcher Marcia Anita Sprandel, what little political space
exists to discuss migration policy in the Brazilian congress has been almost
completely dominated by the trafficking in persons debate.31 According
to Sprandel, Brazil is undergoing a dangerous shift in immigration policy
away from rights and toward law enforcement, where the rubric of “traf-
ficking in persons” is being used to frame debates regarding illegal and
irregular immigration.
The precise regulation of migration law in Brazil may affect Anglo-
American irregular immigrants less, who tend to enter the country legally
and overstay their visas, hence becoming irregular. In fact, it’s quite dif-
ficult to get Anglo-Americans to see themselves as immigrants, even after
they have lived in Brazil for years. As one of my American informants put
it when I asked him if he considered himself to be an immigrant, “Wow,
I’ve never thought of it that way. I guess I always thought of immigrants as
Mexicans or Chinese or something.”
Anglo-American gringos living in Brazil tend to see their situation as
an individual problem and not as a social or political issue. My Canadian
informant Virginia describes how she and her foreign acquaintances deal
with their immigration issues in the following terms:
It’s like we’re all climbing this huge mountain on our own. I mean, we’re all
on the same face of the mountain and we can call out advice to each other,
but each of us is dealing with our own challenges. And you don’t have any
time for someone below you, grabbing at your boot! There’s almost no soli-
darity among gringos when it comes to dealing with the P.F. People won’t
even give you the contact information for their lawyers.
Listening to my Anglo-American informants, I am often struck by the

feeling that they think that their visa issues are an unfair burden that’s been
inexplicably placed upon them by the Brazilian state. They by and large
believe that they are “good gringos” who “respect and love Brazil” and
should thus be allowed to live here indefinitely. They are supported in these
beliefs by their Brazilian friends, colleagues, and relatives, who tend to see
these gringos’ immigration dilemmas filtered through the light of their per-
sonal relationships. In other words, the field of rights and responsibilities,
as established by law, is generally seen as completely secondary to the per-
sonal behavior of the gringo in question, which is judged according to her
“respect and love for Brazil” and her insertion in Brazilian social networks.
This logic of gringuice is so dominant that many Brazilians are shocked
when they discover that a gringo friend has immigration problems. In fact,
the belief that “respect for Brazil” (demonstrated by speaking Portuguese,
employing Brazilian cultural devices, cutting oneself off from relationships
with other foreigners and, above all, not entering into conflicts with Bra-
zilians) should remove a given gringo from the state’s surveillance is so
strong that many gringos themselves employ it in the face of the migratory
bureaucracy.
An excellent example of this took place on the television show Mais
Você, hosted by Ana Maria Braga, on February 25, 2011.
On this occasion, Braga’s guest was Alex Cutler, AKA “Don Blanquito,” a
young, white American rapper who had been engaging in ping-pong immi-
gration between Brazil and the United States since 2004, residing in-country
as long as his tourism visa would allow and returning to the United States
when it expired. Cutler was living in a favela and performing in funk shows
in some of the most dangerous regions of Rio’s North Zone, while working
as a tour guide and teaching English. Unfortunately, his tourist visa would
expire once again in March. He was appearing on Mais Você specifically to
appeal to Braga’s audience for their help in his quest for residency status.
Cutler wanted to permanently migrate to Brazil and he was upset that
there was no clear path forward for him to legally do this: he had no
needed job skills, wasn’t a student or a journalist, didn’t want to marry. . . .
In short, Cutler had no legal argument whatsoever for being allowed to
stay in Brazil. As most gringo immigrants do, however, he proclaimed: “I
love this marvelous country very much and I don’t want to leave! It makes
me sad to think I must!”
Moved by Cutler’s plea, Braga addressed the Federal Police, appealing
to them to let the rapper stay in the country. She concluded her show by
consoling Cutler and saying, “I’m sure you’ll find a way to stay. You’re
already a Brazilian.”32
Shortly after Cutler’s appearance on Mais Você, I interviewed him. He

claimed to have been involved with the Spanish-language rap scene in
the United States, which would imply a certain degree of contact with the
situation of immigrants in that country, and yet he still seemed to be sin-
cerely confused as to why he wasn’t being allowed to stay in Brazil. He did
not see himself as an immigrant, but as an “expat[riate]” and, once again,
reiterated how he felt his “love and respect” for Brazil should be taken into
consideration by the Federal Police when it came time to look at his visa
situation. Since our discussion, Don Blanquito has apparently found a way
further up his particular mountain, however: as of 2013, he was still in
Rio, producing songs about the upcoming Olympic games.
Cutler’s reaction to his immigration dilemma is not at all uncommon
among gringos in Brazil. It is when we look at the simultaneously proxi-
mate and distant nature of the stranger/fremde/gringo in the light of Brazil’s
abiding culture of cordiality that we can gain insight into why Brazilians
and gringos alike do not see these foreigners as immigrants.
In 1936, sociologist Sérgio Buarque de Holanda popularized the com-
ment that Brazil’s singular contribution to global civilization was “the cor-
dial man.”33 Oceans of ink have since been spilled by social scientists and
historians in discussing what cordiality means in the Brazilian social con-
text. The best English-language analysis of Buarque de Holanda’s thoughts
on this topic was perhaps given by Richard Morse:
Brazilians, Sérgio felt, were adverse to ritualism. Social life liberates the cor-
dial man from rationalizing his world and from fearing to live with his own
self. Cordiality, he argues, dictates preferences whereas democratic benevo-
lence aims to balance off and neutralize egoisms. While the “humanitarian”
ideal of the greatest welfare for the greatest number subordinates quality to
quantity, cordiality loses force beyond a narrow circle and fails to cement
extended forms of social organization. . . . Thus does Sérgio define Brazil’s
challenge of political organization.34
Cordiality developed in Brazil as a consequence of urbanization and

modernization within a deep and abiding context of rural patriarchalism,
forming a sociocultural substrate whose members are linked by sentiment,
but not interests and ideas. In this context, family and personal connec-
tions come to the fore and often take precedence over public law: duties,
not rights, are the language of the cordial man.35
I am not proposing that cordiality be used as a key for understanding
Brazilian society entirely, or even that it should be applied without caution
to the study of immigrants and Brazilian prejudices. As Octavio Ianni has
pointed out, the theory itself may in fact be a carnivalized, denunciatory

caricature of a Brazilian “population that takes too long to assume the fig-
ure of ‘the people’,” or a historical intellectual artifact of a time and place
(modernizing, urbanizing São Paulo of the 1930s) where the “new Brazil”
feels the need to satirize and reject the old.36
And yet . . .
Anyone who observes Brazilians and gringos interacting on a daily basis
will be struck by how little considerations of rights and law penetrate
into their discourses and how often the language of duties ordered around
personal relationships appears. This language emphasizes how foreigners
must “love and respect” Brazil in order to have their presence in the coun-
try recognized as legitimate. What this means in concrete terms is that
foreign residents of Brazil are encouraged to emphasize their assimilation
(typically by speaking Portuguese, by not criticizing Brazil, and by form-
ing primary relationships with Brazilians) and their connections to those
things that are seen as positive marks of “Brazilianness” in the global image
scape. A gringo’s performance as a “good gringo, almost a Brazilian” thus
becomes much more determinative to her daily acceptance by Brazilians
than her status according to immigration law.
And this, in the final analysis, is the underlying condition that prevents
Anglo-American immigrants to Brazil from seeing their situation as part
of the general problem of the crisis of immigration law, in Brazil or more
globally. The personalizing, individualistic logic of the gringo relationship
deemphasizes immigration policy as a political field of struggle, especially
among those more relatively privileged immigrants who can employ per-
sonal connections to work the system in their favor. For most Anglophone
gringos who are irregularly in Brazil (and indeed, as Jude’s story illustrates,
even some who are legal residents), Brazil’s immigration “non-policy”
appears as a senseless, “huge mountain” they must climb on their own.
Part of this view is rooted in these Anglo-Americans’ prejudices that they
(as members of so-called developed nations) “aren’t really immigrants.”
However, the very arbitrary nature of Brazil’s immigration system encour-
ages them to think about it unsystematically, as a field of play that couldn’t
possibly ever be subject to the rule of rational law.
Notes
1. Apud Charles E. Ronan, “Observations on the Word Gringo,” Arizona and
the West 6 (1964): 23. For further discussion of the term and its history, see Thad-
deus G. Blanchette, Gringos (Master’s Thesis, PPGAS/Museu Nacional, 2000).
2. Aurélio Buarque de Holanda Ferreira, Mini-Aurélio: O minidicionário da lín-

gua portuguesa (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 2000).
3. Gilberto Freyre, Sobrados e Mocambos (SP: Editora Record, 1990 [1936]),
60.
4. Georg Simmel, “The Stranger,” in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. Kurt
Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950 [1908]), 402–403.
5. Ibid., 405.
6. Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Introdução: A Obra de Marcel Mauss,” Sociologia e
Antropologia (São Paulo: COSACNAIFY, 2003 [1966]), 39.
7. IOM, Migratory Routes and Dynamics between Latin American and Carib-
bean (LAC) Countries and between LAC and the European Union. Brussels: 2012.
Accessed on April 3, 2013, http://www.migracion-ue-alc.eu/index.php/en-GB
/data-on-migration/study-on-migratory-routes-and-dynamics.
8. Juliana Castro, “Censo: número de imigrantes no Brasil dobra nos últi-
mos dez anos,” Agência Globo, 27/04/2012. Accessed on December 12, 2012,
http://br.noticias.yahoo.com/censo-n%C3%BAmero-imigrantes-brasil-dobra-nos
-%C3%BAltimos-dez-125501494.html. G1, “Nˆ de estrangeiros que moram no
Brasil cai 15,4% em 10 anos, diz IBGE,” G1, October 17, 2012. Accessed on Decem-
ber 12, 2012, http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/10/n-de-estrangeiros-que
-moram-no-brasil-cai-154-em-10-anos-diz-ibge.html.
9. UOL, “Cresce emissão de vistos de trabalho para estrangeiros,” Canal Execu-
tivo, February 19, 2013. Accessed on February 21, 2013, http://www2.uol.com
.br/canalexecutivo/notas13/190220139.htm.
10. Vladimir Platonow, “Brasil já tem 1,5 milhão de imigrantes regulariza-
dos.” Agência Brasil, May 16, 2012. Accessed on December 12, 2012, http://
agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2012-05-16/brasil-ja-tem-15-milhao-de-imigrantes
-regularizados. Neilmar Oliveira, “IBGE: mais de 700 mil estrangeiros vivem no país.”
Agência Brasil, October 9, 2009. Accessed on December 12, 2012, http://agenciabrasil
.ebc.com.br/noticia/2009-10-09/ibge-mais-de-700-mil-estrangeiros-vivem-no-pais.
11. This estimate was given to me several times over the past couple of years
by members of the CNIg in various different contexts. See also Gilberto Scofield
Jr. and Marcelle Ribeiro, “Crise global e crescimento do Brasil fazem número de
imigrantes crescer 52% no ano, superando 2 milhões,” O Globo, October 29, 11.
12. Ministério de Justiça, apud NBR Notícias, “Brasil já tem mais de 1,5 milhão
de estrangeiros regularizados,” TVNBR, 28/05/2012. Accessed on December 12,
2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LF-DHHqMT-Y.
13. The numbers come from the IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, Years
1935–1998 (RJ: Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). Of this
number, 52,074 (59.75 percent) were Americans, 33,377 were English (38.30
percent), and 1698 (19.50 percent) were “others” (almost entirely Canadians).
14. Blanchette, 2000, op. cit., 38.
15. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, apud Souza Cruz Company, A Presença
Britânica no Brasil: 1808–1914 (RJ: Editora Pau Brasil. 1987), 42.
16. Paul Hugon, Demografia Brasileira (SP: Editora Atlas. 1973), 97–98.
17. Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle
City (NYC: Metropolitan Books, 2009).
18. Gilberto Freyre, Os Ingleses no Brasil (RJ: Topbooks Editora, 2000 [1948]),
122.
19. T. G. Blanchette and A. P. Silva, “As American Girls: migração, sexo e status
imperial em 1918,” Horizontes Antropológicos 15 (2009), 75–99.
20. Julvêncio Lemos, Os Mercenários do Império (Porto Alegre: Palmarinca, 1993).
21. Blanchette and Silva, 2009, 84.
22. Thaddeus Blanchette, “Christchurch: A primeira igreja étnica do Brasil,”
Travessia: A Revista do Migrante 2 (2003): 20. See also Blanchette, Gringos, 2000,
op. cit.
23. Rosalie L. Tung, “American Expatriates Abroad: From Neophytes to Cos-
mopolitans,” Journal of World Business 33 (1998): 125.
24. Going by their self-descriptions: 24 Americans, 1 Peruvian American, 1
Russian American, 9 English, 3 British, 1 Irish English, 2 Canadians, 1 Irish Cana-
dian, 1 Irish, 2 Scottish, 1 Spanish/Filipina/Russian/Brazilian (who married into
the British colony), 1 French Brazilian, 1 Salvadoran, 1 Egyptian, 2 New Zealand-
ers, and 1 Australian.
25. Vanildo Mendes, “Brasil anistia 41.816 estrangeiros em situação irregu-
lar,” Estado de São Paulo, January 6, 2010. Accessed on December 12, 2012,
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,brasil-anistia-41816-estrangeiros-em
-situacao-irregular,491657,0.htm.
26. Mira Olson, “Getting a Work Visa in Brazil,” The Rio Times, April 20,
2010. Accessed on December 12, 2012, http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/
rio-business/getting-a-work-visa-in-brazil/.
27. For more information on marriage as an immigration strategy, see Thad-
deus G. Blanchette, “Is It a Real Marriage? Imigração e casamentos entre brasileiros
e anglo-americanos,” in Cruzando Fronteiras e Disciplinas, eds. Helion Povoa Neto
and Ademir Pacelli Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003).
28. Rosita Milesi, Regularização de Imigrantes no Brasil, pelo sistema do Registro
Provisório—Anistias de 1981, 1988 e 1998 (Brasília: Instituto Migrações e Direitos
Humanos, Rede Solidária para Migrantes e Refugiados, 2009).
29. Giralda Seyferth, “Colonização e Política Imigratória no Brasil Imperial,” in
Políticas Migratórias. América Latina, Brasil e Brasileiros no Exterior, ed. Teresa Sales
(São Carlos: EdUFSCar, 2000), 71–100, 98.
30. Blanchette, 2003, op. cit.
31. Maia Sprandel, “Políticas migratórias no Brasil do século XX,” paper pre-
sented at the International Deslocamentos, Desigualdades e Direitos Humanos
Seminar, July 6, 2012, PUC/SP.
32. “Entrevista com Don Blanquito,” Mais Você, February 2, 2012. Accessed
on December 12, 2012, http://tvg.globo.com/programas/mais-voce/v2011/Mais
Voce/0,,MUL1649895-18173,00.html.
33. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, “O Homem Cordial” in Raízes do Brasil Sergio
Buarque de Holanda (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1992 [1936]), 101–112.
34. Richard Morse, “The Multiverse of Latin-American Identity, c. 1920–

c. 1970,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. X: Latin America Since
1930—Ideas, Culture and Society, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press), 78.
35. Ibid.
36. Octavio Ianni, “Types and Myths in Brazilian Thought,” Revista Brasileira
das Ciências Sociais 1 (2005): selected edition. Accessed on January 12, 2013,
http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?pid=S0102-69092005000100003&script
=sci_arttext.
Part III
Myth: Migration is economically negative.
This section deals with the assumption that immigration has a negative
impact on receiving countries’ economies. To support this claim it is often
argued that immigrants take jobs away from the native population, that
they drive down wages, and that they are keen to exploit national social
welfare systems. There is little if any empirical evidence to support each
of these complaints and most economists agree that, though migrants can
bring both benefits and costs to receiving countries, their overall contribu-
tion tends to be positive. Since migrants generally fill jobs that residents do
not want or cannot fill, the overall impact of migration on unemployment
rates and wage levels is marginal. This is illustrated by María Bruquetas-
Callejo in her chapter by looking at the example of Spain. She highlights
the positive contributions that the large influx of migrants has brought to
the Spanish welfare state and economy. In Spain, as in many other receiv-
ing countries, the arrival of immigrant workers has reinforced, rather than
weakened, the domestic economy and has even contributed to the survival
of certain productive sectors that would have otherwise disappeared.
Low-skilled workers tend to be more affected by migration inflows than
high-skilled workers, as they compete directly with the incoming labor force,
which often has similar skills and a comparable educational background.
Yet, also in the case of low-skilled migrants, research shows that they often
fulfill labor market needs in niche sectors and can make a substantial con-
tribution to the receiving state’s economy. This is, for example, the case for
Indian nationals working in the dairy industry in Italy, as discussed by Kath-
ryn Lum in her chapter. She shows how the vast majority of these low-skilled
workers have successfully inserted themselves into the dairy industry and
how they are contributing to the Italian economy on a large scale.
Also, the assumption that migrants rely heavy on social welfare and
contribute relatively little to the public system is not backed by empiri-
cal evidence. It is often assumed that opening up possibilities for legal
migration and free movement between countries in the developing world
inevitably brings with it a right to extensive social welfare benefits and
their exploitation by migrants. In fact, most migrants make substantial
contributions and have neither the opportunity nor an interest in exploit-
ing national welfare systems. The example of the free movement regime
in the European Union, well illustrated in the chapter by Carrera, Eisele,
Guild, and Parkin, shows on the basis of the EU legal framework as well as
statistics on the reliance on social benefits, that the overwhelming majority
of mobile EU citizens do not present a negative fiscal impact on receiving
countries. The myth of so-called benefit tourism is illustrative of a broader
emerging phenomenon, where developed countries—in times of economic
austerity—are willing to mobilize and fuel negative public sentiments con-
cerning immigration in order to establish regimes of semilegality, denying
core economic and social rights to incoming migrants.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Is Immigration Positive for the

Welfare State?
The Case of Spain
María Bruquetas-Callejo
Introduction
Can immigration be positive for the welfare state? Or is it necessarily
detrimental? Numerous studies have dealt with the impact of migration
on welfare states. Particularly, the economic effects of immigration have
been a popular issue. Immigration brings about various interrelated effects
for the labor market and the welfare state. Migration affects a country’s
labor supply, which may have an impact on wages and employment oppor-
tunities of the native workers. Migration influences public finances, as
migrants contribute to taxes and the social insurance system, functioning
both as contributors and taxpayers and as users of welfare benefits and
services. Migration also adds to population density, which has conse-
quences for the quality of territory-bound public services such as housing
or transport, and also health care or education.
The widespread belief is that migration’s impact on welfare states is
negative. According to this perception, migrants are expensive for welfare
states since their use of welfare benefits and transfers is larger than their
contributions. To dismantle this myth this chapter analyzes the particular
relationship between migration and the welfare state in Spain in the con-
text of the pre-economic crisis. The Spanish case is relevant because it
demonstrates the positive contribution that an extremely large influx of
migrants brought about for the Spanish welfare state and economy. Spain
is particularly interesting because it holds a welfare mix that combines
contributive and universal schemes. In fact, the Spanish case reveals migra-
tion’s clear positive impact in spite of universal schemes that entitle access
to all residents including irregular immigrants. Some scholars defend that
the impact of immigration is negative for countries with generous wel-
fare states, with high social expenses and universal access to benefits. The
Spanish case study refutes this idea. In fact, as we will see, immigrants are
underrepresented in Spanish social assistance services. In spite of univer-
sal programs such as health care or social assistance, migration implies
a net contribution for the Spanish economy that has been considerably
reinforced by the arrival of immigrant workers. A report prepared by the
Economic Office of the President in 2006 stated that 30 percent of Spain’s
GDP growth between the mid-1990s and the beginning of the new cen-
tury was a result of the arrival and settlement of immigrant groups. Since
the great majority of immigrants are young, they constitute a net contribu-
tion to the Social Security budget, and they will continue to be for at least
the next two decades. Moreover, immigrant women’s work constitutes a
crucial contribution to the Spanish welfare state in the provision of care to
dependent persons.
Using data from recent research,1 this chapter sets out to answer two
questions: (1) Does immigration have a positive or negative effect on the
Spanish welfare state? (2) Which factors account for that effect? The find-
ings are based on a statistical analysis of several official data sets produced by
Spanish authorities at different levels: National Institute of Statistics, Center
of Sociological Research, Bank of Spain, diverse ministries and regional gov-
ernments, international organizations (Eurostat, OECD, United Nations)
or social organizations (e.g., FOESSA survey on social exclusion). We start
the chapter with a description of migratory flows and the Spanish welfare
mix, emphasizing the specific channels of access of immigrants to wel-
fare rights. Subsequently we offer empirical data on the participation of
immigrants in several domains of the Spanish welfare state, starting with
data on the use that migrants make of both contributive welfare schemes
(such as unemployment benefits) and universal schemes (such as health
care). We will also present data on the contribution that migrants make to
the Spanish economy and welfare state, in particular on the role of immi-
grant women providing care services. Finally, we will discuss the factors
that help us understand the migration-welfare link in the Spanish case.
Is Immigration Positive for the Welfare State? 199
We will wrap up by drawing some conclusions about the future and about
how migration functions as a catalyst for the strengths and weaknesses of
the welfare state.
The Economic Impact of Migration

The classical literature on the economic impact of immigrants on wel-
fare states comprises cost-benefit analyses in traditional immigration
countries such as the United States, Canada, or Australia.2 The main find-
ing of these studies is that immigrants use welfare programs to a greater
extent than natives, and as a result migrants imply increasing costs for the
public finances of the welfare state (fiscal impact). In Europe the majority of
studies focus on Germany3 and more recently on Sweden,4 Denmark,5 or
the Netherlands6 together with some comparative projects. Although the
European literature coincides in general terms with the classical studies
on the higher welfare dependency of immigrants, it also introduces some
important nuances. For instance, research in European countries confirms
that migrants tend to integrate out of welfare and not into welfare, meaning
that they resort to welfare services in difficult times but go back to work as
soon as they can.7 While most previous studies used cross-sectional data,
Hansen and Lofstrom used panel data to conclude that immigrants in Swe-
den reduce welfare dependence with time spent in the reception country.
An important issue in the literature is how to explain higher rates of
welfare dependency among immigrants. Many studies in the United States,
Australia, or Germany explain the higher welfare dependency of migrants
by referring to socioeconomic characteristics (such as having lower educa-
tion level, younger age, or higher number of children). This means that
when comparing natives and immigrants with similar socioeconomic vari-
ables, immigrants present similar or even lower levels of welfare depen-
dency. If controlling for socioeconomic characteristics reduces the welfare
gap between immigrants and natives, this indicates that immigrants are not
abusing welfare, they are simply more likely to have less favorable socio-
economic positions and to face problems like losing their job or having
difficulties in finding a new one. According to these studies, immigrants
receive more transfers than natives only insofar as they have characteristics
that entitle them to welfare schemes (e.g., being unemployed or having
dependent children).
Although the bulk of the European literature endorses these broad
conclusions, some studies found evidence of residual welfare depen-
dency in immigrants, which means that immigrants have a higher wel-
fare dependency than natives when immigrants and natives who have
similar socioeconomic status are compared. Hansen and Lofstrom,8 for

example, found that in Sweden immigrants are more likely to use social
assistance programs than natives even when socioeconomic characteris-
tics are controlled for. Particularly relevant is the study by Brücker et al.9
using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to compare all
current EU member states (with the exception of Sweden). Concerning
unemployment benefits, they found considerable residual dependency in
some countries, although the effects are moderate. Controlling for socio-
economic characteristics, migrants have significantly more likelihood of
getting unemployment benefits in Finland, Denmark, Austria, the Neth-
erlands, France, and Belgium. On the other hand, in Germany, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and Greece, being a migrant does not affect unemploy-
ment benefit dependency. In terms of pensions, Bruecker et al. found no
residual effects, and in family allowances, effects were seen in only a few
countries (France, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
How can we explain that immigrants have more residual depen-
dency on unemployment benefits in some countries while not in others?
Country variations indicate that the use of welfare benefits by migrants
depends to a great extent on the institutional framework of the receiving
country. In particular, the general expectation is that the more generous
a welfare state is, the higher the use of social provisions by immigrants
would be. A related assumption is that low-skilled immigrants will be
attracted to countries with more generous welfare benefits, while the high
taxes paid in generous states will function as a deterrent to high-skilled
immigrants (adverse selection effect). This is known as the welfare magnet
theory.10 Migrants make rational choices between potential receiving coun-
tries, choosing those with more generous welfare provisions. According to
proponents of this theory, this would explain, for example, how we find
better performing immigrants in the less protective liberal Britain and low-
performing immigrants in more protective welfare states, like the corpo-
ratist-conservative Germany or the social-democratic Sweden.
However, empirical results about the welfare magnet hypothesis are not
conclusive but rather mixed. While many authors explain their findings
by a selection effect, meaning that low-performing migrants were attracted
to the more generous welfare states,11 other studies like Pedersen et al.12
do not find evidence in favor of the welfare magnet hypothesis. Instead,
these studies find that other variables, like social networks or cultural dis-
tance, explain better how migrants choose their countries of destination.
According to this, migrants would tend to go to those places where fellow
nationals are already present, because the information about migration
destinations is normally transmitted via community and family networks.
An alternative explanation to welfare magnets would be to explain

migrants’ welfare dependence in some countries on the basis of differences
in their labor market regulation. Unstable employment and labor market
discrimination can be causes for the dependency of migrants on unem-
ployment benefits, but are not sufficient to explain why residual depen-
dency is larger in strong welfare states. Rather, the crucial difference has
to do with the fact that migrants in generous welfare states are normally
employed in the formal sector, and this entitles them to unemployment
benefits when necessary. In countries with large shadow economies, which
often have weaker welfare states, immigrants generally find jobs in this
deregulated sector, which do not entitle them to unemployment cover-
age once they become jobless. Baldwin-Edwards13 points out that, given
the lack of residual dependency on other welfare benefits, this alternative
explanation seems plausible. The type of labor market in each country, with
different degrees of stratification and regulation, implies specific opportu-
nities and constraints for immigrants’ living strategies, which in turn has
consequences for their economic performance and use of welfare benefits.
Additionally, migration policies influence the welfare use of immigrants
in several ways. Migration policies define entry categories with related enti-
tlements and constraints to access to the labor market and welfare schemes.
For example, welfare receipts of asylum seekers are higher given that they
are not allowed to work in most countries. Moreover, restrictive migration
policies favor irregular migration. Migration policies of different countries
also influence one another and the migration flows that they receive. For
instance, restrictive migration policies in one state may imply that migra-
tion flows redirect themselves to less restrictive (neighboring) countries, as
has indeed occurred in the case of the eastern enlargement of the European
Union.14 This in turn may lead receiving states to engage in a competition
to strengthen migration restrictions more than their neighbors. States also
accommodate their migration policies according to their welfare schemes,
as demonstrated by Gran and Clifford.15 In a comparison of nine countries
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Gran and Clifford investigated the access to social rights in relation to
migration levels. Their findings show that countries with more generous
family allowances present high levels of migration, while countries with
more generous old-age pensions restrict more the entry of elderly migrants.
The former discussion shows the importance of bringing the institu-
tional framework of host welfare states into the picture. Case studies like
the one presented here allow us to see how welfare schemes function in
combination with the ability of the labor market to absorb foreign work,
or how, when migration policies in combination with welfare schemes do
attract more unskilled refugees and migrants to countries that cannot pro-
vide suitable employment for them, the proportion of immigrants’ use of
benefits will tend to increase.
Contemporary Migration to Spain

Spain has gone from being a country of emigration to being a net recipient
of migratory flows. In the past decade Spain experienced a sharp increase
in the foreign resident population due to a migratory flow of extraordinary
volume and intensity. According to aggregate data from municipal popula-
tion registers, there were 923,000 foreign residents in Spain in 2000 out
of a population of 40.4 million. Ten years later (in December 2010), this
figure had increased to slightly over six million foreign residents out of an
overall population of 45 million. In other words, in the past decade foreign
residents have gone from representing 2.28 percent to 12.17 percent of
the total population in Spain. The share of foreign residents of the total
population has increased to reach rates of European countries with the
longest migratory tradition.
On the other hand, as Figure 8.1 shows, data from the Ministry of
Interior reflect much lower figures than those of the municipal population
Figure 8.1 Number of Foreign Residents and Number of Residence Permits

Granted to Foreigners, 2000–2010.
register, as they only count nonnationals legally residing in Spain. Accord-

ing to this source, in June 2010 the number of foreigners with valid
residence permits was 4.744,1692.16
According to data of the Ministry of Interior, of the 4.7 million foreigners
with legal residence in Spain in June 2010, more than half were non-EU
citizens (51.36 percent). The rest (slightly more than 48 percent) are
European citizens with the same civil and social rights as Spanish citizens
and with specific political rights—the right to vote and run in local
elections and for the European Parliament. Since the year 2000 non-EU
immigrants have become the majority of foreign residents in Spain.
From the late 1980s through 2008, Moroccans and Latin Americans
constituted the two largest immigrant groups, the first because of geo-
graphic proximity and the latter because of language and cultural ties.
European integration has facilitated the mobility of European citizens
within the EU common space. This has translated into a significant num-
ber of EU nationals coming to reside in Spain—particularly from the
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal, France, and the Netherlands.
The expansion of the European Union into Eastern Europe has ended up
including under the umbrella of the EU regime a large number of eco-
nomic immigrants proceeding from new member countries (primarily
Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria). The Romanian community has in fact
tripled during the past decade, becoming since 2008 the largest foreign
group. According to data from the Continuous Municipal Register, in Jan-
uary 2009, Romanians represented 14.1 percent of the total foreign popu-
lation, followed by Moroccans (12.7 percent), Ecuadorians (7.5 percent),
and UK citizens (6.7 percent). These four groups combined represented
40 percent of the foreigners registered in Spain.
In general, the foreign population in Spain has a high level of education.
One out of two persons has completed secondary education (junior and
senior) (52.7 percent) and 20.5 percent have a university degree (2007
National Survey of Immigration). However, a large number of foreign
workers occupy positions in the labor structure much lower than the
level of their qualifications. According to the 2007 National Survey on
Immigration (ENI), 71 percent of the 1.2 million low-skilled jobs in Spain
are done by foreign nationals who have completed senior secondary edu-
cation or university.
Spanish Welfare Mix and the Accomodation of Immigrants

Spain is a case of a Mediterranean welfare regime,17 characterized by low
social expenses, a relatively late development of the welfare state, strong
multilevel governance, and a strong reliance on the family for delivering

care services. Most particularly, typical of Mediterranean welfare regimes,
Spain shows a combination of contributive (Bismarkian) and universal
(Beveridgean) benefits, which means that entitlement to old age pensions
and unemployment benefits depends on participation in the formal labor
market and the contribution made to Social Security, while health care
benefits, social services, or education are universal entitlements attached
to all residents in the country regardless of their nationality.
As a consequence, immigrants access the Spanish welfare state through
two channels. On the one hand, Spain has incorporated immigrant workers
with formal jobs into its insurance system through the mere application of
Bismarckian principles, since those principles establish that citizens obtain
benefits proportionally to the contributions that they make to Social Secu-
rity. Social Security is an insurance system financed through the contribu-
tions of workers and employers, which offers protection for labor-related
social risks such as unemployment, old age retirement, and sickness. As
the basic criterion of entitlement depends on the contributions previously
made, foreigners with work permits and jobs in the formal economy have
always had equal access to the system. Also, non-contributive pensions
and non-contributive disability benefits cover both Spanish citizens and
legal foreign residents, as they are means-tested benefits granted to per-
sons who fulfill the necessary requirements.
On the other hand, the Spanish welfare state has extended its welfare pro-
grams based on Beveridgean principles (such as health care, social services,
or education) to include all persons residing in Spain regardless of their
nationality or legal status (universalist criteria). Migrants in an irregular situ-
ation have access to health care, to education, to social services, and to some
social housing programs merely by inscribing themselves in the municipal
register, something quite unusual in Northern European countries.
In welfare sectors following Beveridgean principles, the extension of
rights to immigrants has been the result of complex processes combin-
ing institutional inertias and historical conjunctures. The Spanish public
health care system gives a clear example, as it underwent a slow process
of consolidation that meant the universalization of health care in 1989.
However, this was only applied to country nationals, while foreigners’
access remained conditioned by their contributions to Social Security. The
coalition advocating for the incorporation of undocumented immigrants
into the health care system (third-sector public health organizations and
immigrant rights organizations) manage to gradually ensure the expan-
sion of health rights to nonnationals. After the approval of the 1996 Child
Welfare Law and the 1996 reform of the 1985 Foreigners Law, pregnant
women and children were entitled to receive access to health care on equal
conditions as natives. But it was during the debate for the new Foreigners
Law 4/2000 that health care expanded coverage to all persons that could
demonstrate that they were residing in Spain and lacked resources to cover
the cost of their health care. The mechanism chosen to link health care
coverage with the criterion of residency was enrollment in the municipal
population register, in order to lock out short-term visitors to the country.
Additionally, the social services sector is characteristic of the complex-
ity of Mediterranean regimes. As generally occurs in countries within the
Mediterranean welfare regime, social assistance is the least developed area
of social policy, characterized by a complicated institutional organization
and inadequate funding. Article 14 of Foreigners Law 4/2000 entitles for-
eigners legally residing in Spain to basic and specialized social services and
benefits under the same conditions as Spanish citizens. Foreigners with
an irregular administrative status, on the other hand, have a right to basic
social services and benefits through enrollment in municipal population
registers. This distinction is not based on a clear legal definition regarding
the content of basic and specialized services. As a result, each autonomous
community has resolved in its own way the issue of undocumented immi-
grants’ access to its social services network: in some regions requirements
are flexible in order to facilitate access, while in others semipublic schemes
have been established for undocumented immigrants, often run by third-
sector organizations.18
Participation of Immigrants in Several Domains of the Welfare State

Social Security and Contributive Benefits
As admittance to benefits of the National Institute of Social Security
(INSS) does not depend on nationality but on the contributions made,
Spanish nationals as well as nonnationals with work permits and jobs in the
formal economy have access to the system on an equal footing. This equal
access to Social Security by foreign workers with formal employment has
clearly implied that the strong migratory flows of recent years translated into
a considerable and stable presence of foreign workers among those using
Spanish Social Security. In the period 1996–2007, the Spanish economy
created almost 8 million new jobs, going from 12.6 million of employed
persons in 1996 to 20.5 million in the second trimester of 2007 (2007 EPA
[Active Population Survey]). Half of those new jobs were occupied by non-
nationals, who increased from being 4 percent of the members of Social
Security in 2001 to more than 10.5 percent in October 2011 (INSS).
What is more, the percentage of nonnationals affiliated with the Social

Security system in Spain has remained practically stable during the last
years in spite of the economic crisis, between 10 and 11 percent for male
workers and around 10 percent for female workers. According to figures
published by INSS, in October 2011 there were 17.2 million contribu-
tors from which almost 1.8 were nonnationals, and 81 percent of these
foreign contributors came from non-EU countries. In addition, less than
1 percent of the recipients of pensions currently in Spain are immigrants.
Of this 1 percent, more than half are EU citizens; France with 16,400 and
Germany with 9,400 pensioners occupy the first positions on the list of
foreign recipients of retirement pensions in Spain.
The importance of these figures is huge if we consider this contribution
to the welfare state in relation to the expenses that immigration implies for
the social state. Hence, economic analysis of the cost-benefits that immi-
gration means for the Spanish welfare state generally coincide with the
net contribution that immigration has brought about. According to one
study, in 2009 the contributions of immigrants to Social Security (€8.080
million) put in more to the fiscal balance than all the social expenses con-
cerning migration (6.500 million).19 Considering that the great majority of
immigrants are in their most productive years (between 20 and 40 years),
they constitute a net contribution to the INSS budget, and they will con-
tinue to be for at least the next two decades (assuming that the number of
immigrants remains constant without new arrivals).
These findings are particularly important, given that the Spanish wel-
fare state dedicates an important share of its resources to old-age pensions.
The contributions of immigrants have temporarily raised the ratio of con-
tributors to pensioners to nearly 2.5 to 1. As a result, immigration will
delay by almost five years—from 2023 until 2028—the Spanish pension
system’s entry into a state of deficit.20 Evidently, this clear positive balance
will not be as sharply defined in the future as the first cohorts of migrant
workers settled in Spain in the mid-1980s begin to retire. Also, the present
economic crisis that has destroyed more than 2.2 million jobs in Spain is
affecting immigrant workers more sharply, who have a 32.7 percent unem-
ployment rate against 19.5 percent for natives in 2011, according to data
from the Active Population Survey.
Social Assistance
Spanish policymakers used to fear that the extension of “last net” ben-
efits to immigrants (that is, noncontributory pensions and minimum
income programs) would cause immigrants to massively use these benefits
and that this would erode their incentive to work. Empirical data, how-
ever, show that these expectations were wrong. The strict conditions of
eligibility of these programs considerably restrict access; in particular, they
generally exclude undocumented immigrants.
In fact, immigrants are underrepresented in social assistance services.
Data from 2008 regarding the use of social services by immigrants indi-
cates that foreigners represented approximately 13.7 percent of the users
recorded in the SIUSS database (Social Service User Information System),
a percentage slightly higher than the 11.55 percent of the population that
are foreigners in the 13 regions that participate in the database.21 However,
if we focus instead on the total number of interventions, nonnationals
are clearly underrepresented. Of the total of 2,385,683 social service inter-
ventions in 13 autonomous communities and cities, only 163,308 were
considered as assistance to immigrants (representing 6.85 percent of all
the interventions).
In 2008 immigrants made up 11.2 percent of the beneficiaries of mini-
mum income programs in Spain, a percentage slightly below the actual
weight of the immigrant population in Spain’s overall population, which
was approximately 12.2 percent.22 In addition, if we take into consider-
ation that immigrants represent a greater proportion of the population
at risk of social exclusion, it is clear that the range of coverage of these
programs for the immigrant population is considerably below what would
correspond to this group proportionately and that a significant number of
immigrants are left unprotected.
Health Care
As we saw, the public health system in Spain has gradually expanded
its range of coverage to include almost all of the population residing in the
country, understanding that the right to health treatment is a basic human
right. Nevertheless, the universalization of the public health system has
not guaranteed de facto equity in access. Data from the Spanish Survey
of Living Conditions between 2004 and 2008 show that immigrants
state that they are unable to access medical treatment more often than
nationals do. Moreover, immigrant informants tend to justify this lack of
access more frequently with regard to the scarcity of financial resources
or time.
Analysis of the data from the FOESSA 2007 survey provides us with an
accurate picture of disadvantaged sectors’ access to the National Health
System (NHS). While 3 percent of the population above the poverty line
(above the threshold of 60 percent of the median national income) stated
that they did not have access to the NHS, this percentage increases to 5.2
percent among those below the poverty line. Four categories of homes
can be distinguished, depending on the number of indicators of socio-
economic exclusion that affect them. “Integrated homes” are those not
affected by any indicator of exclusion, “precariously integrated homes” are
those affected by one indicator of exclusion, “vulnerable” are those affected
by two or three indicators, and “excluded” are those homes affected by
four or more indicators of exclusion. According to this classification, 8
percent of the individuals living in “excluded” homes declare that they do
not have access to the public health system; a majority of these individu-
als are undocumented immigrants. As a consequence, nonnationals living
in “excluded” homes have 9.1 times more relative risk than nationals to
access health care through noncontributory health care assistance, and for
foreigners living in “vulnerable homes” this risk is 42.4 times greater than
for nationals.
Moreover, diverse indicators show that immigrants make a differentiated
use of health services. According to data of the 2006 National Health Sur-
vey, nonnationals go to the family doctor 7 percent less and 16.5 percent
less to specialists than the Spanish population. However, immigrants use
emergency services more often, as 65 percent of them had access to hospi-
tal treatment through this channel versus 57 percent of Spanish nationals.
Contribution of Migration to the Spanish Welfare State and Economy

Migrant Women in the Care Sector
Up to here we have analyzed the role played by immigrants as users
of benefits and services of the Spanish welfare state. But immigrants not
only act as welfare recipients but also as providers of benefits and services.
Above all, immigrants play a crucial role in the provision of care to depen-
dent persons, particularly in welfare states that leave care services largely
in the hands of families, as is the case in Southern European countries.
In Spain there has been a spectacular increase in the demand for per-
sonal care services (domestic services and care for children, seniors, and
other dependent persons) in recent years. The level of employment in the
domestic sector began a period of substantial growth in 1998, coinciding
with the increase in immigration. Foreign workers have come to repre-
sent between one half and two thirds of regular employment in the sector,
and the great majority of these jobs are held by immigrant women. In
2004, 91.7 percent of new affiliates to Social Security under the regime for
domestic employees were women.23
The growth in the caregiving sector is a result of demographic changes

and the increasing participation of Spanish women in the labor market,
which has prompted the need to balance work and family life. Labor force
participation rates for women in Spain nearly doubled between 1976 (28.4
percent) and 2009 (51 percent), most particularly among women between
25 and 54 years of age. In response to this there has been a parallel growth
in the private market for personal services, above all in the informal sec-
tor. Given the weak level of public intervention in the reproductive sphere,
Spanish women working outside the home have increasingly turned to
hiring immigrants to cover domestic and caregiving tasks. This not only
reflects important changes in Spain’s caregiving model, but also radical
transformations in the social division of labor, changes that could not have
happened without the contribution of immigrant labor.
Immigrant women have come to play an essential role not only in the
participation of Spanish women in the labor force and in how families
function, but also in supporting and ensuring the sustainability of the wel-
fare regime in Spain. A study by Imserso (Instituto de Mayores y Servicios
Sociales [Institute for Older Persons and Social Services]) estimated that
40 percent of the caregivers of the elderly were foreign women, while for
the case of live-in caregivers this figure reached 81.3 percent.24 While non-
live-in jobs are more socially valuable and in the majority are occupied by
Spanish workers, live-in jobs involve more precarious and often abusive
working conditions.
Data on workers affiliated through the Social Security scheme for
domestic employees from December 31, 2008 indicate that 65.3 percent
of immigrants employed in this sector are from Latin America. The three
largest national groups are Ecuadorians, Bolivians, and Colombians, mak-
ing up 17.3 percent, 12.4 percent, and 11.8 percent respectively of the
total percentage of foreigners employed in the domestic insurance scheme.
Along with these nationalities, a significant number are Romanian (8.5
percent) and Moroccan (7.24 percent). The sector shows a strong ethnic
segmentation, in which the recent arrivals and the undocumented occupy
the worst jobs. Some studies have documented a certain ethnic succession:25
as different national groups become more settled and integrated, they
abandon live-in jobs, which are then taken by less integrated nationalities.
In this regard, Martínez Buján26 shows that in 2004, 37.5 percent of for-
eign caregivers were Ecuadorian women, but after the 2005 campaign that
the government launched to regularize irregular immigrants, 90 percent
of these women received legal residence and their live-in jobs were taken
over largely by Bolivian women, more recently arrived and thus more
often having irregular status.
Contribution to the Economy

The Spanish economy has been considerably reinforced by the arrival of
immigrant workers. Immigrant workers have contributed to the survival of
certain productive sectors that otherwise would have disappeared. A report
prepared by the Economic Office of the President in 2006 stated that 30
percent of Spain’s GDP growth between the mid-1990s and the beginning
of the new century was a result of the arrival and settlement of immigrant
groups. This positive effect increased to 50 percent of GDP growth during
the period between 2000 and 2005. The positive impact of immigrants
is the sum of certain direct effects (increase in private consumption and
the demand for housing, the increase in the overall labor force participa-
tion rate, changes in the demographic structure of the Spanish population,
etc.) and indirect effects on the GDP (such as increase in the labor force
participation rate among the native population and improved flexibility of
the labor market). Other studies have reached comparable conclusions. A
study by the Caixa Catalunya savings bank found that from 1996 to 2006,
Spain’s economy grew an average of 2.6 percent annually thanks to the
contribution of immigrants.27
The impact of immigration in the Spanish labor market has been gener-
ally positive, both for companies and Spanish workers alike. Thanks to
immigration, employers have had cheap and flexible labor available and
have increased their profits.28 Immigrants have helped to introduce flexi-
bility into the labor market and to reduce inflationary pressures in a period
of strong economic and job growth. Immigrant labor has allowed the tran-
sition of autochthonous workers toward jobs with better conditions, and
it has facilitated the labor participation of native women. In fact, some
non-national workers perform jobs that natives reject for their difficulty,
low wages, and precarious working conditions. This challenges populist
arguments that immigrants come to compete with native unskilled work-
ers for the same kind of jobs. For example, in the care sector as we have
seen above, the majority of live-in jobs are occupied by immigrant women,
who take those jobs that no one wants, with long workdays, low wages,
lack of a private life, and so on.
Accounting for the Migration-Welfare Link in the Spanish Case

The data presented above show how in the Spanish case immigration
has brought about a net contribution for the welfare state. The Spanish data
refute the image of non-EU immigrants as more dependent on social benefits
than the autochthonous population. Which factors account for this result?
Primarily, this can be explained by the fact that immigrants are consid-
erably younger (and have higher activity rates) than the native population
and therefore make less use of health services, pensions, and other social
services. This is very evident in the data concerning Social Security, which
indicates that less that 1 percent of beneficiaries of old age pensions are
foreigners, although immigrant workers represent more than 10 percent
of its members. The percentage of foreigners affiliated with Social Security
has also remained practically the same in spite of the high unemployment
rates of immigrants (over 30 percent vs. the 18 percent of the native popu-
lation) in the past years. This way, the Social Security system has not fallen
into deficit as has happened in previous periods of crisis, in spite of the
notable increase of the expenditures in unemployment benefits.
Another reason for the net contribution of immigrants to the Spanish
welfare state and economy is the fact that migrants came to Spain primarily
to fulfill a specific labor demand in the Spanish economy. Contrary to the
claim that welfare states function as magnets for migration, the availability
of jobs in a context of relative prosperity, economic growth, and political
stability did attract labor migrants. Historically, Spain is characterized by
a model of growth that combines intensive use of the labor force with low
technological innovation and productivity. During the years of economic
growth, from the mid-1990s, there were labor shortages in many activities
based on intensive use of labor; this attracted growing economic immi-
gration from Africa, Latin America, and Asia (and later from Central and
Eastern Europe). Economic immigrants from developing countries found
employment in sectors where there were jobs not covered by native work-
ers. This is why migration flows coincided with an unemployment rate
substantially higher than the European average and a relatively low eco-
nomic activity rate. Native workers gradually reject jobs in certain sectors
due to their difficulty, low salaries, and precarious working conditions,
creating a demand for migrant labor.
The case of Spain clearly shows the influence that the labor market has,
in combination with welfare and migration policies, on the socioeconomic
strategies of immigrants. The fact that an important number of non-EU
workers are employed in the informal economy also helps to explain the
low dependency of immigrants on unemployment benefits in compari-
son to natives. Foreign workers employed in the informal labor market
cannot contribute to the Social Security system and are therefore not
insured against risks such as the loss of their job. Therefore, the niche that
immigrants have assumed within the Spanish economy and welfare state
has to be understood in the light of the Spanish welfare schemes. But
still other public policies fostered the role assumed by immigrants in
Spain, as in the case of measures that facilitate the employment of women

immigrants as caregivers in the informal market of care. Research shows
that there is a relationship between the establishment of direct cash pay-
ments to dependent persons and the employment of women immigrants
in the caregiving sector.29 Monetary benefits such as tax deductions and
direct payments encourage the development of a private market for home
care, characterized by high rates of informality and low wages. As “global
caregivers” are willing to work under worse working conditions, they
find opportunities for insertion in the informal market. Spain and other
Southern European countries are introducing cash payments and similar
measures. As a result, there is a direct relationship between the degree
of formalization in the caregiving sector and the immigration of women.
Countries with a social democratic welfare regime and a highly formalized
caregiving sector offer a smaller niche for immigrant employment; Medi-
terranean regimes create the largest demand for jobs as caregivers, while
corporatist regimes fall in between.
Reinforcing these effects, restrictive migration policies in Spain have cre-
ated a considerable flow of undocumented immigrants (and relapse into
illegality) to the point that some authors speak of the state’s production of
illegality. Garcés Mascareñas30 defends that the mismatch between a strong
demand for immigrant labor and political demands for closure (from the
European Union but also from unions) led to nothing less than an out-
right model of irregular migration in Spain. Within this model, the market
regulated entry de facto, as many immigrants as demanded by employers
entered the country, but policies also played a crucial role by restricting
immigrants’ access to membership. Until 2005, Spanish policymakers for-
mulated extremely restrictive entry policies, partly in keeping with Euro-
pean Union–imposed guidelines, partly as a response to the pressure by
unions. As legal entry to Spain was very restricted, immigrants continued
arriving but were undocumented. Legal entry became particularly restric-
tive in the period 2002–2004, when Spain substituted its entry policy
(known as Régimen General) with a quota system that defined each year
how many foreign workers could be contracted by sector and province
(work permits were linked to job contracts provided the “non-existence
of unemployed Spanish workers in the kind of work proposed”). While in
2002 and 2003, 30,000 foreigners got a legal permit via the quotas, local
councils registered more than 400,000 foreigners as new residents in the
same period.31 To solve this mismatch, governments of different political
colors have periodically resorted to the regularization of undocumented
migrants already present in Spain (in 1985, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2001, and
2005). However, each regularization campaign both reduced and produced
illegality.32 Data show that regularization campaigns were followed by a sig-

nificant relapse into illegality, because, although time of residence in Spain
was the main requirement for regularization, for the first renewal one year
after the chief requirement was having a (formal) job.
Notwithstanding their shortcomings, regularization processes have
stimulated immigrants’ entrance into the formal labor market, allowing
them to affiliate with Social Security and to be entitled to state welfare
benefits. In fact, with such mechanisms policymakers pursue three inter-
related goals: to regularize the legal status of many immigrant workers,
to fight the informal economy, and to boost the welfare state by means
of incorporating irregular immigrants as contributors. Immigrants in an
irregular situation do pay indirect taxes like any other resident, but as
they cannot work in the regular market they do not contribute to Social
Security or pay income taxes. Consuelo Rumí, the State Secretary for
Emigration and Immigration during the 2005 regularization, said that
“the main objective of this process is to bring to light jobs in the black
economy” and “to put an end to the social costs of illegal employment,
since immigrants in an irregular situation do not pay taxes or contrib-
ute to Social Security.”33 The last two regularization processes (in 2000
and 2005) were particularly important, as they regularized 630,000 and
690,000 undocumented immigrants respectively. The last one transferred
responsibility for the process to employers with the aim of generating legal
work contracts and in this way increasing contributions to Social Security.
Thirty-two percent of the applications for regularization in 2005 were for
the domestic service and caregiving sector, 21 percent were for construc-
tion; 15 percent for agriculture, and 10 percent for the restaurant and
tourism sector. In the care sector we can observe clearly how the regular-
ization of undocumented immigrants has resulted in a growth of affiliates
with Social Security through the scheme for domestic employees, as the
regularization carried out between February and May 2005 shows.34 These
affiliations are only the tip of the iceberg of a much broader phenomenon,
which escapes fiscal monitoring as the majority of domestic work remains
a part of the shadow economy.
Conclusions
From the analysis of the Spanish case we can draw three main conclu-
sions. The use and contribution that migrants make to a particular welfare
state depends greatly on (1) the economic and migratory cycle, (2) migrants’
socioeconomic characteristics, and (3) the institutional framework and poli-
cies, particularly the labor market, welfare schemes, and migration policies.
The role that migration has played so far in Spain is consistent with
developments in the economy and the migratory cycle. The major boom
of migration took place during the years of economic growth, and then
migrant labor became a crucial asset for the expansion of whole economic
sectors and activities. In addition, as Spain is in an early stage of the migra-
tory cycle, immigrant population is mainly comprised by young people of
working age who are net contributors to the welfare state.
Later on, when the economic depression hit the country, migrant work-
ers were more heavily affected by unemployment than natives. The cri-
sis had a stronger impact on informal and temporary jobs and therefore
as immigrants were mainly employed in such jobs, they have paid the
highest price. The 427,000 unemployed foreign workers in 2007 grew to
1.2 million in 2011. In that year, immigrants’ aggregated unemployment
index went over 32.7 percent as compared to the 19.5 percent of natives.
African immigrants reached 50 percent of unemployment, since they were
mainly employed in the sectors more affected by the crisis (construction,
agriculture, and low-qualified services sector). However, the higher impact
of unemployment among immigrant workers does not mean that they are
becoming more dependent on welfare schemes. On the contrary, according
to data from the Public Service for Employment, unemployed immigrants
present considerably lower coverage indexes (around 40 percent by the
end of 2010) than those of native workers (78 percent). This rules out the
possibility of migrants’ residual dependency on unemployment benefits in
Spain, since a majority of immigrants are employed in the informal labor
market and are thus not entitled to benefits. However, even for those non
natives working in the formal labor market and receiving transfers, the
coverage is rather meager: since benefits are proportional to the duration
and amount of contributions to Social Security, immigrants are generally
less protected than nationals due to the high proportion of temporary jobs
among them (60.2 percent in 2007 vs. 39.2 percent among natives) and to
their shorter labor trajectories in Spain.
It is foreseeable that in the future the proportion of immigrants that
receive social benefits and transfers in Spain will increase, as part of the
natural cycle of settlement of this population and its gradual aging, but
also due to the higher vulnerability of this population. However, as the
Spanish welfare state binds the access to benefits strictly to labor participa
tion, it is also reasonable to expect that the immigrant population will
continue to be underrepresented among the beneficiaries of contributive
schemes such as unemployment benefits as much as among social assis-
tance. Moreover, inequalities point to (invisible) barriers to immigrants’
effective access to benefits and services. Here, issues such as discrimination
and other processes mediating the implementation of policies and applica-

tion of rights need to be seriously approached by states.
To wrap up, this chapter shows how the use of welfare benefits that
migrants make is to a large extent shaped by the Spanish institutional frame-
work, by the possibilities that it opens and the constraints that it entails for
them. In that sense, the conclusions of this case study can be generalized to
other states with a comparable institutional mixture, that is, Mediterranean
welfare states with large informal labor markets and very restrictive migra-
tion policies that favor the presence of large numbers of irregular migrants,
and eventually also for corporatist welfare states with similar migration
policies and labor markets. In fact, migration simply functions as a catalyst
of the intrinsic weaknesses and strengths of welfare states.
Notes
1. Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes and María Bruquetas Callejo, Migration
and Welfare State in Spain (Barcelona: Fundación La Caixa. Colección de Estudios
Sociales no. 31, 2011).
2. George J. Borjas and Lynette Hilton, “Immigration and the Welfare State:
Immigrant Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics (May 1996): 575.
3. Regina T. Riphahn, Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evi-
dence from German Guestworkers (Bonn: IZA discussion papers no. 15, 1998).
4. Jorgen Hansen and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare
Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare?” Journal of Human
Resources 38 (2003): 74.
5. Peter Nannenstad, “Immigration as a Challenge to the Danish Welfare State,”
European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004): 755.
6. Hans Roodenburg, Rob Euwals, and Harry ter Rele, Immigration and the
Dutch Economy (The Hague: CPB Special Publication 47, 2003).
7. Jorgen Hansen and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare
Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare?” Journal of Human
Resources 38 (2003): 74, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. Herbert Brücker et al., “Managing Migration in the European Welfare State,”
in Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo
Debenedetti, eds. Tito Boeri, Gordon Hanson, and Barry McCormick (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 1.
10. George J. Borjas, “Immigration and Welfare Magnets,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 17 (1999): 607.
11. Herbert Brücker et al., “’Managing Migration in the European Welfare
State,” in Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione
Rodolfo Debenedetti, eds. Tito Boeri, Gordon Hanson, and Barry McCormick (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1, op. cit.
12. Peder J. Pedersen, Mariola Pytlikova, and Nina Smith, Selection or Network
Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990–2000 (Bonn: IZA discussion
papers no. 1104, 2004).
13. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Immigration and the Welfare State: A European
Challenge to American Mythology (Urban Environment and Human Resources
Working Paper/Mediterranean Migration, 2002).
14. Tito Boeri and Herbert Brückel, Migration, Coordination Failures and EU
Enlargement (Bonn: IZA discussion papers no. 1600, 2005).
15. Brian K. Gran and Elizabeth J. Clifford, “Rights and Ratios? Evaluating the
Relationship between Social Rights and Migration,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 26 (2000): 417.
16. Secretaria de Estado de la Inmigración y Emigración, Informe trimestral,
30-06-10.
17. Maurizio Ferrera, “The ‘Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe,” Jour-
nal of European Social Policy 6 (1996): 17.
18. Gregorio Rodríguez Cabrero, “Protección social de los inmigrantes extran-
jeros,” in Inmigración, mercado de trabajo y protección social en España, ed. Antonio
Izquierdo (Madrid: CES, 2003).
19. José Vicens Otero (dir.), Ramón Casado, and Paloma Tobes (coords.),
Impacto de la inmigración en el sistema de protección social (Madrid: Consejo
Económico y Social, 2010).
20. Clara Isabel González, José Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, and Michele Boldrin,
Immigration and Social Security in Spain (Madrid: FEDEA, 2009).
21. Ministerio de Sanidad y Política Social, Informe anual 2008 del Sistema Inte-
grado de Utilización de Servicios Sociales (SIUSS) (Madrid: MSPS, 2009).
22. Ministerio de Sanidad y Política Social, Informe anual de rentas mínimas de
inserción (RMI) 2009 (Madrid: MSPS, 2010).
23. María Villares et al., “Los nichos laborales de la inmigración femenina en
España. Del desempeño de tareas reproductivas al autoempleo” (paper presented
in the Congress Mobilités au féminin, Tanger, November 15–19, 2005).
24. IMSERSO, Empleados de hogar. Apoyo a mayores (Madrid: IMSERSO, 2004)
(http:www.imsersomayores.csic.es/estadisticas/encuestas).
25. Raquel Martínez Buján, “Mujeres inmigrantes en el sector doméstico de
cuidados. Los beneficios de la inmigración al Estado de Bienesta,” in El modelo
de inmigración y sus riesgos de exclusión, coord. Antonio Izquierdo (Madrid: Fun-
dación FOESSA, 2008), 259.
26. Ibid.
27. Caixa de Catalunya, “Razones demográficas del crecimiento del PIB per
cápita en España y la UE-15.” Informe semestral I/Economía española y contexto
(Madrid: Caixa de Catalunya, 2006).
28. José Vicens Otero (dir.), Ramón Casado, and Paloma Tobes (coords.),
Impacto de la inmigración en el sistema de protección social (Madrid: Consejo
Económico y Social, 2010).
29. Fiona Williams, Rethinking Families (London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foun-
dation, 2004).
30. Ibid.
31. Antonio Izquierdo and Belén Fernández Suarez, “La inmigración en España
2005–2006: entre la normalización y el flujo de cayucos,” in La situación social en
España, ed. Vicenç Navarro (Santiago de Compostela: Escola Galega de Adminis-
tración Pública, 2006).
32. Blanca Garcés Mascareñas, Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain: Markets,
Citizenship and Rights (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press/IMISCOE, 2011).
33. “Trabajo presenta el dispositivo para poder regulizer a 800 000 ’Sin
papeles.’’ Diario ABC ( January, 2005): 11.
34. In comparison with previous regularization processes, the one in 2005 was
particularly beneficial for workers in the domestic sector, as they could present
their application for regularization if they could show that they had worked at
least 30 hours per week for a period of six months.
CHAPTER NINE
Labor Migration from India to Italy

Debunking the Myth of the Undesirable Low-Skilled
Migrant in the European Union
Kathryn Lum
Introduction
EU migration policy in its current form is characterized by three main
dimensions: attracting highly skilled workers, deterring irregular migra-
tion, and promoting the integration of third-country nationals. The EU
approach is one of increased migration management and filtering so that
Europe receives legal migration, especially in sectors that are lacking in
personnel, while keeping out irregular immigrants (who are presumed
to be low-skilled). The increased emphasis on cooperation both between
EU member states and with countries of origin, as reflected in the Global
Approach to Migration adopted in 2005, is part of this drive to manage
migration more efficiently. A number of directives have been passed aimed
at making Europe a more attractive destination for highly skilled profes-
sionals, such as the Single Permit Directive and the Blue Card initiative,
The research for this chapter was carried out and is reprinted thanks to funding and
permission from the CARIM India project based at the Migration Policy Centre, Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. The
CARIM India project is funded by the European Commission.
both of which seek to simplify the visa/residency application process and

promote greater intra-EU mobility for third-country nationals. A further
Directive on intracorporate employees has been adopted, aimed par-
ticularly at IT workers. EU migration policy appears to be based on the
assumption that low-skilled labor is no longer needed, and indeed, would
be harmful to the European economy at a time of economic crisis and high
unemployment, especially among youth. Low-skilled workers receive
little attention at the EU level, with the exception of seasonal workers
and in some bilateral agreements with individual EU countries. This
chapter seeks to challenge the assumption that low-skilled immigration is
deleterious through a case study of low-skilled employment in the Italian
dairy industry. The vast majority of these workers are from India and have
successfully inserted themselves into this sector of the Italian economy,
without “stealing” jobs from native Italians and avoiding the pattern of
extreme exploitation and irregularity present in other areas of the Italian
agricultural sector. The chapter will also discuss why and how a particular
immigrant group was able to capture and almost monopolize cow milk-
ing, despite the availability of labor from other immigrant communities. In
other words, how and why have Indians from the Punjab region managed,
in such a short period of time, to dominate an entire industry?
Two decades ago, Indian migration to Italy was a largely unknown
phenomenon, and Italy was not part of the “mental map” of economic
migrants from the Punjab region of India (from where the majority of
Indian workers in the dairy industry hail). Located in the northwest of
India, sharing a border with Pakistan, the Punjab state is noted for its long
tradition of migration beginning with the British Empire, along with a
vibrant “migration culture” that has permeated the psyche of a large part of
its population. A majority Sikh state (approximately 60 percent of its resi-
dents profess the Sikh faith), it is known as the breadbasket of India and
has traditionally been one of the most prosperous Indian states, although
in recent years it has lost this status and has been experiencing economic
decline due to a lack of investment in industry. The most favored migra-
tion destinations on the part of Punjabis are English-speaking nations, the
number one country being the United States, although with increasingly
restrictive and selective migration policies being adopted by these nations,
a growing number of Punjabis saw their migration dreams being thwarted.
This has led to a diversification of migration destinations beyond the
English-speaking/Commonwealth world, a process that is ongoing and is
now seeing Punjabis even enter Eastern Europe. By 2013, Italy became an
established migration destination for Punjabis, the Italian flag joining the
American, British, and Canadian flags in advertisements for work abroad
Labor Migration from India to Italy 221
in the Punjab, and Italy boasts the second largest Indian population in
Europe. The Indian community in Italy is estimated at 121,036 (January
2011 figures), which represents an increase of 14.3 percent with respect
to 2010. The Indian population in Italy has been steadily increasing over
time. In the period 1993–2010, the number of Indian nationals residing in
Italy grew at an annual average growth rate of 66.3 percent compared with
35.5 percent registered by the total foreign resident population. It cur-
rently constitutes the eighth largest foreign community in Italy, measured
by those who are registered in the local anagrafe or registry offices.
Beginning in the 1990s, Punjabis started to find work in small dairy
farms scattered across northern Italy. Istat, the national statistics agency
in Italy, reports that 992 such dairy farms were present in northern Italy
in 2010. According to data supplied by Assolatte, the national dairy asso-
ciation of Italy, the dairy industry in Italy is the most important sector of
Italian agriculture, with an annual turnover of 15 billion euros in 2011,
including 2 million euros worth of cheese exports (the most avid consum-
ers of Italian cheeses are the French, followed by Americans, Germans,
and British).1 In Italy, dairy consumption is “recession proof,” with Ital-
ians continuing to consume dairy products, including high-quality DOP
(Protected Denomination of Origin) dairy products, despite the slowing of
the Italian economy.2 Indeed, 87 percent of Italians consider their national
DOP cheeses to be the foundation of the “Made in Italy” brand. Indians
have thus inserted themselves in a sector that is not only economically
important, but also key to Italian identity. Dairy work has since become a
Punjabi niche market, with 90 percent of the workers in this sector esti-
mated to be Indian.3 According to 2008 data from Istat (the Italian Insti-
tute of Statistics), 42.9 percent of Indians work in the agricultural sector
in the Lombardy region, compared to only 2.8 percent of the total for-
eign population, showing a marked tendency for Indians to concentrate
in agriculture, particularly in northern Italy. Thus, unbeknownst to most
Italians, much of the milk they drink and cheese they consume (includ-
ing the national symbol of grana padano) has its origins in cows milked by
Indians, who continue to remain relatively low-profile compared to other
immigrant groups.
This chapter will investigate the origins of the current Indian dominance
of the dairy sector and offer insight into both employee and employer per-
spectives on this vital industry for the Italian economy and consumer. It
will begin with a review of the existing literature on Indian dairy work-
ers, followed by a section on employer perspectives on the Indian pres-
ence in this sector. It will then discuss the working/living conditions faced
by Indian cow milkers and their families. An analysis of the local Italian
press in areas where concentrations of Indian cowhands are highest will

be provided in order to detect general trends in how Italian society per-
ceives Indian residents and their children in the north of Italy. Finally, this
chapter will conclude by offering policy recommendations regarding low-
skilled labor in Europe.
An Overview of Migration Policy and the Dairy Industry in Italy

The history of migration policy in Italy has been conditioned by Italy’s
historic status as an emigrant-sending country. Italy has traditionally been
more concerned with its large diaspora abroad, and with ensuring that
the Italian diaspora maintains citizenship and other ties with Italy, than
with its growing non-Italian immigrant population.4 A series of laws have
made it increasingly easy for ethnic Italians living abroad to obtain Ital-
ian citizenship, whereas non-EU nationals must have been resident for
at least 10 years before they can apply for nationalization, and their chil-
dren are not automatically eligible for Italian nationality. The procedure for
migrating legally to Italy as a non-EU national varies annually. Since 1988,
the Italian government has announced annual job quotas according to
employment sector and nationality for non-EU nationals; quotas that are
judged by a number of experts to be consistently too low, since employer
demand always greatly exceeds the annual quota established.5 In 2007,
for example, in just 38 minutes the quota for home carers for the elderly
was exceeded via an online process—the Ministry of the Interior received
136,382 applications for 65,000 places available.6 Italian migration policy
is characterized by the contradictions inherent in its political economy:
there is a growing populist backlash against immigration and the abstract
figure of the “immigrant” (whose political voice is the Lega Nord party),
yet Italy has a large underground economy (estimated to constitute 22.3
percent of its GDP) that encourages and indeed depends upon irregu-
lar migration, as well as strong individual demand for cheap labor from
poorer countries, especially in domestic service and elderly care. Ambro-
sini argues that immigration in Italy has been managed in an ad hoc and
emergency fashion due to the official perception that immigration was
not necessary for the economic system.7 The tensions inherent in catering
to rising anti-immigrant sentiment while meeting the structural needs of
the Italian economy have resulted in five general amnesties designed to
regularize the status of irregular migrants already living and working for
some time in Italy, the highest number of amnesties in Europe. Between
1986 and 2009 Italy regularized over 1.7 million migrants, a number sur-
passed only by the United States.8 Colombo and Sciortino have questioned
the prevailing consensus in the migration literature that Italy became an

immigrant destination beginning in the early 1970s due in large part to
other Western European countries tightening their migration policies.
They maintain that immigration to Italy commenced well before the oil
crisis of 1973, and hence challenge the view of Italy as a “second-rate”
migration destination.9 Although it is true that opportunities in Italy’s
large informal economy have long drawn immigrants, for Indian immi-
grants, Italy has only recently joined their list of potential destina-
tion countries. For Indian immigrants, the decision of particularly the
United Kingdom to restrict and then completely eliminate access to low-
skilled migration forced many immigrants to consider other European
countries for the first time. Indian immigration to Italy presents some
unique factors not present in other European countries. In Italy, Indian
migration is not exclusively an urban phenomenon, but also rural in
nature. Indeed, the largest community of Indians is found scattered on
dairy farms in the province of Cremona (within the region of Lombardia),
where Indians of Punjabi origin constitute the single largest immigrant
group.
The literature to date on the Indian presence in the dairy industry has
been sparse, reflecting the relatively recent nature of Indian concentration
in this sector. A notable exception is the research report published in 2002,
Turbani che non turbano: Ricerca sociologica sugli immigrati indiani nel cre-
monese (Turbans that don’t disturb: Sociological research on Indian immi-
grants in the province of Cremona), which provides an in-depth look into
the lives of Indian immigrants in this province, including their insertion
into the local economy and their work strategies. The authors describe how
in the region of Lombardia, the agricultural sector is distinguished, unlike
in other parts of Italy, by the need for a specialized, stable, and “regular”
(i.e., legally documented) workforce that is highly available and produc-
tive, in order to be able to adapt themselves to the demanding rhythms of
a dairy farm.10 Employers are keen to “regularize” their workers as soon as
possible, not out of any concern for worker’s rights, but rather in order to
reduce turnover and avoid gaps in production.11 The authors of Turbani
che non turbano found that all of the Indian workers that they interviewed
had official work contracts, and that the turnover rate was low, revealing
that Indians were working long-term on dairy farms and not jumping from
farm to farm. Two different economic insertion strategies were outlined: an
informal one whereby one learns about job opportunities on dairy farms
from fellow countrymen, and a “clientilist” one in which an Indian relies on
a relative/friend to sponsor him to come to Italy.12 The two main results to
emerge from their interviews reveal that Punjabis view their current work
in the stalle (cow sheds) as temporary, and as a means to an end to achieve

capital accumulation for other projects, such as setting up their own busi-
nesses. Several expressed negative views about their work, and all affirmed
that they would never do this sort of work in India.13 The second work spe-
cifically focused on Indian cow milkers is Compiani and Quassoli’s “The
Milky Way to Labour Market Insertion: The Sikh ‘Community’ in Lom-
bardy,” which appeared in a volume (2005) dedicated to Asian migrants in
various European labor markets. Although the authors problematically use
the term Sikh to identify all people coming from the Punjab, they present a
detailed labor market analysis of Indian involvement in the dairy industry.
Compiani and Quassoli outline three main patterns of immigrant labor
market integration in Italy: metropolitan, whereby mainly female immi-
grants concentrate in low-skilled service jobs in urban areas such as house-
keeping and elderly care; industrial, where mainly male immigrants work
in small and medium-sized factories; and seasonal, in which both male and
female immigrants work as temporary laborers in the fields of agriculture
and tourism.14 They argue that Indian migration presents unique character-
istics and has not conformed to any of these labor insertion models. They
distinguish between two different migratory projects followed by Sikhs:
one based on capital accumulation, focused on returning to India, and a
long-term migratory project, influenced in particular by family reunifica-
tion and the school-going age of their children. The authors maintain that
it is the second path that is more prevalent in Italy, and assert that increas-
ingly Indians prefer to invest their savings in Italy rather than their home
country.15 Echoing the previous article reviewed, Compiani and Quassoli
stress country ties, which they term “origins network” (in essence one’s
clan), in facilitating both economic and social integration in Italy. Solidar-
ity among Indians is high and includes hosting new arrivals, helping them
find a job, and assisting them with bureaucratic procedures.16 The authors
state that “caste hierarchies play a fundamental role in the life of Indian
immigrants in the province of Cremona,” but found that their informants
downplayed its importance in work and social contexts.17 With regard to
working conditions, the authors mention that the free accommodation pro-
vided on-site is often “in a dubious hygienic state,” that the wages are good
(quoted in lire), and that overtime pay is usually paid under the table.18
The authors take great care to refute the popular notion that Indians are
naturally predisposed to this sort of work due to their worship of cows.
They underline the fact that most Indians aspire to entrepreneurship and
are not satisfied with their current work.
Both articles explain the background of the Italian exodus from the cow
milking industry, although Gardani et al. provide a more detailed analysis
of this process. According to Gardani et al. the mechanization of the indus-

try beginning in the 1950s led to a sharp reduction in the number of jobs
available, forcing Italian youth to look for work elsewhere.19 Second, the
economic boom that Italy experienced in the postwar period led to new
aspirations that working in the cascine (dairy farms) could not fulfill. In
particular, the houses on the cascine were increasingly abandoned in favor
of more modern urban housing.20 Finally, the low social status associated
with cow milking was an additional incentive to look for other work, even
when the salary was raised and working conditions improved consider-
ably with mechanization. Gardani et al. make the interesting point that
male bergamini (cow milkers) could not find local women willing to marry
them and had to resort to finding marriage partners from other Italian
regions.21 The socio-economic context leading to the Italian exodus from
cow milking provides the background necessary to understand how Indi-
ans from the Punjab have been able to exploit an important gap in the
market.
Methodology
The results of this study are based on both secondary research and field-
work carried out in various rural locations across northern Italy over a
period of two weeks in 2012, complemented by telephone interviews. An
anthropological methodology was employed, in which both participant
observation on dairy farms and structured interviews using an interview
guide (see the appendix to this chapter) were used as research tools. The
language of the interviews carried out varied: for employers, union rep-
resentatives, and those in local government, Italian was used; for Indian
interviewees, most interviews were conducted in Punjabi in the presence
of an informal translator (either a friend or another family member). One
interview with a Punjabi interviewee was carried out in English. Inter-
views with Indians were carried out in family homes and lasted anywhere
from one hour to an entire morning or afternoon; the remaining ones were
carried out either in a public place such as a café or over the phone. Given
the predominance of male workers in dairy milking, the vast majority of
my employee interviews were male (as were all employers); however, since
interviewees were always interviewed in a family environment and I also
sought to interview the wives of the workers, my sample is composed of
an almost equal number of men and women, and it also includes three
adolescents and one child. A total of 28 interviews were carried out, 6
with employers, 6 with local government and union representatives, and
16 with Punjabi Indians and their families. All interviews with employers
and union representatives were carried out by phone (due to their geo-
graphic spread), whereas interviews with local government employees and
the cow milkers and their families were carried out in person. Interviewees
were selected via the snowball method. The names used in the interview
quotes below are all pseudonyms.
Employer Perspectives
Interviews with the owners of dairy farms provide many of the keys
to understanding how Indians have come to dominate the cow-milk-
ing sector. All the employers in my sample had only Indian employees,
which depending on the size of the dairy farm ranged from one to seven
employees, with an average of two. This reflects the fact that most dairy
farms are small and medium-sized businesses in northern Italy. In response
to my question about how and why they hired their first Indian cow-
hand, several mentioned that their previous Italian workers had retired
and that they had found it difficult to find an Italian replacement. Pap-
pagardo expressed the sentiment of many employers when he stated: “We
find it difficult to find Italian staff. Thank goodness that we have them (the
Indians)!”
It appears that as their long-standing Italian workers went into retire-
ment, employers tapped into local networks to find replacements; Indian
workers were the ones available and recommended by other farm owners
to fill these jobs. Their hardworking nature then solidified their presence
in the industry. However, the question remains as to why Indians, and not
some other immigrant group, came to dominate the industry. Egyptians
are also active as cow milkers, although their presence is very much that of
a minority compared to Indians (no statistics are available on the number
of Egyptians working in this sector). Once again, employer perspectives
can help explain what has become an Indian economic niche. When ques-
tioned, employers repeatedly stated their preference for Indians due to
concerns that Egyptian workers are more “conflictual” and complain about
their working conditions. Indians are seen as better workers because they
do not challenge their employers:
It is not that we prefer Indians per se, I started by coincidence with an

Indian. They say that the Egyptians and the Arabs are more conflict prone,
they file lawsuits against you. Better the Indians, they work less but they are
more peaceful. (Benetton)
They say that the Egyptians are people who create trouble, who fight.
I learned from a colleague that hiring Egyptians is a big mistake. (Algeri)
We prefer Indians because they are tranquilli (quiet). The Indian is

quieter than the Egyptian or the Moroccan. I have heard from colleagues
who have hired Egyptians—some are happy but many complain. (Pasquale)
Despite the large population of Romanians in Italy, not one of the

employers interviewed had worked with a Romanian or knew of an
employer who had hired one. It appears that Romanians have not even
attempted to enter the dairy industry, but rather have gravitated toward
factory work in northern Italy. The above comments reveal the extent to
which “ethnic reputations” influence the hiring process and how employ-
ers informally consult one another about their experiences with workers
from different ethnic/national origins. The attraction of hiring an Indian
therefore lies to a great extent in his reputation for being a “quiet” person
who will not be too assertive about his rights as a worker.
The goal of achieving a harmonious and stable workforce, as well as
reducing hiring costs is a third factor that has contributed to Indian domi-
nance in the dairy sector. My interviews with employers show that they
rely on their preexisting Indian employees when they seek to hire another
worker. This has meant that once an employer hires one Indian cowhand,
the entire workforce of the dairy farm is likely to be Indian, frequently
composed of various relatives of the initial Indian worker hired. The fol-
lowing example of an employer who has seven Indian workers is illustra-
tive: “I hired my first Indian 10 years ago when my Italian milker retired.
I found him via a colleague. When I needed more, he found them—he
brought over his brother, cousins, uncle, all relatives. We are happy with
them. I prefer that they all come from the same ethnic group, to avoid
arguments. All my workers get along (Algeri).”
Other employers, while stating that they preferred to hire Indians, men-
tioned that they had experienced problems in the past with in-fighting
among their Indian employees, leading one to conclude “that the internal
hierarchy among them should be well defined” in order to avoid conflict.
Another asserted that while he prefers that his workers come from the
same (Indian) group, “I do not want a clan, which could become difficult
to manage, only a small group of relatives.”
The general perception of their Indian employees is positive: all employ-
ers interviewed stressed that overall they were satisfied with their Indian
workers, whom they considered “punctual,” “quiet,” and “not creating
problems.” Contrary to popular perception, which associates Indians with
cows and assumes their “natural” aptitude for working with them, employ-
ers were well aware that most of their workers had had no prior experi-
ence in India as cow milkers. This lack of experience is not considered
problematic, because Indians are perceived to be workers who are com-

mitted and patient. One employer declared: “One of my workers, before
coming here he had never even seen a cow. He knew nothing. He was
an engine driver before and now he does everything. It is the l’impegno
(commitment) that matters—they are more committed.” Although their
knowledge of Indian culture is nonexistent, some demonstrated awareness
that “they have their own religion and their own Mass on Sundays” (all
employers used the term “Church” to refer to the Sikh place of worship
known as a gurdwara). The employer-employee relationship was described
as for the most part cordial. However, their comments also reveal that the
working relationship is not without its challenges, and as with employers
in other sectors, what is most important to them is productivity and the
bottom line. Below are the assessments of some employers regarding their
Indian employees:
Not all are good cow milkers—just like not all Italians are good cow milkers.
They are people who need to be supervised, but on the whole I am satisfied.
They respect the timetable and are punctual. They aren’t very clean like
the Italians—they throw everything on the ground. But they don’t cause
trouble. They are not there for the passion, but for the money. Their passion
comes from the economic factor (the salary). Eventually they will all return
to India. (Algeri)
I am quite satisfied. They are very good workers when they start. How-
ever, slowly they become less good. They need to be supervised. They are
quite accurate, but not very fast. (Benetton) (This employer has changed his
Indian workers four times, always substituted by other Indians.)
They are punctual, they have to be, otherwise they will not have a job.
It seems that they have a good attitude towards work. . . . I have explained
well the rules so I have not had any problems. They have to be supervised,
like all workers. It is not an ethnic problem (the supervision), but universal.
(Napolitano)
With these Indians I get along well. They are polite, timid people.
(Pasquale)
The main problems identified by Italian employers vis-à-vis their Indian

workers were linguistic barriers (lack of Italian language skills when some
workers are initially hired), which are soon overcome as the worker learns
the language, and alcohol abuse, which several employers mentioned as
problematic, particularly among young men. This is why dairy employers
often prefer to hire married men, who are perceived as more responsible
and reliable workers: “They have the tendency to drink too much. They
drink liquor, whisky not wine with meals as we do. . . . In my experience,
you either have to find them young and train them well or hire them
married with a family.”22 “The married ones behave better and drink less”
(Mazzetti). The problem with alcohol was also contextualized, however,
with one employer explaining that he felt that alcohol abuse was due to
their tiring working conditions and limited social life.
Apart from these two problems, the only other challenge highlighted by
employers was disputes between employees, which appear to be swiftly
dealt with. One dairy farm owner succinctly stated: “I told them to resolve
their dispute or leave.” Employers continually stressed how they had not
encountered major difficulties with their Indian workforce: “fanno la loro
vita” (they lead their own lives) was a common refrain, implying that
they do their job and then live quietly, with many commenting that “their
women are always at home.”
The advantages of hiring an Indian are therefore multiple. The lead-
ing benefit is that finding further employees is no longer onerous; Italian
employers rely on their Indian employees to recommend another per-
son. It is clear that they prefer to use informal networks when hiring,
rather than formal processes, for this is not only quicker and cheaper, but
also ensures that their new worker will likely be obedient and hardwork-
ing, having usually been recruited by a relative. The more experienced
employee can furthermore help in training the new worker and “show
him the ropes.” The concern to find workers who are reliable and “trou-
ble free” encourages the practice of hiring relatives/friends of their exist-
ing workers, who are considered more trustworthy and controllable than
non-recommended individuals. An additional, although largely invisible
benefit is the unpaid labor carried out by the wives of Indian workers,
who provide the hot food and tea when their husbands return home from
work, and before they start their shifts (including at night and in the early
morning), without complaining (a benefit that was explicitly highlighted
by one employer, who compared their attitude to that of Italian women:
“The wives don’t say anything, not like Italian women who complain!”).
The overwhelming Indian majority in the dairy sector can thus be
explained by a native labor shortage, combined with chain migration once
Indians had established a foothold in a sector abandoned by Italians. This
finding coincides with research carried out on the making of immigrant
economic niches by Roger Waldinger. In his study of how certain immi-
grant groups managed to gain entry into New York City public employ-
ment, he argues that the social network approach alone cannot account for
immigrant niches. Waldinger asserts that in order for immigrant workers
to be able to insert and consolidate themselves in a particular niche, there
also need to be changes in the relative supply of native workers and in
the structure of employment.23 Thus, in the case of New York City, the
waiving of New York residency/U.S. citizenship requirements, along with
the retirement of native white workers in key job categories that were dif-
ficult to fill locally due to competition from the private sector, created a
talent gap that was filled by highly skilled immigrant workers who valued
the security of a public-sector job.24 Similarly, in the case of cow milk-
ing, the flight of Italians to urban jobs with better working hours created
the opportunity for Indians to move in, drawn by good salaries for low-
skilled work, and then skillfully make use of their various family, gotra
(clan), caste, and village networks to solidify and build upon their initial
foothold. Consolidation of their position was helped by employers eager
to ease and reduce the cost of the hiring process, along with the ethnic
reputation that Indians have earned as a hardworking and acquiescent
workforce. This explains how Indians do not face competition from other
immigrant groups in the cow-milking sector.
Employee Perspectives and Working Conditions

If Italian employers have found a readily available workforce to fill the
gap left by Italians, Indians have found a welcome niche that has enabled
them to insert themselves well into the job market in northern Italy.
Although the work is demanding, it offers several benefits: a rent-free fur-
nished home; free heating/electricity bills depending upon the employer;
free milk; a “regular” work contract with the possibility of being granted a
permanent work contract, or contratto a tempo indefinido, which is highly
desirable in Italy; and ample opportunity to supplement one’s basic
monthly income (busta paga) with overtime and holiday pay. Workers who
carry out checks on the cows in between their shifts earn 100 to 200
euros more per month. Working on Sundays gives you 350 euros a month.
Those who help deliver cows receive an extra payment for each calf deliv-
ered (5 euros per birth). In addition, workers receive a bonus in December
for good performance. Thus, a base salary of 1,500 euros can grow to as
much as 3,000 monthly with overtime, various supplements, and a share
of the profits for each quintal of milk produced. In a good year, this share
of the profits can amount to 1,500 euros in total. Other benefits are not so
widely publicized, but common practice: paying overtime “unofficially,”
that is, apart from the formal pay packet. This means that both employer
and employee save on tax, a mutually beneficial arrangement that has long
existed in the dairy sector, as well as in other occupational sectors across
Italy (indeed, according to press sources, Italy has one of the highest rates
of tax evasion in the European Union). Living in close proximity to the
cow sheds or stalle means that workers avoid having to commute to work
each day and can always be close to their families. The shift of the workers
varies: some work from 2:00 to 6:00 and then from 13:00 to 17:00, others
work from 4:00 to 8:30 and then from 16:00 to 20:30. Regardless of the
exact timings, a common pattern is evident of a night or early morning
shift, followed by an afternoon/early evening shift. There is also the possi-
bility of moving up the internal hierarchy on the dairy farm; many workers
start out feeding milk to the vitelli (baby calves), which is not as well paid,
and then move on to becoming milkers and finally capo or boss, not of the
entire farm, but in the sense of being leader and “milker in chief.” When
asked about the benefits of their job, apart from the obvious economic
and housing benefits, my interviewees25 mentioned factors such as having
free time during the day for running errands and attending to paperwork,
without having to ask for time off work. Several workers also appreciated
being able to pick up their children from the bus stop or from school.
The concentration of Punjabi Indians in the dairy industry provides a new
angle on the dual labor market perspective, which sees the labor market as
being divided into two sectors that are starkly different: the primary labor
market is characterized by stable, well-paid jobs with the prospect of job
mobility, whereas the secondary labor market contains low-paid, precarious
jobs with high worker turnover and little prospect of job mobility. According
to a number of studies, immigrants and minority groups tend to concentrate
in the secondary labor market, with the jobs in the primary labor market
being reserved for more powerful members of the majority group.26 Dual
labor market theory further argues that passage from the secondary to the
primary labor market is difficult because of their very different organiza-
tion.27 In many respects, in the case of cow milking, Indians have jobs that
reflect primary labor market conditions: they are relatively well paid (indeed,
many cow milkers earn more than researchers), secure, provide a range of
monetary and nonmonetary benefits, and offer scope (albeit limited) for job
mobility. For the dual labor market perspective to fully capture the differ-
ences between the primary and secondary labor markets, issues of social
respectability and prestige, along with quality of life, should also be taken
into account. The Indian concentration in the dairy industry shows that the
division between sectors is not always so clear-cut, with certain occupations
containing elements of both the primary and secondary labor markets.
Working Conditions
While working on a dairy farm offers financial security and stability
(confirming previous research, all of my interviewees had regular work
contracts), its working conditions involve a number of drawbacks that

negatively impact upon the quality of life of cowhands due to the work
schedule. Surprisingly, when asked about the negative aspects of their job,
not one of my interviewees mentioned their unsociable working hours,
which could be related to the fact that turni or shift work is common
in northern Italy: those who work in leather factories, the second lead-
ing employer of Punjabis, must also work in shifts. However, they did
complain about the cold during winter and humidity/bad smell during
the summer. In the winter, working at night means having to milk cows
in temperatures that can plunge to 15 degrees below zero, without any
heating available. The long winters in northern Italy mean that for much
of the year Indian workers are constantly being exposed to cold weather,
which also freezes their machines, requiring them to pour hot water on
them before starting work. Most workers affirmed that milking cows in
the summer was much easier, and that fans helped deal with the heat on
very hot days. Another common complaint concerned overtime payments;
while some workers had no problems, others said that their employers did
not pay all of their overtime. In fact, it appears that the economic crisis
in Italy has led some employers to take advantage of high unemployment
and growing economic uncertainty to reduce salaries. The following two
quotes attest to this economic reality:
My boss takes advantage of the unemployment situation by not paying all of

our hours . . . but if I complain, I will easily be replaced and the job market
is very bad at the moment in Italy. There are no jobs. (Bupinder)
The malik (boss) knows that the Indians are good workers but they don’t
want to pay us as they do Italians. My boss pays me well, but they exploit
us. The boss knows that there are no jobs so they are exploiting and paying
less money. (Sukhwinder)
The night and early morning shifts worked by Punjabis also take their
toll. Although most workers preferred not to highlight chronic tiredness,
which they took for granted, some did speak out: “My health has suffered,
no normal rest. You don’t get proper sleep, even on Saturdays and Sun-
days. I only sleep four or five hours a night” (Vijay).
The quality of one’s accommodation depends to a great extent on one’s
employer. It is he who decides whether he will cover their bills (gas bills
are exorbitantly high in Italy). Some families had all their heating costs paid
by their employer, while others had to pay their own, leading them to heat
only their living room in order to save money. With two notable excep-
tions, the stalle houses were old and not well maintained. Although they
were not “unhygienic” as claimed by Compiani and Quassoli, it is clear that

Italian farm owners have not invested in them for some time. Only two of
the homes I visited were modern. Most families did not complain about the
standards of their accommodation, describing it as tikke (all right), although
one particularly articulate interviewee lamented the fact that “Punjabis
accept such poor housing.” While the vast majority of families appreciated
the free accommodation provided by their employer (only one man worked
for a farm where accommodation was not available), two declared that they
preferred to be independent and not live on the farm, in such close proxim-
ity to their boss. As one worker explained: “If you live in the stalle, the malik
can call you at any time, just to talk or ask you to do something. The malik
can control you more. I prefer to be a homeowner—to be free.” Both of
these men had invested in property in Italy and were proud homeowners.
In the case of Bupinder, although he lived in a tiny one-bedroom apartment
in which he, his wife, and his two daughters shared the same bedroom, he
still preferred this independence to living in the stalle.
Relations with their employer varied. While a majority answered “he is
okay” or “chenga” in response to the question “What is your boss like?”,
further questioning revealed that as with any power relationship, it was
sometimes fraught with tension. One worker said that although his cur-
rent boss was “good,” his previous bosses were “very bad.” One yelled at
him all the time, and the second fired him after he first had an accident
and broke his wrist (he took leave), and then flew to the Punjab to attend
his elder brother’s funeral. When he returned to Italy, he discovered that
he had been fired, and he was consequently homeless, since his home was
linked to his job.
The following quotes summarize the general experience of most work-
ers: “The malik [boss] doesn’t care about us, only about making money. If
you work well, they will treat you well” (Harpreet). “He pays well but he
is not polite. His language is not good” (Gurpreet).
Some of the men who had achieved the position of capo (leader) spoke
of greater pressure to perform, as well as to ensure the satisfactory per-
formance of other Indian workers: “If you are a capo, there is more pres-
sure, more responsibility. Malik is always criticizing, saying you have been
here so long. Also, you will be blamed if anything goes wrong with the
person you have recommended.” Two mentioned that although relations
with their employer were excellent, the Italian capo they had to deal with
made life difficult for them. Outside of work, very little social interaction
takes place with their employers. Out of a total of 14 Punjabi families, only
one cow milker mentioned inviting his employer to his home to celebrate
events such as children’s birthdays.
Mode of Entry into the Dairy Industry

The vast majority of Punjabis mobilized their family-based networks in
order to find a job in the dairy industry. A common response was that their
mamaji (maternal uncle) or a more distant relative helped them find their
first job. In some cases, a friend from the Punjab was mentioned, usually
from their pind (village). The route to subsequent jobs varied. Satwinder
described how when the stalle he was working in closed down, his boss
told him about another opportunity nearby. Bupinder found his first job
via his brother-in-law, and his second job via the farm veterinarian who
informed him about a job opening in another stalle and recommended him
for the post. It is important to note that none had had previous experi-
ence in this field: most had worked in factories previously, or if “in agri-
culture,” were landowners rather than agricultural workers. Although the
vast majority of cow milkers are men and their wives homemakers, there
are exceptions: I interviewed one woman who worked alongside her hus-
band for 10 years in the stalle, while raising a family and tending to all the
household tasks. Although exceptional, when women work in the stalle
(I learned of only two cases of husband and wife working together), they
find their jobs via their husbands, and their labor force participation is
legitimated by the fact that they are not working independently with unre-
lated men. Although Compiani and Quassoli (2005) found that caste was
minimized by their interviewees, it continues to play a fundamental role
in networking and job insertion. It is used as a resource on the part of all
caste communities, but not all castes benefit equally from caste-based job
networks. Workers from the Jat, Brahmin, Saini, Lubana, and Arora com-
munities all found jobs via the extended family or friends. SC (Scheduled
Caste)28 or Dalit workers, in contrast, followed a different pattern of labor
force insertion. The last to have arrived in the dairy sector, they have found
it more difficult to mobilize family and caste networks in finding a job. As
a result, Dalit respondents were more likely to have found their initial job
either by themselves or via Italian contacts (such as veterinarians). The
example of Rawinder, from the Ravidassia community, is illustrative. One
of the few Ravidassias who arrived in Italy before the larger, more recent
wave of Ravidassia migration, he has been living in Italy for 24 years, of
which he has worked 13 years on one dairy farm and 10 years in his cur-
rent stalla. He found his first job in the dairy industry via an Italian friend
of his boss and when that dairy farm closed down, he was sought out and
hired by his current malik. He proudly stated “bohut respect kardey” (our
employers respect us a lot). The same family and caste networks that are
mobilized to find jobs are also used to share information about and fill
further vacancies. Thus, the majority of workers worked with relatives or

intracaste friends that they had recommended. In the stalle of the Brahmin
family I interviewed, for example, Sharma works alongside his brother-in-
law. Most Jats mentioned working alongside Jats, Sainis with other Sainis,
and Dalits with fellow Dalits. However, there were also examples of inter-
caste solidarity. Bupinder, a Jat, had recommended a Saini friend for a job
at his stalla, and Satwinder had recommended a Ramgarhia friend in addi-
tion to a Saini relative at his dairy farm. However, it appears that intercaste
solidarity stops at the “pollution barrier” of the SC castes. SC interviewees
stated that they were rarely helped by Punjabis from other castes, and
singled out the Lubanas (an OBC or intermediary caste)29 as being particu-
larly hostile toward them in Italy. Only one Dalit interviewee had found
work thanks to the recommendation of a Hindu “general category” friend.
The following testimony by an SC (Ravidassia) man reveals that caste can
at times poison working relations:
I work with two more Indians (they are husband and wife), Jat. They were
there first. At first, when I was working under them, they were happy. They
even came to my house and we exchanged gifts. Tu harda got kiya? (what
is your gotra?) Tusi kiton? (where are you from?) were the usual questions
when I first arrived. They don’t say directly, but indirectly they express caste
ism. They are illiterate. Then when I became the capo, they became jealous,
they don’t want to work under a Chamar. . . . They don’t speak to me for
11 hours straight! Not even a greeting. (Vijay)
Being able to mobilize family and broader caste connections is thus

critical to the migration project. These connections are drawn upon and
then, once a worker is established, the favor is repaid, with some Punjabis
claiming that they have helped up to 50 fellow countrymen in gaining a
foothold in the dairy industry. The strong networking exhibited among
all Punjabi migrants is accentuated by the tendency for small enterprises
in Italy to privilege personal connections in hiring in the absence of pub-
lic institutions that facilitate the matching of labor demand and supply.30
Given that Indians of Punjabi origin have essentially carved an economic
niche in the dairy industry, competition for new jobs takes place between
Punjabis. In a time of economic recession, this competition is increasingly
conducted along caste lines, leading SC interviewees to lament caste bar-
riers to entering the stalle. Researchers who have studied “ethnic work-
places,” such as De Bock, have found that shared ties of language and
nationality/region of origin deepened interpersonal relations between col-
leagues, and encouraged socialization outside of work.31 However, it is
important to recognize that the bonds of ethnicity are also crisscrossed

with internal divisions that can weaken ethnic solidarity in the workplace.
In the case of Punjabis living in Italy, caste continues to be a determining
factor in gaining access to the dairy industry, giving some a “caste pre-
mium” and disadvantaging others. Social networks are indeed very impor-
tant in the formation of ethnic occupational niches and give co-ethnics a
distinct advantage, but they also bring limitations. These limitations are
highlighted by a number of studies that stress that social networks are
more useful for accessing jobs that require lowers levels of skill and edu-
cation, which is also reflected in the case of the Italian dairy industry.32 A
study carried out by Poros on networking among Gujarati Indian immi-
grants in New York and London found that relying on interpersonal con-
nections channeled specific caste communities into either small business
or entry-level positions in the dominant labor market, and limited new
information and resources beyond these occupational niches.33 This limi-
tation also exists for first-generation Punjabi Indians in northern Italy, who
risk being channeled exclusively into the dairy industry, missing out on
other opportunities, and restricting their access to other sources of infor-
mation. Thus while social networks facilitate labor market entry, they also
filter information and can exclude minority or disadvantaged members of
ethnic groups, as Dalit Indians have found. We should therefore be cau-
tious about generalizing about the benefits of “ethnic capital,” when such
capital in the Indian context is often distributed more narrowly along caste
rather than co-ethnic lines.
The Families of the Bergamini

How are the wives and the children of Punjabi bergamini affected by
living in the stalle? Although the wives of Punjabi bergamini are frequently
perceived to be invisible on the part of Italian society, they play a vital, if
overlooked role in dairy farms across northern Italy. In several of the fami-
lies I visited, women would help their husbands wash down the cow milk-
ing area at the end of the day, allowing him to finish his shift quicker. They
are important co-workers including, during winter, donning hats and
braving the cold in work that appears to go unacknowledged by Italian
employers and by the Punjabi community at large. This situation contrasts
starkly with the economic prominence that Indian women have achieved
in Southern California, many of whom are visible as managers in ethnic
businesses such as grocery stores and motels, sometimes independently,
with their husbands working elsewhere.34 More broadly, the lives of Pun-
jabi women are conditioned by the daily routine of their husbands: they
rise when their husbands do in order to prepare food or tea for them, and
have hot food ready for them when they come back. They thus suffer from
the same disturbed sleeping patterns of their husbands. Their views on
life in the stalle varied. They were happy with their husbands’ salary, but
not much else. The most frequent complaint was that of loneliness, since
they often live in isolated hamlets where their social life is extremely lim-
ited. In addition, they suffer from a lack of mobility due to their lack of a
driver’s license, which also impacts upon their children’s capacity to social-
ize outside of school, findings that have emerged in other studies on the
bergamino community in Italy.35 They are usually completely dependent
upon their husbands and the vast majority do not speak Italian. Social life
is very much family based. However, being removed from an extended
family in the Punjab has meant a lightening of their daily workload. Sev-
eral women shared that living in a nuclear family unit in Italy has meant
they have less food to prepare: “In the Punjab I was making at least 30
rotis (unleavened bread) a meal, here only 10.” Others welcomed the fact
that although more isolated, they were also freer from gossip and social
interference in their lives.
Harpreet, a Hindu Brahmin, described her life as the wife of a bergamino
in Italy in the following way: “I sometimes feel lonely but my (house) work
keeps me busy, plus I pray, go to temple, help my husband in the stalle, so
I keep my mind busy. My husband is good, he has no bad habits.” Oth-
ers, however, feel that their time in Italy has been wasted. A woman who
had studied mathematics for her “plus 2” (final two years of secondary
school) and had one year of college confided that “theran sal ku vich pa
ditey”; she feels the last 13 years of her life have “gone down the drain.”
This sentiment was echoed, although more indirectly, by other Punjabi
women, whose daily lives are monotonous and circumscribed by their
families. For several women, their only social outing is to the gurudwara or
temple, but if their place of worship is not close to home, these visits are
few and far between. The wives of the bergamini are a wasted talent pool
that unfortunately has not been harnessed; a problem accentuated by the
fact that their husbands have not encouraged them to learn Italian or look
for a job outside of the home. Compiani and Galloni found that the Sikh
women they interviewed expressed a desire to work when their children
are grown.36 The wives of bergamini also expressed a desire to work outside
the home (in occupations such as factory work, seamstress, or home care
worker), but lamented that their lack of Italian and educational qualifica-
tions made this desire difficult to achieve in Italy, especially in a cultural
context in which their primary duty is caring for their families. During my
fieldwork, I met only one woman who was fluent in Italian (and also the
only woman actively looking for work), but she was the wife of a Dalit
leather factory worker (indeed, it appears that the wives of factory workers
are more likely to learn Italian and hence find work outside of the home
than the wives of dairy workers). This linguistic deficit is a strong barrier
to the economic and social insertion of Punjabi Indian women in Ital-
ian society (particularly “dairy wives”), and also make it more difficult to
escape difficult situations at home.
The decision to migrate to Italy was taken by their husbands or other
male family members, which can compound their feelings of powerless-
ness and isolation in Italy. Even the sole woman in my sample who had
worked alongside her husband for 10 years before they opened an Indian
general store together expressed mixed feelings about her work and life
in Italy: “It was my husband who wanted to go abroad, not me, but I had
to follow him. Before, when I worked in the stalle, I thought about going
back to India, but now that we have our own business, it is okay and I
want to stay here, even though I don’t like Italy. India acha-yahan ne he
(India is good, here is not good)” (Manpreet).
The New Generation of Italian Punjabis

The children of Punjabi bergamini, who have feet in two cultural
worlds simultaneously, suffer from prejudice, exclusion, and bullying at
school. Northern Italy is well known for being a region intolerant toward
outsiders: when southern Italians or meridoniali started migrating to
northern Italy in search of work in the 1960s, they were condescend-
ingly called terrone (the term is linked to the Italian word for land), the
implication being that they were uneducated, uncouth peasants. Northern
Italy thus has a long tradition of internal racism that has now turned its
attention toward external immigrants, a social current that finds its politi-
cal voice in the openly xenophobic political party the Northern League.
My discussions with the children of Punjabi bergamini reveal that there is
strong social stigma attached to working as a bergamino. Although Italians
may no longer want to work in this field, the strong Indian presence in
this industry has nonetheless generated resentment and provoked feelings
of jealousy. While the majority of Punjabi cow milkers and their wives
disavowed experiencing racism (even the only man in my sample who
wears the Sikh turban), this was not the case for their children, who come
into closer daily contact with Italian society at school. Following are the
testimonies of two daughters of Punjabi cow milkers who shared with me
how being Indian, and more specifically, the daughter of a bergamino, is
not easy.
Ten-year-old Gurpreet, the eldest of three, was born and raised in Italy
and speaks perfect Italian. Her parents are SC, and her father works alone
in the stalla. Although she has visited India only once, she pleads with her
parents to send her there permanently. With sadness in her eyes, she told
me the following story of her experiences at school, which combine both
racism and casteism:
The Italians say I smell, that I don’t wash, that why is my father a bergamino?
Why are all Indians bergaminos? They have never come to my home, they
say I don’t want to visit a smelly, disgusting stalla. They make fun of me, the
Italian boys are even worse. The girls, they don’t talk to me. They say they
want to be my friend, but then they treat me badly. They say that just for a
joke. . . . Once a boy said your father is so dark, he is black! I never told my
father this, so he would not get upset. I only have one friend, an Egyptian
girl who really understands me. There is a Jat girl who is good, but she has
never come to my home. Whenever I invite her, she says I will think about
it, or I will come when I am free. But she never does. . . . Another Jat girl,
who is one year older than me, also makes fun of me. Every time she sees
me she says I smell, that I am ugly, that my hair is disgusting. She says my
father is a bergamino. Her father works in a pig factory, and she says pigs are
nicer than cows, that cows stink. (Gurpreet)
Nineteen-year-old Mona, the eldest of two from an SC family, has com-

pleted technical secondary school and is currently looking for a job in
the accounting field. She had similar experiences of being excluded and
mistreated at school:
There is a lot of racism in Italian schools. More on the part of Italian girls.
They don’t talk to us and behind our backs, they speak badly about us.
They don’t include us in any way. During school parties, they refuse to eat
our food like samosa and makhani. They say we are brown, black because
we don’t wash. Once, in middle school, a boy even spit on me in the school
bus. He told me that you are so dark because you don’t wash. I know of
one case where a girl was told she smelled and that her hair was disgusting
because she oiled it, so she stopped oiling it. . . . They have never asked me
about India or Indian culture—they are not interested. (Mona)
The children of Punjabi bergaminos thus face systematic exclusion and

stigmatization at school, and are frequently bullied, often without the
knowledge of their parents. Most parents, when asked how their children
were doing at school, responded that they faced no problems, which shows
that many Punjabi children are reluctant to reveal the full extent of their
suffering. Since their parents do not tend to face an overtly racist culture at
work and often have the benefit of working alongside relatives or friends
from the same region, it may be difficult for them to understand just how
isolated and vulnerable their children feel both in the classroom and out-
side of it. In addition, their limited knowledge of Italian perhaps protects
them from fully assimilating the depth of local prejudice. Their children,
on the other hand, are exposed to it daily, leading many of them to dread
attending school. Even where children affirmed that they were not bullied,
it is never easy to be a “minority of one” in the classroom, as is the case of
17-year-old Malwinder from a Sikh family, who is the only Indian in his
school. When he arrived in Italy from India, he wore the patka (smaller ver-
sion of the turban worn by schoolboys), but soon removed it after he had
been teased and asked “What is that onion on your head?” He informed
me that it is only possible to wear the patka if there are “many Indians at
school,” otherwise the risk of being exposed to daily ridicule is very high.
Ironically, although parents were often critical of the Italian school sys-
tem, it was not due to problems of racism but rather of discipline and
worry that their children will be exposed to unhealthy habits and too
much Western culture. Bupinder has sent his two daughters back to the
Punjab for precisely this reason.
My eldest daughter studied three years in Italy. Here the school is not good.
The students are not serious. Homework kita? Homework ne kita? (Have I
done or not done my homework?) There is no tension. The children here
do not go for tuition. They are smoking, drinking, have many bad habits,
girls also. They are not well dressed as in India. . . . I want my daughter to
learn about Indian culture, values, respect, not Italian culture. When you
are the only one [at school], you always feel different. In India, no. This is
why I keep my pug (turban), because I don’t want to lose my culture, my
background. (Bupinder)
When discussing the situation of Punjabi bergamini in Italy, therefore, it

is important to take into account the impact of their work on their families
as well. While the relatively high salary and various financial supplements
translate into concrete material benefits that enhance their izzat or status/
respect back home (almost all of the men I spoke with have invested in
property in the Punjab), life in the stalle can prove to be a lonely, unsatis-
factory experience for their wives. They experience upward social mobility
as diaspora wives, but little social integration in Italian society. The chil-
dren of Punjabi bergamini are well integrated, yet suffer a dual stigma at
school: both socioeconomic in nature due to the low social status attached
to cow milking, and ethnic, for being Indian. While their parents, with
great sacrifice, have improved their social capital in the Punjab, Indian
children living in Italy are often faced with the necessity of conforming to
Italian culture in order to survive at school, particularly when they find
themselves in schools with a tiny Indian population. Unlike their parents,
they cannot count on becoming izzat wallahs (highly respected persons) in
their native village in order to compensate for the drawbacks of immigrant
status in their adopted country. The generation gap is significant and can
only grow in the coming years, as the second generation becomes increas-
ingly “Italianized.” A positive development, however, is that not one of
the children interviewed has become or aspires to become a bergamino.
The dairy industry will thus continue to be nourished by first-generation
Indian labor. All Punjabi parents were keen that their children find alter-
native employment. A Lubana man summed this up when he stated, “I
want my son to work like you, not like me, not as bergamino. All our
money goes to our son and his future.”
Local Perspectives on Indians in Northern Italy

Discussions with those involved in local government have revealed
that there are no particular policies in place concerning Indian bergami-
nini. Rather, local government officials have informally expressed concern
about kabaadi (Indian wrestling) matches degenerating into alcohol-driven
violence, and the use of public parks during the summer, during which
cricket is played, often for hours at a time, resulting in complaints from
Italian neighbors. Thus for local-level administrations, the Indian popula-
tion is viewed simply from a law and order perspective as another “extra-
EU” immigrant community that must be “managed.” Since the Indian
population is still relatively small compared to other immigrant groups
(the Indian community is in seventh place nationwide), it is often not high
on the radar of local government civil servants. This also leads to a lack of
specific knowledge about Punjabi Sikhs, the majority of Indians living in
northern Italy. For example, on one occasion when speaking with a civil
servant, she mentioned that the Indian community had opened a large
mosque, confusing it with the gurudwara that had recently been inaugu-
rated. Discussions with a woman who has worked on integration issues
with the comune or local administration of Treviglio (half an hour north of
Milano) reveal a disturbing trend in which both Indian and other immi-
grant children tend to concentrate in technical and professional training
high schools as opposed to academic high schools that prepare children
for university. In Italy, all children at the age of 13 must choose the type of
secondary school they will attend: academic (which are further subdivided
into “classical,” linguistic, scientific, and artistic schools), technical high
schools, and finally professional high schools. All have the same dura-
tion of five years and enable students to enter university if they pass the
school-leaving exam, although in practice few technical institute and pro-
fessional school students choose this route. According to the 2012 report
of the Italian Ministry for Education, only 31 percent of students from
technical high schools and 12.4 percent of students from professional
high schools later attend university, versus over 80 percent of students
who attend “classical” and scientific high schools.37 An integration advisor
in Treviglio stated that very few Indians study in “university track” high
schools, in part because the children of bergamini are not encouraged by
their middle school teachers to consider academic high schools.38 She sees
the same pattern of automatically sending Italian working-class children to
technical and professional high schools being repeated with the children
of immigrants, who are assumed to not be “university material.” Indeed,
in my sample of 14 families, only two had children studying or who had
studied in an academic high school (in both cases this was a liceo scientifico
or scientific high school). The rest attended technical or professional high
schools that are not geared for university training. Thus the children of
Indian bergamini are not following in their parents’ footsteps, nor are most
of them proceeding to university after their secondary studies, a cause of
concern that is not being addressed by local administrations. An interview
with a civil servant who works for the comune of Bergamo, however, shows
that there are discordant voices. He openly criticized immigration policy
in Italy, which he accused of being “backward” and responsible for per-
manently stigmatizing all minorities as “immigrants,” including the sec-
ond and subsequent generations. He argued that both local and national
policies should distinguish between newly arrived immigrants and those
who were already settled, rather than “putting them all in the same pot.”
Furthermore, he was of the opinion that general pro-diversity or diver-
sity sensitive, rather than immigrant-specific policies were needed at the
local level. Currently, all non-EU immigrants are lumped together in the
same category of “immigrant” for the purposes of local government ser-
vices, which not only means that the specificities of different immigrant
groups are lost, but also that internal diversity within these populations is
obscured.
More than local administrations, unions are more often involved with
Indian bergamini. Almost all of the Punjabis in my sample belonged to
the CGIL (Conferazione Generale Italiana di Lavoro) union, which is the
largest union in Italy. However, while Indian bergamini faithfully pay their
union dues, most affirmed that the union was not doing much for them:
“They are just passing the time and taking our money.” In the current eco-
nomic climate in which dairy employers have the upper hand, few Indian
bergamini seem inclined to seek union help to resolve disputes. None of
my interviewees mentioned consulting their union recently, although my
most articulate interviewee did agree that the union “is helpful.” A differ-
ent picture emerged from interviews with local union representatives, who
claimed that many Indian bergamini came to them for help regarding their
paychecks and their hours, although since none of the local union offices
collect statistics on the number and demographic characteristics of the
workers who visit them, no numbers are available to verify their claims.
Information from the Treviglio branch of the CGIL reveals that Indians
are less likely to visit the union than other immigrant groups, such as
Moroccans, Albanians, and Egyptians. The Cremona branch of the CGIL
union estimated that 50 percent of Indian bergamini are CGIL members,
and that 80 percent are regolari, that is, with legal contracts. According to
the Cremona branch, 90 percent of cases involving Indian bergamini are
resolved satisfactorily without recourse to the legal system. The Bergamo
branch of CGIL stated that they received a visit from an Indian bergamino
“every few months,” which concerned, apart from their paychecks, prob-
lems with the bureaucracy, their residency permits, and their tax declara-
tions. Legal proceedings initiated by Indians are “very rare,” so it appears
that when Indian bergamini turn to their union, it is usually for help with
bureaucratic and contractual issues. The CGIL union therefore does play
a role at the local level in helping some Indian bergamini negotiate Italian
bureaucracy, but equally many bergamini do not make use of their union as
a resource. Although the CGIL union has not adopted any specific policy
or campaign directed at Indians working in the dairy sector, a number of
local branches have Rights Offices (Ufficio Diritti) dedicated to assistance
for immigrants on a certain day of the week (typically for three hours). The
importance of the Indian bergamino community is testified by the fact that
some union representatives were able to estimate specifically how many
of their members were Indian, and that some branches, such as Bergamo
and Brescia, have started to hire Indian union workers (the overwhelm-
ing majority of union workers, however, are Italian, including those who
service the Rights Offices).
Images of Indians in the Italian Press: An Overview

The Italian press has in general portrayed a positive image of Indian
bergamini. They are consistently described as hardworking and dedicated,
and following the publication of an article in the International Herald

Tribune on the Punjabi contribution to the dairy industry, which several
Italian newspapers translated into Italian, they are praised for having
“saved” the Italian milk/cheese industry. An article in Il Messagero,39 for
example, extols the virtues of Indian cow milkers for being “lavoratori seri
e infaticabili” (serious and indefatigable workers), “non violenti” (nonvio-
lent), “quasi mai al centro di episodi di cronaca nera” (rarely in the news due
to crime), and “poco inclini a chiedere aiuto ai servizi sociali” (not inclined to
rely on social welfare programs). In short, the ideal immigrant is invisible,
does not drain the welfare state, and does not “create trouble.” The author
of the above article, entitled “I sikh ci salvano il latte? Puniamoli col test
d’italiano” (The Sikhs have saved our milk? Let’s punish them with an Ital-
ian test”), is critical of the Italian government’s decision to introduce new
Italian language tests for long-term residence permits, which the author
argued would be difficult for Indian bergamini to achieve, given that they
spend most of their time working with cows. The article also makes the
point that although obligatory, Italian language courses are not funded
by the government. In a similar vein, an article entitled “L’industria del
parmigiano salvata dai Sikh” (The Parmigiano industry saved by Sikhs),40
from the Italia dall’estero website, presents a glowing account of the Indian
presence in the dairy sector, quotes stalla owners who declare how com-
mitted and integrated their Indian workers are, and highlights how Indi-
ans are “patient with cows” due to their “sacred status in the Sikh religion.”
This positive portrayal, apart from promoting erroneous stereotypes that
associate all Indians with cows (and falsely states that cows are sacred in
Sikhism), also overlooks the real motives driving employer satisfaction
with their Indian workers: their reputation as an obedient and passive
workforce. A third article from the Il Giornale newspaper41 mixes both
positive and negative assessments of the Indian presence, as reflected in
the very title: “La Riserva Indiana d’Italia invisibili, stakanovisti e innamorati
della terra: In meno di dieci anni la comunità è quadruplicata e quasi tutta
lavora nell’agricoltura. Libertà massima. Gratitudine a volte poca” (The Indian
reserve of Italy, invisible, extremely devoted to work and “in love” with the
land: In less than 10 years the community has quadrupled and almost all
work in agriculture. With maximum liberty. And at times little grateful-
ness). Thus while Indians are praised for their hardworking character, it is
simultaneously implied that they are ungrateful to their host country. The
article discusses Christian, Hindu, and Sikh Indians, although a union
representative of the latter community is accused of not returning the wel-
come shown to Indians in the city of Brescia, due to his statement on the
Italian marine incident of killing two Indian fishermen off the coast of
Kerala. The article stresses how Christian, Hindu, and Sikh Indians have
been highly successful in establishing places of worship and organizing
a wide variety of events (often with government sponsorship/funding),
asserting that Italy has “warmly welcomed” and “given ample social space”
to the various sections of the Indian community. A fourth article, from the
Cremona Oggi online newspaper,42 entitled “Indiani da bergamini a impren-
ditori: E i Sikh guardano al mercato immobiliare” (Indians from bergamini
to businesspeople: Sikhs looks towards the property market), presents a
vision of Indians that goes beyond their perennial association with cow
milking and the countryside. The article discusses how Indians are “big
savers” and are now using those savings to invest in real estate and some-
times buying entire cascine (dairy farms). It is one of the most balanced
articles to appear in the Italian press to date, for although it acknowledges
the strong presence of Indian bergamini in Cremona province, it also brings
to light how Indians have recently begun diversifying their occupational
profile and especially setting up their own businesses. Two young brothers
who manage a petrol station are interviewed, and one of them is quoted
as feeling “well integrated” and “comfortable” in Italy. Finally, although
the general tenor of the Italian press toward Indian bergamini is positive
and appreciative, this is not the whole story. The online comments that
followed an article in Corriere della Sera43 about Indians saving the famous
grana padano cheese reveal that while Italians acknowledge (and at times
lament) that their youth no longer want to work in the stalle, some Italians
are uncomfortable with the fact that this industry is now dominated by
foreigners. Several readers expressed their frustration with Italian youth
who look for work in other countries rather than accept “humble” jobs at
home, as well as hinted at the growing competition posed by immigrants
in the Italian labor market. There is thus a divergence between the success-
ful integration stories of Indian bergamini presented by the press, and the
underlying unease on the part of a portion of the local population toward
one of their most emblematic industries being “taken over” by foreign-
ers. The “quiet revolution” that Indians have achieved in the Italian dairy
industry is now increasingly well known, which brings both greater social
visibility, but also the risk of economic jealousy.
Conclusion
Over the last two decades, Punjabis have carved a successful niche for
themselves in the Italian dairy industry, a remarkable feat that has attracted
international attention and saved an industry that was in crisis. This quiet
migration story can be characterized as a win-win situation for both Italy
and India. Italy gained a hardworking pool of foreign labor that replaced
a dwindling native labor pool, as Italians abandoned cow-milking. Thus
the frequent charge that is leveled at immigrants, “that they steal European
jobs,” does not apply in this case. India, and in particular the state of
Punjab, has gained, not only through remittances, but in enabling the
family migration projects of thousands of Punjabis to be realized through
the processes of chain migration. Punjabis have proven themselves to
be hardworking and committed workers, which, along with their labor
acquiescence, have earned them a good reputation among Italian employ-
ers. Italian employers now prefer to hire Indians over both other immi-
grant groups and ethnic Italians. Indeed, on several occasions, Italian dairy
owners remarked that ethnic Italian workers “were not reliable,” since
those few still hired often did not remain for long, in stark contrast to
Indian workers who have made a career out of cow-milking. Punjabis are
well known for being an enterprising diaspora group, and Italy is no excep-
tion. Working as a bergamino represents a first step on the labor ladder for
Punjabis. While future economic strategies varied, with some men desir-
ing to return to India once they had accumulated enough savings, sev-
eral also had their eyes on the ultimate dream for many: to establish their
own business in Italy. Although only one family in my sample had actu-
ally achieved this, there is no doubt that this trend toward occupational
diversification beyond the stalle and factory work will continue to gather
pace. This case study of Indian bergamini shows that there is scope for
facilitating low-skilled immigration in Europe in certain sectors, debunk-
ing the myth that only high-skilled workers will contribute to the EU
economy and make it more competitive. Furthermore, it can be argued
that providing more avenues for legal low-skilled immigration can help
reduce irregular migration and give immigrants who may set out with
lower levels of education and skills the opportunity to upgrade those
skills once in Europe. Many young men from India consciously choose
the irregular migration route, paying huge sums of money, because they
are fully aware that their low levels of education preclude the possibility
of legal migration to Europe, which is reserved exclusively for the highly
educated in a number of member states, especially those who have
adopted a point-based immigration system. Allowing targeted low-
skilled migration can relieve the pressure on a number of EU member
states struggling to cope with large numbers of irregular migrants and,
more importantly, officially acknowledge the need for low-skilled labor
even amidst an economic crisis. Finally, the example of Indian bergamini
in Italy shows that ethnic concentration can occur in a sector without
leading to the formation of an ethnic “ghetto.” The strong presence of
Indians in the cow-milking sector has occurred without leading to the

formation of an ethnic economy consisting of co-ethnic employers and
employees, since all employers are Italian, and Indian families live scat-
tered across the countryside, preventing ethnic residential concentrations.
EU policymakers should therefore consider the need for low-skilled labor
on a country, regional, and sectoral basis, rather than presuming that it
will necessarily lead to competition in the EU labor market with native
workers.
Appendix: Interview Guide

1. How long have you been working in the stalle?
2. How did you find your first job in the stalle?
3. What work did you do before in the Punjab? In Italy?
4. How many other Indians do you work with?
5. Are they from the same community as you or relatives?
6. What is the accommodation like?
7. What is your monthly net salary?
8. What are the working conditions like? In winter? In summer?
9. Describe your boss. Is he familiar with Indian culture?
10. If you could, what job would you like to do in Italy?
11. Describe your shifts.
12. What are the worst and most positive aspects of your job?
13. What does your wife think about your work?
14. What are your future plans? Stay in Italy, migrate to another country, or
return to India?
15. What is/was your father’s occupation?
16. What is the job situation of other family members?
17. Do you belong to a trade union? How has the union helped you?
18. How is your overtime paid?
19. Where do you prefer to invest, in India or in Italy?
20. How often do you send money back home?
Notes
1. No author, “Assolatte: il fatturato dei latticini italiani ha raggiunto nel 2011
i 15 miliardi di euro,” June 18, 2012, accessed January 21, 2013, http://www
.beverfood.com/v2/news+notizia.storyid+5341-assolatte-il-fatturato-dei-latticinio
-italiani-ha-raggiunto-nel-2011-i-15-miliardi-di-euro.htm.
2. No author, “Nel 2008 l’industria lattiero-casearia si conferma il primo settore
alimentare italiano,” June 16, 2009, accessed January 21, 2013, www.assolatte.it/
assolatte/download1.jsp?file=/assolatte/images/.
3. European Journal, “Italy: Sikh Cheese Producers,” Deutsche WelleEnglish,

September 20, 2008, 08:12, accessed March 13, 2012, http://www.podcast.tv/
video-episodes/italy-sikh-cheese-producers-4887664.html.
4. Giovanna Zincone, “Italian Immigrants and Immigration Policy-Making:
Structures, Actors and Practices,” IMISCOE Working Paper: International Migra-
tion, Integration and Social Cohesion Network (2006).
5. Claudia Finotelli and Giuseppe Sciortino, “New Trends in Italian Immigra-
tion Policies: ‘To Change Everything in Order to Keep Everything the Same,’” Real
Instituto Elcano (2008), 5.
6. Vladimiro Polchi, “Flussi immigrati, second clic day i 65.000 posti esau-
riti in 38 minuti,” La Repubblica, December 18, 2007, accessed September 14,
2011, http://www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/flussi-decreto/clic-18dic
/clic-18dic.html.
7. Murizio Ambrosini, “The Role of Immigrants in the Labour Market,” Inter-
national Migration 39 (2001): 61, at 62.
8. Amanda Levinson, The Regularisation of Unauthorised Migrants: Literature
Survey and Country Case Studies—Regularisation Programmes in Italy (Oxford: Cen-
tre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, 2005) (see p. 1).
9. Asher Colombo and Giuseppe Sciortino, “Italian Immigration: The Origins,
Nature and Evolution of Italy’s Migratory Systems,” Journal of Modern Italian Stud-
ies 9 (2004): 49, at 54.
10. Ludovico Gardani, Maria Josè Compiani, Francesca Galloi, and Prem Lal
Raina, Turbani che non turbano: Ricerca sociologica sugli immigrati indiani nel cremo-
nese (Provincia di Cremona: Osservatorio provinciale sull’immigrazione, 2002),
1–71 (see p. 34).
11. Maria Josè Compiani and Francesca Galloni, “I sikh in Lombardia,” in
I Sikh: Storia e immigrazione, eds. Domenica Denti, Mauro Ferrari, and Fabio
Perocco (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2005), 143–162 (see p. 154).
12. Gardani et al., Turbani che non turbano: Ricerca sociologica sugli immigrati
indiani nel cremonese (Provincia di Cremona: Osservatorio provinciale sull’im
migrazione, 2002), 1–71 (see p. 36).
13. Ibid. (see pp. 36, 37).
14. Maria Josè Compiani and Fabio Quassoli, “The Milky Way to Labor Market
Insertion: The ‘Sikh Community’ in Lombardy,”, in Asian Migrants and European
Labour Markets: Patterns and Processes of Immigrant Labour Market Insertion in Europe,
eds. E. Spaan, F. Hillmann, and T. Van Naerssen (London: Routledge, 2005), 138–
158 (see pp. 139–141).
15. Ibid. (see pp. 146–147).
16. Ibid. (see p. 149).
17. Ibid. (see p. 148).
18. Ibid. (see pp. 151–152).
19. Gardani et al., Turbani che non turbano: Ricerca sociologica sugli immigrati indiani
nel cremonese (Provincia di Cremona: Osservatorio provinciale sull’immigrazione,
2002), 1–71 (see p. 30).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. (see p. 31).
22. Italian government policy permits all long-term residence permit hold-
ers, as well as all foreigners who have a residence permit for at least one year
(independent of the type of residence permit), to apply for family reunification.
Foreigners can apply to sponsor their spouse, who must be at least 18 years of
age, dependent children under the age of 18, and parents over the age of 65
who do not have other children in their country of origin who can take care of
them.
23. Roger Waldinger, “The Making of an Immigrant Niche,” International Migra
tion Review 28 (1994): 3 (see p. 3).
24. Ibid. (see p. 12).
25. A total of 14 different Punjabi families were interviewed for this study.
26. Eric Fong and Jing Shen, “Explaining Ethnic Enclave, Ethnic Entrepre-
neurial and Employment Niches: A Case Study of Chinese in Canadian Immigrant
Gateway Cities,” Urban Studies 48 (2011): 1605 (see p. 1607).
27. Ibid.
28. “Scheduled Caste” is the official Indian government term that refers to
former untouchables. Untouchability was formally legally abolished in the Indian
constitution of 1947, but remains one of the most persistent forms of discrimina-
tion in India.
29. OBC stands for Other Backward Caste and is a large official category that
includes thousands of caste groups that are neither Dalit nor upper caste.
30. Murizio Ambrosini, “The Role of Immigrants in the Labour Market,” Inter-
national Migration 39 (2001): 61 (see p. 69).
31. J. de Bock, “When and How Does Ethnicity Come into Play? Immigrant
Workers’ Social Contacts at the Workplace” (unpublished PhD thesis chapter,
European University Institute, 2012).
32. D. Caulkins and C. Peters, “Grid-Group Analysis, Social Capital, and
Entrepreneurship among North American Ethnic Groups,” Crosscultural Research
36 (2002): 48; F. D. Wilson, “Ethnic Concentrations and Labor-Market Oppor-
tunities,” in Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity and Employment in the
United States, eds. F. F. Bean and S. Bell-Rose (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1999), 106–140.
33. Maritsa V. Poros, “The Role of Migrant Networks in Linking Local Labour
Markets: The Case of Asian Indian Migration to New York and London,” Global
Networks 1 (2001): 243 (see p. 253).
34. Karen B. Leonard and Chandra S. Tibrewal. “Asian Indians in Southern
California: Occupations and Ethnicity,” in Immigration and Entrepreneurship: Cul-
ture, Capital, and Ethnic Networks, eds. Ivan Light and Parminder Bhachu (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 141–162 (see p. 151).
35. Francesca Gandolfi, “Dove vado e con chi sto. Il caso dei sikh,” in Arriv-
are Non Basta: Complessità e fatica della migrazione, ed. Mara Tognetti Bordogna
(Milano: Franco Angeli, 2007), 283–290 (see p. 285).
Maria Josè Compiani and Francesca Galloni, “I sikh in Lombardia,” in I Sikh:

Storia e immigrazione, eds. Domenica Denti, Mauro Ferrari, and Fabio Perocco
(Milano: Franco Angeli, 2005), 143–162 (see p. 156).
36. Maria Josè Compiani and Francesca Galloni, “I sikh in Lombardia,” in
I Sikh: Storia e immigrazione, eds. Domenica Denti, Mauro Ferrari, and Fabio
Perocco (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2005), 143–162 (see pp.156–157).
37. Michele Scalisi et al., Focus “Il passaggio dalla scuola secondaria di sec-
ondo grado all’Università”: Diplomati Anno Scolastico 2010/2011—Immatricolati
Anno Accademico 2011/2012. (Roma: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e
della Ricerca, 2012), 1–16 (see p. 7).
38. However, it is also important to point out that overall, for the first time in
Italian history, a slight majority (52 percent) of Italian students in 2012 choose
to study in technical or professional high schools (data from the Italian Ministry
of Education), reversing the previous tendency of a clear preference for academic
high schools.
39. C. Giustiniani, “I Sikh ci salvano il latte? Puniamoli col test d’italiano,” Il
Messagero, August 12, 2010, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.ilmessaggero
.it/home_blog.php?blg=P&idb=767&idaut=11.
40. No author, “L’industria del parmigiano salvata dai Sikh,” Italia dall’
Estero, November 16, 2011, accessed March 12, 2012, http://italiadallestero.info
/archives/12945.
41. Gabriele Villa, “La Riserva Indiana d’Italia invisibili, stakanovisti e
innamorati della terra: In meno di dieci anni la comunità è quadruplicata e quasi
tutta lavora nell’agricoltura. Libertà massima. Gratitudine a volte poca,” Il Giornale
.it, March 8, 2012, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.ilgiornale.it/interni/la
_riserva_indiana_ditalia_invisibili_stakanovisti_e_innamorati_terra/08-03-2012
/articolo-id=576129-page=0-comments=1.
42. No author, “Indiani da bergamini a imprenditori: E i Sikh guardano al
mercato immobiliare,” Cremona Oggi, August 19 2011, accessed March 12, 2012,
http://www.cremonaoggi.it/2011/08/19/indiani-da-bergamini-a-imprenditori-e-i
-sikh-guardano-al-mercato-immobiliare/.
43. No author, “Senza gli indiani addio Grana Padano: L’inchiesta del New York
Times: sono loro che mandano avanti l’industria casearia del nord Italia,” Corriere
della Sera.it, September 8, 2011, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.corriere.it
/economia/11_settembre_08/immigrati-indiani-salvano-produzione-grana-padano
-nytimes_620818ec-d9f7-11e0-89f9-582afdf2c611.shtml.
CHAPTER TEN
The Myth of Benefit Tourists and

Welfare Magnets
A Relationship between Social Welfare and Free
Movement in the European Union?
Sergio Carrera, Katharina Eisele,
Elspeth Guild, and Joanna Parkin
Introduction
The fiscal impact of mobility of persons on the budgets and econo-
mies of receiving states has become an increasingly sensitive question
across political and media debates. Immigrants have often been charged
with drawing disproportionately on national welfare provisions and with
burdening local social services. Certain scholars have contended that
such controversies are only to be expected, given the inherent tensions
between the construct of a welfare system and the nature of migration. It
has been suggested that welfare systems and the logic of distributive jus-
tice on which they depend rely on these being closed systems, implying a
strong distinction between “members” and “nonmembers.” Consequently,
certain academic debates have even argued that national welfare states
cannot coexist alongside the free movement of labor by third-country
workers.1
Nowhere have these discussions proved more pertinent and contro-

versial than lately in the European Union (EU). The so-called “European
Social Model(s)” provide for comparatively extensive social protection. At
the same time, European economic and political integration under the
framework of the European Union has established a common space of
free movement for all citizens of the EU member states, who bear the
fundamental right to travel, live, and work in any country of the Euro-
pean Union with only minimum administrative restrictions by the receiv-
ing state. Devised as a necessary accompaniment to the establishment of
an EU single market, both the geographical scope and the free movement
rights attached to the status of EU citizen have expanded with the process
of European integration. Free movement within the Union now applies
across 28 member states stretching from Ireland to Romania and Sweden
to Cyprus and entitles EU citizens not only to work in another member
state but also to claim a number of political, civil, and social rights, which
includes access to certain forms of social benefits.
These new citizenship rights, together with the eastward expansion of
the European Union that has taken place over the last decade, has fos-
tered growing fears over intra-EU mobility and the impact on welfare.
Assumptions that the “generous” welfare provisions of certain (especially
northern) member states can function as “magnets” for their southern
and eastern neighbors have preceded every EU enlargement process and
have been exacerbated by the deepening recession and rising unemploy-
ment of the late 2000s. These debates came to a head in 2013 with the
media frenzy and political struggles that took place ahead of the removal
of transitional controls on the movement of nationals from Romania and
Bulgaria. The overwhelming characterization of Romanians and Bulgarians
as prospective “benefit tourists” has dominated public and policy debates
and prompted certain national governments to attempt to roll back citi-
zenship rights and freedoms established by European integration.
This chapter examines the myths, misconceptions, and controversies
that have emerged around benefit tourism and welfare magnets in the
very specific context provided by the European Union.2 In many ways
the European Union provides an ideal case study for examining the myths
and realities around cross-border human mobility and social welfare. With
the removal of internal border controls and politically imposed restric-
tions on movement, the European Union provides a laboratory by which
to test hypotheses concerning why people move and the impact of their
mobility on receiving-state welfare systems. Examining in particular the
debates of the last decade since the European Union’s eastern enlargement,
the chapter asks the following questions: what themes have characterized
The Myth of Benefit Tourists and Welfare Magnets 253
controversies surrounding mobility and social welfare in the Union? Are

fears of benefit tourism and the hypothesis of welfare magnets supported
by evidence (provided by statistical data and social science research
findings)?
The chapter begins by setting out the EU legal framework on social
security coordination and social benefits for mobile EU citizens. It then
explores how national concerns over reliance on social benefits by non-
nationals have translated into political debates at the EU level, focusing
in particular on nationals of the new Eastern European member states
(Romania, Bulgaria). Finally, the chapter deconstructs these debates and
the myths behind alleged “social welfare tourism” by certain groups of
EU citizens through an examination of the evidence and knowledge on
which they are founded. The chapter concludes that the available data and
evidence fail to substantiate the link between free movement and social
welfare regimes or any relationship between EU citizens’ mobility and any
alleged exploitation of EU member states’ welfare systems. Indeed, the
existing research on the relation between welfare and EU mobility rather
demonstrates that the actual challenge may be one of insufficient (and
therefore unequal) access to welfare coverage (social security benefits and
social advantages) granted by the current European Union legal frame-
work to mobility citizens due to administrative barriers at the regional and
local levels in many EU member states. Nevertheless the failure to rely on
comprehensive and comparable data on reliance by nonnationals on social
benefits in political discussions leaves a gap for myth-making and the arti-
ficial construction of social welfare tourism as a major policy problem in
the Union.
The EU Legal Framework on Social Security Coordination and Social Benefits

The free movement of persons constitutes one of the four fundamen-
tal freedoms of the European Union and lies at the heart of the project
of European integration and one of its core political foundations, that is,
citizenship of the European Union. The EU legislature adopted rules coor-
dinating social security and determining entitlements to social assistance
and social security benefits with the objective of facilitating this freedom
of cross-border mobility for nationals holding the nationality of member
states, that is to say EU citizens. The underlying rationale is the following:
if the social security position for EU citizens—and in particular for those
who are workers—is not ensured in the host member state, EU citizens
are discouraged from making use of their free movement rights in the first
place by moving across the member states’ frontiers.
The European Union deals with social protection in two ways: first,
through the coordination of the member states’ social security systems
(mentioned below) and second, through equality, that is, the prohibition
of nationality discrimination laid down in Article 18 TFEU.3 The prohibi-
tion of nationality discrimination in relation to access to social benefits is
specified in EU secondary legislation as this section explains in more detail
below.
Entitlement to social security benefits is, however, also explicitly
included in EU primary law. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
legally binding since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on Decem-
ber 1, 2009, stipulates that “everyone residing and moving legally within
the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advan-
tages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.”4 The
European Union recognizes and respects the entitlement to social security
benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as mater-
nity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency, or old age, and in the case
of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union
law and national laws and practices.5
The highly politicized debates in the European Union on the rela-
tionship between social benefits and free movement have contributed
to propagating the impression among societies that mobile EU nation-
als can access social benefits in the host member state too easily and
without any restrictions. This is, however, not the case. The right to
free movement for EU citizens, including the right to social security
benefits and social assistance, is not absolute in nature and is still
subject to certain preconditions under EU law. This subsection aims to
clarify the applicable rules for EU citizens by providing an overview of
the legal framework on, first, social security coordination and, second, the
access to social benefits. Importantly, these two aspects relating to social
security are regulated by different legal instruments, which we will now
examine.
Social Security Coordination

The coordination of social security does not mean that social security
rules in the European Union are harmonized or replaced by one European
system, but that the European Union establishes a system that coordinates
social security rules and thereby protects social security rights for citizens
moving within the European Union.6 The coordination of social secu-
rity for EU citizens is today governed by Regulation (EC) No. 883/20047
and an implementing regulation.8 These two instruments consolidated
the rather complex legal regime and replaced the previously frequently
amended Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71.9
What does social security coordination mean, if the harmonization of
different European systems is explicitly excluded? Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1408/71 stipulated four basic principles that determined its
application.
• First, the regulation laid down the principle of equal treatment in all European
Economic Area (EEA) states, meaning that all persons who fall under the regu-
lation have the same obligations and enjoy the same benefits under the legisla-
tion of the host state as nationals of that state.
• Second, EU citizens can only be obliged to adhere to a social security system
of one state, which is, as a general rule, the state of employment (for non-eco-
nomically active persons it is the state of residence).10 The regulation sets out
the rules on the determination of the applicable legislation to prevent conflicts
of law.
• Third, the aggregation of insurance periods in a state other than that of
employment must be taken into consideration to determine the amount of
benefit.
• Fourth, the payment of benefits is not contingent upon residence in the state
that is responsible for allocating the benefit. This has been labeled as the prin-
ciple of exportability of benefits.11
While these principles remain valid for the application of Regulation

(EC) No. 883/2004, this latter regulation now provides for improved
social security coordination with clearer rules. The new framework has
solved a number of contentious issues. In particular, Regulation (EC) No.
883/2004 covers all EU nationals who are insured under national law—
and in doing so promotes European citizenship—as well as stateless per-
sons, refugees, and their family members and survivors (whereas previous
Council Regulation [EEC] No. 1408/71 applied only to employed persons,
self-employed persons, and to members of their families).12 Moreover,
Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 has reinforced the principle of equal treat-
ment among EU nationals and has strengthened access to cross-border
health care.13 Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 applies to sickness benefits,
maternity and equivalent paternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age
benefits, survivors’ benefits, benefits in respect of accidents at work or
occupational diseases, death grants, unemployment benefits, preretire-
ment benefits, and family benefits.14
The coordination of social security under Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004
must be distinguished from access to social benefits under the so-called
Citizens’ Directive 2004/38/EC.
Access to Social Benefits Under Citizens’ Directive 2004/38/EC

Access to social assistance for EU citizens is governed by Directive
2004/38/EC,15 which specifies the conditions that have to be met before
EU citizens and their family members may exercise their right to move
and reside freely in the European Union. As the Commission explained,
social assistance benefits are typically “benefits that a Member State grants
to those who do not have sufficient resources to meet their basic needs,”
and may relate, for instance, to non-contributory access to health or hous-
ing services or family benefits and allowances.16 EU citizens who move
to another member state for the purpose of employment and their family
members are entitled to the same social assistance benefits as nationals
from the beginning of their stay.17 Other EU citizens who reside legally in
another EU member state must also be treated equally with nationals in
accordance with Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC, but safeguards are in
place to protect host member states from unreasonable financial burdens.
During the first three months of residence the host member state is not
obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance to EU citizens who are
not economically active, or who are first-time job-seekers. Importantly,
benefits of a financial nature that, independently of their status under
national law, are intended to facilitate access to the labor market cannot
be regarded as constituting social assistance within the meaning of Article
24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC.18
For a period of longer than three months, EU citizens acquire the right
of residence in another member state if they are either employed or self-
employed; or if they have sufficient resources for themselves and their
family members so as not to become a financial burden on the social assis-
tance system of the host member state during their period of residence and
have comprehensive sickness insurance. This means that such EU citizens
are either workers (and have thus an income) in the host member state, or
they have to prove “sufficient” resources (which are equal or higher to the
income threshold below which social assistance is accorded).19 Therefore,
it is—in practice—unlikely that such EU citizens require social assistance
in the host member state.
In cases where a non-economically active EU citizen applies for a social
assistance benefit, this request must be evaluated in view of the right to
equal treatment; if there is a reasonable doubt, member states may verify
whether a person claiming social assistance benefits has become an unrea-
sonable burden on the social assistance system.20
The Court of Justice in Luxembourg specified in the case of Brey
that member states may make the grant of a social assistance or special
non-contributory benefit to an EU citizen from another member state con-

ditional upon that citizen meeting the requirements for obtaining a legal
right of residence for a period exceeding three months.21 Yet, an expulsion
measure must not be the automatic consequence of a European Union
citizen’s or his or her family member’s recourse to the social assistance
system of the host member state.22 The Commission has in this context
pointed out that “authorities should assess the individual situation taking
into account a range of factors such as the amount, duration, temporary
nature of the difficulty or overall extent of the burden which a grant would
place on the national assistance system. If, on this basis, authorities con-
clude that the persons have become an unreasonable burden, they may
terminate their right of residence.”23
After a period of five years EU citizens acquire the right to permanent
residence and have access to social assistance in the same way as nation-
als of the host member state. The wording of Directive 2004/38/EC in
terms of entitlement to social assistance is ambiguous indeed: what does
the concept of “unreasonable burden” exactly refer to?24 While the Euro-
pean Commission’s 2007 “Guide on How to Get the Best out of Directive
2004/38/EC”25 provided some indication, it does not define the term in a
clear manner. Under the heading “Keeping the Right to Reside” the guide
states:
If your right to reside is conditional upon having sufficient resources not

to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member
State during the period of residence (i.e., when you study or are an inactive
person there), it might be terminated once you become an unreasonable
burden on the social assistance system.
This does not mean that you cannot apply for social assistance there
when you are in need. However, in this case the host Member State is entitled to
examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and after taking into account
the duration of your residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid
granted, it may consider that you have become an unreasonable burden on its
social assistance system and proceed to your expulsion. An expulsion measure
can in no case be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance
system.
As this section demonstrates, the EU legal framework governing access

to social welfare for mobile EU citizens is rather complex and by no means
unqualified. Indeed, the legislation contains a number of safeguards to
prevent abuse and misuse of the social rights provided. At the same time,
these rights have clearly developed as a necessary accompaniment to Euro-
pean integration. Without access to social welfare, the free movement of
labor would be based on a very narrow interpretation of the meaning of

worker; a single market requires that individuals are free not only to work
abroad, but to seek work and move between employments.
Political Discourses and Myths on Alleged Welfare Tourism in the European Union
Despite the sound economic and social principles driving the progres-
sive expansion of social rights to mobile EU citizens, this process has not
been free of controversy. Debates surrounding EU mobility and welfare
have given rise to their own set of myths and misconstructions, which
have recently come to a climax in political discussions at the EU level.
Controversies surrounding mobile EU citizens’ access to welfare are not
a new phenomenon. Fears associated with EU welfare tourism can be seen
as far back as Greece’s accession to the European Union in 1981, and vari-
ants of debates over “poverty migration” have characterized each accession
of a new member to the European Union.26
From the outset, EU laws coordinating social security systems to ensure
that EU citizens would not be penalized with a loss in their entitlements
when they moved from one member state to another have had their detrac-
tors. During the 1980s and early 1990s it was northern member states that
feared that EU laws (and their interpretation by the Court of Justice of the
European Union) would jeopardize the high level of protection given by
their social security schemes. In the Netherlands and Nordic countries, for
instance, there was an expectation that the application of EU laws on social
security would lead to a massive inflow of people from the south of Europe
to take advantage of these countries’ generous welfare models.27
However, it is only in the last decade, with the European Union’s east-
ern expansion, that political discourses surrounding EU mobility and wel-
fare truly intensified. The accession in 2004 of 10 new member states
largely from Central and Eastern Europe, followed in 2007 by the entry
of Romania and Bulgaria, triggered a variety of debates across the incum-
bent members. A number of negative fears were expressed around the
significant income differentials between the existing member states (the
so-called EU15) and the new entrants (the EU10).28 Moreover, the east-
ern enlargement coincided with the adoption of the 2004 Free Movement
Directive, which expanded the rights of unemployed EU citizens to reside
in another member state and explicitly granted EU citizens access to social
assistance in other member states (see above), further exacerbating the
unease among certain parties.
The fact that the arrival of millions of new EU citizens with the right to
move and reside across the EU coincided with a dramatic strengthening
of social rights for EU mobile workers is noteworthy in its own right.29

Indeed, it serves as a reminder that although we are concerned here with
the growth of myths around migration and social benefits, these fears were
not sufficient to halt the path of EU integration in the field of social secu-
rity coordination.
Nevertheless, they did play a decisive role in the decision by a majority
of EU15 governments to impose transitional controls on the movement of
workers from new entrants. This meant that citizens of these new member
states would have to wait for a transitional period of up to seven years
before being free to exercise their full free movement rights, including
applying for social benefits. Despite these additional controls, the period
following the 2004 enlargement saw large numbers of central and eastern
Europeans move from east to west, especially to countries that chose not
to restrict access to their labor markets, such as the United Kingdom.30
This surge in mobility of EU citizens coincided with the outbreak of the
global financial crisis in 2007 and subsequent economic recession, which
forced many EU governments to reevaluate their social models and make
deep reductions in public spending on social assistance. Together with
climbing unemployment, austerity deepened public anxiety about intra-
EU mobility. Where non-EU migrants (so-called third-country nationals)
had been the scapegoats of choice for populist politicians and press in
certain member states, negative attention began to shift instead toward
mobile EU citizens. In the United Kingdom this coalescence between the
anti-immigrant and Euro-skeptic agenda created a perfect storm, with
Prime Minister David Cameron forced to announce an in-out referendum
of the United Kingdom’s European membership. But other Northern Euro-
pean states were not immune; websites encouraging citizens to denounce
Polish and Romanian workers were set up in the Netherlands in 2012,31
while in 2010 the French government began a campaign to dismantle
Roma encampments and deport EU citizens who had come from Eastern
Europe.32
Anxiety reached a critical point in 2013 as the free movement
restrictions imposed on Romania and Bulgaria by eight EU member states
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Spain,
and the United Kingdom) approached their expiration date of January
2014. Concern centered in particular around the access by Romanian
and Bulgarian nationals to so-called “special noncontributory benefits,”
with the perception gaining prevalence that certain people would be
motivated to exercise their EU free movement rights solely in order to
claim their entitlement to these minimum subsistence benefits accessible
to the economically nonactive.33 Fears ran particularly high in the United
Kingdom where tabloid newspapers ran daily stories about floods of

“immigrants” (EU citizens) from southeastern Europe looking to come
to Britain for welfare tourism. British Work and Pensions Secretary Iain
Duncan Smith stoked fears when railing against Europeans who “use the
free movement rules just to travel around, looking for the best benefits
they can get.”34 Prime Minister David Cameron proposed a package of
reforms setting out a range of measures the UK authorities would take
to limit EU citizens’ access to social benefits and to deport those found
homeless.35 Germany also saw a discursive framing of so-called poverty
migration, with the press focusing on burdens to social services and then–
Interior Minister Hans-Pieter Friedrich announcing measures to prevent
individuals from Romania and Bulgaria entering the country under false
pretenses to collect welfare benefits.36
In 2013, the debates over EU mobility and welfare tourism, which hith-
erto had primarily been confined to the national sphere of domestic poli-
tics, spilled over into EU policy discussions and saw certain member state
national governments attempt to limit and renationalize free movement
rights of mobile EU citizens as a consequence.
These efforts are most clearly reflected in a joint letter sent in April 2013
from the interior ministers of Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, and
the Netherlands to the EU presidency.37 The letter requested the amend-
ment of EU rules on free movement due to the misuse of national welfare
schemes by “certain immigrants” from other member states. Stating that
a “significant number” of mobile EU citizens draw benefits from receiving
member states’ social systems without the correct entitlement, the letter
claimed that social systems in these states were coming under “consider-
able strain.” They also expressed concern over the additional costs certain
member states would have to shoulder due to “the fraudulent use of the
right of free movement of EU citizens” and demanded better tools to fight
against such abuses, including more effective expulsion and reentry bans.
Subsequently, the Council of the EU invited the Commission to look at
the implementation of free movement rules, including guidance on fight-
ing abuse of these rules, and to present a report on the matter by Decem-
ber 2013.38 The European Commission largely rejected the claims of EU
member states, stating that EU law already provided sufficiently for the
prevention of abuse. Indeed, the European Commissioner, Cecilia Malm-
ström, issued a blunt refusal to the request of the four member states,
reiterating that the Commission did not intend to amend EU rules on free
movement.39
However, this did not prevent debates from heating up in the lead-
up to January 1, 2014, and the end of transitional arrangements on
Romanian and Bulgarian workers. The a priori designation by certain gov-

ernments and their national media of a swath of EU citizens as potential
cheats and “benefit scroungers” led to an outbreak of tensions between
members of the European bloc. Government representatives of Romania
and Bulgaria hit back with thinly veiled barbs directed at the inflammatory
populist discourse of UK politicians and tabloids, while the Polish govern-
ment declared its intention to veto any future changes to EU laws that
would prevent mobile workers from having access to welfare benefits.40 In
December 2013, the foreign ministers of the so-called Visegrad countries
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) issued their own joint
statement at the EU level, warning of the dangers of eroding the EU sin-
gle market and underlining the economic benefits that EU nationals from
Central and Eastern European countries had brought to the economies of
the EU15 member states.41
A certain proportion of the rhetoric depicting EU mobile citizens as
benefit tourists linked to electioneering by national politicians, many of
whom appeared to be under increasing pressure from the rise of popu-
list elements in domestic politics and for whom the arrival of supposed
“floods” of European citizens provided a useful diversion from unemploy-
ment figures and ever deepening cuts to public spending. Yet, the inten-
sification of EU-level debates surrounding mobility and welfare in 2013
cannot simply be dismissed as cynical politicking. Indeed, by calling free
movement into question at the highest political EU level, member states
made an unprecedented challenge to the fundamental freedoms of the
European Union, one that threatened to roll back more than 20 years of
European integration in the field of social rights and free movement to the
pre-1992 era, when free movement was granted to a narrow category of
economic movers.
For this reason these controversies deserve careful attention. In addi-
tion, when these debates are unpacked, they reveal two troubling underly-
ing themes, which recur in the discourses surrounding EU free movement
and social welfare.
First, the debates are revealing when considering what and who are tar-
geted by discussions linking EU mobility and welfare. Political discourse
has tended to blur the legal distinction between who is a “foreigner” and
who is a “citizen.” Under EU law, nationals of other EU member states
are referred to as “mobile EU citizens” and not “immigrants,” a term that
is reserved for non-EU or “third-country” nationals. Indeed, one of the
key guiding principles behind citizenship of the Union is nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of nationality. Despite this, as the above-mentioned joint
letter sent in April 2013 by the interior ministers of Germany, Austria,
the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands to the EU presidency revealed,

national authorities have referred overwhelmingly to “EU immigrants.”
This terminological inaccuracy, which ignores the past 20 years of Euro-
pean integration post the Maastricht Treaty, echoes the political demands
that threaten to considerably erode the constitutive rights and benefits of
European citizenship and create a two-tier or even second-class European
citizenship if implemented. They allude to a period pre-enlargement, even
pre-Maastricht, when EU citizens were still regarded before the law as for-
eigners, requiring residence permits and residence tests, and whose mobil-
ity was regulated by migration controls via the determination of whether
someone is a burden on the welfare system.
More troubling still, closer inspection indicates that this political dis-
course is discriminatory when singling out those EU nationals suspected
to be more likely to abuse other member states’ social security systems.
Certain member states politicians have spoken in positive terms about
specific categories of movers, such as young people seeking to leave crisis-
hit southern member states like Italy, Portugal, and Spain—and even
launched initiatives designed to facilitate their mobility.42 In parallel, these
same politicians have expressed their concern over the arrival of groups
from Romania and Bulgaria, with a more or less explicit reference to EU
citizens of Roma origin in particular. Allusions have been made to the
potential impact these individuals will have on welfare systems, as well as
crime rates and begging, and initiatives have focused rather on improving
the “integration” of these EU citizens in their (Eastern European) mem-
ber states of origin, with a view rather to preventing them from exercis-
ing their free movement rights.43 Political discourse therefore privileges
certain EU movers (young, qualified, and highly motivated jobseekers—
including from the south) while stigmatizing others (Romanian and Bul-
garian nationals who come to apply for benefits). This distinction reveals
a troubling ethnic and economic dimension with the focus on Roma and
the poor.
Second, a paradox of the EU discourse on social benefits and mobility
in the Union has been the striking lack of empirical evidence and data
substantiating these claims. The quantitative and qualitative knowledge
on costs of social benefits in the mobility field have been almost entirely
missing in current debates. This is partially due to the difficulties associ-
ated with obtaining independent statistics that could provide an accurate
overview of the actual reliance on social benefits in the receiving member
states by nonnationals. Data and national statistics on the uses of social
assistance are, however, scarce and not easily accessible and compa-
rable in a cross-member state fashion (see the next section below). The
consequence, therefore, is that the widening of alarming discourses on

social welfare tourism has taken place without the grounding in objective
evidence and solid statistical data needed to back up such allegations. This
has favored an increasing focus on anecdotal evidence and fueled subjec-
tive, nonrational, and politicized discourses and policy initiatives, particu-
larly by some national governments of the EU member states. Perceptions
and fears appear to be the main framing factors in presenting access to
social benefits and social welfare tourism as a major policy problem. The
European Commission has drawn attention to this paradox, criticizing the
lack of any verifiable evidence and appealing to member states to uphold
the right to free movement by “countering public perceptions not based on
facts or economic realities.”44
This overview therefore indicates that the concept that certain EU mem-
ber states act as welfare “magnets” to a growing body of “benefit tourists”
from certain other EU member states has not only taken hold in the public
imagination and in political discourse, but threatens to impact very con-
cretely on the EU policy process.
Welfare Magnets and Benefit Tourists? A Brief Overview of the Evidence

In light of the discussions on “poverty migration” and “social benefit
tourism” that have hit the headlines across the member states, the fun-
damental question arises whether such claims can be backed by research
evidence and statistics. In recent years a growing number of EU citizens
have made use of their free movement rights living in another member
state. Still, the actual number of EU citizens having exercised free move-
ment and residing in a different EU member state is by and large quanti-
tatively low. The actual share of EU nationals residing in another member
state increased from approximately 1.6 percent at the end of 2004 to 2.8
percent at the end of 2012.45 What proportion of EU citizens move for
welfare reasons?
Although comprehensive and cross-comparative research on this ques-
tion is sparse, nevertheless there is a growing body of evidence drawn
from both official studies by international organizations as well as social
sciences research that nuances some of the at times rather alarming public
and political statements. Figures cited by the European Commission, for
instance, state that the main motivation for EU citizens to move to another
member state is connected first and foremost to work, followed by family-
related reasons.46 Therefore, work, rather than welfare benefits, is the main
pull factor for EU mobile citizens. In fact, mobile EU nationals who are
not economically active constitute only a limited share of the total number
of mobile EU nationals (estimated between 0.7 percent and 1 percent).47

This finding is drawn from an independent study produced for the Euro-
pean Commission in 2013, which also provides evidence that on average
mobile EU citizens are more likely to be in employment than nationals liv-
ing in the same country; this gap is partly caused by differences in the age
composition of mobile EU citizens and nationals, with a greater propor-
tion of the former category falling within the 15–64 age bracket. It is also
telling that pensioners, students, and jobseekers accounted for more than
two-thirds of the nonactive mobile EU citizen population in 2012 and
that the vast majority of nonactive mobile EU citizens live in economically
active households.48
These findings are supported by a range of academic research. C.
Giulietti and M. Kahanec have reviewed and compared the literature and
major economic studies discussing whether or not immigrants and mobile
EU citizens are attracted by welfare. The economists come to the conclu-
sion that “statistical analysis does not support the hypothesis that welfare
is a strong magnet for immigrants; even when such an effect is found, it is
relatively weak compared to other immigration determinants.”49 The schol-
ars quote research indicating that both migrants and mobile EU citizens
are on average younger than natives and hence more likely to contribute
to taxes, rather than being a fiscal burden for the host society. Interestingly,
they identify recurring evidence that indicates that, rather than being the
source of welfare abuse, migrants and mobile EU citizens in Europe are
subject to insufficient welfare coverage. This is due to the fact that they are
often likely to face administrative obstacles and informal barriers linked to
discrimination and inadequate knowledge by local administrations of the
entitlement rights of nonnationals.
These findings are complemented by K. Groenendijk’s analysis of the
data revealing the reliance on social assistance by nonnationals in Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. He concludes that “from
the data on the three Member States discussed in this paper, it appears that
EU migrants apply for or receive social assistance far less often than third-
country nationals, even less often than the nationals of the host Member
State themselves.”50 Similarly, C. Dustmann, T. Frattini, and C. Halls find
in their analysis of the fiscal costs and benefits of A8 (nationals from the
Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union
in May 2004) mobility to the United Kingdom that there is little reason to
believe that in the longer run, A8 nationals who arrived between 2004 and
2008 will constitute a net burden to the welfare system.51 The researchers
make clear that this finding is also in line with their analysis on the prob-
ability of welfare claims, where they show that A8 nationals—even if they
were identical in a large number of characteristics to natives, like age, edu-

cation, children, and disability—would still be less likely to claim benefits.
Finally, it is interesting to highlight the observations of the OECD’s
International Migration Outlook 2013, which may shed further light on
(mis)understandings of the link between migration and welfare.52 The
OECD finds that immigrants tend to have a less favorable net fiscal posi-
tion than the native-born, but that this is almost exclusively driven by
the fact that immigrant households contribute on average less in terms of
taxes and social security contributions than the native born and not by a
higher dependence on benefits. It is also highlighted that differences in the
composition of the migrant population by migration category (labor, fam-
ily, humanitarian) account for a large part of the cross-country variation of
migrants’ fiscal position relative to that of the native-born.
Conclusions
This chapter has critically examined the controversies around social
benefits and mobility of EU citizens in the European Union. Focusing on
the political debates that emerged in the lead-up to the lifting of transi-
tional controls on the movement of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in
January 2014, it asked what are the recurring themes and assumptions
underlying political discourses in some of the most vociferous EU member
states, and how do these tally with the evidence?
We chart a wide number of political discourses and policy strategies in
the period leading up to January 2014, with a handful of national govern-
ments raising the alarm over the “costs” and “financial burdens” of “social
welfare tourism.” Yet, these discourses also betray a blurring of the facts
and a difficult relationship in the use and misuse of knowledge and data.
On the one hand, political discourses reveal a degree of confusion and
inconsistency around the material and personal scope of the migration-
welfare debates—what and who are the targets of public and political state-
ments linking mobility/migration/free movement and the welfare burden?
Here, certain categories of mobile EU citizens are singled out for particular
concern, with recourse made to some established tropes—vagrants, gyp-
sies, and thieves. This discriminatory—even racialized—discourse identi-
fies certain unwanted categories of movers and undermines the principles
of equality and nondiscrimination that underpin the concept of European
citizenship and the freedoms enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
The conflation of legal statuses (EU mobile citizens or “migrants”?) is
part of the wider terminological confusion generated by a complex and
rather fragmented legal framework covering access to social benefits by EU

citizens exercising freedom of movement. It perhaps also goes some way
to explain the difficulty encountered by some mobile EU citizens to have
access in practice to the social rights to which they are entitled. Evidence
indicates that lack of knowledge in local administrations over the forms of
assistance nonnationals may claim poses practical barriers to EU citizens
when accessing benefits under EU law. Yet, these deficiencies in the func-
tioning of the EU’s Single Market have not preoccupied policymakers in
discussions over mobility and social welfare. Rather, it is the prospect of
benefit tourists moving with the express purpose of taking advantage of
the generous welfare systems of their European neighbors that has formed
the overriding focus of policy debates.
However, this chapter finds that the available evidence fails to substan-
tiate the link between free movement and “overburdened” social welfare
regimes in the EU context. The overwhelming majority of mobile EU citi-
zens move for reasons of work and do not present a negative fiscal impact
on receiving member states. Rather, and as already highlighted, the exist-
ing research on the relation between welfare and mobility of EU nationals
demonstrates that the actual challenge may be one of insufficient welfare
coverage by mobile EU citizens and barriers to their inclusion in many EU
member states. This challenge may well constitute an obstacle or disincen-
tive to intra-EU mobility by European citizens, which remains at present
too limited.
In bringing attention to social sciences research, this chapter has
exposed the disjuncture between the evidence and “myths” around migra-
tion and welfare in the Union. Yet, we need to exercise caution here too:
the free movement/welfare debate in the European Union cannot be boiled
down to a presentation of the data. Should there be evidence of a signifi-
cant proportion of mobile EU citizens relying (lawfully) on social welfare,
this would not necessarily justify reopening Directive 2004/38 and rolling
back EU free movement rights as certain member states have demanded.
Indeed, the very legitimacy of the political impulse driving recent debates
in the European Union can be called into question when taking into
account that free movement rights are intrinsic to the European project, a
project that has evolved beyond an economic union to become a political
framework conferring rights and freedoms on European citizens, which
are now also enshrined in a legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
That said, more comprehensive, comparable, and easily accessible sta-
tistics in the Union on reliance by nonnationals on social benefits would be
beneficial. It is precisely the scarcity of comparable data and low visibility
of the data that exist that has allowed an increasing focus on subjective,
nonrational, and politicized discourses and policy initiatives. An absence
of evidence opens a gap for myth-making and the artificial construction of
social welfare tourism as a major policy challenge.
Notes
1. Gary P. Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 485 (1986):51; Pawel
Kaczmarczyk, “Are Immigrants a Burden for the State Budget?”, EUI Working
Paper, RSCAS 2013/79, European University Institute: Florence.
2. This chapter is based on Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, and K. Eisele, Social
Benefits and Migration: A Contested Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU (Cen-
tre for European Policy Studies: Brussels, 2013).
3. Elspeth Guild, “Does European Citizenship Blur the Borders of Solidarity?”
in The Reconceptualisation of European Union Citizenship, ed. Elspeth Guild et al.
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 189.
4. Article 34(2), EU Charter.
5. Article 34(1), EU Charter.
6. Recital 4 of the Preamble to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of
June 14, 1971, on the application of social security schemes to employed per-
sons, self-employed persons, and to members of their families moving within the
Community.
7. Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of April 29, 2004, on the coordination of social security systems.
8. Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of September 16, 2009, laying down the procedure for implementing Regula-
tion (EC) No. 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems.
9. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of June 14, 1971, on the application
of social security schemes to employed persons, self-employed persons, and to
members of their families moving within the Community.
10. Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.
11. Anne Pieter van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons Within the European Com
munity—Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003),
63–64.
12. Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.
13. Rob Cornelissen, “The European Co-ordination of Social Security and
Third-Country Nationals,” in The Social Security Co-ordination Between the EU and
Non-EU Countries, eds. Danny Pieters and Paul Schoukens (Intersentia: Antwerp,
2009), 14; see Arts. 2, 5, and 20 (2) of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 as well as
Case C-56/01 Inizan [2003] ECR I-12403 and Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR
I-4325.
14. Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.

April 29, 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the member Sstates.
16. European Commission Communication, COM(2013) 837, 25.11.2013,
p. 5.
17. As laid down in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of April 5, 2011, on freedom of movement for
workers within the Union.
18. Joined Cases C-22 and C-23/08 Vatsouras [2009] ECR I-4585, para. 45.
19. Article 8(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC.
21. Case C-140/12 Brey, Judgment of September 19, 2013, not yet reported,
paras. 38 and 42.
23. European Commission Communication, COM (2013) 837, 25.11.2013,
p. 6; the Commission refers to Article 15 of Directive 2004/38/EC and para. 72 of
C-140/12 Brey, Judgment of September 19, 2013, not yet reported.
24. See Paul Minderhoud, “Free Movement, Directive 2004/38 and Access to
Social Benefits,” in Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Chal-
lenges Ahead, eds. Paul Minderhoud and Nicos Trimikliniotis (Nijmegen: Wolf
Legal Publishers, 2009), 69–85.
25. Right of Union citizens and their family members to move and reside freely
within the Union—Guide on How to Get the Best out of Directive 2004/38/EC, available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/faq/freetravel/doc/guide_2004_38_ec_en.pdf.
26. Kees Groenendijk, “Access for Migrants to Social Assistance: Closing the
Frontiers or Reducing Citizenship?,” in Social Benefits and Migration: A Contested
Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild et al. (Brussels:
CEPS, 2013), 1.
27. Rob Cornelissen, “EU Regulations on the Coordination of Social Security
Systems and Special Non-Contributory Benefits: A Source of Never-Ending Con-
troversy,” in Social Benefits and Migration: A Contested Relationship and Policy Chal-
lenge in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild et al. (Brussels: CEPS, 2013), 82.
28. These countries comprised Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
29. Elspeth Guild, “Does European Citizenship Blur the Borders of Solidarity?”
in The Reconceptualisation of European Union Citizenship, ed. Elspeth Guild et al.
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 205.
30. Meghan Benton and Milica Petrovic, “How Free Is Free Movement?
Dynamics and Drivers of Mobility within the European Union” (Brussels: Migra-
tion Policy Institute Europe, 2013).
31. Refer to the critical reactions by the European Parliament on the use of
discriminatory websites such as the one that was introduced by the Dutch PVV,
European Parliament resolution on discriminatory Internet sites and government
reactions, 2012/2554, 12.3.2012, which stated in paragraph 3, “Stresses the obli-

gation of all European Union governments to guarantee the rights of free move-
ment and non-discrimination; calls on the European Council and the Dutch
Government formally to condemn the PVV hotline since it undermines those
rights and is an affront to European values and principles.”
32. Sergio Carrera and Anaïs Faure-Atger, “L’Affaire des Roms: A Challenge
to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,” CEPS Liberty and Security in
Europe Series, Brussels, 2010.
33. Rob Cornelissen, “EU Regulations on the Coordination of Social Security
Systems and Special Non-Contributory Benefits: A Source of Never-Ending Con-
troversy,” in Social Benefits and Migration: A Contested Relationship and Policy Chal-
lenge in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild et al. (Brussels: CEPS, 2013), 82–110.
34. Stefan Simons and Carsten Volkry, “The Flood? Western Europe Fearful of
Eastern Immigration,” Der Spiegel Online International, February 10, 2013.
35. Elspeth Guild, “Cameron’s Proposals to Limit EU Citizens’ Access to the
UK: Lawful or Not, under EU Rules?” CEPS Commentary: Brussels, November
29, 2013.
36. “Interior Minister: Germany to Deport ‘Poverty Immigrants’,” Der Spiegel
Online International, June 7, 2013.
37. Letter to Mr. Alan Shatter, Minister for Justice and Equality (Republic of Ire-
land), President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, May 2013.
38. Press Release of the Council of the EU, 3244th Council Meeting, Justice
and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, June 6–7, 2013, 10461/13.
39. “JHA: Commission and Dublin Do Not Want to Revise Free Movement
Rules,” Agence Europe, 7 June 2013.
40. Valentina Pop, “Poland vows to veto British changes to EU migration rules,”
EU Observer, January 8, 2014.
41. “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Countries on the
Free Movement of Persons,” Council document 17395/13, Brussels, December 4,
2013.
42. For instance, pilot projects to better integrate qualified Southerners into
the German labor market by aiding them to enter jobs and apprenticeships are
being set up at the German national level. See Sven Astheimer, “Gut, dass wir die
Spanier haben,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 18, 2012; S. Becker et
al., “Die neuen Gastarbeiter—Europas junge Elite fur Deutschlands Wirtschaft,”
Der Spiegel, 25.02.2013.
43. Sergio Carrera, “Shifting Responsibilities for EU Roma Citizens: The 2010
French Affair on Roma Evictions and Expulsions Continued,” CEPS Liberty and
Security in Europe Series: Brussels, 2013.
44. European Commission communication on free movement of EU citizens
and their families: five actions to make a difference, COM (2013) 837, Brussels,
25.11.2013.
45. See European Commission, “DG Employment Estimates Based on Eurostat
Migration Statistics and the EU-Labour Force Survey (LFS) and EU Employment
and Social Situation Quarterly Review,” June 2013, pp. 42–43. Indeed, the major-
ity of foreign citizens in the European Union are in fact third-country nationals.
46. European Commission Communication, COM(2013) 837, 25.11.2013,
p. 3, referring to Eurostat, EU-LFS, 2008 module on labor market situation of
migrants.
47. ICF GHK Milieu Report, “A Fact Finding Analysis on the Impact on the
Member States’ Social Security Systems of the Entitlements of Non-Active Intra-
EU Migrants to Special Non-Contributory Cash Benefits and Healthcare Granted
on the Basis of Residence,” October 14, 2013 (revised December 16, 2013), pp.
13 and ss.
48. Ibid.
49. Corrado Giulietti and Martin Kahanec, “Does Generous Welfare Attract
Migrants? Towards Evidence-Based Policy-Making,” in Social Benefits and Migra-
tion: A Contested Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild
et al. (Brussels: CEPS, 2013), 111.
50. Ibid., Chapter 1, “Access for Migrants to Social Assistance: Closing the
Frontiers or Reducing Citizenship?” by Kees Groenendijk, p. 19.
51. Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini, and Caroline Halls, “Assessing the
Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK,” Fiscal Studies 31 (2010),
1–41.
52. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Inter-
national Migration Outlook 2013.
About the Editors
Diego Acosta Arcarazo is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Bristol.

He was previously Lecturer in Law at the University of Sheffield and holds
a PhD in European law from King’s College London. His area of expertise
is EU migration law and he is currently interested in migration law and
policies in South America. He is regularly invited to present his work at
international conferences and has provided consultancy on the subject for
the European Union, the International Centre on Migration Policy Devel-
opment (ICMPD), Brazil’s Ministry of Labour, and LexisNexis, among
others. He has published widely in the area of European migration law,
including his book The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of
EU Citizenship: An Analysis of Directive 2003/109 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).
He has also co-edited two other books: EU Justice and Security Law: After
Lisbon and Stockholm (Hart, 2014, with Cian Murphy) and EU Immigra-
tion and Asylum Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, with Peers,
Guild, Groenendijk, and Moreno-Lax).
Anja Wiesbrock is a Senior Judicial Advisor at the Research Council of
Norway. She has previously worked as a Researcher at the Department
of Private Law, University of Oslo and as an Assistant Professor in Euro-
pean Law at the University of Maastricht. She has also been a Visiting
Researcher and Lecturer at several institutions around the world, includ-
ing Harvard Law School, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), Dokuz
Eylul University (Izmir), and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). Her
main research interests focus on EU free movement law, EU migration law,
public procurement, and state aid, and she has published widely in these
areas, including her book Legal Migration to the European Union (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2010) and the edited volume The Greening of Business under EU
Law: Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously (Routledge, 2014).
About the Contributors
Thaddeus Gregory Blanchette holds a PhD in social anthropology from

the Brazilian National Museum and is currently a professor of anthropol-
ogy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ, Macaé). He has pub-
lished widely on sex work, trafficking in persons, and immigration and
is an associate with the Interdisciplinary Nucleus for Migration Studies
(NIEM) in Rio de Janeiro. Currently, he also works as a representative for
the Davida prostitutes’ rights association on the Rio de Janeiro and Federal
antitrafficking in persons councils. Together with his wife, Dr. Ana Paula
da Silva, he is researching the impact of mega-sporting events on sex work
and migration in Rio de Janeiro.
María Bruquetas-Callejo is an associate teacher at the Department of Soci-
ology of the University of Amsterdam and research fellow at the Institute
of Migration and Ethnic Studies. In addition, she works as an independent
consultant for different institutions, such as the European Commission
(DG Home). She received her PhD in sociology (2012) from the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam with a PhD thesis that dealt with the implementation
of integration policies for immigrant students in Barcelona and Rotterdam.
Her research interests focus on the comparative analysis of public policies,
particularly those in relation to immigrant populations and the welfare
state.
Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and
Home Affairs Section at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). He
holds a PhD in migration and integration from the Faculty of Law of the
University of Maastricht (The Netherlands) and has published widely on
EU justice and home affairs law and policies. Carrera has acted as an exter-
nal expert for the European Economic and Social Committee, the Com-
mittee of the Regions, the European Parliament, and the EU Fundamental
274 About the Contributors
Rights Agency in the field of justice and home affairs. He has given several
lectures and training courses at different universities and institutes, includ-
ing the University of Maastricht, the University of Kent, the European
University Institute, and the College of Europe.
Françoise De Bel-Air is a sociologist and demographer. She specializes in
the political demography of Arab countries. She has been a research fel-
low and program manager at the French Institute for the Near East (IFPO)
in Amman, Jordan. Currently, she is a part-time professor at the Migra-
tion Policy Centre of the European University Institute, in charge of the
CARIM-South project on the Arab states and Turkey. She is also the sci-
entific coordinator for the Demography and Economy module in the Gulf
Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme, co-organized by the
Gulf Research Centre (Geneva) and the MPC. Her publications include
about 30 book chapters, scientific articles, and research papers on migra-
tion in the Arab region, and an edited volume on Migration and Politics in
the Middle East (2006).
Raúl Delgado-Wise is founder and former Director (2002–2012) of the
doctoral program in development studies at the the Autonomous Uni-
versity of Zacatecas, Mexico. He is also President and founder of the
International Network on Migration and Development and Co-Chair of
the Critical Development Studies Network. He holds a UNESCO Chair
on Migration, Development and Human Rights and is a member of the
National Academy of Science and of the National Research System of Mex-
ico (level III). Professor Delgado received the annual prize for economic
research, “Maestro Jesús Silva Herzog,” in 1993. He is author/editor of 22
books and more than 150 essays, including book chapters and refereed
articles.
Katharina Eisele is a Researcher in the Justice and Home Affairs Section of
the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and an Assistant
Professor at the Law Faculty of Maastricht University (The Netherlands).
She finalized her doctoral dissertation on the external dimension of the
European Union’s migration policy at Maastricht University in 2013. Her
book was published in the Brill’s Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in
Europe Series in May 2014. She was previously employed as a trainee at the
European Commission’s Legal Service.
Philippe Fargues is a sociologist and demographer. He gained his PhD at
the University of Paris-Sorbonne in 1974. He is the founding Director of
the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute. He held
senior positions at the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris
and the American University in Cairo and taught at Harvard and various
universities in France, the Middle East, and Africa. His research interests
include migration, population and politics, demography, and develop-
ment. He has extensively published on these topics.
Selene Gaspar is a demographer specializing in the design and construc-
tion of socioeconomic and demographic indicators on migration and
population. She has worked for the National Council of Population and
the Secretary of Social Development in Mexico and has been invited to
collaborate as an expert in numerous national and international research
projects. She has published several books, peer-reviewed articles, and
research papers. Among them are Inserción ocupacional, ingreso y prestacio-
nes de los migrantes mexicanos en Estados Unidos (CONAPO, 2008) and La
migración mexicana y el mercado de trabajo estadounidense: tendencias, per-
spectivas y oportunidades (CONAPO, 2007). Ms. Gaspar is currently a lead-
ing researcher in the development of the Information System on Migration
and Development (SIMDE) at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas.
Elspeth Guild is a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS). She is Jean Monnet Professor ad perso-
nam of European immigration law at Radboud University Nijmegen (The
Netherlands) as well as Queen Mary, University of London. She is also a
partner at the London law firm Kingsley Napley. She lectures widely on
EU law and has acted as special advisor to the UK House of Lords Inquiry
into EU economic migration. Her interests and expertise lies primarily in
the area of EU Justice and Home Affairs law (including immigration, asy-
lum, border controls, criminal law and police, and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters). She also researches EU privacy and data protection law
and the nexus with human rights.
Jessica Hagen-Zanker is a Research Fellow in the Social Protection team
at the Overseas Development Institute, a London-based development
think tank. She specializes in the quantitative analysis of social protection,
in particular social protection and migration, financing social protection,
survey design and analysis, and impact evaluation. Jessica has a PhD in
migration from Maastricht University and has published a wide range of
policy and academic papers, including in the journals Development Effec-
tiveness, Migration and Development, and Eastern European Economics.
Sara Iglesias Sánchez LL.M. (Yale Law School), PhD (Universidad Com-
plutense of Madrid) currently holds a position as a Référendaire at the
Court of Justice of the European Union. Dr. Iglesias was Lecturer of Pub-
lic International Law and EU law at the Law School of the University of
Cádiz, where she also coordinated the Bilingual Master in International

Relations and Migration Policies. Her research has mainly focused on
EU migration law, citizenship, and the protection of fundamental rights
in the European Union. She has been a visiting researcher at the Max
Planck Institute for International and Comparative Law, at the Rad-
boud University in the Netherlands, and at the Center of Research and
Studies of the Hague Academy of International Law. She is the author of a
book on the status of third-country nationals in the European Union, and
has produced numerous contributions to journals (including the Common
Market Law Review, the European Law Journal, and the European Journal of
Migration and Law) and collective volumes.
Kathryn Lum is an anthropologist and Research Fellow based at the
Migration Policy Centre within the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute in Florence. She is the scientific
coordinator of an EU-funded research project on Indian migration to
the European Union, which carries out empirical research on the Indian
community in a wide variety of European countries. The project has thus
far produced over 75 papers and is a leading source of both qualitative
and quantitative information on the Indian population in Europe. Kath-
ryn Lum’s research interests include the politics of caste in India, Dalit
movements, the Indian diaspora in Europe, gender and migration, and the
anthropology of education. Kathryn Lum teaches cultural anthropology
and migration studies in Florence.
Humberto Márquez is Chair of the Doctoral Program in Development
Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. He is Direc-
tor of the journal Estudios Críticos del Desarrollo, and editor of the journal
Migración y Desarrollo and the magazine Observatorio del Desarrollo. Profes-
sor Márquez is member of the International Network on Migration and
Development and of the National Research System of Mexico (level II).
He is the author, co-author, and editor of several books, book chapters,
and refereed articles. His most recent publications are Diccionario crítico
de Migración y Desarrollo (Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2012); Espejismos del Río
de Oro. Dialéctica de la Migración y el Desarrollo en México, co-authored
with Raúl Delgado-Wise (Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2012), and El Laberinto
de la Cultura Neoliberal. Crisis, Migración y Cambio, co-edited with Raúl
Delgado-Wise (Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2013).
Jochen Oltmer is Associate Professor for Modern History and board mem-
ber of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS)
at Osnabrück University. He is the author and editor of numerous books
on the history of migration, including The Encyclopedia of Migration and

Minorities in Europe: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present (edited
with Klaus J. Bade, Pieter C. Emmer, and Leo Lucassen), Globale Migra-
tion. Geschichte und Gegenwart (Global Migration. History and Present),
and Migration im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Migration in the 19th and 20th
Centuries).
Joanna Parkin is a Policy Officer in the Ethics Team of the European Com-
mission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA). Prior to joining the
Commission she was Research Fellow in the Justice and Home Affairs Sec-
tion of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) where she spe-
cialised in EU border surveillance technologies, Schengen, and EU law
and policy relating to irregular migration, citizenship, and integration. She
holds a master’s in migration studies from the University of Kent.
About the Advisory Board
Aderanti Adepoju, Nigerian, professor, economist-demographer, received

his PhD in demography in 1973 from the London School of Economics.
He spent several years lecturing and researching issues on migration at
the universities of Ife and Lagos, Nigeria, and while working for the ILO
(Addis Ababa), United Nations (Swaziland), and UNFPA (Dakar). A for-
mer President of the Union for African Population Studies and member
of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Migration, he
is now Chief Executive, Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos,
member of The Hague Process on Refugee and Migration Policy, and Coor-
dinator, Network of Migration Research on Africa. He also serves on the
editorial advisory boards of key international migration journals. He is a
member of several scientific associations, including IUSSP. He has pub-
lished numerous scientific articles, books, and monographs on aspects of
Africa’s complex development agenda, especially international migration
and regional integration. These include: International Migration within, to
and from Africa in a Globalised World (Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, ed.,
2010); Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: A Migration Profile of Nigeria (Safari
Publishers, Ibadan, with van der Wiel, 2010); International Migration and
National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Leiden, co-edited, 2007); and
Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa (Uppsala, 2007). A book—Migration in the
Service of African Development: Essays in Honour of Professor Aderanti Ade-
poju (ed. John Oucho, 2011)—acknowledged his four decades of research
on African migration issues.
Jorge A. Bustamante is a Mexican sociologist with a PhD from the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame (Indiana, United States), where he has also held an
endowed chair (Eugene Conley Professor of Sociology) since 1986. He was
also the founder and first president of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, a
280 About the Advisory Board
research and degree-granting institute located in Tijuana, Mexico, from

its creation in 1982 until January 1998. He has published more than 200
articles in scholarly journals of the United States, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Venezuela, Spain, and Mexico. The majority of these publications
deal with Mexican immigration to the United States and the U.S.-Mexico
border phenomena. His research on international migrations was awarded
the Premio Nacional de Ciencias in 1998 and the Premio Nacional de
Demografia in 1994 by the president of Mexico. He has been a faculty
member of the University of Texas at Austin, El Colegio de México in Mex-
ico City, the University of Notre Dame, the National University of Mexico,
and the Institute of Political Sciences of Paris. He has served as Coordinator
of the Committee of Social Sciences for the National Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology for the President. He served as Correspondent
for the OCDE-Sopemi for 10 years until 2004. He was appointed as UN
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants as of July 29, 2005,
a position he held until June 2011. On January 3, 2005, the Permanent
Committee (Comisión Permanente) of the Legislative Power of Mexico pro-
duced a resolution, which was voted unanimously, to nominate Dr. Jorge
A. Bustamante for the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Bustamante was notified by
the president of the American Sociological Association that he was selected
as the 2007 recipient of the Cox-Johnson-Frazier Award, one of the two
highest granted to a sociologist in the United States. On October 26, 2010,
the Mexican Bar Association awarded Dr. Bustamante the National Juris-
prudence Award for his work in favor of the human rights of migrants. On
December 13, 2011, he was appointed by the Mexican Senate as an advisor
to the director of the National Commission of Human Rights of Mexico.
François Crépeau is Full Professor and holds the Hans and Tamar Oppen-
heimer Chair in Public International Law at the Faculty of Law of McGill
University (Montreal, Canada). In 2011, he was appointed the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (2011–2014)
by the United Nations Human Rights Council. In this capacity, he has con-
ducted official visits to Albania, Tunisia, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and Qatar. He
has also dedicated thematic reports on the detention of migrants, the pro-
tection of migrants’ rights at the external borders of the European Union,
climate change and migration, and global migration governance. He is
guest professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (2010–2015). He
has given many conferences, published numerous articles, and written or
(co-) edited seven books: Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years after 9/11/
Terrorisme, Droit et Démocratie: 10 ans après le 11 septembre 2001 (2012);
Recueil de droit des réfugiés: Instruments, Jurisprudences et Documents/The
Refugee Law Reader (2010, 2012); Les migrations internationales contempo-

raines—Une dynamique complexe au cœur de la globalisation (2009); Penser
l’international, Perspectives et contributions des sciences sociales (2007); Forced
Migration and Global Processes—A View from Forced Migration Studies (2006);
Mondialisation des échanges et fonctions de l’État (1997); and Droit d’asile: De
l’hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires (1995). He heads the Mondialisation et
Droit International collection at Éditions Bruylant-Larcier (Brussels). He is
a member of several editorial boards: Journal of Refugee Studies, International
Journal of Refugee Law, Refuge, Droits fondamentaux, and the European Journal
of Human Rights. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and was a
Fellow (2008–2011) of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.
Andrew Geddes is Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield (United
Kingdom). He has been awarded an Advanced Grant by the European
Research Council (2014–2019) to work on a project analyzing international
migration governance (the MIGPROSP project). He specializes in the com-
parative and international analysis of politics and policymaking with a par-
ticular interest in international migration. He has published a large number
of books and articles on European and international migration, as well as
work on British elections and British relations with the European Union.
Between January 2008 and September 2011, he was Head of the Department
of Politics at the University of Sheffield. He has been awarded fellowships
at the European University Institute and Free University of Berlin. Between
2009 and 2011 he was a member of the Lead Expert Group appointed by
the UK government’s Chief Scientific Advisor to oversee production of the
report Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and
Opportunities.
Kees Groenendijk is emeritus Professor of Sociology of Law at the Uni-
versity of Nijmegen (the Netherlands), founder and Research Fellow of its
Centre for Migration Law (www.jur.ru.nl/cmr), and Chair of the Standing
Committee of Experts on international immigration, refugee, and criminal
law (Meijers Committee). He wrote a PhD on defending group rights in
civil courts (1981), was Dean of the Faculty of Law (1993–1995), and
was one of the founding editors of Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht, a year-
book on Dutch and international case law on immigration, refugees, and
race relations published since 1975. He was a member of the Network of
Experts on Free Movement of Workers (1992–2013). He is a member of
the Odysseus Network of Experts on European Migration and Asylum Law.
He has published on the social and legal status of immigrants, immigra-
tion and race relations legislation and policies, legal integration of immi-
grants, and nationality law. In the past 15 years he has coordinated a series
of international comparative research projects concerning the legal status

of migrants.For his publications see: http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/research/
publications-author/groenendijk/
Binod Khadria is a professor of economics and education at Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi (India), and Director of the International
Migration and Diaspora Studies (IMDS) Project. He has been a recipient of
prestigious Times and Fulbright fellowships, and has been a visiting pro-
fessor at universities in various parts of the world. His publications include
The Migration of Knowledge Workers: Second-Generation Effects of India’s
Brain Drain (Sage, 1999) and several research papers published by ILO,
OECD, GCIM, IRD (France), IDE-JETRO (Japan), Harvard International
Review, 2010 World Social Science Report, and others. He is Deputy Chair
(South Asia) and Regional Coordinator (India) at Asia Pacific Migration
Research Network (APMRN), and sits on the boards of the International
Network on Migration and Development (INMD), Zacatecas (Mexico); the
International Geographical Union (IGU); the Metropolis International
(Canada); IOM Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC) in South
Korea; IOM’s World Migration Report 2010; Asian and Pacific Migration Jour-
nal (Philippines); Journal of South Asian Diaspora (India); Migration Studies
(OUP, United Kingdom); Journal of International Migration and Integration
(Canada); Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (Canada); and Encyclopedia of
Global Human Migration (2013, Wiley-Blackwell). He was a nominated
member of the International Advisory Committee (IAC) of the United
Nations Third Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)
Civil Society Days (CSD) held at Athens in November 2009. In the same
year, he launched the annual India Migration Report on the subtheme Past,
Present and the Future Outlook (distributed by Cambridge University Press;
now in second reprint). In 2012, he published the next volume, India
Migration Report 2010–2011: The Americas (Cambridge University Press,
New York). He is presently engaged in the preparation of the next volume,
India Migration Report: The Continents of Africa and Europe, and planning
another one on The Asia-Pacific.
Wei Li received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Beijing, China, and
her PhD in geography at the University of Southern California in 1997.
She is a professor at the Asian Pacific American Studies/School of Social
Transformation, and School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Plan-
ning at Arizona State University. Her research is on urban ethnicity and
ethnic geography, highly skilled international migration and transnational
connections, and financial sector and minority community develop-
ment, focusing on Chinese and other Asian groups in the Pacific Rim.
Her research has been funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation,
Canada-U.S. Fulbright Foundation, and the Government of Canada. She
is the author of Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America
(2009, paperback 2012; the 2009 Book Award in Social Sciences, Asso-
ciation for Asian American Studies, University of Hawaii Press); editor of
From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim
Countries (2006, University of Hawaii Press); co-editor of Immigrant Geog-
raphies of North American Cities (2012, Oxford University Press), Landscape
of Ethnic Economy (2006, Rowman and Littlefield), and two journal theme
issues; and co-author of 88 other scholarly articles. She was a member
of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Race and Ethnic Advisory Committees on
the Asian Population, and served as its elected chair (2010–2012) and
vice chair (2004–2009). She was the Fulbright Visiting Research Chair at
Queen’s University, Canada (2006–2007), and among the inaugural class
of the National Asia Research Associates with the National Bureau of Asian
Research and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2010–
2011). She is a member of the International Steering Committee of the
International Metropolis Project, and the North American Director for the
International Society of Studying Chinese Overseas.
Index
Please note the boldface locators indicated a complete discussion of the topic.
African slaves, 38–39 conclusions concerning, 265–

Algeria, 73 267; controversies concerning,
amnesty, 17, 159, 180, 181, 182 259–261; coordination of social
Angola, 53 security for EU citizens, 254–255;
Argentina: historical migration Council Regulation (EEC) No.
to, 46–47; migrant-sending 1408/71, 255, 267n6, 267n7;
and migrant-receiving, 6; data and national statistics on
transformation of immigration social assistance, 263, 264;
law, 16–17 discrimination and, 262, 268n31;
arrest and deportation of migrants, Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso
127–128 Frattini, and Caroline Halls, 264,
Association of Southeast Asian 270n51; electioneering, 261; EU
Nations (ASEAN), 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights,
asylum seekers, 5, 201 254, 266; EU citizens accessing
asylum seekers, detention of, 14–15 benefits, practical barriers to,
Australia, 45–46, 199 266; EU expansion, 252, 258;
Austria-Hungary, 44–45 “EU immigrants,” 261, 262;
EU legal framework on social
Bangladesh, 63 security coordination and social
Belgium, 53 benefits, 253–255; “European
benefit tourists and welfare magnets, Social Model(s),” 252; expulsion
myth of, 251–270; anxiety of measure, 257; fiscal costs and
2013 concerning, 259–260, 261; benefits of A8 nationals, 264; Free
“benefit scroungers,” 261; Brey Movement Directive (2004), 258;
case, 256–257; Citizens’ Directive free movement of citizens/labor,
2004/38/EC, 255, 257; Citizens’ 251, 252, 253, 254, 257–258; free
Directive 2004/38/EC, access to movement rights as intrinsic to the
social benefits under, 256–258; European project, 266; Giulietti,
286 Index
Corrado and Martin Kahanec, 264, principles determining, 255;

270n49; global financial crisis/ special noncontributory benefits,
economic recession (2007) and, 259; surge in mobility of EU
259–260; Groenendijk, Kees, citizens, 259; terminological
264, 270n50; “Guide on How confusion, 261, 265; transitional
to Get the Best Out of Directive controls on the movement of
2004/38/EC,” 257; introduction workers from new entrants,
to, 251–253; “Keeping the Right 259–260; unreasonable burden
to Reside,” 257; legal distinction ruling, 257; welfare magnets and
between “foreigner”and “citizen,” benefit tourists (overview of),
261; mobility of EU citizens, surge 263–265
in, 258; motivation for EU citizens Beveridgean principles, 204
to move to another member Beyond Smoke and Mirrors (Massey,
state, 263–264; Netherlands and Durand, and Malone), 13
the Nordic countries, 258; non- Blue Card initiative, 219
contributory benefit, 256–257; borders as floodgates, 81–99;
nondiscrimination and nationality, Accession Treaties, 90; adoption of
261; northern member states free movement of workers in the
fears of, 258; OECD’s International EEC, 91; Articles of Confederation
Migration Outlook 2013, 265; (U.S.), 87; barriers and the
percentage of of EU nationals incentives to mobility, 93; border
residing in another member state controls, 82; concluding remarks
(2012), 263; Polish and Romanian concerning, 92–94; Court of
workers, 259, 268n31; political Justice (EU), 85; Directive 2004/38
debates concerning social benefits (EU), 85, 97n42; elimination of
and mobility, 254, 258, 260, 261– legal barriers to movement, 92;
262; political discourses and myths elimination of obstacles to free
on alleged welfare tourism in the movement, 86; enlargements
EU, 258–263; “poverty migration” in the European Union, 90–92;
debate, 258; quantitative and equal treatment principle, 88;
qualitative knowledge on cost of EU, enlargement of, 90; EU free
social benefits, 262; Regulation movement, basic structure of, 84–
(EC) No. 883/2004, 254, 255; 86; EU law and mobility, 88–89;
reliance by nonnationals on EU levels of interstate mobility, 82;
social benefits, 266–267; research EU mobility across member states,
concerning, 264–265; right to 89; Eurobarometer, 86; EU system
free movement, 254; Romania/ of mutual recognition of diplomas,
Bulgaria and, 252, 258, 259, 88; free movement of workers,
261, 262; social benefits and restriction of, 90; free movement
mobility paradox, 262–263; social patterns in the EU, have the last
protection and, 254; social rights enlargements transformed, 90–92;
for EU mobile workers, 259; social interstate mobility in the EU and
security coordination, 254–255; in the U.S., 84–89; interstate
social security coordination, mobility in the U.S. and in the
Index 287
EU, the reality of, 89–90;intra- globalization and, 122; optimistic

EU mobility, figures on, 91, 92; assumptions about, 121; “scientific
introduction to, 81–83; legal maquiladoras,” 122; triadic patents,
framework for free movement for 122; wages, 124
EU citizens, 84–85; level of intra- Brazil: irregular situations in,
EU mobility, 93; “market building” 101–102; migrant-sending and
(EU), 89; migration and migrant migrant-receiving countries, 6;
worker conceptions, 83; migration migration issues in, 2; Portugal, 73;
myth, 83; mobility rights, 88; transatlantic migrants and, 44
“myth” notion, 83; patterns of Brazil, gringos, immigration, and
internal mobility, 82; irregularity in, 167–194; “almost
postenlargement mobility and a Brazilian” status, 168; American
GDP, 83; recreational activities Girls case, 174; amnesty for
limitations, 89; right of residence, irregular immigrants, 180–182;
88; rights for family members, Anglo-American gringos view of
85; right to equal treatment, 87; immigration issues, 188–189;
right to travel (U.S.), 87, 96n29; Anglo-Americans impact on
right to travel, EU compared Brazil, 173–174; arbitrary nature
with U.S., 86–89; Saenz v. Roe, of Brazil’s immigration system,
87, 96n29; Schengen area border 168; “beach bums,” 175; Brazilian
controls, 82, 85–86, 88, 97n41; immigration law, movement to
social systems, impact on, 83; change, 188; Brazilian immigration
state citizenship under U.S. law, law and policing, 177; Brazilian
design of access to, 88, 97n44; media, dominant narrative
transitional arrangements for the regarding immigration in, 172;
European Union, 90–91; Treaty “Brazilianness,” 191; cordiality
of Amsterdam, 85; Treaty of the and, 190–191; Cutler, Alex, case
European Union, 84; tuition fees to of, 189–190; deportation, 177;
students, 88–89, 97n46; Zemel v. duty and, 190–191; English-
Rusk, 87, 96n40 speaking immigration to Brazil,
“brain circulation,” 121–124; brain 173; expats, 175; Federal Police,
drain, 23–24, 121; characteristics dealing with, 181–184; floating
of restructuring of innovation signifier, 171; foreign publication
systems, 121–122; effect on accreditation status, 179; Freyre,
Mexico, 124; foreign population Gilberto, 174; general division
25 years or older with higher among Anglo-American gringos
education in the U.S. (2011), living in Rio de Janeiro, 175;
123 (fig.); geography of research “good gringo,” 191; gringo,
and development (R&D), 122; case study of, 184–188; gringo,
innovation systems, restructuring concept of, 168; gringo defined,
of, 121; Mexican immigrants 167, 168, 169; gringo irregular
with higher education in the U.S., ity, 177–178; gringo relationship,
123 (fig.); Mexico and, 122–124; logic of the, 191; gringos, local,
MNCs and, 122, 124; neoliberal 175–176; gringos and cordiality,
288 Index
188–191; gringos as immigrants, Brücker, Herbert, et al., 200,

167; gringos as strangers, 215n11
169–172, 171; gringuice, logic of, Bush, George W., 115
168, 189; Holanda, Sergio Buarque
de, 173, 190; Hugon, Paul, 174; Calderón, Felipe, 127
identifying markers of gringos, California, 42–43
169–170; illegal immigrants Canada, 3, 44, 199
defined, 169; immigration policy, Canales, Alejandro, 125, 135n40
shift in, 188; internal policing of capitalism, 104, 105. See also global
foreigners, 177; introduction to, capitalism
167–169; investment status, 179; capitalist development, 112
irregular immigrants defined, cheap labor, 109, 110
169, 177; language, use of, 170, Chinese migrants, 22–23
191; marriage and children, 180; Coalition for Humane Immigrant
migratory flow to Brazil, 173; Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA),
multiple tourist entries, 178; 128
NGO volunteering, 179; number Compiani, Maria Josè and Francesca
of all foreigners living in Brazil, Galloni, 234, 237, 248n11
173; number of foreigners legally Cremona Oggi, 245
living in Brazil, 172; number of Cuba, 116
work visas granted to foreigners, cultural integration, 18–19
172; percentage of illegal/irregular Cutler, Alex, 189–190
immigrants, 177; population
of Brazil, 172; population of demographic dividend transfer from
foreigners in Brazil, 172; research Latin America to the U.S., 116
into gringos, 176–177; “respect (fig.)
for Brazil,” 189; retirement and, deportation of immigrants, 128,
179; Simmel, Georg, on, 170–171; 128–129
sports status, 179; Sprandel, Marcia discrimination, 22–23
Anita, 188; statistics regarding dual labor market theory, 63–64
immigration to and from Brazil, Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso
172; stranger and gringo, 170–171; Frattini, and Caroline Halls, 264,
student status, 179; tourist visa, 270n51
178; upgrading to a different
immigration status, 179–180; East African Community (ECA),
U.S. Americans and, 173; visa, 2
177, 178, 180; visa strategies, Economic Community of
178–180; volunteer visa, 179; West African States (ECOWAS),
worker status, 179; work visas, 2
172, 173, 175 El Salvador, 116
Brian K. Gran and Elizabeth J. ethnopolis, 23
Clifford, 201, 216n15 Eurobarometer, 86
British Nationality Act (1948), Europe, historical migration to,
53 50–54
Index 289
European expansion and global between the end of World War II

migration from the 16th to the and 1980, 53; France, 53; gates
19th centuries, 37–40; African of entry, 51–52; Germany, 51;
slaves, 38–39; basic context for global educational and training
European migration movements migration, 51–52; Netherlands,
worldwide, 37–38; British 51, 53; Portugal, 53; privileged
colonial policy, 39–40; contract gates of entry, 53; shipping
workers, 38; convicts and, 38; industry and, 52; transatlantic
epidemics, 38; European slave migration, ending of, 51; United
trade, 39; indentured servants, Kingdom, 51, 53
38; indigenous population, extractivism and neo-extractivism,
decimation of, 38; labor and, 104
37–38; missionaries and, 38;
natural population growth, 40; Faist, Thomas, 73
number of people transferring family decision making, 68–72;
permanently to the Americas, absolute and relative income
38; Spanish and Portuguese effects, 69–70; altruism, 71; co-
conquest of the Americas, 37, insurance, 70, 71; conclusion
38; Spanish policy on emigration concerning, 71; diversification of
and colonial immigration, 39; income, 70; financial gains,
statistics concerning British 68, 69; household cooperation,
and Welch migration, 40; 71; migration costs, 70–71; NELM
statistics concerning Scots and (new economics of labor
Irish migration, 40; statistics migration) theory, 68–72; Nepal
concerning Spanish and Portuguese example, 70; poverty and, 69;
migration, 39; trading posts, 40; remittances, 69, 71; risk of income,
U.S. European-origin population 70; risk-sharing, 71, 80n37; self-
(1700), 40 enforcing contracts,
European slave trade, 39 71; Stark, Oded, 68, 69; transfers,
European Union: migration issues 71
in, 2; open borders, 3, 30. See family reunification, 19
also benefit tourists and welfare feminization of migration, 6
magnets, myth of fetishization of migration, 130
Europe as migrant destination financialization, 132n7
since the 19th century, 50–54; forced migration, 32; criminal
academic qualifications, acquisition violence, 113, 134n29; defined,
of, 51; British Nationality Act 33; extent of, 115; human
(1948), 53; colonial collaborators trafficking, 113, 134n28; mass
as immigrants, 52–53; colonial deportation as double forced
rule and, 51; decolonization, migration, 129; modalities of, 113;
51; decolonization and, 52–53; return and, 127
educational and training foreign direct investments (FDI), 145
immigration, 51–52; at the end France, 51, 53
of World War II, 52, 53–54; Freyre, Gilberto, 174
290 Index
Gardani, Ludovico, et al., 223, 224, “good migrants,” definition of, 113
248n10 Gordon, Jennifer, 20
Germany, immigration of foreign Greece: free movement of workers,
workers, 64 restriction of, 91; Greek-Turkish
Giulietti, Corrado and Martin border fence, 21; migrant-
Kahanec, 264, 270n49 sending and migrant-receiving,
Global Approach to Migration 6; myth of migrants as a threat to
(2005), 219 society, 21–22; Operation Xenios
global capitalism: monopoly Zeus, 21
capital, 107; myth of the free Groenendijk, Kees, 264, 270n50
market, 106; North American guest worker programs, 15
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), guest workers, 114, 149, 154, 162
106–107; surplus expropriation, Gulf states, migration to, 139–166;
107 1930s to the 1970s: the emergence
globalization, 4–5, 54, 76. See also of dependency on foreign labor,
neoliberal globalization, nature of 141–142; 1990s: reconstructing
global labor arbitrage, 105 national societies in the Gulf,
global migration issues: in Brazil, 2; 143–144; October 1973 war to the
development of countries and, 3; Gulf War of 1990–1991: foreign
in the European Union, 2; extent labor and the oil rent, 142–143;
of migration, 3; feminization of :2000s and beyond: negotiating
migration, 6; globalization and economic reform with no political
actors, 4–5; introduction to, 1–3; opening, 144–147; age distribution
in Japan, 2; migration policies, of national and nonnational
6–7; in Morocco, 2; myth of populations in GCC countries: a
being swamped by migrants, 8–10, comparison, around 2010, 152
29–30; myth of brain drain, 23–24; (fig.); age structure of migrant
myth of language and integration populations, 151; Arab uprisings in
tests, 18–19; myth of migrants as GCC states, 141; average monthly
a threat to society, 21–22; myth salaries in the private sector by
of migration as economically nationality (Saudi/non-Saudi)
negative, 12–13; myth of migration and occupation (2010), 150(fig.);
serving as an escape from poverty, capital-intensive industries and,
10–11, 30, 54; myth of numbers 143; children, nonnational, 161;
and rights trade-off, 20; myth choices concerning immigration,
of restrictive migration policies 141; conclusion concerning,
as effective, 14–15; myth of the 162–163; demographic growth
effectiveness of restricted migration in GCC populations, 146;
policies, 14–15; myth of the purity demographic imbalance, 150,
of the nation, 18; open borders, 3; 156; demographic normalization,
poverty and, 3, 10–11, 30, 54; in toward, 161; demographics,
Qatar, 1–2; scale of migration, 3; separate, 149–150; distribution
societal wealth and, 3–4; in South of employed populations by
America, 2; in the United States, 2 activity sector and occupations,
Index 291
148–149; domestic workers, 148, GCC countries, 145; marriage/

149, 152, 153, 155, 160, 165n25; intermarriage, 153–154, 165n30;
dual societies in GCC, 147–157; marriages with a foreign spouse
elderly persons (nonnational), 161; by sex, proportion of (selected
employed persons by occupation GCC countries, 2000 – 2012), 153
and nationality group (Kuwaitis, (fig.); migrants, second generation
Asians, Arabs, expatriates), 2012, of, 150; migration trends and
149 (fig.); entitlements and migration policies, discrepancies
rights of residential populations, in, 162; mobilization of capital,
gap in, 162; family reunion, 143; national and nonnational
obstacles to, 149–150; females populations in the GCC countries
and unemployment, 145–146; (1970 – 2010), 143 (table);
foreign direct investments (FDI), naturalization, 154, 159–161,
145; foreign labor, policies limiting 165nn32 and 34; Nitaqat (“ranges”)
the supply of, 158–159; foreign campaign for the Saudization
population increases, 142; gender of the workforce,, 159–160;
and migrant populations, 151; nonnationals, population of,
global connections and migration 144–145; nonnationals, second
dynamics, 141–147; guest workers, generation of, 161; nonnationals
149, 154, 162; Gulf Cooperation in Gulf economies: the “dual labor
Council (GCC), 139, 163n1; markets,” 147–149; nonstate labor
high immigration rates and as a privilege for citizens, 140;
unemployment rates for nationals, number of men per 100 women
145; Human Development Index in national and nonnational
rankings, 139; introduction to, populations of GCC countries
139–141; Iranian revolution, 143; (2010), 151 (fig.); oil boom, first,
irregular migrants, 141, 145; kafala 142–143; oil booms and migration,
(sponsorship) system, 140–141, 142; oil “rent” accumulation, 141;
142, 154–157; kafala, reform of, ongoing changes in migration
160; kafala and dual societies, 157; policies, 157–163; Pan-Arabism
kafala and number, 156; kafala and labor migration, 142; paradox
and political agency, 157; kafala of high employment levels, 146;
and separation between locals and paternal jus sanguinis system, 154,
foreigners, 156–157; Kurds and 162; patterns of workers’ inflows,
Shias, 144; Kuwait, invasion of, 145; phases of, 140; political
143; Kuwait, spatial segregation allegiance, 140; political events
by nationality group, 152–153; and migration flows, 140; political
Kuwait minimum salary, 150; labor tensions and post-rentier transition,
imports and political vulnerability, 157–158; population and labor
144; labor market reforms, markets, trends in, 162; population
160–161; labor nationalization, and percentage of nationals and
144; labor reforms and workforce nonnationals (April 2014), 145
nationalization, 159–161; (table); population mobility, 141;
largest migrant communities in “presentation of self” imperatives,
292 Index
160; private sector employment, Hugon, Paul, 173

146–147, 148, 150, 164n22; human capital model, 66–67
productive work, 142; public Human Development Index (HDI),
sector employment and locals, 146; 108
Qatar, intermarriage in, 153; Qatar, Human Development Index rankings,
spatial segregation by nationality 139
group, 152, 165n29; recruitment Human Repatriation Program, 128
of Asian over Arab workers, 143; human trafficking, 113, 134n28
remittance sending and, 145;
rent-based social contract, 140; Il Giornale, 244
rentier social contract, 140, 141, Il Messagero, 244
155, 163n9; Saudi Arabia, foreign immigrant work, 20–21
labor policies, 159; Saudi Arabia, immigration and the welfare state
management of foreign labor, 157; (case of Spain), 197–217; access to
Saudi Arabia, naturalization of the National Health System (NHS),
long-term professionals, 161; 207–208; belief that migration is
Saudi Arabia and nationalizations, negative on welfare states, 197–
154; Saudi oil fields, 142; 198; Beveridgean principles and,
segregation, spatial-geographical, 204; Brian K. Gran and Elizabeth
151–153; selective recruitment J. Clifford, 201, 216n15; Brücker,
policies and the demographic Herbert, et al., 200, 215n11;
structure of expatriate caregiving sector and immigration,
communities, 151; South-South 209; Child Welfare Law (1996),
migration movements, 139; 204; conclusions concerning,
sponsorship,, 157; transition in the 213–215; contemporary migration
migration regime of the Gulf states, to Spain, 202–203; contribution of
162–163; treatment of foreign migration to the Spanish welfare
workers, 160; unemployment, 140, state and the economy, 208–213;
144, 145–146; unique societies contributions of immigrants to
in, 140; voluntary workforce Social Security, 206; contribution
nationalization programs, 159, to the economy, 210; direct
166n43; welfare packages for cash payments, 212; domestic
Gulf nationals, 142; workforce, employees and immigration, 209,
indigenization of, 159; work hours, 217n34; economic immigration,
149; xenophobia, 156; youth 211; economic impact of
unemployment, 159 migration, 199–202; education
and the foreign population in
H2a visa, 114 Spain, 203; effects of migration,
Hansen, Jorgen and Magnus 197; extension of rights to
Lofstrom, 200, 215n4 immigrants, 204; Foreigners Law
Hercog, Metka, 23 (1985), 204; Foreigners Law
Holanda, Sergio Buarque de, 173, 4/2000, 205; “global caregivers,”
190 212; Hansen, Jorgen and Magnus
Honduras, 116 Lofstrom, 200, 215n4; health
Index 293
care, 207–208; immigrants access 213; selection effect, 200; social

the Spanish welfare state, 204; assistance, 206–207, 211; Social
immigrant women, economic Security and contributive benefits,
importance of, 209; informal labor 205–206; Spanish welfare mix and
market, 211–212; introduction the accommodation of immigrants,
to, 197–199; irregular migration, 203–205; statistics concerning
201; irregular migration model, Social Security and immigrants,
212; labor market, impact of 205–206; unemployment benefits,
immigration on, 210; labor market 200; unemployment rate, 206;
and the socioeconomic strategies universalization of health care,
of immigrants, 211; labor supply 204, 207; welfare dependency,
and migration, 197; Mascareñas, 199; welfare magnets hypothesis,
Garcés, 212; Mediterranean welfare 200–201
regime, 203, 204, 205, 212; integration of nonnationals, 17–18
migrant women in the care section, integration tests, 18–19
208–209, 212; migration-welfare International Herald Tribune, 244
link, accounting for, 210–213; net international migration, 101
contribution of immigrants to the International Organization for
Spanish welfare state and economy, Migration (IOM), 113
210–211; number of foreigners Ireland: high intra-EU migration
with valid residence permit in levels to, 92; migration to the
Spain, 203; number of foreign U.S., 101
residents and number of resident irregular migration, 17, 113–114
permits granted to foreigners Italy: Indian migrants and, 12–13;
(2000–2010), 202 (fig.); Lampedusa shipwreck, 2, 26n6.
number of foreign residents See also labor migration from India
in Spain, 202; participation of to Italy
immigrants in several domains
of the welfare state, 205–208; Japan, migration issues in, 2
Pedersen, Peder J., et al., 200, job precarity, 114
216n12; pension system and job security, 105
immigrants, 206; percentage of
foreign recipients of retirement Kapur, Devesh, 124, 136n57
pensions, 206; positive Kaya, Gözde, 15
contribution of migrants to kinship and acquaintanceship
the Spanish welfare state, 198; networks, 35–36
public health care system, 204,
207–208; quota system, 212; labor, direct and indirect export of,
regularization campaigns and 109–110
processes, 212–213, 217n34; labor and nature, 105–106
residual welfare dependency, labor and settlement migration in
199, 200; restricted migration the context of rapid globalization
policies, 201; restrictive migration during the late 19th and early
policies, 212; Rumí, Consuelo, 20th centuries, 40–45; Argentina,
294 Index
46–47; Australia, 45–46; Brazil, products, 221; dual labor market

44; California, 42–43; Canada, 44; theory and, 231; Egyptian workers,
colonial expansion, 43; demand for 226–227; employee perspectives
labor, 41, 42; discrepancy between and working conditions, 230–231;
population and work availability, employer/employee relations, 233;
41–42; economic growth and employer perspectives on, 226–
ongoing territorial expansion, 230; EU approach to migration,
42; economic interdependence, 219–220; EU migration policy,
41; frontier colonization, characteristics of, 219; families of
43; indigenous populations, the bergamini, 236–238; Gardani,
41; industrial expansion, 41; Ludovico, et al., 223, 224, 248n10;
international economic network- Global Approach to Migration
building, 43; machtpolitisch, 43; (2005), 219; home heating, 232;
“Neo Europes,” settlement of, 41, homes and condition of, 232–233;
45; remigration, 45; scramble for Il Giornale on, 244; Il Messagero
Africa, 43; Siberia, 48–50; statistics on, 244; Indian migration to Italy,
concerning European overseas 220; Indian population in Italy,
migration, 44; statistics concerning 221; intercaste solidarity, 235;
global long-distance migrations, internal hierarchy of the dairy
44; transport and communications, farm, 231; internal racism, 238;
expansion of, 43–44; United States, International Herald Tribune on,
41, 42–43, 44 244; introduction to, 219–222;
labor arbitrage, global, 105 Italian diaspora, 222; Italian
labor markets, regulation of, 114 education system and, 241–242;
labor migration from India to Italy, Italian migration policy, 222;
219–250; alcohol abuse, 228, Italian press: images of Indians in
229; amnesties, 222; Blue Card (an overview), 243–245; Italian
initiative, 219; caste-based job Punjabis, new generation of,
networks, 234; caste hierarchies, 238–241; Italian school system,
224, 234, 234–236; CGIL 240; job competition between
(Conferazione Generale Italiana Punjabis, 235; linguistic barriers,
di Lavoro) union, 242–243; chain 228; methodology, 225–226;
migration, 227, 229, 234–235; migration policy and the dairy
children of Punjabi bergaminos, industry in Italy, overview of,
238–241, 242; conclusion 222–225; “The Milky Way to
concerning, 245–247; Cremona Labour Market Insertion: The
Oggi newspaper on, 245; Cremona Sikh ‘Community’ in Lombardy”
province and, 223–224; dairy (Compiani and Quassoli), 224;
consumption in Italy, 221; dairy mode of entry into the dairy
farming and Punjabis, 221; dairy industry, 234–236; northern Italy,
industry in Italy, 221; Dalit Indians, local perspectives on Indians in,
234, 235, 236; disputes between 241–243; overtime payments,
employees, 229; DOP (Protected 230; permanent work contract
Denomination of Origin) dairy (contratto a tempo indefinido), 230;
Index 295
procedure for migrating legally Mediterranean welfare regime, 203,

to Italy as a non-EU national, 204, 205, 212
222; Punjabi women and, 234, MERCOSUR regional organization, 2
236–238; Punjab migration to Merkel, Angela, 17
India, 220–221; Punjab region Mexico: “brain circulation,” 123–124;
of India, 220; racism, 238–240; Calderón, Felipe, 127; cheap labor,
Romanians workers, 227; salaries 110; economically redundant
of Indians, 230; SC (Scheduled population, 112; economic sectors
Caste) workers, 234, 235, 249n28; for employment of Mexicans in
shifts of the workers, 231, 232; U.S., 118; educational resources
Sikhs, 220, 228, 241; Single Permit transferred to the U.S., 126; forced
Directive, 219; taxation, 230; migration, 113; foreign investment,
Turbani che non turbano report, 110; higher education, Mexican
223–224; unionism and, 242– immigrants with, 123 (fig.),
243; unpaid labor benefit, 229; 123–124; Human Development
Waldinger, Roger, on the making Index (HDI), 108; inflation,
of immigrant economic niches, 110; labor deficit in, 112; labor
229–230; worker complaints, 232; force surplus, 112 (fig.); labor
working conditions, 231–233 precarization in (2012), 111 (fig.);
labor precarization: in Mexico, 111 as major workforce provider for
(fig.), 130; unforeseen dimensions the U.S., 116; maquiladoras, 110,
of, 105 113, 122, 134n30; minimum
labor/social security rights and wage, 110; national labor market’s
migration, 19–21 absorption possibilities, 111;
Lampedusa shipwreck, 2, 26n6 neoliberal Mexico–United States
language and integration tests, migration system, 116; neoliberal
18–19 restructuring and, 110; North
Latin America: demographic dividend American Free Trade Agreement
transfer from Latin America to the (NAFTA), 107; “poverty” category
U.S., 116 (fig.); transfer of working in, 110; poverty reduction and
population, 116 remittances, 125; projections
“Laws of Migration” (Ravenstein), of Mexican emigration to the
60 United States, 127; purchasing
long-distance migration, 31 power of the minimum wage,
low-skilled immigration, 6, 12 110; remittances, 125–126;
remittances (1990–2012), 125
machtpolitisch, 43 (fig.); remittances versus cost of
Malaysia, 6 education and social reproduction
mandatory detention, 14, 15 of immigrants who entered the
maquiladoras, 110, 113, 134n30 U.S. between 1994 and 2008,
maquiladoras, scientific, 122 126 (fig.); statistics concerning
Mascareñas, Garcés, 212 cheap labor, 110; support fund
Massey, Douglas, 13, 14, 72, for migrants, 129; temporary
80n39 worker programs, 114–115; as a
296 Index
transit nation for migrants from changes in, 75 (fig.); NELM (new
other nations, 115; United States – economics of labor migration)
Mexico asymmetries (1994–2012), theory, 68–72; neoclassic migration
107 (table); United States – Mexico theories, 62–63; network theory,
migration (1840–2012), 108 73–74; percentage of world
(fig.); wage reduction, 108; work population who are migrants,
effort increase, 110. See also myths 59; political context migration
regarding Mexico–United States decisions, 65; poverty and, 59;
migration push and pull factors framework,
micro-level theories of migration, 65– 66; social systems, theory of, 67–
72; family decision making, 68–72; 68; system theory and migration,
human capital approach, 66–67; 65; theories of migration defined
push and pull factors framework, by initiation or perpetuation of
66; social systems theory, 67–68; migration, 72 (table); theories
value-expectancy model, 67 of migration defined by level of
migrant networks, 74, 80n43 analysis, 61 (table); undercasting
migrant-sending/migrant-receiving of migrants, 68; value-expectancy
countries, 6 model, 67; world systems theory,
migration, a review of theoretical 64–65
economic literature on, 59–80; migration, definition of, 32
“3D jobs,” 68; Arango, Joaquín, migration, fetishization of, 130
on, 60, 78n5; classification of migration, macro theories of, 62–65;
migration theories, 61; conclusion dual labor market theory, 63–64;
concerning, 77–78; cumulative neoclassical migration theories,
and circular causation, 74–75; 62–63; system theory of migration,
dual-economy models of Lewis, 60; 65; world systems theory, 64–65
dual labor market theory, 63–64; migration, meso theories of, 72–75;
early migration models, 60; family cumulative and circular causation,
decision making, 68–72; human 74–75; Massey, Douglas, 72,
capital model, 66–67; introduction 80n39; network theory, 73–74;
to why people migrate, 59–61; theories of migration defined
labor migration theory, 60–61; by initiation or perpetuation of
“Laws of Migration” (Ravenstein), migration, 72 (table)
60; level of analysis, 61–62; migration and development:
macro theories of migration, capitalism, 104, 105; extractivism
62–65; meso theories of migration, and neo-extractivism, 104; global
72–75; microeconomic models, 60; labor arbitrage, 105; introduction
micro-level theories of migration, to, 103–104; labor and
65–72; migrant networks, 74, nature, 105–106; laborforce
80n43; migration decision-making, oversupply, 105; labor
diagram of general framework precarization, 105; neoliberal
of, 76 (fig.); migration decision- globalization, nature of, 104–106;
making, general framework of, unequal development, 105;
75–77; migration flows over time, workforce liberation, 105. See also
Index 297
myths regarding Mexico–United migration policies, 6–7; asylum-

States migration seekers, detention of, 14–15;
migration and labor/social security family reunification, 19;
rights, 19–21 feminization of migration, 6;
migration as historically normal, integration of nonnationals, 17–18;
31–58; to Argentina, 46–47; to irregular migration, 17; language
Australia, 45–46; background and integration tests, 18–19; low-
causes and geographical/ skilled migrants, 6; mandatory
temporal specifics of migration detention, 14; migrant-sending/
as a historical phenomenon, 35 migrant-receiving countries, 6;
(table); conclusion concerning, open entry and closed membership
54; definition of migration, 32; formula, 20; pre-entry language
economic and social opportunities tests, 19; regional migration
and, 34; European expansion and governance, 6; remittances, 6;
global migration from the 16th restrictive migration policies, 14–
to the 19th centuries, 37–40; 16; right-wing and anti-immigrant
Europe as migrant destination parties and, 7; scapegoating and, 7,
since the 19th century, 50–54; 21; skilled workers and migration,
forced migration, 32; globalization 6; temporary labor migration
and, 54; global migration and, (circular migration), 15; voting
32; historical migration types, 33 rights for nonnationals, 16
(table); historical phenomenon Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 113
of migration, 32–37; information militarization of the U.S.-Mexican
transmission on migration, 34–36; border, 14
introduction to, 31–32; kinship monetary fetishism, 124
and acquaintanceship networks, monopoly capital, 107
35–36; labor and settlement Morocco, 2, 73
migration in the context of rapid multiculturalism, 19
globalization during the late 19th myths concerning migration: of being
and early 20th centuries, 40–45; swamped by migrants, 8–10, 29–
labor migration, 37; life planning 30; brain drain, 23–24; language
and migration, 34; market access, and integration tests, 18–19;
34; motivation for migration, 32, migrants are a threat to society,
34; nomadism, 32; opportunity 21–22; migration is economically
structures and, 36; poverty and, negative, 12–13, 195–196;
54; remigration, 34; remittances, migration only takes place from
34; to Siberia, 48–50 developing to developed countries
migration-development nexus, and serves as an escape from
23–24 poverty, 10–11, 30, 54, 101–102;
migration from developed to numbers and rights trade-off, 20;
developing countries, 101–102 purity of the nation, 18; restrictive
migration management, 113–114, migration policies are effective,
130, 135n34, 219 14–15. See also benefit tourists and
migration movements, 101 welfare magnets, myth of
298 Index
myths regarding Mexico–United nation, 104; capitalism, 104, 105;

States migration: first myth: North- concentration of patents, 104;
South regional integration based extractivism and neo-extractivism,
on free market principles leads to 104; financialization, 132n7;
economic convergence and reduced global labor arbitrage, 105;
migration, 106–109; second myth: internationalization strategy, 104,
neoliberal restructuring promotes 131n4; labor and nature, 105–106;
progress and social well-being, labor precarization, 105; unequal
109–111; third myth: emigration development, 105; workforce
under neoliberalism is a free and operation, 105
voluntary act, 111–113; fourth neoliberalism, 108, 112
myth: migration management neoliberal Mexico–United States
through the balancing of the migration system, 116
labor markets is beneficial for all Nepal, 70
stakeholders, 113–115; fifth myth: Netherlands, 51, 53
migration implies an invasion of network theory, 73–74
the receiving country, 115–117; New Zealand and voting rights for
sixth myth: immigrants constitute nonnationals, 16
a burden for receiving countries, nomadism, 32, 33
117–119; seventh myth: migrants North American Free Trade Agreement
constitute a fiscal burden, 119– (NAFTA), 14, 106–107, 108
121; eighth myth: brain circulation North-North migration movements,
benefits countries of origin, 101
121–124; ninth myth: migrants
are agents of development and Obama, Barack, 119, 127, 128
their resources, mainly Oda, Hisaya, 24
remittances, are vehicles for open borders, 3, 30
development, 124–127; tenth open entry and closed membership
myth: the crisis in receiving formula, 20
countries promotes voluntary Operation Xenios Zeus, 21
returns that benefit countries of Organization of American States
origin, 127–131 (OAS), 113
orthodox liberalism and neoclassical
national security, 117 economics, 109, 133nn17–18
natural disasters, 113, 134n27
NELM (new economics of labor Pakistan, 24
migration) theory, 68–72 parallel lives and social cohesion, 22
neoclassic migration theories, patents, 104, 122, 136n49
62–63 Pedersen, Peder J., et al., 200,
“Neo Europes,” settlement of, 41, 45 216n12
neoliberal capitalist world order, 109 Poros, Maritsa V., 236, 249n33
neoliberal globalization, nature Portugal, 53, 73, 91
of: access to a highly qualified poverty and migration: family
workforce from peripheral decision making, 69; myth
Index 299
concerning, 3, 10–11, 30, 54; as science/engineering and foreigners,

reason for migration, 59 122, 136n46
pre-entry language tests, 19 Secure Border Initiative (SBI), 115
Siberia, historical migration to, 48–50
Qatar: intermarriage in, 153; spatial Siegel, Melissa, 23
segregation by nationality group, Simmel, Georg, 170–171
152, 165n29; treatment of migrant Single Permit Directive, 219
workers, 1–2, 25nn1–2 skilled workers and migration, 6,
123–124
regional migration governance, 6 social change and migration, 31
remigration, 34, 45 social cohesion and parallel lives, 22
remittances: Canales, Alejandro, on, social protection, 70, 71, 112, 252,
125, 135n40; cost of education 254
and social reproduction of Mexican social security benefits, 13
immigrants who entered the social systems, theory of, 67–68
U.S. between 1994 and 2008 South Africa: migrant-sending and
versus remittances, 126 (fig.); migrant-receiving countries, 6;
development and, 124–127; migration issues in, 2; xenophobia
economy impact of, 24, 34; in, 22
education costs and, 126; family South Korea, 2
remittances, 124; from the South-South migration movements,
Gulf states, 145; International 10–11, 101, 139
Organization for Migration on, Spain: free movement of workers,
130; Kapur, Devesh, on, 124, restriction of, 90, 91; migrant-
136n57; Mexico: remittances sending and migrant-receiving, 6;
1990–2012, 125 (fig.); migration positive contributions of migrants,
decision-making and, 69, 70, 71, 12
77; monetary fetishism, 124; myth Sprandel, Marcia Anita, 188
concerning, 124–127; Pakistan, 24; Stark, Oded, 69
poverty reduction and, 125; World structural adjustment programs, 109
Bank on, 127 surplus expropriation, 107
research and development (R&D), Switzerland, 2
122–124 system theory and migration, 65
residual welfare dependency, 199,
200 taxes: Barack Obama administration
restrictive migration policies, on, 119; contributions of Mexican
14–15 immigrants to U.S. treasury
restrictive migration policies as a rule, (1994–2008), 120 (fig.); ratio
15–16 between taxes and public social
Rumí, Consuelo, 213 benefits (2008), 120 (fig.)
Russia, 44 temporary labor migration (circular
migration), 15
Saenz v. Roe, 87, 96n29 temporary worker programs,
scapegoating and migrants, 7, 21 114–115
300 Index
“3D jobs,” 68 visa, 114; Human Development

transatlantic migration, 45, 47, 50, 51 Index (HDI), 108; integration
Trans-Siberian Railway, 48–49 of nonnationals, 18; labor/social
Treaty of Amsterdam, 85 security rights, 20–21; Mexican
Treaty of the European Union, 84 immigrants with higher education
triadic patents, 122, 136n49 in, 123 (fig.); Mexican workers
Turkish migration to the European and the expansion of the U.S.
Union, 15 economy, 129–130; Mexico: cost of
education and social reproduction
UN Convention on the rights of of immigrants who entered the
migrant workers (1990), 6 U.S. between 1994 and 2008
undercasting of migrants, 68 versus remittances, 126 (fig.);
unemployment benefits, 200 Mexico–United States asymmetries
United Kingdom, 51, 53; high (1994–2012), 107 (table);
intra-EU migration levels to, 92; Mexico–United States migration
migrant-sending and migrant- (1840–2012), 108 (fig.); migration
receiving countries, 6; myth of reforms, 2; myth of brain drain, 24;
brain drain, 24 neoliberal Mexico–United States
United States: arrest and deportation migration system, 116; projections
of migrants, 127–128; average of Mexican emigration to the
income of Mexican immigrants in, United States, 127; research and
121; “brain circulation,” 123– development (R&D), 122–124;
124; Chinese migrants, 22–23; salary differentials among major
contribution by ethnic groups the ethnic and migration groups
U.S. labor force growth (2000– in, estimated (2010), 119 (fig.);
2010), 117 (fig.); contribution of Secure Border Initiative (SBI), 115;
Mexican immigrants to the U.S. taxes and migrants in, 119–120;
treasury, 120 (fig.); demographic taxes and public social benefits,
dividend transfer from Latin ratio between (2008), 120 (fig.);
America, 116 (fig.); deportation of temporary worker programs,
immigrants, 128–149; economic 114–115; transatlantic migrants,
sectors for employment of 44. See also borders as floodgates;
Mexicans in, 118; fetishization myths regarding Mexico–United
of migration, 130; forced return, States migration
130; forced return of immigrants, Uruguay, 116
128–129; foreigners in science and
engineering (S&E), 122, 136n46; value-expectancy model, 67
foreign population 25 years or visa trading, 160
older with higher education in, 123 “voluntary” return, 127, 135n33
(fig.); GDP growth by workforce voting rights for nonnationals, 16
origin (2007–2010), 130 (fig.);
GDP growth contribution based Waldinger, Roger, on the making of
on worker ethnicity and migration immigrant economic niches, 229
status (2000–2010), 118 (fig.); H2a “war on drugs,” 134n29
Index 301
war related migration, 52 world population who are migrants,

Washington agenda, 109, percentage of, 59
133n19 world systems theory, 64–65
welfare dependency, 199
work, immigrant, 20–21 xenophobia, 22, 115
workforce liberation, 105
World Bank quoted, 127 Zemel v. Rusk, 87, 96n40
Global Migration
GLOBAL MIGRATION
Volume 2

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,

Wiesbrock, editors.
volumes cm
Includes index.
JV6033.G55 2015
304.8—dc23 2014035460
ISBN: 978-1-4408-0422-9
EISBN: 978-1-4408-0423-6
19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 4 5

Praeger
ABC-CLIO, LLC

To my wife, María.
Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Part I Myth: Restrictive migration policies

are effective. 1
Chapter One Militarization of the Mexico-U.S. Border and
Its Effects on the Circularity of Migrants 3
Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren
Chapter Two Out of Sight, Out of Mind?: The Myths and
Realities of Mandatory Immigration Detention 23
Daniel Ghezelbash and Mary Crock
Chapter Three The Quest for Turkish Migration to the
European Union: Exploring the
Misconceptions 47
Gözde Kaya
Part II Myth: Restrictive policies toward migrants

are inevitable. 67
Chapter Four Regularization in the European Union and
the United States: The Frequent Use of an
Exceptional Measure 69
Alan Desmond
Chapter Five National Voting Rights for Permanent
Residents: New Zealand’s Experience 101
Kate McMillan
viii Contents
Chapter Six Improving Migrants’ Rights in Times of Crisis:

Migration Policy in Argentina since 2003 129
Pablo Ceriani Cernadas
Part III Myth: Restrictive immigration policies

promote integration. 159
Chapter Seven Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten: Naturalization
Biases Tested in Practice 161
Dimitry Kochenov
Chapter Eight Family Reunion as a Means of Integration:
Has It Failed or Succeeded? 177
Thomas Huddleston
Chapter Nine The Mythical Death of Multiculturalism 197
Tariq Modood

Index 231
Tables and Figures
Tables
5.1 Migrant Enrollment on the Electoral Roll, Wave 2 112
5.2 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Enrollment on the Electoral Roll,
Wave 3 113
5.3 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Voting Behavior, Wave 3 113
5.4 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Enrollment on the Electoral Roll,
Wave 3, by Country of Origin 115
5.5 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Voting Behavior, Wave 3, by Region
of Origin 115
6.1 Unemployment Rates in Argentina, 1990–2011 134
6.2 Migration Flows to/from Argentina, 1950–2003 135
8.1 Dutch Proposals for EU Family Reunion Directive 180
9.1 Four Modes of Integration 204
Figures
1.1 Intensity of U.S. Enforcement Effort, 1970–2010 8
1.2 Sector of Undocumented Border Crossings, 1970–2010 9
1.3 Use of Paid Guide during Undocumented Border Crossings,
1970–201010
1.4 Cost of Undocumented Border Crossing, 2012 12
1.5 Probability of Border Crossing Outcomes, 1970–2010 13
1.6 Probability of Leaving for the United States in Undocumented
Status, 1970–2010 14
1.7 Probability of Return from an Undocumented Trip within
12 Months of Entry, 1970–2010 15
6.1 Incidence of Poverty and Indigence, 2003–2012 148
6.2 Employment Trends According to Migration, 1995–2001 149
6.3 Employment Trends According to Migration, 2002–2010 149
8.1 Permits for Non-EU Families as Percent of Total Legal

Immigration in 2011 182
8.2 Composition of Reuniting Non-EU Families in 2011 183
Acknowledgments
general audience tackling the most common misperceptions and myths on
migration. Hence, we started our work with the intention of providing a
collection of essays dealing with some of the most common misconcep-
gained contributors from all five continents discussing issues in more than
50 countries. Our approach is interdisciplinary, and our authors discuss
migration from legal, political, sociological, historical, economic, demo-
graphic, anthropological, and geographic angles. Finally, we decided to
include a combination of some of the most important and renowned
Crépeau, professor of law at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, and
current United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
xii Acknowledgments

United States; Aderanti Adepoju, professor of economy and demography
and chief executive of the Human Resources Development Centre in
at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India.
through the whole editorial process. Beth Ptalis began the project with us
and worked on it until January 2014. She was then replaced by Jessica
Finally, our understanding of migration as a global issue has benefited
from our various research visits at several institutions around the world
who have welcomed us with open arms for several days, weeks, or months.
Diego would like to thank the following institutions where he has con-
ducted research since 2009: the Centre for Migration Law at the University
of Nijmegen (Netherlands), the Riga Graduate School of Law (Latvia), the
National University of Singapore (NUS), the Universidad di Tella in Bue-
nos Aires (Argentina), the Fundação Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro (Bra-
zil), and the Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá (Colombia). Anja would like
to express her gratitude to Harvard Law School in Cambridge (United
The task of editors of a collection of essays can sometimes be an ardu-
ous one. We are very grateful to our authors that this was not the case for
the book you hold in your hands. We have been very privileged to have
deepened our links with those authors we already knew in person and to
have met new colleagues through email, Skype, and in person to discuss
the chapters in such varied places as Milan, Brussels, Barcelona, New

Delhi, Maastricht, Izmir, Buenos Aires, Boston, Toronto, Philadelphia,
New York, Oxford, Madrid, and Bristol. As editors we also met in Valencia
in 2012 and in Oslo in 2013 to discuss the structure of the project.

Dr. Anja Wiesbrock
Bristol and Oslo
June 10, 2014
Part I
Myth: Restrictive migration policies are effective.
When facing complex challenges governments often resort to restrictive

policies without properly thinking about the results they may produce.
For instance, many receiving states try to strengthen border control in
order to prevent irregular migration, without adequately considering the
effectiveness and side effects of such measures. The example of the U.S.-
Mexican border discussed by Massey and Pren in their chapter shows that
such measures are not only ineffective in limiting the number of irregular
migrants, they also lead to increasing death rates among unauthorized
border crossers, rising costs of crossing the border, and longer stays for
migrants working in the United States in order to pay off the crossing
costs. The situation is similar in the European Union, where the drowning
of hundreds of irregular migrants trying to reach the European Union by
boat has recently made headlines.
Receiving states also tend to restrict the residence rights of labor
migrants with the objective of curtailing their stay and ensuring their
return to their country of origin. The example of the famous “guest worker
model” in postwar Western Europe shows that such temporary admission
schemes are unlikely to be effective and can have significant negative
implications in terms of the integration of migrants and their family mem-
bers. As the example of Turkish migrants described by Kaya shows, a
migration policy that treats migrant workers as “guests” and excludes them
from certain crucial rights, such as the right to work for their spouses, has
serious repercussions for their integration.
Another restrictive and counterproductive policy is the detention of
asylum seekers, which is hardly effective in reaching the objective of
restricting their numbers and in fact has many undesirable side effects. In
2 Global Migration
particular mandatory detention, which has become a widespread and per-

manent policy tool in countries such as Australia, the United States, Can-
ada, and New Zealand, is hardly justifiable from a cost-benefit perspective.
As Ghezelbash and Crock show, automatic mandatory detention is not
only contrary to norms of international human rights law, but it also pro-
duces several by-products, including devastating effects on the health and
well-being of detainees. Moreover, such policies are economically unsound
because of the astronomical fiscal costs associated with them.
CHAPTER ONE
Militarization of the Mexico-U.S.

Border and Its Effects on the
Circularity of Migrants
Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren
Introduction
It is a common belief among policymakers and the general public that
millions of desperately poor people in the developing world look to devel-
oped nations as a potential escape hatch through which they can free them-
selves from abject misery at home, and that in the absence of restrictive
immigration and border policies millions of migrants would flood into
developed countries to settle permanently, overwhelming their culture,
society, and economy. In reality, however, relatively few people emigrate
despite stark international inequalities. As of 2013, just 3.2 percent of the
world’s citizens lived outside the country of their birth, and half of these
people became international migrants through local displacements that just
happened to cross international boundaries (as in Africa, where colonial-era
frontiers often split tribal lands). Many were transformed into “immigrants”
by the movement of international boundaries rather than by moving them-
selves (as happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union). In all, only
around 1.5 percent of contemporary immigrants moved from a poor to a
rich country and 40 percent of all international migrants remain in the
developing world.1
4 Global Migration
In general these migrants are not desperate people seeking to escape

abject poverty but strategic actors acting to improve their lives and adapt-
ing to change at home using foreign labor instrumentally as a tool. Those
who depart internationally are not the poorest of the poor, but those with
access to some form of capital to facilitate the trip, be it financial, social, or
cultural.2 Moreover, when they move internationally they do not disperse
randomly or head to the nearest destination but instead move to nations to
which their country is connected by relations of investment, trade, poli-
tics, and colonization, thereby producing a small set of relatively stable
migration systems around the world, systems that perpetuate themselves
over time and across space.3 People generally migrate to places where they
are already connected.
Among those who become international labor migrants and move from
developing to developed nations, the preferred migratory strategy is often
one of circulation, with workers moving into and out of foreign labor mar-
kets for periods of short-term labor.4 Circulating back and forth sporadi-
cally, they remit funds and repatriate savings to provide for their families,
solve economic problems at home, and make investments in the service of
some economic project. Most migrate a few times over the course of their
working lives, and then retire back to their home community to enjoy the
fruits of their foreign labor and repatriated earnings.
Despite the high rate of circulation within stable migration systems,
some migrants inevitably do acquire social and economic ties to people
and institutions in destination areas that draw them into permanent settle-
ment; but in the absence of barriers to circulation this number tends to be
relatively small. As a result, once the social and economic infrastructure
for a stable migration system is in place, restrictive policies generally back-
fire by preventing circulation within it and unwittingly promoting long-
term settlement, often against the desires of the migrants themselves.5
When European nations ended two decades of guest worker recruitment
in the early 1970s, for example, migrant workers who earlier had come
and gone secure in the knowledge that they could return should the need
or desire arise, dug in their heels and sought permanent residence. Rather
than circulating they had to sponsor the entry of spouses, children, and
other relatives, causing foreign populations to grow rather than shrink.6
Likewise, in the United States, millions of Mexican migrants to the
United States circulated back and forth with temporary work visas between
1942 and 1964, and millions more continued to circulate as undocu-
mented migrants between 1965 and 1985 after the temporary worker
program was shut down. After the cutoff of guest worker migration in
1965 the annual inflow of formerly legal temporary workers simply
Militarization of the Mexico-U.S. Border and Its Effects on the Circularity of Migrants 5
reestablished itself under undocumented auspices, and by 1979 the circu-

latory system had once more stabilized.7 During the period of undocu-
mented circulation from 1965 to 1985, 85 percent of entries were offset by
departures8 and the population of undocumented Mexicans rose very
slowly, reaching just 2.2 million in 1986.9 Beginning in that year, however,
the United States began an unprecedented militarization of its southern
border, an enforcement effort that accelerated in the 1990s and redoubled
again after 2001 to reach record levels by the year 2010.10
The border buildup occurred despite the fact that the number of unau-
thorized entries had peaked and stabilized around 1979. Nonetheless, the
undocumented population of the United States grew rapidly during the
1990s and 2000s, and by 2008 the unauthorized Mexican population of
the United States stood at seven million persons.11 With the onset of the
Great Recession in 2008, the population dropped by around a million
persons as unemployment spiked and labor demand withered. Since
2009, the total has fluctuated around six million and the inflow has hov-
ered around a net of zero.12 As a result of the border militarization the
United States is now host to a resident population of 11 million undocu-
mented migrants, 60 percent of whom are Mexican and 20 percent of
whom are Central American.13
These facts raise an obvious question: how did a massive increase in
border enforcement during a period of stable undocumented entries lead
to a sixfold increase in the undocumented population over 20 years? Very
clearly, not only did the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border fail to
prevent undocumented population growth in the United States; by all
appearances it appears to have accelerated it, a counterproductive out-
come that has to represent one of the most expensive and colossal policy
failures in U.S. history. Since 1990, billions of dollars have been spent on
the Border Patrol only to accelerate the rate of undocumented population
growth to record levels. This chapter explains how and why this paradoxi-
cal outcome occurred. After describing and documenting the massive
increase in border enforcement, it describes how migrants adapted to pro-
duce the counterproductive effects just described.
The Border Buildup

In the decades prior to 1986 the size and budget of the Border Patrol
grew rather slowly. As of 1985 the agency had just 3,232 officers and an
annual budget of only $142 million. Upon assuming the presidency
in 1981, however, Ronald Reagan increasingly framed the Mexico-U.S.
border as a bulwark against communist infiltration from the south and
6 Global Migration
labeled undocumented migration as a threat to national security, noting

that “terrorists and subversives are just two days’ driving time from [the
border at] Harlingen, Texas.”14 In 1986 Congress responded to the pre-
sumed threat by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
In addition to criminalizing the hiring of unauthorized workers and offer-
ing legal status to long-term undocumented residents and migrant farm
laborers, the legislation provided $400 million in new funds to the
Border Patrol, thus initiating a militarization of the border that continues
to this day.
The hiring of more Border Patrol officers generated more border appre-
hensions, of course, and the rising tide of apprehensions was then taken as
evidence of the growing “alien invasion” to justify the agency’s request for
still more resources, thus yielding a self-feeding cycle of enforcement,
apprehensions, more enforcement, more apprehensions, and even more
enforcement.15 In 1990 Congress authorized the hiring of 1,000 additional
Border Patrol officers, streamlined removal proceedings, and increased
penalties for immigration violations. It followed up in 1996 with the Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which allo-
cated even more funds to the Border Patrol to enable the purchase of
military equipment and to hire 1,000 officers per year until the Border
Patrol reached 10,000 officers.16
In 1996 Congress passed two other pieces of anti-immigrant legislation.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
placed restrictions on the access of immigrants to federal entitlements, not
just for undocumented migrants but legal immigrants as well. At the same
time, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act declared any
alien who had ever committed a crime, no matter how long ago, immedi-
ately deportable; it also gave immigration authorities new powers for the
“expedited exclusion” of any alien who had ever crossed the border with-
out documents, irrespective of current status.17
In response to the attacks of September 11, Congress passed the 2001
USA PATRIOT Act, which tripled the number of immigration enforcement
personnel and authorized them to deport, without hearings or evidence, all
aliens—legal or illegal, temporary or permanent—that authorities might
have “reason to believe” would commit, further, or facilitate acts of terror-
ism.18 In 2004 the National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection
Act funded the purchase of even more military equipment for the Border
Patrol, along with additional officers, immigration investigators, and deten-
tion centers. The 2006 Secure Fence Act authorized the construction of
hundreds of miles of fencing along the border, along with new vehicle
barriers, automatic cameras, and high-intensity lighting, and placed into
service new spy satellites and unmanned drones. Finally, in 2011 the Bor-
der Security Act funded 3,000 more Border Patrol agents and increased the
agency’s budget by another $244 million.
The militarization of the border has been a bipartisan affair, growing
steadily through the Reagan, Clinton, Obama, and both Bush administra-
tions. Apart from legislative actions, border militarization was also enacted
through a series of quasi-military operations, beginning with Operation
Blockade in El Paso in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in
1994.19 Together, these two programs sought to erect literal walls of
enforcement resources at the two busiest border crossings. Rather than
stopping the inflows, however, they simply diverted them to other, less
patrolled sectors of the border. In response, special operations were pro-
gressively launched in these sectors as migrants serially adapted to the
new deployments. Operation Rio Grande extended enforcement activities
west of El Paso into New Mexico in 1998; Operation Safeguard expanded
intensive enforcement to the Tucson Sector in 1999; the Arizona Border
Initiative sought to cover the rest of Arizona’s border in 2004; and finally
the Secure Borders Initiative was applied to the entire 3,000 mile border
in 2005.
Through the foregoing legislative actions and enforcement operations,
the United States progressively militarized the Mexico-U.S. border in the
25 years between 1985 and 2010. The fruits of this effort are illustrated in
Figure 1.1, which shows trends in selected indicators of border enforce-
ment using data obtained from the Office of Immigration Statistics at the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security space.20 The figure shows trends in
the number of Border Patrol officers, the size of the Border Patrol budget,
and the number of “linewatch hours” spent by agents patrolling the Mex-
ico-U.S. border. To put each series on the same scale the data are divided
by values observed in 1986, the year the militarization began. The figure
thus gives the factor by which each enforcement indicator has increased
since that date.
As can be seen, there is little evidence of any sustained increase in
enforcement before IRCA’s passage. After 1986 the enforcement effort
began to increase, slowly at first but then accelerating rapidly after the
enforcement operations of 1993 and 1994 and the passage of the anti-
immigrant acts in 1996, and then expanding exponentially after the
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act in late 2001. By 2010 the
number of linewatch hours had increased five times the level observed in
1986, the number of Border Patrol officers had risen by a factor of six,
and the Border Patrol budget had grown 24 times. The militarization of the
U.S.-Mexico border is thus clearly manifest in official statistics.
8 Global Migration
Figure 1.1 Intensity of U.S. Enforcement Effort, 1970–2010.
The Response by Migrants

Undocumented migrants are not simply passive recipients of U.S. poli-
cies, of course, but dynamic, active agents who can be expected to respond
behaviorally to the militarization of the border in order to evade capture and
continue on to jobs waiting in the United States, so they can earn money for
their families and economic projects at home. The foregoing text has already
alluded to one response: shifting the locus of border crossing to avoid newly
militarized sectors. Figure 1.2 examines the changing geography of undocu-
mented border crossing using data from the Mexican Migration Project
(MMP) to plot the share of undocumented entries occurring at traditional
pre-1986 crossing points (Tijuana–San Diego, Mexicali-Calexico, and
Juarez–El Paso) versus new crossing points along the border between Sonora
and Arizona and others in the southern Rio Grande Valley. Since 1987 the
MMP has conducted annual surveys of randomly chosen households in
selected Mexican communities along with network samples of migrants
from the same communities living in U.S. destination areas. The MMP data
have been well described and validated in prior publications.21
The analyses that follow draw here on histories of migration and border
crossing that were compiled from migrant household heads in the MMP
Figure 1.2 Sector of Undocumented Border Crossings, 1970–2010.
sample. In order to reveal long-term trends and eliminate short-term fluc-

tuations, the series of percentages crossing in different sectors was
smoothed using three-year moving averages. The data reveal that between
1970 and 1988 70 percent to 80 percent of all crossings occurred in tradi-
tional sectors of California and Texas, principally San Diego and El Paso.
The additional resources allocated to border enforcement by IRCA were
naturally targeted to these sectors and after 1988 the share of crossing at
traditional locations began to decline. After the launching of Operation
Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper, the decline accelerated and the share
crossing at traditional locations reached a nadir of 30 percent in 2003.
Over the same period, the share of crossings through the Sonoran desert
into Arizona grew steadily from 5 percent to 56 percent. Thus, the imme-
diate effect of the initial phase of border militarization was to divert the
undocumented inflow away from San Diego and El Paso and into Arizona,
which prior to IRCA had been a quiet backwater where few crossings
occurred.22
The shift in crossing points was not lost on the Border Patrol, of course,
and in response it launched Operation Safeguard in Tucson in 1999 and
implemented the Arizona Border Initiative in 2004. From the latter date
10 Global Migration
onward the share of Sonoran crossings declined rapidly to reach 35 per-

cent in 2008, when the Great Recession hit and undocumented migration
briefly went negative. Thereafter the action shifted to the southern Rio
Grande Valley, with the share crossing there rising from 14 percent to 35
percent. After 2008 the share crossing into Arizona once again rose sharply
to reach 63 percent in 2010, but the number of border crossings by 2010
was quite small as undocumented migration hovered around a net of zero.
In any event, the point is clear: over the past 25 years the intensification of
border enforcement in one sector simply has pushed the traffic to other
border locations where migrants face fewer Border Patrol officers and less
enforcement materiel.
In addition to changing their points of border crossing, another
action taken by migrants to increase the odds of success is to invest in
the services of a professional border crossing guide, colloquially known
as a coyote.23 Figure 1.3 draws on MMP data to show the percentage of
undocumented migrants who used a paid border crossing guide to enter
the United States from 1970 through 2010. Because migrants who have
already made the crossing at least once can draw upon their own
Figure 1.3 Use of Paid Guide during Undocumented Border Crossings,

1970–2010.
knowledge and experience in order to facilitate a successful entry, this

percentage is shown separately for migrants on their first undocumented
trip and those on a later trip. Prior work has shown that migrants tend
to substitute their own migration-specific human capital for the social
capital of a border crossing guide as they gain experience and accumulate
trips.24
Consistent with this idea, for most of the period under study the
share using a paid guide was less for experienced than first-time migrants.
Nonetheless, the percentage has always been high for both groups and
it has steadily risen over time. In 1970, 66 percent of all crossings by
experienced migrants and 72 percent of those by new migrants were
carried out with the assistance of a coyote. By 2010, however, the share
had reached 90 percent for both groups. As the border was steadily
militarized, in other words, a growing fraction of migrants turned to
professionals to help them gain entry to the United States. U.S. border
policy thus turned the use of a coyote from a common to a universal
practice.
The services provided by coyotes and the risks experienced both by
coyotes and migrants did not remain constant over this time, however. As
border crossing shifted increasingly to remote, desolate locations the envi-
ronmental risks to life and limb steadily grew. At the same time, because of
changes in U.S. immigration law the penalties for human smuggling rose
steadily over time. It is one thing for a coyote to guide a migrant from
Tijuana to San Diego, both safe urban areas where the downside risk is
capture and voluntary return to try again later; but it is quite another thing
to guide a migrant through a hostile terrain where the downside risks
include dehydration, heat exhaustion, drowning, and death, and for coy-
otes arrest and possible imprisonment. Given the more complicated stag-
ing required to guide people across the border in remote areas and the
increased legal and environmental risks of doing so, one would naturally
expect the costs of border crossing to rise.
Figure 1.4 draws on reports by respondents to the MMP to present the
average cost of an undocumented border crossing from 1970 to 2010 in
constant 2012 dollars. As can be seen, the real cost of border crossing was
modest and falling before the 1980s, declining from $685 in 1970 to $533
in 2003. From 2003 to 2008 the cost remained fairly constant; but there-
after it rose steadily year by year to reach $2,663 in 2010, an inflation rate
of 7.7 percent per year. In the course of shifting to more remote locations
and relying on paid guides who provided ever more elaborate services, the
up-front costs of gaining access to the United States thus rose quite dra-
matically for undocumented migrants.
12 Global Migration
Figure 1.4 Cost of Undocumented Border Crossing, 2012.
Limited Efficacy at the Border

The final effect of border militarization on the likelihood of gaining
entry to the United States depends on the balance of power in the cat-and-
mouse game played by migrants and Border Patrol officers—an equilib-
rium between the personnel, materiel, and resources devoted to the
capture of undocumented entrants and the strategies, behavioral adapta-
tions, and investments made by migrants to evade capture. Figure 1.5
again draws on MMP data to examine trends in the likelihood of two key
outcomes in the ritual encounter between undocumented migrants and
officers along the border: apprehension and ultimately gaining entry to the
United States after a series of attempts.
The bottom line shows the likelihood of apprehension by the Border
Patrol on any given attempt at entry, which began with a probability of
around 40 percent in the early 1970s, fell to a low of 22 percent in 1989,
and then rose to 30–35 percent from 1994 through 2002. Thereafter a
sharp increase occurs to produce a value of 50 percent in 2008, by which
time the number of migrants actually attempting entry was quite small.
For most of the past three decades the likelihood of apprehension on any
Figure 1.5 Probability of Border Crossing Outcomes, 1970–2010.
given attempt at unauthorized border crossing was not very high. What-
ever the likelihood of apprehension, capture seems to have little or no
effect in preventing an ultimate entry into the United States. The top line
shows the likelihood of successfully gaining entry after multiple attempts,
which ranges between 0.95 and 1.0 throughout the period, with only a
slight decline over time.
In sum, the billions of dollars spent militarizing the border after 1986
seem to have had virtually no payoff in terms of preventing the entry of
undocumented migrants to the United States. Over the entire 40-year
period the average probability of apprehension was just 0.338 per attempt
and the average probability of eventually gaining entry was 0.98, with no
real trend in either. With an average probability of apprehension of one-
third on any attempt and a 98 percent chance of ultimately getting in, the
odds have always been very much in the migrant’s favor.
The Lack of a Deterrent Effect

The foregoing figures suggest that the militarization of the U.S. border
is unlikely to have had much of an effect in deterring undocumented
14 Global Migration
migrants from leaving for the United States in the first place. Figure 1.6
again draws upon migration histories from the MMP to show the probabil-
ity of leaving for the United States on a first undocumented trip and the
likelihood of later taking an additional undocumented trip from 1970
through 2010. Despite the massive increase in border enforcement after
1986, there is little evidence of a deterrent effect on prospective migrants,
at least through 2001. From 1970 through this date, the probability of tak-
ing a first undocumented trip to the United States fluctuated around 1
percent per year with little change in either direction. Only after 2001 is a
sustained decline toward zero observed, but of course employment
demand in the United States was also weakening during this time and
ultimately collapsed in 2007–2008.
There is even less evidence of a deterrent effect on experienced U.S.
migrants. Naturally, someone who has already been to the United States is
more likely to go again, and from 1970 through 1992 the probability of
taking an additional undocumented trip varied around 0.04 as opposed to
0.01 on first trips. After 1992, however, the likelihood of taking an addi-
tional undocumented trip rose steadily to reach a level around 0.06
Figure 1.6 Probability of Leaving for the United States in Undocumented Status,
1970–2010.
between 1999 and 2004. Thereafter the probability drops sharply to

around 0.03 in 2007 before recovering to around 0.05 in 2008–2010.
Despite these fluctuations there is no evidence of a sustained decline in the
likelihood of taking an additional undocumented trip in response to the
massive border buildup.
For evidence of a sustained decline, one must turn to probabilities of
return migration, which are plotted in Figure 1.7. From 1970 through
1986, the probability of returning to Mexico within 12 months of an
undocumented entry rose slightly from 0.54 to 0.60 on first trips and from
0.76 to 0.82 on later trips. In other words, prior to the passage of IRCA the
likelihood of returning to Mexico within a year of entry was very high,
especially for experienced migrants who had established a pattern of cir-
culation back and forth. After 1986, however, both series underwent a
sustained decline to historically unprecedented levels, a decline that
accelerated in the mid-1990s after the launching of border enforcement
operations. By 2005 the number of migrants leaving on a first undocu-
mented trip was too small to compute a reliable return probability, but by
then it had reached a record low 0.16. As shown in the figure, however,
Figure 1.7 Probability of Return from an Undocumented Trip within 12 Months

of Entry, 1970–2010.
16 Global Migration
experienced migrants continued to cross the border in significant num-

bers, but by 2010 their one-year likelihood of return stood at just 0.25.
Backfire at the Border

Through the passage of legislation and the launching of special enforce-
ment operations, the United States undertook a massive militarization of
its border with Mexico between 1986 and 2010, increasing the size of the
Border Patrol six times and raising its budget by a factor of 24. This mili-
tarization unfolded in phases, concentrating first in El Paso and San Diego,
historically the two busiest sectors. Although targeted investments in
enforcement began in these sectors with the passage of IRCA in 1986, full-
scale militarization was not undertaken until the launching of Operation
Blockade in El Paso in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in
1994. In response to these shifts in the deployment of border enforcement
resources, undocumented migrants adjusted their behavior by redirecting
their crossing efforts to the Sonora-Arizona border. As new operations
were launched to militarize Arizona’s southern border, migrants redirected
themselves to the lower Rio Grande Valley.
In addition to shifting to less patrolled sectors of the border, undocu-
mented migrants also sought to evade capture by drawing on the services of
paid border crossing guides known as coyotes. The use of such guides had
been common along the border for many years, but in response to the mili-
tarization it became almost universal, even among experienced migrants,
who reported using a paid guide on 90 percent of crossings by 2010. How-
ever, the services provided by coyotes grew increasingly costly as border
crossing shifted to more remote areas and became costlier and riskier, both
in terms of environmental hazards and legal repercussions. From 1986 to
2010 the cost of border crossing rose from around $500 to $2,600 per trip
in constant 2012 dollars.
These evasive actions apparently worked well because apprehension
probabilities generally remained low for most of the period, averaging
around 34 percent and only reaching 50 percent in 2008, by which time
attempted entries had fallen to record lows owing to the Great Recession.
No matter what the apprehension probability, however, apprehended
migrants were extremely likely to attempt another entry right away, with
the likelihood of ultimately gaining entry to the United States over a series
of attempts also remaining very high, generally varying just under 100
percent. Thus the massive militarization of the border had little effect on
the likelihood of ultimately achieving a successful border crossing and
gaining entry to the United States.
Given the foregoing probabilities, it is hardly surprising that the border

militarization had little deterrent effect on Mexicans contemplating a first
undocumented trip to the United States. From 1985 through 2001 the
probability of initiating undocumented migration fluctuated closely
around 1 percent per year. It is possible that increasing border enforce-
ment had some deterrent effect after 2001, but the downward trend coin-
cides with the weakening of U.S. labor demand with the bursting of the
dot-com bubble in 2000–2001 and the collapse in demand with the Great
Recession of 2007–2008. Among experienced U.S. migrants, moreover,
there is no evidence at all of a deterrent effect, with the probability of tak-
ing an additional undocumented trip rising sharply in the 1990s to peak
at around 6 percent a year around the turn of the century and displaying
no clear trend thereafter.
Our analysis thus suggests that the militarization of the Mexico-U.S.
border was ineffective in deterring undocumented Mexicans from decid-
ing to depart for the United States, either on a first or later trip, and that
the massive buildup did little to prevent undocumented migrants from
eventually gaining entry to the United States once they arrived at the bor-
der. To the extent that the militarization of the border had a discernible
effect on the behavior of undocumented migrants, the changes were
entirely counterproductive. By diverting migrants to even more remote
segments of the border, the selective, stepwise hardening of particular sec-
tors diverted migrants into harsh and dangerous terrain, which raised the
death rate among unauthorized border crossers24 and, as already shown,
dramatically increased the out-of-pocket costs of border crossing.
Increasing up-front costs to undocumented migrants implies longer trip
durations and lower rates of return movement. For example, if an undocu-
mented migrant can expect to earn $500 per month, then in 1985 it would
take one month of work in the United States to pay off the crossing costs
and make the trip profitable. With crossing costs at $2,600 in 2010, how-
ever, a migrant would have to work more than five months to pay off the
crossing costs and begin to profit from the trip. Increasing trip durations
imply lower likelihoods of return migration, and this is exactly what is
observed after 1986. Whereas the probability of returning to Mexico
within 12 months of entering the United States without documents stood
at 60 percent for first-time migrants and 80 percent for experienced
migrants in 1986, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century the
figures had reached 21 percent and 25 percent, respectively.
In other words, the principal effect of border militarization on the
behavior of Mexican migrants was not to deter them from heading north-
ward or prevent them from crossing the border; it was to dissuade them
18 Global Migration
from returning once they had paid the costs and experienced the risks of
undocumented border crossing. Our analysis thus provides the informa-
tion needed to explain the paradox outlined at the outset of this chapter—
how the massive militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border managed to
increase rather than decrease the growth of the United States’ undocu-
mented population.
Simply put, the surge in undocumented population growth occurred
because rising border enforcement failed either to deter undocumented
Mexicans from leaving for the United States or to prevent them from gain-
ing entry once at the border; but it did dramatically reduce the likelihood
of return migration back to Mexico. By raising the costs and risks of unau-
thorized border crossing, the militarization of the border did induce
migrants to minimize border crossing. Unfortunately for U.S. policymak-
ers, migrants accomplished this end not by remaining in Mexico but by
staying longer in the United States once they had paid the costs and expe-
rienced the risks at the border. In the end, rather than solving the “prob-
lem” of undocumented migration, the border buildup became a border
backfire and a textbook case of unintended consequences from poorly
conceived policies.
From Migration Restriction to Migration Management

In the end, international migration does not stem from a lack of eco-
nomic development, but from development itself.25 As markets for goods,
capital, commodities, and services globalize, so do markets for labor and
human capital and international flows of skilled and unskilled workers
logically follow. The extension of markets into developing nations is trans-
formative and displaces many people from traditional livelihoods. In the
context of transformative development, migration becomes an accessible
strategy that common people can use to adapt to the flux and change
occurring around them.26 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, most
of those uprooted from the countryside simply moved internally to
expanding cities to contribute to the urbanization of their societies; but
some proportion always moved internationally.27
As globalization once again surged at the end of the 20th and beginning
of the 21st centuries, and once again nations became linked by interna-
tional flows of investment, trade, transportation, and communication,
immigration also rebounded to levels not seen since the turn of the last
century.28 As before, today’s migrants come not from stagnant, backward
areas of the world, but from those regions that are in the throes of dynamic
social, political, and economic change, and Mexico is no exception.
Indeed, since 1993 the United States and Mexico have been linked together
in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has acted forcefully
to promote the free cross-border movement of goods, capital, commodi-
ties, and services; but somehow within this otherwise integrated North
American economy U.S. policymakers expected, or hoped, that labor
migration would not occur.29
Rather than building provisions for the movement of workers into the
treaty, the United States spent more billions to militarize the border with
its new trading partner, inadvertently interrupting a circular flow of work-
ers that had been decades in the making. If the U.S. authorities had devoted
this money to structural adjustment assistance to Mexico rather than bor-
der enforcement while creating legal avenues for the circulation of migrants
back and forth across the border, it is likely that the undocumented popu-
lation of the United States would be a fraction of its size today. Paradoxi-
cally, when it comes to immigration flows, less restriction and more
management can yield more actual control and smaller numbers of immi-
grants in the long term.30
The obvious model for such an arrangement is the European Union,
which upon admitting new members initiates a transition period to full
labor mobility while providing funds to ease the disruptions associated
with structural adjustment, drawing upon special accounts such as the
European Social Fund, the Regional Development Fund, and the Euro-
pean Cohesion Fund, into which wealthier nations of the European Union
regularly make payments. A good example is what happened when Spain
was admitted to the European Union. For hundreds of years Spain had
been a country of emigration, first to locations overseas and later to loca-
tions throughout the European Union. Despite a 30 percent gap in real
GDP per capita between Spain and Northern Europe, the country was
ultimately admitted with full membership and put on a pathway to free
labor mobility.
Rather than building a wall at the Pyrenees to prevent a feared influx of
Spanish migrants, however, the European Union transferred $59 billion in
structural adjustment funds to Spain to improve its social, economic, and
physical infrastructures and bring conditions in Spain up to basic EU stan-
dards. As a result, when EU accession occurred in 1986, there was a net
inflow of Spaniards back to Spain and, like other nations in the European
Union, Spain quickly became a net receiver of immigrants from overseas,
as well as from other EU member states.31 In this sense, the initiation of
NAFTA in 1993 was a lost opportunity for the United States. If it had fol-
lowed the European route of transnational market integration and incor-
porated labor migration into the structure of NAFTA through expanded
20 Global Migration
quotas for Mexican permanent residents and easier access to legal work
visas for Mexican workers, it would not now be facing the political conun-
drum of how to absorb millions of undocumented migrants into its social
and economic fabric.32
Notes
(New York: United Nations, 2013), http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013
.htm, accessed October 31, 2013.
2. Douglas S. Massey, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pel-
legrino, and J. Edward Taylor, Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the End
of the Millennium (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3. Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim, and Hania Zlotnik, eds., International Migration
Systems: A Global Approach (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992).
4. Oded Stark, The Migration of Labor (Cambridge, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
5. Douglas S. Massey, “Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legal-
ization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analyses 29
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2005).
6. Philip L. Martin and Mark J. Miller, “Guestworkers: Lessons from Western
Europe,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33 (1980): 315.
7. Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of US
Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America,” Popula-
tion and Development Review 38 (2012): 1.
8. Douglas S. Massey and Audrey Singer, “New Estimates of Undocumented
Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension,” Demography 32 (1995):
203.
9. Karen A. Woodrow and Jeffrey S. Passel, “Post-IRCA Undocumented Immi-
gration to the United States: An Assessment Based on the June 1988 CPS,” in
Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s,
eds. Frank D. Bean, Barry Edmonston, and Jeffey S. Passel (Washington, DC:
Urban Institute Press, 1990), 33.
10. Douglas S. Massey, “Immigration Enforcement as a Race-Making Institu-
tion,” in Immigration, Poverty, and Socioeconomic Inequality, eds. David Card and
Steven Raphael (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013), 357.
11. Ruth E. Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates
Since 1986 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011).
12. Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2012
(Washington, DC: Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013).
13. Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Origins of the New Latino Under-
class,” Race and Social Problems 4 (2013): 5.
14. Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and
Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 87.
15. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell
16. Massey, Durand, and Malone, op. cit.; Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization
of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home
(Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin,
1996).
17. Stephen H. Legomsky, “Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review,” Texas Law Review 78 (2000): 1612; Douglas S.
Massey and Magaly Sánchez R., Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in
Anti-Immigrant Times (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010).
18. Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning
of America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).
19. Dunn, op. cit.; Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal
Alien” and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2001).
20. Compiled from the website of the Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics,
accessed October 31, 2013; plus earlier printed reports.
21. Douglas S. Massey and Chiara Capoferro, “Measuring Undocumented
Migration,” International Migration Review 38 (2004): 1075; Jorge Durand and
Douglas S. Massey, Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican Migration Project
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Douglas S. Massey and René Zenteno,
“A Validation of the Ethnosurvey: The Case of Mexico-U.S. Migration,” Interna-
tional Migration Review 34 (2000): 765. Complete documentation and all data
from the Mexican Migration Project are available from the project website (http://
mmp.opr.princeton.edu/).
22. Douglas S. Massey, “How Arizona Became Ground Zero in the War on
Immigrants,” in Illegals in the Backyard: State and Local Regulation of Immigration
Policy, eds. G. Jack Chin and Carissa Hessick (New York: New York University
Press, 2013); David Spener, Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the
Texas-Mexico Border (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2009).
23. Audrey Singer and Douglas S. Massey, “The Social Process of Undocu-
mented Border Crossing,” International Migration Review 32 (1998): 561.
24. Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, Nestor Rodriguez, Ruben Hernandez-
Leon, and Stanley Bailey, “Death at the Border,” International Migration Review 33
(1999): 430–54.
25. Douglas S. Massey, “International Migration and Economic Development
in Comparative Perspective,” Population and Development Review 14 (1988):
383.
26. Alejandro Portes, “Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational
Communities,” in The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back, eds. D. Kalb, M.
van der Land, and R. Staring (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 253.
22 Global Migration
27. Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration:
Causes and Economic Impact (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).
28. Patricia Fernandez Kelly and Douglas S. Massey, “Borders for Whom? The
Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 610 (2007): 98.
29. Douglas S. Massey, “Caution: NAFTA at Work,” Miller-McCune Magazine 1
(2008):2.
30. Douglas S. Massey, “From Immigration Restriction to Immigration Manage-
ment,” UN Chronicle 50 (2013), September, http://unchronicle.un.org/article
/migration-restriction-migration-management/, accessed October 21, 2013.
31. Douglas S. Massey, “Muros o Puentes? Visiones Alternativas de la Integración
Regional en Norteamérica y Europa,” Revista de Ciencias y Humanidades de la
Fundación Ramón Areces 10 (2009): 75.
32. Massey (2008), op. cit. above, n. 29.
CHAPTER TWO
Out of Sight, Out of Mind?

The Myths and Realities of Mandatory
Immigration Detention
Daniel Ghezelbash and Mary Crock
Introduction
What is it about irregular migrants that the prospect of their arrival
causes angst in nations all around the world? Such migrants are the quint-
essential other, decried as a danger to everything from national security to
social cohesion. While the sovereign power of governments to exclude or
deport noncitizens who enter or remain without authority is by and large
beyond dispute, migrants seeking asylum as refugees pose particular chal-
lenges. For many states the ability to deal with asylum seekers is qualified
by obligations contained in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees and subsequent Protocol (the Refugee Convention and
Protocol) and other human rights instruments.1 Controlling this latter
group of highly visible unwanted migrants has come to dominate the politi-
cal discourse of both developed and developing nations all around the
world. Even countries that are generally relaxed about large-scale immi-
gration have moved to introduce measures aimed at restricting access to
humanitarian migrants—most particularly those presenting as unauthor-
ized maritime arrivals. One such measure is mandatory detention, which
involves the automatic detention of certain classes of irregular arrivals
24 Global Migration
without consideration as to whether incarceration is necessary or appro-

priate in a given instance.
In this chapter we begin by tracing the history of mandatory detention
policy, documenting its normalization from a temporary and extraordinary
measure used at times of crisis, to a permanent tool of migration control.
We start with the two countries in which the practice was pioneered: the
United States of America and Australia. More recent moves to adopt the
policy in Canada and New Zealand are then examined briefly. We then
explore and debunk three myths that are commonly promoted to justify
the policy of long-term mandatory detention. The first posits that manda-
tory detention is essential to maintain public health and national security.
The second myth is that mandatory detention is required to prevent asy-
lum seekers absconding while their claims are being processed. The third
myth that we explore is the claim that mandatory detention works as a
deterrent that can effectively reduce future asylum seeker flows. While we
concede that the first two justifications may justify detention in certain
circumstances, we argue that there is no proof that mandatory detention
works or has ever worked as a deterrent. We argue that automatic manda-
tory detention is inherently dissonant with norms of international human
rights law, when used to control or deter asylum seekers. We agree with
the view put forward in the UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Detention
(2012) that detention needs to be necessary and proportional in each case.
Any decision to detain should be based on an individualized assessment of
threat and/or flight risk. Having scrutinized the justifications given for the
use of long-term mandatory detention, we examine some of the by-
products and realities of the practice. These include the devastating effects
prolonged immigration detention has on the health and well-being of
individuals—and its damaging impact on society more broadly. We also
explore the fiscal costs of maintaining the policy. In concluding we argue
that the mandatory detention of irregular maritime arrivals has had more
to do with alleviating public concerns and scoring cheap political points
than with fulfilling any legitimate policy goals.
The Road to Mandatory Detention

This section begins by tracing the development of the policy of manda-
tory detention of asylum seekers in the two countries in which the practice
was first developed: the United States and Australia. The implementation
of the policy followed a similar pattern in each jurisdiction. Mandatory
detention was first introduced to target a specific cohort of maritime
asylum seekers. Following legal challenges to the validity of laws that were
Out of Sight, Out of Mind? 25
originally addressed to specific groups, more general laws were introduced

mandating the detention of irregular arrivals more generally. In both coun-
tries, the broad mandatory detention provisions resulted in the incarcera-
tion of large numbers of asylum seekers—and endemic problems in the
detention system. In response, both countries subsequently embarked on
reforms aimed at mitigating some of the excesses of the rules. The section
concludes with an examination of more recent moves to introduce manda-
tory detention policies in Canada and New Zealand.
United States
U.S. law has made provision for the detention of aliens seeking admis-
sion to U.S. territory since 1891. The Immigration Act of 1891 included
provisions for officers to “inspect all such aliens” or “to order a temporary
removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time and place, and
then there detain them until a thorough inspection is made.” In the face
of apparent corruption and/or incompetence on the part of federal immi-
grant inspectors that was seen to be resulting in the admission of persons
who should have been excluded, the government introduced a stricter
detention regime in the Immigration Act of 1893. These provisions con-
firmed that “it shall be the duty of every inspector of arriving alien immi-
grants to detain for special inquiry . . . every person who may not appear
to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” Mandatory
detention was born, and this represented “the first time that any legisla-
ture had dictated that detention must be used as a mode of procedure in
administering the immigration laws. This purported to remove even the
discretion to determine the necessity and suitability of detention. This
reflected the view, confirmed by judicial doctrine of the time that migrants
were essentially beyond constitutional protection until authorized to be
admitted.”2
The United States abandoned “presumptive” detention in 1954. The
move coincided with the introduction of a universal visa system under
which U.S. consuls stationed abroad would conduct initial screening of
immigrants. While unauthorized arrivals continued to be detained upon
arrival for preliminary inspection, the majority were released on parole.
Only those deemed likely to flee or those whose freedom of movement
could endanger the national security or public safety were detained beyond
the initial inspection phase. Until the early 1980s, the policy of releasing
on parole newly arrived immigrants (including asylum seekers) resulted in
the detention of only a “minimal” number of aliens.3 The liberal release
policy was explained by the Supreme Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber: “The
26 Global Migration
parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which need-

less confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are con-
ducted. . . . Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,
and is generally employed only as to security risks and those likely to
abscond. . . . Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an
enlightened civilization.”4
The arrival of large numbers of unauthorized Haitians and Cubans by
boat led to a reconsideration of the detention policy in 1980–1981. After
an announcement by then-Cuban president Fidel Castro that those who
wished to leave Cuba were free to do so, more than 125,000 Cubans
made their way to the United States by boat as part of a flotilla that
became known as the Mariel Boatlift.5 Cubans arriving without authoriza-
tion had traditionally been treated more favorably than arrivals from other
countries, enjoying a special path to permanent residence through the
Cuban Adjustment Act. Given the sudden surge in arrivals and reports
that many of those making the journey had been deliberately released
from Cuban jails and mental institutions, the U.S. government began
screening all arrivals before releasing them into the community. Such
detentions were carried out under the existing legal and policy framework,
with people being held pending a decision as to whether they posed
a threat to the community. While the majority were quickly released, a
small minority who were deemed inadmissible were held in long-term
detention.
While the Cuban arrivals were dealt with using the existing detention
provisions, the contemporaneous arrival of a comparatively smaller cohort
of fugitives from Haiti acted as the trigger for the reintroduction of harsher
detention provisions. Haitian asylum seekers fleeing the repressive regime
of Jean-Claude (Papa Doc) Duvalier had begun arriving in southern Flor-
ida in as early as 1963. Their numbers slowly increased throughout the
1970s. In 1980, the same year as the Mariel Boatlift, the number of Haitian
arrivals peaked at 24,530. Beginning in May 1981, the administration of
President Reagan implemented an informal rule that provided for the
mandatory detention of all Haitians arriving by boat without documenta-
tion. This informal policy was struck down by the courts on a technical
point. The government authorities had not followed the correct procedure
when introducing the rule.6 In response, a fresh regulation was introduced
(this time following the correct procedures), expanding mandatory deten-
tion to apply to all irregular arrivals. The rule provided that “any alien who
appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and who arrives with-
out documents or who arrives with documentation which appears to be
false, altered, or otherwise invalid . . . shall be detained.”7
Parole was only available on limited, enumerated grounds.8 These

included: (1) “emergent reasons”; (2) reasons defined to be “strictly in the
public interest”; and (3) release for the purpose of participating in a pros-
ecution. “Emergent reasons” were defined to include situations where the
immigrant had a serious medical condition and continued detention
would not be appropriate.9 Release was only considered to be “strictly in
the public interest” if two conditions were met. First, the detainee must
have posed neither “a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Second, the
detainee had to be pregnant, a juvenile, an infant, a beneficiary of an
immigrant visa petition filed by a close relative, or a witness to a judicial,
administrative, or legislative proceeding.10
These regulations were a turning point because they marked the first
time that deterrence was used to justify the detention of irregular migrants.
Incarceration was no longer framed only in terms of facilitating exclusion
or deportation, but instead was being used to send a signal to others con-
sidering making the journey to the United States. This was made explicit
in the reasons explaining the adoption of the new rule published by the
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) in 1982: “The Administration
has determined that a large number of Haitian nationals and others are
likely to attempt to enter the United States illegally unless there is in place
a detention and parole regulation.”11
While detention was mandatory, the regulations outlining the grounds
for parole provided sufficient discretion to cause significant fluctuations in
the way release decisions were made, both within and between jurisdic-
tions and over time. In response to overcrowding within the detention
centers, a number of programs were introduced in the mid-1980s that
used the public-interest parole provisions to facilitate the release of asylum
seekers who did not pose security or flight risks.
The tendency for immigration detention laws to relax and then toughen
in response to politics and external pressures has played out in the U.S.
case. One decade later, parole provisions relating to irregular arrivals were
made more restrictive with the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996 (IIRIRA). As well as changing the
vocabulary of U.S. immigration law by streamlining deportation and
exclusion proceedings into removal proceedings, the IIRIRA introduced
the notion of expedited removal. Under this process, noncitizens who arrive
in the United States without valid documentation or with false documen-
tation can be ordered removed without further hearings, reviews, or
appeals.12 When a person indicates an intention to apply for asylum, the
inspector refers the case to an asylum officer for an interview,13 who deter-
mines whether the unauthorized noncitizen has presented a “credible fear
28 Global Migration
of persecution.”14 Only if the asylum officer finds the claim to be credible

can the person pursue the claim for asylum through regular removal pro-
cedures. These rights and procedures are inferior to asylum claims made
outside the expedited removal procedures. As well as having no right to
appeal on the merits, judicial review of expedited removal decisions is
expressly barred.15
Under IIRIRA, the U.S. policy of mandatory detention for unauthorized
arrivals has continued, with all persons subject to the expedited removal
procedures being detained. In relation to the release of asylum seekers,
separate criteria were introduced for persons awaiting a credible fear deter-
mination and those found to hold such a fear. Where a person is awaiting
such status determination, detention is mandatory16 and parole is only
available in extremely limited circumstances. Once an asylum seeker has
made out a prima facie case by establishing a “credible fear” of persecution,
the grounds for release are wider, reflecting the same criteria that existed
before the 1996 reforms.
In response to reports of endemic problems in the detention system
including repeated incidents of human rights violations and denial of basic
medical care, in more recent years the administration of President Obama
has embarked on a program of detention reform. A series of changes were
made in 2009 to address human rights concerns, improving oversight of
the system and expanding the use of alternatives to detention. Notable
initiatives include the reduction in the use of penal facilities for immigra-
tion detention and the creation of an independent office of detention over-
sight to inspect facilities and review complaints. While most reforms have
focused on the conditions in detention, changes have also been made to
parole policies. The most significant of these relates to release of asylum
seekers who establish a prima facie case (credible fear). While they are
continuing to be detained upon arrival, a policy introduced in January
2010 directs agents to release asylum seekers who have established a cred-
ible fear of returning to their home country, who can verify their identity,
and do not pose a security or flight risk.17
Australia
Australian law has provided for the administrative detention of unau-
thorized noncitizens since federation. Section 8C of the Immigration
Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) authorized the incarceration of any person
ordered by the minister to be removed, “pending deportation and until he
is placed on board a vessel for deportation from Australia.” The Migration
Act 1958 (Cth) created a new class of persons who could be subject to
administrative detention: persons arriving in Australia without authoriza-

tion. Having said this, while detention provisions existed in the law, they
were used sparingly until relatively recently. It was not until Australia
began to experience the arrival of maritime asylum seekers that use of
detention began on a large scale.
Australia’s first serious experience of “boat people” began in April 1976,
when a boat arrived in Darwin Harbour in Australia’s far north carrying
five Vietnamese men. Over the next five years a little over 2,000 Vietnam-
ese nationals made the journey to Australia by boat without authorization,
with the last arriving in 1981. Fugitives from the Vietnam War, these peo-
ple also represented Australia’s first extended experience of asylum seek-
ers.18 Although provisions existed in law that allowed the government to
refuse entry or detain persons arriving by boat without authorization, the
relevant provisions were not invoked at first. As the irregular maritime
arrivals continued, however, the initial goodwill began to fade and both
sides of Australian politics began considering harsher measures. It is at this
point that we see the first discussions of establishing “processing camps”
in Australia. In 1979, the Australian Labor Party, then in opposition,
adopted a policy platform at their national conference that called for the
establishment of camps where “uninvited refugees” would be held until
another resettlement country could accept them.19 This distinction
between uninvited and invited refugees remains prevalent in the political
discourse about refugees in Australia today. Invited refugees are those
whom Australia selects for resettlement as part of its offshore humanitarian
program. Asylum seekers are, by definition, uninvited as they arrive in the
country of asylum without prior authorization. The Refugee Convention
creates international obligations about how states can deal with asylum
seekers, the most important of which is the obligation not to repatriate
asylum seekers to a place where they would face certain types of
persecution.
A similar policy of establishing processing camps was raised in the cabi-
net discussions of the ruling Australian Liberal Party as a possible solution
should the unauthorized arrival of boats continue.20 Put to the cabinet in
January 1979, the proposal was for the construction of a holding center for
persons arriving in Australia without authorization.21 Foreshadowing the
future development of remote processing centers, it stipulated that “an
essential feature of any such centre would be its capacity for secure con-
tainment. This would necessitate the choice of a remote location with
some form of natural protection eg. a remote island or inland centre.”22
Later years would see successive waves of boats carrying first Cambo-
dian nationals, then Sino-Vietnamese and Chinese nationals arriving in
30 Global Migration
Australia in search of asylum. Despite their modest numbers, these arrivals

provoked a strong reaction from the government and community. A Labor
government led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke began detaining all unau-
thorized boat arrivals. Existing “turn around” laws were invoked under
which persons arriving by boat who were suspected of not holding an
entry permit could be detained until returned from whence they came.23
The decision not to release the Cambodians enjoyed bipartisan support,
but ultimately the policy did not sit easily with the Migration Act as it
stood in 1989. The “turn around” provisions were supposed initially to
operate within a 72-hour framework. A legal challenge brought on behalf
of 15 Cambodians who had been held for more than two years prompted
amendments to the legislation in 1992. The changes reinforced and for-
malized the policy of mandatory detention, albeit with a nominal limit of
273 days (or nine months).24
The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (which came into force on Sep-
tember 1, 1994)25 replaced these provisions with a scheme that provided
simply that all “unlawful non-citizens” must be detained until either
granted a visa or removed from Australia.26 As in the United States, tar-
geted mandatory detention provisions that had been introduced as a tem-
porary and “exceptional” measure to deal with a particular cohort of boat
arrivals were expanded to apply to all unauthorized arrivals. The new law
applied to all persons who either arrived without a visa or who were in
Australia on expired or canceled visas. Significantly, the 273-day time
limit, which had applied under the earlier law, was omitted.
Unlike the U.S. system, no provisions were made in the Australian leg-
islation for the release of detainees on parole. Instead, a system of bridging
visas was introduced, which could allow the release of certain “unlawful
non-citizens” pending the determination of their claim for a substantive
visa. Eligibility for a bridging visa was made dependent on a person going
through “immigration clearance.”27 Only persons who had been cleared
through immigration control and admitted into Australia were eligible.
Irregular arrivals, who by definition were not and could not be immigra-
tion cleared, could only be released if they belonged to certain “prescribed
classes” defined at the Minister for Immigration’s discretion. Hence asylum
seekers who arrived irregularly were routinely detained for the entire dura-
tion of their status determination procedures. In 2004, Australia’s High
Court upheld the constitutionality of the detention laws, even where the
laws had the potential to mandate the indefinite incarceration of a nonciti-
zen who could not be removed from Australia.28 While there have been a
number of minor recent reforms (discussed below), the overall architec-
ture of mandatory detention remained in force in 2013.
Under mounting pressure around the wrongful detention and even

removal of lawful residents and Australian citizens, and concerns about
the effect of detention on the mental health of children and adult detain-
ees, the Australian government introduced reforms to its mandatory deten-
tion policy in July 2005. Moves were made to release children from
detention; visas were introduced to provide for the release of persons who
could not be removed from the country; and the Commonwealth Ombuds-
man was given oversight of persons held in detention for more than two
years. These reforms were endorsed and extended by the Labor Party
when it took office in 2007. The Labor government committed itself in
2008 to using detention as a last resort and for the shortest period of time,
avoiding indefinite detention and the detention of children.29 Mandatory
detention—and the detention of children—remained (and still remain) a
reality.30 There were further moves to ease the mandatory detention regime
in 2011, when eligibility criteria for bridging visas were expanded signifi-
cantly. Asylum seekers entering Australia irregularly became eligible for
release, provided they had undergone health, security, and identity
checks.31 Reflecting the practice of parole in the United States, reporting
conditions were imposed on those released. Those found breaching these
conditions ran the risk of having their visas canceled and being returned
to immigration detention.
Alongside its onshore detention facilities, Australia has at times oper-
ated a system of offshore processing, which involves the transfer of asylum
seekers to processing facilities in third countries where they are mandato-
rily detained. The policy of offshore processing was first introduced in
Australia in 2001 as part of what was then dubbed the Pacific Solution.
Offshore processing facilities were established in Nauru and on Manus
Island in Papua New Guinea, with asylum seekers mandatorily detained
while having their claims for refugee status assessed, as well as after being
recognized as refugees while they waited for resettlement in a third coun-
try.32 In many instances, the conditions of detention faced by detainees at
these offshore facilities were worse than those faced by their onshore coun-
terparts. Offshore detainees faced harsher physical conditions, reduced
access to essential services, and particularly long and uncertain periods in
detention.
Delivering on an election promise, the Labor party abandoned offshore
processing in 2007, only to reintroduce it again in 2012 in response to a
rise in the number of unauthorized maritime arrivals. Since that time
asylum seekers who arrive in Australia irregularly by boat have again
become liable to be transferred to processing facilities in Nauru and on
Manus Island. Transferees face the prospect of an even longer period of
32 Global Migration
mandatory detention than the first incarnation of the Pacific Solution.

This is the result of the implementation of a “no advantage” test for both
onshore and offshore detainees. Under this principle, processing times
for persons who arrive in Australia irregularly by boat are extended to be
in line with persons waiting for resettlement to Australia through the
country’s offshore resettlement program. This was done with the aim of
shifting the “balance incentive” in favor of using regular pathways of
resettlement.33 Changes to the bridging visa system in 2011, as well as a
greater utilization of community detention, mean that asylum seekers
processed in Australia are now generally released into the community
after initial prescreening checks. Persons transferred to offshore facilities,
however, are detained for the entire processing period, which reports
indicate may be as long as five years.34
Canada
As in Australia and the United States, mandatory immigration detention
laws were introduced in Canada in response to the arrival of a particular
cohort of boats carrying irregular migrants. In Canada, the arrival of just
two asylum seeker vessels served as the trigger for legislative change. The
first boat, the Ocean Lady, arrived on Canada’s shores in October 2009 car-
rying 76 Tamil men. This was followed by the MV Sun Sea, which was
intercepted off the west coast of Canada on August 13, 2010, with 490
Tamil men, women, and children on board. Plans for a mandatory deten-
tion regime were announced shortly after the Sun Sea’s arrival. After a two-
year legislative process, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration Act (or Bill
C-31) was enacted in June 2012. This act gives the Canadian Minister of
Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism the authority to label
groups of noncitizens “designated foreign nationals.” The designation pro-
cess is triggered where noncitizens enter Canada in violation of immigra-
tion law, with the assistance of a smuggler motivated by profit, or where
the minister believes the noncitizens as a group cannot be examined and
dealt with “in a timely manner.” While the provisions are drafted in gen-
eral terms to apply to groups of smuggled persons, it is clear that the target
of the provisions is irregular maritime arrivals.
One ramification of being a “designated foreign national” is detention for
a period of up to one year for the purpose of determining identity, inadmis-
sibility, and illegal activity.35 The original legislative proposal provided that
detainees would not have their detention reviewed inside a minimum of 12
months and thereafter every six months. In a concession to refugee advo-
cates and opposition parties, an amendment was introduced that provides
for the review of mandatory detention within 14 days and thereafter every
six months. Even with this concession, the changes represent a major
departure from the earlier detention provisions (which continue to apply to
those not designated by the minister). These provisions restrict the deten-
tion of nondesignated asylum seekers to a number of clearly defined, excep-
tional circumstances. These include where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the person in question (1) is unlikely to appear at his or her
next hearing or interview; (2) is considered a danger to public safety; (3) is
inadmissible on the ground of security or for violating human or interna-
tional rights; or (4) cannot provide adequate identification to satisfy the
officer of the person’s identity.36 A decision to detain under this power must
be reviewed within 48 hours, again after 7 days and then every 30 days after
that.
New Zealand
New Zealand is the latest country to introduce a mandatory detention
regime for irregular migrants. The Immigration Amendment Act 2013
introduced provisions for the detention of irregular migrants who reach
New Zealand as part of a mass arrival group. Mass arrival group is defined
as 30 or more people, and such arrivals can be subject to detention for an
initial period of up to six months. When compared to the Australian and
Canadian laws, however, New Zealand’s mandatory detention regime
includes a number of important additional safeguards. Most notably, the
group warrant for detention can only be issued by a District Court judge,
who must be satisfied that detention is necessary based on certain stipu-
lated grounds. This is in contrast to Australia and the United States, where
detention is automatic for all unauthorized persons, and Canada, where
the decision to designate a group as subject to mandatory detention is
made by the Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism.
The Myths
In this section we examine and dismiss the three justifications most
commonly used by governments to justify the introduction of mandatory
detention policies. The first myth posits that mandatory detention is essen-
tial to maintain public health and national security. The second is that
mandatory detention is required to prevent asylum seekers absconding
while their claims are being processed. The final myth that we explore is
the claim that mandatory detention works as a deterrent that can effec-
tively reduce future asylum seeker flows.
34 Global Migration
Health and Public Safety Myth

A common justification of mandatory detention measures is that incar-
ceration is necessary to ensure public health and safety. The argument is
that persons who have not had their identities verified and who have not
undergone health and security checks can pose a risk to public safety. In
our view, this is the most plausible of the justifications given for detention
and is based, at least in part, on legitimate concerns. Asylum seekers who
travel by irregular means arrive on a nation’s shores with no prescreening
whatsoever. In some instances such persons may indeed pose health and/
or security risks if released into the community without sufficient scrutiny.
Taken at its strongest, this argument justifies mandatory detention for the
period of time it takes to carry out initial checks. However, the necessity of
mandatory detention for all arrivals during this preliminary stage is ques-
tionable. Is it really necessary to detain children and other vulnerable per-
sons where they pose no threat to public safety? What about individuals
who can readily verify their identities? Surely a more humane and sensible
policy is to detain persons only where there is some reason to suspect that
they could pose some sort of danger. This is the approach taken through-
out most European countries. It was the approach taken in Canada before
the recent introduction of mandatory detention provisions. It is still the
policy that operates in relation to arrivals not defined as “designated for-
eign nationals.” These Canadian rules provide that persons may be detained
in situations where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they pose
a danger to public safety, are inadmissible on security grounds, or cannot
prove their identity. Such a system provides for the detention of persons
who pose possible security and health risks, but avoids the unnecessary
detention of those who do not.
Compliance Myth
Another common justification for mandatory detention is that incarcera-
tion is necessary to ensure that individuals turn up for their immigration
hearings. The logic is that if irregular entrants are released into the com-
munity, some (particularly those with weak claims for a substantive visa)
will simply abandon the immigration process and live irregularly in the
community. The problem with this argument is that it creates a false dichot-
omy between full-fledged detention and unsupervised release. In reality,
governments have a range of alternatives at their disposal that allow for the
monitored release of individuals into the community. Many of these mea-
sures have a successful track record of ensuring high levels of compliance.
In their more intrusive forms, these programs rely on electronic tagging and
other forms of electronic reporting. In the 2011/2012 fiscal year an alterna-
tive to detention program in the United States relying on such technology,
among other measures, yielded a 93.8 percent appearance rate at immigra-
tion hearings. However, it is important to bear in mind the human rights
implications of such intrusive measures. These concerns are highlighted by
the UNHCR in their 2012 Revised Detention Guidelines, which emphasize
that such measures should only be used in circumstances where persons
would otherwise be detained. These intrusive monitoring measures should
not be used as an alternative to release. Less intrusive measures such as
community supervision have also proven to be successful. Community
supervision combines supervision (such as regular reporting) with the
delivery of case management and social services. These programs have con-
sistently provided very high compliance rates. A pilot program run by the
Vera Institute in the United States between 1997 and 2000 resulted in a 91
percent appearance rate for noncitizens generally at all required hearings
and a 93 percent appearance rate for asylum seekers.37
Although it operated a system of mandatory detention without any
option for parole for many years, Australia has recently introduced reforms
allowing for the release of asylum seekers into the community during the
processing of their claims. This is achieved through two mechanisms. The
first is community detention, under which individuals remain in immigra-
tion detention as a matter of law, but are released into the community
under certain conditions. These conditions may include, among others,
curfews, the requirement to sleep at a specified residence every night,
travel restrictions, and reporting requirements. The second mechanism is
release on bridging visas while a person’s claims are being assessed. Gener-
ally, persons released on such visas are not subject to any restrictions on
their liberty, although reporting conditions may be imposed. Despite large
increase in the use of these measures in recent years, there have been no
reported problems relating to the failure of persons to turn up at their
immigration proceedings. It is important to note, however, that these
alternatives to detention programs are not available to persons detained in
Nauru and on Manus Island under Australia’s offshore processing regime.
Deterrence Myth
Mandatory detention has also been justified on the grounds that it
deters future irregular migrants from making the journey to a nation’s
shores. The logic is that making life difficult for irregular arrivals will send
a message to other potential irregular migrants not to undertake the
36 Global Migration
journey. The facts provide no evidence that even the most punitive forms
of detention have ever acted as deterrents.38 The flow data of irregular
migrants in countries that have adopted mandatory detention policies
does not bear out any sort of correlation, let alone a causative link, between
detention policy and a reduction in irregular arrivals (boat people or oth-
erwise). In the context of Australia, the former Department of Immigration
and Citizenship secretary Andrew Metcalf is on the record stating support
for such a view: “Is immigration detention a deterrent? It has been in place
since 1992 and did not stop almost equal waves of boat arrivals in 1999–
2001 and 2009–2011.”39 Similarly, in the case of the United States, there
have been large fluctuations in the number of both land and sea arrivals in
the period between 1981 and the present, despite there being mandatory
detention provisions of one sort or another in force targeting such arrivals
throughout that period.
The Damaging Realities

In this section we discuss the damaging realities of mandatory deten-
tion. First we look at its detrimental effect on the health and well-being of
detainees and on society more generally. Second, we consider arguments
that it violates international human rights law. Third, we consider the
astronomical fiscal costs associated with the practice. Fourth, we examine
the question of why, despite these shocking realities, governments persist
with the policy. We argue that the mandatory detention of asylum seekers
and others who arrive irregularly is more about scoring cheap political
points with the voting public than achieving legitimate policy goals.
Detention Is Inherently Harmful

Detention causes significant damage to the health and well-being of
detainees, with numerous studies demonstrating the adverse impact of
mandatory detention on physical and mental health.40 Research shows
that detention is particularly harmful to survivors of torture or other trau-
matic events, compounding existing underlying mental health issues. This
is particularly the case with children. Take, for example, the case of Shayan
Badraie, the six-year-old Iranian asylum seeker detained in Australian
detention centers for a year and a half starting in March 2000. After wit-
nessing the attempted suicide of another detainee, Shayan became mute,
suffered night terrors, and stopped eating and drinking. Shayan’s situation
received widespread media attention after a video showing him slumped
limp and lifeless in his father’s arms was smuggled out of the detention
center and shown on national television. The child continued to be

detained despite expert psychological advice and widespread public out-
cry. As will be explored further below, such cases not only result in damage
to vulnerable detainees, but cost the government large sums of money
in compensation payouts. In 2006, the NSW Supreme Court ordered
that AUD $400,000 (USD $370,000) in compensation be paid to the fam-
ily of Shayan Badraie for the psychological harm he suffered while in
detention.
The practice of mandatory detention also significantly impedes the inte-
gration of asylum seekers into the community. While some detainees may
be removed or depart voluntarily, many will eventually have their claims
approved and be released into the community. The experience of deten-
tion can act as a serious barrier to a person integrating into the host society.
The trauma inflicted on persons by the state through the detention process
could significantly decrease their willingness to accept the values and life-
style of the host nation. In turn, they may be more likely to focus on their
own cultural identity and shun integration. This is exacerbated by the
impact that the policy of mandatory detention has on broader community
attitudes. Locking up asylum seekers promotes the idea that these people
pose a threat to society and are unworthy of sympathy. Such views can
trigger a vicious cycle of distrust and animosity between minority ethnic
groups and members of the cultural majority of the host nation.
Mandatory detention of irregular arrivals normalizes arbitrary detention
and the violation of due process rights. In both the United States and Aus-
tralia, when first introduced, the policy of mandatory detention applied
only to specific cohorts of boat arrivals. In both countries, the policy was
normalized and expanded to apply to a much broader category of irregular
arrivals. In 1996, the United States went even further, introducing a policy
of mandatory detention for certain classes of long-term U.S. permanent
residents charged with committing certain crimes. Suddenly it was not
only new arrivals who could be detained arbitrarily, but also long-term
permanent residents who had spent most of their lives in the United States.
The lesson is that tolerance of violations of the fundamental rights of any
cohort of persons is dangerous. Acceptance normalizes such violations
and increases the chance that such measures will be expanded to apply to
other members of society.
Mandatory Detention Is Contrary to International Human Rights Law

The sovereign right of states to regulate migration is recognized under
international law. International human rights instruments, however, place
38 Global Migration
clear limits on the circumstances in which an irregular migrant can be

detained. Arbitrary detention of immigrants is prohibited by the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as by provi-
sions of the Refugee Convention, a point that has been emphasized by the
UN High Commission for Refugees’ Executive Committee and the UN
Human Rights Committee. Detention is considered arbitrary when “it is
not necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example to prevent
flight or interference with evidence.”41 Detention, therefore, in each given
instance, must be measured against the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality. UNHCR describes these requirements in the following manner:
The general principle requires that a balance be struck between the impor-
tance of respecting the rights to liberty and security and freedom of move-
ment, and the public policy objectives of limiting or denying such rights.
The authorities must not take any action exceeding that which is strictly
necessary to achieve the pursued purpose in the individual case. The neces-
sity and proportionality tests further require an assessment of whether there
were less restrictive or coercive measures (that is, alternatives to detention)
that could have been applied to the individual concerned and which would
be effective in the individual case.42
The common justifications put forward for mandatory detention have

already been discussed. In this section, we briefly revisit each to demon-
strate that none of the justifications meet the proportionality threshold
outlined above. We argue that mandatory detention is inherently arbitrary
and hence in violation of international human rights law. By definition,
mandatory detention will always violate the principle of proportionality
because people are detained without individualized assessments as to the
necessity of detention in a given instance.
We saw that the first justification is that mandatory detention is neces-
sary for public safety and security. As noted earlier, even at its strongest,
this argument only supports the use of mandatory detention for the period
of time it takes to establish a person’s identity and to run health and secu-
rity checks. However, even during this initial screening period, it is diffi-
cult to see how detention would be necessary and proportional for all
persons. For example, the detention of minors and other vulnerable indi-
viduals will rarely be justifiable as a necessary and proportionate measure
required to maintain public safety. The second justification relates to the
need for mandatory detention to ensure that individuals do not abscond
while their claims are being processed. As discussed above, alternatives to
detention such as supervised community supervision have a proven track
record of ensuring high appearance rates. As such, detention is not a
necessary and proportionate measure to ensure compliance as there are

less intrusive options for achieving this goal. The third justification is
deterrence. UNHCR and other UN treaty bodies have made it clear the use
of detention for this purpose will always be arbitrary. The UNHCR reminds
state officials that “detention of asylum-seekers which is applied . . . as part
of a policy to deter future asylum seekers, or to dissuade those who have
commenced their claims from pursuing them, is contrary to the norms of
refugee law. It should not be used as a punitive or disciplinary measure for
illegal entry or presence in the country.”43
Accordingly there are no circumstances in which a blanket rule of man-
datory detention will meet the necessary and proportionate test, making
such detention arbitrary and in violation of international law.44
Mandatory Detention Is Very Expensive

In financial terms, the policy of mandatory detention has cost the
United States and Australia a literal fortune. For the 2012/2013 fiscal year,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was allocated USD $1.959 bil-
lion for its detention operations. Based on a maximum detention capacity
of 32,800 persons, the cost of detaining each individual comes to approxi-
mately USD $164 each day. In relative terms, the Australian government
spends many times more on its detention network. In 2011/2012, Austra-
lia spent AUD $1.235 billion (USD $1.14 billion) on immigration deten-
tion. With an average detention population of 7,000 persons during this
period, the cost of detaining each individual came to approximately AUD
$483 (USD $446) a day. In 2012/2013 the cost rose to AUD $2.124 billion
(USD $1.96 billion) and estimates over five years for Australia’s current
policies of detention and offshore processing have been placed as high as
AUD $9 billion (USD $8.3 billion). The exorbitant nature of these costs is
highlighted when one considers that the entire budget allocated to the
UNHCR to deal with more than 42 million people of concern in 2012/2013
was only USD $5.3 billion.
Given the reliance on private facilities, the bulk of this money is flowing
to large international private prison corporations that reap huge profits
from running immigration detention facilities. To these figures, we must
also add the millions of dollars paid out in compensation cases, such as the
payout given to the family of Shayan Badraie discussed above. The cost for
persons subject to alternatives to detention or community supervision is
substantially lower than detention. In the United States, it costs between
USD $0.17 and $17.78 to place a participant in one of the existing alterna-
tive to detention programs. On the basis of these figures, if the United
40 Global Migration
States were to release all noncriminal detainees (80 percent of its detention
population) on such programs, it would stand to save USD $1.7 billion a
year. In Australia, the average cost of placing a person into community
processing arrangements is just AUD $30 (USD $28) a day. This represents
a saving of more than 90 percent when compared to regular detention.
Mandatory Detention Is Motivated by Political Point Scoring,

Rather than Legitimate Public Policy Goals
Given the high human and fiscal costs of mandatory detention, its inef-
fectiveness as a deterrent, and the existence of less intrusive (and cheaper)
alternatives that can meet the policy’s legitimate goals, why do govern-
ments still resort to the policy? The sad reality is that mandatory detention
policies are an easy way for governments to gain political mileage. Irregu-
lar migrants and in particular, maritime arrivals invariably receive very
high levels of media exposure and a strong negative response from much
of the public. In turn, harsh measures targeting such arrivals are generally
popular with the electorate. In a classic example of politics of fear, politi-
cians play on the basest of human emotions: the fear of the outsider. When
politicians announce a restrictive immigration policy such as mandatory
detention, they are sending two distinct signals to the electorate. The first
is that irregular migrants pose a danger and are to be feared. The second is
that their party is the best placed to protect voters from the danger. In one
move, the policy announcement both manufactures a sense of crisis and
purports to solve it.
The motive of manufacturing a crisis for electoral gain is clearly evident
in the case of New Zealand. At least in the United States, Australia, and
Canada, mandatory detention provisions were introduced in response to
the actual arrival of maritime asylum seekers. New Zealand has never had
an asylum seeker boat reach its shores. Instead, the need for the proposed
measures is based on a dubious claim that there is an “ongoing threat” of a
mass arrival of asylum seekers by boat. New Zealand (and other nations
contemplating taking a similar path) would be wise to take note of the
serious damage that can be caused by the politicization of immigration
policy and associated fearmongering. In Australia, the demonization of
boat people has caused irreparable damage to the general health of its
multicultural society. As we have written elsewhere:
There is no more than a passing coincidence that the years of extraordinarily

harsh border control policies under the Howard government culminated in,
first, an unprecedented number of wrongful arrests, detention and removals
of citizens and lawful permanent residents and, second, in inter-racial riot-

ing that made headlines all over the world. Over 240 non-citizens and citi-
zens were subjected to unlawful arrest and detention between 1997 and
2004. The two cases that grabbed the attention of the nation were those of
permanent resident Cornelia Rau, detained in spite of her mental illness at
Woomera Detention Centre; and Vivian Solon-Alvarez, an Australian citizen
who was both mentally ill and physically handicapped when removed from
Australia and left destitute at a Philippines airport. It is not possible to vilify
one section of the migrant community and then expect the broader society
not to extend the disapprobation to other minority groups.45
Conclusion
The mandatory detention of asylum seekers who arrive by irregular
means has been justified on the bases of three myths. The first posits
that mandatory detention is essential to maintain public health and
national security. We argue that while such concerns may reflect a legiti-
mate government interest in certain circumstances, the health and security
argument does not justify mandatory detention without individualized
assessments as to the necessity of detention in a given instance. The sec-
ond myth is that mandatory detention is required to prevent asylum seek-
ers absconding while their claims are being processed. Again, we argue
that this reason may reflect a legitimate government interest in certain
circumstances, but it does not support a blanket rule of mandatory deten-
tion. The success of alternative to detention programs suggest that the aim
of ensuring compliance can in most instances be achieved by far less intru-
sive measures. Detention will only be justified on this ground if the system
allows for individualized assessments that operate to identify persons who
pose a high risk of absconding and who cannot be managed with a less
intrusive measure. The third myth is that mandatory detention works as a
deterrent, which can effectively reduce future asylum seeker flows. Not
only is there no empirical data to support such a claim, but detention
based on such a justification will always be arbitrary because it can never
be justified as necessary and proportionate to securing a legitimate govern-
ment interest.
The reality is that the policy of mandatory detention comes at a very
high human and fiscal cost. Prolonged mandatory detention has a devas-
tating impact on the health and well-being of detainees. It is also damaging
to society more generally, entrenching social division and tearing the social
fabric of multicultural societies. In terms of fiscal costs, the policy costs
governments a literal fortune, both in terms of the costs associated with
42 Global Migration
operating detention facilities, and money paid out in damages to compen-

sate detainees for the harm experienced during detention. The policy is
also at odds with international human rights law, as mandatory detention
without individualized assessments as to the necessity of detention in a
given circumstance will by definition be arbitrary.
In the absence of any compelling policy justifications, governments
around the world continue to support policies of mandatory detention for
irregular migrants. While the measures are at times popular within the elec-
torate, this does not make their introduction the right course of action. In
fact, we would argue that mandatory immigration detention is an excellent
example of policies that actually operate against the best interests of the vot-
ers that support them. Given the harms caused by detention—to both those
taken into custody and to the societies supporting the measure—we would
go so far as to label the policies shameful. When used against refugees and
asylum seekers, mandatory immigration detention laws operate to vilify
one of the most vulnerable groups in society for the sake of political advan-
tage. The mandatory deprivation of liberty of individuals who pose no
threat and who have committed no crime should have no place in demo-
cratic societies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the
right of every person to seek asylum from persecution. So too should we
recall that the freedoms underpinning modern notions of democracy start
typically with the injunction that individuals should not be deprived of
their personal liberty without just cause. When we detain asylum seekers
without reason, we ultimately undermine our own freedoms and moral
authority.
Notes
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted July 28, 1951),
entered into force April 22, 1954), 189 UNTS 137. Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees (adopted January 31, 1967, entered into force December 13, 1973),
606 UNTS 267.
2. Daniel Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, Politics (Cambridge:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 15.
3. Arthur Helton, “The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States,”
New York Review of Law and Social Change 14 (1986): 355.
4. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), 190.
5. For an overview of this episode in Cuban-U.S. history, see for example,
Benedict L. Stabile and Robert Scheina, “U.S. Coast Guard Operations During the
1980 Cuban Exodus” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012), accessed March 30, 2013, http://
www.uscg.mil/history/articles/USCG_Mariel_History_1980.asp.
6. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (SD Fla. 1982), 1003 holding that the
INS had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 500 et seq. (1982) by
instituting a new rule without first publishing notice of the proposed change in
the Federal Register and giving opportunity for interested parties to comment.
7. 8 CFR § 235.3(b) (1982).
8. 8 CFR § 235.3(b) (1982).
9. 8 CFR § 212.5(a)(1) (1982).
10. 8 CFR § 212.5(a)(2) (1982).
11. Helton, above n. 3, 359.
12. INA §235(b)(1)(A)(i).
13. CFR § 235.3(b)(4).
14. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v) defines “credible fear of persecution” as a significant
possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien
in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that
the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.
15. INA § 235(b)(1).
16. INA §235(b)(1)(B)(ii).
17. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Parole of Arriving Aliens
Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture” (Directive No. 11002.1,
December 8, 2009).
18. Note that Australia had experiences of irregular migration prior to this
date, the most notable of which was the arrival of a large number of West Papuan
asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea between 1963 and 1973 when the latter was
an Australian territory: see David Palmer, “Between a Rock and Hard Place: The
Case of Papuan Asylum-Seekers,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 52
(2006): 576.
19. Laurie Oakes, Labor’s 1979 Conference, Adelaide (Canberra: Objective Pub
lications, 1979), 40–41, 154.
20. Australian Cabinet Paper, “Submission No. 2906: Review of the Indo-
Chinese Refugee Situation—Decision No. 7501,” January 23, 1979, available
through the National Archives of Australia (Series: A12909) (Control: 2906), 25.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. See s 88 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), inserted by Migration Legislation
Amendment Act 1989. Note that these provisions existed as s. 36 prior to this
amendment.
24. Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth). Note that exceptions to the 273-
day limit on detention meant that in practice many detainees were held for much
longer periods. For example, s. 54Q provided the exclusion from calculation of
days when stipulated events are taking place, such as the hearing of court or tri-
bunal actions, or the time taken by a person to furnish information. For a detailed
account of this period in Australian immigration history, see Mary Crock, ed.,
Protection or Punishment? The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia (Sydney: The
Federation Press, 1993).
44 Global Migration
25. See Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 54Q inserted by Migration Amendment
Act 1992 (Cth).
26. See Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), s. 54W, s. 54ZD.
27. Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), Part 2, Div. 4.
28. See Al Kateb v. Godwin (2004), 219 CLR 562.
29. See Hon. Chris Evans, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, “New
Directions in Detention: Restoring Integrity to Australia’s Immigration System,”
Speech given at Parliament House, July 29, 2008.
30. As of May 31, 2013, there were 1,731 children in closed immigration
detention facilities and an additional 1,326 children in community detention in
Australia: see “Children in Immigration Detention,” Australian Human Rights
Commission, accessed September 24, 2013, https://www.humanrights.gov.au
/children-immigration-detention#How%20many%20children.
31. See Hon. Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, “Bridg-
ing Visas to be Issues for Boat Arrivals” (November 25, 2011), accessed March 25,
2013, http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb180599.htm.
32. Note that between 2005 and 2008, the remaining detainees held at the
facility on Nauru were allowed freedom of movement on the island between cer-
tain hours.
33. Angus Houston, Paris Aristotle, and Michael L’Estrange, Report of the Expert
Panel on Asylum Seekers (August 2012), 11, 37, and 47, accessed September 30,
2013, http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report
/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf.
34. Paul Maley, “Tony Abbot Sets Nauru Stay at Five Years,” The Australian,
October 19, 2012, accessed September 30, 2013, http://www.theaustralian
.com.au/national-affairs/policy/tony-abbott-sets-nauru-stay-at-five-years/story
-fn9hm1gu-1226498935706#.
35. The second major ramification is disqualification from eligibility for per-
manent visa if found to be a genuine refugee. This measure is itself modeled on
Australian Temporary Protection Visa regime, which operated from 1999 to 2007.
36. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27, s. 55.
37. Eileen Sullivan et al., “Testing Community Supervision for the INS: An
Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program, Volume I” (August 2000).
38. Alice Edwards, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and
Alternatives to Detention of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other
Migrations, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2011/01.
Rev.1, April 2011, 1.
39. The Age, “Politics of Detention Defy All Reason” (August 18, 2011), accessed
March 30, 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/editorial/politics-of-detention
-defy-all-reason-20110817-1iy5a.html.
40. Janette Green and Kathy Eagar, “The Health of People in Australian
Immigration Detention Centres,” Medical Journal of Australia 192 (2010): 65–70;
Derrick Silove, Zachary Steel, and Charles Watters, “Policies of Deterrence and the
Mental Health of Asylum Seekers,” Journal of the American Medical Association 284
(2000): 604–11; and Zachary Steel and Derrick Silove, “The Mental Health Imp
lications of Detaining Asylum Seekers,” Medical Journal of Australia 175 (2001):
596–9.
41. A. v. Australia, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 560/1993,
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, para. 9.2 (April 30, 1997).
42. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2012), Detention Guide-
lines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 21.
43. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (1999), UNHCR’s Guidelines
on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers.
44. See, for example, A. v. Australia, Human Rights Committee, Communica-
tion No. 560/1993, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (April 30, 1997).
45. Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, “Do Loose Lips Bring Ships?: The Role
of Policy, Politics and Human Rights in Managing Unauthorised Boat Arrivals,”
Griffith Law Review 19 (2010): 276.
CHAPTER THREE
The Quest for Turkish Migration

to the European Union
Exploring the Misconceptions
Gözde Kaya
Introduction
The implementation of guest worker policies has been a highly debated
and controversial subject. These policies are expected to show “win-win-
win” results, coming to the benefit of the migrant workers, the migrant-
sending countries, and the migrant-receiving countries. While migrant
workers can earn higher wages abroad, migrant-receiving countries win by
increasing their economic production via additional employment in their
labor markets. Migrant-sending countries benefit through remittances and
the acquired professional training and skills brought back by migrant
workers.1 Hence, short term migration is regarded as beneficial in eco-
nomic terms both for sending and receiving countries.2 It helps to fulfill
the labor gap in receiving countries while it contributes to reducing the
unemployment rate in sending countries, since it is mostly assumed that
the unemployed workers migrate.3
This chapter seeks to dismantle a number of myths regarding guest
worker policies by exploring the example of Turkish migration to the
European Union (EU). The European Union and Turkey have long had a
48 Global Migration
special relationship, which started with the signing of the Ankara Associa-
tion Agreement in 1963.4 The Association Agreement not only included
the gradual foundation of a Customs Union between the parties but also
envisaged the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the European Union in
the long run. Turkey applied for full EU membership in 1987 and has had
official candidacy status since 1999. The European Union opened the
accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Since then, the accession
negotiations have been progressing slowly due to the political deadlock in
Turkey-EU relations.
Even though the European Union has a long history of successive
enlargements, Turkey’s accession to the European Union is likely to differ
from past enlargements due to the country’s population, size, geographical
location, economy, security, and military potential as well as its cultural
and religious characteristics.5 There have been long and controversial
debates in the EU with regard to Turkish accession. Most of these debates
are closely linked to fears over potential mass migration from Turkey to the
EU member states. The main reason behind this negative approach is the
experience of EU countries with Turkish migrations as a consequence of
the guest workers policies of the 1960s.
By dismantling a number of myths surrounding Turkish migration to
the European Union, this chapter will illustrate that most of these fears are
unfounded. The first myth to be covered in this chapter addresses the
implementation of the guest worker agreements that were deemed to be
beneficial for both sending and receiving countries. In reality those agree-
ments turned out to be perceived as a failure, satisfying neither the Turkish
nor the European side. The negative experience of the guest worker pro-
grams is likely to have negative influences on Turkey’s current accession
process to the European Union. It is feared that the large-scale migration
of low-skilled Turkish workers and the integration problems of the past
will be repeated as soon as Turkish nationals are granted the right to free
movement.
Second, this chapter addresses the myth that opening the borders
and allowing for permanent migration will lead to massive migratory
movements from economically disadvantaged countries. The validity of
such perceptions is questioned on the basis of socioeconomic and demo-
graphic indicators and in the light of a review of surveys predicting the size
of migratory flows from Turkey to the European Union in the coming
years.
The third myth to be discussed is more specific to the EU-Turkey rela-
tionship. It is often assumed that the migration possibilities of Turkish citi-
zens to the European Union are limited and that the borders are essentially
The Quest for Turkish Migration to the European Union 49
closed. This perception fails to take sufficient account of the free move-
ment rights already enjoyed by Turkish nationals under the Association
Agreement and the Additional Protocol as interpreted by the European
Court of Justice. The rulings of the Court are of considerable significance
and should be implemented effectively at the member state level. How-
ever, only a few member states, whose national courts are actively advocat-
ing this process, have been putting into effect new measures with a view to
facilitating Turkish citizens’ entry to their countries.
Hence this chapter seeks to question the validity of skeptical concerns
and myths surrounding Turkish migration to the European Union that are
largely linked to the failure of past guest worker policies. The chapter
starts by giving a historical background of the guest worker agreements
concluded between Turkey and the European countries in order to under-
stand the roots of current misconceptions. The scope of the agreements
and the migratory movement from Turkey to the European countries
are analyzed in this context. Second, the chapter focuses on the impact
of the failure of the guest worker policies on the daily lives of Turkish
nationals from a legal perspective. In other words, the question of how
far the Turkey-EU relationship is currently negatively affected by the
prejudices deriving from past migratory movements is examined. The
last part of the chapter analyzes in detail the validity of the EU concerns
regarding a potential mass migratory flow from Turkey to the European
Union.
The Guest Worker Policies of Western European Countries

The large-scale emigration of Turkish citizens to Western Europe started
with the conclusion of labor recruitment agreements between Turkey and
a number of Western European countries after the Second World War. The
labor scarcity in most European countries during the process of postwar
reconstruction paved the way to the conclusion of such agreements, and
their signature was perceived to be beneficial for both Turkey and the
migrant receiving countries. Turkey’s first Five-Year Development Plan
(1962–1967) encompassed the need for the “export of surplus labor
power” as a tool of development, which was expected to lead to the inflow
of remittances and the reduction of unemployment rates in Turkey.6 For
Turkish workers it was considered beneficial to work abroad since the
wages were significantly higher than what was offered in their home
country.7
In that context, the Turkish government signed labor recruitment agree-
ments with a number of Western European countries including Germany,
50 Global Migration
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Sweden, United Kingdom,

Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway between 1964 and 1981.8 The West-
ern European countries planned to receive a temporary labor supply and
did not intend to integrate the migrant workers into their societies, since
the workers were expected to return to their home countries after a period
of employment. Castles explains this perception by pointing out that most
European countries were intending to import labor instead of people.9
Therefore, the labor agreements concluded during this period were based
on the principle of rotation. According to this principle, Turkish workers
would go abroad for one year and then return to their home countries.
However, this principle was not implemented properly. Employers in the
receiving countries were unwilling to send the trained workers back to
their home countries after they had acquired the necessary skills and to
restart the same process in every rotation cycle to train the newcomers.
Moreover, Turkish workers were keen to prolong the duration of their
work and stay in the host countries since this provided them with the
opportunity to make more financial savings.10 Hence, temporary contracts
turned out to be renewable for extra periods or in some cases were trans-
formed into permanent ones.11 In the beginning of the 1970s the Euro-
pean governments changed their policies, started to perceive migrant
workers as permanent rather than temporary, and provided them with
social security rights.12
The Turkish migrant workers coming to Western Europe were mostly
uneducated, unskilled, and unexperienced, migrating essentially for eco-
nomic purposes. According to Unat, the composition of Turkish migration
flows to the EU can be explained on the basis of high population growth,
an unexpected sudden movement of low-skilled workers from the villages
to the cities, and the difficulty of supplying new posts for the newly estab-
lished industrial sectors in Turkey.13 Turkish workers were mainly employed
in the iron and steel industry, the manufacturing industry, the building
and construction industry, and mining. Many Turkish workers chose to
work in the automobile industry (on assembly lines), the iron and metal-
lurgical industry, as well as in the textile, carpentering, ready-made
clothing, and food industries. As pointed out by Unat, Turkish workers
were not much interested in the service sector mainly due to their low
qualifications.14
In 1974, the governments of most European countries stopped recruit-
ing foreign workers and in 1975 the large-scale emigration of Turkish
workers to Europe finally ended.15 In that context, many European coun-
tries started to support return of the early migrants to Turkey. Hence in the
early 1980s, the governments of most European countries enacted Return
Acts and bonuses to encourage return migration to the home country. The
number of returnees to Turkey increased due to such governmental poli-
cies, which led to the return of 310,000 early migrants from Germany
between 1983 and 1985 and around 10,000 migrants from the Nether-
lands between 1985 and 1986. Yet, the size of the return migration started
to fall during the late 1980s.16
In fact, the policy of encouraging return migration was countereffective.
Many Turkish migrants thought that they would not have a second
chance to reenter their host country of residence after returning to Turkey
and therefore shifted their plans toward permanent settlement.17 The neg-
ative effects of the oil crisis on European countries’ economies worsened
with the increase of the unemployment rates in that period. It is not sur-
prising that the rise of the unemployment rates first showed an impact
on the guest workers, whose unemployment rates were double the rates
of native citizens.18 After the economic recovery, most guest workers
could not find the jobs they were initially recruited for since the need
and the available positions for those jobs in the recruitment market no
longer existed.19
However, the cutback on the movement of Turkish workers to the
European labor market in 1975 did not mean that the emigration of
Turkish citizens ended. In fact, the size of Turkish populations living
in Europe continued to increase. The two main factors for this increase
were family reunification and the so-called marriage migration, that is,
marriage with Turkish citizens who had already settled in Europe. What’s
more, new Turkish citizens born from those families contributed to the
increase of the size of the migrant population.20 One has to note that there
also existed a large number of irregular Turkish migrants and an increasing
inflow of asylum seekers during that period. In short, though the amount
of Turkish workers moving to Europe increased relatively little between
the period of 1985 and 2000, the size of Turkish populations living in
Europe grew significantly. Icduygu argues that since 2000, there has been
a new stagnation era with regard to Turkish emigration to Europe. Thus,
the number of Turkish citizens migrating to Europe declined significantly.21
Still, Turkish nationals along with Romanians form one of the largest
groups of non-EU nationals residing in the European Union with almost
2.3 million in a European Union with a population of 505.665 million by
2013. Germany, hosting the 75 percent of Turkish nationals in the Euro-
pean Union, has the largest number of foreigners with 7.4 million in the
European Union by 2012.22
While not responding to the expectations of the migrant-receiving
countries, the guest worker policy also did not turn out to be a success
52 Global Migration
from a Turkish perspective. The main result of the guest worker policy
for Turkey was the inflow of remittances from migrant workers, which
contributed to the country’s economy. This migrants’ contribution to the
Turkish economy also came in the form of different types of investments
such as the setting up of business, trade, or the buying of properties or
equipment.23 However, the intention of most Turkish migrants was to
establish small businesses or become taxi/truck drivers after they had
returned to Turkey, while few of them chose to continue with their former
type of employment or work as qualified workers.24 Hence, according to
Unat, the consequences of the guest worker policy for Turkey were unlikely
to show their effects through the returned migrants’ professional training
and experiences to be transferred to the industrial sector in Turkey as
expected. The returning migrants were mostly the oldest, the least quali-
fied, the least healthy, or the people with individual or family-related prob-
lems. In general, return to the home country was perceived as a sign of
failure.25
Hence, Turkish workers’ migration to Western Europe did not material-
ize as expected by the sending and the receiving countries. After the
long migration process, the EU countries were left with a nonintegrated
immigrant population instead of temporary guest workers. Unlike in
the United States, where Turkish migrants are considered to be well
integrated, the migrants in most European countries were unlikely to
become integrated into the host society mainly due to the lack of a far-
sighted national immigration policy.26 On the Turkish side, the economy
was not boosted by the remittances brought by Turkish workers as
envisaged.27
In short, past global experiences have revealed that guest worker poli-
cies have hardly met their objectives and in most cases created some
unwanted consequences. The programs ended up with the permanent
settlement of many temporary guest workers in the host countries.28 More-
over, the guest worker policies came mostly to the benefit of the migrant
workers who were moving from low-income countries to higher income
countries while creating small net economic benefits in the host coun-
tries.29 According to some commentators, low-wage temporary worker
programs were unlikely to succeed in high-wage liberal democracies.30
The reason is closely linked to the existence of strong legal systems and the
observance of international human rights treaties in democratic countries.
Most migrant workers are granted social rights yet fail to have access to
civil and political rights.31 In addition, the implementation of these pro-
grams created extra costs in social services for both the migrant worker
and the accompanying family members, such as children born in the host
country requiring public education and health care.32 So it is not surpris-

ing that European countries’ guest worker policies with regard to Turkish
workers failed and led to unexpected consequences.
Effects of the Failure of the Guest Worker Policies in Turkey-EU Relations

The failure of the guest worker policies of the Western European coun-
tries and particularly Germany with regard to Turkish nationals has obvi-
ously had some negative influences on Turkey-EU relations. This migration
experience reveals its strongest effects in the area of free movement of per-
sons. The free movement of persons is considered as one of the strongest
political devices of the European Union since it constitutes a core element
of the single market.33 This right has progressively developed under the
case law of the European Court of Justice.34 In the early stages of the inte-
gration process, the right of free movement and residence had primarily an
economic purpose providing for the free movement of workers and self-
employed persons exercising an economic activity. Over the years, the free
movement of persons has developed beyond this narrowly defined scope,35
and it is currently regarded as a basic right of all EU nationals linked to EU
citizenship.
Concerning free movement rights, the EU-Turkey Association Agree-
ment not only pursues the aim of founding a Customs Union between
the EU and Turkey, it also encompassed provisions with regard to the
establishment of the free movement for economically active citizens of
the parties. Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional
Protocol set the goal of eventually establishing the free movement of per-
sons and workers between the EU and Turkey.36 Yet, the free movement
rights were never put into force, particularly due to the lack of political
will among the European leaders and strong public objections against
the exercise of free movement rights for Turkish nationals. Such objections
are likely to stem from the past experiences of EU countries with regard
to Turkish migration. The failure of the guest worker policies first showed
possible negative effects in the 1980s with the introduction of visa policies
toward Turkish nationals in most EU member states.37 Starting in 2001,
the renewal of visas has apparently become difficult and has started to
hinder Turkish citizens’ accession to EU territory to a considerable extent.
Hence, many cases have been brought before the European Court of
Justice regarding interpretation of the free movement provisions of the
Association legislation.38 On account of the Court’s case law the mobility
rights of Turkish citizens are in fact more extensive than appears at
first sight.
54 Global Migration
The Prohibition to Introduce New Restrictions in Relation to Access

to Employment and Self-Employment
The Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement between the EU
and Turkey contains a so-called standstill clause, which forbids the parties
to the agreement from worsening the conditions of access to employment
and self-employment (Article 41/1 of the Additional Protocol).39 The EU
member states were thus prevented from introducing any new restrictions
on the conditions of access to employment and self-employment and the
provision of services after the entry into force of the Protocol on January 1,
1973.
In 2009, the European Court of Justice decided the Soysal case, one of
the most crucial judgments regarding the Association legislation.40 The
case was brought before the court by two Turkish truck drivers, Mr. Soysal
and Mr. Savatli, who were refused the renewal of their visas by German
authorities to enter Germany and conduct their professions. Germany did
not have any visa requirements for Turkish nationals in 1973 and intro-
duced such requirements only in 1980. The Court held that Germany had
violated the Association Agreement by introducing stricter conditions for
the admission of service providers after 1973.
It follows from the Soysal judgment that all visa requirements for service
providers, workers, or self-employed persons introduced by EU member
states after 1973 infringe the Association Agreement. Among the nine EU
member states in 1973 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), seven
countries had concluded bilateral agreement with Turkey exempting non-
professionals (tourists, students, and family visitors) from a visa require-
ment for a stay of up to three months.41 Moreover, the majority of EU
member states was a party to a multilateral agreement of the Council of
Europe concluded in 1957, which provides for the abolition of visa obliga-
tions for the nationals of the contracting parties for visits of up to three
months.42 Even though several EU member states have invoked a clause
allowing for the suspension of the Agreement to Turkish nationals (Article
7 of the Agreement), most of these reservations are invalid since they were
made after the entry into force of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement in
1973 or the countries’ respective accession dates to the EU. Only a few
new member states, such as Austria, Malta, and Slovenia, invoked the sus-
pension clause before their accession to the European Union and are
therefore not bound by the prohibition to introduce visa requirements for
stays of up to three months.
Even though the Soysal judgment thus holds great potential for the
movement of Turkish citizens to the European Union, it appears that most
EU member states are lacking the will to enforce the judgment. This stale-
mate is likely to be linked to the previous experiences of EU-Turkey migra-
tion under the guest worker programs. Only three member states, namely
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, have recently changed their visa
rules to implement the Soysal case. Moreover, the European Commission
has failed to take effective measures against the member states who have
been reluctant to implement the judgment.
Introduction of Long Transitional Periods or the Permanent Derogation

for Free Movement of Turkish Nationals
Another crucial point to be addressed is the so-called permanent deroga-
tion debate concerning the area of free movement of persons in Turkey-EU
relations. The European Union introduced this concept for the first time
during the negotiations for EU accession in 2005. Paragraph 12 of the
Negotiation Framework focused on the potential need to consider long
transitional periods, specific arrangements, or permanent safeguard clauses that
correspond to clauses that are permanently available as a basis for safeguard
measures in the fields of free of movement of persons. Moreover, the indi-
vidual member states are left with great discretion to decide on the even-
tual establishment of the free movement of persons for Turkey. Aydin and
Keyman rightfully point out that such kind of derogations were not intro-
duced in the text of the Negotiating Framework prepared for Croatia,
which was adopted on the same date and prepared in almost identical
language. This leads to accusations of a so-called second-class membership
or privileged partnership to be offered to Turkey instead of full member-
ship.43 Similar transition periods with regard to the exercise of the right of
free movement have previously been applied to other acceding member
states. With a view to protecting their own labor markets, some EU mem-
ber states, such as Germany and Austria, have invoked temporary transi-
tional periods against workers coming from new member states that were
part of the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargements. Such policies were based
on fears of mass migration from the newcomers to the old members deriv-
ing particularly from the economic and social differences between the west
and the east. The high unemployment rates in the old member states and
the cheap labor force to be provided easily from the Eastern countries can
be listed among the reasons for the introduction of such transitional
periods.
56 Global Migration
It is thus likely that in the case of accession Turkish citizens will not
immediately enjoy a right to free movement, but will be faced with long
transitional periods. On account of the size of the Turkish labor force
the duration of such a transitional period is likely to exceed seven years
as provided in the case of the 2004 enlargement. It can be expected to
last between 10 and 15 years.44 However, a transformation of such transi-
tional periods into permanent derogations is not acceptable, as such a
practice would represent unfair treatment and discrimination among EU
citizens.45 In any case, free movement of persons constitutes a core right
that is directly linked both to the status of European citizenship and
the internal market and that has been guaranteed as a fundamental right
under the case law of the European Court of Justice. In that regard, the
introduction of those derogations is inherently contrary to the spirit of
EU law itself.
Questioning the Admissibility of the Prejudices Concerning Turkish Migration to the EU

In order to question the reality of the myth of a feared and expected
mass migratory flow from Turkey to the European Union, it is crucial to
address the potential necessity for Turkish citizens to migrate to the Euro-
pean countries within the coming years. The need for Turkish citizens to
leave their country of origin and to move to the European Union is consid-
ered more acute when the socioeconomic conditions in Turkey do not
satisfy the citizens, particularly the active working population. In general
terms, labor migration is likely to occur when there is slow economic and
industrial growth in a country or when there are large income disparities
between the citizens.
Considering the surprising level of economic growth in Turkey within
the past few years, the need for Turkish citizens to migrate to the European
Union should be requestioned. In this context it is important to compare
Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) with that of countries hosting the
largest number of Turkish migrants such as Germany, the Netherlands,
and France. Turkey’s GDP per capita in 2012 was USD $10,666 (the high-
est record of all time), while Germany was recorded at USD $41,514, the
Netherlands at USD $46,054, and France at USD $39,772 for the same
year. Besides, the GDP per capita in Turkey is above that of two EU coun-
tries, Bulgaria and Romania, which were recorded in 2012 at USD $6,986
and USD $7,943, respectively.46 Turkey’s GDP per capita fluctuated
between USD $497 in 1960 and USD $1,567 in 1980.47
This reveals that Turkey is still likely to be placed among the poorest
countries in the European Union after Bulgaria and Romania, far behind
the most important migrant-receiving countries. Those differences can be

regarded as the main cause underlying the fear of potential mass migration
from Turkey to the European Union. Nevertheless, considering the level
reached by Turkey in terms of socioeconomic development within the last
20 years, it appears that Turkey climbs up the modernization stairs rapidly
and continues to gradually close the gap between itself and the EU mem-
ber states.48 It is also noteworthy that the economic need for Turkish work-
ers to migrate to the European Union is currently much lower than in the
early 1960s, given the country’s record per capita GDP in 2012.
Thus, Turkey’s socioeconomic development calls into question the
predictions of mass migration to the European Union. Turkish nationals
will be unlikely to migrate in huge numbers in the long run, in particular
when compared to Turkish-European migration flows of the past. Accord-
ing to the Commission Staff Working Document of 2004, which focuses
on the possible outcomes of Turkey’s accession to the European Union,
the size of the potential migration after accession will not only be linked
to the development of Turkey’s national income level. It is also likely to
be linked to the growth potential of the biggest industrial cities of the
country such as Istanbul and Kocaeli. The reason behind this is that
migrant workers originating from the rural areas are more likely to
choose these central cities, which offer sufficient employment opportu-
nities, rather than foreign countries that represent larger cultural and
language challenges.49
Moreover, mass migratory movements from Turkey to the European
Union seem unlikely when considering current Turkish unemployment
rates in comparison with unemployment rates in the EU member states.
Even though Turkey’s unemployment rate of 8.1 percent in 2012 was still
higher than that of major receiving countries such as Germany (5.5 per-
cent), the Netherlands (5.3 percent), and France (10.2 percent), it was
considerably less than the unemployment rates of other EU countries such
as Greece (24.3 percent) and Spain (25 percent).50 High unemployment
rates in Turkey are thus not likely to represent a major pushing factor for
migration to the European Union.
At the same time, the current demographic composition of the Euro-
pean Union means that migration from Turkey could have substantial
positive impacts on the European economies. According to Eurostat’s latest
population projections, the total population of the EU-28 member states
was about 505.665 million in 2013 but was projected to peak at 525 mil-
lion by 2050 before declining to 522 million in 2060. The median age of
the EU-27’s population was 41.5 years in 2012 but is assumed to increase
to 47.6 years within the same period. Moreover, the active working-age
58 Global Migration
population is deemed to decline constantly while people aged 65 or over

are expected to account for 29.5 percent of the population of the EU-27
member states in 2060, increasing from 18.2 percent in 2013. In 2012, the
ratio of old-age dependency for the EU-27 was 26.8 percent, which means
that there were approximately four persons of working age to finance
every person aged 65 or older. However, the old-age dependency ratio of
the population of the EU-28 member states is expected to increase to
50.16 percent in 2060.51
Icduygu and Karacay offer three alternatives for combating the aging
population of the European Union and its negative consequences, namely
increasing the labor force participation rates, raising the age for retirement,
and conducting a more effective migration policy. If the European Union
chooses the first two options, then it has to reach higher rates for labor
force participation to catch up to those met by Scandinavian countries and
has to implement higher retirement ages. In that case, the aging popula-
tion will have no serious negative impacts on the employment and social
policies or the economy. However, in case it does not choose those options
together or in case it cannot implement them fully, then a decline in the
size of the labor force by 2050 will undoubtedly occur unless the Euro-
pean Union decides to receive migrant workers from non-EU member
states.52
Unlike the guest worker policies of the 1960s, currently the European
Union has the alternative to fill some parts of this gap through the poten-
tial migratory flows within the EU countries, particularly by means of
movement from the Central and Eastern European countries to the west.
However, it has to be borne in mind that there exist several factors that
affect international migration, such as the differences of “supply and
demand” or “necessities and opportunities” in economic terms and “selec-
tivity and choice” in political and social terms.53 Therefore, one cannot
guarantee that it will be the most effective way for the European Union to
simply rely on such movements. This demographic circumstance puts
Turkey on the agenda of the European Union, perhaps as a last but not
least option.
Currently, the demographic indicators of Turkey differ considerably
from those of the EU-28 countries. According to data provided by the
Turkish Statistical Institute, the total size of the population in Turkey in
2012 was around 75.627 million. This number is expected to rise to
84.247 million by 2023 and reach its peak point of 93.475 million in
2050 before starting to decline. The size of the 65 years and older popula-
tion constituted 7.5 percent of the total population in 2012, which means
that Turkey is to be considered as a country with young population in
comparison to the European Union. However, the projections show that

this percentage is likely to increase to 10.2 percent in 2023 and 27.7 per-
cent in 2075. In 2012, the median age of Turkey was 30.1 and it is pro-
jected to increase to 34 by 2023 and 42.9 by 2050, which corresponds to
the fact that the Turkish population will also start aging within the coming
decades.54
Two conclusions follow from the above-mentioned projections. First, if
the European Union chooses the migration option to solve its problem of
an aging population, it will need migrant workers from third countries
including Turkey. The Commission Staff Working Document of 2004
reveals that the removal of the existing obstacles to the free movement of
labor is likely to cause some additional migration flows from Turkey to the
European Union. These migration flows can be considered to reduce the
negative effects of the European Union’s aging population on its potential
growth rate.55 The Commission therefore favors a controlled migratory
movement from Turkey to the European Union. The potential migratory
flow will to a large extent differ from past experiences since both the Euro-
pean Union’s and Turkey’s needs have changed. Currently member states
tend to have economic migration from third countries primarily for high-
skilled labor jobs.56 Therefore the ones who are likely to migrate to the
European countries are the ones who are highly qualified and well edu-
cated in accordance with the European Union’s demands. This will also
facilitate the social and cultural integration of Turkish migrants to the
European Union and the difficulties that had been experienced in the
1960s are unlikely to reoccur.57 In fact, given the current demographic
projections, the potential need arising from the EU labor market in the
near future is unlikely to be met even with Turkey’s whole population
migrating to the European Union.58
As a second point, statistical data reveal that even Turkey’s population
will start aging soon, which will inevitably decrease the migratory pres-
sure, as it is mostly the young Turkish working population that intends to
migrate. In contrast, the rise of the aging EU population is likely to increase
the migratory flows from the European Union to Turkey since many Euro-
pean retirees choose Turkey to settle down after retirement.
A survey carried out in 2006 by Krieger and Maître59 with regard to the
potential migratory flows from the fourth and fifth EU enlargement coun-
tries and Turkey to the European Union reveal interesting results. The
scholars measured both the general and the firm intentions of the respon-
dents with regard to their migration to the European Union within the
coming years. In the survey the general intention to migrate was defined
as a basic attitude toward migration, while the firm intention corresponded
60 Global Migration
to the highest level of possibility to move. Even though Turkish nationals

had the highest general intention to migrate (6.2 percent), it is notable that
only 0.3 percent had the firm intention to migrate to the European Union
within the next five years.60 Another study conducted in 2004 by the Inde-
pendent Commission on Turkey61 supports this approach and anticipates
the migration potential from Turkey to the European Union to continue to
stay around 2.7 million people, which corresponds to almost 0.5 percent
of the total EU population.62
A third study concluded in 2006 offers three scenarios depending on
different variables deriving from certain experiences with regard to labor
migration. The first analysis focused on the potential of Turkish migration
to the European Union to be measured within the context of the past expe-
riences of Germany as a host country. The analysis included two scenarios
in which the obstacles for the labor mobility were assumed to be removed.
The first scenario evaluates Turkish migration over the actual experiences
of EU countries with regard to free movement of labor and arrives at the
conclusion that the total net migration of Turkey is expected to reach 1.1
million at the highest level by 2030. The second scenario was based on the
past experiences of those countries with regard to the guest worker agree-
ments. In that scenario, though the migration number climbed up, the
potential migration of Turkish nationals was still limited to 1.8 million by
2030.63
The last analysis of this study took Turkey’s own experience as the only
reference point, and two scenarios occurred that ended up with totally dif-
ferent results with regard to potential Turkish migration to the European
Union. According to the first scenario, after a successful accession period,
Turkey becomes a full member in the EU. This scenario also presumes that
Turkey holds a high economic growth rate, and the right of free movement
to the European Union is granted by the year 2015. That being the case,
the results of the first scenario reveal that the potential net migration from
Turkey to the European Union is likely to reach to 2.1 million by 2030,
which is far from causing any serious disturbances in the EU labor market.
However, the second scenario focuses on the suspension of Turkey’s mem-
bership prospective to the European Union accompanied by low economic
growth and high unemployment rates. In the second scenario, the EU is
considered to continue its existing visa regulation against Turkish nation-
als. Under this scenario, the low rates of economic growth and the rising
unemployment levels in the country are very likely to raise the pressure on
potential migration to the European Union. Therefore, the projection of
total net migration is expected to exceed 2.7 million before 2030. This
second scenario shows that the loss of membership perspective for Turkey
is likely to result in more immigrants coming to the European Union

though strict conditions have been imposed on labor mobility.64
Last but not least, it is worth noting that the European Union is not the
only alternative for Turkish migrants, since many Turkish nationals prefer
to move to both traditional migrant-receiving countries, such as the United
States, Canada, and Australia, and new destination countries, including
the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States, that pro-
vide advantageous employment opportunities. Moreover, within the last
two decades, Turkey itself has been transformed into both a migrant-
receiving country and a migratory transit country.65
In short, the potential mass migration from Turkey to the European
Union is less likely to occur when the development of the socioeconomic
indicators of Turkey itself within recent years is taken into account. In any
case, migratory flows to the European Union after accession will not lead
to the feared results, since the dynamics of the coming movement will dif-
fer from past experiences. It is clear that migration from Turkey will come
to the benefit of the European Union considering its aging and declining
population. However, taking into account the gradually changing demo-
graphic structure of the Turkish population, such migratory movements
may not be sufficient to overcome the difficulties likely to occur in the
European labor market in the next 30 years.
Concluding Remarks
The first myth debunked in this chapter is that the guest worker poli-
cies conducted during the 1960s by the Western European countries were
advantageous both for Turkey and the migrant-receiving countries. The
workers migrating from Turkey in this period were mostly low educated
and unqualified, sometimes hardly capable of reading or writing in their
native language. The guest worker policies were designed in a way that did
not foresee integration into the host societies. At the same time, Turkish
workers did not intend to integrate themselves, as they initially planned to
return to their home country after making enough financial savings. How-
ever, the guest worker programs did not work out as envisaged. Most
workers never returned home and the Turkish population in the host
countries started to increase due to family unifications and births to next
generations.
The failure of the guest worker policies started to show negative conse-
quences in the 1980s through the introduction of visa requirements for
Turkish nationals. Although the Association legislation between Turkey
and the European Union provided for the exercise of free movement rights
62 Global Migration
for Turkish nationals in progressive stages, this has never materialized. Be

that as it may, the movement rights of Turkish citizens are not as limited as
appears at first sight on account of the case law of the European Court of
Justice. Many Turkish nationals who want to enjoy their free movement
rights have brought cases before national courts of the member states,
which were referred to the European Court of Justice. The Court has
recently been ruling in favor of Turkish nationals with regard to exercising
their free movement rights under the Association legislation. Yet, many
member states are not willing to enforce the Court’s judgments, and the
European Commission has so far failed to take effective measures against
the member states that breach their obligations under the Association leg-
islation. Moreover, possibilities of introducing permanent derogations to the
free movement of persons inevitably appear on the agenda when Turkey’s
EU membership is discussed. Such arrangements have, however, never
been applied before and would entail unfair treatment and discrimination
contrary to the nature and the spirit of EU law.
The third myth that was addressed in this chapter concerns the poten-
tial of mass migratory flows from Turkey to the European Union after Tur-
key’s eventual accession to the European Union. It has been argued that a
controlled migration from third countries including Turkey can be an
alternative to fill the gap of the qualified labor force of the European Union.
The surveys measuring the potential migratory flows from Turkey to the
European Union reveal that even in the worst scenario, the total migration
from Turkey will hardly exceed 2.7 million in the long run. The develop-
ment of the socioeconomic indicators of Turkey combined with increasing
income levels and decreasing unemployment rates in recent years indicate
that the large migratory flows of the past are unlikely to be repeated. In
any case, the scope of migration to the European Union after a possible
accession is likely to differ on account of the needs and the past migration
experiences of both sides. It is notable that the surveys measuring poten-
tial migratory flows emphasize that mass migration is less likely to occur if
Turkey becomes a full member of the European Union. In case that mem-
bership is denied, other ways of uncontrolled migration such as irregular
migration are likely to rise. From a migration perspective, Turkish acces-
sion would thus be beneficial for both Turkey and the European Union.
Notes
1. Martin Ruhs and Philip Martin, “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-offs and Guest
Worker Programmes,” International Migration Review, 42 (2008): 249.
2. Nermin Abadan Unat, “Turkish Workers in West Germany—A Case Study,”

Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 24 (1969): 45.
3. Ahmet Icduygu, “50 Years After the Labor Recruitment Agreement with Ger-
many: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey,” Perceptions, 17/2 (2012): 21.
4. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic
Community (EEC) and Turkey, signed on September 12, 1963, at Ankara by the
Republic of Turkey and the member states of the EEC and the Community.
Council Decision 64/732/EEC of December 23, 1963 (JO 1964 217, 3685).
5. Commission Staff Working Document, Issues Arising from Turkey’s Member-
ship Perspective, COM (2004) 656 final, Brussels (2004), 4.
6. Icduygu (2012): 13–14.
7. Nermin Abadan Unat, Bitmeyen Goc-Konuk İscilikten Ulus-Otesi Yurttasliga
(Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2006), 58.
8. Icduygu (2012): 14; Philip Martin, “Turkey-EU Migration: The Road Ahead,”
Perceptions, 17 (2012): 127; Unat (2006), 58.
9. Stephen Castles, “Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?” The Interna-
tional Migration Review, 40/4 (2006): 742.
10. Unat (2006), 60.
11. Ahmet Icduygu, “Circular Migration and Turkey: An Overview of the
Past and Present—Some Demo-Economic Implications,” European University
Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, CARIM Analytic and
Synthetic Notes, Circular Migration Series, Demographic and Economic Module,
10 (2008): 9.
12. Unat (2006), 62.
13. Unat (1969): 25–28.
14. Unat (1969): 26.
15. Icduygu (2012): 14.
16. Icduygu (2012): 20.
17. Structuring Immigration—Fostering Integration, Report by the Independent
Commission on Migration to Germany, Berlin (2001), 13, accessed December 14,
2012, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschueren/Struct
uring_Immigation_-_Fostering_Id_14625_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
18. Martin (2012): 125.
19. Martin (2012): 126.
20. Icduygu (2012): 15–18.
21. Icduygu (2012): 17–18.
22. Data obtained through Eurostat, European Social Statistics 2013 Edition,
ISSN 1977-7930; accessed April 14, 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-FP-13-001/EN/KS-FP-13-001-EN.PDF
23. Icduygu (2012): 22–23.
24. Unat (1969): 46.
25. Unat (2006), 75.
26. Mathias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt, and Daniel Steinvorth, “Turkish Immigra-
tion to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities,”
64 Global Migration
Part II: “The Rise of the Immigrant Neighbourhoods,” Spiegel Online International
(2010), accessed September 27, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international
/germany/turkish-immigration-to-germany-a-sorry-history-of-self-deception-and
-wasted-opportunities-a-716067.html
27. Philip L. Martin, The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labor Migration to Western
Europe-with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany (Geneva: Interna-
tional Labor Office, 1991), 2.
28. Martin Ruhs, “The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future
International Migration Policy,” International Labour Review, 145/1–2 (2006): 7.
29. Ruhs and Martin (2008): 250.
30. Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The Mirage of Mexican Guest
Workers,” Foreign Affairs, 80/6 (2001): 119.
31. Castles (2006): 747.
32. Martin and Teitelbaum (2001): 121.
33. For further details with regard to the free movement of persons in the
European Union, see Gözde Kaya, “The Free Movement of Persons in the Context
of European Citizenship and the Last Enlargement,” (LLM Thesis, Utrecht Univer-
sity School of Law, the Netherlands, 2006).
34. A. Castro Oliveira, “Workers and Other Persons: Step by Step from Move-
ment to Citizenship—Case Law 1995–2001,” Common Market Law Review 39
(2002): 77.
35. Siofra O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship—From the
Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (London: Kluwer Law International,
1996), 17.
36. Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the
EU within the Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an asso-
ciation between the European Economic Community and Turkey with regard to
the provisions on the coordination of social security systems, COM (2012), 152
final (2012), 6; Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU—The Four Free-
doms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 548.
37. For a detailed analysis of the right of free movement of Turkish nationals in
the European Union, see Gözde Kaya, “Free Movement of Turkish Citizens after
the Soysal Judgment,” in Turkey and the European Union Facing New Challenges and
New Opportunities, eds. Firat Cengiz and Lars Hoffmann (Routledge, 2014).
38. Kees Groenendijk and Elspeth Guild, Visa Policy of Member States and the
EU Towards Turkish Nationals after Sosyal (Istanbul: Economic Development Foun-
dation Publications [IKV] No. 249, 2011), 11.
39. Additional Protocol entered into force on January 1, 1973.
40. Case C-228/06, Mehmet Soysal, İbrahim Savatli v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Soysal and Savatli hereafter), [2009] ECR I-1031.
41. Groenendijk and Guild (2011), 22–23.
42. The European Agreement on Regulations Governing the Movement of Per-
sons between Member States of the Council of Europe, CETS No. 25 signed on
December 13, 1957, and entered into force on January 1, 1958. Turkey became a
party to the agreement in 1961. For further information see Council of Europe
Treaty Office, accessed February 5, 2013, http://conventions.coe.int
43. Senem Aydin-Duzgit and Fuat Keyman, “EU-Turkey Relations and the
Stagnation of Democracy,” Global Turkey in Europe Series, 2(2012): 3, accessed
January 5, 2013: http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_WP_02.pdf
44. Ronald H. Van Ooik and James H. Mathis, “Turkey’s Accession to the
European Union: Temporary and Permanent Derogations from the EU’s Economic
Acquis,” in Turkey’s Accession to the European Union, eds. Belgin Akcay and Bahri
Yilmaz (United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2013), 77.
45. Van Ooik and Mathis (2013), 77.
46. Data obtained from the World Bank, accessed September 19, 2013, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
47. Data obtained from the World Bank, accessed September 15, 2013, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6
48. Ahmet Icduygu and Aysem Biriz Karacay, “Demography and Migration in
Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations, in Turkey, Migration and the EU:
Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, eds. Secil Pacaci Elitok and Thomas Straub-
haar (Hamburg Institute of International Economics, edition HWWI, 2012), 24.
49. Commission Staff Working Document (2004), 16.
50. Data obtained through Eurostat, Unemployment Statistics, accessed October
27, 2013, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unem
ployment_statistics
51. EU Employment and Social Situation, Quarterly Review, March 2013; accessed
April 10, 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KE-BH-13
-0S2/EN/KE-BH-13-0S2-EN.PDF; Population Structure and Ageing, European Co
mmission, Eurostat, accessed February 15, 2013, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing; data obtained
through Eurostat, Population Projections, accessed April 10, 2014, http://epp.euro
stat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/main_tables
52. Icduygu and Karacay (2012), 27.
54. Population Projections 2013–2075, Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed
February 20, 2013, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15844
55. Commission Staff Working Document (2004), 15–16.
56. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, 3rd Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum SWD (2012), 139 final,
COM 2012, 250 final (2012), 4.
57. Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, From Turkey in Europe:
More than a Promise? (2004), 33; accessed February 16, 2013, http://www
.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2004_english.pdf; Icduygu and Kara-
cay (2012), 32.
59. Hubert Krieger and Bertrand Maître, “Migration Trends in an Enlarging
European Union,” Turkish Studies, 7/1 (2006): 45–66.
66 Global Migration
60. Krieger and Maître (2006): 48–49.

61. Cited supra note 57.
62. Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), 33.
63. Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubas, and Nilufer Yildiz, “Immigration Scenarios:
Turkey-EU,” Turkish Studies, 7/1(2006): 34–36.
64. Erzan, Kuzubas, and Yildiz (2006): 40.
Part II
Myth: Restrictive policies toward migrants are inevitable.
This assertion is indeed much more complex than certain media or

political analysis would lead us to believe, since any migration policy is
usually a mix of restrictive and liberal elements. In academic discourse,
this was graphically depicted by Zolberg, who argued that the core
dilemma for the world’s major migrant destination states was how high to
build the walls and how wide to open the doors in those walls.1 There are,
of course, dramatic differences among countries, since some of them
utterly disregard migrants’ rights (see De Bel-Air and Fargues), whereas
others, such as in the examples in this part, offer innovative solutions to
complex challenges.
When it comes to the granting of more extensive rights to nonnationals,
the legal status of irregular migrants is highly controversial. Having entered
the country through irregular channels and having disregarded the appli-
cable entry rules, irregular migrants are often considered not to have
“earned” a right to stay and other privileges. However, far from adopting a
categorically restrictive approach, receiving countries have found innova-
tive solutions on how to deal with irregular migrants. Rather than focusing
exclusively on restricted rights and expulsion, many governments have
chosen instead to grant irregular migrants a regular right to stay. Such
regularization procedures are in fact a widely used measure, as shown by
Alan Desmond in his comparative chapter on regularization in the United
States and the European Union.
Even though the granting of more extensive rights to regular migrants
on the basis of duration of residence is generally considered desirable,
long-term residents often face restrictions to their body of rights that are
deemed inevitable. The right to vote, for example, is generally only
68 Global Migration
available to citizens and the granting of voting rights to nonnationals is

unthinkable for many. Yet, there are examples showing that categorically
restricting the political rights of migrants is not inevitable. For instance, all
European Union citizens enjoy the right to vote in local elections in another
EU member state, and some European countries, such as Sweden and the
Netherlands, have extended this right to all long-term residents. In New
Zealand, a case discussed by McMillan in this part, permanent residents
even have the right to vote in national elections.
Moreover, even though migration policies tend to become more restric-
tive during economic downturns, this does not have to be the case. We can
also find examples of countries that embrace a liberal, rights-based approach
toward migration even in times of economic crisis, such as in the case of
Argentina discussed in Ceriani’s chapter. The three chapters in this part thus
provide examples of countries using nonrestrictive means of managing
migration, challenging assumptions depicting restrictive migration policies
as inevitable.
Note
1. Aristide R. Zolberg, “The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing
World,” International Migration Review 20 (1989): 403.
CHAPTER FOUR
Regularization in the European Union

and the United States
The Frequent Use of an Exceptional Measure
Alan Desmond
Introduction
The presence of irregular migrants in the European Union and the
United States is a much discussed topic in both jurisdictions. Indeed, in
the last couple of years in the United States it has been the subject of
relentless media coverage, divisive political debate, furious legislative
activity, and remarkable levels of migrant mobilization. The incendiary
nature of the issue is perhaps not surprising given that there are up to
11.5 million irregular migrants in the United States.1 While the European
Union is home to a numerically smaller irregular migrant population esti-
mated at up to 3.8 million,2 irregular migrants in both jurisdictions
embody a challenge to state sovereignty by illustrating the incomplete
nature of state control of borders and the limitations on states’ ability to
regulate the admission and residence of noncitizens. State efforts at
addressing this issue focus on tightening borders and returning or
The author is indebted to Marie Provine, the editors of the volume, and an anonymous
reviewer for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of the chapter. The author
acknowledges the generous support of the Irish Research Council.
70 Global Migration
deporting irregular migrants to their countries of origin, or countries

through which they transited. An alternative response to the presence of
irregular migrants, however, is a practice referred to as both regularization
and legalization.
Regularization may be broadly defined as any state procedure by which
non-EU citizens, or in the context of the United States, non-U.S. citizens,
“who are illegally residing, or who are otherwise in breach of national
immigration rules, in their current country of residence are granted a legal
status.”3 Regularization has been undertaken in both the European Union
and the United States for a variety of reasons, ranging from the humanitar-
ian to the practical. Regularization may occur on the basis of one-off pro-
grams to which migrants have to apply within a specified, limited period
of time, or on the basis of measures that are a permanent feature of a state’s
migration law framework. Thus, for example, Poland conducted a one-off
regularization program to which migrants in an irregular situation could
submit applications between January 1, 2012, and July 2, 2012. Those
who satisfied the conditions were awarded a two-year residence permit,
which also entitled its holders to work.4 An example of a permanent regu-
larization measure, on the other hand, is to be found in the immigration
law framework of Spain, which provides for the conferral of a legal status
on irregular migrants who demonstrate social integration in Spanish soci-
ety by satisfying a number of conditions including three years’ residence in
Spain, the absence of a criminal record, and the availability of a job.5 The
eligibility criteria for regularization, as well as the particular type of migra-
tion status conferred on regularized migrants, will of course vary from
program to program and from state to state.
This chapter, however, does not aim to present an exhaustive catalogue
of the different types of regularization that have been employed in the
European Union and the United States. Neither is it a strict, systematic
comparison of EU and U.S. use of regularization. Rather, it seeks first to
demolish the myth that regularization is a seldom-used measure: it is esti-
mated that between 1996 and 2008 over 6 million migrants may have
been involved in transitions from irregularity to a legal status in the Euro-
pean Union alone,6 with the number of migrants regularized in the United
States in the last 25 years also running into the millions. Such widespread
use of regularization itself highlights another myth; that all or most irregu-
lar migrants are deported. In the European Union, for example, only about
40 percent of irregular migrants are removed.7
Second, the chapter seeks to highlight some of the many powerful
arguments in favor of this particular policy option, thereby advancing
the case for regularization in spite of strong political opposition in both
Regularization in the European Union and the United States 71
jurisdictions. Most irregular migrants are drawn across borders by the

availability of work and better life prospects, rather than the chance of
regularization. Indeed, migrants in an irregular situation are often only
partially responsible for their status, which can be attributed to factors
including economic deprivation in their home countries, a demand for
labor in the host country, and lack of regular migration routes facilitating
a legal confluence of supply and demand. A further compelling argument
for regularization, and simultaneously an explanation for the low rate of
removal of irregular migrants indicated in the preceding paragraph, is the
nondeportability of many such migrants. Nonremovability can result from
a number of factors including lack of cooperation from the countries of
origin or transit, or indeed the migrants themselves.
The chapter thus sketches some of the most common reasons for and
means of regularization on both continents, and seeks to show that there
exists much common ground as to when and why regularization could or
should take place. Given such common ground, it does not require too
great a stretch of the imagination to consider that there may be a broad
right to a legal status, which should be put on a legislative footing.
While the conferral of a legal status on irregular migrants is generally seen
as being in the gift of the state, there have been occasions when EU member
states have been required to regularize individuals, either as a result of judg-
ments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Thus in the European Union there
exists, albeit in very limited circumstances, a right to regularization. We will
argue for the broadening of this right to encompass a broader swath of the
irregular migrant population. While the human rights of migrants do not
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, respect for human rights is not uni-
form and it is more difficult to claim that there is any recognition at the
judicial or legislative level in the United States that migrants in an irregular
situation may have a right to a legal status. Nonetheless, there is much nor-
mative commonality in the EU and U.S. treatment of regularization.
It should be noted that in both the academic literature and public dis-
course unlawfully present migrants are referred to variously as illegal,
undocumented, unauthorized, and clandestine. The term employed
throughout this chapter, however, is irregular migrant, which is less heav-
ily laden than the alternative terms.8 It is also worth noting that migrants
may find themselves in an irregular situation for a variety of reasons: many
will have entered on a valid visa, staying on after the expiry of their docu-
ments; some may have unlawfully crossed the border of the state in which
they reside; others will have unsuccessfully claimed asylum, failing to
leave the host state after the rejection of their asylum claim.
72 Global Migration
Irregular Migration in the European Union

In this section on regularization in the European Union we will begin
by locating the issue in the broader context of EU activity in the field of
irregular migration. This will be followed in turn by an examination of the
EU attitude to regularization on the basis of the policy positions taken by
various actors. We will then turn our attention to the regularization poten-
tial of the Returns Directive. Finally, we will suggest that regularization
obligations have been imposed on states by, respectively, judgments of the
CJEU and the ECtHR.
It is important to understand regularization in the European Union in
the broader context of efforts to develop a common EU policy on irregular
migration. The European Union gained competence over asylum and
migration with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999,
which provided for the progressive establishment of an area of freedom,
security, and justice.9 The treaty facilitated development of a common
migration policy by making a number of areas, including irregular migra-
tion, subject to measures adopted by the Council.10
The practical realization of the mandate in the Treaty of Amsterdam to
create an area of freedom, security, and justice was discussed in a number of
important policy documents,11 which evinced a preoccupation with preven-
tion and reduction of irregular migration. These aims were to be achieved
through, inter alia, a coherent EU policy on readmission and return,12 fur-
ther harmonization of member states’ laws on carriers’ liability,13 and closer
cooperation between member states’ border control services.14
As well as an emphasis on prevention of irregular migration and return
or deportation as a response to the presence of irregular migrants, the
European Commission has linked irregular migration with crime and secu-
rity. It has described the fight against illegal migration “and criminal activi-
ties related to it” as essential to the security of both member states’ societies
and migrants themselves,15 as it may be linked with terrorism, trafficking,
exploitation, and other serious crimes, which pose a major threat to the
European Union.16 This treatment of irregular migration as a security and
law enforcement issue is reflected in, for example, the adoption by the Jus-
tice and Home Affairs Council in 2010 of 29 measures to reinforce protec-
tion of the external borders and combat irregular migration.17
The EU Attitude to Regularization

Given the emphasis on removal of irregular migrants, with over a quar-
ter of a million deported in 2009,18 and the view of irregular migration as
a security and law enforcement issue, it is unsurprising that the European

Commission generally takes a dim view of regularization. It has acknowl-
edged that some of the regularization measures undertaken by member
states result from the difficulty of returning to their countries of origin
irregular migrants whose status is the result of a demand for labor and
limited opportunities for legal migration,19 and has recognized that irregu-
lar migrant workers make a contribution to the economy in the short
term.20 Nonetheless, the Commission is of the view that that illegal entry
or residence “should not lead to the desired stable form of residence.”21
Large-scale regularization, in particular, is viewed by the Commission
as encouraging further irregular migration.22 Apart from the putative pull
effect, the Commission objects to regularization because of its possible
spillover effect, namely the entry of regularized migrants into the territory
of other member states, which the absence of internal border controls
within the Schengen area facilitates:23 in most EU member states lawfully
resident migrants are entitled to travel without a visa to other states in the
Schengen zone for up to 90 days.
Opposition at the EU level to regularization was bolstered, in particular,
by Spain’s regularization in 2005 of more than 578,000 irregular migrants.
This focused the attention of other EU member states on the implications
of mass regularizations for other states24 and led to the establishment in
2006 of a mutual information exchange system whereby member states are
required to provide advance information on planned policy measures that
potentially impact on other member states.25 Efforts at the level of the
European Council to secure a commitment in the 2008 European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum26 to an outright ban on mass regularization in the
European Union gave way to a compromise agreement, at the insistence of
Spain,27 that member states use only case-by-case regularization, rather
than generalized regularization, under national law for humanitarian or
economic reasons.
A more benign view of regularization is taken by the European Parlia-
ment28 and, in particular, the European Economic and Social Committee
(EESC), a consultative body of the European Union. The EESC has criti-
cized the European Commission for not viewing irregular migrants as per-
sons whose rights should be guaranteed29 and has called for the Commission’s
approach to migration to include steps to legalize the situation of irregular
migrants so as to both combat irregular work and the exploitation of
migrants while at the same time addressing concerns about the European
Union’s future demographic and economic needs.30 Suggesting that EU leg-
islation for such measures would recognize the link between restrictive
migration policies and irregular migration,31 the EESC has explicitly
74 Global Migration
attributed the presence of large numbers of irregular migrants to decades of

restrictive policies.32 Channels for regularization, which would take into
account conditions such as employment status, family links, degree of inte-
gration into society, and humanitarian reasons, should be opened,33 as
return cannot be the sole response to the presence of irregular migrants.34
The EESC has also suggested that measures aimed at punishing exploit-
ative employers should be accompanied by sympathetic treatment of those
exploited, allowing them to have their status legalized.35 Noting the con-
tribution to the European Union’s social and economic development made
by irregular migrants,36 the EESC asserts that both human rights consider-
ations and economic and social needs mandate the regularization, under
certain conditions, of many irregular migrants.37 It has expressed approval
for those member states that have in place legislation facilitating regular-
ization, be it for reasons of employment, humanitarian concern, or inte-
gration in the community.38
The Council of Europe, an international organization established in
1949 that currently has 47 member states, including all 28 EU member
states, has also endorsed regularization of irregular migrants in certain
situations. In a resolution on the human rights of irregular migrants the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) accepted that
member states have the right to regulate the entry of foreign nationals and
to return irregular migrants to their country of origin, but noted that they
must do so in accordance with international human rights law.39 Alluding
to the right to respect for private and family life enshrined in Article 8 of
the ECHR, the PACE stated that removal should not take place when the
irregular migrant concerned has particularly strong family or social ties
with the country seeking removal, or when removal is likely to violate the
right to private and/or family life of the prospective expellee.40 The PACE
called on the governments of Council of Europe member states to facilitate
enjoyment by irregular migrants of their minimum rights by, inter alia,
considering all relevant means for regularization where there are reasons
why irregular migrants cannot or should not be returned to their country
of origin.41
The focus of the European Union and its member states on prevention
of irregular migration and removal of irregular migrants may well be an
example of sovereign grandstanding, a showy flexing of sovereign muscle
borne of a perceived loss of control over policy initiatives in other areas.42
At the other end of the spectrum, the EESC and PACE evince an apprecia-
tion of the contribution irregular migrants make to the European Union,
as well as the significance of the ties they forge in the host country and the
weight that should be attached to such ties.
The Returns Directive—an Emerging Obligation to Regularize or Expel?

While the EU’s preoccupation with security and its preference for return-
ing irregular migrants is exemplified by the measures it has adopted through
the years relating to the detection, expulsion, and readmission of irregularly
staying non-EU citizens,43 a number of these measures nonetheless acknowl-
edge the relevance of human rights protections and standards, something
that is also true of one of the most important pieces of legislation adopted in
recent years in the field of irregular migration, namely the Returns Direc-
tive.44 The Returns Directive aimed to establish common standards and pro-
cedures in member states for returning illegally staying non-EU citizens,45
and much of the attention it drew related to its perceived shortcomings
across a range of areas, particularly in relation to provisions on prolonged
pre-removal detention and mandatory reentry bans.46 These shortcomings
occasioned one commentator to characterize the Directive as a codification
of an expulsion regime that is lacking from a rights perspective.47
The Returns Directive may justifiably be criticized for leaving too much
discretion in the hands of the member states, thereby undermining the
harmonization at which EU legislation by its very nature aims. The extent
to which the original Commission proposal was watered down48 under-
lines not just the punitive intent of member states but also the difficulty
inherent in a lawmaking process that requires the approval of both the
relevant EU institutional actors and 28 sovereign states.
Such criticisms notwithstanding, the Directive does allow for the ulti-
mate vindication of the rights of individual migrants in an irregular situa-
tion, namely, a legal status. While the punitive bias of the legislation is
clear, it simultaneously gives member states the option to regularize irreg-
ular migrants instead of returning them, thereby removing them from the
reach of a procedurally punitive returns process.
The aspiration of the Returns Directive to eliminate the presence of
irregular migrants in the European Union is evident in the requirement
that member states issue a return decision to any irregularly staying non-
EU national.49 Return, however, will not always be possible. Indeed, the
requirement to issue irregular migrants with a return decision is located in
a chapter of the Directive entitled “Termination of Illegal Stay,” an objective
that may also be achieved by conferring a legal status on an irregular
migrant. Thus Article 6(4) in the same chapter provides that member
states may at any moment regularize the status of an irregular non-EU citi-
zen for compassionate, humanitarian, or other reasons.
While the mechanism by which such regularization may be effected is
left to the discretion of the member state,50 the Directive offers some
76 Global Migration
guidance as to the reasons that may provide grounds for regularization.

Member states in their implementation of the Directive are required to
take due account of, inter alia, the best interests of the child, family life,
and the state of health of the migrant in question.51 Similarly, the preamble
to the Directive states that the best interests of the child, in line with the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the respect for family life,
in line with the ECHR, should be primary considerations of member states
when implementing the Directive.52
Such references to human rights considerations give rise to a far weaker
claim to regularization than did the original Commission proposal, which
provided explicitly that no return decision would be issued where mem-
ber states were subject to fundamental rights obligations, particularly
those resulting from the ECHR such as the right to education and the
right to family unity.53 Nonetheless, the Returns Directive places no
restriction on member states in terms of regularizing irregular migrants
and implicitly recognizes that return should give way to regularization
where certain factors such as family life and children are sufficiently
strong.
It is important to note, however, that the Returns Directive does not
envisage any circumstances in which there is a strict obligation on member
states to regularize irregular migrants, and a decision not to issue a return
decision, or to withdraw one, is not equivalent to conferring a legal status.
Such an obligation may be inferred from both the Directive’s aspiration to
eliminate the presence of irregular migrants as well as the legislation’s
explicit reference to specific human rights considerations such as the best
interests of the child, which are to be primary considerations for the mem-
ber states in implementation of the Directive.
There have been a number of important CJEU rulings regarding the
Directive.54 But even in cases concerning migrants in an irregular situation
who can be neither deported from nor detained in the host state, the
Court at no point imputes a duty to regularize on the state. While member
states may at any time regularize the stay of such migrants according
to Article 6(4), such a decision would seem to be entirely in the gift of
the state.
Despite the fact that the Returns Directive does not give rise to any strict
obligation to regularize, it nonetheless represents an acknowledgment of
the significance of irregular migrants’ ties to host state societies and indexes
the normative weight to be attached to such ties when states consider
deporting such migrants. The Directive thus recognizes the de facto mem-
bership in the European Union of many irregular migrants and the impor-
tance of giving that membership a de jure basis.
Regularization as a Result of Judgments of the CJEU

In cases where regularization in the European Union has been required
by the courts, it is usually as a result of a finding by the ECtHR or the CJEU
in favor of migrants in an irregular situation who are seeking to resist
deportation or expulsion from an EU member state. The ECtHR, set up by
the Council of Europe, enforces the European Convention on Human
Rights but can only hear complaints of a violation of the Convention after
all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The CJEU, on the other hand,
monitors compliance with the EU treaties. Its jurisdiction is limited to
cases that fall within the scope of EU law, and exhaustion of domestic rem-
edies is not a prerequisite for cases to be referred to the CJEU. In terms of
protection of irregular migrants from expulsion, the ECtHR and CJEU
essentially protect different categories of migrants and thus take different
approaches.55 Broadly speaking, the ECtHR under the rubric of Article 8
ECHR deals with the expulsion from or desire to enter the European Union
of non-EU citizens and/or the family members of those non-EU citizens,
whereas CJEU cases concerning irregular migrants often relate to the
unlawfully present non-EU family members of EU citizens. Thus the
ECtHR case law in this field essentially looks to the degree of integration
of the prospective expellee in the host country, his or her legal status some-
times of little significance,56 while the CJEU case law treats the rights of the
EU citizen whose family member is threatened with expulsion or nonad-
mission. A key distinction between the case law of both courts in this field
is that while the ECtHR recognizes the principle that the contracting states
enjoy the right to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens,57
the CJEU jurisprudence often has the effect of depriving member states of
any discretion in preventing the entry or continued stay of non-EU family
members of EU citizens.
A number of recent CJEU cases have effectively facilitated regularization
of irregular migrants who had family ties to an EU citizen. In Metock
(2008)58 four non-EU citizens who had unsuccessfully applied for asylum
in Ireland went on to marry citizens of other EU member states who were
resident in Ireland. These were not marriages of convenience. The four
non-EU citizens applied for residence cards as spouses of EU citizens but
the applications were refused by the Irish authorities as the applicants had
not satisfied the requirement in Irish law of prior lawful residence in
another EU member state. Metock and the other three applicants chal-
lenged this refusal in the Irish High Court, which, having found that all
four marriages were genuine, sought clarification from the CJEU concern-
ing EU legislation on the right to movement and residence within the
78 Global Migration
European Union of EU citizens and their family members. In response, the

CJEU issued a groundbreaking judgment that a member state cannot pre-
vent the entry or continued stay of a non-EU spouse of an EU citizen who
is exercising his or her right of free movement, regardless both of when
and where the marriage took place and of how the non-EU spouse first
entered the host member state.
In Zambrano (2011),59 a source of much controversy because of its
extension of the protection of EU citizenship to non-moving European
Union citizens, the CJEU found that national measures are unlawful if they
have the effect of depriving EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the
substance of their rights as EU citizens. The finding was made on the basis
of EU citizenship as enshrined in Article 20 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU), one of the core foundational treaties of
the European Union. Article 20 TFEU confers EU citizenship on everyone
who is a citizen of an EU member state. The Zambrano case concerned the
eponymous couple from Colombia who had unsuccessfully sought asylum
in Belgium. Despite refusing to recognize the couple as refugees, Belgium
did not return them to Colombia because of the ongoing civil war. In 2003
and 2005 the couple had children who acquired Belgian citizenship, which
meant that by virtue of Article 20 TFEU they also held EU citizenship. The
Zambrano couple sought to have their situation regularized and take up
residence in Belgium as the parents of Belgian citizens, the refusal of which
by the Belgian authorities led to a request for clarification from the CJEU
concerning the application of the EU citizenship provisions of Article 20
TFEU to the case of the Zambrano children.
The CJEU noted that refusing the Zambrano couple a right to remain in
Belgium could also result in their EU citizen children having to leave Bel-
gium. The Court held that the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the
children’s rights as EU citizens entailed an obligation on the EU member
state in question to grant both a right of residence and an employment
permit to the unlawfully present Zambrano parents. If forced to leave the
territory of the European Union because of the expulsion or impoverish-
ment of their parents, the Zambrano children would be unable to exercise
the substance of the rights conferred on them as EU citizens.60 Though the
Court in Zambrano and subsequent cases narrowed the scope of applica-
tion of the judgment to the parents of minor dependent EU citizen chil-
dren,61 it nonetheless had significant implications. The judgment had the
effect of preventing the expulsion from EU member states of migrants in
an irregular situation who had EU citizen children and in some cases
required member states to allow reentry of migrant parents of EU citizens
who had already been expelled.62
Zambrano is a striking example of the potential of the CJEU to oblige

states to confer a legal status on migrants in an irregular situation on the
basis of their connection with EU citizens. In the subsequent CJEU deci-
sions in McCarthy63 and Dereci64 the Court had the opportunity to extend
the regularizing effect of that connection beyond the irregular migrant par-
ents of minor dependent EU citizen children to the non-EU spouses and
parents of adult, nondependent EU citizens, but passed up the opportu-
nity, mindful no doubt of the political implications of such a potentially
far-reaching decision. This, of course, does not preclude such a develop-
ment in the future.
Regularization as a Result of Judgments of the ECtHR

Regularization of migrants in an irregular situation has sometimes been
required by the ECtHR under Article 8 ECHR, which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Deportation of an irregular migrant will constitute an interference

with this right if the irregular migrant in question enjoys private and family
life in the expelling state, and deportation will therefore only be justified if
it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. The
ECtHR refers as a matter of course in expulsion cases to the right of the
state, as a matter of well-established international law, to control the admis-
sion and residence of migrants. The recognition by the Court of the right
of states to control immigration means that states enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation, or discretion, in this area. The ECtHR’s treatment of this mar-
gin of appreciation has given rise to case law that has been criticized as
inconsistent, as it is fact-based rather than principled.65 Nonetheless, two
recent cases concerning the expulsion of irregular migrants illustrate a dis-
crete set of circumstances in which such migrants, under Article 8, may not
be expelled and are entitled to a legal status.
In Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands (2006),66 the
first applicant was a Brazilian national who, during the course of her
80 Global Migration
irregular stay in the Netherlands, entered into a relationship with a Dutch

citizen. Following the birth of a daughter, who acquired Dutch citizen-
ship, the couple separated and parental authority was awarded to the
Dutch citizen father. The ECtHR held that the expulsion of the first
applicant would break the ties between mother and daughter and that it
was in the daughter’s best interests for her mother to remain in the Neth-
erlands. It thus found that the economic well-being of the country did
not outweigh the rights of mother and daughter under Article 8. While
the Court rebuked the applicant for her cavalier attitude to Dutch migra-
tion rules,67 it was equally critical of the paramount importance attached
by the Dutch authorities to the fact of the first applicant’s unlawful
residence.68
In Nunez v. Norway (2011),69 the applicant, shortly after arriving in
Norway on a tourist visa, was deported and given a two year reentry ban
following her arrest for shoplifting. She returned to Norway four months
later using a different passport. She subsequently married a Norwegian
national and was awarded work and settlement permits. Following separa-
tion from her Norwegian husband, she cohabited with a fellow Dominican
Republican who was also in possession of a settlement permit and with
whom she had two daughters before she separated from him.
After Nunez’s violations of Norway’s migration laws came to light, the
authorities sought to expel her and prohibit her reentry for two years.
Custody of her two children was awarded to her former partner. When
examining the proposed expulsion under Article 8, the ECtHR gave voice
to its oft-repeated principle that where family life was created by persons
who were aware from the outset that migration status rendered family life
within the host state precarious, then they could have no legitimate expec-
tation of being able to stay. Expulsion in such cases will give rise to incom-
patibility with Article 8 only in the most exceptional circumstances.70
The Court also referred to the applicant’s strong ties to her country of
origin and the aggravated nature of her migration offences, finding that the
latter factor gave rise to a strong public interest in favor of expulsion when
assessing the issue of proportionality under Article 8.71 The Court none-
theless went on to find that expulsion would be incompatible with Article
8. Taking a child-centered approach, the Court noted that expulsion would
probably result in separation of mother and children for a minimum of
two years. The Norwegian authorities had thus not attached sufficient
weight to the best interests of the children for the purposes of Article 8,
and Norway had not acted within its margin of appreciation “when seek-
ing to strike a fair balance between its public interest in ensuring effective
immigration control, on the one hand, and the applicant’s need to be able
to remain in Norway in order to maintain her contact with her children in

their best interests, on the other hand.”72
The principle that emerges from Rodrigues and Nunez, therefore, is that
an irregular migrant may not be expelled if such expulsion would result in
separation from his or her young children. Expulsion in these cases would
have led to separation because custody of the children had been awarded
to the lawfully resident fathers of the children. This fact might be relied
upon to significantly narrow the scope of application of the regularization
principle to which these cases give rise. Nonetheless, the cases reflect a
shift in the ECtHR’s approach in cases of expulsion where the focus had
previously been largely on the behavior of the irregular migrant parents, as
opposed to the best interests of the child.73
This change of approach was characterized by Judge Jebens in Nunez as
an important step forward, which inevitably reduces states’ margin of
appreciation in such cases. Indeed, a joint dissenting opinion in the case
gave expression to the concern that if expulsion of Nunez would be dis-
proportionate, then it may hardly ever be possible to expel a foreign
national who has a child with a person holding a residence permit. The
majority judgment in Antwi v. Norway (2012),74 which is difficult to recon-
cile with that in Nunez, may have been an attempt to allay the concerns of
the two dissenting judges in Nunez. In Antwi the ECtHR upheld the expul-
sion and accompanying five-year reentry ban imposed on a Ghanaian
national whose offences were similar in nature to those of Nunez, but less
aggravated. The Court found that there were no insurmountable obstacles
to the applicant enjoying family life with his Ghanaian-born Norwegian
citizen wife and their child as they could all settle together in Ghana or, at
the least, maintain regular contacts.75 While in Nunez neither the applicant
nor her estranged partner, nor indeed their two children, were Norwegian
citizens, the spouse and child of the applicant in Antwi both held Norwe-
gian citizenship. This might lead a neutral observer to view Antwi’s claim
to remain in Norway as stronger than that of Nunez. By contrast with the
finding in Nunez, however, the Court in Antwi held that sufficient weight
was attached to the best interests of the child in ordering her father’s expul-
sion.76 One way of addressing such inconsistent decision making would be
to put in place clearer rules at the EU level on when migrants in an irregu-
lar situation are entitled to remain in a host country.77
While the right to respect for family life protected by Article 8 may
facilitate regularization of irregular migrants, so too may the right to
respect for private life, which Article 8 also recognizes. Thus, for example,
in Slivenko v. Latvia (2003)78 the Grand Chamber found that the expulsion
from Latvia of a long-term resident ethnic Russian family would not be
82 Global Migration
incompatible with the Article 8 right to family life as the family unit was
being expelled as a whole and could continue to enjoy family life together
in Russia. The Court did find, however, that such expulsion would fall foul
of the right to respect for private life in Article 8, the private life of every
human being made up of a “network of personal, social and economic
relations.”79 This approach to private life under Article 8 provides the
Court with great scope to facilitate the regularization of irregular migrants
regardless of whether they enjoy family life within the host state.
The case law of the ECtHR has taken on greater significance at the EU
level with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009,
which obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR.80 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty
gave legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.81 The charter binds
the EU institutions and member states when they are implementing EU
law82 and codifies rights, most of which are applicable to all persons, not
just EU citizens. It sets out a minimum level of rights protection and
explicitly permits the EU and individual member states to provide greater
rights protections than those contained in the charter and the ECHR.83
Where the charter sets out rights that correspond to rights guaranteed by
the ECHR, the meaning and scope of such rights are to be the same as
those laid down by the ECHR.84 For example, Article 7 of the charter,
which corresponds to Article 8 ECHR, is to be interpreted and applied in
line with Article 8 principles and jurisprudence.
Thus the post-Lisbon human rights landscape, dominated by the char-
ter and the ECHR, provides a more hospitable environment for migrants
and the protection of their rights and is conducive to greater exploitation
of the regularization potential of Article 8 ECHR as well as the regulariza-
tion principle contained in Article 6(4) of the Returns Directive.85 The
body of case law that the ECtHR is beginning to develop, outlining the
situations in which irregular migrants should be regularized, will inform
the application of Article 6(4) of the Returns Directive and will provide
the minimum standards on which the CJEU will draw when applying
Article 7 of the charter. As the conferral of a legal status on irregular
migrants is essentially a matter for each individual EU member state, apart
from situations where it is mandated by CJEU and ECtHR case law, the
Commission should move beyond policy statements on an EU framework
for regularization86 to bringing forward proposals for EU legislation on
regularization. The right to regularization enshrined in such legislation
could draw upon and broaden the principles articulated in CJEU and
ECtHR case law and the Returns Directive. While the practical realization
of such a measure would not be without difficulty,87 it would both further
the development of a common EU migration and asylum regime and
ensure greater clarity, certainty, and consistency in regularization across

the European Union.
Irregular Migration in the United States

The irregular migrant population in the United States is significantly
larger than that in the European Union, both numerically and as a percent-
age of the overall population. Indeed, the much-discussed need for com-
prehensive immigration reform (CIR) in the United States is understood
by many to refer largely to the resolution of the presence of so many irreg-
ular migrants in the country. The political deadlock that has prevented the
passage of CIR legislation is due in part to the opposition to regularization
from those who first want the law enforced against irregular migrants.88 As
Massey and Pren show in their chapter in this collection, however, it is
abundantly clear that the main response of the United States to irregular
migration has, as in Europe, consisted in strengthening borders and
emphasizing the return of irregular migrants. The Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), discussed in greater detail below, which
introduced the current era of migration control policies, was followed by
the passage of laws in 1996 that made it more difficult for irregular
migrants to legalize their status, made deportation mandatory for a broad
range of offenses, and restricted discretionary relief in deportation cases.89
This focus on prevention of irregular migration and the detection, deten-
tion, and deportation of irregular migrants has culminated in a situation
where current spending on U.S. immigration enforcement agencies is
more than the total combined outlay on all of the country’s main criminal
federal law enforcement agencies.90 Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) holds over 33,000 migrants in detention on any given day, and
over 4 million migrants have been deported since 1990, with 2011 wit-
nessing the expulsion of a record 392,000 migrants.91
Nonetheless, despite perceptions to the contrary, the United States has
a long history of regularizing irregular migrants. Until 1924 the United
States operated a statute of limitations on deportation of irregular migrants,
meaning that once a migrant had resided in the United States for a mini-
mum period of time he or she would not be deported.92 Another early
example of regularization is the provision in the Registry Act of 1929 that
granted permanent residence to migrants who could show good moral
character and continuous residence in the United States since June 3,
1921.93 As in the European Union, regularization in the United States has
been effected by various means and continues right up to the present time.
Indeed, it is arguable that in light of the current size of the irregular migrant
84 Global Migration
population in the United States and the decisive role of the Latino vote in
the 2012 presidential elections94 that regularization has never before been
an issue of such consequence, political significance, and public attention.
For purposes of convenience, regularization in the United States will be
categorized as legislative, judicial, or administrative. While authority for
the latter two may be found in legislation, they both involve a significant
degree of discretion.
Regularization Legislation
The number of migrants regularized in the United States in the last 25
years runs into the millions.95 The legal status conferred on almost all of
these migrants had a legislative basis. While private immigration bills may
be introduced by members of Congress to seek a legal status for individual
irregular migrants,96 and irregular migrant victims of domestic violence,97
trafficking,98 and other crimes99 may qualify for legal status, the most con-
sequential piece of migration legislation from the point of view of legaliza-
tion is IRCA.100
IRCA, described at the time of its enactment as the most comprehensive
reform of U.S. migration law since 1952,101 sought to definitively resolve
the question of irregular migration in the United States by taking a three-
pronged approach: regularization, increased border enforcement, and the
criminalization of the hiring of irregular migrant workers through the intro-
duction of an employment verification and employer sanctions regime.102
IRCA thus sought to both deal with the resident irregular migrant popula-
tion through legalization and prevent future irregular migration by making
it harder to enter the United States undetected and remove the incentive for
irregular entry by outlawing the employment of irregular migrants through
penalization of those who employed them.
IRCA’s legalization prong was itself multifaceted, though most attention
has focused on the two legalization programs that yielded the greatest
number of regularized migrants. The general legalization program was
open to migrants who had been unlawfully resident since January 1, 1982.
Such migrants could apply for an 18-month temporary resident status,
after which they became eligible for permanent resident status subject to a
number of conditions, including the absence of specified convictions and
a minimal understanding of U.S. language, history, and government. The
requirement that applicants for this general legalization program had to
have been unlawfully resident in the United States since January 1, 1982,
rendered ineligible the many migrants who had irregularly entered the
country subsequent to that date but prior to the enactment of IRCA and
those who, though lawfully present on January 1, 1982, fell out of regular
migration status before the passage of IRCA. Nonetheless, the general
legalization program led to the regularization of almost 1.6 million irregu-
lar migrants.
The second legalization program introduced under IRCA, the Special
Agricultural Workers (SAW) program, was open to migrants who had
worked at least 90 days in seasonal agricultural services during the 12
months ending May 1, 1986. After a one- to two-year temporary residence
status, beneficiaries of SAW were eligible to adjust to permanent residence.
SAW facilitated the acquisition of lawful permanent residence status of up
to 1.1 million persons, with the result that the two main programs of
IRCA’s legalization prong led to the regularization of a combined total of
about 2.7 million migrants. Given estimates that the irregular migrant
population in 1980 was up to 4 million in number, the extent of regular-
ization achieved by IRCA could be said to have been comprehensive from
the point of view of 1980. It could not, however, be said to have been
comprehensive from the point of view of 1986. The fact that IRCA pre-
cluded from legalization migrants who were not lawfully present on Janu-
ary 1, 1982, and agricultural workers who could not demonstrate 90 days
of agricultural work prior to May 1, 1986, meant that it failed to address
the situation of up to 3 million migrants in an irregular situation.
The legalization prong of IRCA can thus be deemed to have been, at
best, partially successful. IRCA as a whole clearly failed to permanently
reduce irregular migration. This may be attributed to a number of factors
including a lack of serious enforcement of the employer sanctions provi-
sions, the ineligibility for regularization of so great a number of the irregu-
lar population, and failure to adequately provide for the legal situation of
family members of those successfully regularized under IRCA. This points
up the need for any future regularization initiative to be applicable to as
broad a swath of the irregular migrant population as possible.
Judicially Sanctioned Regularization

The U.S. migration courts may confer lawful status on irregular migrants
on a discretionary basis, provided the migrant can show that he or she has
been of good moral character during a period of continuous residence in
the United States of at least 10 years and that removal would occasion
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her spouse, child, or
parent who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.103 Formerly
referred to as suspension of deportation, this form of discretionary relief is
now called cancellation of removal as a result of the Illegal Immigrant
86 Global Migration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. Apart from

establishing highly restrictive eligibility criteria, IIRIRA capped the num-
ber of irregular migrants whose removal could be cancelled in this manner
at 4,000 per fiscal year.104
Despite the limited and highly restrictive nature of this type of regular-
ization, it nonetheless constitutes state acknowledgment of the importance
of time spent in the United States and the ties to society that are developed
over the course of that time. It is an admission of the fact that the sovereign
right of the state to deport is sometimes trumped by a migrant’s claim to
stay.
Administrative Relief—Legal Limbo?

The executive branch of the U.S. government has the authority to grant
various forms of administrative relief to migrants who would otherwise be
required to leave the United States.105 Administrative relief is generally
granted on a short-term basis, often to ensure a lawful stay for migrants
before they transition to a longer-term migration status, and it has been
conferred in recent years on widows and children of U.S. citizens106 and on
Liberians.107
The issue of administrative relief became the focus of much attention
following President Obama’s announcement in June 2012 that he was to
grant a form of relief known as deferred action108 to irregular migrants who
arrived in the United States before the age of 16 and who lived in the
United States for a minimum of five years, are under the age of 30, do not
have a criminal record, and are high school graduates or currently in
school or have been honorably discharged from the military.109
The program, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),
was designed for the category of irregular migrant popularly referred to as
Dreamers, after the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act, a legislative proposal first introduced in 2001 and endorsed
by the House of Representatives in 2010 but blocked in the Senate by
Republicans.
While the DREAM Act would have put its beneficiaries on a path to
permanent residence, DACA, whose eligibility criteria mirror those of the
DREAM Act, only allows Dreamers to apply for a renewable two-year
deferral of deportation and work authorization. Estimates put the number
of those eligible to apply to DACA at up to 1.4 million.110
DACA was clearly a response to the failure to secure passage of the
DREAM Act through Congress. It enjoyed broad support and had the
mark of consistency: the program built on prosecutorial discretion111
guidelines issued by the director of ICE in 2011 calling on ICE personnel

to focus the agency’s limited resources on pursuing deportation of high-
risk migrants while favorably exercising discretion not to seek deportation
in the case of irregular migrants who pose no threat, particularly those
who are family members of U.S. citizens or have lived a long time in the
United States.112
Nonetheless, DACA raises a number of troubling issues. First, it falls far
wide of definitively addressing the precarious situation of its beneficiaries.
Despite being able to apply for work, successful applicants to DACA can-
not be certain of a renewal of deferred action at the end of the initial two-
year period. Second, the program is clearly a stopgap measure, symptomatic
of a wider piecemeal approach to plugging the many holes in the U.S.
migration system. Finally, the privileging of the Dreamers’ claim to legal
status in the United States gives rise to an insidious distinction between
the deserving and undeserving irregular migrant, the young hardworking
assimilated migrants without status who number up to 1.4 million, and
the remaining less deserving and less desirable irregular migrants who
number up to 10 million.
The Potential for Broad-Based Regularization in the United States

Writing in 2010, Hiroshi Motomura, a leading U.S. migration law
scholar, noted the seemingly irreconcilable differences between those on
either side of the debate around CIR. For many of those advocating such
reform, legalization was the key component. For those on the other side of
the debate, however, legalization was the one change that was most objec-
tionable.113 The intractability of the regularization issue is underscored by
the protracted, thwarted efforts to pass the DREAM Act into law and by the
many other unsuccessful legislative attempts at regularizing discrete cate-
gories of irregular migrants.114
The 2012 U.S. presidential election may, however, have marked a turn-
ing point. Popularity among migrant communities, and Hispanic voters in
particular, was credited with an important role in Obama’s victory.115
Indeed, Obama’s strong showing among Latino voters was bolstered by the
DACA program.116 The immediate aftermath of the November 2012 presi-
dential election thus saw many traditionally antilegalization Republicans
take a markedly more pro-migrant approach to the issue of CIR.117 There
is, of course, much disagreement among Republicans as to the precise
scope of any proposed legalization,118 but there is nonetheless reason to
believe that the 113th Congress may be the one that substantively tackles
the issue not just of the discrete category of irregular migrants known as
88 Global Migration
the Dreamers, but the wider irregular migrant population of up to 11.5

million persons. One indication of this is that the Dreamers have, com-
mendably, called for any migration initiative to address not just their own
particularly sympathetic situation but also that of their many fellow irregu-
lar migrants who do not satisfy the DREAM Act criteria.119
Conclusion
One of the most striking differences between the European Union and
the United States in terms of regularization is the divergence in the treat-
ment of the irregular migrant parents of EU and U.S. citizen children.
While in the European Union the expulsion of irregular migrants with EU
citizen children has been curtailed by the Zambrano ruling, the United
States continues to deport irregular migrant parents of U.S. citizen chil-
dren.120 It would be churlish, however, not to mention that the United
States does recognize that the claim to stay of irregular migrant family
members of U.S. citizens is particularly strong,121 reflecting both the nor-
mative conception of citizenship implicit in Zambrano and the weight
attached to such ties by the ECtHR in Article 8 expulsion cases.
While family ties to the citizens of a state undoubtedly provide a power-
ful argument for legalization, the most equitable regularization measure
would be one that treats all irregular migrants equally. Indeed, the exam-
ples of regularization discussed above, and the reasons for them, make it
clear that there are many instances where we approve of regularization
even where unlawfully present migrants have no ties to citizens of the host
state. It is clear, therefore, that liberal democracies value the ties that indi-
viduals forge to a community, the contributions that they make, and the
time invested in such ties and contributions. When we add this fact to the
reality that, contrary to popular perception, regularization is a frequent
occurrence, we are provided with sufficiently fertile ground for yielding
agreement on the existence of a broad right to a legal status and the pro-
priety of instituting a mechanism to give effect to such a right.
Thus an irregular migrant who has spent a specified minimum period of
time in a state should in most cases be granted a legal status. This would
avoid both the accusations of racism that have been leveled at past use of
regularization measures in the United States,122 as well as the insidious
dichotomy between the deserving and undeserving irregular migrant, most
recently and strikingly illustrated by the privileging of the claim of the so-
called Dreamers to legal status in the United States. A mechanism allowing
for automatic transition to legal status subject to a minimum temporal
requirement would also have the advantage of minimizing bureaucratic
discretion and inconsistency in application.123 While such a mechanism

may justifiably be accompanied by additional requirements such as the
absence of a criminal record, such requirements should be few in number
so as to ensure that as broad a swath as possible of the irregular migrant
population is caught by the regularization measure.
The proposal of such a mechanism cannot, of course, be discussed
without reference to the minimum period of time an irregular migrant
would be required to have spent in a state before becoming eligible for
regularization. Joseph Carens, himself an advocate of such an approach,
admits that any time-contingent regularization measure will inevitably
involve an element of arbitrariness.124 Carens settles for five years as the
cutoff point beyond which an irregular migrant should no longer be
forced to live in the liminal state of illegality. Poland’s 2012 regularization
program set the bar at four years. Whatever period of time is ultimately
chosen, it should be as short as is feasible so as to minimize the length of
time during which migrants may be alienated from the mainstream of
society, blighted by the fear of deportation, which fosters a reluctance to
demand respect of rights and renders migrants vulnerable to exploitation
and abuse.
Using the passage of time as the main criterion for regularization rec-
ommends itself not just for reasons of simplicity. It would serve as a recog-
nition of the de facto membership of the migrant in the state in which he
or she has been resident, an acknowledgment of the contribution he or she
has made to, and the ties forged with, the society. Such an acknowledg-
ment would be nothing new. It was reflected in the statute of limitations
on deportation from the United States that operated until 1924. It is
reflected in the thousands of cancellations of removal that have been
granted in the United States in the last 20 years and in the dozens of regu-
larization programs that have been implemented in the European Union in
recent decades.125
In order for regularization to be meaningful and effective it must ensure
that beneficiaries do not fall back into irregularity.126 This means granting
a legal status that, even if short in duration, is easily renewed and in the
long run puts its beneficiaries on the path to long-term residence and,
ultimately, citizenship. While Article 8 ECHR obligations may preclude an
EU member state from deporting an irregular migrant, the state has discre-
tion as to the type of status it confers on such persons. Whatever type of
migration status is initially granted to regularized migrants, time spent in
such a status should be reckonable for the purposes of long-term residence
in the European Union127 and in the U.S. context should be adjustable to
lawful permanent residence.
90 Global Migration
Such a regularization mechanism is open to a number of rebuttable

criticisms, of which the most commonly advanced is that it would incen-
tivize further irregular migration by those hoping to benefit from
regularization in the future. This, however, ignores the fact that most
irregular migrants are drawn across borders by the availability of work.
This immediate reward is to the fore in their decision-making process,
unlike the remote possibility of future regularization.128 Furthermore,
irregular migrants themselves are often only partially responsible for their
status, which can be attributed to factors including economic deprivation
in their home countries, a demand for labor in the host country, and lack
of regular migration routes facilitating a legal confluence of supply and
demand.
On a practical level, it is not possible to remove all or even most irregu-
lar migrants. States simply do not have the resources for such a monumen-
tal endeavor. Even if they did, they would encounter obstacles created by
the migrants themselves as well as the countries to which deportation is
sought.129 Given the limitations placed on states’ deportation capacities by,
inter alia, the prohibition of collective expulsion, the rights of migrants
regardless of status, obstructionist opposition from grassroots migrants’
rights organizations, and the possibility of seeking prevention of deporta-
tion in the courts, the removal of a large portion of the irregular migrant
population is unrealistic.
Toleration of the existence of a large resident population of irregular
migrants should not be the response to nondeportability. This could lead
to the alienation of such migrants from the mainstream of society, turning
them into pariahs130 and sowing the seeds of future problems in areas such
as crime and health care, which disadvantage not just the migrants them-
selves but wider society: when irregular migrants fear coming into contact
with the authorities they are easy prey for criminals and illegal substan-
dard health service providers. Apart from such practical problems, a sys-
tem of “internal institutionalized caste” is also incompatible with liberal
democratic values.131 Indeed, it was concern about the creation of an
underclass within U.S. society that informed the celebrated decision in the
1982 case of Plyler v. Doe132 in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
as unconstitutional a Texas regulation that barred irregular migrant chil-
dren from attending public schools.
While irregular migrants are rule-breakers, it seems disproportionate to
hold them perpetually liable to deportation for their initial unlawful entry
or failure to depart in accordance with the conditions governing their ini-
tial lawful entry. As Carens argues, the passage of time erodes the state’s
right to deport. The more time that passes, the weaker the state’s right to
expel becomes, with the claim of the irregular migrant to a legal status
growing correspondingly stronger.133
The argument for regularization is not irreconcilable with states’ right to
control their borders. It is, however, an acknowledgment that we live in a
world of enhanced mobility and porous borders where migrants who find
themselves in an irregular status are often only partially responsible for
their situation. Those who enter, even if unlawfully, and become members
of liberal democratic societies should have their de facto membership rec-
ognized on a de jure basis. This was essentially the point made by Barack
Obama when he announced the DACA program in June 2012. Employing
the language of inclusion and citizenship, the U.S. president noted that
“these are young people who study in our schools, they play in our neigh-
borhoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag.
They are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but
one: on paper.”134 A similar narrative of integration, justifying regulariza-
tion, could be constructed for millions of other irregular migrants in the
United States and, indeed, all around the world.
Regularization is not of course a panacea for the problem of irregular
migration, but might be viewed as one element of an overall strategy for
tackling the issue. Other measures that might be taken in tandem with
regularization include providing greater opportunities for regular migra-
tion and providing assistance to countries of origin of irregular migrants
so as to address the push factors associated with irregular migration.135
Failure to adequately address these issues, which are central to the phe-
nomenon of irregular migration, serves only to strengthen the case for
regularization.
Notes
1. Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthor-
ized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011 (Washington:
DHS, 2012).
2. Dita Vogel, Vesela Kovacheva, and Hannah Prescott, “The Size of the Irregu-
lar Migrant Population in the European Union Counting the Uncountable?” Inter-
national Migration 49 (2011): 78.
3. Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler, REGINE—Regularisations in
Europe: Study on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-Coun-
try Nationals in the Member States of the EU (Vienna: ICMPD, 2009), 7, accessed
December 24, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/immigration
/docs/studies/regine_report_january_2009_en.pdf
92 Global Migration
4. Art. 3 i 12 ustawy z dnia 28 lipca 2011 r. o zalegalizowaniu pobytu niek-

tórych cudzoziemców na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o zmianie
ustawy o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej i ustawy o cudzoziemcach.
5. Artículo 122, Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, sobre derechos y lib-
ertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, tras su reforma por
Ley Orgánica 2/2009, accessed December 24, 2013, http://www.intermigra.info
/extranjeria/archivos/legislacion/1297167595059.pdf
6. Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, REGINE—Regularisations in Europe: Study on
Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals in
the Member States of the EU, 30.
7. According to the Council of the European Union, authorities in the EU mem-
ber states apprehend more than 500,000 irregular migrants annually, of whom
about 40 percent are deported. See, Council of the European Union, 7007/14, An
Effective EU Return Policy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014).
8. Joesph H. Carens, “The Rights of Irregular Migrants,” Ethics and International
Affairs 22 (2008): 164.
9. Art. 61 of the then EC Treaty.
10. Art. 63(3)(b) of the then EC Treaty.
11. Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement
the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and
justice (Vienna Action Plan), Dec. 3, 1998, OJ 1999 C 19/1; Presidency Conclu-
sions, Tampere European Council, Oct. 15–16, 1999, Bulletin EU 10–1999.
12. Vienna Action Plan, para. 36(c)(ii).
13. Vienna Action Plan, para. 36(d)(iv).
14. Tampere Conclusions, para. 24.
15. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and
Tools, COM (2008), 359 final, 17.06.2008, 3.
16. Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a Common
Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools. Impact Assessment,
COM (2008), 359 final, 17.06.2008, 24.
17. Commission Staff Working Document on the fulfilment of the 29 measures
for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immi-
gration adopted at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, held in Brussels
on February 25 and 26, 2010, SEC (2010) 1480 final, 26.11.2010.
18. European Migration Network, Annual Report on Migration and International
Protection Statistics 2009 (Brussels: EMN, 2012), 47.
19. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000), 757 final,
22.11.2000, 13.
20. Ibid., 27.

21. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, COM (2001), 672 final,
15.11.2001, 6.
22. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Par-
liament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions—Study on the Links between Legal and Illegal migration, COM (2004),
412 final, 04.06.2004, 10.
23. Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication
on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe, 27.
24. Albert Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option or Part and Parcel of a
Comprehensive Policy Response to Irregular Migration?” (IMISCOE Working
Paper No. 24, 2009), 4.
25. Council Decision 2006/688/EC of October 5, 2006, on the establishment
of a mutual information mechanism concerning member states’ measures in the
area of asylum and immigration, OJ 2006 L 283/40.
26. Council of the European Union, 13440/08, European Pact on Immigration
and Asylum (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008).
27. EurActiv.com, “The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,” September
18, 2008, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope
/european-pact-immigration-asylum-linksdossier-188480
28. See, for example, European Parliament resolution on the links between
legal and illegal migration and integration of migrants (2004/2137(INI)), OJ C
124E, 25.05.2006, 32.
29. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Commu-
nity Immigration Policy,” OJ C 260, 17.09.2001, 4.2.3.
30. Ibid., 4.3.4.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 3.5.1.
33. Ibid., 4.3.5.
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Common
Policy on Illegal Immigration,” OJ C 149, 21.6.2002, 3.5.1.
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Commu-
nity Immigration Policy,” OJ C 260, 17.09.2001, 4.3.6; Opinion of the European
Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions—A Common Immigration Policy for
Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools (2009/C 218/15), OJ C 218, 11.09.2009, 72.
36. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper on a
Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents, OJ C 61, 14.03.2003, 2.5.
37. Ibid., 2.7.
94 Global Migration
38. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions”—
“Study on the Links between Legal and Illegal Migration,” OJ C 157, 28.06.2005,
pp. 86–91, 3.8
39. Resolution 1509 (2006), Human Rights of Irregular Migrants, Parliamen-
tary Assembly, para. 2.
40. Ibid., 12.12.
41. Ibid., 16.5.
42. Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for
Migration and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2.
43. Ryszard Cholewinski, “The EU Acquis on Irregular Migration Ten Years
On: Still Reinforcing Security at the Expense of Rights?” in The First Decade of EU
Migration and Asylum Law, ed. Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud (Leiden: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 2012), 157–165.
December 16, 2008, on common standards and procedures in member states for
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ 2008 L 348/98.
45. It should be noted that member states may exclude from the scope of the
Returns Directive non-EU citizens who are subject to return as a criminal law
sanction and those who are apprehended in connection with the irregular cross-
ing of an external border. The Returns Directive does not apply to persons enjoy-
ing the Community right of free movement as defined in Article 2(5) of the
Schengen Borders Code. See Art. 2 of the Returns Directive.
46. Anneliese Baldaccini, “The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants
under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive,” European Journal of Migra-
tion and Law 11 (2009): 2.
47. Ibid.
48. See generally Diego Acosta Arcarazo, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in
EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament Becoming Bad and Ugly? (The
adoption of Directive 2008/115: the Returns Directive),” in The First Decade of EU
Migration and Asylum Law, ed. Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud (Leiden: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 2012), 179–205.
49. Art. 6(1). The Commission has observed that the Returns Directive “ensures
that a person is either legally present in the EU or is issued with a return decision.”
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Com-
munication on Migration, COM (2011), 248 final, 4.5.2011, 9.
50. Art. 6(4).
51. Art. 5.
52. Preamble, para. 22.
53. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally stay-
ing third-country nationals, COM (2005), 391 final, Art. 6(4).
54. See, in particular, Case C-329/11, Alexandre Achughbabian v. Préfet du Val-

de-Marne, December 6, 2011; C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, [2011] ECR I-03015; Case
C-357/09 PPU, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), [2009] ECR I-11189.
55. See generally Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, “The Conver-
gence of the European Legal System in the Treatment of Third-Country Nationals
in Europe: The ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence,” The European Journal of Interna-
tional Law 22 (2011): 1071.
56. On the issue of the lack of weight attached to an illegal status see especially
Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, E.C.H.R. 2006.
57. Moustaquim v. Belgium, no. 12313/86, E.C.H.R. 1991, para. 43.
58. Case C-127/08, Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform, [2008] ECR I-06241.
59. Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm),
[2011] ECR I-01177, para. 42.
60. Ibid., 43–44.
61. Ibid., 45.
62. Pamela Duncan, “Over 850 Non-EU Parents Get Residency,” The Irish
Times, January 24, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.irishtimes
.com/newspaper/frontpage/2012/0124/1224310673916.html; Pamela Duncan,
“State Pays over €1.2m to Settle Cases with Non-EU Parents,” The Irish Times,
October 15, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.irishtimes.com
/newspaper/ireland/2012/1015/1224325258352.html
63. Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, May 5, 2011.
64. Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v. Bundesministerium fur Inneres, Novem-
ber 15, 2011.
65. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the
European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), chap. 6.
66. Rodrigues da Silva & Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, E.C.H.R.
2006.
67. Ibid., para 43.
68. Ibid., para 44. The decision in Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer has been
criticized for attributing too little weight to the necessary effectiveness of immigra-
tion law. Daniel Thym, “Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR
in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularise Illegal Stay?” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 57 (2008): 102.
69. Nunez v. Norway, no. 55597/09, E.C.H.R. 2011.
70. Ibid., para. 70.
73. Siobhán Mullally and Liam Thornton, “The Rights of the Child, Immigra-
tion and Article 8 in the Irish Courts” in ECHR and Irish Law, ed. Ursula Kilkelly
(Bristol: Jordans, 2009), 403–409.
96 Global Migration
74. Antwi and others v. Norway, no. 26940/10, E.C.H.R. 2012.

76. Ibid., para. 103.
77. Norway, the respondent state in the two cases under discussion, is not, of
course, a member of the EU, but all 28 EU member states are members of the
Council of Europe and therefore bound by the decisions of the ECtHR.
78. Slivenko et al. v Latvia, no. 48321/99, E.C.H.R. 2003.
80. Art. 6 TEU, Consolidated Versions of the TEU and the TFEU OJ 2010/C
83/01, March 30, 2010.
81. Ibid.
82. Art. 51(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C
364/1.
83. Ibid., Art. 52(3) and 53.
84. Ibid., Art. 52(3).
85. For more on the changes wrought by Lisbon on the EU legal and institutional
landscape and the human rights potential they could unlock, see Sergio Carrera,
“The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, Asylum and
Borders: The Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme,” in The
First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, ed. Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 229–254.
86. Communication from the Commission on policy priorities in the fight
against illegal immigration of third-country nationals, COM (2006), 402 final,
19.07.2006, 8; Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council: An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen,
COM (2009), 262 final, 10.6.2009, 26.
87. Such as, for example, the difficulty posed by member states’ reluctance to
commit to common policies that limit their freedom to legislate on migration. See
Elizabeth Collett, The EU Immigration Pact—from Hague to Stockholm, via Paris
(Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2008), 3.
88. Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise
of a Formidable Machinery (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), 14.
89. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, “Deportation, Social Control, and Punish-
ment: Some Thoughts on Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,” Harvard Law Review
113 (June 2000): 1889; Paul B. Hunker III, “Cancellation of Removal or Cancel-
lation of Relief? The IIRIRA Amendments: A Review and Critique of Section
240(A)(A) of the INA,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2000): 1.
90. Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement, 8.
91. Ibid., 11.
92. See, for example, section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). Section 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No.
68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924), however, provided for deportation of most migrants
“who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been at the time
of entry not entitled under this Act to enter the United States, or to have remained
therein for a longer time than permitted under this Act.” See also Mae M. Ngai,
Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 59–60.
93. Registry Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1512 (1929).
94. Julia Preston and Fernanda Santos, “A Record Latino Turnout, Solidly Back-
ing Obama,” New York Times, November 7, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/with-record-turnout-latinos-solidly
-back-obama-and-wield-influence.html
95. Donald M. Kerwin, More Than IRCA: US Legalization Programs and the Cur-
rent Policy Debate (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2010).
96. The number of irregular migrants whose status has been regularized on
foot of private immigration bills is miniscule. See, generally, Kati L. Griffith, “Per-
fecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and Deportable
Lawful Permanent Residents,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 18 (2004):
273; Margaret Mikyung Lee, Private Immigration Legislation: CRS Report RL33024
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007).
97. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(51), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51);
USCIS Memorandum on Adjustment of status for VAWA self-petitioner who is pres-
ent without inspection April 11, 2008, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www
.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998
-2008/2008/vawa_11apr08.pdf
98. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)
(T).
99. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)
(U).
100. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
101. Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
2 Pub. Papers 1522 (Nov. 6 1986).
102. This description of IRCA is based on the analysis in Amanda Levinson,
The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants: Literature Survey and Country Case
Studies (Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 2005), 16–18; Hiroshi
Motomura, “What Is “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”? Taking the Long
View,” Arkansas Law Review 64 (2010): 225–240; and Kerwin, More Than IRCA.
103. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
104. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1).
105. See, generally, Hiroshi Motomura et al., “Executive Authority to Grant
Administrative Relief for DREAM Act Beneficiaries” (Letter to the President, May
28, 2012), accessed December 24, 2012, http://millermayer.com/news/law-pro
fs-write-to-president-on-executive-options-for-granting-relief-to-dream-act-benef
iciaries.html
106. “DHS Establishes Interim Relief for Widows of U.S. Citizens,” June 9,
2009, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs
-establishes-interim-relief-widows-us-citizens
98 Global Migration
107. “Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians,” March 23, 2009, accessed
December 24, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential
-memorandum-regarding-deferred-enforced-departure-liberians
108. For the use of deferred action in immigration law, see generally Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, “Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transpar-
ency in Immigration Law,” University of New Hampshire Law Review 10 (2012): 1.
109. “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children,” June 15, 2012, accessed December 24,
2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion
-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
110. Migration Policy Institute, “As Many as 1.4 Million Unauthorized Immi-
grant Youth Could Gain Relief from Deportation under Obama Administration
Grant of Deferred Action,” June 15, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012, http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/news/2012_06_15.php
111. For the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, see, generally,
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, “The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law,” Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 9 (2010): 243.
112. “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigra-
tion Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens,” June 17, 2011, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.ice
.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
113. Motomura, “What Is ‘Comprehensive Immigration Reform’?,” 227.
114. See, for example, Andrew Ayers, “Legislative Developments: Advancing
the Status of Undocumented Immigrants,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 18
(2003): 211–213.
115. Julia Preston and Fernanda Santos, “A Record Latino Turnout, Solidly
Backing Obama,” New York Times, November 7, 2012, accessed December
24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/with-record-turnout
-latinos-solidly-back-obama-and-wield-influence.html
116. Ibid.
117. Julia Preston, “Republicans Reconsider Positions on Immigration,” New
York Times, November 9, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/11/10/us/politics/republicans-reconsider-positions-on-immigration.html
?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y&_r=0
118. Ibid.
119. Julia Preston, “Young Leaders Cast a Wider Net for Immigration Reform,”
New York Times, December 2, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012, http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/us/young-leaders-cast-a-wider-net-for-immigration-ref
orm.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y
120. Between January 1 and June 30, 2011, ICE removed over 46,000 migrant
parents of U.S. citizen children. See ICE, Deportation of Parents of U.S.-Born Citi-
zens: Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress. Second Semi-Annual Report (Washington:
DHS, 2012), 4.
121. “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion for the Removal of Aliens,” op. cit.
122. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 82 and 86. For a critique of Ngai’s influential and
widely acclaimed work, see Nazgool Ghandnoosh and Roger Waldinger, “Strange-
ness at the Gates: The Peculiar Politics of American Immigration,” International
Migration Review 40 (2006): 719.
123. Joseph H. Carens, “The Case for Amnesty,” in Immigrants and the Right to
Stay, Joseph H. Carens (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2010), 25–26.
124. Ibid., 23.
125. See, generally, Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, REGINE—Regularisations in
Europe: Study on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-
Country Nationals in the Member States of the EU.
126. Marc R. Rosenblum, Immigrant Legalization in the United States and
European Union: Policy Goals and Program Design (Washington: Migration Policy
Institute, 2010), 7.
127. For example, the legislation governing Poland’s 2012 regularization
program provided that the two years’ residence granted to successful applicants
was not reckonable toward the period of continuous legal residence required by
persons seeking long-term residence status in the European Union. Art. 3 ust. 6
ustawy z dnia 28 lipca 2011 r. o zalegalizowaniu pobytu niektórych cudzoziemców
na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o zmianie ustawy o udzielaniu
cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i ustawy o
cudzoziemcach.
128. Motomura, “What Is ‘Comprehensive Immigration Reform’?,” 233.
129. See, for example, Emanuela Paoletti, “Deportation, non-deportability and
ideas of membership” (Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series 65, Oxford,
July 2010).
130. Owen Fiss, “The Immigrant as Pariah” in A Community of Equals: The Con-
stitutional Protection of New Americans, Owen Fiss (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999),
3–21.
131. Linda Bosniak, response to Carens’s “The Case for Amnesty,” in Immi-
grants and the Right to Stay, 90.
132. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
133. Carens, “The Case for Amnesty,” 2010, op. cit.
134. “Remarks by the President on Immigration,” June 15, 2012, accessed
December 24, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15
/remarks-president-immigration
135. As suggested by, among many others, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe. See Resolution 1568 (2007), Regularisation Programmes for
Irregular Migrants, Parliamentary Assembly, 20.1–20.4.
CHAPTER FIVE
National Voting Rights for

Permanent Residents
New Zealand’s Experience
Kate McMillan
Introduction
New Zealand is widely recognized as having the most liberal approach
to voting rights for noncitizens in the world.1 One of only four countries
to permit noncitizens to vote in national elections, it is by far the most
inclusive of those four,2 extending voting rights to permanent residents
after only one year’s residence. As such, analysis of the New Zealand expe-
rience has much to contribute to international debates about the benefits
and risks associated with the provision of national voting rights to nonciti-
zens. It offers a unique empirical case with which to examine questions
such as whether enfranchising noncitizens leads to better integration out-
comes for immigrants or, less positively, allows immigrant minorities to
exercise a political influence incommensurate with their understanding of,
or commitment to, their country of residence. Such questions are of more
than academic interest to the vast number of migrants around the world
disenfranchised by electoral rules based on an exclusively or largely
national understanding of political community. For citizenship theorists
too, the New Zealand case should be of interest. Its extension of voting
rights to nonresident citizens in addition to noncitizen residents has cre-

ated a model of political community flexible enough to accommodate New
Zealand’s current experiences of high immigration and emigration and
rapid diversification. The inability of noncitizens to stand for public office
at the national or local government level in New Zealand, however, reflects
more common international practices of defining political community
through citizenship status.
Intriguingly, and despite growing international interest in New Zealand’s
electoral inclusiveness, the policy has generated little discussion in its
domestic context. Virtually no academic or official research has been
conducted on the levels or consequences of noncitizen voting in New
Zealand, and the issue has never been electorally salient.3 An optimistic—
and plausible—reading of this laissez-faire attitude might be that few
or none of the negative consequences feared by opponents of national
voting rights for noncitizens have come to pass. This might lead to a
further assumption: that other countries, too, have little to fear from
extending national voting rights to noncitizens. Alternatively, however,
we might ask whether the absence of controversy surrounding noncitizen
voting in New Zealand springs from factors unique to that country. We
should, by this account, be open to the possibility first, that the policy
is uncontroversial for reasons other than its untrammeled success, and
second, that even if it were possible to assert with some confidence that
the granting of national voting rights has led to wholly positive outcomes
in the New Zealand context, such outcomes may not be replicated in other
contexts.
In this chapter I argue that there are, indeed, a number of historical,
cultural, and geopolitical factors specific to New Zealand that help explain
both why permanent residents were granted the vote in 1975, and why
that decision remains uncontroversial and underresearched almost 40
years later. I also argue, however, that although there are limited data with
which to identify either positive or negative effects of noncitizen voting in
New Zealand, those data that are available tend to suggest that permanent
residents vote much less frequently than citizens, making it unlikely that
they exercise undue political influence. Even with proportional represen-
tation, for example, and strikingly high levels of migration, no immigrant
parties have gained representation in the New Zealand parliament. Thus,
although undoubtedly much more empirical research is needed into how
New Zealand permanent residents and citizens view the relationship
between noncitizen voting rights and things such as political community,
solidarity, identity, and membership, to date the New Zealand experience
of noncitizen voting is reassuring rather than alarming.
National Voting Rights for Permanent Residents 103
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first I seek to explain the
1975 decision to extend voting rights to all permanent residents who had
lived in New Zealand for a year. Such rights had since 1853 been granted
to British subjects resident in New Zealand. In this, New Zealand diverged
from Canadian and Australian polices, both of which contemporaneously
removed the voting privileges accorded to British subjects by restricting
those privileges to citizens (with some exceptions for previously enrolled
British subjects). A second section considers the effects of this policy. With
reference to the range of arguments identified in the literature for and
against noncitizen voting, I ask what support the existing evidence in New
Zealand provides for the various claims made by defenders and opponents
of noncitizen voting. Finally, I look at the model of political community
that emerges from New Zealand’s laws about who is eligible to contribute
to political decision making, and reflect on how well this model serves
New Zealand’s contemporary interests as a country of both high immigra-
tion and emigration.
Why New Zealand Extended the Franchise to Permanent Residents

The decision to extend the franchise to New Zealand permanent resi-
dents after one year’s residence was taken with the passing of the Electoral
Amendment Act of 1975. It followed an Electoral Select Committee rec-
ommendation that Section 39 of the Electoral Act of 1956, which required
electors to be a “British subject ordinarily resident in NZ [who] had resided
in NZ continuously for at least 1 year,” be amended by removing the “Brit-
ish subject” requirement. This left the requirement that a voter simply be
someone who was “ordinarily resident in New Zealand” and has “the
intention of residing therein indefinitely” (although the latter was subse-
quently replaced in the legislation by the requirement that a person have
been resident in New Zealand for at least one year).4
British subjecthood had been a central qualification for voting in New
Zealand since the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852. In common with
electoral laws in other British colonial legislatures, the 1852 act drew from
an imperial as opposed to a nationally based understanding of political
community. According to the British concept of subjecthood, those under
British imperial rule were united in their allegiance to the British monarch;
“aliens” were those whose allegiance lay with foreign leaders, or who were
sovereign “citizens” of independent nation states. With the British mon-
arch as the head of state for each colonial legislature, allegiance to the
Crown—British subjecthood—was considered a necessary if insufficient
qualification for locals electing these legislatures. Hence the New Zealand
Constitution Act of 1852 enfranchised all males over the age of 21 who
could satisfy one of three property qualifications,5 but specifically excluded
“aliens.”
The requirement that voters be British subjects endured in New Zealand
electoral law for more than 120 years, 25 of those after the status of New
Zealand citizen was created with the New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1948.
By the 1970s, however, several developments had occurred that brought
to the fore questions about whether British subject status remained the
proper qualification for voting rights in New Zealand. For a start, Britain
itself had begun to abandon its commitment to the imperial concept of
belonging, winding back the rights associated with British subject status
for those born outside of the United Kingdom. In the face of postwar
migration from the “new” Commonwealth it passed a succession of
immigration acts in 1962, 1968, and 1971 restricting the immigration of
British subjects from the Commonwealth into the United Kingdom. By
explicitly distinguishing between the entry and abode rights of British-
born subjects and their children, and British subjects not born in Britain
and without British ancestry, the “common code” of nationality that had
operated throughout the Commonwealth since the British Nationality and
Status of Aliens Act of 1914 was broken.6 For New Zealand and Australia,
closely tied to Britain by means of trade as well as by cultural and historical
links, Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community on January
1, 1973—the same day that the 1971 Immigration Act came into force—
further emphasized this changing relationship.
As Britain began to move away from an imperial and Commonwealth-
based conceptualization of political community to one tied more closely to
national citizenship, so too did the settler societies of New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, and Canada. Distinctions were removed between Commonwealth
and non-Commonwealth migrants in the immigration laws of each coun-
try in the 1970s, and free immigration for British subjects halted in New
Zealand and Australia.7 Australian citizens ceased to also be British sub-
jects in 1973, and likewise, the words “British subject” were dropped from
New Zealand passports in 1974.
Alongside this progressive demotion of Commonwealth ties was a
heightened interest in nondiscrimination as a principle guiding legislation
and policy. New Zealand’s ratification of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1972 had moti-
vated the passage of the Race Relations Act in 1971. Multiculturalism was
adopted as official policy in both Canada and Australia in the 1970s, and
the new Labour government elected in New Zealand in 1972 emphasized
both the growing diversity of New Zealand’s population and the uniquely
bicultural nature of New Zealand society. In a speech at the marae (Maori

meeting place) where the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between Maori and the
British Crown had been signed, Labour prime minister Norman Kirk artic-
ulated the notion that New Zealand’s growing independence from the
United Kingdom came with a new awareness of and appreciation for its
indigenous identity and values:
Now as a nation we are independent and on our own. As Britain joins her
destiny with Europe, we must draw more upon the spiritual and cultural
strength of the people who make our nation. We are ready. I know that we
have not reached the end of the road; we have scarcely started on the jour-
ney. The Maori people, similarly, have not reached the end of the road. All
of us together are in our way making New Zealand.8
It was in this environment that New Zealand, like Canada and Australia,
began to question whether the imperial conception of political community
was still an appropriate basis on which to allocate political rights.
For the Electoral Select Committee established in 1973 to consider
changes to the 1956 Electoral Act the question of British subject status as
a qualification for voting was greatly overshadowed by a number of other
issues, including, most significantly, those concerning Maori electoral rep-
resentation. In respect of this the Select Committee’s report recommended
a nonracial, self-selecting definition of Maori for the purposes of establish-
ing Maori seats. It also recommended that the Representation Commission
responsible for setting electoral boundaries employ the same population
ratios for Maori representation as for non-Maori representation.9 Other
important changes recommended by the Committee included the reduc-
tion of the voting age from 21 to 18, the enfranchisement of convicted
prison inmates, and measures to allow for election-day enrollment for
those who would otherwise be disenfranchised.10 The principles of equal-
ity, nondiscrimination, and a desire to increase electoral inclusion charac-
terize all the Committee’s recommendations.
Initial advice from the chief electoral officer to the Select Committee,11
however, and from the secretary of justice to the minister of justice,12 sug-
gested a more restrictive rather than more inclusive definition of an elector
was under consideration, with both stating that the appropriate qualifica-
tion to be an elector was now New Zealand citizenship. Papers put before
the committee included extracts from Michael Ameller’s 1966 comparative
study of parliaments, which stated, “[T]he primary condition for the exer-
cise of the franchise embodied in all codes of electoral law is that of nation-
ality.”13 Other reports detailed changes to the electoral qualifications in
Canada, where British subjecthood as a qualification to vote had been

replaced by Canadian citizenship (with provisions for already enfranchised
British subjects) in 1975, and discussed similar proposals in Australia.
Such advice ensured the committee was fully aware that a decision to
extend the franchise to permanent residents rather than restrict it to citi-
zens would go against an emerging postcolonial norm in which political
rights were based explicitly on formal membership of a nationally con-
strued community.
Archival evidence offers few clues as to why the committee erred on the
side of inclusion. Only three of the 34 submissions received by the Select
Committee concerned Section 39. All three supported removal of British
subject status as a qualification for voting, but they differed on the ques-
tion of whether voting rights should be restricted to New Zealand citizens
or extended to all permanent residents. The Republican Movement took
the former view, arguing, colorfully, that:
The Electoral Act is one of the ugliest colonial fossils embedded in New
Zealand’s legislative record. Many of its provisions are simply carry-overs
from the British Parliamentary Representation Act. It gives foreigners from
England a vote in a country which is not theirs. . . .
We propose that the term “British subject” be deleted entirely from the
Act, to be replaced by the words “New Zealand citizen” meaning a person
born in, or naturalised, as a citizen of New Zealand. This is the first indis-
pensable step to the de-colonisation of the Act.14
An alternative view was expressed in submissions from the School of

Political Science and Public Administration at Victoria University of Wel-
lington and from the Auckland University Labour Club. Both emphasized
the need for voting qualifications to be based on the principle of nondis-
crimination, with the Victoria University submission arguing:
It is difficult to see why a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, who is classified

in the Electoral Act as a British subject, should have special preference over
a person from the Netherlands or the United States of America. Moreover,
in light of changes that have taken place in the Commonwealth over the last
two decades there appears to be little justification any longer for retaining a
distinction between British subjects and others for purposes of qualifying as
New Zealand electors. We propose that the qualification for registration be
standardised for all non-New Zealand persons. One alternative is New Zea-
land citizenship. Another alternative, which we prefer, is simply two years’
continuous residence in New Zealand and a stated intention to reside in
New Zealand.15
Similarly, the Auckland University Labour Club argued Section 39

“unfairly discriminates between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth
citizens and unnecessarily eliminates permanent residents in New Zealand
who have as much concern about this country as citizens.”16
The committee’s report is ambivalent on the question of which option
was preferable. Although they stated that New Zealand citizenship was
now the characteristic that defined a New Zealander, they were concerned
about excluding “certain” migrants from voting rights, acknowledging that
many British subjects and Irish citizens had “unfortunately” chosen not to
naturalize. Recognizing that Canada had already restricted voting rights
to citizens, and Australia was considering doing the same, the committee
said it felt the time was “not opportune” in New Zealand for a similar
restriction and thus recommended voting rights be given to those who are
“ordinarily resident in New Zealand” with the intention to reside there
permanently. Endorsement of noncitizens’ voting rights was, however, less
than wholehearted, with an additional recommendation that a New Zea-
land Constitution and Electoral Act be passed by Parliament the following
year, at which time the issue of restricting voting rights to citizens ought to
be reconsidered.17
By the time the Electoral Amendment Bill came to be debated in parlia-
ment in 1975 the extension of voting rights to all permanent residents had
become entirely uncontroversial, lost, perhaps, in the much fiercer debate
over the amendments concerning Maori electoral arrangements. The pro-
posed changes to Section 39 were mentioned only once, when the mem-
ber for Waitemata, Hon. Michael Bassett, spoke of the amendment during
the Second Reading:
I think there are a number of interesting points in this, including the removal
of the requirement that a person has to be a British subject. It is high time it
was. . . . This Bill suggests that at least there shall be equal rights. One does
not have to be a British subject any longer; one has only to be over the age
of 18, be intending to reside permanently in NZ, and have been here 3
months or more. That will constitute entitlement to vote. Some people born
in other countries have liked to go through the naturalization ceremony and
become New Zealand citizens, but some have not wanted to do that. It has
often been a matter of like or dislike of the ceremony, and I do not see why
the right to vote should be attached to those people who are prepared to go
through the ceremony and denied to the others.18
Bassett uses language of equality, rights, and nondiscrimination,

similar to that found in the Select Committee Report. Yet his statement is
extraordinary in the lack of importance it accords to the act of naturaliza-

tion. For Bassett, political membership appears to precede naturalization,
and the ceremony of naturalization is neither here nor there in terms of
qualifying someone to vote. This is consistent with a general disinclination
in New Zealand to think of citizenship in formal political terms—itself a
consequence of immigration policy’s more central gatekeeping role during
New Zealand’s settlement period—and the evolutionary rather than revo-
lutionary development of post-colonial citizenship.19
Some part of the explanation for the sanguinity with which Bassett and
his parliamentary colleagues regarded noncitizen voting lies with the ideo-
logical spirit of the times, discussed above. Some part, also, lies with New
Zealand’s tradition of liberality in relation to the franchise, dating back to
the original 1852 franchise, described at the time as “the most liberal that
has ever been granted to a British colony.”20 New Zealand was also, of
course, the first country in which women won the right to vote, in 1893.
Rodríguez argues that this tradition of expanding the franchise has meant
“New Zealand’s identity as a nation-state is intimately tied to its status as a
historical, global leader in the expansion of the franchise.”21
Also central to any understanding of the policy, however, is New Zea-
land’s immigration experience up until 1975. In contrast to the experi-
ences of both Canada and Australia, migration flows into New Zealand
had yet to significantly diversify. Migrants continued to be sourced from
what the Immigration Act of 1964 defined as the preferred “traditional
source countries” of England, Ireland, Australia, and the Netherlands. In
effect New Zealand was still operating what has been described elsewhere
as a “white New Zealand policy”22 so that by 1975 only 2.6 percent of New
Zealand’s population came from ethnic groups other than the official cat-
egories of “European” (89.5 percent) or “Maori” (7.9 percent).23 In the
virtual absence of migration from non-European countries,24 Bassett’s
comment reflects ethnic and imperial conceptions of political community
in which migrants—still overwhelmingly British, Australian, or Dutch—
might be assumed to be sufficiently similar to native-born New Zealanders
to make any formal transition from “migrant” to “citizen” unnecessary.25
Thus, Section 39 was duly amended and the provision for voting rights for
permanent residents who had resided in New Zealand continuously for
one year was enacted without controversy.
Since this period, and particularly following changes to immigration
policy in 1991, New Zealand has experienced a very significant increase in
immigration, and rapid diversification in terms of the source countries of
those immigrants. The most recent census from which published data are
available (2006)26 showed almost 18 percent of the population to be from
non-Maori, non-European backgrounds, with projections estimating that

number to rise to over 26 percent of the total population by 2026.27 Such
changes to New Zealand society have not, as yet, led to either popular or
official demands that voting rights be restricted to citizens. Instead, new
justifications reflecting contemporary concerns have been advanced in its
support.
The policy has only ever received one in-depth reconsideration: that
provided in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System
in 1986. Its terms of reference were broad, and the issue of noncitizen vot-
ing formed only a minor part of its deliberations, but its reflections were
informed by principles the Commission applied more broadly to other
aspects of the New Zealand electoral system. These included that “[T]he
process of choice [of elected representatives] should to the fullest extent
possible give each member of the community an equal part in the choice
of Government and a fair opportunity to participate in the process.”28 Rec-
ognizing that the New Zealand policy was unusual internationally, the
committee said:
It may be questioned whether voting rights should be extended to those

who have not become full citizens. It could be argued that their commit-
ment to New Zealand is less than wholehearted and that they should be
denied a right which is elsewhere restricted to full citizens. On the other
hand, permanent residents have been granted permission to live and work
in NZ and usually make a full contribution to the community and its future.
In this sense, they can be said to have earned full membership of the com-
munity and to be entitled to vote. Although the extension of voting rights to
permanent residents is unusual, we are disinclined to suggest the removal
of rights which have long been enjoyed and which may help integrate new
members into our community.29
The two primary reasons provided here—that permanent residents

make a full contribution to the community and thus should be able to
contribute to political decision making, and that voting rights may help
integrate immigrants into society—are among the reasons provided in the
theoretical literature in support of extending voting rights to noncitizens.
It is to these arguments, their counterparts, and New Zealand’s experience
of noncitizen voting rights since 1975 that the next section turns.
The Consequences of Enfranchising Permanent Residents: Assessing the Evidence

Debates about the risks and benefits of extending local or national vot-
ing rights to noncitizens draw from both normative and empirical
arguments. On the normative side, Bauböck identifies two liberal demo-

cratic arguments in favor of noncitizen voting rights. One he calls the prin-
ciple of “territorial inclusion,” which “regards a democratic polity as a
community of individuals who are subjected to the same political author-
ity and its laws and who have therefore equal rights to representation and
participation in the making of these laws.”30 According to this principle,
residence in a particular territory is the marker of political belonging.31 A
second principle he calls that of “affected interests,” in which those who
are affected by the decisions of those rulers have a right to participate in
the process of selecting the rulers.32 A similar but not identical argument
places emphasis on the contributory aspect of membership, arguing that
residents who are required to pay equal taxes to citizens should have an
equal say in deciding how those taxes are spent, via the selection of politi-
cians.33 Arguably, each argument gains normative strength as a migrant’s
period of residency in a particular community increases.34 A further
defense of noncitizen voting is that better public policy is made when the
“knowledge, interests, and preferences of non-citizen residents are consid-
ered along with those of citizens.”35
Normative arguments against noncitizen voting draw from a variety of
conceptions of political community and political participation rights. For
what Bauböck calls “traditional republicans”36 the link between citizenship
and political community is based on formal membership of the political
community over which citizens enact “self”-government. Thus, voting
should be the exclusive privilege of citizens; permanent residents who
wish to vote should seek naturalization. By so doing they demonstrate
loyalty to their adopted political community, as well as an awareness of
and commitment to its particular political norms and practices. Owen
identifies an exclusive conception of formal citizenship in which it is
assumed that “there is a norm of singular allegiance between an individual
and a polity expressed in the injunction of that each individual has one but
only one ‘nationality.’”37 Aliens who owe allegiance to a foreign power are
not, by this understanding, appropriately qualified to be electors. A fur-
ther and even less flexible justification is that of ethnic nationalism, which
excludes from formal membership and political participation those who
do not conform to an ethno-cultural conceptualization of the polity.38
Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka also identify an objection to noncitizen
voting on the grounds that “requiring citizenship for voting purposes
arguably helps to preserve the cohesion and boundaries of the national
community.”39
Alongside and often drawing from these normative arguments are a
range of empirical claims about the likely outcome of noncitizen voting
rights. Groenendijk identifies two empirical claims in favor: first, extend-

ing political rights to noncitizens improves migrant integration outcomes
by stimulating immigrants’ political participation in the host country while
also sending a message to citizens that immigrants are “permanent mem-
bers of society.” A second claim is that immigrants who are enabled to vote
at local or regional levels will be encouraged to naturalize so that they can
access voting rights at the national level and jobs reserved for citizens.40
Both enhance migrant integration.
Groenendijk also identifies a number of empirical arguments against
noncitizen voting: foreign governments may attempt to influence the
domestic politics of countries where their expatriate citizens are enfran-
chised; immigrant minority groups could establish ethnic or single-issue
political parties, weakening existing political parties; existing power bal-
ances may be disrupted with some parties benefiting more than others
from the immigrant vote; and incentives for naturalization are reduced.41
New Zealand’s nearly 40 years of experience with noncitizen voting at
the national level will do little to settle the normative disputes over who
should properly be enfranchised to vote at the national level. Can it be of
more help in relation to the empirical claims Groenendijk identifies? In the
rest of this section I take these claims one by one, and ask how they stack
up against the evidence available from New Zealand.
Extending Voting Rights Promotes Integration and Sends a Message that Immigrants
Are Permanent Members of Society
This claim draws from an assumption, common in the academic litera-
ture,42 that the acts of enrolling to vote and casting a vote are positive
indicators of migrant integration into a host society. The Migrant Integra-
tion Policy Index (MIPEX), which compares levels of migrant integration
across countries, for example, allocates higher integration scores to those
countries that provide noncitizen residents with access to voting rights
and the right to stand for elections at various levels of government.43 Hay-
duk argues this positive relationship between voting and integration exists
because immigrants and citizens alike “tend to become involved and
invested in their communities and the nation when given a voice and
means of participating in social and political processes.”44 Munroe argues,
further, that “by participating in public political life, noncitizens can
develop the deliberative skills and democratic commitments necessary to
stabilize multicultural democracies.”45 Where new migrants form elector-
ally significant blocs political parties are also incentivized to reach out to
such communities, facilitating two-way integration.
There is no authoritative data on the political participation of eligible

noncitizen permanent residents in New Zealand. Major studies on elec-
toral behavior such as the New Zealand Election Study have not contained
questions on citizenship status, and New Zealand’s electoral agencies have
not yet conducted any in-depth research into the electoral participation of
noncitizens. The closest we are able to get to such data comes from the
Longitudinal Immigration Survey New Zealand (LisNZ) run by the Depart-
ment of Labour and Statistics New Zealand.46 This survey interviewed
migrants granted permanent residency at 6, 18, and 36 months after their
arrival in New Zealand (Waves 1, 2, and 3 respectively) between 2004 and
2005. The survey’s focus on recent migrants to New Zealand means the
data will not capture most of those who had met the residency require-
ment for citizenship but chosen not to naturalize. Nonetheless, the data do
tell us something about the electoral participation of migrants within the
first 36 months of being granted residence in New Zealand and thus about
the speed with which political integration is occurring in the migrant
population.
Enrollment on the electoral roll (but not voting) is compulsory for those
eligible to vote in New Zealand. All those interviewed in waves 2 and 3
would have been legally required to enroll. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate
that the proportion of migrants enrolled to vote increased over the 18
months between waves 2 and 3, with 87 percent of those who remained
noncitizens enrolled by the time they had been in New Zealand for 36
months.47 This compared with a total enrollment figure of 93.7 percent of
the eligible population at the time of the 2008 election.48
Given the legal compulsion to be on the electoral roll, migrants’ enroll-
ment is an indicator of their understanding of New Zealand electoral law
Table 5.1 Migrant Enrollment on the Electoral Roll, Wave 2

Enrollment Percent (%)
On the electoral roll 74
Not on the electoral roll 24
Don’t know 2
N = 35,450
Note: The values presented are based on proportions calculated from weighted
population estimates, enabling inferences to be made on the migrant population as a
whole.
Source: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Longitudinal Immigration
Survey New Zealand, March 11, 2013.
Table 5.2 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Enrollment on the Electoral Roll, Wave 3

Enrollment Percent (%)
On the electoral roll 86
Not on the electoral roll 12
Don’t know 2
N = 28,360
Notes: The base data include LisNZ participants who did not have New Zealand
citizenship at Wave 3. All people counts are rounded using graduated random rounding.
Proportions are calculated from rounded counts.
and/or a willingness to comply with it. Electoral turnout provides an even

stronger indicator of migrant integration as it demonstrates the extent to
which migrants took up the opportunity to vote in 2008, the first election
in which they were eligible to vote. Here a much greater discrepancy is
evident between national turnout and that of noncitizens, with 55 percent
of the noncitizens voting in national or local elections (Table 5.3), com-
pared to a national turnout in the 2008 election of 79.5 percent.49
The gap between noncitizen and citizen levels of voter enrollment and
turnout evident in the LisNZ data mirrors Groenendijk’s findings that non-
citizen voters in a number of European countries exercise their political
rights much less frequently than do the citizen population.50 If a positive
relationship between political integration and the extension of voting
rights exists, we would expect to see a smaller gap between citizen and
Table 5.3 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Voting Behavior, Wave 3

Voting behavior Percent (%)
Voted in local body or national elections 55
Have not voted in local body or national elections 44
Don’t know 1
N = 28,360
Notes: The base data include LisNZ participants who did not have New Zealand
noncitizen voting levels in countries that extend voting rights to the

national level than exist in countries where noncitizens are only able to
vote in local, municipal, or regional elections. Data comparing the partici-
pation rates of citizens with noncitizens in other jurisdictions are scarce, as
much data on immigrant voting behavior does not distinguish between
citizen and noncitizen immigrant voters.51 Some data are available about
noncitizen voting in Swiss cantonal elections: these indicate that nonciti-
zens are approximately half as likely to vote as Swiss nationals,52 while the
comparable figure in New Zealand is 69 percent.53 Much more compara-
tive research into rates of noncitizen voter enrollment and voter turnout in
contexts with different levels of noncitizen voting rights is needed, how-
ever, to establish a clear relationship between degrees of enfranchisement
and levels of participation. Qualitative research examining how access to
voting rights affects noncitizens’ experiences of integration would comple-
ment such analysis.
Multivariate analysis of the LisNZ data demonstrate a number of vari-
ables are significant for noncitizen immigrant electoral enrollment in New
Zealand, with the region of origin being one of the most significant.54
Those from North Asia,55 Southeast Asia,56 and the Pacific were less likely
to be enrolled to vote than those from the United Kingdom/Irish Republic,
South Africa, South Asia,57 or North America (Table 5.4), all of which have
enrollment levels nearly equivalent to the national average. Similarly, some
variation in voter turnout is evident by the source regions of those inter-
viewed, with those from North America and South Asia more likely to vote
than those from other regions (Table 5.5). These differences reflect
migrants’ political acculturation in their home countries, with those from
regions with well-established democratic traditions more likely to enroll
and vote than those from regions without such traditions.58 Comparative
data are needed to assess the longer-term effects of enfranchisement on
groups with initially lower levels of participation.
Electoral participation, however, is only one measure of noncitizens’
electoral integration. Also relevant are the effects that enfranchisement of
noncitizens has on the host society. Where migrants are not enfranchised
politicians do not need to take into account their interests, and more space
is created for entrepreneurial politicians to deploy anti-immigrant rhetoric
for electoral gain. This can lead, in turn, to other parties adopting and
competing over the anti-immigrant agenda.59 Conversely, enfranchised
migrants are potential voters and politicians are incentivized to seek their
votes.
New Zealand’s contemporary experiences with anti-immigrant elec-
toral politics are mild by international comparisons. The only party to
Table 5.4 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Enrollment on the Electoral Roll, Wave
3, by Country of Origin
Country of origin On the electoral roll (%)
United Kingdom/Irish Republic 91
South Africa 90
North America 90
Rest of Europe 86
North Asia 76
South Asia 90
Southeast Asia 82
Pacific 78
Other/unknown 89
N = 28,360
Notes: The base data includes LisNZ participants who did not have New Zealand
Table 5.5 Non–New Zealand Citizens’ Voting Behavior, Wave 3, by Region of

Origin
Voted at local body or national
Country of origin
elections (%)
United Kingdom/Irish Republic 56
South Africa 53
North America 63
Rest of Europe 56
North Asia 45
South Asia 68
Southeast Asia 58
Pacific 54
Other/unknown 51
N = 28,360
Notes: The base data includes LisNZ participants who did not have New Zealand
consistently raise immigration as an election issue is the populist New

Zealand First Party, and although it did experience significant electoral
gains from this in the 1990s,60 the major parties have consistently chal-
lenged its anti-immigration rhetoric, preferring instead to compete for the
votes of new migrants. Each of the major parties now presents ethnically
diverse party lists and at the 2011 election nine MPs (7.5 percent) elected
were from non-Maori ethnic minority descent, eight of those standing for
one of the two main parties.61 Six of the nine were elected off their party
lists. The ethnicities represented were diverse: Indian Sikh, Korean,
Samoan, and Chinese descent (National); Tokelauan, Fiji Indian, Chinese,
and Samoan descent (Labour); and a Samoan list MP was elected for the
New Zealand First Party.
New Zealand’s electoral agencies are similarly concerned to “reach out”
to new migrants as potential voters. The New Zealand Electoral Commis-
sion (now the central electoral agency of New Zealand) has identified Pacific
peoples and “culturally and linguistically diverse audiences” as target groups
in their 2012–2015 strategy to increase electoral participation.62
In sum, the limited data available about the political participation of
noncitizens suggests that while noncitizens do not enroll and vote at levels
commensurate with citizens, their enrollment increases with their length
of residency, and there is a smaller gap between their voter turnout and
that of noncitizens with more limited electoral rights. The enfranchise-
ment of noncitizens has also encouraged political parties to compete for
the immigrant vote and may help explain the comparatively low levels of
anti-immigrant rhetoric during election periods.
Extending Voting Rights to Noncitizens Encourages Naturalization/Granting Voting Rights

Reduces Incentives to Naturalization
A second argument in favor of extending voting rights to noncitizens
is that it encourages naturalization. This is usually an argument made in
favor of allowing non-nationals to vote in elections for sub-national levels
of government on the grounds that the experience of political participation
at local or regional levels will prompt migrants to seek national voting
rights via naturalization. New Zealand’s extension of national voting rights
to noncitizens could, by this logic, remove an important factor motivating
migrants to naturalize. On the other hand, increased opportunity for politi-
cal participation through national voting rights could lead to greater identi-
fication with the political community and a desire to take out citizenship.
New Zealand’s rates of naturalization have, in fact, been comparatively high
by international standards, frequently ranking third in the world.63 It is
unlikely this is due to the extension of national voting rights to permanent

residents. Janoski’s comparative study of naturalization in industrialized
countries finds that Canada, which requires citizenship for national voting
rights, consistently experiences the highest rates of naturalization of the
countries studied. He identifies characteristics unique to settler societies as
a significant explanation for high levels of naturalization in Canada, Austra-
lia, the United States, and New Zealand.64 This suggests that while extend-
ing voting rights to noncitizens in the New Zealand case is not a driver of
naturalization, it equally has not acted as a disincentive to naturalize.
Foreign Governments May Attempt to Influence the Domestic Politics of Countries

Where Their Expatriate Citizens Are Enfranchised
This argument against noncitizen voting reflects normative beliefs that
citizenship is a singular form of allegiance; noncitizens remain, therefore,
loyal—or at least vulnerable—to a foreign power.
There is no publically available research on whether foreign govern-
ments have attempted to influence New Zealand politics via expatriate
voters. In 2011 newspapers reported that a Chinese-resident businessman
involved with establishing a new immigrant political party in New Zea-
land, the New Citizens Party, was also behind a controversial bid by a
Chinese government–owned company to purchase a large dairy farm in
New Zealand.65 This raised suspicion that “the real power behind this new
party is the Chinese Government.”66 The New Citizen Party stood a candi-
date at the Auckland Botany by-election in 2011, but although the candi-
date, Paul Young, came third, the party merged with the Conservative
Party prior to the 2011 election and secured no seats at that election. This
incident suggests attempts by foreign governments to influence New
Zealand’s electoral politics may be a possibility. As the next section argues,
however, the challenges facing ethnic minority parties are significant.
Immigrant Minority Groups Could Establish Ethnic or Single-Issue Political Parties,

Weakening Existing Political Parties
As an argument against noncitizen voting this claim makes sense only
in as far as it refers to the ability of noncitizen ethnic minorities or immi-
grants to support ethnic parties: the desirability of ethnically based politi-
cal parties is a question that deserves consideration independently of the
issue of noncitizen voting. Where high levels of immigration coexist with
high levels of naturalization, as is the case in New Zealand, the “danger” of
immigrant or ethnic minority parties forming is present even without the
electoral participation of noncitizen voters. Moreover, as New Zealand

electoral laws require all candidates for local and national political office to
hold New Zealand citizenship, noncitizens would be able to vote for an
ethnic party but not stand as a candidate. Nonetheless, with New Zealand’s
three yearly election cycles and five-year residency requirement for citi-
zenship, tens of thousands of permanent residents are eligible to vote at
each election and seemingly favorable institutional and demographic con-
ditions exist for the creation of ethnic minority parties they may like to
support.
The Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, widely rec-
ognized as providing greater opportunities for minority representation,67
was introduced for national elections in 1996. A 5 percent threshold for
gaining a share of seats based on the party vote is waived if a party gains
an electorate seat. Demographically, New Zealand continues to have high
levels of immigration (40,000 permanent resident approvals annually in
2010 and 2011, each equaling almost 1 percent of the population). In the
year to June 2012 the largest source of those approved for permanent resi-
dency was the United Kingdom (15 percent) followed by India and China
(13 percent each) and the Philippines (8 percent).68 Those born overseas
constituted 23 percent of the total population at the time of the 2006 cen-
sus,69 a number likely to have risen considerably since that time given high
levels of both immigration and emigration. Moreover, some migrant
groups are heavily concentrated into certain electorates, with 73 percent of
Pacific-born migrants and 66 percent of Asian-born migrants concentrated
in Auckland city.70
Six political parties have been established since the introduction of MMP
with the intention of capturing the immigrant minority vote. To date none
have succeeded and no currently registered extraparliamentary parties
appeal explicitly to an immigrant base, although two parties (the Maori
Party and the Mana Party) reflect the interests of indigenous Maori voters.71
An Ethnic Minority Party contested the 1996 election with the intention of
attracting Asian voters in the face of anti-Asian rhetoric from the populist
New Zealand First leader Winston Peters. The party received 0.12 percent
of votes and no seats.72 The Asia Pacific United Party, which sought a com-
bination of Asian and Pacific immigrant votes, received even fewer votes
(0.02 percent) the same year. Both parties went on to merge with the
United Party, which has gained seats in Parliament since 1996, but follow-
ing mergers with several other parties the influence of its ethnic minority
constituency became negligible. In 1998, five sitting MPs who had split
from the New Zealand First Party established the Maori Pacific Party, seek-
ing an electoral alliance between Maori and Pacific voters. After winning
only 0.19 percent of the national vote in the 1999 election the party dis-
banded. Another party designed to capture the Pacific vote, the Pacific
Party, was established by sitting MP Philip Field after his expulsion from
the Labour Party following corruption charges. With the charges still pend-
ing he contested the 2008 election as leader of the Pacific Party and won
0.3 percent of the vote but no seats. He was subsequently convicted,
imprisoned, and his Pacific Party deregistered. The most recent attempt to
harness the Asian vote came with the creation of the short-lived New Citi-
zen Party in 2010, discussed above. Their merger with the Conservative
Party once again removed from the New Zealand party system the presence
of a political party established explicitly to represent the interest of ethnic
or immigrant minorities, although a large number of the Conservative
Party electorate candidates in 2011 came from minority backgrounds.
The lack of success of non-Maori ethnic minority parties to date illus-
trates the numerous difficulties facing such parties. Two routes to parlia-
mentary representation exist: gain 5 percent of the national vote and thus
5 percent of the list seats in Parliament, or win at least one electorate seat
and a number of seats proportional to your national party vote. Both pre
sent challenges. One challenge is purely numerical and may be reduced
over time as these populations experience rapid increase. At the time of the
2006 census 10 percent of the population identified as “Asian” and 7 per-
cent as “Pacific,” including those of the non–voting age population.73 An
Asian party wishing to gain representation through the party vote would
have to gain over 50 percent of Asian votes nationally, and for a Pacific
party, over 75 percent of all Pacific votes. Working against the likelihood of
this is a high level of internal diversity: among those categorized as “Asian”
are migrants from mainland China, Taiwan, India, Korea, the Philippines,
Japan, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia,74 while the Pacific category includes those
from Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Tuvalu. Some
within each category are third- or fourth- or even fifth-generation New
Zealanders while others are new migrants. Those who were born elsewhere
enter New Zealand under a diverse set of visas, ranging from those that
require high levels of skills, education, or capital to those that grant entry
on a humanitarian or quota basis, such as the refugee and Pacific quotas.
Diversity can make building alliances within and between ethnic groups
difficult, and, as the data in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate, the voting
profile for subcategories within the Asian population and between the
Asian and Pacific populations are quite different. Compounding the diffi-
culty of creating alliances between groups that are distinguished by very
different class as well as ethnic profiles75 is the tendency of some such
groups to have low levels of electoral enrollment and turnout.
Parties possibly face a greater chance of success by pursuing electorate

seats in electorates with a high proportion of minority voters. Several
such electorates now exist in New Zealand, including the Mt. Roskill
electorate in Auckland, where over 40 percent of the voters identify as
Asian and over half the electorate were born outside of New Zealand, and
the Botany electorate, where 33 percent of the electorate identify as
Asian.76 The experience in those electorates has been that voters over-
whelmingly supported one of the two major parties, Labour and National.
In the Mt. Roskill electorate, for example, the Labour Party won over 57
percent of the party vote in 2011, while in the Botany electorate the
National candidate won 61 percent of the vote, and in both electorates
the combined National/Labour party vote was around 85 percent.77 In the
Mt. Roskill electorate the remaining votes were spread among 17 minor
parties.78
Nonetheless, as the immigrant population increases, the likelihood of a
successful ethnic minority party may grow, although the barriers remain
high. From a democratic point of view such representation—even if it
sprang in part from support from noncitizen voters—would seem to dem-
onstrate a political system that is responsive to its electorate, and thus a
desirable rather than undesirable outcome.
Existing Power Balances May Be Disrupted with Some Parties Benefiting

More Than Others from the Immigrant Vote
Immigration is frequently controversial precisely because it threatens
to disrupt existing social or economic power relations. In a democratic
society, however, all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or national back-
ground, have an equal right to participate politically. Any objections to
the political power exerted by citizens with an immigrant background
are unsustainable democratically. Concerns about the growing electoral
strength of particular immigrant groups is a topic more properly for
debate about levels and types of immigration policy. An objection directly
concerning the enfranchisement of noncitizens is the potential it gives
those who are not formal members of a political community to affect the
rules governing that community, including, importantly, rules about the
relationship between membership and rights. Political parties, moreover,
may be incentivized to manipulate rules about entry and membership for
electoral advantage, thus permanently tilting the electoral playing field in
their favor.
To assess the extent to which these issues have been a problem in the
New Zealand context we need to disaggregate data concerning the
comparative electoral power of various immigrant populations in New

Zealand from the data to do with the electoral power of noncitizens. There
is a growing body of work on the political participation of ethnic minori-
ties in New Zealand, particularly the newer Asian minorities that have
arrived since the introduction of the points system in 1991.79 As discussed
above, however, the data used in these analyses do not distinguish by citi-
zenship status. The data presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 shows that non-
citizens vote at a rate much lower than citizens, and this, combined with
the diversity of the immigrant population, suggests that fears about the
ability of noncitizens to alter existing power balances in parliament are
likely to be unfounded in the New Zealand case. The question of whether
political parties in New Zealand adjust immigration policies so as to
encourage the immigration of ethnic groups they know to be more likely
to support them is, as argued above, a debate about immigration policy
more than one about the voting rights of noncitizens.
Conclusion: Noncitizen Voting Rights and Political Community in the 21st Century
Concepts of political membership are constitutive of democratic poli-
tics: there can be no “self” government without a clear understanding of
who constitutes that “self.” In all democratic states experiencing diverse
migration flows the norm of restricting voting rights to citizens is under
strain. Many democratic states are struggling to justify restrictive boundar-
ies around the political community in the face of requests from permanent
residents that they be admitted access to full membership.
New Zealand’s 1975 decision to admit into its political community
those who had been resident in the territory for only 12 months set it
apart from other democracies, including the British settler states with
whom it shared so many constitutional practices and cultural values.
Restrictive immigration policies and flows at the time of the decision help
explain why the official debate about the decision was devoid of rhetoric
about foreigners and aliens gaining excessive political power, concerns
that characterize many contemporary debates about noncitizen voting
outside of New Zealand. Yet New Zealand’s noncitizen voting policy
remains as uncontroversial and under-examined domestically in the cur-
rent context of high immigration, emigration, and ethnic diversity as it
did under the opposite conditions. What explains this continuity across
almost 40 years?
One explanation might be that New Zealand was fortunate—in part by
accident, in part by design—to make the transition to a more flexible form
of political community before immigration placed excessive strain on a
restrictive national model. The absence of politicization of the issues tends

to suggest that New Zealand’s inclusive definition of political community
suits its contemporary experience as a country that competes globally for
skilled, educated, and moneyed migrants from diverse ethnic and national
backgrounds, just as it did when New Zealand was a country with strictly
limited kin-migration. New Zealand’s current electoral rules extend voting
rights not only to noncitizen residents but also to nonresident citizens
(providing they return home at least once every three years). This pro-
duces a concept of political community capable of accommodating the
political interests of its large diaspora (estimates put the diasporic com-
munity at around 800,000–1,000,000, equal to 25 percent of the resident
population) as well as those of newly arrived migrants from around the
world, and a local population increasingly characterized by complex
diversity. Political parties compete for the migrant vote instead of the anti-
immigrant vote, and New Zealand’s electoral agencies are encouraging new
migrants to take up the political opportunities New Zealand electoral rules
offer them.
The analysis presented in this chapter found the fears most commonly
expressed in relation to noncitizen voting are largely unrealized in the
New Zealand context, although much more research needs to be done into
when, how, and why noncitizens participate electorally, and with what
results. Whether the tentative findings produced here would be replicated
in other contexts is even less certain. As argued above, New Zealand’s gen-
erally benign experience with noncitizen voting is a product of a number
of unique historical experiences and domestic political concerns. Other
countries may not be able to replicate the conditions under which New
Zealand developed its uniquely liberal approach to defining political com-
munity, and it seems unlikely that any other country will experience the
seamless transition from one form of membership rule to another that
New Zealand has experienced. Nonetheless, the New Zealand experience
has much to offer international debates about the consequences of includ-
ing noncitizens within the national political community, and deserves
much greater scholarly attention.
Notes
1. Rainer Bauböck, “Expansive Citizenship: Voting beyond Territory and Mem-
bership,” Political Science and Politics 38 (2005): 683; André Blais, Louis Massicotte,
and Antoine Yoshinaka, “Deciding Who Has the Right to Vote: A Comparative
Analysis of Election Laws,” Electoral Studies 20 (2001): 41; David Owen, “Resident
Aliens, Non-resident Citizens and Voting Rights. Towards a Pluralist Theory of

Transnational Political Equality and Modes of Political Belonging,” accessed March
14, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/163969/Resident_Aliens_Non-resident_Citiz
ens_and_Voting_Rights; David C. Earnest, “Noncitizen Voting Rights: A Survey of
an Emerging Democratic Norm” (paper presented at the annual convention of the
American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28–31,
2003), accessed February 1, 2013, http://www.voting-right.org/downloads/Info
_Pdf/Earnest-noncitizen-voting-APSA_2003.pdf; Christina M. Rodríguez, “Non-
citizen Voting and the Extra Constitutional Construction of the Polity,” I • CON 8
(2010): 30; Immigrant Voting Project, “Noncitizen Voting Rights around the World:
An Overview,” accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.immigrantvoting.org/mate
rial/TIMELINE.html.
2. Noncitizens who have been resident in Chile for five years may vote in
national elections, in Malawi after seven years, and in Uruguay after eight years’
residence.
3. Notable exceptions include Anne Henderson, “Immigrants and Electoral
Enrolment. Do the Numbers Add Up?” Statistics New Zealand Working Paper No.
13-01 (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 2013), accessed March 25, 2013,
http://apo.org.au/research/immigrants-and-electoral-enrolment-do-numbers-add;
Fiona Barker, “Le droit de vote des étrangers en Nouvelle-Zélande,” Migrations
Société (March–April 2013): 146.
4. Electoral Select Committee, “Report of the Electoral Act Committee 1975,”
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, I.15, Vol. IV (Wel
lington: Government Printer, 1975).
5. Neill Atkinson, Adventures in Democracy: A History of the Vote in New Zealand
(Dunedin: University of Otago Press and Electoral Commission, 2003): 23.
6. Kate McMillan, “Developing Citizens. Subjects, Aliens and Citizens in New
Zealand since 1840,” in Tangata Tangata: The Changing Ethnic Contours of New
Zealand, eds. Paul Spoonley, Cluny Macpherson, and David Pearson (Victoria:
Thomson Dunmore Press, 2004), 278–279.
7. M. D. R. Evans, “Choosing to Be a Citizen: The Time-Path of Citizenship in
Australia,” International Migration Review 22 (1988): 243; Irene Bloemraad, Incor-
porating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2006), 25.
8. Brian Easton, The Nationbuilders (Auckland: Auckland University Press,
2001).
9. Atkinson, 187.
10. Atkinson, 186.
11. Mr. R. Cameron, Secretary of Justice, “Letter to the Minister of Justice about the
Upcoming Revision of the Electoral Act” (March 28, 1974). National Archives refer-
ence number ABCL W4035 Box 8, Record Number E 1 / 2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
12. J. E. Wright, “Draft Submission from the Chief Electoral Officer on the
Review of the Electoral Act” (February 11, 1974). National Archives reference
number ABCL W4035 Box 8, Record Number E 1 / 2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
13. Michael Ameller, Parliaments: A Comparative Study on the Structure and

Functioning of Representative Institutions in Fifty-Five Countries. A New and Com-
pletely Revised Edition (London: Cassell, and Interparliamentary Union, 1966).
National Archives reference number ABCL W4035 Box 8, Record Number E 1 /
2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
14. Republican Movement, “Submission to the Electoral Select Committee”
(1974). National Archives reference number ABCL W4035 Box 8, Record Num-
ber E 1 / 2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
15. R. M Alley, J. A. Halligan, P. R. Harris, Prof. J. L. Roberts, and Dr. A. D.
Robinson, “Submission from the Victoria University of Wellington School of Polit-
ical Science and Public Administration to the Electoral Select Committee” (June,
1974). National Archives reference number ABCL W4035 Box 8, Record Number
E 1 / 2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
16. Auckland University Labour Club, “Submission to the Electoral Select
Committee” (1974). National Archives reference number ABCL W4035 Box 8,
Record Number E 1 / 2, Part 2, 1974–1975.
17. Electoral Select Committee, “Report of the Electoral Act Committee
1975” Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, I.15, Vol. IV
(Wellington: Government Printer, 1975). The new national government elected in
1975 did not take up the committee’s recommendation.
18. Michael Bassett, “Second Reading of the Electoral Amendment Bill,” New
Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 398 (June 12, 1975): 2095.
19. See McMillan (2004): 269.
20. William Swainson, New Zealand and Its Colonization (London: Smith, Elder
& Co., 1859), 291.
21. Christina M. Rodríguez, “Noncitizen Voting and the Extra Constitutional
Construction of the Polity,” I • CON 8 (2010): 40.
22. Paul Spoonley and Richard Bedford, Welcome to Our World? Immigration and
the Reshaping of New Zealand (Auckland: Dunmore Publishing, 2012), 35.
23. New Zealand Department of Statistics, The Population of New Zealand 1974,
United Nations Committee for International Coordination of National Research in
Demography Series (Wellington: Department of Statistics, 1974), accessed March
10, 2013, http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c-c37.pdf.
24. The largest source of non-European migrants was from the Pacific Islands,
constituting 7.3 percent of those born overseas at the time of the 1971 census.
New Zealand Department of Statistics, The Population of New Zealand 1974, United
Nations Committee for International Coordination of National Research in
Demography Series (Wellington: Department of Statistics 1974), accessed March
10, 2013, http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c-c37.pdf.
25. McMillan (2004): 269.
26. A census planned for 2011 was cancelled due to social disruption follow-
ing a severe earthquake in Christchurch. Data are not yet available for the census
undertaken in March 2013.
27. Ministry for Social Development, The Social Report 2010, accessed March
10, 2013, http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/people/ethnic-composition-popul
ation.html.
28. Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report of the Royal Commission on
the Electoral System 1986, accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.elections.org.nz/
voting-system/mmp-voting-system/report-royal-commission-electoral-system-1986.
29. Ibid.
30. Bauböck, 2005.
31. See also, R. S. Katz, Democracy and Elections (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997); David Owen, “Resident Aliens, Non-resident Citizens and Voting
Rights. Towards a Pluralist Theory of Transnational Political Equality and Modes
of Political Belonging,” accessed March 14, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/16
3969/Resident_Aliens_Non-resident_Citizens_and_Voting_Rights.
32. Bauböck, 2005.
33. André Blais, Louis Massicotte, and Antoine Yoshinaka, “Deciding Who Has the
Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis of Election Laws,” Electoral Studies 20 (2001):
41; Kees Groenendijk, “Local Voting Rights for Non-Citizens in Europe: What We
Know and What We Need to Know” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute,
2008), accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/local
-voting-rights-non-nationals-europe-what-we-know-and-what-we-need-learn.
34. Kees Groenendijk, “Local Voting Rights for Non-Citizens in Europe: What
We Know and What We Need to Know” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Insti-
tute, 2008), 5.
35. Daniel Munroe, “Integration Through Participation: Non-Citizen Resident
Voting Rights in an Era of Globalization,” International Migration & Integration 9
(2008): 43.
36. Bauböck (2005): 685.
37. Owen, 2.
38. Bauböck (2005): 685.
39. André Blais, Louis Massicotte, and Antoine Yoshinaka, “Deciding Who Has
the Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis of Election Laws,” Electoral Studies 20
(2001): 52.
40. Groenendijk, 2008.
41. Ibid.
42. Marco Martiniello, “Political Participation, Mobilisation and Representation
of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe,” in Migration and Citizenship, ed.
Rainer Bauböck (Amsterdam: IMESCO and Amsterdam University Press, 2006): 84,
accessed March 20, 2013, http://dare.uva.nl/document/45576; Daniel Munroe
(2008); Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), accessed March 13, 2013, http://
www.mipex.eu/political-participation; Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld, “Bench-
marking in Immigrant Integration” (Rotterdam: European Research Centre on
Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) and Erasmus University Rotterdam,
2003), accessed March 13, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library

/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/general/benchmarking_final_en.pdf.
43. MIPEX, 2013.
44. R. Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United
States (New York: Routledge, 2006), 63.
45. Munroe (2008), 65.
46. Migrants approved for permanent residence between November 1, 2004,
and October 31, 2005. At wave 1 there were a total of 7,137 participants, at Wave
2 there were 6,069 participants, and by Wave 3 there were 5,144 participants.
See: http://dol.govt.nz/publications/research/lisnz.
47. New Zealand’s naturalization laws changed in 2005, increasing the resi-
dency requirement for citizenship from three to five years. Many of those inter-
viewed in the LisNZ survey would have been eligible for citizenship after three
years. The data presented in Table 15.2 include only those Wave 3 interviewees
who had not taken out citizenship.
48. Justice and Electoral Committee, “Enquiry into the 2008 General Election
Report of the Justice and Electoral Committee” (Wellington: New Zealand Parlia-
ment, October 2009), accessed March 20, 2013, http://www.parliament.nz/NR
/rdonlyres/536853F3-35B6-4ABE-B791-6460F52F8F2D/116046/DBSCH_SCR_
4509_Inquiryintothe2008generalelectionI7.pdf.
49. New Zealand Electoral Commission, “Results of the 2008 General Elec-
tion,” accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults
_2008/.
50. Groendendijk (2008): 11.
51. See, for example, Groenendijk’s figures on immigrant participation in three
Dutch cities.
52. Immigrant Voting Project, “Immigrant Voting Rights in Switzerland,”
accessed March 25, 2013, http://www.immigrantvoting.org/World/Switzerland
.html.
53. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, “The Political Participa-
tion of Migrants in New Zealand,” Longitudinal Immigration Survey New Zealand
(Wellington: MBIE, 2013).
54. Anne Henderson, “Immigrants and Electoral Enrolment. Do the Numbers
Add Up?” Statistics New Zealand Working Paper No. 13-01 (Wellington: Statistics
New Zealand 2013), accessed March 25, 2013, http://apo.org.au/research
/immigrants-and-electoral-enrolment-do-numbers-add.
55. Includes those from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Tibet.
56. Includes those from the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma, Lao,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.
57. Includes those from India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, and those of Indian ethnicity from Fiji.
58. Shee-Jeong Park, “Political Participation of ‘Asian’ New Zealanders: A Case
Study of Ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders” (PhD diss., University of
Auckland, 2006).
59. Tim Bale, “Turning Round the Telescope. Centre-Right Parties and Immi-
gration and Integration Policy in Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 15
(2008): 315.
60. Kate McMillan, “Immigration and Citizenship Debates of the 1990s,” in
Andrew D. Trlin and Paul Spoonley, eds., New Zealand and International Migration
4 (2005): 267–290.
61. New Zealand Parliament, “Members of Parliament,” accessed March 20,
2013, http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/MPP/MPs/.
62. Personal correspondence with Electoral Commission (March 1, 2013).
63. Thomas Janoski, The Ironies of Citizenship Naturalisation and Integration in
Industrialized Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
64. Ibid.
65. Adam Bennett, “Crafar Player Linked to New Political Party,” New Zealand
Herald, August 27, 2010, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.nzherald
.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10669157.
66. The Standard, “New Citizens Meet Natural Dairy in Beijing,” January 15,
2011, accessed March 10, 2013, http://thestandard.org.nz/new-citizens-meet
-natural-dairy-in-beijing/.
67. IDEA, Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook (Stock-
holm: IDEA Sweden, 2005–2006).
68. Ministry of Business, “Innovation and Employment, Migration Trends Key
Indicators Report: June 2012,” accessed March 13, 2013, http://www.dol.govt.nz
/research/migration/monthly-migration-trends/12jun/index.asp.
69. See note 26.
70. Ministry of Social Development 2010, The Social Report, accessed March 25,
2013, http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/people/people-born-overseas.html.
71. New Zealand Electoral Commission, Register of Political Parties 2013,
http://www.elections.org.nz/parties-candidates/registered-political-parties-0/register
-political-parties-0.
72. New Zealand Electoral Commission, “General Election Results 1996–2005,”
http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events/general-elections-1996-2005.
73. Ministry of Social Development 2010, http://www.socialreport.msd.govt
.nz/people/ethnic-composition-population.html.
74. Statistics New Zealand, “QuickStats about Culture and Identity,” accessed
March 25, 2013, http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2006CensusHomePage/Quick
Stats/quickstats-about-a-subject/culture-and-identity/asian.aspx.
75. Statistics New Zealand, “People and Communities,” 2006, accessed March
20, 2013, http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities
.aspx.
76. New Zealand Parliament, “Electorate Profiles,” http://www.parliament.nz
/en-NZ/MPP/Electorates/.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. See, for example, J. Buck, “The Puzzle of Young Asian Political Participa-
tion: A Comparative Discussion of Young Asian Political Participation in New
Zealand and the United States” (PhD diss., University of Canterbury, 2009); Shee-
Jeong Park, “Political Participation of ‘Asian’ New Zealanders: A Case Study of
Ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders” (PhD diss., University of Auckland,
2006); Manying Ip, “Political Participation of the Chinese in New Zealand with
Special Reference to the Taiwanese Immigrants,” Chinese in New Zealand website,
accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.stevenyoung.co.nz/the-chinese-in-new
-zealand/Participation/Political-Participation-of-the-Chinese-in-New-Zealand-with
-special-reference-to-the-Taiwanese-Immi.html.
CHAPTER SIX
Improving Migrants’ Rights in

Times of Crisis
Migration Policy in Argentina since 2003
Pablo Ceriani Cernadas
Nada tienen que ver las características de los inmigrantes que hoy están llegando a
nuestro país, especialmente a nuestras grandes ciudades, con las de aquellos inmi-
grantes italianos y españoles que han hecho grande a nuestra patria, cuando vinieron
a trabajar y a poner industrias. Esto se ve claramente reflejado en el caso concreto de
muchos delitos que están azotando la ciudad de Buenos Aires con tours de delincuentes
que vienen de otros países, con tours sanitarios que vienen a ocupar nuestros hospi-
tales, con delincuentes que vienen a usurpar casas y a ejercer la prostitución. Argen-
tina hoy vive al revés: estamos exportando ingenieros y científicos, y estamos
importando delincuentes.1
Daniel Scioli (2001)
Introduction
During a legislative debate on criminal law, shortly before being elected
vice president of the nation, together with his running mate Nestor
The author would like to thank Agostina Hernández Bologna for her help in finding and
analyzing the information used in writing this chapter, and Andrea Stilman for her assis-
tance in the final editing. The chapter has been translated by Marinka Yossiffon.
Kirchner, then-representative Daniel Scioli resorted to “arguments” that

had been iterated and reiterated in previous years. Essentially, during the
lapse that extended the years immediately before and after the new cen-
tury, it was commonplace in Argentina to hear anti-immigration discourse
disseminated by different social and political figures.
Using a similar logic to that evinced in various current migration-
receiving countries, expressions and opinions of a xenophobic nature pro-
liferated in Argentina during the 1990s, especially directed to migrants
from neighboring countries. As the economic and social crisis in the coun-
try progressively escalated over the course of the decade, immigrants
became the ideal scapegoat for the many problems experienced by the
population. Hence, the increase of unemployment, poverty, and alleged
insecurity were attributed directly and indirectly to the effects of migra-
tion, despite the fact that statistics and other evidence roundly denied
those explanations.
At the beginning of the following decade, this situation reached an
extreme peak as anti-immigration discourse—based on myths rather than
evidence—gave way to acts of violence against the migrant population.
These serious incidents included instances of the torture of migrants, and
the murder of a young Bolivian woman and her few-months-old infant,
leading to judicial and international claims being filed by the victims, their
families, migrants’ organizations, and human rights associations.2
This scenario, marked by xenophobia, was, in turn, complemented by
the existing legal framework and its enforcement by immigration authori-
ties. Since 1981, a profoundly restrictive immigration law had been in
place, based on the doctrine of national security adopted by the dictatorial
military government then in power. Since the return to democracy in
1983, this law not only remained in force but was also extended, being
also systematically applied by the different administrations that ran the
government until 2003. In some cases, practices were even more restric-
tive than the text of the legislation.
In this context, as the economic crisis became more acute at the end of
the 1990s, two phenomena occurred. First, there was a notable increase in
detention and expulsion measures against migrants with irregular migra-
tion status. These measures were implemented through procedures
plagued by irregularities and lacking the basic guarantees of due process.
Second, and at the same time, claims were more frequently filed by
migrants reporting deprivation of rights, such as health, education, or
labor.3
The economic crisis intensified over the years, reaching its apex in 2001
and 2002. By then, unemployment, poverty, and indigence had reached
Improving Migrants’ Rights in Times of Crisis 131
the worst levels recorded in the country’s history. The statistics on crime,
and especially crimes involving violence, such as robbery, also conveyed
problems of an unprecedented magnitude in Argentina. This scenario was
completed by record numbers of Argentines migrating to other countries,
both within the region in South America and beyond.
Despite this economic state of affairs coupled with the negative social
conception of immigration in some sectors of the society, and the practices
that systematically affected migrants’ rights, the National Congress passed
a new immigration law at the end of 2003 and repealed the so called
“Videla Law.” This new law had been formulated with the participation of
a broad and diverse range of social and political stakeholders, particularly
civil society organizations. This innovative legal framework, rather than
further restricting the rights of migrants, enacted a notable change by
shifting the focus that had formerly guided Argentine immigration policy,
namely security, toward a rights-based approach.
Why was a reform of this nature possible? How could this new immi-
gration policy take such a direction considering the situation of immi-
grants at that time, the prevailing xenophobia, the postures of different
political actors, and especially the context of an immense socioeconomic
crisis? At a global level it may be seen that, when faced with economic
crisis states do often adopt increasingly restrictive immigration policies;
hence it is especially interesting to analyze the course of this process in
Argentina in order to tackle the well-entrenched assumption or myth that
during periods of economic crisis, migration policies do necessarily need
to become more restrictive.
The following pages are devoted to examining this change. They do not
involve a detailed analysis of Argentina’s migration law since this has
already been the subject of various studies.4 This chapter rather seeks to
reflect on the social and political processes that resulted in the shift of ori-
entation in immigration policy in Argentina, in order to offer some expla-
nations as to how and why this change occurred. While this shift took
place in a global context described by increasing discussions about human
rights duties in migration policies, these debates had a critical impact in
Argentina, due to a number of factors to be examined in this chapter.
To do so the analysis focuses on certain aspects that had characterized
the stage immediately prior to the normative change that took place in
2003. It also looks at the initiatives that were propagated by different social
sectors—especially civil society—and describes the social, political, and
economic contexts in which these processes occurred.
In what follows, some observations are made on the principal causes
that gave rise to this transformation and how a first step in the form of
legislative change then metamorphosed into a completely new state policy

on migration. This discussion includes some comments on the impact of
these changes—together with other measures—on issues such as employ-
ment increase and poverty reduction. It also addresses some facts and
circumstances that reveal certain pending issues that contribute to consoli-
dating these changes.
Finally, the chapter provides some short comments on the regional
scope in which this transformation has taken place and mentions some
initiatives that have been adopted—during the same period—in the con-
text of MERCOSUR and other regional processes that include South
American countries. The concluding remarks recapitulate the principal
points of each section in order to share some reflections that contribute to
the broad and integral debates—that are necessary and urgent—required
by a phenomenon that is both multidimensional and structural such as
migration.
Changes in Immigration Law: A Step Forward in Difficult Times

In this section, the situation prior to the adoption of the 2004 Immigra-
tion Law 25,871 is briefly described in order to comment on the events
and actors involved in the legislative change. The following pages provide
some details about the social and political context that oversaw a new
stage in the long immigration history of a country that had received mil-
lions of migrants hailing from different countries and regions since the
middle of the 19th century.
Restrictive Law, Arbitrary Practices, and Xenophobia during an Economic Crisis:

Migrants at Risk, Rights Denied
In 1981, the military dictatorship abolished law number 817. This law,
which had been passed in 1876, provided for an immigration-fostering
policy that was especially welcoming to migrants of European origin. The
law sought to populate the territory and to contribute to the establishment
of an economy based on an agro-exportation economic model.5 In its place
law 22,439 was passed, which later became known as the Videla Law, in
reference to the dictator who exercised presidential functions at the time
of its sanction.
In line with the ideology that characterized South American dictator-
ships of the period, this law was based on the doctrine of national security.
Migrants were therefore perceived as a potential enemy of the nation and
as a threat to national security and public institutions. In addition to
imposing serious restrictions on basic rights such as health and education,

the law also regulated migration procedures without any minimal guaran-
tees of due process. In turn, it established duties of migration control and
reporting of migrants without regular residence that the entire public
administration—including health, education, and civil registry services—
were obliged to follow.
Following the return to democracy in 1983, the Videla Law remained
nonetheless in force for 20 years. During this time, the problems caused by
this repressive legislative framework were aggravated by various factors,
two of which merit mention. First, the two immigration-implementing
regulatory decrees sanctioned by the executive power during the 1980s
and 1990s continued or even deepened the restrictive logic that character-
ized the law. Second, since approximately 1995, there was a progressive
deterioration of the living conditions of the migrant population as a result
of a combination of the economic crisis, xenophobia, and increased
enforcement of the coercive mechanisms enshrined in the law.
The return to democracy—and the spirit of increased liberty and recu-
peration of rights that characterized its first years—had no effect whatso-
ever on the legislation and migration policy in force in the country. Even
though foreigners were no longer persecuted under the extermination
plan that had been utilized during the dictatorship (in alliance with other
authoritarian governments, through the so-called Condor Plan), the law
adopted during the dictatorship years continued to remain in force during
democratic times.
Although the political context had changed substantially, the applicable
law was not modified until the first years of the 21st century. In 1984 a
regularization plan was implemented, in light of the fact that the existence
of the population with irregular immigration status had been caused by
the inadequate policy in force until that time. Nevertheless, only one year
later, the government in place at that time invoked the deterioration of the
economic situation, not only to maintain the legislation in force, but also
to adopt measures establishing new restrictions.6 In line with this, decree
1434 was adopted in 1987. This decree regulated the Videla Law in a nar-
row manner, thereby confirming the continuation of a restrictive policy.
This tendency grew in the following decade. First, in 1994, a new
implementing regulation of the Videla Law was adopted through decree
1023. This decree continued to focus on security and on restricting
migrants’ rights, especially those who were in an irregular situation.7 This
new legal framework had serious consequences as revealed by the increas-
ing intensity of its enforcement during those years through measures of
immigration control, obstacles to the regularization of undocumented
workers, and a number of constraints on basic rights such as health and

education.
This process of deterioration of migrants’ rights was exacerbated by
other factors and circumstances during this period such as the progressive
corrosion of the socioeconomic conditions of a large sector of the society;
indeed the crisis would explode merely a few years later. This deterioration
of the socioeconomic context had a twofold effect on migrants: first, inso-
far as being part of those sectors of society in a most vulnerable situation;
and second, since there was a reinforcement of xenophobic practices that
denied their rights and stimulated their persecution and stigmatization.
In the last decade of the 20th century, the Argentine economic model
was characterized by macro-level growth, guaranteed and promoted by
international financial organisms such as the IMF, and accompanied by
measures such as parity between the peso and the dollar, the privatization
of public companies, and the freeing up of foreign trade and cash flow. At
the same time, these policies were directed toward dismantling the social
protection mechanisms that the military dictatorship of 1976 had initi-
ated. The impact of these measures on the yearly increase of poverty, indi-
gence, and unemployment characterized the atmosphere of crisis pervading
the country, an atmosphere that would erupt a short time later (Table 6.1).
Another of the consequences of the policies implemented since the
1990s (more precisely, the culmination of a process that started with
the coup d’état of 1976) was the rise in emigration. Essentially, during the
years immediately prior to the change of the migration law, migration in
the country was characterized by a growing negative balance, explained as
the gradual increase of the number of Argentines migrating to other coun-
tries, alongside a decrease in immigration from neighboring countries (see
Table 6.2).
Additionally, growing poverty and unemployment were accompanied
by an exponential increase in the number of crimes occurring, as well as
the violence used in committing these crimes. In this context, migrants
began to be used as scapegoats—named responsible for the many
Table 6.1 Unemployment Rates in Argentina, 1990–2011

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
6.3 6.0 7.0 9.3 12.1 16.6 17.3 13.2 12.4 13.8 14.7
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
18.3 17.8 17.3 14.8 11.6 8.7 8.5 7.9 8.7 7.9 7.1
Source: INDEC.
Table 6.2 Migration Flows to/from Argentina, 1950–2003

Years Nationals Foreigners
1950–1954 − 30,221 388,901
1955–1959 − 45,322 208,659
1960–1964 − 48,287 172,938
1965–1969 − 53,874 164,557
1970–1974 − 29,598 271,938
1975–1979 − 168,710 82,778
1980–1984 − 165,416 145,105
1985–1989 − 6,693 168,847
1990–1994 − 75,777 195,834
1995–1999 − 127,539 214,030
2000–2003 − 193,030 67,384
Source: W. Actis and F. Esteban, “Argentinos en España: inmigrantes, a pesar de todo”
(June 2008).
problems faced by different social and political sectors in the country.

Hence, xenophobia considerably increased, incited by civil servants of the
national government as well as some media.8 This situation led to some
extreme situations such as the attacks and torture of members of the Boliv-
ian community, and even the murder of a young Bolivian woman and her
infant child, flung from a moving train while being reviled with insults
about her being an immigrant.
The xenophobia and crisis formed a vicious circle that reinforced the
application of the coercive mechanisms of the de facto law then in force.
Therefore, during those years, the number of detained and arbitrarily
deported migrants increased constantly.9
The positive side of this complex scenario was the gradual reaction from
different social actors to the immigrants’ plight. Faced with this situation,
several processes started to germinate within social movements in those
years: first, the subject of migration began to appear on the agenda of
human rights organizations, such as the Centro de Estudios Legales y Soci-
ales (CELS, the Center for Legal and Social Studies), the Asamblea Perma-
nente de Derechos Humanos (APDH, the Permanent Assembly for Human
Rights) and the Servicio de Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ, the Service for Peace
and Justice), as well as in the agenda of unions (Central de los Traba-
jadores de Argentina, CTA, the Argentine Workers Headquarters). Second,
new migrants’ associations (such as the Bolivian Movement for Human
Rights or Peruvian Migrant and Refugee Women) began to form. And
finally, a process of coordination began to take shape among different
institutions, such as those mentioned above, as well as others with greater

experience of working with the immigrant population, such as the Servi-
cio Ecuménico de Orientación y Apoyo a Migrantes y Refugiados (CAREF,
the Ecumenical Service for Guidance and Support of Migrants and Refu-
gees), the Departamento de Migraciones del Arzobispado de la Ciudad de
Buenos Aires (Migration Agency of the Archbishop of the City of Buenos
Aires), the Fundación Comisión Católica de Migraciones (FCCAM, the
Foundation Catholic Migration Commission), and academic specialists
on the subject (centered around RIMCA, Red de Investigadores de las
Migraciones Contemporáneas en Argentina, the Network of Researchers of
Contemporary Migration in Argentina).
At this stage, the actions of civil society institutions, at first a heteroge-
neous and uncoordinated group, were focused on primarily two kinds of
action: first, the defensive strategies for avoiding regressive measures—for
example, in 1999, they joined forces to oppose a bill proposed by the exec-
utive power that sought to enhance even further the restrictive character of
the Videla Law. Second, actions protecting rights, different in nature and
scope—providing social, legal, and other types of assistance, with the goal
of ameliorating the impact of arbitrary or discriminatory policies and prac-
tices toward migrants. Incipiently, these organizations began developing
actions for demanding rights with strategic objectives, such as a judicial
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the immigration law.
This growing role of social organizations included permanent monitor-
ing of the actions of the legislative branch, especially the Population
Commission of the Chamber of Representatives (the lower house of the
National Congress), where bills directed to reforming or repealing the
immigration law were drafted. Cooperation between these organizations
and the representatives of some political sectors interested in approving a
new immigration law originated and was strengthened in this context.
These ties played a decisive role during 2003 in the process that finally
achieved the adoption of a new legal framework that completely reori-
ented Argentine immigration policy.
The Adoption of Law 25,871: Actions, Motives, and Actors

On the December 20, 2001, the crisis in Argentina reached its acme
with the resignation of the president during a declared state of emergency
and violent repression against the population protesting in the streets; 40
people were killed and more than 500 arbitrarily incarcerated. The expo-
nential growth of poverty and unemployment and the serious decline in
the living conditions of an unprecedented number in the population as a
consequence of the neoliberal style of policies implemented in the country

had led to a politically and socially unsustainable situation.
As mentioned earlier, during those years and especially in this context,
xenophobia increased alongside restrictions on the rights of the migrant
population. Yet beginning in 2002, the gravity of the country’s situation
contributed in different ways, indirectly and inadvertently, to undoing this
negative tendency. Two factors were important in this regard: the crisis
itself, and the emigration of Argentines.
In fact, it could be posited that the depth of the economic, social, and
political crisis, and the identification of the decisive factors, or rather the
identification of the responsible parties—especially political actors, public
officials, the economic and financial sectors—helped “the immigration
issue” somewhat. Only in a forced and almost laughable way could anyone
really try to blame the immigrants as the scapegoats this time. The flight of
millions in capital from the privileged sectors, general corruption, the par-
ing down of social rights, and the policies of structural adjustment (follow-
ing the “advice” of multilateral credit organisms) clearly revealed the names
of the responsible parties, completely unconnected to the immigrants
residing in the country.
Simultaneously, the increase in the number of Argentines that emigrated
as a consequence of the crisis in a short period of time also led to some
social sectors becoming more sensitive to migration and its causes. Although
this did not imply the disappearance of xenophobia, nor did anti-immigra-
tion groups cease to exist, it did contribute to partially reducing its impact
in those years and to creating an environment of understanding and empa-
thy about migration, despite the fact that some actors—particularly in the
media—treated Argentine emigration and immigration to the country in
different and contradictory ways.10
These circumstances were not necessarily the main factors leading to
the modification of the immigration law. The cardinal drive behind the
change in the law—and the new focus for immigration policy—came from
a broad range of social and political actors, in which civil society organiza-
tions played a key role, through which many different actions and strate-
gies grew and refined themselves over time.
Indeed, institutions linked to different churches, union representatives,
human rights organizations, researchers, university professors,11 and espe-
cially migrant associations comprised a socially diverse group that saw
overturning the Videla Law as their primary shared goal. The scope of
work and knowledge of each sector, contacts in the legislature, and differ-
ent experiences in defending, promoting rights, or assisting migrants were
central in the consolidation and strengthening of the collective project. As
a common objective a series of increasingly refined strategies began to

develop. The following merit mention:
• Taking legal actions through injunctions and writs of habeas corpus that sought
to declare the unconstitutionality of the migration law
• Repeated requests for meetings with government representatives (the Ministry
of the Interior, the National Immigration Authority) and presentation of pro-
posals, with basic principles that a new migration law should include
• Dissemination of reports on the principal violations of migrants’ rights, includ-
ing the main problems of the migration law
• Solicitations for access to information about practices of detention and deporta-
tion of migrants
• Participation in public hearings in the National Congress12
• Protests and social demonstrations in public spaces
• Numerous activities (seminars, workshops, conferences) directed toward mak-
ing the violations of migrants’ rights known to the general public and revealing
the necessity for a new immigration law
• Reporting Argentina before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
and several United Nations bodies, such as the Committee against Racial
Discrimination
These activities contributed to reinforcing cooperation among civil soci-

ety organizations and to increasing the effectiveness of the social and legal
services that several organizations provided to migrants, such as free legal
aid. They also generated a series of opportunities and mechanisms for
advocacy in order to increase the chances to change the migration law.
A pivotal part in this process, as Novick describes,13 was also played by
those congressional representatives that promoted or supported the reform
of the immigration law. Different political parties presented bills on the
issue, and finally the Socialist Party representative, Rubén Giustiniani,
drafted a bill in 2002 that was passed the following year. This project, it is
important to highlight, underwent many different phases of consultation
with governmental institutions, civil society organizations, and other spe-
cialists in the field. It was approved after a broadly inclusive process rarely
seen before in the country.
Without going into all the facts and reasons that may have led to the
law’s adoption, it is important to mention some especially relevant issues.
First, there was the adoption of the MERCOSUR agreement to which I will
refer below.14 Second, litigation challenging the Videla Law was brought in
front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Third, the
incorporation of human rights norms into the 1994 Argentine Constitu-
tion was important in making it possible to develop that legal framework
when applying it to migrants. Fourth, there was an energized human rights

discourse in the context of immigrants’ rights on the part of the new gov-
ernment in power since 2003. Fifth, there was a growing immigrant popu-
lation that had no means of regularizing their status. And, as mentioned
earlier, there was the development of a vibrant immigrants’ rights and
advocacy community.15
In December 2002, the Agreements on Residence for Nationals of States
Parties of MERCOSUR were signed in Brasilia. This agreement, recognizing
the right of residence to the nationals of other countries in the region,
entailed a tremendous change in the focus of immigration policies in South
America, something that was then clearly reflected in the new Argentine
migration law.16 According to the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), this critical agreement—proposed by the Argentinean delegation at
MERCOSUR’s Migration Permanent Forum in October 2002—was assumed
by member states as a essential step for pursuing the common goal of
regional integration.17
In 1999, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) submitted a
petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regard-
ing the arbitrary detention and deportation of an immigrant from Uruguay
who resided in the country with his wife and children, all of them Argen-
tine nationals. A few years later, the case, De la Torre v. Argentina, presented
an opportunity for friendly settlement, that is, a place for discussion and
negotiation between the petitioners and the state, with the Commission
intervening as arbiter. In this context, the reform of the migration law was
one of the central issues debated in arriving at a resolution in the case; in
2003 state representatives committed to taking the necessary measures for
such a reform.18
Finally in the stage immediately prior to the ratification of law 25,871,
the government that had come to power a few months earlier played a key
role in the successful completion of this process. This fact cannot be
entirely understood without considering another fundamental issue: the
proximity between the new government and the human rights organiza-
tions, especially on subjects linked to the transition to democracy and the
search for truth, justice, and memory relating to crimes committed during
the military dictatorship that seized power in 1976. Since the beginning of
the new regime, a public commitment had been made to a state policy
addressing these pending obligations; this brought about an intimate dia-
logue with leading actors in the human rights movement in the country.
In light of this budding relationship that required a revision and rever-
sion of the dictatorship’s legacy, the inclusion of the Videla Law on the
public agenda became possible. Presented as a symbol of the doctrine of
national security and policies incompatible with the National Constitu-

tion, the immigration law was rapidly incorporated among the pending
issues of democratic transition that had started 20 years before.
Many different factors converged in that moment leading to the new
migration law. The government’s decision to support the reform comple-
mented the basis and fundamental condition for this change, that is: a
social movement that had been years in coming together, the growing par-
ticipation of migrant communities themselves, the work of representatives
of other political parties, as well as the impact of many actions and initia-
tives that had been undertaken in the previous years by these actors indi-
vidually and in concert. On December 17, 2003, the Senate approved the
migration bill that was signed into law by the Executive on January 21,
2004.
New Law, New State Policy?

As previously noted, this chapter is not directed to examining the con-
tent of immigration legislation in detail, but rather the process that led to
its adoption and the impact and the measures passed after this reform.
Nevertheless, it is important to note a few aspects of the law. Its character-
istic focus on human rights has already been mentioned. This is clearly
seen from the fundamental principles that must guide migration policy,19
as well as its recognition of migration as a right that is “essential and
inalienable to the person, and [which] the Republic of Argentina guaran-
tees on the basis of the principles of equality and universality” (article 4).
Articles 7 and 8, on the rights of education and health respectively,
symbolize the magnitude of the turn in the legal framework. On the one
hand, the former law restricted these rights for migrants in an irregular
situation and required employees and civil servants of schools and health
centers to act as agents of immigration control and to report any irregular-
ity to the National Migration Authority. Taking the opposite view, the cur-
rent law guarantees the equality of nationals and foreigners in access to
these rights and prohibits any restriction based on migration status. At the
same time it requires that education and health services assist migrants to
regularize their migration status.
Other notable aspects of the law are the obligation to facilitate the
regularization as a prevention of a possible sanction—for example, of
expulsion—in the face of an immigration irregularity; the recognition of
all guarantees of due process in immigration proceedings—including in
the duty to ensure free counsel (legal assistance); the principle of nonde-
tention during the proceedings that might result in expulsion from the
country;20 and the guarantee that a measure of expulsion can only be

ordered by a judge or tribunal—and not by an administrative authority.
A few months after the law was passed, two plans for migration regular-
ization were announced with the purpose of granting residence permits
to those who were in the country irregularly at that time. It must be noted
that under the previous law and its restrictive enforcement by the immi-
gration authority, there was an exponential increase in the number of
migrants with irregular residence status. As the National Migration Author-
ity recognized at that time, in the context of policies dedicated almost
exclusively to migration control and a perverse system with impossible
requisites for acquiring residence, this agency ended up being a factory,
churning out the undocumented.21 According to official estimates, there
were between seven hundred thousand and one million people residing
irregularly in the country at the beginning of 2004.22
Hence, in order to reverse this trend, two regularization programs were
implemented: one directed to migrants from countries that were not part of
MERCOSUR,23 and the other called the “Great Homeland” or Patria Grande
(Programa Nacional de Normalización Documentaria, the national program
for documentation normalization)24 dedicated specifically to migrants who
were nationals of MERCOSUR member states parties. The latter was com-
plemented with another important innovation in the law: the creation of a
new residence category for migrants of regional countries. Hence, in addi-
tion to regularization of those who had entered the country irregularly
before 2005, the legislation recognizes—along the lines of the aforemen-
tioned Residence Agreement—the right to reside for regional migrants, first
with a two-year temporary permit and then with a permanent one.
This change with regard to the residence categories is especially signifi-
cant. If one takes the total number of permanent residences granted
between 2004 and 2012 (635,909) into account, 91.86 percent of these
correspond to nationals of South American countries, while of the total of
temporary residence permits in the same period (763,790), 95.09 percent
refer to regional migrants.25 These numbers reveal two important charac-
teristics of the new migration legislation and policy: on the one hand,
a recognition of the reality of the migratory flows into the country, mostly
comprised of South American migrants, and on the other, a will to facilitate
regular migration status for these migrants, regardless of work circum-
stances or economic condition—starkly differentiating this approach from
the instrumental or utilitarian tendencies that characterize migration poli-
cies in many countries.26
One interesting question from the period following the adoption of the
new migration law and the implementation of regularization plans is the
posture assumed by the Argentine state in matters of migration policy dur-

ing regional and global meetings—such as the Global Forum on Migration
and Development. During these events, declarations made by government
officials mark a progressive recognition of the fact that the legal change
reflected a rejection of the formerly prevailing philosophies on migration
issues, and hence, an about-face in the objectives of the migration policy.
Regarding this, the National Director of Migration noted that Argentine
migration policy emerges from “another vision of the State: [a shift] from a
police state to the rule of law” 27 that places people and the protection of
their rights at the very center. The new migration law, according to the
report submitted by Argentina to UN bodies, has a goal of equalizing rights
between migrants and nationals, as established by the National Constitu-
tion.28 Similarly, the National Migration Authority underscored that “from
its beginnings, the principal object of Argentina’s migration policy has
been to ensure in good will that all the world’s individuals have the chance
of settling in Argentine land and, in this way, contribute to the permanent
construction of the Nation.”29
In its report to the UN Committee for the Protection of Migrant Work-
ers, Argentina made a special note of the legal recognition of migration as
a human right: “The right to migrate implies a positive attitude towards
migration and puts an end to viewing it as a phenomenon related to delin-
quency and insecurity. Migration must no longer be seen in a negative light
but should be regarded as a contribution to the countries’ development.
The right to migrate also implies a conceptual distinction between a for-
eigner’s immigration status and his or her human condition, which super-
sedes any other situation. In other words, a person’s dignity, fully supported
through the guarantee for his or her fundamental rights, must not and may
not be limited by the irregularity of his or her entry or stay in Argentine
territory. [. . .] Argentine legislation broadly applies this rule, viewing
migration in a positive and realistic perspective adapted to current circum-
stances and based on the conviction that migrant population is not a
demographic burden but a tool for national growth.”30
Similarly, presidential speeches31 on immigration in Argentina since
2004 are directed to highlighting three primary issues: the change of
migration policy from a control-based to a rights-based focus within the
scope of a process of regional integration; the multiple positive effects of
the different migratory flows to the country both past and present; and the
restrictive character of migration policies in other countries, especially in
the northern hemisphere. This was the content of the president’s 2010
announcement of the adoption of the implementing Regulation to Law
25,871.
Regarding this regulation, it is important to emphasize that it was the

result of a formal participative process, including representatives of gov-
ernment sectors, civil society organizations, and international agencies
(UNHCR and IOM). In effect, National Migration Authority decree Reso-
lution 37130/08 of May 26, 2009, formed a mixed Advisory Committee in
order to draft the regulation for the law.
The measures for migration regularization and the form in which these
were presented and discussed reveal the changes in public policy. The
program “Patria Grande” was presented as state policy—and not as migra-
tion amnesty32—basically for two reasons, or rather, with two objectives in
mind: it dealt with a policy of retroactive regularization that recognized
the right of residence as part of a process of regional integration, and it
described regularization as a mechanism that provides numerous benefits
to the migrant population, the state, and to society in general. In this way,
facets of its contribution to social cohesion and social integration, the fight
against work exploitation, reducing unemployment, and other conditions
of vulnerability, and in general, the elevation of levels of human develop-
ment were emphasized.
Another aspect that should be underlined in political terms is the
regional role that Argentina has taken in the last decade. Since the approval
of the Residence Agreements in 2002, Argentina has been a protagonist
both within MERCOSUR and the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR).33 In this sense, it is striking that, given that Argentina is the
South American country that has received the greatest number of migrants,
it has also been one of the most active countries in adopting many regional
initiatives dedicated to increasing the protection of migrants’ rights. In
other latitudes, countries with similar characteristics are usually the ones
that demand stronger migration controls, if they do not directly abrogate
people’s rights based on nationality and/or immigration status.
Finally, it is important to highlight Argentina’s role in MERCOSUR’s
decision to request an Advisory Opinion before the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, asking the tribunal to establish standards on the rights
of children and adolescents in the context of migration. This and other
regional actions display a striking, and unquestionably heterodox, politi-
cal trajectory: this is the South American country that receives the greatest
part of the migrant population, and far from proposing a restrictive, con-
trol-based paradigm, it has actively promoted a policy of human rights–
centered principles and obligations.
In this scenario, it seems reasonable to affirm that we are facing a new
state policy on the subject of migration. At the very least, it can be men-
tioned that important and necessary steps have been taken for shaping a
public policy that proposes a focus and paradigm that are notably differ-
ent. This difference is seen not only when compared to the policies that
regulated migration before 2004, but also—in some aspects—from the
historically restrictive legal framework that was inaugurated at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, when the Law of Residence was sanctioned in
1902, allowing for the expulsion of foreigners by the executive power
without guarantees or any judicial control.
It is also different from the main tendencies at the global level in the last
two decades, in which many countries have adopted increasingly restric-
tive policies. Argentina changed this logic almost 10 years ago and has
undergone a noteworthy turnaround since that time. This change, for the
aforementioned reasons, reveals a state policy that is based on different
priorities, different focuses, and, above all, different principles. In addi-
tion, it indicates that in times of economic crisis, improving migrants’
rights could contribute not only to ensure equal treatment and fulfill inter-
national legal obligations, but also to promote human development
through social policies that include all members of society.
A transformation of this nature and scope, and especially commitment
over time, is only possible by means of a medium-term process. Such a
process must contemplate a series of multidimensional factors and the
participation of many actors—social and political—at different levels,
local, national, and regional. In this sense, as will be described in the fol-
lowing sections, there are still many pending issues that must be addressed,
deepened, or revised in order to consolidate the transition.
Contradictions, Obstacles, Delays, and Retractors

It can be said that this new legal and political framework on migration
in Argentina constitutes an open process, still in construction and even
still burgeoning, not exempt from contradictions and problems, especially
as regards implementation. These snags are the result of a series of factors
related, on the one hand, to public policy and the agents in charge of
applying it, and, on the other hand, to other social, political, and cultural
processes that span different actors’ opinions on immigration, migrants’
integration in the society, and even the migration policies of several coun-
tries in the region.
Regarding the implementation of the new Argentine migration policy
over the course of the first decade of its existence since 2004, one aspect
most frequently named by different institutions has been the absence
of measures directed to sufficiently disseminating the new legal frame-
work. This deficiency is apparent not only in the lack of mechanisms of
communication directed toward the immigrant communities, but also in

the limited measures for promoting and ensuring compliance by some key
government organizations (health services, educational institutions, etc.),
and in the dearth of initiatives directed toward informing and sensitizing
the general public to migrants’ rights.
These limitations around the dissemination of the law in Argentina,
alongside the duration of the former law, have doubtless obstructed and
delayed the full effective guarantee of the rights recognized therein, not-
withstanding the gradual compliance that has been seen on various issues
(due process, judicial intervention, prevention of arbitrary detention, access
to health and education). In particularly sensitive areas—such as health
care centers, schools, and the judiciary—this lack of information is comple-
mented by prejudice and negative portrayals of immigration prevalent in
various social sectors. A number of recent publications have described
some of the remaining challenges in terms of migrants’ effective access to
human rights, including the right to vote.34
In this sense, possibly one of the most important challenges that must
be duly and proportionately confronted, by short- and long-term mea-
sures, is the question of xenophobia. This is the central challenge for either
the cohesion of migration policy, or else the eventual failure or limitation
of its impact and effective realization. In a more insidious manner than in
the 1990s, some media continue to disseminate distorted representations,
myths, and stereotypes about immigration in the country, especially about
South American migrants.35
Xenophobia is also directly and indirectly promoted by some political
actors. Particularly, the party that currently governs the city of Buenos
Aires—two mandates between 2007 and 2015 under Mauricio Macri—
has on various occasions resorted to trying to link various social problems
in his jurisdiction to immigration. As in former times, or as currently
occurs in other countries, some governments use immigration as a scape-
goat for diverting discussion from the errors and deficiencies of their own
public policies. Debates about, for example, the conditions of the health
care system, or the lack of a policy guaranteeing the right to adequate
housing, are instrumentally distorted by injecting false notions about
migration and its impact into the debate.36
It is certain that due to various requests by the national government
and especially from different civil society institutions, several initiatives
directed toward promoting the rights of migrants and preventing and
sanctioning xenophobia have been developed. By way of example, in
the scope of the Inter-Institutional Working Group, coordinated by the
University of Lanus and UNICEF with the participation of numerous
governmental organizations and civil society, abundant materials are

currently being prepared on immigration, rights, and the prevention of
xenophobia; these are directed to elementary and high school students,
as well as teacher training programs.37 The educational system can play
a key role, especially in the medium and long term, in strengthening
rights and social cohesion in multicultural societies like Argentina.
Another aspect that must be taken into account is the work conditions
of many migrants who live in Argentina. As will be seen in the following
section, during these years the employment situation has improved for a
great number of immigrants. Nevertheless, issues remain, for example,
many migrants are employed in sectors characterized by precariousness
and scant protection of employment rights, such as domestic work, con-
struction, and agriculture. Likewise, there are many reports of labor and
sexual exploitation of the foreign population, some of which have been
traced to human trafficking networks. There is a pending agenda here that
includes, among other things, improving wage conditions and fighting
against human trafficking, especially protecting their victims through a
rights-based agenda.
It is also important to mention that although the category of residence
for MERCOSUR nationals is an innovative and particularly important
mechanism for achieving regular migration and especially for the regular-
ization of a great number of migrants who come to and reside in the coun-
try (in addition to contributing to the process of regional integration), this
might generate harmful effects that contradict some aspects of the law.
This is referring to the difficulties in regularization that migrants arriving
from other regions have experienced. The program for the regularization
of migrants from Senegal and the Dominican Republic was initiated in
January 2013, after a process of dialogue between the state and civil soci-
ety representatives.38 Although this measure is positive, it is still necessary
to evaluate more flexible and creative general mechanisms for dealing with
these situations, on the basis of the right to migrate found in article 4 of
the migration law.
In addition, there is a critical remaining challenge in the process of
consolidating the shift of Argentinean migration policy. While the legis-
lation adopts a very different approach in comparison to the former
migration law, its implementation is still in the hands of the Ministry of
Interior. If the migration policy is characterized by its rights-based lan-
guage and it is described as part of human development policies, then
other governmental organizations should have some mandate on migra-
tion issues. For this reason, it could be asserted that either an interinsti-
tutional body or interinstitutional coordination mechanisms should be
put in place in order to ensure a comprehensive, rights-based migration

policy.
Finally, there are two questions relating to the regional situation that are
of great relevance. On the one hand, the structural causes that push the
migration of thousands of people to the country. It is of the greatest impor-
tance that these conditions begin to be progressively reversed (social
exclusion, discrimination, among others) through public policies on the
national and regional level. On the other hand, the need to harmonize
migration policies of South American countries, as has been already pro-
posed on various occasions in countries in the region. The design of shared
regional legal and political frameworks can no doubt contribute to
strengthening the implementation of policies in the countries that have
already made significant changes, such as Argentina. A later section exam-
ines some of the initiatives that have been approved with respect to the
context of MERCOSUR, highlighting some positive aspects as well as some
doubts and dilemmas that remain to be considered.
The Impact of the New Immigration Policies: Dispelling Myths, Prejudice, and Discourse
It is common to find discourse and arguments about the different
negative consequences that will eventually arise from a migration policy
that guarantees migrants’ rights, especially migrants with irregular status,
and in particular social rights. Over the last decade the voices calling for
more restrictive immigration policies—especially with regard to entrance
and residence—and the inequality of human rights (compared to nation-
als and between foreigners by virtue of their immigration status) have mul-
tiplied in many regions in the world.
As described at the beginning of this chapter, the discussion on migra-
tion in Argentina before 2003, including migration policy, was plagued
with these types of myths, stereotypes, and prejudices. Migrants were
repeatedly pointed out as the main reason for the increasing unemploy-
ment, although there were no official or unofficial evidence-based reports
supporting these kinds of arguments.
In this context, it is interesting to look at information about the migrant
population and Argentine society in general in the 10 years since the
immigration law was passed. Although this is a relatively short time period
in which to seriously examine the impact of the new immigration policy
and identify the most stable tendencies, recent research has already noticed
some of the positive changes that have resulted.
Among other aspects, some studies have witnessed how, during this
time, data on employment, work conditions, and reduction of poverty
levels have shown marked improvement. This trend holds true both for
immigrants and for the society as a whole. Previous sections have shown
statistics that reveal the reduction of unemployment during these years
and its increase in the previous decade. The figures on poverty and indi-
gence corroborate this trend (see Figure 6.1).
Similarly, the figures regarding the work conditions of the migrant pop-
ulation reveal a marked improvement, especially when considering the
increase in the number of regular, registered jobs. The figures in Figure 6.1
and Figure 6.2 will verify this tendency as well as the opposite trend dur-
ing the years of more restrictive immigration policies.
These results are not the direct consequence of a change in migration
policy or of any particular measure directed to the immigrant population,
but rather an effect of a series of public programs and policies in different
areas, such as employment, and social protection, among which immigra-
tion is one of many.
The same can be said in the opposite context: in countries in which
there is an effort to link immigration with unfortunate circumstances—
especially during times of crisis—what is really revealed is the deteriora-
tion of the quality of life of the population as a consequence of economically
or socially inefficient or inadequate policies.
In these contexts, the necessity of more restrictive migration policies is
strongly voiced, precisely with the objective of increasing vulnerability
Figure 6.1 Incidence of Poverty and Indigence, 2003–2012.

Figure 6.2 Employment Trends According to Migration, 1995–2001.
Figure 6.3 Employment Trends According to Migration, 2002–2010.
and inequality, which is another effect—and not cause—of this crisis.

Moreover, these occurrences are harmful to the migrant community, which
is erroneously considered—often for purely electoral interests—as the
responsible party.
It is certain that over these years, along with employment-related poli-
cies such as incentivizing employment and improvements in social and
labor protections, migration policies aided in reducing irregular migration
significantly, as well as equalizing the rights of migrants, especially in the
area of social rights, including labor rights. Several times at the national
level, as well as during international events, the government noted how
these policies, especially regularization programs, were designed under

the auspices of policies fomenting human development, promoting inte-
gration and social inclusion and the reduction of informal employment.39
Finally, with regard to the impact of Law 25,871 it is important to note
another issue that undermines restrictive discourses on migration. Regu-
larizing migration, and especially the category of residence for nationals of
South American countries, has not had any impact on the number of
migrants entering Argentina from these countries. As has already been
noted, migrants from the region represent around 90 percent of Argenti-
na’s migration. The new law created a criterion that very closely approxi-
mates regional free circulation. Nevertheless, this change has not generated
a “pull factor” (efecto llamada). These trends, until recently, have not varied
significantly. What has changed is the increase of regular migration and the
decrease of the number of people in undocumented circumstances.
From State to Regional Policy?

In the last few years, a notable turnaround has also been observed in
the focus promoted by other countries in South America, especially in the
regional and global discussion processes on migration. In the sphere of
the South American Conference on Migration, a consultative process on
migration adopting nonbinding resolutions, as well as in regional organi-
zations such as UNASUR or MERCOSUR, the states have progressively
begun to adopt a human rights–based rhetoric on migration. In this pro-
cess, it must be noted the active role played by Argentina (alongside other
countries) in promoting a new path that replaces the former focus on
national security and migration control.
Among the issues that states of the region have zealously underlined are
the necessity of harmonizing legislation and migration policy among all
the countries; the promotion of equality of rights between nationals and
foreigners without regard to their migration status; the creation of a South
American citizenship; and the adoption of a free circulation zone for peo-
ple within the region.
The level of advancement of these changes is ambiguous and varies
considerably according to the country being considered. Argentina, with-
out a doubt, is the country that has taken the most steps: changing legisla-
tion, adopting regularization programs, and creating a residence category
for regional nationals. Other countries have also taken important steps in
a similar vein. At the level of MERCOSUR, the residence agreements of
2002 and decision 64/2010 are significant measures by which a regional
citizenship is being developed by guaranteeing free movement for people.
But here, as well, implementation has occurred at different rates in each

country.40
The consolidation of a new regional model for migration policy still
faces many challenges ahead, as it has been described by many special-
ists.41 Especially, there remains much effort needed for harmonizing migra-
tion legislation through legal frameworks focused on protecting rights that
will lend coherence to the rhetoric used by regional governments over the
last years.42 This coherence must also drive the revision of some mecha-
nisms already in place at the MERCOSUR level that seem to guarantee
equality of rights exclusively to nationals of countries of the region and not
to all migrants regardless of their place of origin. This would avoid repli-
cating some restricted aspects of the European Union model, so harshly
criticized by South American countries, and, in this way, give shape to a
new paradigm for migration policies. 43
Final Thoughts
Beginning in 2003, Argentina has taken tremendously important steps
in the design of a migration policy characterized by a clearly rights-based
focus. The magnitude of this change can be clearly seen in two aspects.
First it reversed a century of restrictive legislation on migration that had
begun with the 1902 residence law and that ended with the general viola-
tions of rights in a context of high levels of xenophobia, notably during the
last military dictatorship (1976–1983).
This important change undertaken by a host country for South-South
migration has been the result of a meeting of wills and combination of
forces among a variety of different actors in a specific social, political, and
economic context. The tireless work of civil society organizations, com-
bined with legal action and demands for the recognition of rights, the role
of some legislators, and the political decisions of the new government, all
came together to pass a long-awaited law. According to Jachimowicz,44
these measures were prompted by the desire to create a comprehensive
immigration system based on democratic values instead of the previous
military-defined framework, and they were influenced by the growing
human rights movement in the region.
What is striking is that this conjunction was marked by the deep crisis
that unprecedentedly affected the living conditions of millions of people.
Moreover, in the period immediately prior to this change, immigrants had
been the object not only of violations of their basic rights, but also of a
level of xenophobia that had been on the rise, dangerously mirroring the
crisis as it touched ever more people.
The new legal framework was accompanied by a regularization pro-

gram that, presented as state policy, allowed and continues to allow South
American migrants to access residence, amounting to 90 percent of the
migrants arriving in the country. Among the government discourse of the
last few years, a legislative change has been observed that gradually shifted
into new public policy.
This migration policy is notable in a global context marked by the
opposite tendency: restrictive, utilitarian, instrumental policies that are
narrow and myopic, according to De Lucas,45 or directly anti-immigration,
that criminalize irregular migration and permanently reduce rights that
should be granted to all individuals. The discussions are also limited in
global meetings on migration and development, where fundamental ques-
tions such as the structural causes (of migration) and the human rights of
migrants remain backstage, while the agenda follows an economic model
of development in which migrants are seen as commodities that must
increasingly contribute to the economy of destination countries (with their
labor, usually in unequal, precarious conditions) and to their countries of
origin by means of remittances that generate a large number of benefits to
many political, economic, and financial actors.
In the same line, Hines asserts that in an era of increasing emphasis on
security throughout the world, the openness of the new Argentinean
migration law contrasts with the restrictive immigration laws of other
countries, particularly those of United States. Additionally, she adds, the
Argentine law serves also as a breath of fresh air and optimism when com-
pared to the restrictive laws of other countries.46
Therefore, the change witnessed in Argentina is truly interesting, also
because it took place in a developing country. The content of this change,
the context in which it has occurred, and its impact, in large part cast
doubts on or directly undeceives the discourses, practices, and policies
that restrict or deny migrants’ rights in many countries.
In Argentina a number of challenges that must contribute to the more
extensive and effective implementation of the law still persist. These are
necessary for consolidating the changes of a state policy so that it will be
preserved and reinforced over time. Among these issues are the adapta-
tion and adjustment of laws that contradict the migration law, the fight
against practices that deny or restrict rights (e.g., the procedure for appli-
cation for residence for migrants of non–South American countries), the
adoption of interinstitutional coordination mechanisms, and the progres-
sive reduction of employment exploitation. The greatest long-term chal-
lenge is the presence of xenophobia at all levels of the society, including in
the arenas of politics and the judiciary. Similarly, the progress on a regional
level and its orientation will doubtless influence whether this change
takes root or not.
For such reasons, if these and other pending challenges are addressed
in an efficient manner, and this policy unifies on a regional level, the steps
already taken will become a pathway for undoing the restrictive tenden-
cies of the current global stage. This would contribute significantly to pro-
tecting and universalizing the rights of migrants and to strengthening
democracy, social cohesion, and the rule of law in migrant-receiving
societies.
Notes
1. “The characteristics of the immigrants that are nowadays arriving in our
country, especially to our big cities, have nothing to do with the Italian and Span-
ish immigrants that made our country great when they came to work and build
industry. This is clearly reflected in the concrete case of many crimes that are
excoriating the city of Buenos Aires, by the ‘tours’ of delinquents that come from
other countries, by the health ‘tours’ that are taking over our hospitals, by the
delinquents coming to usurp homes and engage in prostitution. Argentina today
lives in reverse: we are exporting engineers and scientists and importing crimi-
nals” (author’s translation).
2. In response to these international claims, the UN Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (CERD) stated the following: “The Committee is
concerned by the existence of xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants, primar-
ily those from neighboring countries, asylum seekers and persons of African
descent. These attitudes, which are manifested even in some of the media, seem
to have increased as a result of the present economic crisis and have given rise, on
occasion, to violent incidents. The Committee recommends that the State party
monitor such attitudes and incidents closely and take appropriate steps to deal
with them” (CERD, Concluding Observations: Argentina, CERD/C/304/Add.112,
27 April 2001).
3. Pablo Asa and Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “Migrantes: ley inconstitucional y
práctica arbitraria,” in Derechos Humanos en Argentina. Informe 2002 (Buenos Aires:
Ed. Siglo XXI, 2002), 421.
4. Rubén Giustiniani (coord.), Migración: un derecho humano (Buenos Aires: Ed.
Prometeo, 2004); Susana Novick, “Migración y políticas en Argentina: Tres leyes
para un país extenso (18762004),” in Las migraciones en América Latina. Políticas,
culturas y estrategias, ed. Susana Novick (Buenos Aires: Catálogos-Clacso, 2008);
Barbara Hines “The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine
Immigration Law,” Cornell International Law Journal 43 (2010): 471.
5. For the sake of rigor, two clarifications are important: first, the populating
policies ignored the indigenous peoples that originally inhabited the territory
(shortly thereafter, they would undergo a real genocide at the hands of the Argen-
tine army). Second, the other goal of law 817, the “colonization” of the land, was
seriously hindered by the land grabs of a few landowner families, which forced
many migrants to settle in the city or even return to their countries of origin.
6. For further information on these measures, see Susana Novick, “Políticas
inmigratorias en la Argentina” in Enrique Oteiza, Susana Novick and, and Roberto
Aruj, eds., Inmigración y Discriminación Políticas y Discursos (Buenos Aires: Grupo
Editor Universitario, 1997).
7. Pablo Asa and Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “Migrantes: ley inconstitucional y
práctica arbitraria,” op. cit.
8. On xenophobic discourse of this period, see Diego Casaravilla, “Crisis Social,
Discurso y Xenofobia,” in Buenos Aires. Ciudad con Migrantes (Buenos Aires: Pro-
grama TODAS por la integración con Mujeres Migrantes. Ed. Dirección General de
la mujer, 2000); Susana Novick and Enrique Oteiza, “Inmigración y derechos
humanos. Política y discurso en el tramo final del menemismo” (Buenos Aires:
Instituto Gino Germani, Documento de Trabajo Nro. 14, febrero de 2000).
9. On migrant detentions and deportations during this period, see Pablo Ceri-
ani Cernadas, “Migrantes: una deuda pendiente. Veinte años de vigencia de la ‘ley
Videla’ en democracia,” in CELS, Derechos Humanos en Argentina. Report 2002–
2003 (Buenos Aires: Ed. Siglo XXI, 2003), 517–536.
10. See, for example, contradictions in the online editorials of La Nación news-
paper, in Pablo Ceriani, ibid.
11. On this subject, the work of Dr. Gabriel Chausovsky, professor at the Uni-
versity of Buenos Aires and the National University of the Litoral, and federal
appeals court justice (Paraná, Entre Rios) deserves special mention.
12. This website: http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/cpydhumanos/Vers
Taq2002.htm#Setiembre%2026 (online, March 15, 2013), contains the tran-
scripts of various hearings held in 2002 at the Population Commission of the
Chamber of Representatives.
13. Susana Novick, “Una nueva ley para un nuevo modelo de desarrollo en un
contexto de crisis y consenso,” in Rubén Giustiniani (coord.), op. cit.
14. The MERCOSUR (Common South Market) was created as an economic-
focused integration process by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. Since then, it has
been progressively addressing social aspects of integration, including on migration
issues. The original member states were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Since December 2013, all South American countries have become part of
MERCOSUR. While Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela are full
member states, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Surinam are
associated states. For further information, see http://www.mercosur.int/.
15. Barbara Hines, “The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current
Argentine Immigration Law,” op. cit. at 482.
16. On this, see Pablo Asa and Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “Política migratoria
en el Conosur: Los acuerdos del MERCOSUR y la nueva ley de migraciones en
Argentina,” Beyond Law 11 (2005): 39.
17. IOM, “Integración y migraciones. El tratamiento de la variable migratoria

en el MERCOSUR y su incidencia en la política argentina,” in Cuadernos Migrato-
rios No. 3 (Buenos Aires, 2012), 47–52.
18. For more details on the case, see IACHR, Report No. 85/11, Petition
12.306, Friendly Settlement, Juan Carlos de la Torre vs. Argentina, July 11, 2011.
19. By establishing the principles and general obligations of the law, article 3
insert and highlights the duty to “comply with international commitments in the
field of human rights, integration, and the mobility of migrants” (translation
mine).
20. For a more detailed analysis of the content of the law of migration, see the
papers compiled in Rubén Giustiniani, Migración. Un derecho humano, op.cit.
21. Declaration made by the National Director of Migration, Ricardo E. Rodrí-
guez, before the Population Commission of the Chamber of Representatives at
the hearing of March 24, 2004. http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/cpydhum
anos/VersTaq2004.htm#Marzo%2024 (online reference March 2013).
22. See Diario La Nación, January 4, 2004: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/560937
-el-gobierno-blanquearia-a-700-mil-inmigrantes-ilegales (online, December 2013).
23. Decree No. 1169/2004.
24. Decrees Nos. 836/2004 and 578/2005.
25. National Migration Authority, Resolved Settlements, permanent and tem-
porary, 2004–2012, at http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/pdf_varios/estadisticas
/Estadistica%20WEB%20Radicaciones%202012%20IV.pdf (online, April 2013).
26. On this instrumentalist notion of migration policies, see Javier De Lucas,
“La migración, como res política,” Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho
10, October 2004, http://www.uv.es/cefd/Index_10.htm.
27. Martín Arias Duval, “Nuevas tendencias, nuevos asuntos, nuevos enfoques
de cara al futuro,” in Taller sobre el Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Nacionales
para la Gestión de la Migración Internacional, September 7–9, 2010, Santiago, at
http://www.eclac.cl/celade/noticias/paginas/8/41138/02MartinArias.pdf, online,
December 2012. Translation from the author.
28. United Nations Committee for the Protection of All Migrant Workers and
Their Families, initial report submitted by the Argentine Republic under article 73
of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Their Families, CMW/C/ARG/1,4, August 4, 2010, paragraph 43.
29. National Migration Authority, Gestión a contramano del llamado “Primer
Mundo” (Periódico Migraciones, Año 1, No. 2, Buenos Aires, July 2008). Transla-
tion from the author.
30. Initial report submitted by the Argentine Republic under article 73 of the
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their
Families, op. cit., paragraphs 108–110 (official translation).
31. About these speeches, see Angelica Alvites Baiadera, “Estado y migración.
Discursos sobre políticas migratorias,” in VII Jornadas de Sociología de la Universi-
dad Nacional de La Plata, “Argentina en el escenario latinoamericano actual:
debates desde las ciencias sociales” (La Plata, December 2012).
32. On the program “Patria Grande” as a state policy rather than amnesty,
Roberto Benencia, “La política migratoria argentina,” in OIT y Ministerio de Tra-
bajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, La inmigración laboral de sudamericanos en Argen-
tina (Oficina de País de la OIT, 2011, Buenos Aires), 17–52.
33. The Union of South American Nations was created in 2008. According to
its constitution, UNASUR seeks to build regional integration among its peoples at
the cultural, social, economic, and political levels. For further information, see
www.unasur.org.
34. See, among others, the papers edited by Susana Novick in “Migraciones y
Políticas Públicas: nuevos escenarios y desafíos” (Buenos Aires: Catálogos, 2012).
Available online at http://webiigg.sociales.uba.ar/pobmigra/migracionypolpublic
as2012.pdf.
35. On this, see Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “De políticas migratorias y editoriales
políticas: La Nación, la xenofobia y la inmigración en Argentina,” in Sistema Argen-
tino de Información Jurídica (SAIJ), accessed April 14, 2014, http://www.infojus.gov
.ar/index.php?kk_seccion=documento&registro=DOCTRINA&docid=CF110154.
36. See AA.VV., Racismo, violencia y política. Pensar el Indoamericano, dos años
después (Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento: Los Polvorines, 2012); see
also Gerardo Halpern, “Ellos sí lo saben y lo hacen. ‘Haciendo Buenos Aires’ o
crónicas mediáticas alrededor del Parque Indoamericano,” Temas de Antropología y
Migración 1 (2011): 65.
37. Regarding this, see Universidad Nacional de Lanús and UNICEF, Niñez,
Migraciones y Derechos Humanos en Argentina. Estudio a diez años de la Ley de Migra-
ciones (Ediciones UNLA: Lanús, 2013). On the materials elaborated by UNLA,
UNICEF and the Ministry of Education, see http://valijainmigracion.educ.ar/.
38. Dispositions 1 and 2, 2013 of the National Migration Authority. Among
other civil society actors in this process were representatives from human rights
organizations (such as CELS), faith-based institutions (CAREF), academic sectors
(National University of Lanús), and migrants’ associations from Senegal, Domini-
can Republic, and other countries of origin (like the Asociación de Migrantes
Senegaleses en Argentina).
39. See the document presented by Argentina in Roundtable 1, “Partnerships
for Migration and Human Development: Shared Prosperity—Shared Responsibil-
ity,” at session 1.2., “Joint strategies to address irregular migration,” at the Global
Forum on Migration and Development, Puerto Vallarta, México, accessed April
14, 2014, http://www.gfmd.org/en/docs/mexico-2010.
40. For further information on these measures adopted at MERCOSUR level,
see IOM, “Integración y migraciones. El tratamiento de la variable migratoria en el
MERCOSUR y su incidencia en la política argentina,” op. cit.
41. See all the papers gathered in Susana Novick, ed., Migraciones y Mercosur:
Una relación inconclusa (Buenos Aires: Catálogos, 2010), available online at http://
webiigg.sociales.uba.ar/pobmigra/archivos/migraymercosur.
42. See Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “Luces y sombras en la legislación migratoria
latinoamericana,” Revista Nueva Sociedad 233 (2011): 68.
43. On this, see Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, “Ciudadanía, migraciones y libre cir-
culación en el Mercosur: ¿Hacia un paradigma basado en los derechos humanos o
la réplica del modelo excluyente de la Unión Europea?” Revista de Derecho Migra-
torio y de Extranjería 30 (2012): 259.
44. Maia Jachimowicz, “Argentina: A New Era of Migration and Migration Pol-
icy,” Migration Information Source, February 2006, accessed April 14, 2014, http://
www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=374.
45. Javier De Lucas, La migración, como res política, op. cit.
46. Barbara Hines, op. cit.
Part III
Myth: Restrictive immigration policies promote integration.
This part discusses the topical issue of integration of nonnationals and

the intersection of immigration, integration, and culture. It challenges the
assumption that integration can be measured and that restrictive immigra-
tion policies in the form of language and integration tests are a useful tool
to promote integration. This is a multifaceted subject of the utmost impor-
tance in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, and it surfaces in many
of the discussions in the book. In Europe, integration has been a crucial
issue for policymakers and a controversial topic in public debates. Promi-
nent political figures have helped to sustain misconceptions and fears
about the integration of immigrants and the effects of increased diversity.
German chancellor Angela Merkel famously declared the death of multi-
culturalism in Germany while French president Nicolas Sarkozy has stated
that American and British efforts to encourage diversity have only strength-
ened extremism and diluted national identities.1 The myth of the belief in
the purity of the nation still exerts a powerful influence, notably in Europe,
where calls for preserving national identities are on the rise.2 In the United
States, as a traditional immigration country that is characterized by the
diversity of its citizens, fears of losing U.S. “national” culture and values
are less pronounced. Be that as it may, the United States has its own share
of integration debates, mostly related to the rights of irregular migrants
who have lived in the country for many years.
The difficulty in defining what integration means has to be taken as the
starting point for any meaningful debate on the matter. Receiving coun-
tries have used different modes of integration, such as assimilation, indi-
vidualist-integration, and cosmopolitanism. A particularly controversial
mode of integration, namely that of multiculturalism, is discussed by
Modood in this section. He shows that multiculturalism is not “dead,” but

continues to be a relevant and current policy approach that in fact meets
the deficits of several other modes of integration.
Integration, whatever its definition, is certainly a process that takes
time, and in which both newcomers and the receiving society play a role.
Indeed, the controversial ways in which integration is measured in Europe
is the subject of the other two chapters in this section. Both Kochenov and
Huddleston challenge the usefulness and legitimacy of language and inte-
gration tests for family reunification (Huddleston) and naturalization
(Kochenov).
Notes
1. Spencer P. Boyer and Victoria Pardini, “Current Immigration and Integration
Debates in Germany and the United States: What Can We Learn from Each Other,”
Heinrich Böll Foundation North America, July 30, 2013, accessed May 27, 2014,
http://www.boell.org/web/index-Boyer&Pardini_Immigration-and-Integration.htm
2. Diego Acosta Arcarazo, “A Belief in the Purity of the Nation: The Possible
Dangers of Its Influence on Migration Legislation in Europe,” Studies in Ethnicity
and Nationalism 10 (2010): 234; Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
CHAPTER SEVEN
Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten

Naturalization Biases Tested in Practice
Dimitry Kochenov
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the dubious premises of “repressive liberalism”1
underlying the policy of cultural “integration” adopted by a number of
otherwise liberal democracies around the world.2 I am using my own first-
hand experience of naturalization in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
pioneering jurisdiction with regard to the introduction of so-called “cul-
tural integration.”3
Claiming that there is no such thing as a nation-specific culture to be
tested and that the creation and consolidation of EU citizenship changed
the whole framework of reference within which any member state nation-
ality operates and should be discussed, this chapter exposes the counter-
productive nature of the mistaken integration approach to the absorption
of noncitizens embraced by a growing number of countries in the Euro-
pean Union.
Following a brief outline of the main problematic aspects of the shift
toward the policy of cultural testing evident in Europe, where more and
The earlier, much longer version of this text was released as a RSCAS Working Paper (EUI
Florence) 2011/06 (2011). Many thanks to the editors for their help, encouragement, and
support and to the Advisory Board for their comments.
more countries now require the passing of culture and language tests at
naturalization, or even at the moment of acquisition of permanent resi-
dence, and of its apparent clash with the rationale of EU integration,
including the continuing articulation of the concept of EU citizenship,
the chapter turns to a concise account of the author’s naturalization experi-
ence. Building on the first two sections, the myth of necessary integration
of the newcomers (who are, in fact, long-term permanent residents) into
the majority society is exposed and analyzed. Having lost substantive
cultural essence, contemporary legal vision nationality disallows states
from developing profoundly illiberal monocultures by punishing differ-
ence. Universality of modern culture reinforced by the ideal of liberal
tolerance ensures that states introducing culture testing, even those doing
it seriously, simply have nothing to test. The chapter continues focusing on
the clash between the essences of EU citizenship on the one hand and that
of member states’ nationalities on the other, firmly placing the debate
within the legal-political context of European integration.
The developments identified damage the harmonious advancement of
the societies of the member states in a number of important ways, includ-
ing the propagation of mythical national exceptionalism through the state-
mandated exclusive idea of culture and, what is probably more important,
through making it clear to the applicants for naturalization, no matter
where they might be coming from, that their own nonculture is not good
enough for the states where they reside. Once the layer of EU citizenship
is added on top of the problems identified, the urgency to deal with the
problems outlined becomes even more acute.
Outline of the Problem

The new reality that came about with the articulation of the status of EU
citizenship4 deeply affected the very essence of the member states’ nation-
alities in a number of important ways. While EU citizenship provides all
member states’ nationals with a number of Union-wide rights that no
member state alone could grant, the status of EU citizenship is derived
from that of the nationalities of the member states, often finding itself in a
contrarian relationship with such nationalities. The main logic behind the
nationalities of the member states—to which numerous naturalization
practices aimed at incorporating newcomers clearly testify—is that of set-
tling the nationals within the confines of the states. The main logic of EU
citizenship, on the contrary, consists in liberating citizens from the nega-
tive effects of the “container theory of society”5 that states impose.6 This is
so, since the main EU citizenship right is to leave one’s member state of
Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten 163
nationality and to settle elsewhere, as is explained in Article 21(1) TFEU.

Hence German nationals residing in Paris, French living in Stockholm, or
Swedes residing in Tallinn are not to be equated to ordinary migrants, as,
approached from a legal point of view, they are exercising their quasi-
unconditional right, as EU citizens, to work and reside in any of the mem-
ber states of the European Union.
The situation of the newly naturalized member state nationals is a perfect
illustration of the logical disharmony existing between the two legal orders
in the European Union, and the contradictory vectors of to stay and to go,
affecting the same individuals simultaneously. This duality of statuses,
which governs the life of every single EU citizen, exemplifies the archaic
logic behind naturalizations, which is never questioned by politicians and
is only rarely seriously criticized by scholars. The illuminating critical
accounts provided by Dora Kostakopoulou7 and Joseph Carens8 are partic-
ularly useful in employing simple facts to challenge the counterproductive
views entrenched within the political mainstream, which, in essence, focus
on the quasi-totalitarian embrace of a mythical monoculture, impossible in
reality, corresponding to each bounded community, each nation.
Such an idea of the world shapes a duality, which consists in the tension
between presumed order inside and anarchy outside,9 automatically dis-
missing any outside culture as inferior to that of the majority culture inside
the state, mistakenly embracing the presumption of monocultural citizen-
ship, which never existed in reality, however hard the states tried to impose
it within the confines of their “imagined communities.”10 Indeed, “nowhere
is a common identity sufficient to give rise to new forms of governance.
Identities overlap and compete with one another.”11
While member states present language and integration tests preceding
naturalization as necessary and useful, this chapter takes exception with
this commonly accepted view, demonstrating that the contrary is true.
First of all, the liberal ideology of tolerance, coupled with common sense,
allows for arguing against such practices. Indeed, those who are willing to
naturalize are in the absolute majority of cases long-term residents of a
polity. It would appear to be exceptionally arrogant of any container society,
of any state, to assume that the culture and language(s) of these people are
inherently inferior to the ones that the state happens to sponsor.
Asking those who successfully functioned in a society for years on end
to pass any form of naturalization test simply underlines their otherness
and exposes a presumption against the acceptance of such people as equals
before they pass through the state-sponsored purification process. In short,
it comes down to the denial of social facts:12 those who never bother to
naturalize will stay, but will always be looked down upon by the state
faithful to the presumption of their cultural inferiority. The latter will man-
date their exclusion from the majority society composed of correct citizens,
whose representatives in the legislature would preach faithfulness to the
real (i.e., state-sponsored) culture, which is usually viewed as a frozen set
of conventions, rather than a set of dynamic interactions of different,
mutually enriching influences.13
In fact, when speaking of culture in such a context, it is impossible not to
focus, following Adorno, on the idea of control, since “whoever speaks of
culture speaks of administration as well, whether this is his intention or
not.”14 Once the state intervenes, the very essence of what one commonly
understands as culture is instantly transformed: “the law can play an instru-
mental role in ‘organizing culture,’”15 leading to the formation and promo-
tion of Leitcultur—the official state-sponsored version of culture that is
promoted by the state. The path of liberal democratic states during the last
half century is, broadly speaking, also a path away from such interventions
toward tolerance and pluralism, as exemplified by the degree to which states
have embraced human rights and nondiscrimination commitments. How-
ever, as the recent adoption of naturalization culture tests reveals, this does
not prevent majorities hailing the exceptionalism of local cultures, thereby
subtly (or otherwise) employing narratives against those who do not belong.
An acceptance by the majority should not deter scholars from criticizing
this state of affairs, however: the understanding that majorities are more
often wrong than right predates Publius, and democracy is only a success,
since it “does not demand much of people and [. . .] can function with a
minimal human being.”16 Moreover, democracy is just the means, as Philippe
Van Parijs rightly reminds us, not a value in itself.17 In the context of the
European Union all the aforementioned considerations are amplified by the
functioning of the concept of EU citizenship. This status is conferred on any
individual who acquires the nationality of a member state and is essentially
antithetical to the narrow-minded nationalist concerns that drive all natural-
ization politics. EU citizenship, by its mere existence, thus renders dubious
all the integration efforts put in place by national legislatures. These national
policies cannot escape from being assessed in the context of the European
Union as a whole. In fact, agreeing with Will Kymlicka, one of the European
Union’s key achievements is precisely in the taming of liberal nationhood.
Not to recognize this would amount to “moral blindness.”18
On a Personal Note: Becoming Dutch

When going through the process of naturalization in the Netherlands,
like any other citizenship applicant, I was asked to prove that I legally
resided in the kingdom for a number of years, that my income was suffi-
cient, and also that I was well enough versed in the local language and
culture, as outlined in Chapter 4 of the Citizenship Law (Rijkswet op het
Nederladerschap). A most elaborate testing system in place in the Nether-
lands is tuned to ensure “the integration” of newly naturalized citizens into
the society.19 The law demands that an official test of (official) culture be
passed. Many years of working and living in a country are not taken as a
testimony of such integration.
The consequences of such an approach are truly paradoxical. Integration
turns out to be a bureaucratic exercise ignoring the reality of life entirely,
as actual functioning in the society does not count for it. Having spent
five or more years in the country, anyone necessarily has a network of
friends, as well as daily routines, be it a law professor, a priest, or a porn
actor. Passing an integration test in such a context merely means getting
a seal of state approval for your life, which the state distributes among
the taxpayers basically at random: today a professor of Dutch law is
more successful than a Catholic priest preaching to Latin Americans—
tomorrow a porn actor starring with Dutch divas is preferred by the
kingdom to a poet writing in Tagalog with the majority of friends coming
from Luzon. The assumption that a state, when dealing with law-abiding
denizens, can officially brand some lives as deficient is certainly a worri
some one indeed.
The inburgeringstoets sends a message that is clear: possessing humanity
is not sufficient to be embraced by the Dutch state even after years spent
in the kingdom. Like a great number of other European countries, the
Dutch state views the society it is in charge of as so highly specific and dif-
ferent from any other that it feels compelled to test the knowledge of this
specificity among those willing to naturalize or acquire permanent resi-
dence, that is, those who have been part of this very society for many
years. Listening to the municipal employee, I began to wonder how I had
been able to survive so many years in a society so very different and unique.
Do they really see Godard’s films differently? Do they read Dostoyevsky
differently?
To prove my worthiness to vote in a country where I have been paying
taxes for my entire working life, I registered for the test. The content of it
was truly strange, to say the least. It included questions like “Your neigh-
bour died. What should you do?” with the following suggested answers:
“1. Nothing; 2. I send a condolences card; 3. I go help the widow.” As any
specialist in Dutch culture knows, only one of these answers is correct.
Consider another example: “Mrs. de Jong says ‘I will go and eat now’ (Ik
ga nu eten).” Suggested reactions: “1. You are invited to join Mrs. de Jong;
2. Mrs. de Jong does not feel like speaking with you any more and wishes
to go home; 3. Mrs. de Jong will probably invite you to eat with her later.”
And last: “Fines above a certain amount disqualify you from the possibility
to become Dutch” with the following suggested reactions: “1. Thank God
I only have a parking fine; 2. I did not know about this rule; 3. I never
drink when I am driving.”
Upon completing the test—for which, incidentally, example copies are
not available anywhere on the basis that preparation is considered impos-
sible since “the proper attitude . . . cannot be learnt by heart”20—the feel-
ing of optimism that should normally accompany the decision to become
a fully-fledged member of the society where one has been living for a very
long time was entirely gone. I clearly remember how puzzled I was. Is this
Dutch culture? For me Dutch culture included references to the Union of
Utrecht, to the Golden Age with its tulipmania, to the art of Rembrandt
van Rijn and Vincent van Gogh, to Piet Mondriaan, to groundbreaking
architecture and design, Amsterdamse School, De Stijl, and so on. Above
all it included references to the famed liberalism and tolerance entrenched
in Dutch society, and yet, as the very existence of this absurd test abun-
dantly testified, this aspect of Dutch culture is nowhere to be seen here.
The language that I learned to read Cees Nooteboom’s Rituelen seemed
desecrated. This is not to suggest, of course, that these things should be
tested: the basic premise of freedom is that different people do like—and
should be allowed to like—different things. My personal selection will
definitely be very different from any personal selection of any other Dutch-
man. The trouble is, however, that once contents are not what is checked
by the tests, their existence cannot possibly be justified as such at any
level, besides a desire to restate that those who are willing to naturalize are
different (they know it anyway) from some ephemeral majority in their
country as well as to underline that this difference is something that is
disliked by the powers that be. Importantly, the flaws of test-thinking are so
profound that they cannot be confined to the level of the particular mem-
ber states. In this sense, any suggestions to Europeanize the culture testing
or introduce an additional EU dimension to it would only make matters
worse by importing misconceptions to the supranational level of law and
regulation.
The kingdom made it clear that besides being in contempt of my own
culture and humanity, all that I considered important about Dutch culture
and all that made me apply for naturalization, tired of being a foreigner,
actually did not count. What counted was a handful of irritating clichés
like “our trains are yellow” and “our land is flat” as well as an ability to
fill in forms correctly (to which several questions in the culture test were
dedicated). It takes passing this test to realize that, in fact, the imburgering-
stoets does not test any knowledge of anything and is not related to any
culture whatsoever, however widely construed. Its real purpose seems to
be the self-justification of the myth of exceptionalism of the local culture
of the kingdom. The account of mythologies provided by Barthes is instru-
mental in this regard: myths are not important for the story they tell, but
for what they do, since “in a mythical system causality is artificial, false; but
it creeps, so to speak, through the back door of Nature.”21 Thus what
counts in the context of the culture tests is not the rubbish content of these
exercises, but the line they draw between us and them, which is, however,
entirely arbitrary.
My personal story is not exceptional. Neither is it all too country-
specific. More and more liberal democracies in the world introduce tests to
check how accustomed citizens-to-be are with their culture and society.22
This worrisome practice of attempting the annihilation of the “other” by
imposing on her the status of “one of us,” which J. H. H. Weiler abhorred,23
Žižek equally criticized,24 and Kymlicka found suspicious,25 now seems to
be accepted as a norm of daily life. Indeed, “integration” is a very interest-
ing way of dealing with the “other.” In the words of Weiler such a “come be
one of us” strategy functions in the following way.
It is noble since it involves, of course, elimination of prejudice, of the notion

that there are boundaries that cannot be eradicated. But the “be one of us,”
however well intentioned, is often an invitation to the alien to be one of us
by being us. Vis-à-vis the alien it risks robbing him of his identity. Vis-à-vis
oneself, it may be a simple manifestation of both arrogance and the belief in
my superiority as well as my tolerance. If I cannot tolerate the alien, one
way of resolving the dilemma is to make him like me, no longer an alien.
[. . .] It is a form of dangerous internal and external intolerance.26
Luckily the tests promoted by a number of states are not and cannot
possibly be effective. States cannot either impose any “nation-specific cul-
ture” on the new citizens, or, indeed, invent such a culture. And asking to
know a local language does not make one forget the other five, let alone
the lullabies,27 since the private realm, our biological existence, is bound
to be separated from the sphere of the political, all the interpenetration of
the two notwithstanding.28
The strongest point of culture is its universality, its appeal to the whole
of humanity, which unavoidably plays against any messianic feelings in the
legislatures introducing culture tests. Indeed, the content of the tests exem-
plifies the impoverished character of the myths of national exceptionalism.
The duo of globalization and liberalism has done its job. While classical
myths are rich, colorful, and intriguing, the myths of cultural exceptional-
ism adopted by the liberal democracies can only be dull and deeply embar-
rassing. If the Dutch example I provided does not seem convincing enough,
any other citizenship test would do the job.
State-Mandated Étalons of Culture

My first thesis is that liberal democracies have simply lost the luxury of
inventing themselves as nations in a substantive vein.
Post–World War II developments leading to the rise of international
migration—as well as international marriages producing children directly
disproving the dogma of unitary identities and exclusive nationhood—
coupled with the global rise of human rights rendered it impossible for
states to continue shaping their nations.29 States effectively lost any legal
possibility of imagining themselves as rooted in homogeneous monocul-
tural societies, unable to ask of their own nationals and of the growing
numbers of newcomers anything more than mere respect for the liberal
ideology.
Nationality as such has been reinvented in a procedural vein, becoming
merely a Kopplungsbegriff30 connecting a state and a person. Proceduraliza-
tion of the idea of nationality means that lacking certain mythical charac-
teristics of a worthy citizen cannot cause either deprivation of nationality
nor block access to naturalization, as “‘abstract character’ of state member-
ship [. . .] is decoupled from rights and identity.”31 The citizenship test I
had to pass was so embarrassing not because its patriotic drafters were
unwise. Quite to the contrary, in fact, they knew the limits of what they
legally could do all too well. Once state membership is abstract and there
is an obligation to introduce a nation-specific culture test for those willing
to naturalize, the test is bound to be at least as abstract as the belonging
itself, that is, a waste of time. Yet, faithful to the inertia of the modern times
of nation-formation and in spite of the general shift away from assuming
the responsibility for nation-forming, states have not stopped using the
quasi-messianic rhetoric of national specificity, of which culture and lan-
guage testing are clear illustrations.
Whatever the mythical cultural exceptionalism of liberal democracies
today might mean, besides the puzzling questions about a mevrouw de
Jong, it is clear that it is powerless in front of a task of the generation and
preservation of social cohesion. Actually, it is actively destroying such
cohesion. Neither the embarrassing questionnaires about local culture,
nor the tests of proficiency in the local language are able either to replace,
or to provide added value to simple socialization of new members of a

society. Indeed, instead of promoting socialization, they merely play a role
of mobilization bias32—a well-known conclusion of social scientists, which
is hardly new. Indeed, agreeing with Dora Kostakopoulou, “a sense of
belonging to community develops with inclusion in society and politics,
rather than as a result of citizenship ceremonies and language proficiency
tests.”33 There is nothing scary about a natural evolution of the society,
where people eat what they want, pray when they want, and choose a lan-
guage suitable, as far as they can judge, for the occasion.
Given that states are bound to exercise self-restraint in nation-building,
it became apparent that “the paradigm of societies organised within the
framework of the nation-state inevitably loses contact with reality.”34 With
the rise of human rights ideology and the proceduralization of nationality,
the array of exclusive entitlements that nationality could bring weakens,
as the deprivation of rights on the ground of not being a citizen becomes
more difficult to explain and justify. Consequently, a number of key social
and some political rights previously associated with the idea of “belonging
to a nation” came to be connected with residence only, watering down
citizen-foreigner dichotomies.35
As a result of the developments described, national borders are genu-
inely irrelevant for increasing numbers of people in planning their lives.
This makes it impossible wholeheartedly to embrace the fictions taught to
our great-grandfathers by the public school systems of the day in the
expression of a reality masterfully exposed by Ernst Renan: “l’oubli, et [. . .]
l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation.”36 States
are trying hard to come up with their own culture but there is no such
thing, beyond tolerance, that can be embraced, but not owned.
EU Citizenship/Member States’ Nationalities: Diverging Vectors

My second thesis is that, when viewed through the lens of EU integra-
tion, language and culture tests seem even less justified, running counter
to the very idea of European integration, let alone that of EU citizenship.
The European Union adds to the transformative potential of liberalism
and migration in general. Precisely because EU citizenship is a contingent
and complementary status, the power of the member states, who remain
in charge of nationalities,37 is severely weakened. This is so, since while
each one of them taken separately can have an illusion that it controls
access to EU citizenship, taken together they do not, as long as the natu-
ralization regimes are not harmonized, at least to some extent. Differences
between the member states in terms of granting their nationalities (and EU
citizenship) are huge, to say the least. To give a couple of examples, the
residence time in the state before naturalization can vary from zero days to
more than ten years; nationalities can be extended in a simplified way to
same-sex spouses and partners in some states, while others would totally
ignore human reality falling outside of the Catholic church’s teaching; last,
some countries simply sell permanent residence (United Kingdom, Latvia,
Portugal) or citizenship (Malta, Cyprus, de facto Austria, etc.) outright—
no strings attached. Huge disparities between the citizenship laws of all
the member states lead to the multiplication of the ways of acquisition of
the same status of European citizenship. In failing to regulate the issue of
access to EU citizenship effectively, the member states opted for the illu-
sion of control rather than the resolution of outstanding problems, which
include, most importantly, the need to design an effective immigration
policy for the European Union, while ensuring that the rights of EU citi-
zens and third-country nationals are protected.
In a borderless European Union the current approach means that more
than 28 ways of acquiring the same status applicable in all the member
states are in existence.38 Informed third-country nationals are free to
choose the member state where the access to nationality is framed in the
most permissive terms, in order to move to their dream member state later,
in their capacity as EU citizens. Obviously, when comparing the number
of rights associated with EU citizenship with that associated with the
nationality of a particular member state, it becomes clear that at present for
third-country nationals residing in the European Unioin it is becoming
increasingly irrelevant in which member state to naturalize.
Consequently, the member states are unable to make a coherent claim
to be able to control the access of nonnationals to their territories.39
No matter how they frame their citizenship laws, the mere existence of
the internal market has already destroyed any direct logical connection
between the territory of a particular member state and the people of
that member state. The conceptual contradiction between the nationality
policies of the member states and the main EU citizenship rights is
clear. While the member states grant nationality to those connected
with their territory or populace, assuming that the nationals would keep
such connections, EU citizenship follows an opposing rationale, aiming
at encouraging people to move, to benefit from the opportunities that
the internal market has to offer, and to think beyond their member
states. Consequently, third-country nationals naturalizing in a particular
member state can do this for two reasons: either to stay in the member
state or to leave (immediately), benefiting from the main right of EU
citizenship.
Currently, the member states seem to assume that the latter choice is
not an option, since all the naturalization policies are built on the assump-
tion that a new citizen will stay in the member state, which provides justi-
fication for the linguistic, cultural, and other tests the newcomers are
asked to pass before EU citizenship is conferred on them. Once the EU
dimension is taken into account, however, the illusory world in which the
member states are still living crumbles in a second: why would you ask of
an applicant for naturalization to be proficient in Latvian, a language that
virtually no one speaks in the European Union (and the world), if it is
known that the main right that naturalization confers is to leave Latvia and
to benefit from EU citizenship rights in a wider Europe where hardly any-
thing Latvian will help? This is so obvious and, at the same time, so stub-
bornly ignored by the member states that the situation can hardly be
characterized in optimistic terms. However, given the lasting impact of
European integration on the nationalities of the member states it is
unavoidable that change will come. Pronounced in a slightly different con-
text, these words of Advocate General Poiares Maduro certainly apply to
the awkward situation of those persons who, when naturalizing in the
European Union, are exposed to culture and language tests: “Citizenship
of the Union must encourage Member States to no longer conceive of the
legitimate link of integration only within the narrow bonds of the national
community, but also within the wider context of the society of peoples of
the Union.”40
Viewed from the other side, any utterly intrusive Latvian policy of lan-
guage and culture promotion targeting uniquely third-country nationals41
is by definition futile, since Latvia is just a tiny spot on the map of the
European Union, where borders do not exist for EU citizens. The latter can
rely on EU law to come to Latvia and settle there. Given that any discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality, either direct or indirect, is squarely pro-
hibited by Article 18 TFEU, the application to EU citizens of any kind of
tests in any circumstances is legally impossible. And if a Belizean natural-
ized on the island of Curaçao who acquired Dutch nationality by virtue of
passing an exam on the knowledge of Papiamento can settle in Latvia
without any tests, how can the preservation of cultural specificity be used
as an argument for asking a Moldovan to pass them? Is Papiamento less
dangerous for the survival of Latvian culture than Romanian written in
Cyrillic script? Obviously, the same observations apply to any of the mem-
ber states of the Union in a situation where, as Alexander Somek put it,
“the [EU] does no longer yield.”42
Even though the European citizenship does not directly question the
dubious nature of claims to the nation-specific cultures, it clearly fleshes
out the inconsistency of the policy of culture and language testing by the
member states. Even if a specific culture to be tested existed (which is not
the case, as the previous two sections have demonstrated), and even if the
knowledge of particular state-selected languages were indispensable for
successful functioning in a society (which is equally untrue), the claim for
prenaturalization tests still makes no sense, as it ignores all those who do
not intend to naturalize and simply live in a territory of the given member
state, in particular, all EU citizens coming from other member states, who
are given virtually all rights associated with the nationality anyway, no
naturalization required.43
Should one be alarmed by this state of affairs? Most certainly not: the
examples provided simply point to the fact, once again, that the assertions
of messianic cultural exceptionalism by the member states are rooted in
prejudice, rather than any legitimate concerns. On the issue of language,
one can spend days in Luxembourg without hearing Luxembourgian.
We are likely to hear less of it in the near future, just as we will hear less
Dutch in the streets of Amsterdam or less English in the streets of San
Francisco. Is this a valid reason to make a handful of third-country nation-
als naturalizing in the Grand Duchy pass a language exam? Of course
not, since, first, knowing a language does not necessarily mean using it.
Second, should the new Luxembourgians opt for benefiting from their
free movement right and leave the country, they will not have anyone
to speak to (too bad they were pushed to learn the language they will
never need). Last, given that language requirements do not apply to non-
naturalising third-country nationals and EU citizens, their imposition
clearly cannot have anything to do with Luxembourgian society, of which
the latter two groups make up an all too important part. Rather, it is about
the distorted self-image of the state, which opts for intruding into the lives
of the most vulnerable among the populace with its unjust demands. How
else can this be characterized if not as, following Etienne Balibar, “apart-
heid européen?”44 Putting culture and language testing into the EU context
demonstrates with clarity how arbitrary, random, and non-sensical these
policies are.
Conclusion
Whatever liberal democracies think about the stand-off between the
culture of humanity and their own culture, when connecting the state-
approved possession of the latter with the newly reinvented notion of citi-
zenship, to which the culture and integration tests testify, it is inevitable
that the obvious is bound to prevail. The return to the logic of modern
states of the 19th century actively shaping their nations and annihilating
the other within their borders is highly unlikely. And in their present form,
the tests, as introduced, do not actually test anything even closely related
to culture, despite trying to reassert citizenship against the personhood of
those taking them. This is wrong and can lead to increasing tensions in the
societies making this mistake, just as any other arbitrary divide unjustifi-
able on its face would. Linda Bosniak is absolutely right, submitting that
“the very idea of personhood in liberal-egalitarian thought is ethically
expansive . . . [this idea] contains the normative and rhetorical resources
to challenge every context in which it is situated—including the national
constitutional context itself.”45 The battle for self-serving myths fought by
all the integrationist states against their own inhabitants willing to be
accepted is thus lost, having just started. It is most regrettable that this
does not prevent the current policies from intruding into the lives of hun-
dreds of thousands of people throughout the European Union, derailing
their lives for no reason and driven by sheer prejudice and the lack of com-
mon sense.
Invention of cultural exceptionalism through culture testing of perma-
nent residents should stop as soon as possible. The idea that every liberal
democracy in the European Union is in possession of its own unique
culture worth being imposed on the newcomers is the first problem I
promised to outline. The second problem concerns the chronic blind-
ness of the member states, unwilling to see the effects of European citi-
zenship and the successful functioning of the internal market on their
societies. In reframing naturalization policies, attention should be paid
to the fact that the member states do not represent closed-container soci-
eties any more and that the vectors of EU citizenship and of their nation-
alities are diametrically opposed to each other. Asking someone to learn
Slovenian to become an EU citizen can thus be counterproductive, a
mistake.
Last, it is highly worrisome that the member states do not feel the need
to respect the private realm of those willing to naturalize; language and
culture should be left to every individual human being to choose and to
practice. By demonizing those who have not yet answered the question-
naire about mevrouw de Jong’s preferences, social cohesion is undermined
and numerous lives derailed. While pointing out all this is restating the
obvious, it is most unfortunate that these issues are not seriously discussed
in the European Union today. It is easy to predict, however, that in the
medium-term future naturalization procedures in the European Union will
be radically different from what we have now—more open and, ultimately,
more just.
Notes
1. Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for
Immigrants in Western Europe,” West European Politics 30 (2007): 1.
2. Rainer Bauböck and Christian Joppke (eds.), “How Liberal Are Citizenship
Tests?” EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2010/41, 2010.
3. Ricky van Oers, Deserving Citizenship (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013).
4. Dimitry Kochenov, “The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last
Ten Years of Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon,” Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 62 (2013): 97.
5. Kitty Calavita, “Law, Citizenship, and the Construction of (Some) Immigrant
‘Others’,” Law & Soc. Inquiry 30 (2005): 401, at 405–409.
6. Dimitry Kochenov, “Member States’ Nationalities and the Internal Market:
Illusions and Reality,” in From Single Market to the Economic Union: Essays in Mem-
ory of John A. Usher, eds. Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Laurence W. Gormley (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012): 241.
7. Dora Kostakopoulou, “Why Naturalisation?” Perspectives on European Politics
& Society 4 (2003): 85; Dora Kostakopoulou, The Future Governance of Citizenship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8. Joseph H. Carens, “Citizenship and Civil Society: What Rights for Resi-
dents?” in Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and
Europe, eds. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (New York/Oxford: Randall Books,
2002), 100; Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
9. Philip Allot, “The European Community Is Not the True European Com-
munity,” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2485, p. 2491; Yishai Blank, “Why Citizen-
ship?” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (2007): 411, p. 414.
10. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991, 2nd ed.).
11. Beate Sissenich, “Justification and Identity in European Integration,” Con-
stellations 14 (2007): 347, p. 349.
12. Joseph H. Carens (2002): 110, op. cit.
13. David Chaney, “Cosmopolitan Art and Cultural Citizenship,” Theory, Cul-
ture & Society 19 (2002): 157.
14. Theodor Adonor, The Culture Industry (London: Routledge, 1991), 107.
15. Miriam Aziz, The Impact of European Rights on National Legal Cultures
(Oxford: Hart, 2004), 83.
16. John Mueller, “Democracy and Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery: Elections,
Equality, and the Minimal Human Being,” American Journal of Political Science 36
(1992): 983.
17. Philippe Van Parijs, Just Democracy: The Rawls and Machiavelli Programme
(London: ECPR, 2012).
18. Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice,” in Another

Cosmopolitanism, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
128, p. 135.
19. Ricky van Oers 2013, op. cit.; Ricky van Oers, Betty de Hart, and Kees
Groenendijk, “Country Report: The Netherlands,” EUDO Citizenship Observa-
tory RSC Paper, EUI, 2009.
20. Kees Groenendijk, “Integratie en uitsluiting in het nederlandse vreemdelin-
genrecht,” in Integratie en uitsluiting, eds. Pieter Boeles and G. G. Lodde (The
Hague: Sdu uitgevers, 2005), 9, at 30.
21. Roland Barthes (trans. Annette Lavers), Mythologies (New York: Farrar,
Straus, & Giroux, 1972), at 131.
22. Ricky van Oers, Eva Ersbøll, and Dora Kostakopoulou, eds., A Re-definition
of Belonging? (The Hague: Koninklijke Brill, 2010).
23. Joseph H. H. Weiler, “In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional
Sonderweg,” in European Constitutionalism beyond the State, eds. Joseph H. H.
Weiler and Marlene Wind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7.
24. Slavoj Žižek, “Against Human Rights,” New Left Review 34 (2005): 10.
25. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995).
26. Joseph H. H. Weiler, 2003, op. cit, at 19.
27. Sonia Bychkov Green, “Language of Lullabies: The Russification and De-
Russification of the Baltic States,” Michigan Journal of International Law 19 (1997):
219.
28. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1998).
29. Richard Falk, “The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization,” Citi-
zenship Studies 4 (2000): 5; Christian Joppke, “Immigration and the Identity of
Citizenship: The Paradox of Universalism,” Citizenship Studies 12 (2008): 533.
30. Linda Bosniak, “Citizenship Denationalized,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 7 (2000): 447; Gérard-René de Groot, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel
(Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1989); Christian Joppke, “Citizenship between
De- and Re-Ethnicization (I),” Archive européen de sociologie 44 (2003): 433; Ron-
nie D. Lipschutz, “Members Only? Citizenship and Civic Virtue in a Time of Glo-
balization,” International Politics 36 (1999): 203.
31. Christian Joppke, 2003, op. cit., at 433.
32. Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social Integration,” Sociology 9 (1975):
289.
33. Dora Kostakopoulou, “Thick, Thin and Thinner Patriotisms: In This all
There Is?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006): 73.
34. Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age
of Modernity,” British Journal of Sociology 51 (2000): 79, at 80.
35. Sandrine Maillard, L’émergence de la citoyenneté sociale européenne (Aix-en-
Provence: Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2008).
36. Ernst Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? et autres essais politiques (Paris: Agora,
1992, 1st ed. 1882), at 41.
37. Eg Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] para. 39.
38. Dimitry Kochenov, “Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and
a Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights,” Columbia Journal of European
Law 15 (2009): 169, at 182–186.
39. Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens (New York: Rowman and Little-
field, 2007), 8.
40. Advocate General Opinion, Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] para 23
(emphasis added)).
41. Dimitry Kochenov, Vadim Poleshchuk, Aleksejs Dimitrovs, “Do Profes-
sional Linguistic Requirements Discriminate? Latvia and Estonia in the Spotlight,”
European Yearbook of Minority Issues 10 (2013): 137.
42. Alexander Somek, “Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European
Citizenship,” European Law Review 32 (2007): 787, at 789.
43. Dimitry Kochenov (2012), op. cit.
44. Étienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple (Paris:
La Découverte, 2001), 191.
45. Linda Bosniak, “Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought,” Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (2010): 9, at 29.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Family Reunion as a Means

of Integration
Has It Failed or Succeeded?
Thomas Huddleston
Introduction
Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to
create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third-country nationals
in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion,
a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty. (Preamble 4 to Direc-
tive 2003/86/EC)
These words from the preamble to the EU Directive 2003/86/EC cap-

ture the long-established principles behind the right to family life and
family reunion, which have been vested in many national laws and consti-
tutions as well as European and international law. Facilitating family
reunion enables the integration of immigrants—both of the sponsor and
of his or her reuniting family members. The foreign family members of
nationals and foreigners should be treated as equally as possible in confor-
mity with the current definition of the family under national law. The
right to family life and family reunion limits the discretion of the state and
provides procedural guarantees for equal rights of men and women, the
best interests of the child, and favorable conditions for refugees. But
increasingly, many national policymakers in Europe have come to believe
that restricting family reunion is the best way to facilitate the integration
of immigrants. This chapter analyzes the findings of the Migrant Integra-
tion Policy Index (MIPEX) for European countries as well as traditional
countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Family reunion is used as a case study to review emerging cross-national
evidence about impact of different requirements on family reunion rates
and integration outcomes. This chapter first presents the differences in
national policies and statistics on non-EU family reunion before investi-
gating the stated and real effects of recent restrictions on immigrants’
opportunities for family reunion and integration in their new country of
residence.
National Policies: Family Reunion as a Means of Integration?

Overall, the family reunion policies in most major countries of immi-
gration still respect the basic legal principle that family reunion is a means
of integration. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),
policies are still slightly favorable for family reunion and the integration of
reuniting families in 14 EU member states and in traditional non-EU
countries of immigration, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States. For example, the majority of EU member states adopt
slightly inclusive definitions of the family and only basic conditions for
acquisition in their family reunion laws:
• Right to family reunion for all those who meet the legal requirements
• The residence requirement for sponsors is around one year or less
• The minimum age limit for sponsors and spouses is the age of adulthood (i.e.,
18 years)
• Some entitlement to family reunion for sponsors’ adult parents and adult
children
• Requirements for housing and economic resources based on basic national
benchmarks
• No language and integration conditions or pre-entry tests for family reunion
But today, a few and increasing number of countries are imposing

burdensome conditions for family reunion and tend to restrict eligibility
and family definitions. Countries like Austria, Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland have made family reunion policies more
politicized, complex, and volatile, often in response to the rising far
right. According to MIPEX, such countries are increasingly imposing
Family Reunion as a Means of Integration 179
their demanding conditions for naturalization onto long-term residence

and—to some extent—family reunion. The unstable nature of these
political arrangements makes the future hard to predict in these coun-
tries. The 2011 Danish elections and new government significantly
focused on removing elements of the recent Danish model of family
reunion restrictions.1
Without a doubt, the most striking example of this restrictionist turn in
national family reunion policies is the Netherlands. The Netherlands is
one of the European countries that helped to pioneer the right to family
life for immigrants in the last quarter of the 20th century. Since the mid-
2000s, the increasing electoral power of the far right has led to a number
of restrictions for both Dutch citizens and third-country nationals. Most
notably, the previous Dutch minority government received the support of
Geert Wilders’s PVV on condition that they meet his target to cut non-
Western immigration by 50 percent by introducing a set of restrictions in
all areas of migration, family reunion, asylum, residence, and citizenship.2
Denmark’s previous government and the role of the radical right Danish
People’s Party served as the model for this power arrangement and the
proposed restrictions. Geert Wilders’s support also came with demands to
reduce immigration through a reopening of the EU family reunion direc-
tive3 and through lobbying for changes at the national level in other mem-
ber states.4 The Dutch government unsuccessfully defended these sets of
proposals5 “in the name of integration” (see Table 8.1).
The contrast is striking between this trend within EU countries and the
established policies in traditional countries of immigration. Although
national policymakers in Europe often look to Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand as models of selective immigration, they forget that these countries
often accompany their diverse work immigration channels with inclusive
family reunion policies. Compared to most EU member states, traditional
countries of immigration are less likely to obstruct migrants from reuniting
with families and more likely to help all workers and families to find the
right job. Prearrival language or integration conditions for reuniting
spouses is absent from the thinking in traditional countries of immigra-
tion. No fixed income amount is placed on family reunion with spouses or
minor children as economic resource requirements only apply to parents
or other adult dependents. No accommodation requirement is usually
imposed because the income requirement is deemed sufficient. The major
difference in traditional countries of immigrations is the definition of eli-
gible family members. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States, adult permanent residents and some temporary residents can spon-
sor their spouse, dependent children, parents, grandparents, as well as
Table 8.1 Dutch Proposals for EU Family Reunion Directive

Dutch proposals for EU Family Dutch government’s claims
Reunion Directive (summary)
Directive would apply to all arriving EU citizens residing in another EU
non-EU family members. Non-EU country who want to reunite with
families of EU citizens would lose the family living outside the EU are
favorable conditions for family reunion presented as misusing EU law. Those
under EU 2004/38/EC on freedom of who move to another EU country
movement. expressly to reunite with family are
presented as misusing the “Europe
route.”
EDIT: Raise optional maximum age limit Partners will be in better position to
from 21 to 24 choose partner, complete education,
NEW: Require sponsors to have and provide for themselves, modeled
“sufficient” level of education on post-2002 policies of previous
Danish minority coalition, supported
by Danish People’s Party.
NEW: Allow tests to prove whether It is possible to establish a definite
families’ ties with country are stronger link between a person and society.
than ties with country of origin Only those with a definite link today
are likely to successfully integrate over
time. The test is applied successfully
in Denmark (post-2002 policy).
EDIT: Restrict options for income Income requirement and integration
requirement (e.g., 120% of minimum conditions will improve economic
wage) self-sufficiency of family and
NEW: Revoke temporary permits if integration of partner.
people do not complete integration
conditions
NEW: Require sponsors to pay deposit Sponsor and family must pay for any
of a bond costs that they incur for the state.
other dependent relatives like orphaned minors. In contrast, Austria, Den-

mark, France, and the Netherlands impose many conditions on sponsors,
while also imposing waiting periods and restricted definitions of the
family.6 In traditional countries of immigration, a secure family life as a
starting point for integration is seen as central to the well-being of future
immigrant citizens.
The future for transnational families remains unclear in many EU mem-
ber states, given the current political climate and influence of far right
parties. MIPEX noted little improvement in family reunion policies
between 2007 and 2010. Only five of the 24 concerned member states
(Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain) recently improved
family definitions, conditions, time limits, or associated rights. In contrast,
more favorable conditions were undermined in six countries (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden), while conditions
became even more restrictive in Austria and Malta. MIPEX finds that mem-
ber states disagree significantly on how to apply new conditions to immi-
grants. Countries with favorable policies have tried to set income or
housing requirements based on what all residents are expected to meet in
society. For example, Portugal lowered the income requirement because
the crisis forced everyone to get by with less, including immigrants. But
increasingly, Europe’s major immigration countries are asking immigrants
to fulfill conditions that many nationals could not: higher age limits for
family reunion than for marriage, higher income requirements, and lan-
guage tests with high fees and little support.
The Assumptions behind New Restrictions

Politicians and the press often have a certain image of immigrants when
they speak about family reunion. It is likely to be the Moroccan and Turk-
ish wives arriving in countries with longer histories of family immigration
like Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany. Family reunion is often
invoked as the way that most immigrants come to an EU member state.
These stereotypes are far from the real lives of these families who are mak-
ing the European Union their home. Instead, in most EU member states,
the number of reuniting non-EU families is small compared to the many
other people arriving legally every year. The European Commission noted
that family immigration has progressively decreased from half of all legal
immigration in the early 2000s to 32 percent at the beginning of 2013. In
recent years, people coming with a family permit do not make up the
majority of newcomers in the European Union, but they are a large—and
sometimes the largest—group in the majority of EU member states. Figure
8.1 presents the latest Eurostat statistics on how many non-EU citizens
came to join their non-EU sponsor in 2011. These are the people directly
affected by most national policy discussions on family reunion.7
In most member states, non-EU family reunion is not large compared to
the many other people arriving every year. The countries where non-EU
family reunion is most important are the Czech Republic, Greece, Norway,
and Sweden. Since the financial crisis, non-EU family reunion has become
more important in Southern European countries as the overall levels of
new immigration have fallen in these previously major destinations for
Figure 8.1 Permits for Non-EU Families as Percent of Total Legal Immigration in
2011.
work migration. Non-EU family reunion is also important in Central Euro-

pean countries with very new and few immigrant communities. In other
countries, the level drops to around one in five in Austria, Germany, and
the Netherlands or one in six in Belgium, Denmark, France, or the United
Kingdom. Very few non-EU families reunite in Cyprus, Ireland, or Malta.
New policy restrictions are also often based on the assumption that
family reunion is increasing in the country and across the European Union.
In fact, the numbers are modest for most countries. The major destina-
tions for non-EU families are Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain, with
Sweden, France, and Germany far below them. Numbers have decreased
across many countries and increased in only Hungary, Latvia, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden. Using the non-EU family reunion rate calculated by
the author,8 non-EU family reunion seems more common (>3 percent) in
countries like Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Italy, Portugal and a few Central European countries. Non-EU family
reunion is rare (<1 percent) in Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, and
Malta.
Although the public associates family reunion with specific countries of

origin, the list of major countries of origin shows that families come from
all over the world. Moroccans, the largest group, make up only 11 percent
in the 26 EU countries and Norway. That’s just one in nine reuniting fami-
lies. For Turks, the figure is much lower, at 3 percent (or just one in 33).
In recent years, most reunited non-EU families in EU countries have been
coming from the world’s largest countries, Europe’s neighbors, and major
countries of origin for immigrants settled in the European Union. Rarely
do most newcomer families in a given country come from the same non-
EU country, which is mostly the case in new and relatively small countries
of destination for non-EU families.
Lastly, spouses, particularly wives and elderly parents, are usually
invoked in debates around family reunion policy. Yet national statistics
demonstrate that the policy affects children as much as spouses and rarely
affects people outside the nuclear family. Figure 8.2 depicts what percent-
age of non-EU family permits in 2011 went to spouses or partners, chil-
dren, and other family members in various EU countries. This Eurostat
data shows that the relevant EU Family Reunion Directive affects children
as much as spouses. In most countries in 2010 and 2011, more children
arrived than spouses or partners. Spouses and partners made up the
majority in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden. Only the
nuclear family is able to reunite in most countries. Few other family mem-
bers benefited from family reunion, mostly in new countries of migration
like the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. These trends
change little from year to year.
Figure 8.2 Composition of Reuniting Non-EU Families in 2011.

So What Are Family Reunion Restrictions Good For?

The introduction of new family reunion requirements, such as age lim-
its, language tests, income levels, and attachment requirements, has often
been justified as necessary for integration. The stated objectives in law or
parliamentary debates are to improve immigrants’ motivation to partici-
pate in society, their social, economic, and civic participation, and their
knowledge of the national language as well as to fight forced marriages.
This section presents the research findings and gaps on the impact of spe-
cific family reunion requirements and tests on the integration process of
non-EU immigrants and their reuniting families. Pre-entry tests, high
income requirements, and high age limits are recent, untested, and limited
to very few countries in the European Union. The desk research drew on
evaluations commissioned by government, studies by universities and
think-tanks in English and Danish, and three independent European
research projects (PROSINT,9 INTEC,10 and the Family Reunification
Project.)11 The main countries covered are Austria, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Availability of Courses?
High-quality pre-entry courses for family reunion tend to be appreciated
by immigrants, especially those with little formal education, when these
courses are accessible and adapted to their needs.12 Unfortunately, pre-entry
courses are often unavailable, inaccessible, low quality, or expensive in many
countries and circumstances.13 For example, the German government eval-
uation14 found that courses were less accessible for people who lived in
certain countries or remote rural areas as well as for people who used non-
Latin alphabets or were illiterate. Applicants wait on average two months on
course waiting lists and require an estimated four months for the course
itself. These courses may not even be sufficient to pass the pre-entry test.
Even 39 percent of the spouses able to pass the test said they needed more
preparatory support than the current training package sold by the Dutch
government.15 Indeed in some countries, it is not safe for spouses to learn
everything that the Dutch government considers to be essential about life in
the Netherlands. In 2009, one in three people who bought the Dutch train-
ing package received a censored version of its DVD Coming to the Nether-
lands, because their country’s government outlaws all movies showing
homosexuality or nudity.16 Lastly, the high costs make pre-entry tests even
more inaccessible. German and Dutch focus groups17 assessed the financial
burden as high in many countries of origin. According to estimates by Ernst
& Young, a global accounting firm, 719 € was the average total cost for
migrants preparing for the Dutch pre-entry test.18 One in four people spend
more than 719 €. Two to 3 percent spend almost 2,000 € to meet the require-
ment. Many applicants may need to quit their jobs and forgo an income to
attend the estimated four-month course. People living far from the few cities
with an official course-provider will face additional travel and accommoda-
tion costs for the test and potentially for the course.
Self-selection is one of the main reasons why some spouses can succeed
in pre-entry courses and tests, according to Dutch and German govern-
ment evaluations of the pass/fail rates.19 Self-selection means that certain
types of people are more likely to fail because of their personal back-
ground. These spouses who fail may be just as motivated or prepared to
learn as those who pass. But for these type of tests, who they are matters
as much—and perhaps more—than what they do. A test abroad will have
a disproportionately negative impact on vulnerable groups, especially
when faced with high costs and low levels of support to pass pre-entry
requirements. For example, less-educated spouses are less able to learn all
the information abroad needed to pass than highly educated spouses.
Passing the test is more difficult in certain countries, potentially due to the
language differences and location of the course and test facilities (e.g.,
Morocco and Russia for the German test; Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam
for the Dutch test). The elderly, refugees, residents of politically unstable
countries, and to some extent women, also fail at higher rates than other
groups. The German government evaluation identified additional factors
like limited access to the official course, no previous knowledge of any
foreign language, and individual vulnerability.
Language Learning?
Pre-entry language tests and requirements have only marginal effects on
language learning, according to government evaluations and academic
focus groups in Germany and the Netherlands.20 Immigrants and embassy
staff in the two countries agreed that the little German or Dutch that
spouses can reasonably learn from their hometown in their country of
origin is not enough to get by in Germany or the Netherlands. Further-
more, the marginal language learning effects are not very sustainable.
Many successful applicants then forgot the little they learned between the
pre-entry test, final word on the acceptance of their application, their
arrival in their country of destination, and their enrollment in a language
course. Additional requirements on age limits, income, and attachment do
not seem to promote language learning.
Educational Progress?
The educational effects of pre-entry tests, age limits, or income require-
ments appear to be minimal. Preparing for and passing the pre-entry test
has little to no effect on raising an individual’s level of education.21 This
finding may be related to the test’s minimal effects on language learning.
Higher age limits in Denmark had no demonstrable impact on education
of immigrants and ethnic minorities, as observed by the Danish National
Centre for Social Research (SFI).22 Education levels of ethnic minority
women, which have been improving all the time, made no significant
gains since the introduction of this age limit in 2002. Higher income
requirements in the Netherlands, which aimed to promote economic par-
ticipation, may have unintentionally undermined participation in higher
education, as some sponsors drop out of long-term education tracks in
order to get some income to meet the requirements.23
Labor Market Integration?

Government and academic evaluations find that these new require-
ments had little to no effect on immigrants’ position in the labor market.
The pre-entry test for the Netherlands did not improve spouses’ economic
integration, according to the Dutch government evaluation.24 Higher
Dutch requirements on incomes and age limits had little benefit for labor
market integration, according to an earlier evaluation by the governmental
agency WODC.25 The disproportionately high income requirement raised
labor market participation for some newcomers, but mostly before and
during the application process. After family reunion, labor market partici-
pation returned to normal levels. A qualitative Dutch study26 suggests that
people who are committed to living with their family often scramble to
meet the income requirements in any way possible. These sponsors, espe-
cially women and young people, may end up in short-term employment,
such as overtime or low-skilled, undesirable, or dead-end jobs. This type
of work does not offer long-term prospects. This minor and momentary
uptick in labor market participation is not an indicator of sustainable
progress on integration.
In Denmark, analysis by SFI concluded that raising the age limit did
not raise the economic participation among young immigrants and Danes
with an immigrant background. Their economic participation improved
in virtually the same way as comparable groups of Danes without an immi-
grant background. A 2008 government-funded study by the Danish Insti-
tute of Government Research27 concluded that the spouses immigrating
under the stricter post-2002 rules had good labor market potential. How-
ever, neither the study nor the Integration Ministry examined their
assumption that spouses arriving after 2002 actually had more potential
than spouses arriving before. A 2011 broad study on this question28 ana-
lyzed registered data from Danish Statistics of about 30,000 residents from
non-Western countries residing in Denmark for at least 6.5 years. Laurit-
zen and Larsen found no significant difference in the employment rates of
residents admitted in the one year before or the one year after the 2002
changes.
Fighting Forced Marriage?

There is no quantitative and little qualitative data that the number of
forced marriages is reduced by pre-entry tests, age limits, or income
requirements. Forced marriages are notoriously difficult to detect or to
count. In the United Kingdom, raising the age limit from 16 to 18 had no
effect on the incidence of forced marriage, according to a government-
commissioned analysis of large-scale national databases.29 The SFI research
also found no effect for that country’s 24-year age limit.30 Anecdotal
accounts can be used either for or against the effectiveness of these new
requirements. On the one hand, some German teachers abroad specu-
lated31 that the pre-entry test may offer a chance for people to get out of a
forced marriage because they can try to deliberately fail the test. On the
other hand, victims who fail to meet family reunion requirements may be
forced to marry and live in their or their parents’ country of origin. Danish
and British embassies have had several cases of their citizens or residents
being forcibly taken abroad.32 Most victims contacting Danish women’s
shelters were reportedly women frightened of being taken abroad, partly
due to the country’s restrictive family reunion policy.33 These new require-
ments may thus have the effect of moving forced marriages abroad, where
victims have more difficulty accessing protection.
Victims and survivors themselves, who were consulted in UK focus
groups,34 did not think that age limits of 21 or 24 would prevent forced
marriages. The few benefits that they identified—greater maturity, educa-
tion, and independence—were outweighed in their minds by many more
costs and risks:
• Greater physical or psychological harm

• Mental health problems like attempted suicide and self-harm
• Barriers to potential support like child protection legislation and school-based
counseling
• Spouses must entry the country with false documentation or sponsors are taken
abroad by force
• Dual marriage system leading to indirect discrimination against certain ethnic
groups
To address the mix of personal, family, and community factors behind

forced marriages, the UK focus groups of victims suggested that family
reunion policies were less effective than direct victim support, preventive
work, and educational resources. Interviews with Danish victims’ support
groups suggest focusing directly on raising education levels among immi-
grant women in the country and raising everyone’s awareness of forced
marriages and services. Measures to fight forced marriage may be most
effective when spouses can access trained services and women’s shelters in
the country of destination.35
Discouraging and Delaying Family Reunion

Besides promoting integration, one major often unsaid assumption is
that these new requirements will restrict family reunion rates. Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient was used to assess the relationship between
non-EU family reunion rates and policies as measured by MIPEX.36 Rates
were calculated for 2008, 2010, and 2011. A very strong positive correla-
tion emerged between the non-EU family reunion rate and family reunion
policies for 25 EU member states in 2011.37 A country’s non-EU family
reunion rate is strongly connected to its policy, regardless of whether the
policy is measured as the MIPEX family reunion strand (Spearman’s rho
0,623, p < 0.001) or access to family reunion—the average of the first
three family reunion dimensions (Spearman’s rho 0,611, p < 0.01). This
strong correlation holds for policies and rates in 2010, 2007–2008, and
for legal changes in 2011.
While correlation is not the same as causation, the nature of the two
variables suggests a causal link. Policy influences which and how many
families are eligible and are accepted for family reunion. Certainly, fam-
ily reunion is also influenced by a person’s need and eligibility to reunite
with a family member abroad, depending on the situation in the coun-
try of origin, international travel costs, immigrants’ reason for migra-
tion, marital status, family size and structure, length of residence, and
intentions to settle permanently. Still, these results demonstrate that
policy restrictions are a major factor behind low and declining non-EU
family reunion rates. Policies that become more restrictive, selective,
and discretionary will likely function as obstacles for sponsors and fam-
ilies who want to reunite.
These aggregate-level findings are also confirmed by national evaluations
of pre-entry tests, age limits, and fees and income requirements. Denmark’s
post-2002 policies further decreased demand for family reunion38 and
raised the overall marriage age among ethnic minorities.39 Higher age limits
and income requirements in the Netherlands were major causes of a swift
and significant decline in family reunion applications, according to the
Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.40
Generally, income or employment requirements disproportionately exclude
migrant women from becoming family reunion sponsors, because they
have greater child-care responsibilities and depend more on part-time or
informal work.41 The OECD observes that income requirements may also
delay sponsorship among migrant men and youth, who are disproportion-
ately affected by the economic crisis’s higher levels of unemployment and
poverty.42 Pre-entry tests led to an especially sharp temporary drop in the
number of family reunions in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The
drops were greatest for these countries’ largest countries of origin. After the
introduction of a pre-entry requirement, Germany’s application rate
dropped by 25 percent in the first six months, especially from Turkey, Ser-
bia, Kosovo, and Russia. France’s dropped by 27 percent in the first six
months of 2009. The Netherlands’ dropped by 40 percent in the first two
years, especially from Morocco and Ghana.43 The UK government expects
its pre-entry test will cause a drop in applications.44 After these initial drops,
application numbers have slightly improved in Germany and the Nether-
lands. Whether these numbers are the same as they would have been with-
out the new policies is disputed by quantitative analysts. Family reunion
flows are regularly fluctuating and hard to predict. The introduction of
these types of restrictions does have a disproportionate impact on limiting
the number of family reunions in the short term and perhaps longer.
The Impact on Families: Persistence, Resettlement, Delay, and Desistence

The overall effect of this drop on couples and families has been mixed
and difficult to quantify. Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow propose to classify
these impacts as persistence, resettlement, delay, and desistence:
• Persistent families are still able to apply under the new regulations.
• Resettling families have to reunite in one country or another via regular or irreg-
ular channels.
• Delayed families have to wait months or years to pass the new requirements or
age limits.
• Desisting families cannot reunite—either they remain separated or break up as a
family/couple.
Only persistent families are properly captured in family reunion statis-

tics. Few families are likely to try the second option—resettlement—since
these routes are limited, costly, and risky: a work or humanitarian permit
for the spouse, moving to another country or EU member state, return
to their country of origin, visa overstaying, unauthorized entry, or false
documentation. Many more couples may have had to delay, as suggested
by family reunion statistics that first dropped after changes like pre-entry
tests but then (partially) recovered. For example, the UK government esti-
mated that 15 percent of couples will be delayed an extra one to two years
for spouses to pass the pre-entry test.45 Recent focus groups in the Nether-
lands suggest that the pre-entry test, age limit, and income requirements
forced the average family to wait 15 extra months. Applicants under
21 waited an average of 30 months to meet not only the new age limit, but
also the higher income requirement, which had a disproportionate impact
on young people entering the labor market.46 The fourth and final group—
desisting families—applies to an unknown number of people. Since the
number of applications has not fully returned to previous or projected
levels, it is safe to conclude that many families are still not able to apply.
While this self-selection effect pushes couples to persist, resettle, delay,
or desist, little evidence exists that instead they are pushed to choose a dif-
ferent spouse. If the sponsor already has a spouse or family abroad, he or
she has few options besides enforced separation or divorce and family
breakup. If the sponsor is looking for a spouse abroad (family formation),
he or she could instead look for someone in their or another EU country
(the so-called “substitution effect”). Significant changes in partner choice
have been observed in the Netherlands47 but not in Denmark.48
Many more potential sponsors are simply not marrying anyone. Lower
marriage rates have been registered among Danish young men and women
of non-Western background.49 Rates are lower not just for those under the
24-year age limit, but also for those above 24 who cannot meet the many
other requirements. The Rockwool Foundation in 2009 attributed this
substantial drop in marriage rates to Denmark’s post-2002 age limit and
attachment requirement.50 However, the trend toward lower marriage
rates began well before in 1997. Moreover, Sweden has had very similarly
low rates since the early 2000s but maintained its more inclusive family
reunion policies. In the Netherlands, many more residents of Turkish and
Moroccan background are becoming old enough to legally marry, but

fewer are getting married than before.51 Who and when these young peo-
ple will want to marry are unknown.
It is hard to conclude that changes in partner choices and marriage ages
are substitution effects of new family reunion policies. Before these poli-
cies were in place, these countries were experiencing less demand for fam-
ily formation among residents with ethnic minority backgrounds, as new
generations became better educated and active in the labor market. Which
families are able to persist or resettle? Which are more likely to be delayed
or deterred? The Dutch and German government evaluations52 find that
“self-selection” explains not only the differences in pass/fail test rates but
also in application rates. Persistent and resettling families are not necessar-
ily more motivated or prepared than deterred families. But they are more
privileged and less vulnerable. Those who have the resources to pass the
test are still able to apply. Those without these resources are now less likely
to apply. This self-selection effect is less common for Germany than the
Netherlands, where the pre-entry test and preparation costs are much
higher. The statistically significant factors for self-selection are similar for
application and rejection rates. These requirements disproportionately
discourage vulnerable groups like the elderly, the less educated, residents
of specific countries, people coming from armed conflicts, and to some
extent women. When these people are part of a family, they are not only
more likely to fail a pre-entry test, but also less likely to apply. The Dutch
evaluation also finds that cases of family reunion are more negatively
affected than cases of family formation.
Conclusions
Family reunion restrictions show no signs of long-term effectiveness
for their stated integration goals, according to government and academic
evaluations. Spouses abroad have had to show greater motivation and
preparation than before. Many put in disproportionately high costs, time,
and stress to pass these tests. Hardly any get anything out of them.
Government evaluations, focus groups with migrants, and interviews
with course providers conclude that there is no balance between their
great efforts abroad and the limited outcomes for their integration.53
Better formal and informal opportunities for learning and participation
await them in the country of destination. In comparison, integration
abroad is not a very cost-effective option. Beyond pre-entry tests, it cannot
be claimed that other new requirements like age limits, attachment assess-
ments, or high income levels and fees effectively promote language
learning, socioeconomic participation, and educational progress or reduce

forced marriages. These new requirements do not really help reuniting
families to integrate faster into their new country of residence.
Instead, these new requirements have a disproportionate impact on lim-
iting the number of family reunions. Sharp temporary drops in application
rates suggest that restrictions have a significant impact on some families.
“Self-selection” filters out vulnerable groups from passing tests, applying
for family reunion, and using alternative options like the EU resettlement
route. As a result, many sponsors may not choose a different partner or let
their family break up. Instead, their family life becomes harder or even
impossible through “enforced separation.” Some may give up altogether on
the idea of living together, while others may delay their family reunion
application or their wedding day. These new requirements delay and dis-
courage many families from reuniting. These findings are particularly wor-
rying, given immigrants’ self-reported benefits of family reunion for their
family life and integration. The 2012 Immigrant Citizens Survey used com-
parable random sampling methods to interview over 7,000 non-EU-born
adults in 15 cities in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. Among these respondents, reunited families stated that family
reunion helped them to improve their family life, sense of belonging to the
country, and often other integration outcomes. But the documents required
and discretionary powers of authorities were cited as major problems for
past applicants, while sponsors still separated from their families often said
that they either cannot meet the requirements or do not know if they meet
them. These recent research and evaluation findings merit greater reflec-
tion about the assumptions underlying many new family reunion restric-
tions in the name of integration. The OECD’s PISA study finds that every
extra year that children spend in their country of origin and not in their
country of destination has a negative impact on their language learning and
societal adjustment as children age. Their conclusion is that family reunion
should be facilitated as soon as possible. Policy actors must scrutinize more
strictly whether recently proposed family reunion requirements exacerbate
the very problems that they are supposed to address.
Notes
1. Danish Government, Et Danmark, Der Står Sammen Regeringsgrundlag (2011).
2. Antonio Cruz, “Dutch coalition agreement which takes into account demands
of anti-immigration party will, if implemented, virtually halt third-country
immigration,” Migration News Sheet, Migration Policy Group, October 2010.
3. “Wilders: Samenwerking sommige dossiers knaagt,” De Volkskrant, October

14, 2011.
4. “Wilders calls EU commissioner a hippie and a ‘terrible person’,” Dutchnews
.nl, October 14, 2011.
5. Dutch government, Position paper—the Dutch standpoint on EU migration
policy, The Hague: Dutch Government (2011).
6. For more on these comparisons between EU member states and traditional
countries of immigration, see Thomas Huddleston, “Integration policies across
the Atlantic: How far behind Canada is Europe, how far ahead?” in International
perspectives: Integration and inclusion, ed. James Frideres and John Biles (Queen’s
University, Kingston, Canada, 2014), 235.
7. For example, the number of family reunions seems high in countries such as
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands because nearly every
other person who obtained a family permit in 2011 belonged to the family of EU
citizens. EU citizens’ family members also accounted for most of the families
reunited in Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta.
8. Naturalization rates are created in a similar way by Eurostat. The rate pre
sents the number of successful applicants (numerator) as a part of the total non-
EU legal resident population (denominator).
9. P. W. A. Scholten et al., Integration from abroad: Perception and impacts of pre-
entry tests for third-country nationals (Vienna: ICMPD, 2012).
10. Tineke Strik et al., Integration and naturalisation tests: The new way to
European citizenship: The INTEC project (Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen,
2010), pp. 30–44.
11. Tineke Strik, Betty de Hart, and Ellen Nissen, Family reunification: A barrier
or facilitator of integration? A comparative study (Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers,
2013).
12. Strik et al. (2010), Strik et al. (2013), and P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012),
pp. 61–64, 69–77.
13. Strik et al. (2010) and P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012), pp. 61–84.
14. Bundesregierung Deutschland, Bericht über die Evaluierung des Nachweises
ein-facher Deutschkentnisse beim Ehegattennachzug nach dem Aufenthaltsgesetz: Sprach-
lern-und Sprachtestangebote, Visumverfahren (Berlin: Bundesregierung Deutschland,
2010). See also Strik et al. (2010), Strik et al. (2013), P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012),
pp. 61–64.
15. Regioplan, De Wet Inburgering Buitenland. Een onderzoek naar de werking, de
resultaten en de eerste effecten (Den Haag: Regioplan, 2009), p. 26, and P. W. A.
Scholten et al. (2012), p. 65.
16. Significant, Evaluatierapport Inburgering in Nederland (The Hague: Rijks
overheid, 2010), p. 14 and P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012), p. 65.
17. Strik et al. (2010) and P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).
18. P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012), p. 66.
19. Regioplan (2009), Strik et al. (2010), P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).
20. Strik et al. (2010) and P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).
21. Regioplan (2009) in P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).

22. Garbi Schmidt et al., Ændrede familiesammenføringsregler. Hvad har de nye
regler betydet for pardannelsesmønstret blandt etniske minoriteter? (Copenhagen: SFI,
2009).
23. Arjen Leerkes and Isik Kulu-Glasgow: “Playing hard(er) to get: The state,
international couples, and the income requirement,” European Journal of Migration
and Law 13 (2011): 95 and Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecen-
trum, International family formation restricted? An evaluation of the raised income-
and age requirements with regard to the migration of foreign partners to the Netherlands
(The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, 2009).
24. Regioplan (2009) in P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).
25. Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, WODC (2009).
26. Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow (2011).
27. Dorte Caswell et al., “Family-supported female immigrants—Opportunities
and obstacles on the job market and in the educational system,” AKF Working
paper 14 (2008).
28. Lauritzen Hesselberg and Larsen Rode, “Tøjleløs kontrol—en multilevel
analyse af ikke-vestlige indvandreres arbejdsmarkedsintegration før og efter de
skærpede regler for familiesammenførings ikrafttræden den 1. juli 2002” (MA
thesis, University of Århus, 2011).
29. Marianne Hester et al., Forced marriage: The risk factors and the effect of rais-
ing the minimum age for a sponsor, and of leave to enter the UK as a spouse or fiancée
(Bristol: Bristol University, 2008).
30. Schmidt et al. (2009).
31. Bundesregierung Deutschland (2010).
32. Schmidt et al. (2009) did not come to any conclusions about either the
amount or geographical distribution of these cases.
33. Ibid.
34. Hester et al. (2008).
36. The data used were the 2007 and 2010 MIPEX scores for family reunion
policies. Data were also collected on 2011 legal changes in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom based on the
MIPEX blog. The analysis was also run on a score for “Access to family reunion.”
It is the average of the first three dimensions of the strand: eligibility, conditions,
and security of status. The fourth, rights associated, is excluded since it measures
families’ rights upon arrival. Together, the first three all regulate their ability to
reunite. They capture how restrictive, selective, and discretionary the policies are.
37. Thomas Huddleston, “Family reunion: Confronting stereotypes, confront-
ing policies,” Migration Policy Group, Brussels, p. 4, accessed June 12, 2014,
http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/family%20reunion%20briefing%2020
12%20final%20edited.pdf
38. Karina Moeslund and Elisabeth Strasser, Family Migration Policies in Den
mark (Vienna: BMWF/ICMPD, 2008) and Schmidt et al. (2009).
39. Marie Louise Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs Torben, “Ægteskabsmønstret for

unge medindvandrerbaggrund: Konsekvenser afændringer i udlændingeloven i
2000 og 2002,” Working paper 22 (Copenhagen, Rockwool Fondens Forskning-
senhed and Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2009).
40. Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, WODC (2009).
41. Albert Kraler, Civic stratification, gender and family migration policies in
Europe (Vienna: BMWF/ICMPD, 2010).
42. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International
migration outlook SOPEMI 2010 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010).
43. Strik et al. (2010), Strik et al. (2013), pp. 32–35.
44. UK Border Agency, English language requirement for spouses: Impact assess-
ment (London: UK Border Agency, 2010).
45. Ibid.
46. Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow (2011).
47. P. W. A. Scholten et al. (2012).
49. Ibid.
50. Schultz-Nielsen and Torben (2009).
51. Jaco Dagevos et al., “Ontwikkelingen in integratie op hoofdlijnen,” in Jaar-
rapport Integratie 2009, eds. Jaco Dagevos et al. (The Hague: SCP, 2009), p. 19.
52. Strik et al. (2010), pp. 33–35, Strik et al. (2013), and P. W. A. Scholten
et al. (2012).
53. Ibid.
CHAPTER NINE
The Mythical Death of

Multiculturalism
Tariq Modood
Introduction
Prime Minister David Cameron’s declaration that “multiculturalism is
dead” has a long pedigree and is by no means confined to the Right.1 Mul-
ticulturalism has always had its left- as well as right-wing critics, but the
obituaries probably began in 1989 with Fay Weldon: “Our attempt at mul-
ticulturalism has failed. The Rushdie Affair demonstrates it.”2 The “Rush-
die Affair” she writes of takes its name from the British-Indian author of
the novel The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie, an erstwhile champion of
multiculturalism but whose portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed and his
wives in this novel outraged many Muslims all over the world and led to
the Ayatollah Khomeini issuing a call for all Muslims to seek the death of
the author and others associated with the publication of the novel.
Whatever our views on the novel The Satanic Verses, the Salman Rush-
die Affair crisis made clear that the minority-majority faultline in Britain
and elsewhere was not going to be simply about color racism;3 and that
multiculturalism could not be confined to steel bands, saris, and samosas.
For some liberals that meant the end of their support as angry Muslims
This is a shortened version of “Citizenship in a Diverse and Multicultural Society,” in New

Paradigms in Public Policy, ed. Peter Taylor-Gooby (Oxford: British Academy and Oxford
University Press, 2013), 103.
muscled in on something that was only meant for secular transgressives

like gays and black youth. Earlier street disturbances were hailed as “right
on” politics but a passionate religious identity was too “multicultural” for
many liberals. Till this point it had been assumed that opposition to mul-
ticulturalism would be from conservatives, nationalists, and Christians,
but from the Rushdie Affair onward liberals across Western Europe began
to worry that liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, secularist poli-
tics, and gender equality were at risk from the newly settled ethno-
religious minorities. With the attacks of 9/11 and the arrival in the West
of international terrorism in the name of Islam, this tendency to blame
multiculturalism became a common feature across the political spectrum
and has come to assume its own terroristic forms, such as in the mass
murder by the Norwegian Anders Breivik. Additionally, many commenta-
tors and politicians talk of multiculturalism as divisive and productive of
segregation.
Yet, the idea that multiculturalism has failed or is dead is a myth. Its
plausibility is based on the fact that there is a lot of confusion about what
multiculturalism is and what it is not. This is partly because “multicultur-
alism” is too often defined by its critics, whose sole purpose is to create a
straw man to knock down. But it’s also because both its critics and some of
its defenders falsely oppose multiculturalism with integration; and the
confusion also partly stems from the fact that there is more than one form
of multiculturalism and they relate to integration in different ways. To
appreciate these complexities and the confusions they engender involves
an understanding of multiculturalism that is not distorted by the rhetorical
backlash against it. To further this task I offer here a theoretical framework
for displaying that multiculturalism is a mode of integration that tries to
meet the deficits of other modes such as assimilation, individualist-
integration, and cosmopolitanism, and, like the others, it is based on the
core democratic values of liberty, equality, and fraternity/unity.
Identifying and Responding to “Difference”

The need for integration arises when an established society is faced
with people whom it perceives, and therefore treats, unfavorably by
comparison with other members. Typically these outsiders also perceive
themselves as “different,” though not necessarily in a negative way. This
challenge may relate to different areas or sectors of society and policy,
such as employment, education, and housing. For example, someone is
integrated into the labor market when she or he is able to enjoy equality
of opportunity in accessing jobs and careers, as well as the education
The Mythical Death of Multiculturalism 199
and training necessary to compete for such jobs; and when the labor
market is not segmented into different parts with radically different
monetary rewards and working conditions for those with broadly similar
qualifications and experience. This is particularly relevant where the seg-
mentation is, formally or informally, based on the categories of “difference”
such as race, ethnicity, religion, and so on. What is true of labor markets
can be applied more generally. The purpose of integration is equality of
opportunity in a society where membership of any sector of society—
employment, education, and so on—is not based on criteria such as race
and ethnicity.
Integration has a number of components based on opportunities to par-
ticipate, which are context-specific and need to be secured by law and
policy initiatives. It also has a subjective and symbolic dimension, which
too has some contextual features, but which also has a more general or
“macro” character: how a minority is perceived by the rest of the country
and how members of a minority perceive their relationship to society as a
whole. Even if members of ethnic minorities are fully integrated in terms
of legal rights, access to employment, or education that does not mean
they have achieved full social integration. This also requires some degree
of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole—what
the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain called “a sense of belonging”4—
and acceptance from the majority population that the minority persons are
full members of society and have the right to feel that they belong.
Sectoral integration and the general sense of integration can happen at
an individual level. An individual may choose to integrate or not, and may
be given opportunities to participate or not. My interest in this chapter is
not in individual choices and opportunities themselves, but in examining
their impact at the level of groups or society as a whole. A sense of belong-
ing is dependent on how others perceive and treat you, not just as an
individual but also as a member of a racial group or ethno-religious com-
munity. Each policy area will have its own imperatives and difficulties, for
example in the areas of qualification levels or residential segregation,5 but
there is also a general understanding that we as members of society have
about what our society is and what it is to be a member. This informs
popular understanding as well as political ideas and the general terms of
policy paradigms. As the Quebec Commission puts it: “the symbolic
framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the other, collec-
tive memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material
framework.”6 This is particularly relevant because the sense of “crisis”
about multiculturalism and integration operates at this general and soci-
etal level. This is evident when one considers how few are the policies
directed at integration or how small the funds involved are, compared to

the headline importance that the issues regularly achieve. In thinking
about policy paradigms of a general ethos or orientation at a national level
it is therefore important to engage at this broader societal level.7
I consider this larger, macro-symbolic sense of integration with its
implied policy paradigms or framings through discussing four modes of
integration: assimilation, individualist-integration, and two versions of
multiculturalism, one of which I will call cosmopolitanism.8 Each mode
offers its own distinctive interpretation of the core values of Western
democracy (freedom, equality, and civic unity, or “fraternity”), and is a
developing model.9 The issue or “problem” these paradigms are addressing
is postimmigration “difference.”10 Large-scale immigration into Europe has
been by people marked by “difference.” The “difference” is not confined to
the fact of migration, or how long the migrants and their families have been
in one of these countries, or the fact that they come from less economically
developed parts of the world. “Difference” primarily refers to how people
are identified: how they identify themselves (for example as “white,”
“black,” “Chinese,” “Muslim,” etc.), how they identify others (again as
“white,” “black,” “Chinese,” “Muslim,” etc.), and how they are identified by
others (“white,” etc.).
These identities fall (not necessarily unambiguously or discretely)
within the fields of “race,” ethnicity, religion, culture, and nationality as
various forms of difference. They will no doubt be classed or gendered in
specific or generalizable ways but the important point from which every-
thing else follows is that these identities are not reducible to, or, stronger
still, are not primarily socioeconomic or “objective” in classical sociologi-
cal terms. The identities involve subjectivity and agency. The relationship
between migrants and the “hosts,” or more accurately, given that the
migrations in question took place mainly in the third quarter of the 20th
century, the minority-majority relations, cannot be understood without
the forms of difference. The relevant interactions cannot be explained, the
position of different actors cannot be predicted (or even guessed at), and
political preferences cannot be expressed without the explicit or implicit
use of the idea of difference. It is commonly said that we must distinguish
between multiculturalism as social description and Multiculturalism as
political understanding of those social facts.11 Interestingly, the same
could be but is rarely said about class/Class, nation/Nation, or gender/
Gender. In fact, social description and sociological concepts are not nor-
mally politically neutral. The concepts I analyze below are normative and
policy-oriented but they presuppose an understanding of what the social
phenomenon is that demands a political response. The problem, then, is
how to integrate difference, or to put it another way, the processes whereby

difference ceases to be problematic. I shall consider four modes of integra-
tion (summarized in Table 9.1).
Modes of Integration
Assimilation is the term used to describe a situation when the processes
affecting change and the relationships between social groups are seen as
one-way. The preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to dis-
turb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new
compatriots as possible.12 We may think of it as one-way integration. This
may simply be a laissez-faire approach with few policies but the state
can play an active role in bringing about the desired outcome, as in early
20th-century “Americanization” policies toward European migrants in
the United States. The desired outcome for society as a whole is seen as
involving least change in the ways of doing things for the majority of the
country and its institutional policies. Assimilation seeks to erase difference
so that the occasions for discrimination and conflict are not allowed to
take root. From the 1960s onward, beginning with anglophone countries
and spreading to others (though most prominently perhaps not to France),
assimilation as a policy has come to be seen as impractical (especially for
those who stand out in terms of physical appearance), illiberal (requiring
too much state intervention), and inegalitarian (treating indigenous citi-
zens as a norm to which others must approximate). It was as early as 1966
that Roy Jenkins, then the UK home secretary, declared that in the view of
the British government integration is “not a flattening process of assimila-
tion but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmo-
sphere of mutual tolerance.”13 Accordingly, “assimilation” as a term has
come to be dropped in favor of “integration.” Even today, when some poli-
ticians use the term “integration,” they actually, consciously or not, mean
what here has been defined as assimilation.14 The use of these terms in
public discourse cannot be taken at their face value but should be critically
inspected.
In the three modes of integration that go beyond assimilation, processes
of social interaction are seen as two-way, where members of the majority
community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do
something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing to, or not trying
to, integrate. Assimilation—in policy terms, not merely as reference to
personal choices—has recently come to the fore most often in relation to
naturalization, with the introduction of language requirements and tests of
national knowledge. Yet, the established society is the site of institutions,
including employment, civil society, and the state, in which integration

has to take place. The prospective citizens’ rights and opportunities must
be made effective through the antidiscrimination laws and policies that
regulate these institutions. At this point we should distinguish between
the two-way modes, individualist-integration and multiculturalism. The
former sees the institutional adjustments in relation to migrants or minori-
ties as only relevant to claimants as individuals and bearers of rights as
equal citizens.15 Minority communities may exist as private associations
but are not recognized or supported in the public sphere.
Multiculturalism is where processes of integration are seen as two-way,
as involving groups as well as individuals, and as working differently for
different groups.16 In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and
thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the “multi”).
“Culturalism” refers to the fact that the groups in question are likely not
just to be marked by newness or phenotype or socioeconomic location but
by certain forms of group identity. The integration of groups is in addition
to, not as an alternative to, the integration of individuals, antidiscrimina-
tion measures, and a robust framework of individual rights. Multicultural-
ism, like most concepts, takes different forms in different contexts and at
different times. For example, it has been differently understood in the
Netherlands and in Britain.17 For example, in Britain it developed out of an
original focus on racial discrimination and socioeconomic inequality,
whereas in the Netherlands it seems to have been initially at the expense
of social mobility. It is also understood differently in Quebec compared to
anglophone Canada, for while the latter see it as including all cultural
groups into an inclusive Canadianness, the former see multiculturalism as
denying the status of the Quebecois as one of the two official cultures of
Canada.18 The meaning of any mode of integration is subject to debate and
contestation. Those who originate the policy may start with one meaning,
as for example, Roy Jenkins did in relation to race and culture. Then oth-
ers, including latecomers to the debate, may push it or extend it in other
directions by, for example, making religion central, as some Muslims in
Britain have done.19
Equality is central to multiculturalism, as it is to other conceptions of
integration. The key difference between individualist-integration and mul-
ticulturalism is that the concepts of group and of the equal status of differ-
ent kinds of groups (racial, ethnic, religious, etc.) are essential to the latter.
Postimmigration minorities are groups differentiated from the majority
society or the norm in society by two factors: on the one hand, negative
“difference,” alienness, inferiorization, stigmatization, stereotyping, exclu-
sion, discrimination, and racism; on the other, by the senses of identity
that groups so perceived have of themselves. The two together are the key
data for multiculturalism. The differences at issue are those perceived both
by outsiders or group members—from the outside in and from the inside
out—to constitute not just some form of distinctness but a form of
alienness or inferiority that diminishes or makes difficult equal member-
ship in the wider society or polity.
Multiculturalism has recently been defined as “where ethno-cultural-
religious minorities are, or are thought of, as rather distinct communities,
and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness.”20 This, however,
is only part of it. Multiculturalism allows those who wish to encourage
such distinctiveness to do so; but it also seeks forms of social unity that are
compatible with this, what Hartmann and Gerteis call “new conceptions of
solidarity,”21 grounded in a concept of equality.22 Each mode of integration
must be understood in terms of its interpretation of free choice, equality,
and fraternity (as displayed in Table 9.1). Characterizations of multicultur-
alism that omit unity as a key component are extremely common but
incomplete.
Further Unpacking Multiculturalism and Integration

Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from indi-
vidualist-integration because it explicitly recognizes the social reality of
groups, not just of individuals and organizations. There may, however, be
considerable complexity about what is meant by the social reality of
groups. Ideas of groups as discrete, homogeneous, unchanging, bounded
populations are not realistic when we are thinking of multicultural recog-
nition.23 Disagreement about the extent to which postimmigration groups
exist and/or ought to exist and be given political status means that there
are two kinds of multiculturalism.24 I shall use “multiculturalism” to refer
to the view that group membership is a central feature of people’s identity
in our society.25 I shall use “cosmopolitanism” to refer to the view that “dif-
ference” is perceived as valuable (or pragmatically accepted) but that group
identity is not of importance or, if it exists, that it should not be politically
recognized.26 The contention is that in the early stages of migration and
settlement, especially in the context of a legacy of racism, colonialism, and
European supremacism, processes of social exclusion created or reinforced
certain forms of “groupness” such as white and black. However, as a result
of social mixing, cultural sharing, and globalization in which the domi-
nant identities of modernity (such as of race and nation) are dissolving at
least at the level of everyday encounters, people have much more fluid and
multiple identities, combine them in individual ways, and use them in
Table 9.1 Four Modes of Integration1
Assimilation Individualist-Integration Cosmopolitanism Multiculturalism
Objects of Policy Individuals and Individuals marked by Individuals marked by Individuals and groups marked
groups marked by “difference,” especially “difference,” especially their by “difference,” especially their
“difference.” their treatment by treatment by discriminatory treatment by discriminatory
discriminatory practices of practices of state and civil practices of state and civil society,
state and civil society. society, and societal ideas, and societal ideas, especially of
especially of “us” and “them.” “us” and “them.”
Liberty Minorities must Minorities are free to Neither minority nor Members of minorities should be
be encouraged to assimilate or cultivate their majority individuals should free to assimilate, to mix and
conform to the identities in private but are think of themselves as match, or to cultivate group
dominant cultural discouraged from thinking belonging to a single identity membership in proportions of
pattern. of themselves as a minority, but be free to mix and their own choice.
but rather as individuals. match.
Equality Presence of Discriminatory treatment Antidiscrimination must be In addition to antidiscrimination
difference must be actively eliminated accompanied by the the public sphere must
provokes so everyone is treated as an dethroning of the dominant accommodate the presence of new
discrimination and individual and not on the culture. group identities and norms.
so is to be avoided. basis of difference.
Fraternity A strong, Absence of discrimination People should be free to Citizenship and national identity
homogeneous and nurturing of unite across communal and must be remade to include group
national identity. individual autonomy national boundaries and identities that are important to
within a national/ should think of themselves minorities as well as majorities;
European, liberal as global citizens. the relationship between groups
democratic citizenship. should be dialogical rather than
one of domination or uniformity.
1
In all cases it is assumed that a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values are operative to a large degree and what is highlighted here is in
addition to or interaction with them.
context-sensitive ways.27 For example, the ways that Caribbean-origin

Britons have socially blended into a “multiculture” and have sought con-
viviality and sociability rather than separate communities may perhaps not
be fully captured as a form of individualistic integration.28 While remain-
ing economically marginal and overrepresented in relation to the social
problems associated with deprived inner city areas, they have become a
feature of popular culture in terms of music, dance, youth styles, and
sport, in all of which they have become significantly overrepresented.29
To the extent that football teams, Olympians, and television programs
such as The X Factor are central to popular and national identities, Carib-
bean-origin people are placed at the center of British national imaginaries.
Moreover, Britain and most other countries in Western Europe have
recently experienced and are experiencing a new wave of immigration and
will continue to do so, including the free movement from within the Euro-
pean Union. Given the diversity of the locations from which migrants are
coming, the result, it is argued, is not communities, but a churning mass
of languages, ethnicities, and religions, all cutting across each other and
creating a “super-diversity.”30 This may be setting a pattern for the future,
and it may be allied to a further argument that globalization, migration,
and telecommunications have created populations dispersed across coun-
tries that interact more with each other, and have a greater sense of loyalty
to each other, than they might to their fellow citizens.
In what ways does cosmopolitanism go beyond individualist-integra-
tion? Its distinctive ethos is that we should value diversity and create the
conditions where it is individually chosen. We should oppose all forms of
imposition of group identities on individuals and therefore the ideas,
images, and prejudices by which individuals are rendered inferior or por-
trayed as threatening, and so excluded from full membership in society.
We should not require assimilation or conformity to dominant group
norms. Inherited or ascribed identities that slot people into pigeonholes
not of their choosing, giving them a script to live by, should be refused:
they not only reduce the options of the kind of person one can be but
divide society into antagonistic groups.31 Cosmopolitanism is a conception
of multiculturalism as maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority
individuals, to mix with, borrow, and learn from all, whether they are of
your group or not. Individual identities are personal amalgams of bits from
various groups and heritages and there is no one dominant social identity
to which all must conform. The result will be a society composed of a
blend of cultures: a “multiculture.”
While this is an attractive image of contemporary society and links eas-
ily with the ideas of liberal democracy, it has only a partial fit with most
large Western cities, even, say, with London today, let alone with many
parts of most countries. In some towns and cities in northern England, for
example, there is not a range of groups but often just two, for example,
Asian Muslims and whites. Many minority individuals do not float across
identities, mixing and matching, but have a strong attachment to one or
few identities. Most British Muslims seem to think of themselves as
“Muslim” and/or “British” (usually both).32 The fact of super-diversity is
emerging alongside rather than displacing the fact of settled, especially
postcolonial, communities that have a particular historical relationship
with Britain and a particular political significance. Similarly, there are
communities in other European countries with their own historical signifi-
cance such as Maghrebians in France and the Turks in Germany. Some
groups continue to be much larger than others and stand out as groups, in
their own eyes and those of others, and are at the center of public policy
and debate, especially if they are thought to be failing to integrate.
Muslims, for example, seem to be in this category across much of Western
Europe, even when there are high levels of conviviality or diversity.
That is not to say that such minority identities are exclusive. Successive
surveys have shown that most Muslims in Britain strongly identify with
being Muslim but the majority also identify as British; indeed, they are
more likely to identify as “British” and say they have trust in key British
institutions than non-Muslims.33 Gallup (2009)34 found the same in
Germany, but less so in France, although Pew (2006)35 found much higher
levels of national identification in general in France than in other Western
European countries. Post-immigration hyphenated identities, such as
British-Indian, have become as commonplace in Britain as they have been
in the United States for decades. Similarly, diasporic links as described
above certainly exist and are likely to increase, but the net result is not an
inevitable erosion of national citizenship—British African-Caribbeans and
South Asians have families in their countries of origin and in the United
States and Canada, but there is little evidence that most branches of those
families do not feel British, American, or Canadian. Indeed, studies show
that the more multiculturalist countries achieve higher levels of national
identification among migrants and the second generation.36
An important point of difference, then, between the concepts of cosmo-
politanism (and individualist-integration) and multiculturalism proper is
in the understanding of what constitutes a group. In multiculturalism,
the groups formed of post-immigration minorities are not of one kind but
are several—a “multi.” However, neither multiculturalism nor cosmopoli-
tanism provides a comprehensive sociological or political model because
our societies include both people whose identities are based on group
membership, as Sikhs or Muslims for example, and people who are not
committed to or identified by a single core identity. For the latter, one of a
range of different identities may be relevant in different contexts, some-
times as a worker, or a woman, or a Londoner, or a Briton. From the mul-
ticulturalist perspective, these alternative ways of identifying with a group
should be viewed as complementary.37 Moreover, while recognition of eth-
nic or religious groups may have a legal dimension, for the most part it will
be at the level of civic consultations, political participation, institutional
policies (for example, in relation to schools and hospitals), discursive rep-
resentations, especially in relation to the changing discourses of societal
unity or national identity, and their remaking. For these reasons both mul-
ticulturalism and cosmopolitanism can be helpful in understanding differ-
ent aspects of ethnic relations in our society.
Regardless of the extent to which recognition of minority identities in
this way is formal or informal, led by the state or by the semiautonomous
institutions of civil society, individual rights and the shared dimensions of
citizenship are not challenged. There may, however, be genuine concern
that some groups at a particular time and in some areas are becoming too
inward-looking. Where the concern is primarily about a lack of positive
mixing and interaction between groups at a local level, community cohe-
sion measures, for example, a Christian school offering places to non-
Christians or twinning with a non-Christian school, may be an appropriate
response.38 Where the concern is about self-conceptions and discourses
more generally, the issue will be about the national or societal identity.
While such inwardness has never been part of any theory or policy of mul-
ticulturalism, it is clear that it is a fundamental anxiety of the critics of
multiculturalism, many of whom go as far as to define multiculturalism in
terms of such separatism.39 It is therefore important to emphasize that
multiculturalism is a mode of integration. Attempts to promote multicul-
turalism should be examined for their success in achieving this, in the
same way that hostility to minorities or other modes of integration are
assessed.40
Ways in Which Multiculturalism Is Not Dead

This unpacking of what is meant by multiculturalism is also helpful in
understanding those who say that multiculturalism has failed41 or that
multiculturalism is dead.42 They may mean to endorse assimilation, indi-
vidualistic integration, or cosmopolitanism. At the same time they are
acknowledging and possibly reinforcing the social behavior and structures
of group difference because their lament is that some groups (especially
Muslims) are clearly visible as distinct groups when they should not be;
they attribute this fact to a separatist tendency in the groups, encouraged
by allegedly multiculturalist policies. Hence, paradoxical as it may sound,
fierce critics of multiculturalism are usually accepting certain assumptions
of multiculturalism even while rejecting its political implications. If they
thought these groups were merely the product of stereotypes and exclu-
sion (in the sense that “racial” groups are a product of racism) or were
primarily socioeconomic in character (perhaps a working-class “fraction”),
then that would be a sociological disagreement with the multiculturalists.
The irony is, of course, that the accusatory discourse of “some groups are
not integrating” may actually be reinforcing group identities and therefore
contributing to the social conditions that gives multiculturalism a socio-
logical pertinence. On the other hand, a sociology that marginalized eth-
nicity in favor of say, individuals, class, and gender would have a better fit
with antimulticulturalist politics but might be unable to explain or predict
the relevant social reality. Our normative orientation, individualist or mul-
ticulturalist, suggests to us an ideal sociology but also recommends itself
to us as feasible politics because we think that our view of how groups and
individuals interact in society is accurate.
Moreover, it is not just at the level of sociology that antimulticulturalists
may find themselves using multiculturalist ideas; even while deploying an
antimulticulturalist discourse they may enact multiculturalist policies.43 For
example, they may continue with group consultations, representation, and
accommodation. The British government has found it necessary to increase
the scale and level of consultations with Muslims in Britain since 9/11, and,
dissatisfied with existing organizations, has sought to increase the number
of organized interlocutors and the channels of communication.44 Avowedly
antimulticulturalist countries and governments have worked to increase
corporatism in practice, for example with the creation by former French
President Nicholas Sarkozy of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in
2003 to represent all Muslims to the French government in matters of wor-
ship and ritual; and in the creation of the Islamkonferenz in Germany in
2005, an exploratory body, yet with an extensive political agenda. These
bodies are partly top-down efforts to control Muslims or to channel them in
certain directions and away from others;45 nevertheless, such institutional
processes can only be understood as multiculturalist as they do not fall
within the conceptual framework of assimilation, individualist integration,
or cosmopolitanism. They are normatively less than the best of multicultur-
alism but they clearly are deploying a multiculturalist mode of integration,
and their presence offers the possibility of movement toward a more egali-
tarian, rather than a controlled top-down, multiculturalism.46
There is indeed a new intolerance in relation to certain Muslim practices

(for example, the niqab) and this is leading to some new laws or policies in
parts of Europe (though not yet in Britain). We do not yet seem to be wit-
nessing a paradigm shift, a fundamental change in the models or interpre-
tations used to explain events, for example, from pluralistic integration to
individualist integration. The antimulticulturalist may not just be pointing
to the visibility of groups like Muslims, but expressing the view that there
is an insufficient participation of such groups into a common life or sharing
of common values. My point is that some of the measures are not consis-
tent with assimilation or individualism but acknowledge the social reality
and political significance of groups. It may be thought that I am here
obscuring the central difference between multiculturalism and its political
critics: namely, that the latter but not the former emphasize integration into
a common life. I am, however, disputing this: the multiculturalism in the
writings of key theorists such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu
Parekh, and Anne Phillips, and in the relevant documents, laws, and poli-
cies of Canada, Australia, and Britain are all aimed at integration.47 The
difference between the pro- and antimulticulturalists lies not in the goal of
integration but, first, in the normative understanding of integration. I have
tried to bring this out by reference to the alternative interpretations and
prioritizing of the normative concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity
(summarized in Table 9.1). Second, there are different judgments about
contexts and about what will deliver results and more generally how soci-
ety works or what I have been calling implicit sociologies.
This analytical framework helps us also to understand those who say
they welcome diversity but seem to be in agreement with critics of multi-
culturalism. Critics of multiculturalism are usually pointing to the public
assertion of strong group identities by people within that group, in order to
mobilize a group to achieve certain policies and/or to demand differential
treatment. One response is from those who point to the success of multi-
culturalism in their neighborhoods, which they describe as multi-ethnic
and where people do not just live peaceably side by side but mix freely and
where that mixing is valued above monoculturalism. Yet such views do not
imply support for strong group identities and related policies; on the con-
trary, their success may be seen to be dependent on the absence of the lat-
ter.48 While this is a reasonable response in its own terms it does not meet
the criticism of multiculturalism and in fact may share it. It is the group-
based multiculturalism that has increasingly become unpopular and is
what critics have in mind, and so the weakness of the rebuttal is obscured
by the fact that advocates of neighborhood “multiculturalism” are actually
referring to what I call “cosmopolitanism.”
An example of this tendency is the way in which the majority of

Australians welcome multiculturalism, and indeed see it as part of the
country’s identity, but see it “in terms of a mix of individuals rather than an
ensemble of groups.”49 A group-based multiculturalism is much less popular
than cosmopolitanism. Yet, the question we have to consider is whether the
integration of all postimmigration formations can be achieved without
multiculturalism. Moreover, a group-based multiculturalism, where group
membership is voluntary, may be part of the future in an unintended way
as it is highly compatible with Prime Minister Cameron’s vision of a “Big
Society” in which civil society associations based on locality and faith,
including interfaith groups, take over some of the responsibilities currently
falling to state agencies. If it is the case that groups such as Sikhs, Hindus,
and Muslims are to be civil society partners of government, and to be
delegated resources as such, it is difficult to see how the new Big Society
represents a break with what is rejected as “state multiculturalism.”50
The analysis offered here of related ideas about society and policy para-
digms, each of which consists of a model of society and normative political
ideas, includes a sense of unity or fraternity. For modes of integration are
not just about how society is organized, or about politics, but include
ideas, however rudimentary or undeveloped, of ourselves as a social unity
(as displayed at the bottom of Table 9.1). For assimilationists, this consists
of a strong, homogeneous national identity. Individualist-integration
emphasizes the liberal and democratic character of the national polity.
Cosmopolitanism is uneasy with the national, an identity that demands
allegiance from all citizens while creating boundaries between ourselves
and the rest of the world. With multiculturalism comes a positive vision
of the whole remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginal-
ized on the basis of equality and sense of belonging. It is at this level
that we may fully speak of multicultural integration or multicultural
citizenship.51 This third level of multiculturalism, incorporating the socio-
logical fact of diversity, groupness, and exclusion, but going beyond indi-
vidual rights and political accommodation, is perhaps the level that has
been least emphasized. That is how it seems to many whose understand-
ing of multiculturalism, sometimes polemical but sometimes sincere, is
that multiculturalism is about encouraging minority difference without a
counterbalancing emphasis on cross-cutting commonalities and a vision of
a greater good. This has led many commentators and politicians to talk of
multiculturalism as divisive and productive of segregation.
Theorists of multiculturalism such as Charles Taylor and Bhikhu
Parekh,52 related policy documents such as the report of the Commission
on Multi-Ethnic Britain, and enactments such as those in Canada and
Australia, universally regarded as pioneers and exemplars of state multi-

culturalism, all appealed to and built on an idea of national citizenship.
Hence, from a multiculturalist point of view, though not from that of its
critics, the recent emphasis on cohesion and citizenship, sometimes called
“the civic turn,”53 is a necessary rebalancing of the political multicultural-
ism of the 1990s. This largely took the form of accommodation of groups
while being ambivalent about national identity.54 This does not invalidate
the analysis offered here that integration without some degree of institu-
tional accommodation is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, for multicul-
turalists, a renewing of national identity has to be distinctly plural and
hospitable to the minority identities. It involves “rethinking the national
story” with the minorities as important characters; not obscuring differ-
ence but weaving it into a common identity in which all can see them-
selves, and that gives everyone a sense of belonging to each other.55
Minority politics are common in the United States, but most groups, while
honoring their origins, seek inclusion in the American dream. They seek
to be and have come to be accepted as hyphenated Americans (for exam-
ple, as Italian-Americans, or Asian-Americans). The trend is present in
parts of Western Europe, especially in Britain. While not yet fully accepted,
and indeed currently resisted in countries like France and Germany, it
may be that hyphenated nationalities will become the norm here too.
Conclusion
It may be the case that all the attempted models of integration, espe-
cially national models, are in crisis. They are certainly perceived as such,
even if the rhetorical animus is reserved for multiculturalism. None have
brought about equality of opportunity measured in terms of socioeco-
nomic indicators, nor full acceptance of minorities as full co-citizens and
co-nationals, even if multiculturalist countries are doing better than non-
multiculturalist countries. In any case, we can have a better sense of what
the issues are and so what needs to be done if we recognize that discourses
of integration and multiculturalism are exercises in conceptualizing
postimmigration difference and as such operate at three distinct levels: as
an (implicit) understanding of the relationship between individuals and
groups in society; as a political response; and as a vision of the whole in
which difference is to be integrated. Depending on the understanding in
question, certain political responses are more or less possible. The socio-
logical and political assumptions are thus mutually dependent.
In this chapter I have offered a framework in which four distinct politi-
cal responses (assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism,
and multiculturalism) can be understood in terms of liberty, equality, and

fraternity/unity, thereby bringing out what is of merit in each mode as well
as the ways in which it is deficient. They illuminate one another and each
successive position attempts to include what is thought to be missing from
the predecessor. Each position can in principle be attractive from different
perspectives: some ethnic minorities may wish to assimilate, some to have
the equal rights of integrated citizens, some to maintain the cultural differ-
ences of their group identities, and some to be free to choose cosmopolitan
mixed identities suiting the roles they take on in a more diverse society.
Equally, host communities may look on different groups of migrants in all
these different ways. Assimilation may be more appropriate in terms of
national language acquisition before naturalization; individualist-integra-
tion may provide the model for nondiscrimination in the labor market; yet
multiculturalism may be the basis for supplementing electoral representa-
tion (where minorities are underrepresented), in creating new attitudes of
inclusivity and in rethinking national identities. Each approach has a par-
ticular conception of equal citizenship, but the value of each can only be
realized if it is not imposed but is the preferred choice of minority indi-
viduals and groups who, being a “multi,” are bound to choose differently.
Thus no singular model is likely to be suitable for all groups. To have a
reasonable chance of integrating the maximum number of members of
minorities, none of these political responses should be dismissed.
Multiculturalism may currently be viewed as undesirable by European
publics and policymakers. Given how central Muslims have become to the
prospects of integration on a number of fronts, it is unlikely that integra-
tion can be achieved without some element of this approach, which is
being practiced even by those politicians who are making antimulticultur-
alist speeches. Perceptions of Muslims as groups, by themselves and by
non-Muslim majorities, are hardening. The key question is whether Mus-
lims are to be stigmatized as outsiders or recognized as integral to the pol-
ity. Finally, we must not overlook the third analytical level, which in many
ways is not primarily about minorities but about the majority. The enlarge-
ment, hyphenation, and internal pluralizing of national identities is essen-
tial to an integration in which all citizens have not just rights but a sense
of belonging to the whole, as well as to their own “little platoon.”56
Notes
1. In the winter of 2010–2011, seven very senior European politicians, includ-
ing Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron, and President Sarkozy, made
high-profile speeches announcing that multiculturalism was dead or had utterly

failed. See Liz Fekete, “Understanding the European-wide Assault on Multicultur-
alism,” in Defending Multiculturalism: A Guide for the Movement, ed. H. Mahamdallie
(London: Bookmarks, 2011), 61.
2. Fay Weldon, Sacred Cows (London: Chatto & Windus, 1989).
3. Tariq Modood, “British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair,” The Political
Quarterly 61 (1990): 143.
4. Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), The Future of Multi-Ethnic Brit-
ain: Report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Runnymede Trust,
2000), 2–14.
5. Different groups may integrate to different degrees across sectors. For exam-
ple, Jews in Britain are highly integrated in relation to employment but are the
most residentially segregated religious minority. See Ceri Peach, “Islam, Ethnicity
and South Asian Religions in the London 2001 Census,” Transactions of the Insti-
tute of British Geographers 31 (2006): 353.
6. Gerard Bouchad and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconcili-
ation (Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural
Difference: Quebec, 2008); see also Gerard Bouchard, “What is Interculturalism,”
McGill Law Journal 56 (2011): 435.
7. For an alternative view that at a moment when general conceptions are con-
fused, we can best grasp what the real issues are by focusing on “the everyday,” see
Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood,” Ethnicities 8 (2008):
536.
8. The concern here is not primarily in relation to socioeconomic integration,
for which see Glenn C. Loury, Tariq Modood, and Steven M. Teles, eds., Ethnicity,
Social Mobility and Public Policy in the US and UK (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 2005; and Anthony Heath and Sin Yi Cheung, Unequal Chances:
Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets (Oxford: published for the British
Academy by Oxford University Press), 2007. The bigger challenge, for another
occasion, is to connect the socioeconomic with the issues discussed in this
chapter. The issues of “difference,” however, are as important as the socioeco-
nomic in relation to equal citizenship and have to be understood in their own
terms.
9. In doing so I follow Charles Taylor’s treatment of the concept of secularism
though without claiming that he would wish to use it as I do in relation to integra-
tion. See Charles Taylor, “Foreword: What Is Secularism?” in Secularism, Religion
and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. G. B. Levey and Tariq Modood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10. Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
11. For example, Malik Kenan, “Multiculturalism Undermines Diversity,” The
Guardian, March 17, 2010, accessed January 3, 2014, http://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/17/multiculturalism-diversity-political-policy
12. When U.S. sociologists use the term “assimilation,” as in “segmented
assimilation” (see Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The New Second Generation:
Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth,”

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 530 [1993]: 74),
they usually mean what is meant by integration in the United Kingdom. Jeffrey
Alexander speaks, however, of three “modes of incorporation,” assimilation,
hyphenation, and multiculturalism; see Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
13. Roy Jenkins, “Racial Equality in Britain,” in Essays and Speeches by Roy Jen-
kins, ed. A. Lester (London: Collins, 1967), 267.
14. Liz Fekete, Integration, Islamophobia and Civil Rights in Europe (London:
Institute of Race Relations, 2008), 8–19.
15. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001).
16. Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), The Future of
Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books, 2000); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking
Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Second Edition (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A
Civic Idea, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
17. Christian Joppke, “The Retreat from Multiculturalism in the Liberal State:
Theory and Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology 55 (2004): 237; Ruud Koop-
mans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, Contested Citizenship:
Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2005).
18. Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Recon-
ciliation (Quebec: Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related
to Cultural Differences, 2008), 115–117.
19. Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005).
20. Michael Emmerson, Interculturalism: Europe and Its Muslims in Search of
Sound Societal Models (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011).
21. Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis, “Dealing with Diversity: Mapping
Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms,” Sociological Theory 23 (2005): 218.
22. Bouchard and Taylor, 2008, op. cit.
23. Modood, 2007, op. cit. “The Ethnic Group in American Society Became
Not a Survival from the Age of Mass Immigration But a New Social Form” (Natan
Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto
Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963),
xvii). To emphasize the point that one needs to be using the concept of groups
but not in its simplest traditional meaning, perhaps one should use the term
“groupness.”
24. Tariq Modood, “Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the ‘Recognition’
of Religious Groups,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 378; Nasar Meer and
Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural State We’re In: ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic
Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism,” Political Studies 57 (2009): 473.
25. This is how the term has been used by the leading political theorists such as
Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1994); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political
Theory, Second Edition (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); and by
the Canadian government; it is also consistent with Commission on the Future of
Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile
Books, 2000) and other exponents of multiculturalism—see Tariq Modood,
Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 13–19.
26. Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,”
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1991): 751.
27. Stuart Hall, “New Ethnicities,” in Race, Culture and Difference, eds. James
Donald and Ali Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992), 252–259.
28. Paul Gilroy, Between Camps: Race, Identity and Nationalism at the End of
Colour Line (London: Allen Lane, 2000).
29. Stuart Hall, “Aspiration and Attitude . . . Reflections on Black Britain in the
Nineties,” New Formations 33 (1998): 38.
30. Steven Vertovec, “Super-Diversity and Its Implications,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 30 (2007): 1024; Ted Cantle, Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and
Diversity (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).
31. K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity and Survival: Multicultural
Societies and Social Reproduction,” in Charles Taylor, ed., Multiculturalism: Exam-
ining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994),
149.
32. Alan Travis, “The Need to Belong—But with a Strong Faith,” The Guardian,
June 17, 2002, accessed April 13, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002
/jun/17/september11.religion1
33. Anthony Heath and Jane Roberts, “British Identity: Its Sources and Possible
Implications for Civic Attitudes and Behaviour” (2008), last accessed May 14,
2014, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/docs
/british-identity.pdf
34. Gallup, The Gallup Coexistence Project: Muslim West Facts Project (2009),
accessed April 13, 2014, http://www.eurislam.info/wpcontent/uploas/pdfs/gall
up_coexist_2009_interfaith_relations_uk_france_gemrn.ny.pdf
35. Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims
View Each Other” (2006), last accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.pewforum
.org/2006/07/10/islam-and-the-west-how-great-a-divide/
36. Victoria Esses, Carina Ulrich Wagner, Matthias Preiser, and Christopher J.
Wilbur, “Perceptions of National Identity and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and
Immigration in Canada and Germany,” International Journal of Intercultural Rela-
tions 30 (2006): 653; Matthew Wright and Irene Blooemrad, “Is There a Trade-off
between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and
Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective,” Perspective on Politics 10

(2012): 77.
37. Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), The Future
of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books, 2000); Tariq Modood and Jan
Dobbernack, “A Left Communitarianism? What about Multiculturalism?,” Sound-
ing 48 (2011): 54.
38. Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team
(London: Home Office, 2001).
39. A review of the American social science literature found that “[t]he most
common conception of multiculturalism in both scholarly circles and popular
discourse is a negative one, having to do with what multiculturalism is not or
what it stands in opposition to. Multiculturalism in this usage represents hetero-
geneity as opposed to homogeneity, diversity as a counterpoint to unity” (Dougles
Hartman and Joseph Gerteis, “Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism
in Sociological Terms,” Sociological Theory 23 [2005]: 218–40). They found that if
they looked at exponents, as opposed to critics, of multiculturalism such simplis-
tic dichotomies were unsustainable and they concluded: “Multiculturalism is best
understood as a critical-theoretical project, an exercise in cultivating new concep-
tions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of pervasive and
increasing diversity in contemporary societies,” op. cit., 221–222.
40. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State:
Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008).
41. Weldon, 1989, op. cit.; for Angela Merkel’s speech on the failure of multi-
kulti, see Preseeurop, “Mufti Merkel handbags Multikulti,” (2010), accessed April,
13, 2014, http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/364091-mutti-merkel-hand
bags-multikulti
42. David Cameron, “PM’s Speech at Munich Security Conference” (2011),
accessed April 13, 2014, http://queerbristolsantiracistreadinggroup.files.word
press.com/2011/03/extract-from-cameron-munich-speech.pdf
43. While the popular belief is that multiculturalism died in the years
following 9/11, analysis of policies in 21 countries shows that, while the growth
of multicultural policies between 1980 and 2000 was modest, far from halting
or retreating it continued to progress between 2000 and 2010, with only three
countries having a lower score in 2010 than 2000 (MCP Index: http://www
.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table_2.pdf). An alter-
native index of 14 countries confirms this “consolidation at moderate levels of
multicultural policies, albeit with important cross-national variation in both
directions,” Ruud Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested
Field in Cross-National Comparison,” Annual Review of Sociology 39 (2013): 8.
44. Therese O’Toole, Daniel DeHanas, Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer, and Ste-
phen Jones, Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance (Univer-
sity of Bristol: Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, 2013).
45. Schirin Amir-Moazami, “Pitfalls of Consensus-Orientated Dialogue: The

German Islam Conference (Duetsche Islam Konfrenz),” Approaching Religion 1
(2011): 2.
46. Frauke Meira, “Not a One-Way Road? Integration as a Concept and as a
Policy,” in Anna Triandafyylidou, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer, eds., European
Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2012), 192.
47. Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge: Polity, 2007),
14–20.
48. Hence the irony that antimulticulturalists like former President Sarkozy are
trying to create corporate representations for Muslims in France; while pro-diversity
authors call for the cessation of government meetings with Muslim community
leaders; see Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen
Lane, 2006); and Kenan Malik, I Am Still a Critic of Multiculturalism, Honest (10
February, 2011), Pandemonium, http://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/still
-a-critic-of-multiculturalism/
49. Judith Brett and Anthony Moran, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism: Ordinary
People Making Sense of Diversity,” Nations and Nationalism 17 (2011): 188; see
also Steve Fenton and Robin Mann, “Our Own People: Ethnic Majority
Orientations to Nation and Country,” in Tariq Modood and John Salt, eds., Global
Migration, Ethnicity and Britishness (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 225.
50. Cameron, 2011, op. cit.
51. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining
the Politics of Recognition, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), 25; Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2000); Modood, 2007, op. cit.
52. Taylor, 1994, op. cit., 25; Parekh, 2000, op. cit.
53. Per Mouritsen, “The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation:
Common Values, State Religion and Islam in Danish Political Culture,” in Multi-
culturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, eds. Tariq Modood,
Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (London, Routledge, 2006), 70.
54. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims,
Multiculture and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism” Political
Studies 57 (2009a): 473. In the 1990s cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism
in Britain began to be linked to a national identity and its modernization, to,
for example, “Cool Britannia” and “rebranding Britain” (Mark Leonard, Britain
TM: Renewing Our Identity (London: Demos, 1997), but others welcomed global-
ization as an era of the “postnational” (Stuart Hall, “New Ethnicities,” in Race,
Culture and Difference, eds. James Donald and Ali Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992),
252–259; Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post National
Membership in Europe (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1994). For how the
CMEB report (2000), op. cit., confusedly tried to adopt both of these positions,
see Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism and Britishness: Provocations, Hostilities
and Advances,” in The Politics of Ethnic Diversity in the British Isles, ed. R. Garbaye
and P. Schnapper (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2014), 21.
55. Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain
(London: Profile Books, 2000), 54–56; Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic
Idea (Cambridge: Polity Books, 2007), 145–154.
56. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1986).
About the Editors

opment (ICMPD), Brazil’s Ministry of Labour, and LexisNexis, among oth-
ers. He has published widely in the area of European migration law,
Lisbon and Stockholm (Hart, 2014, with Cian Murphy) and EU Immigration
and Asylum Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, with Peers,
Anja Wiesbrock is a Senior Policy Advisor at the Research Council of
Norway. She has previously worked as a Researcher at the Department of
Private Law, University of Oslo and as an Assistant Professor in European
Law at the University of Maastricht. She has also been a Visiting Researcher
and Lecturer at several institutions around the world, including Harvard
Law School, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), Dokuz Eylul
University (Izmir), and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). Her main
research interests focus on EU free movement law, EU migration law,
public procurement, and state aid, and she has published widely in these
Pablo Ceriani Cernadas is a Lecturer in Law at the National University of

Lanús, Argentina (UNLA), and Coordinator of its Migration & Asylum
Program at the Center of Human Rights. He is also a member of the United
Nations Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers.
Mr. Ceriani is also guest Professor at various universities in Argentina and
abroad including the University of Buenos Aires–UBA and the University
of Antwerp in Belgium. He is also a PhD candidate at the University of
Valencia, Spain. Mr. Ceriani regularly acts as a consultant for various UN
agencies (UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA) on initiatives about migration and human
rights issues, and he is the author of several publications on human rights
and migration policies.
Mary Crock is Professor of Public Law and Associate Dean (Research) at
the University of Sydney’s Law Faculty. An Accredited Specialist in immi-
gration law, she has been Head Assessor in Specialist Accreditation pro-
grams in immigration law across Australia since 1994. She is the author of
eight books and reports and many articles on immigration and refugee law
and is a busy researcher in this field. She is Chief Investigator for Australia
in the IMPALA project, which involves building a database to compare
immigration laws and policies across 26 countries over 60 years.
Alan Desmond is the E.MA Fellow in International Law at the European
Inter-University Centre (EIUC) in Venice, Italy. He is currently completing
his PhD at University College Cork (UCC), Ireland, under the supervision
of Professor Siobhán Mullally. His doctoral research, funded by the Faculty
of Law, UCC, and the Irish Research Council, investigates the situations in
which irregular migrants in the European Union may have a right to a legal
status. During the course of his PhD he has been a Visiting Researcher at
Warsaw University, Harvard Law School, and UCLA School of Law and
undertook an internship with the Brussels-based NGO, PICUM (Platform

for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants). His primary
research and teaching interests lie in the fields of EU law, international law,
and the ethics of migration. Before embarking on his doctoral studies, he
taught Irish in Poland at the Catholic University of Lublin and Adam
Mickiewicz University. He has also written a number of award-winning
Irish language books.
Daniel Ghezelbash is an Associate Lecturer at Macquarie Law School, Mac-
quarie University, where he teaches courses in administrative law, human
rights, and global governance. His research focuses on comparative immigra-
tion and refugee law, with a particular interest in the diffusion of immigration
law and policy across states. He has recently returned to Australia after a
period of study in the United States, where he spent time as a visiting scholar
at Harvard Law School, Brooklyn Law School, and New York Law School.
Thomas Huddleston is Programme Director on Migration and Integration
at the Migration Policy Group, a 20-year-old Brussels-based think tank. He
is also an External PhD student in European studies at Maastricht Univer-
sity’s Brussels campus. At MPG, he coordinates MPG’s research for Euro-
pean cooperation on national integration policies, including the Migrant
Integration Policy Index (www.mipex.eu) and the development of the
European Commission’s Handbook, Website, and Indicators on Integra-
tion. His most recent pieces can be found on MPG’s website (www
.migpolgroup.com). His topics of interest are family reunion, naturaliza-
tion, immigrant political participation, and measuring the implementation
and effectiveness of integration policies. He also chairs the quarterly migra-
tion subgroup of the NGO Platform on EU Migration and Asylum.
Gözde Kaya is an assistant professor working at the Department of Inter-
national Relations, Dokuz Eylül University, Izmir, Turkey where she has
been a faculty member since December 2000. She holds a bachelor’s degree
in law (1998) and a master’s degree in European Union (2003) from the
same university. In 2005 she was named a Jean Monnet scholar, and she
holds an LLM degree in European law (with honorable mention—2006)
from Utrecht University School of Law, the Netherlands. She completed
her PhD in European studies (2010) at Dokuz Eylül University. Her PhD
dissertation, titled “Gender Discrimination in European Labour Law,” was
selected and published in book form by Turkey’s Ministry for EU Affairs in
2012. She mainly focuses her studies on EU antidiscrimination law, Euro-
pean citizenship, free movement of persons in the European Union, and
Turkey–European Union relations.
Dimitry Kochenov holds the Chair of EU Constitutional Law at the

University of Groningen (the Netherlands). His research focuses on EU
citizenship, EU human rights, and the principles underlying the EU legal
order. He consulted the government of the Netherlands on the EU law
aspects of the constitutional reform of the Caribbean possessions and the
government of Malta on EU citizenship issues. Among his latest edited
volumes are Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart, 2014, with G. de Búrca
and A. Williams); EU Citizenship and Federalism (Cambridge, 2015); and
The Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford, 2015, with A. Jakab).
Douglas S. Massey is the Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and
Public Affairs at Princeton University and Co-Director of the Mexican
Migration Project with Jorge Durand of the University of Guadalajara.
He is past President of the American Sociological Association and the
Population Association and currently serves as President of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science and is the Director of Princeton’s
Office of Population Research.
Kate McMillan is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Victoria University of Wel-
lington, New Zealand. Her research focuses on the politics of citizenship
and immigration in New Zealand and Australia, with a particular interest in
the rights of nonresident citizens and noncitizen residents. She has also
published on media politics in New Zealand: http://www.victoria.ac.nz
/hppi/about/staff/kate-mcmillan. Since 2010 she has been the Co-Editor of
Political Science: http://www.uk.sagepub.com/journals/Journal201960
Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the
University of Bristol and is also the founding Director of the Centre for the
Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. He has led many research projects on
ethnic minorities and Muslims and has published extensively. His latest
books include Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (2nd ed., 2013), Still Not Easy
Being British (2010), and as co-editor Secularism, Religion and Multicultural
Citizenship (2009), Global Migration, Ethnicity and Britishness (2011), Euro-
pean Multiculturalisms (2012), Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect (2013),
and Religion in a Liberal State (2013). He is a regular contributor to the
media and policy debates in Britain. His website is www.tariqmodood.com
Karen A. Pren received her MA in demography from the University of Penn-
sylvania. Currently, she is the manager of the Mexican Migration Project and
the Latin American Migration Project at Princeton University. Her latest arti-
cle, titled “Origins of the New Latino Underclass,” co-authored with Profes-
sor Douglas S. Massey, was published in 2012 in Race and Social Problems.

He spent several years lecturing and researching issues on migration at
the universities of Ife and Lagos, Nigeria, and while working for the
ILO (Addis Ababa), United Nations (Swaziland), and UNFPA (Dakar). A
former President of the Union for African Population Studies and member
of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Migration, he
is now Chief Executive, Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos,
member of The Hague Process on Refugee and Migration Policy, and
Coordinator, Network of Migration Research on Africa. He also serves on
the editorial advisory boards of key international migration journals. He is
a member of several scientific associations, including IUSSP. He has pub-
lished numerous scientific articles, books, and monographs on aspects of
Africa’s complex development agenda, especially international migration
and regional integration. These include: International Migration within, to
and from Africa in a Globalised World (Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, ed.,
2010); Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: A Migration Profile of Nigeria (Safari
Publishers, Ibadan, with van der Wiel, 2010); International Migration and
National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Leiden, co-edited, 2007); and
Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa (Uppsala, 2007). A book—Migration in the
Service of African Development: Essays in Honour of Professor Aderanti Ade-
poju (ed. John Oucho, 2011)—acknowledged his four decades of research
on African migration issues.
Jorge A. Bustamante is a Mexican sociologist with a PhD from the
University of Notre Dame (Indiana, United States), where he has also held
an endowed chair (Eugene Conley Professor of Sociology) since 1986. He
was also the founder and first president of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte,
a research and degree-granting institute located in Tijuana, Mexico, from

member of the University of Texas at Austin, El Colegio de México in
Mexico City, the University of Notre Dame, the National University of
Mexico, and the Institute of Political Sciences of Paris. He has served as
Coordinator of the Committee of Social Sciences for the National Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology for the President. He served as
Correspondent for the OCDE-Sopemi for 10 years until 2004. He was
appointed as UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
as of July 29, 2005, a position he held until June 2011. On January 3,
2005, the Permanent Committee (Comisión Permanente) of the Legisla-
tive Power of Mexico produced a resolution, which was voted unani-
mously, to nominate Dr. Jorge A. Bustamante for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Dr. Bustamante was notified by the president of the American Sociological
Association that he was selected as the 2007 recipient of the Cox-Johnson-
Frazier Award, one of the two highest granted to a sociologist in the United
States. On October 26, 2010, the Mexican Bar Association awarded
Dr. Bustamante the National Jurisprudence Award for his work in favor of
the human rights of migrants. On December 13, 2011, he was appointed
by the Mexican Senate as an advisor to the director of the National
Commission of Human Rights of Mexico.
(Montreal, Canada) University. In 2011, he was appointed the United
ducted official visits to Albania, Tunisia, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and Qatar.
He has also dedicated thematic reports on the detention of migrants, the
protection of migrants’ rights at the external borders of the European
Union, climate change and migration, and global migration governance.
He is guest professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (2010–2015).
He has given many conferences, published numerous articles, and written
or (co-) edited seven books: Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years after
9/11—Terrorisme, Droit et Démocratie: 10 ans après le 11 septembre 2001
(2012); Recueil de droit des réfugiés: Instruments, Jurisprudences et

Documents/The Refugee Law Reader (2010, 2012); Les migrations internatio-
nales contemporaines—Une dynamique complexe au cœur de la globalisation
(2009); Penser l’international, Perspectives et contributions des sciences sociales
(2007); Forced Migration and Global Processes—A View from Forced Migration
Studies (2006); Mondialisation des échanges et fonctions de l’État (1997); and
Droit d’asile: De l’hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires (1995). He heads the
Mondialisation et Droit International collection at Éditions Bruylant-Lar-
cier (Brussels). He is a member of several editorial boards: Journal of Refugee
Studies, International Journal of Refugee Law, Refuge, Droits fondamentaux,
and the European Journal of Human Rights. He is a Fellow of the Royal Soci-
ety of Canada and was a Fellow (2008–2011) of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Foundation.
Andrew Geddes is Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield
(United Kingdom). He has been awarded an Advanced Grant by the Euro-
pean Research Council (2014–2019) to work on a project analyzing inter-
national migration governance (the MIGPROSP project). He specializes in
the comparative and international analysis of politics and policymaking
with a particular interest in international migration. He has published a
large number of books and articles on European and international migra-
tion, as well as work on British elections and British relations with the
European Union. Between January 2008 and September 2011, he was
Head of the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield. He has
been awarded fellowships at the European University Institute and Free
University of Berlin. Between 2009 and 2011 he was a member of the Lead
Expert Group appointed by the UK government’s Chief Scientific Advisor
to oversee production of the report Migration and Global Environmental
Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities.
Centre for Migration Law (www.jur.ru.nl/cmr), and Chairman of the
Standing Committee of Experts on international immigration, refugee, and
criminal law (Meijers Committee). He wrote a PhD on defending group
rights in civil courts (1981), was Dean of the Faculty of Law (1993–1995),
and was one of the founding editors of Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht, a
yearbook on Dutch and international case law on immigration, refugees,
and race relations published since 1975. He was a member of the Network
of Experts on Free Movement of Workers (1992–2013). He is a member of
the Odysseus Network of Experts on European Migration and Asylum
Law. He has published on the social and legal status of immigrants,
immigration and race relations legislation and policies, legal integration of

immigrants, and nationality law. In the past 15 years he has coordinated a
series of international comparative research projects concerning the legal
status of migrants.For his publications see: http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr
/research/publications-author/groenendijk/
India Migration Report: The Continents of Africa and Europe, and planning for
Wei Li received her bachelor and master’s degrees in Beijing, China, and
Transformation, and School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning
at Arizona State University, United States. Her research is on urban ethnic-
ity and ethnic geography, highly skilled international migration and
transnational connections, and financial sector and minority community

development, focusing on Chinese and other Asian groups in the Pacific
Rim. Her research has been funded by the U.S. National Science Founda-
tion, Canada-U.S. Fulbright Foundation, and the Government of Canada.
She is the author of Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban Amer-
ica (2009, paperback 2012; the 2009 Book Award in Social Sciences, Asso-
ciation for Asian American Studies, University of Hawaii Press); editor of
From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim
Countries (2006; University of Hawaii Press); co-editor of Immigrant Geog-
raphies of North American Cities (2012; Oxford University Press), Landscape
of Ethnic Economy (2006; Rowman and Littlefield), and two journal theme
issues; and co-author of 88 other scholarly articles. She was a member of
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Race and Ethnic Advisory Committees on the
Asian Population, and served as its elected chair (2010–2012) and vice
chair (2004–2009). She was the Fulbright Visiting Research Chair at
Queen’s University, Canada (2006–2007), and among the inaugural class
of the National Asia Research Associates with the National Bureau of Asian
Research and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2010–
2011). She is a member of the International Steering Committee of the
International Metropolis Project, and the North American Director for the
International Society of Studying Chinese Overseas.
Index
Ameller, Michael, 105 105, 209, 211; “no advantage”

Ankara Association Agreement test, 31–32; offshore processing of
(1963), 48 asylum seekers, 31–32; processing
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death camps, 29; reforms to mandatory
Penalty Act, 6 detention policy, 31, 35; restrictive
Antwi v. Norway (2012), 81, 96n74 voting rights, 107; uninvited and
arbitrary detention of immigrants, invited refugees, 29; Vietnamese
38 boat people, 29
assimilation, 201, 213n8
asylum seekers: detention of, 1–2; Barack, Obama, 28
Haitian, 26; mandatory detention, Bassett, Michael, 107, 108, 124n18
2, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, Bauböck, Rainer, 110
37, 39, 40, 41; Refugee Convention Blais, André, Louis Massicotte, and
and Protocol, 23 Antoine Yoshinaka, 110, 125n33
Australia: “boat people,” arrival border crossing outcomes, probability
of, 29–30; bridging visa, 30, of (1970–2010), 13 (fig.)
31; children, detention of, 31; Border Patrol: growth of, 6, 7–8, 16;
constitutionality of detention “linewatch hours,” 7
laws, 30; demonization of boat Border Security Act (2011), 7
people, 40–41; free immigration Bosniak, Linda, 173, 175n30
for British subjects, 104; Breivik, Anders, 198
immigration detention, 28–32; bridging visa, 30, 31
Immigration Restriction Act
(1901), 28; indefinite incarceration Cameron, David, 197, 210
of a noncitizen, 30; mandatory Canada: “boat people,” arrival of,
detention, 28–32; Migration Act 32; British subjecthood, 105, 106;
(1958), 28; Migration Reform “designated foreign national,”
Act (1992), 30; multiculturalism, 32–33; mandatory detention,
232 Index
32–33; multiculturalism, 104; Ernst & Young, 184–185

Protecting Canada’s Immigration European Union: aging population
Act (Bill C-31), 32; voting rights, of, 57–58, 59; EU citizenship,
restriction of, 107 logic of, 162; EU citizenship/
Carens, Joseph H., 89, 90, 92n8, 163, member states’ nationalities:
174n8 diverging vectors, 169–172;
circulation of migration, 4, 19 immigration flows and, 19;
Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain population figures for, 57–58;
(CMEB),, 199, 210, 213n4 structural adjustment assistance,
Commission Staff Working Document 19; Treaty on the Functioning
of 2004, 57 of the European Union (TFEU),
compliance myth, 34–35 78. See also regularization in the
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, European Union and the United
208 States
container theory of society, 162 exceptionalism, cultural, 168,
corporatism, 208 172, 173
cosmopolitanism: as a conception of exceptionalism, national, 162
multiculturalism, 205; “difference” exclusion, expedited, 6
as valuable, 203; individualist- expedited exclusion, 6
integration and, 205; integration expedited removal, 27, 28
and, 159; as maximum freedom,
205; modes of integration, 200; family reunion as a means of
multiculturalism and, 205, 206; integration, 177–195; age
national identity and, 210, limits, 178, 180, 186, 187,
217n54 189, 190; assumptions behind
Council of Europe, 74 new restrictions, 181–183;
Court of Justice of the European changes in partner choice, 190;
Union (CJEU), 25, 71, 77–79, 82 children, 183, 192; composition
coyote, 10–11, 16 of reuniting non-EU families in
culturalism, 202 2011, 183 (fig.); conclusions
concerning, 191–192; definition
De Lucas, Javier, 152 of eligible family members,
detention, mandatory: asylum 179–180; definitions of family,
seekers and, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 178; delayed families, 190;
34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41; automatic, Denmark and family reunion,
2, 23, 24, 33; blanket rule of, 39, 179, 186, 189; desisting families,
41; cost of, 2; defined, 23–24; 190; destinations for non-EU
expense of, 39–40; international families, 182; Dutch pre-entry
human rights law and, 37–39; test, 185; Dutch proposals for
normalization of, 24; political EU family reunion directive,
point scoring and, 40–41; road to, 180 (table); Dutch requirements
24–33 on incomes and age limits,
deterrence myth, 35–36 186–187; effectiveness of
Dutch culture, 166 family reunions restrictions,
Index 233
191; enforced separation, 192; language tests and requirements,

family immigration, 181; family 185; pre-entry test (Netherlands),
reunion restrictions, conclusions 186; relationship between non-EU
concerning, 191–192; family family reunion rates and policies,
reunion restrictions, impact 188–189; resettlement, 189,
on families, 189–191; family 190, 192; restriction of family
reunion restrictions, to reunion rates, 188–189; selective
discourage and delay, 188–189; immigration, 179; self-selection
family reunion restrictions and and, 185, 191, 192; spouses and
educational progress, 186; partners, 183, 184; substitution
family reunion restrictions and effect, 190; traditional countries of
forced marriage, 187–188; family immigration, 179; Turks and family
reunion restrictions and labor reunion, 183
market integration, 186–187;
family union restrictions and globalization, 18
language learning, 185; family Groenendijk, Kees, 111, 113
union restrictions and pre-entry “guest worker model” in postwar
entry courses, 184–185, 191; Western Europe, 1
forced marriage, fighting, guest worker policies of Western
187–188; future for transnational European countries, 49–53;
families, 180– 181; Immigrant family reunification, 51; Five-
Citizens Survey (2012), 192; Year Development Plan of
income/employment requirements, Turkey (1962–1967), 49; labor
179, 180, 181, 189, 190; labor recruitment agreements, 49–50;
market integration, 186–187; low-wage temporary worker
Leerkes, Arjen and Isik Kulu- programs, 52–53; marriage
Glasgow, 189; marriage, 187–188, migration, 51; migrants’
189, 190–191; Migrant Integration contribution to the Turkish
Policy Index (MIPEX), 178, 180, economy, 52; postwar recovery
181, 188, 194n36; Moroccans and, 49; principle of rotation,
and family reunion, 183; national 50; results of, 51–52; return of
policies, 178–181; Netherlands early migrants to Turkey, 50–51;
and restrictive family reunion size of Turkish populations
policies, 179, 189; new family living in Europ, 51; Turkish
reunion requirements, 184; migrant workers, characteristics
non-EU family reunion, 181–182, of, 50
183, 188; permits for non- guest worker recruitment, 4
EU families as percent of total
legal immigration in 2011, 182 Haitian asylum seekers, 26
(fig.); persistence and, 189–190; health and public safety
preamble to the EU Directive myth, 34
2003/86/EC, 177; pre-entry Hines, Barbara, 152
courses for family reunion, hyphenated identities, 206,
184–185, 191; pre-entry 211
234 Index
Illegal Immigrant Reform and mandatory detention, expense

Immigrant Responsibility Act of, 39–40; mandatory detention,
(IIRIRA), 85–86 international human rights law
Illegal Immigrant Reform and and, 37–39; mandatory detention,
Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996 justification for, 24; mandatory
(IIRIRA), 27, 28 detention, normalization of, 24;
Immigration Amendment Act 2013 mandatory detention, political
(New Zealand), 33 point scoring and, 40–41;
Immigration and Nationality Service mandatory detention, road to,
(INS) on detention of irregular 24–33; mandatory detention
migrants, 27 defined, 23–24; Mariel Boatlift, 26;
immigration detention, myths and Migration Act 1958, 28; Migration
reality of mandatory, 23–45; Reform Act 1992 (Australia), 30;
arbitrary detention of immigrants, monitoring measures of irregular
38; asylum seekers, 23, 28, 29, entrants, 34–35; myths concerning,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 24, 33–36; New Zealand and,
41; Australia and, 28–32; blanket 33; “no advantage” test for both
rule of mandatory detention, 39, onshore and offshore detainees
41; bridging visa (Australia), 30, (Australia), 32; offshore processing
31; Canada and, 32–33; children, of asylum seekers (Australia),
detention of, 31; compliance 31–32; parole provisions relating
myth, 34–35; conclusion to irregular arrivals (U.S.), 27–28;
concerning, 41–42; credible fear “presumptive” detention, 25;
of prosecution, determination of principle of proportionality and, 38;
(U.S.), 28; Cuban Adjustment Act Protecting Canada’s Immigration
(U.S.), 26; “designated foreign Act (Bill C-31), 32; public-interest
national” (Canada), 32–33; parole, 27; Rau, Cornelia, case of,
detention is inherently harmful, 41; realities of, 36–41; Refugee
36–37; detention reform (U.S.), 28; Convention and Protocol, 23;
deterrence myth, 35–36; expedited Solon-Alvarez, Vivian, case of, 41;
removal, 27; expedited removal UNHCR Revised Guidelines on
(U.S.), 27, 28; Haitian asylum Detention (2012), 24, 35, 38, 39;
seekers, 26; health and public safety uninvited and invited refugees, 29;
myth, 34; Immigration Amendment United States and, 25–28; Universal
Act 2013 (New Zealand), 33; Declaration of Human Rights, 42;
Immigration Restriction Act of validity of mandatory detention
1901 (Australia), 28; indefinite laws, 24–25; Vietnamese boat
incarceration of a noncitizen people, 29
(Australia), 30; informal rules Immigration Reform and Control Act
concerning mandatory detention (IRCA), 6, 7, 9
(U.S.), 26; international human Immigration Reform and Control Act
rights law and mandatory detention, of 1986 (IRCA), 83, 84–85, 97n102
37–39; introduction to, 23–24; Immigration Restriction Act of 1901
liberal release policy (U.S.), 25; (Australia), 28
Index 235
integration: of asylum seekers, 37; Jenkins, Roy, 201

as a bureaucratic exercise, 165;
components of, 199; cultural, Kirk, Norman, 105
161; difficulty in defining, 159; Kostakopoulou, Dora, 163, 169,
electoral turnout and, 113; EU 174n7, 175n33
citizenship and, 164, 169; general Kymlicka, Will, 167, 175n25,
sense of, 199; individualist- 209
integration, 203, 205, 206, 210,
212; institutional accommodation Leerkes, Arjen and Isik Kulu-Glasgow,
and, 211; language and, 163; 189
language and culture tests, 169; Lisbon Treaty, 82
macro-symbolic sense of, 200; Longitudinal Immigration Survey
Migrant Integration Policy Index New Zealand (LisNZ), 112
(MIPEX), 111; modes of, 200, low-wage temporary worker
201–203, 210; multiculturalism programs, 52–53
and, 198, 207, 209; myth of
restrictive immigration policies Maduro, Poiares, 171
promoting integration, 159–160; Mariel Boatlift, 26
need for, 198; pluralizing of Metock case (2008), 77–78,
national identities, 212; political 95n58
rights to noncitizens and, 111; Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten
of postimmigration formations, (naturalization bias tested in
210; purpose of, 199; regional practice), 161–176; Article 18
integration, 139, 142, 143; TFEU, 171; Article 21(1) TFEU,
regularization and, 77, 91; 163; on becoming Dutch (personal
residential segregation, 199; note), 164–168; Bosniak, Linda,
restrictive immigration policies 173, 175n30; Carens, Joseph
and, 159–160; sectoral integration, H., 163, 174n8; conclusion
199; voting rights and, 111, concerning, 172–173; container
113–114; Weiler, J. H. H., on, 167. theory of society, 162; culture and
See also family reunion as a means control, 164; culture and language
of integration tests, 162, 163, 165–166, 171,
international boundaries, movement 172, 173; duality of statuses, 163;
of, 3 Dutch culture, 166; EU citizenship,
international human rights law and logic of, 162; EU citizenship/
mandatory detention, 37–39 member states’ nationalities:
international migration and diverging vectors, 169–172;
development, 18 exceptionalism, cultural, 168, 172,
irregular entrants, monitoring 173; exceptionalism, national,
measures, 34–35 162; inburgeringstoets, 165–167;
integration, 165; introduction
Jachimowicz, Maria, 151, to, 161–162; invention of
157n44 cultural exceptionalism, 173;
Janoski, Thomas, 117, 127n63 Kostakopoulou, Dora, 163,
236 Index
169, 174n7, 175n33; Kymlicka, employment trends according

Will, 167, 175n25; Maduro, to migration, 2002–2010, 149
Poiares, 171; mobilization bias, (fig.); expulsion, 140; factors
169, 175n34; monocultural leading to the modification of
citizenship, 163; nationalities immigration law, 137–140;
and the power of member states, goal of new migration law, 142;
169–171; naturalization, 163, 172; “Great Homeland” regularization
naturalization culture tests, 163– program, 141; Hines, Barbara,
164, 172; naturalization policies, 152; human rights and, 140, 142,
reframing of, 173; outline of the 143; human rights–based rhetoric
problem, 162–164; Parijs, Philippe on migration, 150; human rights
Van, 164, 174n17; prejudice and, organizations, 135; immigration
172; Renan, Ernst, 169, 176n36; law, changes in, 132–140; impact
state-mandated étalons of culture, of the new immigration policies,
168–169; status of EU citizenship, 147–150; implementation of the
162; Weiler, J. H. H., 167, 175n23; new Argentine migration policy,
Žižek, Slavoj, 167, 175n24 145–147; incidence of poverty
Mexican Migration Project (MMP), and indigence, 2003–2012, 148
8–9 (fig.); introduction to, 129–132;
Migrant Integration Policy Index Jachimowicz, Maria, 151, 157n44;
(MIPEX), 111, 178, 180, 181, 188, law 22,439, 132; law 25,871,
194n36 136–140, 142; law 25,871, notable
migrants rights in times of crisis, aspects of the, 140–141; law
improving (migration policy in 25,871, regulation to, 142–143;
Argentina since 2003), 129–152; law 817, 132; legal recognition
adoption of the MERCOSUR of migration as a human righ,
agreement, 138–139; Agreements 142; MERCOSUR and, 138, 139,
on Residence for Nationals of 143, 146, 150, 154n14; migrant
States Parties of MERCOSUR, population, deterioration in
139; anti-immigration discourse living editions of, 133; migrants’
and incidents, 130; Articles 7 associations, 135–136; migrants’
and 8, on the rights of education rights, deterioration of, 134;
and health, 140; capital flight, migrant work conditions, 146;
137; category of residence for migration, new state policy on,
MERCOSUR nationals, 146; 143–144; migration flows to/
conclusions concerning, 151–153; from Argentina (1950–2003), 135
Condor Plan, 133; contradictions, (table); migration policy, posture
obstacles, delays, and retractors, assumed by the Argentine state in
144–147; decree 1023, 133–134; matters of, 142; migration policy
De Lucas, Javier, 152; economic as notable in a global context, 152;
crisis and, 130–131; education, migration regularization, plans
146; emigration, rise in, 134, 137; for, 141; military dictatorship,
employment trends according to 132, 134, 151; National Director
migration, 1995–2001, 149 (fig.); of Migration, 141, 142; National
Index 237
Migration Authority, 140, 142; Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Patria Grande program, 141, 143; Death Penalty Act, 6; average
policies of the 1990s, consequences probability of apprehension, 13;
of, 133–134; Population behavior of Mexican migrants and,
Commission of the Chamber of 17–18; border, limited efficiency
Representatives, 136; presidential at, 12–13; border buildup,
speeches on immigration 5–7; border crossing outcomes,
(Argentina), 142; regional probability of (1970–2010), 13
policy, 150–151; regional role (fig.); border enforcement, failure
of Argentina in migrants’ rights, of, 5; Border Patrol, growth of,
143; regularization programs, 5–6, 7–8, 16; Border Security Act
141; Residence Agreements, 141, (2011), 7; circulation of Mexican
143, 150; residence categories, migrants, 4–5, 19; circulation
change in, 141; restrictive within stable migration systems, 5;
immigration law, 130; restrictive cost of an undocumented border
law, arbitrary practices, and crossing from 1970 to 2010, 11, 12
xenophobia during an economic (fig.); coyote, 10–11, 16; death rate
crisis, 132–136; rights-based and, 17; deterrent effect, lack of,
migration policy, 151, 152; rights 13–16; guest worker recruitment,
of children and adolescents in the 4; Immigration Reform and
context of migration, 143; rights Control Act (IRCA), 6, 7, 9; as
of education and health (article ineffectual, 17; intensity of U.S.
7 and 8), 140; Scioli, Daniel, enforcement effort (1970–2010),
129, 130, 153n1; security and, 8 (fig.); international migration
152; social organizations, 136; and development, 18; introduction
social protection mechanisms, to, 3–5; leaving for the U.S. in
dismantling of, 134; South undocumented status, probability
American Conference on of, 14 (fig.); Mexican Migration
Migration, 150; state policy and the Project (MMP) data, 8–9; from
new law, 140–144; unemployment migration restriction to migration
rates in argentina, 1990–2011, 134 management, 18–20; migratory
(table); unions, 135; Videla Law, strategy, 4; National Intelligence
132, 136, 137; xenophobia, 130, Reform and Terrorism Protection
145, 152–153; xenophobia and Act, 6; national security and, 6;
crisis, 135 Operation Blockade, 7, 9, 16;
Migration Act 1958 (Australia), 28 Operation Gatekeeper, 7, 9,
migration circulation, 4–5 16; Operation Rio Grande, 7;
Migration Reform Act 1992 Operation Safeguard, 7, 9–10;
(Australia), 30 percentage of the world’s citizens
migration systems, stable, 4 living outside the country of their
migratory strategy, 4 birth, 3; Personal Responsibility
militarization of the Mexico-U.S. and Work Opportunity
border and its effects on the Reconciliation Act, 6; populations
circularity of migrants, 3–22; of undocumented Mexicans, 5;
238 Index
quasi-military operations and, 206, 208, 209; Cameron, David,

7; Reagan, Ronald, and, 5–6; on, 197, 210; Caribbean-origin
response by migrants, 8–11; Britons, 205; “the civic turn,”
restricted migration policies are 211; cohesion and citizenship,
effective, myth of, 1–2; restrictive 211; Commission on Multi-
policies, backfire of, 4; results of Ethnic Britain (CMEB),, 199, 210,
border militarization, 5, 13–17; 213n4; conclusion concerning,
return from an undocumented 211–212; Conseil Français du
trip within 12 months of entering, Culte Musulman, 208; corporatism,
probability of, 15 (fig.); return 208; cosmopolitanism, 200, 203,
migration, 15–16, 17, 18; Secure 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 217n54;
Borders Initiative, 7; Secure Fence culturalism, 202; “difference,”
Act (2006), 6–7; stable migration identifying and responding to, 198–
systems, 4; stable undocumented 201; “difference” and identity, 200;
entries, 5; structural adjustment difference between individualist-
assistance, 19; temporary work integration and multiculturalism,
visas, 4; undocumented border 202–203; difference between the
crossings, sector of (1970–2010), pro- and antimulticulturalists,
9 (fig.); up-front costs to 209; discourses of integration and
undocumented migrants, 17; multiculturalism, 211; diversity,
USA PATRIOT Act, 6; use of paid groupness, and exclusion, 210;
guide during undocumented ethnicity, 208; group-based
border crossings (1970–2010), multiculturalism, 210; group
10 (fig.) consultations, 208; Hartmann,
mobilization bias, 169, 175n34 Douglas, and Joseph Gerteis,
monitoring measures of irregular 203, 214n21; hyphenated
entrants, 34–35 identities/nationalities, 206, 211;
Motomura, Hiroshi, 87 individualist-integration, 210;
multiculturalism: cosmopolitanism institutional accommodation,
and, 205, 206; integration and, 210, 211; integration and
207, 209 multiculturalism, unpacking
multiculturalism, mystical death of, 203–207; integration of
of, 197–218; 9/11 attacks and, groups, 202; introduction to,
198, 208, 216n43; alternative 197–198; Jenkins, Roy, 201; key
ways of identifying with a group, theorists of multiculturalism,
207; assimilation, as a policy, 209; labor, segmentation of,
201; assimilation, as a term, 201, 198–199; minority difference,
213n8; assimilation, purpose of, encouraging of, 210; minority
201; assimilation and national identities, recognition of, 206,
language, 212; assimilation and 207; minority politics, 211; modes
naturalization, 201; assimilation of integration, 200, 201–203,
defined, 201; Australia, 209, 204 (table), 210; multicultural
211; “Big Society,” 210; Breivik, accommodation of minorities,
Anders, 198; Britain and, 197, 203; multicultural citizenship,
Index 239
210; multiculturalism, criticism of, National Intelligence Reform and

197–198, 209; multiculturalism, Terrorism Protection Act, 6
recent definition of, 203; Muslim, national voting rights for permanent
intolerance of, 209; Muslim and residents (New Zealand), 101–128;
religion, 202; Muslim practices Ameller, Michael, 105; argument:
and, 209; Muslims, British, 206, existing power balances may
208; Muslims and integration, be disrupted with some parties
212; national identity, 205, 207, benefiting more than others from
210, 211, 217n54; neighborhood the immigrant vote, 117–120;
“multiculturalism,” 209; argument: extending voting rights
Parekh, Bhikhu, 210, 217n51; promotes integration and sends
political responses, 211, 212; a message that immigrants are
postimmigration “difference,” permanent members of society,
200; postimmigration groups, 111–116; argument: extending
disagreement about, 203; voting rights to noncitizens
post-immigration hyphenated encourages naturalization/granting
identities, 206; post-immigration voting rights reduces incentives to
minorities, 206; processes of naturalization, 116–117; argument:
social interaction, 201; residential foreign governments may attempt
segregation, 199, 213n5; “Rushdie to influence the domestic politics
Affair,” 197; Sarkozy, Nicholas, of countries where their expatriate
208; sectorial integration, 199; “a citizens are enfranchised, 117;
sense of belonging,” 199, 213n4; argument: immigrant minority
separatism, 207, 216n39; sociology groups could establish ethnic
and, 208; state multiculturalism, or single-issue political parties,
210, 211; super-diversity, 205, weakening existing political parties,
206, 215n30; symbolic framework 117–120; Auckland University
of integration, 199; Taylor, Labour Club, 106, 107; Bassett,
Charles, 210, 217n51; unity and Michael, 107, 108, 124n18;
multiculturalism, 203; ways in Bauböck, Rainer, 110; Blais, André,
which multiculturalism is not dead, Louis Massicotte, and Antoine
207–211; Weldon, Fay, on, 197 Yoshinaka, 110, 125n33; British
Muslim/Muslims, 202, 206, 208, 209, “common code” of nationality, 104;
212 British concept of subjecthood,
myth: restricted migration policies 103; current electoral rules, 122;
are effective, 1–2; restrictive definition of political community,
immigration policies promote 111, 121; diasporic community,
integration, 159–160; restrictive size of, 122; diversity and alliances,
policies toward migrants are 119–120; Electoral Act of 1956,
inevitable, 67–68 Section 39, 103, 106, 108; Electoral
myth of deterrence, 35–36 Amendment Bill, 107–108; electoral
inclusiveness, 101–102; electoral
national identity, 205, 210, 211, participation, 112–114; electoral
217n54 roll, migrant enrollment on the
240 Index
(wave 2), 112 (table); electoral roll Zealand citizens’ voting behavior,
enrollment, 112; Electoral Select wave 3, 113 (table); non–New
Committee (1973), 105–107; Zealand citizens’ voting behavior,
electoral strength of particular wave 3, by region of origin, 115
immigrant groups, 120; free (table); normative arguments
immigration for British subjects, against noncitizen voting, 110;
104; Groenendijk, Kees, 111, 113; parliamentary representation,
immigrant minority vote, 118; routes to, 119; percentage of New
immigration as an election issue, Zealand population identified as
116; International Convention Asian or Pacific, 119; percentage
on the Elimination of All Forms of population from non-Maori,
of Racial Discrimination (1972), non-European backgrounds,
104; introduction to, 101–103; 108–109; permanent residents,
Janoski, Thomas, 117, 127n63; consequences of enfranchising,
Kirk, Norman, 105; levels of 109–120; permanent residents, why
immigration in New Zealand, 118; New Zealand extended the franchise
liberality in relation to the franchise, to, 103–109; political membership,
108; Longitudinal Immigration 108, 121; political participation
Survey New Zealand (LisNZ), of eligible noncitizen permanent
112, 113, 114; Maori, nonracial, residents, 112; political parties
self-selecting definition of, 105; of New Zealand and immigrant
migrant enrollment on the electoral minority vote, 118–120; preferred
roll, wave 2, 112 (table); Migrant “traditional source countries,”
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), 108; progressive the motion of
111; Mixed Member Proportional Commonwealth ties, 103–104;
(MMP) electoral system, 118; Race Relations Act (1971), 104;
multivariate analysis of the LisNZ Report of the Royal Commission
data, 114; naturalization, 108; New on the Electoral System (1986),
Zealand Citizenship Act (1948), 109; singular allegiance, norm of,
104; New Zealand Constitution Act 110; uniqueness of, 122; Victoria
(1852), 103, 104; noncitizen voting, University, 106; “white New
101; noncitizen voting, empirical Zealand policy,” 108, 124n24;
claims about the likely outcome women and the right to vote, 108.
of, 110–111; noncitizen voting See also New Zealand
controversy, 102; noncitizen voting New Zealand: Immigration
rights and political community in Amendment Act 2013, 33;
the 21st century, 121–122; non- mandatory detention, 33;
Maori ethnic minority parties, mandatory detention, political
119; non–New Zealand citizens’ point scoring and, 40. See also
enrollment on the electoral roll, national voting rights for permanent
wave 3, 113 (table); non–New residents (New Zealand)
Zealand citizens’ enrollment on the North American Free Trade
electoral roll, wave 3, by country Agreement (NAFTA), 19–20
of origin, 115 (table); non–New Nunez v. Norway, 80–81, 95n69
Index 241
Obama, Barack, 86, 87, 91 89; Article 20 of the Treaty on the

Operation Blockade, 7, 9, 16 Functioning of the European Union
Operation Gatekeeper, 7, 9, 16 (TFEU), 78; automatic transition
Operation Rio Grande, 7 to legal status, 88–89; broad-based
Operation Safeguard, 7, 9–10 regularization in the U.S., potential
for, 87–88; Carens, Joseph, on, 89;
Parekh, Bhikhu, 209, 210, 217n51 children’s rights as EU citizens, 78;
Patria Grande program, 141, 143 CJEU cases, 77; comprehensive
permanent derogation, 55, 56 immigration reform (CIR), 83,
Personal Responsibility and Work 87; conclusion concerning,
Opportunity Reconciliation 88–91; Council of Europe, 74;
Act, 6 Council of Europe endorsement
Phillips, Anne, 209 of regularization of irregular
Plyler v. Doe, 90 migrants, 74; Court of Justice of
Poland’s 2012 regularization program, the European Union (CJEU), 71;
70, 89, 99n127 Court of Justice of the European
populations of undocumented Union (CJEU), regularization as a
Mexicans, 5 result of judgments of the, 77–79;
postimmigration “difference,” 200 Deferred Action for Childhood
preamble to the EU Directive Arrivals (DACA), 86–87, 91;
2003/86/EC, 177 Development, Relief and Education
presumptive detention, 25 for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,
principle of proportionality and 86, 88; ECtHR cases compared
mandatory detention, 38 to CJEU cases, 77; EU attitude to
processing camps, 29 regularization, 72–74; European
Protecting Canada’s Immigration Act Commission view of regularization,
(Bill C-31), 32 73; European Court of Human
public-interest parole, 27 Rights (ECtHR), 71, 77; European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
quasi-military operations, 7 regularization as a result of
judgments of the, 79–83; European
Race Relations Act (New Zealand), Economic and Social Committee
104 (EESC) on irregular migrants, 73–
racism, 88, 202, 203 74; human rights, 74, 76; Illegal
Rau, Cornelia, case of, 41 Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Reagan, Ronald, 5–6 Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 85–86;
Refugee Convention and Protocol, 23 Immigration Reform and Control
refugees, uninvited and invited, 29 Act of 1986 (IRCA), 83, 84–85,
regularization in the European Union 97n102; “internal institutionalized
and the United States, 69–99; caste,” 90; introduction to, 69–71;
administrative relief (U.S.), 86–87; irregular migrant, use of the term,
Antwi v. Norway (2012), 81, 96n74; 71; irregular migrant population
arguments for regularization, 71; (EU), 69; irregular migrants as rule
Article 8 of ECHR, 74, 77, 79, 80, breakers, 90; irregular migration
242 Index
in the EU, 72–83; issues central to main criteria for regularization,

irregular migration, 91; judicially 89; time-contingent regularization,
sanctioned regularization (U.S.), 89; United States, irregular
85–86; Lisbon Treaty, 82; mass migrations in, 83–88; widespread
regularization, 73; Metock (2008) use of regularization, 70; Zambrano
case, 77–78, 95n58; Motomura, (2011) case, 78–79, 88, 95n59
Hiroshi, on, 87; nondeportability, remittances, 47, 52, 152
90; nonremovability, 71; number removal, expedited, 27, 28
of migrants deported from the Renan, Ernst, 169, 176n36
U.S. since 1990, 83; number of “repressive liberalism,” 161
migrants in detention in the U.S., resettlement, 189, 190, 192
83; Nunez v. Norway, 80–81, residential segregation, 199, 213n5
95n69; Obama, Barack, 86, 87, return migration, 15–16, 17, 18,
91; one-off regularization, 70; 50–51
Parliamentary Assembly of the Returns Directive, 72, 75–76, 82,
Council of Europe (PACE) on 94n45
irregular migrants, 74; permanent Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v.
regularization, 70; Plyler v. Doe, the Netherlands (2006), 79–80, 81,
90; Poland’s 2012 regularization 95n66
program, 70, 89, 99n127; post- Rushdie, Salman, 197
Lisbon human rights landscape,
82; principal emerging from Sarkozy, Nicholas, 208
Rodriguez and Nunez, 81; racism, The Satanic Verses, 197
88; regularization defined, 70; Scioli, Daniel, 129, 130, 153n1
regularization in the U.S., 83–84; Secure Borders Initiative, 7
regularization legislation (U.S.), Secure Fence Act (2006), 6–7
84–85; Returns Directive, 72, separatism, 207, 216n39
75–76; Returns Directive, Article Slivenko v. Latvia (2003), 81–82,
6(4) of, 75, 76, 82; Returns 96n78
Directive, aspiration of, 75, 76; social interaction, processes of, 201
Returns Directive, CJEU rulings Solon-Alvarez, Vivian, case of, 41
regarding, 76; Returns Directive, de sovereign grandstanding, 74
facto EU membership, 76; Returns Soysal case, 54
Directive, “Termination of Illegal Spain, 19, 70, 73
Stay,,” 74; right to regularization, standstill clause, 54
71, 82; Rodrigues da Silva and structural adjustment assistance to
Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands Mexico, 19–20
(2006), 79–80, 81, 95n66; Slivenko
v. Latvia (2003), 81–82, 96n78; Taylor, Charles, 209, 210, 217n51
sovereign grandstanding, 74; Spain temporary work visas, 4
and, 70, 73; Special Agricultural Treaty on the Functioning of the
Workers (SAW) program, 85; state European Union (TFEU), 78
sovereignty and irregular migrants, Turkish migration to the European
69; state’s rights, 91; time as the Union, quest for, 47–66;
Index 243
access to employment and self- partnership, 55; short term

employment restrictions, 54–55; migration as beneficial, 47; size
aging population of Turkey, 59; of Turkish populations living
aging population problem of the in Europ, 51; socioeconomic
EU, 57–59; Ankara Association development of Turkey, 57;
Agreement (1963), 48; benefits Soysal judgment, 54, 55; studies
of migration from Turkey to the concerning Turkish migration to
EU, 57–58, 61; Commission Staff the EU, 59–61; suspension clause,
Working Document of 2004, 57, 54; temporary transitional period
59; concluding remarks about, 61– policy, 55–56; Turkish accession
62; controlled migratory movement to the EU and Turkish migrations,
from Turkey to the EU, 59; 48; Turkish employment rates
Customs Union, 48; demographic (current), 57; unemployment rates,
indicators of Turkey, 58–59; effects 57; visa requirements, 54; visas,
of the failure of guest worker renewal of, 53, 54
policy in Turkey-EU relations,
53–56; EU-Turkey Association undocumented border crossing
Agreement, 53; family unification, from 1970 to 2010, cost of, 11,
51; Five-Year Development Plan 12 (fig.)
of Turkey (1962–1967), 49; undocumented circulation of
gross domestic product (GDP) of migration, 4–5
Turkey, 56; guest worker policies undocumented entries, stable, 5
of Western European countries, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on
49–53; implementation guest Detention (2012), 24, 35,
worker policies, 47; international 38, 39
migration, 58; introduction United States: aliens, detention of,
of long transitional periods 25; credible fear of prosecution,
or the permanent derogation determination of (U.S.), 28; Cuban
for free movement of Turkish Adjustment Act, 26; Deferred
nationals, 55–56; introduction Action for Childhood Arrivals
to, 47–49; Krieger and Maitre (DACA), 86–87, 91; detection
survey on potential migration reform, 28; Development,
flows (2006), 59–60, 65n59; Relief and Education for Alien
labor recruitment agreements, Minors (DREAM) Act, 86, 88;
49–50; myths concerning, 48–49; expedited removal, 27; Haitian
permanent derogation, 55, 56; asylum seekers, 26; Illegal
population figures for the EU, Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
57–58; prejudices concerning Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 27, 28,
Turkish migration to the EU, 85–86; Immigration Act of 1891,
questioning the admissibility 25; Immigration and Nationality
of, 56–61; principle of rotation, Service (INS) on detention of
50; remittances, 47, 52; return irregular migrants, 27; Immigration
migration, 50–51; second- Reform and Control Act of 1986
class membership or privileged (IRCA), 83, 84–85; informal
244 Index
rules concerning mandatory Universal Declaration of Human

detention, 26–27; Leng May Ma v. Rights, 42
Barber, 25; liberal release policy USA PATRIOT Act, 6
of, 25–26; mandatory detention,
25–28; Mariel Boatlift, 26; number Vera Institute, 35
of migrants deported from the Vietnamese boat people, 29
U.S. since 1990, 83; number of
migrants in detention in, 83; parole Weiler, J. H. H., 167, 175n23
provisions relating to irregular Weldon, Fay, 197
arrivals, 27–28; Special Agricultural Wilders, Geert, 179
Workers (SAW) program, 85;
universal visa system, 25. See also Zambrano case (2011), 78–79, 88,
regularization in the European 95n59
Union and the United States Žižek, Slavoj, 167, 175n24
Global Migration
GLOBAL MIGRATION
Volume 3

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,

Wiesbrock, editors.
volumes cm
Includes index.
JV6033.G55 2015
304.8—dc23 2014035460
ISBN: 978-1-4408-0422-9
EISBN: 978-1-4408-0423-6
19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 4 5

Praeger
ABC-CLIO, LLC

To my wife, María.
Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Part I Myth: Migrant workers cannot get

equal rights. 1
Chapter One Straight Talk about the Dynamics of
Labor Migration 3
Jennifer Gordon
Chapter Two Revisiting the Myth of Guest Worker
Programs: The Case of Malaysia 27
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
Part II Myth: Migrants are a threat to society. 45

Chapter Three False Narratives in the Migration Debate:
Playing Games with Immigrants’ Lives
in Greece 47
Anastassia Tsoukala
Chapter Four Migration Myths and Extreme Xenophobia
in South Africa 71
Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran
Chapter Five International Migration and Immigrant
Settlement in the United States 97
Wei Li and Wan Yu
viii Contents
Part III Myth: Migration always harms the

prospects of developing countries
by causing a brain drain. 131
Chapter Six High-Skilled Migration: A New Way
Forward for Europe, the United States,
and the World 133
Andrew Rottas and Terri Givens
Chapter Seven Promoting Circular International
Migration of the Highly Skilled 153
Metka Hercog and Melissa Siegel
Chapter Eight Student Migration from India:
Implications for the Origin and
the Host Countries 179
Shantanu Sarkar and Rashmi Sharma
Chapter Nine Changing Dynamics of Remittance
Flows and Their Impact on the
Economy: The Case of Pakistan 197
Hisaya Oda

Index 235
Tables and Figures
Tables
4.1 Number and Proportion of Citizens and Noncitizens in South
Africa, 2011 83
4.2 South African Attitudes to Migrants and Refugees, 2010 85
4.3 South African Attitudes Toward Rights for Citizens and Migrants 86
4.4 Likelihood of Taking Action against Migrants 87
5.1 Population and Migrant Composition in the United States,
1960–200999
5.2 Human Capital and SES of Major Immigrant Groups, 1990–2000s 102
5.3 Top Destinations of Foreign-Born Population in the United States,
1990–2009106
5.4 Urban and Suburban Settlement among Foreign-Born Population
in the United States, 1990–2009 108
5.5 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics in Selected
Areas, 2000s 117
8.1 Indian Student Enrollments and Commencements (Year to Date),
2008–2012187
9.1 Shares of Remittances to Pakistan by Source Country 203
9.2 Incidence of Labor Migration at the Household Level 213
9.3 Comparison of Landholding Size by Type of Migration 213
9.4 Results by the Bonferroni Correction Procedure for Comparison of
Mean Landholding 213
Figures
4.1 East Rand Dog Unit, 1998 73
4.2 Official Response to Police Murder of Mido Macia, 2013 73
4.3 Xenophobia Denialism 77
4.4 Representation of Africa as a Threat to South Africa 84
8.1 Distribution of International Students in Destination Countries 181

8.2 Distribution of Indian Tertiary Students in Receiving OECD
Countries, 2011 183
8.3 Number of Indian Students Going to the United States, 1995–
1996 to 2012–2013 184
8.4 Potential and Effective Loss for the Country of Origin of Students
Who Finished Their PhD in the United States 192
9.1 Historical Trend of Pakistani Migrant Workers and Remittances 201
9.2 Volume of Remittances to Pakistan by Source Country 204
9.3 The Trend in the KSE100 209
Acknowledgments
general audience tackling the most common misperceptions and myths on
migration. Hence, we started our work with the intention of providing a
collection of essays dealing with some of the most common misconcep-
gained contributors from all five continents discussing issues in more than
50 countries. Our approach is interdisciplinary, and our authors discuss
migration from legal, political, sociological, historical, economic, demo-
graphic, anthropological, and geographic angles. Finally, we decided to
include a combination of some of the most important and renowned
Crépeau, professor of law at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, and
current United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
xii Acknowledgments

United States; Aderanti Adepoju, professor of economy and demography
and chief executive of the Human Resources Development Centre in
at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India.
through the whole editorial process. Beth Ptalis began the project with us
and worked on it until January 2014. She was then replaced by Jessica
Finally, our understanding of migration as a global issue has benefited
from our various research visits at several institutions around the world
who have welcomed us with open arms for several days, weeks, or months.
Diego would like to thank the following institutions where he has con-
ducted research since 2009: the Centre for Migration Law at the University
of Nijmegen (Netherlands), the Riga Graduate School of Law (Latvia), the
National University of Singapore (NUS), the Universidad di Tella in Bue-
nos Aires (Argentina), the Fundação Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro (Bra-
zil), and the Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá (Colombia). Anja would like
to express her gratitude to Harvard Law School in Cambridge (United
The task of editors of a collection of essays can sometimes be an ardu-
ous one. We are very grateful to our authors that this was not the case for
the book you hold in your hands. We have been very privileged to have
deepened our links with those authors we already knew in person and to
have met new colleagues through email, Skype, and in person to discuss
the chapters in such varied places as Milan, Brussels, Barcelona, New

Delhi, Maastricht, Izmir, Buenos Aires, Boston, Toronto, Philadelphia,
New York, Oxford, Madrid, and Bristol. As editors we also met in Valencia
in 2012 and in Oslo in 2013 to discuss the structure of the project.

Dr. Anja Wiesbrock
Bristol and Oslo
June 10, 2014
Part I
Myth: Migrant workers cannot get equal rights.
It is beyond doubt that migration processes have major implications not

only for the rights of migrant workers in terms of residence, employment
and social security benefits, but also for the rights of resident workers in
the country of destination. There are, however, many misconceptions and
uncertainties regarding the complex relationship between migration and
the enjoyment of certain economic and social rights.
It is, for example, a myth that low-skilled migration to high-income
countries inevitably entails a trade-off between numbers and rights,1 imply-
ing that the admission of larger numbers of temporary migrant workers
cannot work in liberal democracies that are self-constrained by rights and
cannot therefore limit migrants’ access to core economic and social rights.
This is highlighted by Garcés-Mascareñas, who by looking at the case of
Malaysia questions the common assumption that guest worker programs
may be successful in countries that do not restrict the entry of migrant
workers but place significant limits on migrants’ rights. The effectiveness
of such guest worker programs is a myth, as the costs and limited rights
associated with legal entry and stay lead many migrants to resort to
irregularity.
Moreover, economic analyses show that in most cases immigrants do
not have a negative impact on resident workers’ overall wages or employ-
ment rates, and that they are in fact either creating new jobs or taking jobs
that residents refuse to do. Yet, as highlighted by Gordon in her chapter,
there might be a greater detrimental impact on certain local areas and
industries, especially in the short term, and on particular groups of resi-
dents, including the prior wave of immigrants, workers of color, and
workers with less than a high school diploma, when immigrants’ status is
2 Global Migration
structured in ways that make them particularly vulnerable (especially the

undocumented and workers on temporary visas). At the same time, she
points out the need to address the flashpoint question of the employers’
role in creating categories of work that native workers are reluctant to do,
since the core of the problem lies in the deterioration of work for all low-
wage workers in the country.
Note
1. Martin Ruhs and Philip Martin, “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest-
Worker Programs,” International Migration Review 42 (2008): 249.
CHAPTER ONE
Straight Talk about the Dynamics

of Labor Migration
Jennifer Gordon
Introduction
Immigration and work are two strands of the same rope. Wherever
immigrants arrive in significant numbers, the media and politicians express
the fear that the newcomers will compete with citizens for jobs, drive
down wages, and displace resident workers.1 These concerns are height-
ened when the new arrivals are in low-wage industries.
In response to these claims, immigrants’ rights advocates in immigrant-
destination countries (a category in which I am firmly rooted after 30 years
in the field) routinely make a set of arguments. To counteract the claim
that ongoing immigration is harmful to resident workers, we cite the
majority of economists whose studies have found immigrant workers
have either no impact or a net positive impact on native wages and the
employment of residents in most destination countries. In short, as we

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This chapter is adapted with
permission from “Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality at the Intersection of Work and
Immigration,” UC Irvine Law Review 2 (2012): 125. The author thanks Stephen Lee, Robin
Lenhardt, Steven Pitts, and the participants in the University of California, Irvine School of
Law symposium on “Persistent Puzzles in Immigration Law” for their very helpful
comments on the drafts of the UC Irvine article, and acknowledges with gratitude the
research assistance of Lauren Cooperman, Noah Hertz-Bunzl, and Sarah Jaramillo.
4 Global Migration
say in the United States, immigrants come to fill “jobs Americans won’t
do.” Advocates make similar arguments in other destination countries
as well.
In the United States, undocumented immigrants—now numbering an
estimated 11 million—have been the principal focus of debate. To encour-
age support for the rights of such immigrants in the workplace, we con-
tend that reinforcing undocumented workers’ rights should be of concern
for all workers because everyone in the job market is harmed when a set
of workers is unable to demand compliance with basic laws, much less to
organize for better treatment than these minimum standards provide. As a
result, we argue that the focus of government enforcement in the work-
place with regard to undocumented immigrants should be on detecting
and penalizing employers’ labor violations, rather than on enforcing immi-
gration law against workers. In this context, advocates may imply—
although we rarely directly state—that focusing on workplace rights offers
an alternative to immigration enforcement and deportation as a way to
remove undocumented immigrants from the labor market.
This chapter seeks a more complicated truth behind the simplified
assertions on which each of these arguments rests. The most obvious con-
flict lies right on the surface, although I have not seen it explicitly dis-
cussed: if undocumented immigrants do not have a negative impact on
resident workers’ wages and employment rates in low-wage sectors, and if
they are indeed taking “jobs Americans won’t do,” then they are not com-
peting with resident workers for jobs. But if undocumented immigrants
don’t compete with residents, why (beyond empathy and solidarity)
should resident workers care about the enforcement of undocumented
workers’ rights? In the end, I argue that this tension can be at least partly
resolved by a more nuanced look at economists’ claims, complemented by
lessons from other disciplines about how labor markets operate. I also
identify a number of questions for future exploration.
The core lesson I draw for rhetoric from this examination of reality is
that at the intersection of low-wage work and immigration lies a network
with many nodes and tangles, and that we owe it to ourselves, to each
other, and to the broader goal of building strong and stable alliances for
immigrants’ rights to represent what is happening on the ground in ways
that reflect its genuine complexity. While it is important to bridge the
divides between people with firm anti- and pro-immigrant views, that is
not my subject here. Instead, I explore the tensions within positions taken
by progressive, pro-worker, and generally pro-immigrant advocates and
policymakers in the United States on key questions relating to low-wage
labor migration and workers’ rights, especially questions that have to do
Straight Talk about the Dynamics of Labor Migration 5
with race and economics. By focusing on the contradictions in arguments

made by pro-immigrant advocates, however, I by no means imply that the
arguments made by anti-immigrant politicians and others are internally
consistent or well founded. To name just one hypocrisy among many,
numerous legislators who decry the impact of immigration on “our work-
ers” have otherwise shown no interest in the low-wage workforce, voting
against bills to raise the minimum wage, provide job training, and increase
workplace protections.2
With the gaps and internal contradictions in the positions that I and
others have taken as a starting point, I seek to clarify what is actually
happening on the ground and to identify issues requiring further study,
with the goal of removing a few of the intellectual obstacles to a common
understanding among potential allies. Although the United States is the
context in which I root the analysis in this chapter, the situation is similar
in immigrant destination countries throughout the world, and thus it is
my hope that what I have to say here will be of interest beyond U.S.
borders.
Advocates’ Core Economic and Workers’ Rights Arguments

Economic
How much of an impact immigrants have on receiving countries’ labor
markets is a perennial subject of dispute. In the context of the United
States, many economists now agree that aggregate immigration has a neu-
tral or small positive effect on the U.S. economy overall.3 These findings
echo the majority of studies about the impact of immigrants on the labor
market in European Union countries as well.4
Advocates in the United States cite such economic studies to support
the argument that immigrants do jobs that are of little interest to native
workers. For example, in a fact sheet, the Immigration Policy Center of the
American Immigration Council asserts that
[i]f immigrants really “took” jobs away from large numbers of native-born
workers, especially during economic hard times, then one would expect to
find high unemployment rates in those parts of the country with the largest
numbers of immigrants—especially immigrants who have come to the
United States recently (many of whom are unauthorized) and, presumably,
are more willing to work for lower wages and under worse conditions than
either long-term immigrants or native-born workers. Yet . . . there is little
apparent relationship between recent immigration and unemployment rates
at the regional, state, or county level.5
6 Global Migration
Or, as David Scott Fitzgerald of the Center for Comparative Immigra-

tion Studies puts it more succinctly, “unemployed auto workers in Michi-
gan are not migrating to California to pick fruit.”6 This assertion—that
new immigrants are willing to take jobs that U.S. residents won’t do—is
central to the arguments of many advocates for increased immigration
levels.
When economists reach optimistic conclusions about the neutral or
positive impact of immigration on overall native workers’ wages and
employment opportunities, their results strike most casual observers as
counterintuitive. Most people think of the pool of jobs in the United States
as fixed; more workers seeking those same jobs must therefore mean
greater competition, lower wages, and higher unemployment for native
workers who are not willing to work for the resulting reduced rates. Econ-
omists make several claims that counter this common reaction.
First, although there is a debate on this issue, many agree that recent
immigrants in low-wage industries are not “perfect substitutes” for native
workers.7 Without the language skills and cultural familiarity of native
workers, immigrant workers tend to take jobs that require limited literacy
and little contact with customers or other workers outside of their lan-
guage group. Native workers are more desirable for jobs requiring reading,
writing, interaction with customers, or job-related training in the United
States, and for supervisory positions.8 In that sense, new immigrant work-
ers and native workers are often described as “complementary.”9 It is not
that new immigrants compete with no one for jobs. But the people they
compete with are those most like them: other recent immigrants, not most
native workers.10
Second, the number of available jobs is not static. Immigrants are also
consumers, expanding the demand for goods and services, and thus the
need for workers to produce them expands. They start businesses them-
selves, creating new jobs.11 And the availability of large numbers of immi-
grant workers may induce employers to choose more labor-intensive forms
of production, further increasing the number of available jobs.12
Third, immigrants’ impact on the U.S. economy is cushioned by the fact
that they tend to come in greater numbers when jobs are plentiful, while
flows slow in times of recession.13
Finally, economists note that new immigrants fill the gaps left by
changes in the demographics of the United States and the shifting struc-
ture of the U.S. economy. The U.S. population is aging, with workers in
the 16 to 24 age group predicted to shrink by over 900,000 in the next
seven years, and the number of workers over 55 increasing dramatically.14
Immigrants, by contrast, are clustered in the most productive age groups,
from 20 to 59.15 Meanwhile, although the native population is becoming

better educated each year, an increasing number of jobs in this country are
low-skilled.16 Because of the wage differential between new immigrants’
home countries and the United States, and (in many cases) their perspec-
tive that their time in this country will be short, many new immigrants
have a more positive view of jobs at the bottom of the wage and skill lad-
der.17 In these ways, immigrants can be characterized as a match for this
country’s needs rather than a source of competition for scarce jobs—
although, as I discuss below, this perspective can slide too easily into an
unexamined statement that immigrants take “jobs Americans won’t do.”
Workers’ Rights
Until 1986, the United States government did not penalize employers
for hiring undocumented immigrants. With the passage of the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 and its Employer Sanctions provi-
sions, this changed. Since that date, firms have been subject to civil fines
and criminal sanctions for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.18
Sanctions were enforced only sporadically until 2006, when President
George W. Bush began making workplace raids and sanctions compliance
a centerpiece of his efforts to demonstrate his commitment to enforcing
immigration law.19 While President Barack Obama has largely disavowed
the use of immigration raids in the workplace, he has increased enforce-
ment of sanctions to the highest level ever through an emphasis on inspec-
tions of employer records, sometimes referred to by advocates as “silent
raids.”20 The result has been a dramatic rise in investigations, fines, and
criminal penalties against employers.21
Immigrant advocates have opposed both presidents’ approaches to
employer sanctions, arguing instead that federal policy should create a
firewall between immigration enforcement and the workplace. The gov-
ernment should abandon immigration raids and repeal employer sanc-
tions, because their enforcement drives undocumented workers further
underground and undercuts all workers’ ability to claim their rights.
Instead, we argue, the government should put its enforcement resources
into detecting and addressing violations of labor and employment law in
workplaces with large immigrant workforces.22
Advocates explain that immigrants, including undocumented immi-
grants, are already covered by most workplace protective laws in the
United States.23 They have the right to minimum wage and overtime under
the Fair Labor Standards Act,24 the right to a safe and healthy workplace
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,25 the protection of
8 Global Migration
antidiscrimination law in most federal judicial circuits,26 and in most

states, workers’ compensation if injured on the job.27 In one case where
the United States Supreme Court limited undocumented workers’ reme-
dies for retaliation for union support under the National Labor Relations
Act, the Court still made clear that undocumented immigrants qualify as
employees within the act’s definition.28 Advocates note, however, that
undocumented workers are often unable to access the protections they
have on paper because they fear deportation if they come forward to report
a violation of their rights. Thus, immigration controls in the workplace
need to be replaced with effective strategies to encourage undocumented
immigrants to identify violators of workplace protections and pursue com-
plaints against them, coupled with resources directed toward targeted
enforcement of labor laws in immigrant-heavy industries.29
Most people in the United States are now aware that undocumented
workers are targets for abuse. The return of sweatshop-like conditions to
U.S. cities, farms, and suburbs has been news since at least the early 1990s,
when the latest surge in immigration gathered force. But many observers
find the argument that undocumented workers should have greater labor
protections perplexing: if undocumented workers are “illegal,” and it is
against the law for employers to hire them, how could they have any rights
in the workplace at all? Many also express a sense of inequity: isn’t offering
rights to undocumented immigrants an incitement for them to come, and
a reward for breaking the law?
From the perspective of many immigrants’ rights advocates, there are
both principled and pragmatic responses to this challenge. From a prin-
cipled position, many advocates believe that the primary reason to enforce
workplace rights for undocumented immigrants is that they are human
beings who are harmed by the abuses to which they are subjected.30 They
note that U.S. firms covertly (and sometimes overtly) court undocumented
immigrant labor and thus should be held to task for the workers’ ensuing
exploitation.31 These are not, however, the main rhetorical arguments we
offer to the public and to policymakers.
When engaging in the public conversation about immigration, most
advocates emphasize a pragmatic response. In these terms, the rationale
for this seemingly counterintuitive protection of undocumented workers
is that if they are excluded from basic workplace laws, they will be cheaper
as employees and much less likely to complain than native workers. These
workers will be obliged to tolerate dangerous work, long hours, and sub-
minimum pay if they have no recourse to the law.32 Unscrupulous employ-
ers will then seek out an undocumented workforce while maintaining
working conditions at the basement level. This subverts the purposes of
both our immigration and our labor laws. This rationale has proven per-
suasive to a number of judges, agency heads, and legislators.33
The baseline assumption underlying this argument is that undocu-
mented workers and legally authorized/citizen workers are competing
with each other for jobs. If employers must treat all undocumented immi-
grants like citizens under the law of the workplace, the reasoning goes,
firms will have no reason to hire undocumented immigrants and will turn
back to native and legally resident workers. The logical conclusion of this
line of reasoning is that following increased enforcement of workplace
laws, there will be fewer employment opportunities for undocumented
immigrants, who may well return home when they are unable to find
work. This is more often left as subtext than made explicit.
Tensions within and between the Two Arguments

Immigrants’ rights advocates often make both the economic and the
workers’ rights arguments together. For example, in a report calling for
comprehensive immigration reform, Amy Traub of the Drum Major Insti-
tute, a progressive think tank, first states the economic arguments:
Anti-immigrant policies are often premised on a flawed conception of the

economy as a closed, zero-sum system—if an immigrant has a job, he
must have taken a job away from an American. In fact, the economy is
dynamic, and the presence of hardworking immigrants contributes to the
growth of the economy and the creation of new jobs that wouldn’t exist if
they weren’t here.34
Traub then almost immediately asserts the workers’ rights argument:
As long as a cheaper and more compliant pool of immigrant labor is avail-

able, employers are all too willing to take advantage of the situation to keep
their labor costs down and are less willing to hire U.S.-born workers if they
demand better wages and working conditions. So, low-skilled U.S.-born
workers are left to either accept the same diminished wages and degraded
working conditions as immigrants living under threat of deportation or be
shut out of whole industries where employers hire predominantly undocu-
mented immigrants.35
The most obvious conflict between the economic arguments and the
workers’ rights argument lies right on the surface. If immigrants do not
have a negative impact on resident workers’ overall wages or employment
rates, and if they are indeed either creating new jobs or taking jobs that
10 Global Migration
U.S. residents refuse to do, as the economic arguments suggest, then they
are not competing with residents for jobs. But if immigrants do not com-
pete with resident workers, they should not be affecting residents’ wages
and working conditions, as the workers’ rights argument suggests. Why,
then, should those resident workers who are not otherwise inclined to
favor immigrants care about the enforcement of immigrant workers’ rights,
or stand in solidarity with them in workplace organizing efforts?
In what follows, I will argue that this superficial contradiction is resolv-
able to a large degree through a closer examination of the assertion that
immigrants take “jobs Americans won’t do,” and a disaggregated view of
economists’ findings on the job-competition question.
Looking behind “Jobs Americans Won’t Do”

The statement that there are “jobs Americans won’t do” may be correct
on the surface. The differing perspectives of native and migrant workers
on wages and working conditions, and the cultural meaning that U.S. resi-
dents attach to particular jobs, do play roles in sorting out who does
what.36 Farm labor is a perennial example of work that does not attract
resident workers under the wages and conditions on offer.37 The statement
that immigrants do jobs that Americans reject is troubling, though,
when—as is often the case—it is presented as a natural state of affairs,
reflecting only the immutable tastes of workers. In fact, employers are the
primary actors in labor markets. What made a number of occupations into
“immigrant work” was not a natural evolutionary process but a concerted
effort by employers to undercut unions and reduce wages and protections
(and, in some cases, to recruit an immigrant workforce to take the result-
ing jobs that failed to attract resident workers). Employers are actively
involved in generating the supply of labor they need to keep wages low.
Employers who send recruiters to foreign countries, use guest worker pro-
grams, or hire the undocumented through a foreman who builds a work-
force by calling his relatives and friends, are making an active choice to
circumvent the local labor supply. Once started, these flows may be self-
sustaining, but employers’ hands have crafted them.38 This process is evi-
dent in the poultry processing, meat packing, and janitorial industries,
among others.39
Furthermore, employers have repeatedly demonstrated a preference for
immigrants over native workers—and particularly over African Ameri-
cans—based on their beliefs that immigrants are hardworking, subservi-
ent, easier to control, and so on.40 Indeed, to hire through temporary visa
programs, agricultural employers must commit to paying a premium
“adverse effect wage,” which ranges up to $12.72 per hour depending on

the state, rather than the $7.25 per hour minimum wage that they can
offer to resident workers.41 And yet employers use these programs actively,
seeking shelter from stepped-up government enforcement of employer
sanctions against those who hire undocumented workers, and in pursuit
of what they perceive as a controllable, reliable workforce.42
Outside of the context of agricultural and domestic work, and even
within them to some extent, resident workers may become interested
anew in what are now seen as “immigrant jobs,” if wages rise. The classic
example of this is meatpacking, which went from a hell pit of immigrant
work at the turn of the 20th century, described by Upton Sinclair in The
Jungle (1906), to a highly unionized industry paying in the mid-teens per
hour to a native workforce by the 1960s. After the industry consolidated
and systematically broke the back of the unions in the 1980s, and began
recruiting immigrant labor, meatpacking once again became an immigrant
industry, with abysmal working conditions and average wages of seven or
eight dollars per hour.43 It seems likely that resident workers would do
those jobs once again, were they better paid. Garbage collectors in New
York City offer another illustration of the fact that dirty and dangerous jobs
can be attractive to native workers. Sanitation trucks are staffed by union-
ized city employees who earn a starting annual salary of $33,746 (not
including overtime), which rises to an annual base salary of $69,339 after
five and a half years.44 Recruitment of legally authorized workers has never
been a problem. Yet raising wages for socially disparaged work is rarely
presented as an alternative to importing workers who are willing to accept
lower pay, longer hours, taxing demands, and uncompensated risk.
Since the category of “jobs Americans won’t do” is constantly in flux,
rather than fixed, it is urgent to intervene in the labor market in ways that
limit the spread of its boundaries. A reformulation of antidiscrimination
law so that it addresses employers’ illegitimate use of race and nationality
as a proxy for determining subservience (and the practice of making sub-
servience an informal job requirement) is one important step.45 More gen-
erally, active and effective enforcement of basic workplace laws, passage of
living wage ordinances, and sustained organizing efforts that cross lines of
race, ethnicity, and immigration status are essential to avoid more occupa-
tions becoming degraded to the point that resident workers shun them.
This must be done in a way that takes the reality of global competition into
account. Among other things, enhanced enforcement is both politically
and practically easier in industries that are locally rooted rather than foot-
loose. With some notable showcase exceptions, the battle for higher wages
and better working conditions has essentially been lost in a number of
12 Global Migration
sectors where the work can be done overseas with cheaper labor, such as
garment and call centers.46
Disaggregating Economists’ Findings

Economists’ assertions about the neutral or net positive effect of immi-
grants on native workers grow from studies of the impact of immigrant
labor on resident workers and the U.S. economy as a whole. From a closer
vantage point—one that distinguishes between highly skilled immigrants
and those who do low-skilled work, for example, or one that looks at sub-
sectors of the U.S. economy—economists’ conclusions are more complex
and more contested.
Economists broadly agree that high-skilled immigrants bring significant
benefits to the United States.47 With regard to immigrants who do low-
wage work, however, there is a greater range of viewpoints. As noted
above, most economists who find any negative impact conclude that the
group most likely to be hurt by competition with new immigrants is the
prior cohort of immigrants. But others—most prominently George Bor-
jas—have argued that the weight of immigration also falls significantly on
native high school dropouts and those with minimal skills or work experi-
ence. Borjas and others in his camp report relatively small effects, with a 1
percent to 4 percent decrease in the wages of high school dropouts corre-
sponding to a 10 percent increase in immigration.48 Small, but real—a
decrease of 4 percent represents an annual loss of $800 in pretax dollars
for a worker earning $20,000 a year. The number of natives without a high
school education in the United States is shrinking,49 but African Ameri-
cans are overrepresented within the remaining pool.50 This raises the con-
cern that they may be disproportionately affected by low-skilled
immigration.51 On the lower end of this spectrum, the National Research
Council issued an influential study in 1997 that found a small negative
effect on the wages of the lowest skilled native workers, possibly 1 to 2
percent.52
A number of economists, including Heidi Shierholz of the Economic
Policy Institute, have argued that advances in methodology have resolved
the conflict between the mainstream view and the Borjas perspective
in favor of the conclusion that the wages of native workers (including
workers with less than a high school degree, young workers, and African
Americans, all groups that have been the focus of particular concern) are
either unaffected by immigration or see modest benefits from it, while the
wages of foreign-born workers are impacted negatively.53 Some others still
disagree.54
Although the weight of economists’ opinions leans toward the conclu-

sion that the overall impact of immigration on native workers is negligible
and possibly positive, the question remains a live one outside of academia
in many people’s minds. If, in fact, immigrants have a net neutral or posi-
tive impact on the wages and job prospects of resident workers across the
country, and if immigrants take “jobs Americans won’t do,” why do so
many native workers perceive (not just believe from an abstract perspec-
tive) that immigration harms them economically, and thus have such a
hard time accepting the economists’ argument?
I would argue that the economists’ optimistic view—which largely
grows from efforts to estimate the national-level impact of immigration—
is not sufficiently fine-grained to describe the impact of immigration as it
is experienced by communities, workplaces, and individual workers.
Under a bird’s eye approach, losses in one region are balanced by gains
elsewhere, and harm to one group of workers is smoothed out by benefit
to others. But from the perspective of whoever loses in the shift, the harm
is real and deeply felt. While the net economic effect of immigration may
well be neutral or positive, a different picture emerges from a disaggre-
gated perspective.
One question a disaggregated view raises is whether immigrants with
varying immigration statuses, undocumented and temporary workers in
particular, affect economic outcomes for resident workers differently. Here,
too, opinions diverge. Shierholz sounds a note of warning, pointing out
that in the four states with the highest proportion of undocumented immi-
grants in the workforce (California, Florida, New York, and Texas), but
nowhere else in the country, there appears to be a small negative effect of
immigration on wages for male workers with less than a high school
degree.55 She hypothesizes that “[s]ince . . . unauthorized immigrants are
more likely than other workers to be male and also more likely than other
workers to be without a high school degree, a larger inflow of unauthor-
ized immigrant workers, who are easily exploited by employers, may put
downward pressure on the wages of similar native workers in these states,
a pressure that is largely masked in estimates at the national level.”56
Recently, however, economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
found minimal impact on documented workers’ wages at firms that also
hire undocumented immigrants.57
The disaggregated view, as opposed to the bird’s-eye view, raises another
question: what impact does immigration have on particular locations and
industries?58 Some localities are experiencing vast increases in their immi-
grant populations (and therefore in costs local taxpayers bear providing
services, such as education and health care, to these populations), without
14 Global Migration
deriving much benefit, or at least much perceived benefit, for the resident
population.59 But others appear to be benefiting greatly.60 The need for bet-
ter data is especially acute in the South, where over the past two decades
new immigrants have begun to arrive in significant numbers in areas and
industries where African Americans have been concentrated.61 Many of
those new arrivals are undocumented. This shift in immigration patterns
has produced a wealth of anecdotes about a change in hiring preferences
in industries such as chicken processing, janitorial work, and fast food,
with employers now contracting newcomers rather than African Ameri-
cans.62 In the absence of data, observers note the rising unemployment
rate of African Americans and causally link the two.
This change in demographics had barely begun in 1997 when the
National Research Council published its report on the question of the eco-
nomic impacts of immigration. At the time, the Council concluded:
None of the available evidence on spatial correlations suggests that in the

aggregate the economic opportunities of black Americans are substantially
reduced by immigration. . . . Some black workers have lost their jobs to
immigrants, especially when they live in a place with a large concentration
of immigrants. But the vast majority do not live in such places, and their
economic opportunities are determined by other things.63
Today, with new immigrants arriving in large numbers in both urban

and rural southern communities, it would be harder to sustain the posi-
tion that most African Americans are geographically shielded from immi-
gration. Given that an influx of newcomers seems likely to have more
negative short-term impacts that even out in the long term,64 it is not sur-
prising that some of the greatest concerns arise in the “New South” context
where large-scale immigration is a relatively new phenomenon.
Additional questions requiring further research relate to the effect of
immigration on African American workers of different educational levels,65
and on the question of where African Americans no longer employed in
jobs like food processing and janitorial work are now working. Have they
moved to a different region, stayed and found equal or better jobs, or
become unemployed? Too little work has been done in these areas to offer
a definitive answer, although two recent papers suggest that overall, black
workers have been able to “respecialize” in the face of competition with
Hispanic workers, and thus may have been largely shielded from the nega-
tive effects of that competition.66
In the end, while immigration in the aggregate may bring economic ben-
efits to the nation overall, we need to better understand the extent to which
those gains come on the backs of those least able to bear the cost—resident
workers, including poor white workers but particularly workers of color
already disadvantaged by discrimination, whose opportunities are further
limited because they must compete with new immigrants for low-skilled
jobs. This will require more study of the local and industry/occupational
impacts of undocumented and temporary migration on less educated—and
particularly minority—resident workers, and of the employment outcomes
for those workers who are displaced by immigrants.
In the meantime, a more specific description of the economic impact of
immigration on less educated African Americans and other resident work-
ers without a high school degree could ameliorate the rhetorical tension I
identified in opening this chapter. Immigrants are largely beneficial to the
economy and to resident workers overall, but to the extent they have a
negative impact, it falls on prior immigrants and likely also on the least
educated native workers. This effect is most evident when streams of new-
comers first arrive in a region or industry and is amplified when those
immigrants are undocumented. A focus on organizing and on protecting
workplace rights for workers in immigrant-heavy industries will benefit all
workers in the lowest-wage labor markets. This is not in conflict with the
position that, based on an overview of the national economy, immigrants
complement rather than compete with resident workers, explaining the
fact that immigration appears to have either a neutral or a small net posi-
tive overall impact on resident workers’ wages and employment rates.
A Caveat
There is some danger that by acknowledging that the lowest-wage,
least-educated resident workers—who are disproportionately African
American—are likely more negatively impacted by the arrival of new
immigrants than resident workers overall, we will overstate the role of
immigrants in determining African American employment opportunities,
contributing to an exaggerated story of conflict between the two groups.
Media attention to these tensions has penetrated the public’s imagination
far more deeply than quieter reporting of the fact that polling results often
show African Americans expressing viewpoints more favorable to immi-
grants than white respondents do, even as they acknowledge economic
concerns.67 Fears of competition have also cynically been manipulated by
employers, and by politicians who profess a concern for American workers
in the context of arguing to curtail immigration, but then consistently
oppose measures to raise the minimum wage, enhance workplace protec-
tions, or support workers’ rights to unionize.68
16 Global Migration
The economic fate of less educated African Americans requires urgent

attention. Economist Steven Pitts has argued that black workers face “a
two-dimensional job crisis: a crisis of unemployment and a crisis of low-
wage work.”69 African Americans overall have by far the highest unem-
ployment rate of any racial or ethnic group in the United States—in
February 2013, 13.8 percent, compared to 9.6 percent for Latinos and 6.8
percent for whites.70 But while immigration may be one factor among
many in this picture, it is dwarfed by other causes. African American
employment rates have fallen precipitously due to the United States’ loss
of unionized industrial employment, such as auto manufacturing, that
once lifted hundreds of thousands of African American workers into the
middle class; the increase in privatization of government jobs, once a
unionized bulwark for African Americans denied opportunities in the pri-
vate sector; and ongoing discrimination against African American workers
by employers who prefer immigrants for low-wage jobs and whites for
skilled work. The criminalization of young African American men and the
epidemic high school dropout rates among African American students are
two other key factors.71 As Dr. Pitts notes, although black unemployment
receives far more attention, the poor quality of the low-wage jobs in which
so many black workers are employed is an equally—if not more—serious
part of the problem.
Once we acknowledge that immigration may have a disproportionate (if
small) impact on less educated resident workers’ wages and unemploy-
ment levels, and once we highlight particular concern for African Ameri-
can workers who fall into that group because of persistent racism and
disenfranchisement, we must also make clear that factors other than immi-
gration are responsible for the vast majority of African American unem-
ployment in the United States, and for the deterioration in the quality of
low-wage work. Changes in immigration policy are likely to have a mini-
mal impact without initiatives that address the root causes of the problem.
The response to these conditions of work must emphasize the agency of
employers in creating such conditions, rather than blaming immigrants.
With regard to unemployment, additional investment in education (with a
focus on schools in low-income areas), renewed commitment to workforce
development (with an emphasis on linking training to institutions that
help workers build labor market power rather than a sole focus on indi-
vidual skill building),72 and an increase in the minimum wage are likely to
be far more effective responses than restrictionism. A broader assault on
discrimination in the workplace and improved rehabilitation programs for
ex-offenders are also important elements of policy responses.73 Above all,
an effective response requires support for solidarity and organization
among low-wage workers to address the poor pay and treatment they all
face on the job.74
Conclusion
If we, as advocates, can be clearer and more nuanced in our discussion
of the economics of job competition between immigrants and low-wage
resident workers, we will move a long way toward avoiding the tensions
I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. From an overall view, immi-
gration has a neutral or small positive effect on native workers’ wages. But
we should acknowledge that there is much we don’t know about the
potential for a greater detrimental impact on certain local areas and indus-
tries, especially in the short term, and on particular groups of residents,
including the prior wave of immigrants, workers of color, and workers
with less than a high school diploma, when immigrants’ status is struc-
tured in ways that make them particularly vulnerable (especially the
undocumented and workers on temporary visas). Such an approach is
honest and also conveys the urgency of workers’ rights enforcement from
the perspectives of both newcomers and residents in low-wage jobs.
At the same time, it is essential to address the flashpoint question of
employers’ role in creating categories of work that native workers are
reluctant to do. In the United States, we must also acknowledge the
breadth and depth of the sources of African American unemployment
that are unrelated to immigration, and to recognize that at the core of the
problem lies the deterioration of work for all low-wage workers in the
country. If we can do these things, we will come closer to advocating for
immigrant workers in ways that are consistent with reality on the ground
and effective in fostering solidarity between immigrants and resident
workers.
Notes
1. In this chapter I often use “resident” rather than the more common term
“native.” “Resident” encompasses both the native-born and those foreign-born
workers who have set down roots in the destination country (as opposed to tem-
porary migrant workers who intend to return home). In referring to the rhetoric
or scholarship of others, however, I use the term that the author or speaker
employs (“native,” “American,” or “U.S.” workers).
2. For an example, see note 68.
3. For summaries of the literature, see Giovanni Peri, The Impact of Immigrants
in Recession and Economic Expansion (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute
18 Global Migration
2010), 6, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri

-June2010.pdf; Heidi Shierholz, Immigration and Wages: Methodological Advance-
ments Confirm Modest Gains for Native Workers (Washington, DC: Economic Policy
Institute 2010), 1, 3–4, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.epi.org/page/-/bp255
/bp255.pdf. This view is still contested, however. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, Jeffrey
Grogger, and Gordon H. Hanson, “Imperfect Substitution Between Immigrants
and Natives: A Reappraisal,” NBER Working Paper No. 13887, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2008, 28, accessed March 12, 2013, http://
www.nber.org/papers/w13887.
4. For an overview and summary of the literature on the European Union,
see Madeleine Sumption and Will Somerville, The UK’s New Europeans: Progress
and Challenges Five Years After Accession (Manchester: Equality and Human
Rights Commission, 2010), 37–39, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www
.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/new_europeans.pdf; Will Somerville
and Madeleine Sumption, Immigration and the Labour Market: Theory, Evidence and
Policy (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009), 13–14,
accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/
raceinbritain/immigration_and_the_labour_market_-_theory,_evidence,_policy.pdf.
For one of the most recent E.U. studies, see Francesco D’Amuri and Giovanni
Peri, “Immigration, Jobs and Employment Protection: Evidence from Europe,”
NBER Working Paper No. 17139, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, MA, 2011, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers
/w17139.pdf?new_window=1 (examining the impact of immigrant inflow from
1996 to 2007 on native jobs in 14 Western European countries and finding no
negative impact on native employment rates).
5. “Immigration Reform and Job Growth,” Immigration Policy Center, accessed
March 12, 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/immigration-reform
-and-job-growth.
6. David Scott Fitzgerald et al., “The Immigration Economy,” Council on
Foreign Relations Expert Roundup, March 8, 2010, accessed March 12, 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/economics/immigration-economy/p21605.
7. Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, “Rethinking the Effect of
Immigration on Wages,” Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (2012):
152; Marco Manacorda, Alan Manning, and Jonathan Wadsworth, “The Impact of
Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain,”
Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (2012): 120, 122.
8. Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber, “Task Specialization, Immigration, and
Wages,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (2009): 135.
9. Roger Lowenstein, “The Immigration Equation,” New York Times Magazine,
July 9, 2006, 36, 69.
10. Lisa Catanzarite, “Occupational Context and Wage Competition of New
Immigrant Latinos with Minorities and Whites,” Review of Black Political Economy
31 (2003): 77, 88; Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth, “Impact of Immigration,”
123 (see n. 7); Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 3 (see n. 3).
11. Robert W. Fairlie, Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity, 1996–2011

(Kansas City: Kauffman Foundation of Entrepreneurship, 2012), 4, 9–10, accessed
March 12, 2013, http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/KIEA_2012_report.pdf.
12. Harry J. Holzer, Immigration Policy and Less-Skilled Workers in the United
States: Reflections on Future Directions for Reform (Washington, DC: Migration
Policy Institute, 2011), 6–7, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy
.org/pubs/holzer-january2011.pdf.
13. Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 4, 19 (see n. 3); Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera
Cohn, Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave? (Washington, DC:
Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), accessed March 12, 2013, http://pewhispanic.org/files
/reports/112.pdf.
14. Mitra Toossi, “Labor Force Projections to 2018: Older Workers Staying
More Active,” Monthly Labor Review 132 (2009): 32, accessed March 12, 2013,
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/11/art3full.pdf.
15. Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born
Population in the United States—2011 (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center,
2013), table 9a, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29
/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-born-population-in-the-united-states-2011/#9a.
16. On the rising educational attainment of the native population, see U.S.
Census Bureau, “Table A-2, Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have
Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected
Years 1940 to 2012,” U.S. Department of Commerce, accessed March 12, 2013,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/tabA-2.xls. On
the substantial increase in low-wage work in the United States since the 1990s,
see Jérôme Gautié and John Schmitt, eds., Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy World
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009).
17. Jennifer Gordon and Robin Lenhardt, “Rethinking Work and Citizenship,”
UCLA Law Review 55 (2008): 1220–22.
18. The United Kingdom adopted employer sanctions a decade after the United
States. For a useful overview and contrast between approaches in the United
States, United Kingdom, and other EU nations, see Bernard Ryan, Innovations in
Employer Sanctions in the United States and Europe (Washington, DC: Institute for
the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, 2008), accessed
March 12, 2013, ftp://24.211.133.106/AiDisk_a5/Andy/Michael%20Backup%20
20111231/University%20Classes/FALL%202011/HNRS352/Research%20for%20
Amnesty/EmployerSanctionsGMF.pdf.
19. Doris Meissner and Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and
Correcting Course (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009), 9–10,
accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_Feb09.pdf.
20. Jeffrey Kaye, Deeper into the Shadows: The Unintended Consequences of Immi-
gration Worksite Enforcement (Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011),
6, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files
/docs/Kaye_-_Deeper_into_the_Shadows_020911.pdf; Julia Preston, “A Crack-
down on Employing Illegal Workers,” New York Times, May 30, 2011, A1.
20 Global Migration
21. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton, “Over-
sight Hearing on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Priorities and the
Rule of Law,” statement before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration Policy and Enforcement, on October 12, 2011, 112th Cong., 1st
sess., accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/20111012
-morton-ice-oversight.shtm. For a critical discussion of the impact of President
Obama’s policy, see David Bacon and Bill Ong Hing, “The Rise and Fall of Employer
Sanctions,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 38 (2010); Jennifer Gordon, “Holding the
Line on Workplace Standards: What Works for Immigrant Workers (and What
Doesn’t)?” in What Works for Workers?, ed. Ruth Milkman et al. (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2014).
22. See, e.g., National Employment Law Project, From Anti-Immigrant to
Pro-Worker: What States and Cities Can Do About Immigration and Workers’ Rights
(New York: National Employment Law Project, 2010), accessed March 12, 2013,
http://nelp.3cdn.net/09765f29851d123416_ntm6bnn7c.pdf; Rebecca Smith, Ana
Avendaño, and Julie Martínez Ortega, Iced Out: How Immigration Enforcement Has
Interfered with Workers’ Rights (New York: National Employment Law Project,
2009), 5–7, 32–35, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice
/ICED_OUT.pdf?nocdn=1.
23. Michael J. Wishnie, “Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers,” University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 6 (2004): 503.
24. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[U]ndocumented
aliens are ‘employees’ within the meaning of the FLSA.”); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan
Int’l., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting a discovery request seeking
plaintiff’s immigration status in a suit alleging FLSA violations as not relevant and
prejudicial); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(rejecting employer’s motion to dismiss that was premised on the employee’s
undocumented status and confirming that the FLSA covers undocumented
aliens).
25. Rebecca Smith et al., Undocumented Workers: Preserving Rights and Remedies
After Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB (New York: National Employment
Law Project, 2003), 12, accessed March 12, 2013, http://nelp.3cdn.net/b37814524
5dde2e58d_0qm6i6i6g.pdf.
26. Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004); Iweala v. Operational Techs.
Servs., 634 F. Supp. 2d 73, 80 (D.D.C. 2009); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003). But, suggesting that undocumented immi-
grants are not covered by Title VII when alleging discrimination during the hiring
process, see Egbuna v. Time Life Libraries, 153 F.3d 184, 187–88 (4th Cir. 1998).
27. See Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 778 N.W.2d 504, 511 (Neb. Ct. App.
2009) (upholding undocumented workers’ right to workers’ compensation for
on-the-job injuries); Asylum Co. v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 10 A.3d
619, 626 (D.C. 2010) (upholding undocumented workers’ right to workers’ com-
pensation for on-the-job injuries). But see Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, 658 N.W.2d 510,
521 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an employee is not entitled to workers’
compensation wage-loss benefits for periods of time when the employee is unable
to obtain or perform work because of commission of a crime, including the crime
of presenting false documents to obtain employment).
28. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) (hold-
ing that an employer who unknowingly hired an undocumented worker who
presented false documents to obtain employment, and then violated the NLRA by
firing that worker in retaliation for his union support, would not have to reinstate
the worker or provide back pay, the standard remedies under the act, despite the
clear violation of the act’s prohibition on such firings).
29. Smith, Avendaño, and Ortega, Iced Out, 32–35 (see n. 22) (providing
recommendations on how to balance immigration law enforcement and labor
law enforcement); National Employment Law Project, Just Pay: Improving Wage
and Hour Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Labor (New York: National
Employment Law Project, 2010), accessed March 12, 2013, http://nelp.3cdn.net
/b18eeae36c980c3971_y9m6ibw47.pdf (providing recommendations on how to
improve labor law enforcement at the United States Department of Labor).
30. Many immigrants’ rights organizations and campaigns have adopted the
slogan “No Human Being Is Illegal,” a statement credited to Elie Wiesel, 1986
Nobel Prize winner. See, for example, the motto of the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights
at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights.
31. See, for example, the statements of advocates in Julie Watson and Olga R.
Rodriguez, “Many Mexicans Have Jobs Before Crossing,” Associated Press, Apr.
15, 2006, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/16
15627/posts.
32. See, e.g., Amy M. Traub, Principles for an Immigration Policy to Strengthen &
Expand the American Middle Class (Washington, DC: Drum Major Institute for Pub-
lic Policy, 2009), 7, accessed March 12, 2013, www.dec17.org/DMI_immigration
.pdf; see also Jennifer Gordon, “Lack of Worksite Enforcement and Employer
Sanctions,” testimony before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, on June 21, 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess.,
41–43.
33. See, e.g., Agri Processor, 514 F.3d 1, 8–9 (supporting the placement of
undocumented workers in the same bargaining units as legal workers). The NLRA
extends to the undocumented to ensure that legal workers are not adversely
affected by competition from undocumented workers. Ibid., 5; Saipan Hotel Corp.
v. NLRB, 114 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the NLRB covered both
resident and nonresident workers on the Northern Mariana Islands, and noting
that providing NLRA protections to nonresident workers ensures greater protec-
tions of legal workers’ economic interests); Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976
F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting back pay for undocumented aliens
discharged in violation of the NLRA, but noting that providing NLRA protections
to undocumented workers ensures that legal workers are not adversely affected by
competition from undocumented workers); Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (holding
that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to undocumented workers).
22 Global Migration
34. Traub, Strengthen & Expand the American Middle Class, 7 (see n. 32).
35. Ibid.
36. See, e.g., Gordon and Lenhardt, “Rethinking Work and Citizenship,”
1200–01 (see n. 17).
37. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, “Hiring Locally for Farm Work Is No Cure-All,”
New York Times, October 5, 2011, A1.
38. Gordon and Lenhardt, “Rethinking Work and Citizenship,” 1174–79 (see
n. 17); see Steve Striffler, Chicken: The Dangerous Transformation of America’s
Favorite Food (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 96.
39. On the poultry processing industry, see Leon Fink, The Maya of Morganton:
Work and Community in the Nuevo New South (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2003), 12. On the meatpacking industry, see Lance Compa, Blood,
Sweat, and Fear: Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 2004), 11–14. On the janitorial, as well as garment, construction,
and trucking industries, see Ruth Milkman, L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the
Future of the U.S. Labor Movement (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006),
104–13.
40. Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigra-
tion and the Social Organization of Labor (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2003), 157–59, 176–79; Leticia M. Saucedo, “The Employer Preference for the
Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace,” Ohio State
Law Journal 67 (2006): 970; Robert MacKenzie and Chris Forde, “The Rhetoric of
the ‘Good Worker’ Versus the Realities of Employers’ Use and the Experiences of
Migrant Workers,” Work, Employment & Society 23 (2009): 149–50.
41. “Adverse Effect Wage Rates—Year 2013,” Employment and Training
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www
.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/adverse.cfm.
42. Department of Homeland Security statistics show an increase from a low of
14,094 H-2A visas granted in 2003 to a high of 188,411 in 2011. Office of Immi-
gration Statistics, 2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 63, 65, accessed March 12, 2013, http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011
/ois_yb_2011.pdf; Randall Monger, Non-immigrant Admissions to the United States:
2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), accessed
March 12, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_fr
_2011.pdf. For anecdotal support for the assertion that this increase is at least
partially due to increased enforcement, see Kathy Cobb, “Rolling the ICE Dice,”
Fed Gazette, November 1, 2007, 1, 7, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.minn
eapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1167; Peter Rousmaniere,
“Shortages of Farm Labor Hit Florida, California. Are They Due to Immigration
Enforcement?,” Working Immigrants Blog, January 16, 2007, accessed March 12,
2013, http://www.workingimmigrants.com/2007/01.
43. John Brueggemann and Cliff Brown, “The Decline of Industrial Union
ism in the Meatpacking Industry: Event-Structure Analyses of Labor Unrest,
1946–1987,” Work & Occupations 30 (2003): 327; Compa, Blood, Sweat, and Fear
(see n. 39). For accounts of similar shifts in other industries, see all sources cited
in note 39.
44. “Job Opportunities,” New York City Department of Sanitation, accessed
March 12, 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/html/jobs/jobs.shtml.
45. Holzer, Less-Skilled Workers, 8 (see n. 12); Saucedo, “Employer Preference,”
1018–1020 (see n. 40).
46. For one view of this question, see Holzer, Less-Skilled Workers, 8 (see n. 12).
On effective approaches to regulation, see Annette Bernhardt, “The Role of
Labor Market Regulation in Rebuilding Economic Opportunity in the United
States,” Work & Occupations (2012), accessed March 12, 2013, doi: 10.1177
/0730888412445644.
47. For summaries of the literature, see Holzer, Less-Skilled Workers, 1, 3 (see
n. 12), and Somerville and Sumption, Immigration and the Labour Market, 23, 29,
32 (see n. 5).
48. Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, “Imperfect Substitution,” 28 (see n. 4).
49. U.S. Census Bureau, “Completed High School or College” (see n. 17).
50. Chris Chapman et al., Trends in High School Dropout and Completion Rates in
the United States: 1972–2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education,
2011), 8–9, accessed March 12, 2013, nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012006.pdf; Cen-
ter for Labor Market Studies, Left Behind in America: The Nation’s Dropout Crisis
(Boston: Northeastern University, 2009), 5, accessed March 12, 2013, http://iris
.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=clms_pub.
51. Daniel S. Hamermesh and Frank D. Bean, ed., Help or Hindrance?: The Eco-
nomic Implications of Immigration for African Americans (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation 1998), 6; Kristen F. Butcher, “An Investigation of the Effect of Immi-
gration on the Labor-Market Outcomes of African Americans,” in Help or Hin-
drance, 149, 151, 177 (noting an impact on low-skilled African Americans);
Catanzarite, “Occupational Context and Wage Competition,” 88 (see n. 10) (not-
ing that “blacks appear to suffer disproportionately from [immigrant] employ-
ment in brown-collar jobs,” but that “the findings do not support a sweeping
conclusion that immigrant employment is generally harmful to native workers or
to native minorities”). But see Gerald D. Jaynes, A Conversation About the Economic
Effects of Immigration on African Americans (Washington, DC: Immigration Policy
Center, 2009), 3, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org
/sites/default/files/docs/Gerald%20Jaynes%20071409.pdf (summarizing the find-
ings of Franklin D. Wilson and Gerald Jaynes, “Migration and the Employment
and Wages of Native and Immigrant Workers,” Work & Occupations 27 [2000]:
135 [“A colleague and I launched a large-scale statistical analysis to measure
immigration’s effects on wages and employment of natives nationwide. To our
surprise, no matter how we approached the data, our results showed either no
effects or very modest effects for the least-educated black men”]); Cathy Yang Liu,
“Latino Immigration and the Low-Skill Urban Labor Market: The Case of Atlanta,”
Social Science Quarterly 94 (2012), accessed March 12, 2013, http://onlinelibrary
24 Global Migration
.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00858.x/pdf (although immigrants

have entered historically black occupations in Atlanta, observing no downward
pressure on wages of black workers in those occupations; suggesting that labor
market has segmented and black workers now occupy better paid, language-
intensive jobs).
52. James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston ed., The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington, DC: National Acade-
mies Press, 1997), 6. More recently, Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston, looking at
the United Kingdom, conclude that immigration to the United Kingdom increases
native wages above the 40th percentile of the wage distribution, depresses wages
below the 20th percentile, and increases native wages slightly overall. “The Effect
of Immigration Along the Distribution of Wages,” Review of Economic Studies
(2012), accessed March 12, 2013, doi: 10.1093/restud/rds019.
53. Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 1, 11 (see n. 4). A similar argument was
put forth, and similar conclusions drawn, in Linda Levine, Immigration: The Effects
on Low-Skilled and High-Skilled Native-Born Workers (Washington, DC: Congres-
sional Research Service 2010), 10–11, accessed March 12, 2013, http://fpc.state
.gov/documents/organization/142751.pdf. See also Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and
Giovanni Peri, “Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the
Empirics,” NBER Working Paper No. 14188, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA, 2008, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.nber.org
/papers/w14188.pdf?new_window=1.
54. See generally Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, “Imperfect Substitution,” (see
n. 4) (contesting the conclusions of one of the studies on which Shierholz’s
thesis relies and arguing that immigrants are perfect substitutes for native
workers); Christopher L. Smith, “The Impact of Low-Skilled Immigration on
the Youth Labor Market,” Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2012): 55–89 (conclud-
ing that young workers are significantly more negatively impacted by low-
skilled immigration than adult natives; suggesting that this is due to the greater
overlap between the jobs that youth and low-skilled immigrants hold, and to the
fact that young workers are more responsive to the wage changes induced by
immigration).
55. Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 19 (see n. 4).
56. Ibid., 20.
57. Julie L. Hotchkiss, Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, and Fernando Rios-Avila, “The
Wage Impact of Undocumented Workers,” Working Paper No. 2012-4, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2012, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.frbatlanta
.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp1204.pdf. The authors are careful to note that they
do not offer an analysis of overall wages in a labor market where undocumented
workers are present, but rather seek to understand workers’ experiences at a
particular employer. Ibid., 18.
58. Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 3 (see n. 4).
59. On the issue of state and local costs, see generally Congressional Budget
Office, The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets of State and Local
Governments (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2007), accessed March 12,

2013, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6
-immigration.pdf. Note that, overall, advocates across the political spectrum
have documented that immigrants are less likely than natives to use public
benefits such as health care. Leighton Ku and Brian Bruen, “Poor Immigrants
Use Public Benefits at a Lower Rate Than Poor Native-Born Citizens,” Cato
Institute Economic Development Bulletin 17 (2013), accessed March 12, 2013,
http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/poor-immigrants
-use-public-benefits-lower-rate-poor; National Immigration Law Center, “Facts
About Immigrants’ Low Use of Health Services and Public Benefits,” Immigrants’
Rights Update 20 (2006), accessed March 12, 2013, http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs
/research/research002.htm.
60. See, e.g., Office of the New York State Comptroller, The Role of Immigrants
in the New York City Economy (New York: Office of the New York State Comptrol-
ler, 2010), accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/osdc/rpt17-2010
.pdf.
61. Audrey Singer, The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institute, 2004), 5, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.brookings
.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2004/02demographics_singer/20040301_gateways
.pdf.
62. Jaynes, Effects of Immigration on African Americans, 3 (see n. 51).
63. New Americans, 223–24 (see n. 52).
64. Peri, Recession and Economic Expansion, 7 (see n. 3).
65. Shierholz, Immigration and Wages, 23 (see n. 4); Holzer, Less-Skilled Work-
ers, 12 (see n. 13).
66. Arindrajit Dube, Shruti Kapoor, and Todd Sorensen, “The Effect of Immi-
gration on Ethnic Composition and Occupational Reallocation” (preliminary
draft, November 11, 2009), 18, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.tcd.ie/Econ
omics/assets/pdf/Sorensen.pdf. Reaching a similar conclusion with regard to Afri-
can Americans in Atlanta, see also Liu, “The Case of Atlanta” (see n. 51).
67. Carroll Doherty, “Attitudes Toward Immigration: In Black and White,” Pew
Research Center, April 25, 2006, accessed March 12, 2012, http://pewresearch
.org/pubs/21/attitudes-toward-immigration-in-black-and-white (reporting gener-
ally more positive views of immigrants, but greater concern about economic
competition). For an overview of earlier studies with similar conclusions, see
Paula D. McClain et al., “Black and White Americans and Latino Immigrants: A
Preliminary Look at Attitudes in Three Southern Cities” (paper presented at the
2009 American Political Science Association, Ontario, Canada, September 2–6,
2009), 4–6, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/archived
/working%20papers/McClain%20et%20al.pdf.
68. Elton Gallegly (R-CA) offers a good example of such a politician. Known as a
strong proponent of anti-immigrant measures, he has expressed concern about Afri-
can American job loss due to immigration. Chairman Elton Gallegly, “Hearing on
Making Immigration Work for American Minorities,” statement before the
26 Global Migration
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, on Mar. 1, 2011, 112th Cong.,

1st sess., accessed March 12, 2013, http://votesmart.org/public-statement/590733
/subcommittee-on-immigration-policy-and-enforcement-hearing-on-making-
immigration-work-for-american-minorities#.UT_j2aW4AVs. Yet he opposes affirma-
tive action, an increase in the federal minimum wage, or changes in the law to
make unionization easier. “Representative Elton W. Gallegly—Issue Positions,” Proj-
ect Vote Smart, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.votesmart.org/npat.php?
can_id=26750#700. His 7 percent AFL-CIO rating is one of the lowest in the House.
“Elton Gallegly on Jobs,” Ontheissues.org, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www
.ontheissues.org/CA/Elton_Gallegly_Jobs.htm#03n-AFLCIO.
69. Steven Pitts, “The Race Question and Building Labor Power in the Context
of the Immigrant Upsurge,” Labor and Working-Class History Association Newsletter
(Fall 2007): 7, 8.
70. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—February 2013
(Washington, DC: Department of Labor, 2012), accessed March 12, 2013, http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
71. Jaynes, Effects of Immigration on African Americans, 4 (see n. 51); DeWayne
Wickham, “Immigrants a Scapegoat for Blacks’ Unemployment,” USA Today,
August 7, 2007, A9, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/printed
ition/news/20070807/opcom07.art.htm; Earl Ofari Hutchinson, “Rising Latino
Numbers, Rising Black Fears,” Bay State Banner, December 6, 2007, A1, accessed
March 12, 2013, http://www.baystatebanner.com/opinion58-2007-12-06. On the
high levels of incarceration among African American men and the role of criminal
records as a barrier to black employment, see generally Devah Pager, “Double
Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job,” Wisconsin Law Review 2 (2005).
72. Pitts, “Race Question and Building Labor Power,” 8 (see n. 69).
73. Jaynes, Effects of Immigration on African Americans, 4 (see n. 51).
74. Pitts, “Race Question and Building Labor Power,” 8 (see n. 69).
CHAPTER TWO
Revisiting the Myth of Guest

Worker Programs
The Case of Malaysia
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
Introduction
The term guest worker, a translation of the German Gastarbeiter, was
initially used to design West Germany’s massive foreign worker programs
in the 1950s and 1960s. Later on, this term has also referred to temporary
labor schemes elsewhere in the world, from Europe and the United States
to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Guest workers have also been called
braceros, H2 workers, or just temporary foreign workers. Some could
choose among employers or even economic sectors, live outside the work-
place, and renew their work permits as long as they were required. Others
were bound to a particular employer, lived in closed compounds, and had
to return home after few years. Despite these differences, “all have been
authorized by governments to cross borders to work for wages on a tempo-
rary basis.” Their right to work and remain abroad has rested “on the whim
of their employer or that of the government that sanctioned their stay.”1
Temporary labor schemes should be understood as the result of a state-
fashioned compromise aiming at maintaining high levels of labor migra-
tion while also strictly regulating immigration and closing national borders.
28 Global Migration
While foreign workers are imported in the terms and volume defined by
employers, the demand for closure is satisfied by restricting their member-
ship. First, this has been done by curtailing the economic, social, and
political rights of migrants. For instance, their mobility within the labor
market or their access to certain social provisions have often been limited.
Second, the demand for closure has also been given response by making
migrants’ stay temporary. As showed by Hahamovitch,2 the expectation of
repatriation or return is in fact what distinguishes guest worker programs
from former forms of labor transfers: while slaves belonged to an employer
until the end of their lives and indentured servants were generally encour-
aged to stay after their contracts expired, guest workers are by definition
“guests” who are expected to leave.
The first wave of guest worker programs was grounded particularly in the
process of institutionalizing the idea of the nation-state as a prospectively
homogeneous ethnocultural unit.3 Prussia embarked on state-sanctioned
temporary migration in 1890 with Polish-speaking immigrants who fueled
the rise of German nationalism.4 Guest worker programs were implemented
during the two World Wars (in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
the United States) and again after World War II (in France, the United King-
dom, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany). This last
wave was not only the result of demands to preserve cultural unity but also
a response to the expanding attributions of the social state. First, increasing
welfare arrangements led the state to become more interested in protecting
the national labor market so as to avoid unemployment among national
workers.5 Second, the more states promised their citizens in terms of ser-
vices, the more urgent it became to identify who was eligible for these ser-
vices and who was not.
While guest worker programs continued in non-Western countries
(particularly Southeast Asia and the Middle East), by the 1970s and 1980s
there was general consensus that they had “failed” since there was nothing
more permanent than temporary foreign workers.6 The settlement of guest
workers in receiving societies has been explained by the fact that migrants,
unlike goods and capital, were entitled to certain rights under the aegis of
liberal constitutions.7 As the Swiss novelist Max Frisch writes, European
governments had “asked for workers but human beings came.”8 By virtue
of their humanity, guest workers were entitled to social welfare and
eventually residence rights. The guest worker’s status as a human being
and therefore as the subject of rights clashed with the formula of “open
entry” yet “closed membership.” In a context of rights, the compromise
between demands for foreign labor and demands for closure was thus a
mirage9 or proved to be an illusionary solution10 in the long run.
Revisiting the Myth of Guest Worker Programs 29
Following a similar reasoning, the economists Ruhs and Martin11 sig-

naled that low-skilled migration in high-income countries inevitably
entails a trade-off between numbers and rights, arguing that the more
rights low-skilled migrants have, the less advantageous (or desirable) they
are. Inverting the terms, this means that (low-skilled) migrants are desir-
able as long as their presence is (and can be) restricted. If—as the authors
quoted above conclude—liberal states are self-constrained by rights and
cannot therefore limit migrants’ membership, this implies that these states
are de facto compelled to adhere to a policy of low numbers and high
rights. By this logic, countries with few rights constraints would be more
inclined to admit numerically significant labor migration flows, as they
seem to have more ways of excluding newcomers. This same argument is
implicit in the typology of different models of immigration suggested by
Arango,12 who distinguishes between democratic and nondemocratic or
autocratic societies. The former would recognize moral and political obli-
gations vis-à-vis the immigrants while attempting to keep the numbers
admitted as low as possible; the latter would tend to have no compunc-
tions about letting in large numbers of people, though only on the condi-
tion that they be temporary laborers with limited rights.
All these approaches have in common the same assumption: while being
a myth in liberal democracies, guest worker programs are or may be success-
ful in those countries where states do not face rights’ constraints. But to what
extent is this true? The present chapter aims to give an answer to this ques-
tion by considering the case of Malaysia. As with any guest worker program,
Malaysian migration policies have sought to open up entry while restricting
membership. On the one hand, this means that several hundred thousand
migrant workers enter the country every year. On the other, restrictions are
enforced once the immigrants are in the country by bounding their work
permits to a particular employer and making their stay strictly temporary. If
we look at policies as written on the books, we would indeed confirm that
the formula of “open entry” yet “closed membership” seems to work in
Malaysia. However, as we shall see in this chapter, if we look at policies in
practice, the attempt to turn foreign workers into mere merchandise for
import and export as and when demanded turns out to be a myth there too.
Demanded Yet Unwanted

Demands for Foreign Labor
In the early 1970s, the economic inequalities between Malay and
Chinese Malaysians and the consequently exacerbating conflict within and
30 Global Migration
between the two groups led the Malaysian government to implement the
New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990). As Chin observed,13 this devel-
opment program was designed to eliminate poverty and to restructure
society by dismantling the identification of ethnicity with economic func-
tion and geographic space. The NEP led to unprecedented economic
growth, characterized by the shift from an economy based on primary
commodity exports to one based on the export of manufactured goods.
This economic shift was facilitated by the transnationalization of capital
and the relocation of production plants from Western to developing
countries.
While the NEP promoted economic growth, it also had contradictory
effects on the country’s labor. On the one hand, the emphasis on urbaniza-
tion and industrialization promoted Malays to a better position within the
labor market. On the other hand, in contrast with South Korea and Tai-
wan, economic growth depended on foreign investment that was attracted
by emphasizing low labor costs.14 Urbanization and employment policies
sought to—and indeed did—improve the socioeconomic position of
Malaysian citizens regardless of their ethnicity, but economic growth con-
tinued to depend on a continuous supply of cheap labor. In this context,
the employment of regular and irregular migrant workers from neighbor-
ing countries was quickly perceived as being necessary for economic
growth and prosperity.
At the beginning most labor migrants worked in plantations. The
construction boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s also gave rise to a
huge labor shortage and again employers resorted to using immigrant
workers. In parallel, the sustained economic growth also drew Malaysian
women into the workforce. This increased female participation in the
labor force, together with the expansion of the middle class, led to an
immediately heightened demand for foreign domestic workers. After
1990, as economic growth continued, with rates averaging 8 percent
from 1987 to 1996, the demand for migrant labor became generalized,
with shortages reported for the first time in the manufacturing and later
in the service sector. This led migrant workers’ shift from a concentration
in agriculture, construction, and domestic service to being more or
less equally represented in the four major sectors by the late 1990s:
manufacturing (31 percent), construction (20 percent), plantations (25.9
percent), and services (20.4 percent, of which 9.3 percent were in domestic
service).15
Despite state attempts to reduce the migrant worker population and the
consequent increasing emphasis on high-tech and less labor-intensive
industries, there has been an unabated increase in the inflow of migrant
workers since the 1990s. In 2005 and 2008, the numbers of regular immi-
grants rose to 1.8 million and 2.1 million respectively,16 plus an estimated
500,000 to 1,000,000 irregular immigrants.17 In economic sectors, most
regular migrants work in manufacturing, plantations, construction,
domestic service, and agriculture. If one included irregular immigrants,
the proportion of migrant workers would be far higher in construction
but with a significant presence also in plantations, domestic service, and
manufacturing.18 As for nationality, most immigrants come from Indo
nesia, Nepal, India, Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and
Pakistan.
In general terms, we can conclude that economic growth in Malaysia,
associated with an export-oriented economy since colonial times, has
always been achieved by relying on immigrant labor. The exportation of
goods and the import of migrant labor have been, and still are, thus closely
entwined concepts in Malaysia. While in colonial times the exportation of
tin and rubber within the increasing connected world economy was made
possible by the importation of Chinese and Indian labor, in the last decades
the country’s exportation of manufactured goods within an increasingly
globalized economy has been based on the importation of migrant labor
from Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and other Asian countries.
While sustaining growth, immigration has contributed to the consolida-
tion of a dual labor market that, in turn, has intensified Malaysian reliance
on migrant labor. This explains why, despite the recession and growing
unemployment of particular years such as 1985, 1997, and 2002, employ-
ers’ complaints of labor shortages persisted.
Demands for Closure

One of the first pieces of legislation passed after independence in 1957
was the Immigration Act (1959) to regulate the entry and movement of
foreigners into Malaysian territory. The Immigration Act was followed by
an Employment Restriction Act (1968) that made foreigners’ access to the
labor market contingent on possession of a work permit. Although both
acts referred to citizenship, in practice they had a notable ethnic compo-
nent: they affected primarily Chinese and Indians since immigrants from
the neighboring islands of the archipelago, such as Sumatra and Java, did
not fall under the legal category of “aliens” and hence did enjoy free entry
to Malaysia and its labor market.19
This double border continued to operate until the late 1980s. Until
then, the presence of thousands of Indonesians working illegally in rubber
and oil palm plantations and on construction sites did not attract much
32 Global Migration
public attention. They were perceived as temporary (even seasonal) work-

ers and as similar to Malays. However, as Indonesian migrants started to
move to urban areas, particularly to those economic sectors reserved for
local workers, their presence started to be regarded as challenging the NEP
employment policy. They were seen as competing with local workers in
the labor market and notably threatening the preordained redistribution of
wealth and employment among the different ethnic groups. Moreover,
non-Malay communities accused the state of turning a blind eye to the
inflow of Indonesian migrants and hence surreptitiously increasing the
Malay share in the overall population.
These complaints, but particularly the demand to protect the national
labor market, finally displaced ethnicity as a key component of (the imple-
mentation of) migration policies. This gradual closure and delimitation of
Malaysian borders gave rise to the development of a temporary labor
migrant system to “manage” the entry, stay, and repatriation of a foreign
labor migrant force that was in demand yet unwanted. In general, these
measures sought to determine the age, gender, nationality, employment
sector, location and duration of residence, and employment of foreign
workers in Malaysia. The idea behind it was to adapt labor migration to
the requirements of a set of preconceived factors such as the level of
economic activity and rate of unemployment, sectorial labor market imbal-
ances, the numbers of undocumented workers, national security, diplo-
matic relations, and the pressure of particular interest groups.20 Most
Malaysian scholars have described Malaysian migration policies as being
inconsistent, changing, and ad hoc.21 However, as I shall argue in the next
sections, what has been defined as ad hoc could be understood as part of
a guest worker policy aiming to maintain high levels of labor migration
while restricting membership.
Open Entry
Letting Them In
Since economic growth has depended on foreign investments attracted
by low labor costs, the demand for foreign labor has never been discussed.
Rather, the question has been how many, in which sectors, and for how
long. The extension of their stay is defined by the conditions of the work
permit. The number and economic position of migrant workers are directly
assessed by the Immigration Department, which considers requests for
employing migrant workers case-by-case. Applications are weighted by
taking into account whether there are national workers available, whether
the request complies with the quotas established per economic sector
(e.g., in 2006 this quota was one migrant worker for every three local
workers in manufacturing, but three for every single one in construction),
and whether applicants are direct employers or recruitment agencies.
Trade unions regularly complain that this process should be more trans-
parent. As the representative of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress said:
“The government should establish which sectors need foreign workers and
how many.”22 Similarly, the representative of the Malaysian Employers
Federation denounced this as “a cumbersome procedure. It depends a lot
whether you know somebody there. If you are close to officials from the
Immigration Department, you get it. If not, you can keep waiting for
months and months, just going around from one person to another.”23
Despite such limitations in the procedures, between 400,000 and 700,000
migrant workers enter Malaysia every year. These numbers would seem to
suggest that the “necessity” for migrant workers is defined in broad terms.
It seems that, as the Malaysian Agricultural Producers’ Association (MAPA)
representative remarked: “For employers it’s not a problem to get foreign
workers.”24
Apart from case-by-case evaluation of foreign labor demands, the Min-
istry of Home Affairs has regularly enforced a series of bans (in 1993–
1994, 1997, 2001, 2002, and 2005) on different categories of migrant
workers. In 1997 this was justified by Prime Minister Mahathir, who
stated: “The country cannot go on depending on foreign workers. We have
20 million people and 1.7 million foreign workers. If we allow this to go
on we would risk losing control of our country.”25 While the prime minis-
ter invoked security reasons, on other occasions a freeze on the employ-
ment of migrant workers was justified by the need to protect national
workers, to prevent social problems, or to reduce migrant remittances.
Despite all these arguments, employers’ complaints about the persistence
of labor shortages and their negative consequences on economic growth
led on each occasion to an immediate lifting of the ban. We can thus con-
clude that employers’ demands were systematically attended to. This was
the case not only because employers succeeded in imposing their interests,
but also because economic growth and development was one of the main
concerns of the Malaysian state itself.
The Role of Recruitment Agencies

Unlike European guest worker programs, the recruitment of migrant
workers in Malaysia has always been managed by private agencies. Dubbed
“manpower suppliers” and, later, “labor outsourcing companies,” these
34 Global Migration
private agencies organize the whole migration process. Following employ-

ers’ requests, recruitment agencies in Malaysia contact their counterparts
in the country of origin. These counterparts recruit migrants in the villages
(often through other agents) and send the required information to the
Malaysian agency. Once employers agree on the characteristics of the
migrant workers proposed, both the agency in the country of origin and
the one in Malaysia initiate the legal procedures to send and receive them.
Recruitment agencies in Malaysia organize not only the whole registration
process, but also the renewal of the work permit and the annual payment
for medical checkups, insurance, and levy.
Recruitment agencies are often presented as essential in both the recruit-
ment process as well as the deployment of migrant labor from completed
jobs to new ones. Employers defend them by arguing that they are the
necessary “managers” or “guardians” of a migrant labor system that does
not work alone or, in other words, that needs a “middleman” to cope with
the distance between labor’s supply and demand, proceed with legal pro-
cedures, redistribute migrant labor within the Malaysian labor market, and
return immigrants to their countries of origin after the prescribed period
of time. At the same time, recruitment agencies have often been portrayed
as “unscrupulous people” who overcharge migrant workers and “cheat”
them. The Malaysian newspapers are full of such cases: migrant workers
who have been given false promises in terms of salary and/or work condi-
tions or who are abandoned upon arrival to Malaysia after having paid
huge amounts of money to their recruitment agencies.
Employers, trade unions, NGOs, and the government itself have coin-
cided in denouncing recruitment agencies, accusing them of charging
exorbitant fees and practicing a great number of irregularities. Employers
and government officials have underlined how these irregularities make
the whole recruitment process more problematic and inefficient. They
have also complained that exorbitant fees increase the numbers of cases of
absconding as migrants may find out once in Malaysia that they have to
pay most of their salaries so as to return the initial debts. NGOs and trade
unions have been more concerned with migrant workers’ welfare. Their
main argument has been that the presence of recruitment agencies, along
with their regular and irregular practices, increases the vulnerability of
migrant workers in Malaysia.
The ongoing tension between the demand for private agents to manage
the recruitment and employment of migrant workers versus the rejection
of their abusive practices is manifest in the formulation of migration poli-
cies. In 1992, the Human Resources Ministry amended the Private Employ-
ment Agencies Act of 1981 to make using private agents mandatory in the
recruitment of foreign labor. This change arose from the perceived need
for a more orderly process. Three years later, however, the recruitment of
migrant workers (all but domestic) became the exclusive responsibility of
the Home Ministry’s Foreign Workers Task Force. This shift was then
explained by a need to circumvent this middleman’s course and establish
a centralized apparatus that would ensure quicker and tidier processing of
workers’ recruitment.26 Nevertheless, this attempt to centralize recruit-
ment was doomed to fail. Although recruitment agencies were formally
proscribed, employers never stopped using their services.
As the lack of recognition left recruitment agencies in a kind of legal limbo
that made it even more difficult for the government to control them, the gov-
ernment decided to legalize recruitment agencies again in January 2006.
From then on, they came to be called “outsourcing companies” and have
been recognized as the legal employers of migrant workers. As “legal” employ-
ers, they are responsible for the recruitment and stay of migrant workers in
Malaysia. As recruiters, they supply or “outsource” their foreign labor to “real”
employers. Freed of the complex tasks of organizing the recruitment, apply-
ing for work permits and renewals or being responsible for migrant workers’
stay in Malaysia, employers only have to pay a fixed sum (in September 2006
it was RM 6227 per day and worker) for such services. Moreover, this system
of labor outsourcing offers many opportunities for employers to get around
legal obligations and escape payment: it undermines the conditions and
wages established in collective agreements, and it blurs the legal contours of
the employer and his or her responsibility vis-à-vis migrant workers.
In practice, the privatization and commercialization of recruitment, but
also employment of migrant workers, has had a twofold effect. First, it has
increased the costs of legal migration, thus making irregular entry an
advantage. A comparison of costs involved is very instructive. While in
2005 recruitment fees via regular agencies rose from RM 2,000 to RM
3,000, transport to Malaysia via the jalur belakang (“back door,” which was
mostly by boat) rose from RM 100 to RM 2,200.28 Second, the presence of
recruitment agencies explains, too, why many regular migrants fall into
illegality once in Malaysia. In some cases, migrants were recruited without
having a real employer behind their work permits. This means that either
they were abandoned once in Malaysia or they were asked to work with a
different employer, which meant they were working illegally. In other
cases, migrants were brought into Malaysia under forged permits. Finally,
as said before, the mismatch between the debts incurred to get to Malaysia
and the salaries obtained once there have led other migrant workers to the
almost intolerable situation of having to work for years just to pay back the
initial debt. This situation has induced many migrants to run away from
36 Global Migration
their employers. By absconding from employers, migrants escaped debts

and bondage. At the same time, since work permits are tied to a particular
employer, this meant immediately falling into illegality.
Closed Membership
Dependence on Employers
As in any guest worker program, as many migrant workers as demanded
by employers were expected to get in but only in those economic sectors
where they were needed. The idea behind these limitations has been to
restrict the employment of migrant labor to those jobs rejected by local
workers. In fact, both employers and trade unions have agreed that locals
should be given priority. However, while employers have always insisted
that locals were “too choosy” to work in particular sectors, trade unions
proclaimed that labor shortages were not due to a “genuine” lack of man-
power but to poor wages and working conditions. The result has been a
changing policy that opened up particular sectors to migrant workers in
periods of economic growth, while closing them during economic slow-
downs such as in 1997–1998 and 2002.
While this is common to most guest worker programs, what differs
from most labor schemes implemented in Europe is that migrants’ pres-
ence in Malaysia is not only restricted to a specific economic sector but
tied to a particular employer. This policy has been backed by the main
interest groups. For employers, the immobilization of migrant workers has
meant the reduction of migrant labor turnover, particularly in sectors with
lower wages and poorer working conditions. In other words, it was seen
as the best way to prevent migrant workers from leaving their initial
employment to seek better job opportunities. Their immobilization is,
moreover, the only legal guarantee whereby employers can recover their
initial investments in terms of recruitment fees, medical checkups, and
annual levies. For trade unions, the immobilization of migrant workers
within the labor market is seen as the best way to prevent them from dis-
placing local workers. Finally, for the Malaysian state this policy has meant
turning employers responsible for particular migrant workers, both with
regard to their recruitment and to their return to the countries of origin.
In contrast, the immobilization of migrant workers has been denounced
by most Malaysian and international NGOs. Although most migrant work-
ers (excluding domestic workers) are protected under the Employment
Act, their dependence on a particular employer effectively prevents
them from seeking redress in the labor or industrial court. Since the
Immigration Act clearly states that a migrant worker can only stay in the
country within the premises of the enterprise stated in the work permit, if
the migrant worker wants to stop his or her employment due to abuse or
exploitative conditions or the work permit is canceled by the employer
after being brought to court, the migrant worker must return home. Some-
times a special permit is issued in these circumstances but it must be
renewed monthly and does not grant permission to work. Since court
cases can take months and even years, most migrant workers are forced to
return home before the end of the trial.29
In practice migrants’ dependence on their employers has led to a situa-
tion of sanctioned bondage.30 Due to their immobilization in the labor mar-
ket, they must accept the terms and conditions of their contracts, they do
not have the freedom to move from job to job, and, as just noted, their labor
rights are restricted as their legal presence in the country depends on their
employers. Kassim31 therefore concludes that having legal status accentu-
ates, rather than diminishes, migrant workers’ vulnerability. By contrast,
irregular immigrants are not tied to their employer as there is no agreement
signed and they can leave if and when they want. This is evidenced by their
higher rate of job mobility.32 In this particular aspect, we could thus con-
clude that illegality seems to be an advantage to the migrant worker.
This seems to be one of the reasons why many regular migrant workers
leave their employers and therefore become irregular. This is what is described
daily in the Malaysian newspapers as cases of “absconding” or “running
away.” Although there are no public data on the total number of absconders,
the general perception is that this is a common phenomenon.33 In fact, this is
why many recruitment agents and event government officials suggest that
employers should not give migrant domestic workers a day off each week.
Agents and politicians commonly argue that domestic workers “easily fall in
love” or can be “easily manipulated.” If we take into account that they are not
covered under the Employment Act and therefore their situation is even more
fragile, we might conclude that “absconding” is the only real alternative to
improve their situation. If they are not paid, if they have to work too many
hours a day, or if they do not have a day off, “running away” seems to repre-
sent an individualistic way to try to improve their situation.
Taxation of Migrant Labor

As for the immobilization of migrant workers, taxation seeks to control
immigrant presence in Malaysia. In 1992 a levy was introduced to reduce
the employers’ reliance on migrant workers. As stated by the Human
Resources Minister in 1991, the levy aimed to “control the influx of cheap
38 Global Migration
and unskilled labor into the country” and to “keep a close check on the
workers.”34 This was done by imposing an annual tax per migrant worker,
according to their economic sector and skills. The logic behind this varia-
tion was to impose a higher levy in sectors where local workers could still
be found and a lower one in those where foreign workers were in demand.
Moreover, in periods of higher unemployment the levy has been raised to
protect national workers while in periods of lower unemployment it has
been reduced. The official message was that the levy was needed to protect
local workers, yet it should be kept as moderate as possible so as not to
disrupt the Malaysian economy.
In practice, however, the compromise was difficult to maintain. As seen
for entry policies, the device of the levy ended up giving priority again to
the demands of employers. This came about as a consequence of a double
(interconnected) change. First, employers started to deduce the levy from
workers’ monthly wages. Second, as the government immediately recog-
nized the employers’ right to transfer the burden to migrant workers, the
levy shifted from being a tax imposed on employers to being an income tax
paid by migrant workers. According to the NGO Tenaganita, the levy
imposes a great burden on migrant workers. One of its members observed
how “[s]ometimes foreign workers get a very low salary and then the levy
is deducted from it as well as the food. At the end of the month, they
sometimes only get RM 75 or RM 150 (20 or 40 US dollars) and, of course,
they don’t want to keep working for nothing.”35
In practice, the levy has had a twofold effect on migrant workers’ lives.
First, it increased their dependence on employers since now their bondage is
not only defined by the conditions of the work permit (as described above)
but also established in practice through the debt that restarts each year when
the employer advances payment of the levy and then makes monthly deduc-
tions from the migrant workers’ wages. If migrants leave their jobs, the
employer would lose the amount of levy that remains to be deducted from
their monthly wages. This has compelled employers to retain foreign work-
ers’ papers so as to prevent them from running away. Second, yet again, the
levy pushes up the price of legality. Many Malaysian scholars have pointed to
the levy as one of the reasons migrants would prefer to remain or become
irregular.36 This was also one of the main reasons given by irregular migrants
themselves in a survey of 100 respondents in Peninsular Malaysia.37
Only as Temporary Workers

As for any guest worker program, there is general consensus that
migrant workers should remain only temporarily in Malaysia. As stated
repeatedly by employers, trade unionists, and government officials, they

are “temporary workers but not migrants” or “they came here to work, not
to get the permanent residence permit.”38 They are thus considered “birds
of passage.” In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, indentured servants
brought to colonial Malaya were also expected to be temporary. However,
while they were only deported in case of unemployment and health prob-
lems, nowadays migrant workers come to Malaysia with short-term con-
tracts that may be extended for a maximum of five to seven years. Their
temporality seeks not only to reduce social security costs but also to pre-
vent their incorporation into Malaysian society.
Contemporary migrant workers’ presence in the country is temporary
in different respects. First of all, they are expected to leave whenever they
are no longer required. While in periods of economic growth new migrant
workers are recruited and those already in the country are allowed to stay,
in times of economic downturn new recruitments are frozen and migrant
workers in the hardest-hit sectors have to leave. By repatriating them, the
Malaysian government expects to reduce the costs of unemployment while
giving priority to employing local workers. Perfectly illustrating this logic
are the mass repatriation programs that followed the financial crisis of
1997. After a halt in the renewal of work permits was announced, hun-
dreds of thousands of migrant workers were expected to leave the country.
This happened again in 2001, when unemployment rose from 3.1 percent
to 3.7 percent. Here again the government responded by reducing migrant
workers’ stay in Malaysia.
Second, migrant workers are also expected to leave whenever they are
not able to work. In particular, those deemed “medically unfit” are expected
to be immediately repatriated. Being “unfit” means having diseases such as
hepatitis B, tuberculosis, syphilis, or HIV/AIDS, and, for female migrant
workers, being pregnant. Again, this policy seeks to reduce social costs
while maximizing the foreign labor force by keeping in the country only
the fittest workers. For pregnant women, this policy aims to avoid repro-
duction costs as well as the settlement of migrant workers in the country.
In 1998 18,154 cases of “medically unfit” migrants (or 3.6 percent of the
total foreign labor force) were reported.39 In 2004 the highest number was
found in the agriculture sector, with 6,500 cases or 35.2 percent of all
migrant workers employed in this sector.40
Finally, migrant workers are not allowed to stay in Malaysia for more
than five to seven years. This measure again aims to prevent migrant work-
ers’ settlement in the country. The logic is to ensure that migrant workers
come only to work or that they remain “pure labor” without becoming
settled migrants. As with any guest worker program, this results in a
40 Global Migration
migrant labor system that is constantly renewing its labor force. While
assuring a flexible, external labor supply, this constant influx and outflow
of migrant workers seems to militate against productivity. In other words,
employers must train them over and over again without being able to
retain their skills for the company’s benefit. Following employers’ com-
plaints, “certified skilled workers” are exceptionally allowed to stay for 10
years. In the end, they too have to leave. Despite its impact on productiv-
ity, this is accepted by all parties. As the Malaysian Employers Federation
president puts it: “We are not supposed to have these people here forever,
are we?”41
In practice, the temporality of migrant workers in Malaysia, in any of its
three forms, has had a triple effect. As I noted above, it has brought about
a continuous labor turnover that may disrupt productivity. While this has
been one of employers’ complaints in former European experiences, this
did not seem to be a problem for most Malaysian employers, since most
migrant workers have low-skilled jobs. Moreover, as one recruitment
agent remarked, new labor is cheap labor: “We don’t like to depend on
them. If they become skilled workers, they can ask for more money.
Unskilled new workers are much cheaper.”42 The second effect of migrants’
temporality is that it increases the costs of the whole labor migrant system
since old migrant workers must be sent back to their countries of origin
while new ones must be recruited and brought in. The third one is that it
introduces a factor of unpredictability into the supply of migrant labor as
migrants’ presence in the country depends on the general economic
performance.
This unpredictability particularly affects migrant workers, as they can
be required to leave at any moment. If we consider that many of them have
paid considerable money to get to Malaysia, this turns to be particularly
problematic. What happens to those migrant workers who have sold their
properties back home or incurred debts in order to migrate when they are
suddenly ordered to go back? Among my interviews, there was a general
agreement that in many cases they decide to stay in Malaysia even if this
entails becoming irregular.43 Although this scenario is frequently observed,
there are little, if any, data to illustrate it.
Conclusions: A Myth Too

As with any guest worker program, labor migrants in Malaysia are
invited to work for a limited period of time in particular economic sectors
with alleged “labor shortages.” As the term guest worker indicates, the logic
behind it is to have foreigners working without settling in the country. As
many of my interviewees said, the aim of such a program is to get “foreign

workers” instead of “immigrants.” In the case of Malaysia, in contrast to
former guest worker programs in Europe, migrant workers are neither
recruited by the state nor by the employers. Recruitment agencies organize
the whole migration process, including the employment of migrant work-
ers. Moreover, once in Malaysia, migrant workers cannot move from job to
job, as their work permits are bound to a specific employer and the debt
to pay the initial expenses and the annual levy makes them even more
dependent. Finally, migrant workers may be required to leave at any
moment.
When looking at policies as written on the books, the conclusion is that
in Malaysia guest worker programs are not a myth. In contrast to most
liberal democracies, the formula “open entry” and “closed membership”
seems to work. As this chapter shows, the state of Malaysia could choose
a policy of high numbers and low rights. In other words, the state has not
restricted the entry of migrant workers, though it has placed limits on time
of residence, position in the labor market, and social and labor rights.
However, when looking at policies in practice and particularly at the effects
of these policies on migratory flows, the conclusion is the opposite: in
Malaysia, guest worker programs, and the underlying assumption that
immigration is an “economic matter” and that migrants are thus commodi-
ties that can be imported and exported at will, have proved to be a myth
too. The main reason is that the costs associated with migrants’ entry and
stay has tended to make legality a disadvantage so that, in many cases,
resorting to illegality has been advantageous.
Unlike regular immigrants, irregular migrants are not bound to an
employer. Not having a signed contract means that immigrants tend to be
freer to change jobs when they want and hence have more opportunities
for negotiating pay and working conditions. Being irregular can also be
cheaper. It circumvents all costs associated with legal entry and, once in the
country, there is no levy to pay. Finally, illegality tends to make the stay in
Malaysia rather less temporary. Unlike regular immigrants, irregular immi-
grants are not automatically repatriated in instances of economic crisis,
illness or pregnancy, or after five years of working in the country. In short,
the resort to illegality both for migrants who enter the country irregularly
and those who become irregular after “running away” from their employers
has made the immigrant worker situation in Malaysia less manageable than
the country’s immigration policies would suggest. On paper, the policies
do indeed trim down the rights of immigrants. In practice—and this is
quite remarkable when considered from a Western standpoint—the limit-
ing of rights has encouraged illegality as the better alternative.
42 Global Migration
This resort to illegality is not unique to the Malaysian case. There were
the “spontaneous migrants” to northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s
who escaped restrictions imposed by the migrant labor system by migrat-
ing or looking for work on their own; there are as well the contemporary
Eastern European migrants that bypass the well-established commercial
employment agencies or the low-skilled migrants in the Gulf states and
other Asian countries, for whom illegality has also been a way of escaping
state control.44 In all such cases, illegality shows to what extent guest
worker programs are a myth. With or without rights, immigrants cannot
be treated as mere workers, a labor source that can be imported, kept
under constraints, and exported at will.
Notes
1. Cindy Hahamovitch, “Creating perfect immigrants: Guestworkers of the
world in historical perspective,” Labour History 44 (2003): 70.
2. Ibid., 72.
3. John Torpey, The invention of the passport: Surveillance, citizenship and the state
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
4. Ulrich Herbert, A history of foreign labour in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal
workers/forced laborers/guest workers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1990); Leo Lucassen, The immigrant threat: The integration of old and new migrants
in Western Europe since 1850 (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
2005).
5. Leo Lucassen, “The Great War and the origins of migration control in West-
ern Europe and the United States (1880–1920),” in Regulations of migration: Inter-
national experiences, ed. Anita Bocker et al. (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1998).
6. Philip Martin, “Guest worker programmes for the 21st Century,” Back-
grounder (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies, 2000).
7. James F. Hollifield, Immigrants, markets and states: The political economy of
postwar Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
8. James F. Hollifield, “The emerging migration state,” in Motion in place/place
in motion, ed. I. Toshio and I. Masako (Osaka: The Japan Center for Area Studies,
2005), 19–44.
9. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The mirage of Mexican guest workers,”
Foreign Affairs 80 (2001): 117.
10. Demetrios Papademetriou, Philip Martin, and Mark Miller, “US immigra-
tion policy: The guestworker,” International Migration 21 (1983): 39.
11. Martin Ruhs and Philip Martin, “Numbers vs rights: Trade-offs and guest-
worker programmes,” Working paper, no. 40, University of Oxford, 2006.
12. Joaquín Arango, “Dificultades y dilemas de las políticas de inmigración,”
Circunstancia. Revista de Ciencias Sociales del IUIOG 1 (2003): 3.
13. Christine Chin, “The state of the state in globalization: Social order and
economic restructuring in Malaysia,” Third World Quarterly 21 (2000): 1042.
14. Kuama Sundaram Jomo, “Growth with equity in East Asia,” in Southeast
Asian paper tigers? From miracle to debacle and beyond, ed. K. S. Jomo (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 196–219.
15. Ministry of Human Resources, Report on the impact of foreign workers on the
Malaysian economy (Kuala Lumpur, 1994), 36.
16. Azizah Kassim, “Assessing the need for foreign workers and its impact on
Malaysian economy” (paper presented at the National Symposium on Foreign
Workers Policy in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, October 20–22, 2008).
17. Syed Shahir, “Protection of migrant and refugee rights in Malaysia” (paper
presented at the conference Challenges of Global Migration and Forced Displace-
ment, Kuala Lumpur, August 1–2, 2006).
18. Diana Wong and Afrizal Teuku Anwar, “Migran Gelap: Indonesian migrants
in Malaysia’s irregular labour economy,” in Unauthorised migration in Southeast
Asia, ed. G. Battistella and M. B. Asis (Manila: Scalabrini Migration Centre, 2003),
174–175.
19. Diana Wong, “The national context of migration research in Malaysia:
Which nation, what state, whose migration?” (paper presented in a seminar,
Osnabruck).
20. Vijayakumari Kanapathy, “International migration and labour market
developments in Asia: Economic recovery, the labour market and migrant work-
ers in Malaysia” (paper presented at the workshop International migration and
labour markets in Asia, Tokyo, February 5–6, 2004), 382.
21. Patrick Pillai, “Indonesian labour immigrants in Malaysia: A case study of
Kampung Sungai Kayu Ara, Selangor, Malaysia” (PhD diss., University of Malaya,
2005); Patrick Pillai,“Labour market developments and international migration in
Malaysia,” in Migration and the labour market in Asia (Paris: OECD, 2005); Patrick
Pillai, “The Malaysian state’s response to migration,” Sojourn 14 (1999): 178–197;
Azizah Kassim, “International migration and alien labour employment: The
Malaysian experience,” in Megacities, labour and communications, ed. Toh Thian Ser
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1998); Azizah Kassim, “Management of foreign labour: A
Malaysian experiment” (paper presented at the Second Asia Pacific Conference of
Sociology, University of Malaya, September 18–20, 1997); Azizah Kassim, “For-
eign workers in Malaysia: An analysis of sanctioned bondage” (paper presented at
the Regional Conference of the International Council of Psychologists on Psycho-
logical Issues in a Growing Global Community, Manila, August 10–12, 1995);
Azizah Kassim, “Within and beyond the kitchen: The experience of female immi-
grant workers in Malaysia” (paper presented at the conference Linking our Histo-
ries: Asian and Pacific Women as Migrants, University of Melbourne, May 3,
1994); Azizah Kassim, “The registered and the illegals: Indonesian immigrants in
Malaysia” (paper presented at the Movement of Peoples in Southeast Asia Seminar
organized by PMB-LIPI, Jakarta, February 17–19, 1993); Christine Chin, “The
‘host’ state and the ‘guest’ worker in Malaysia: Public management of migrant
44 Global Migration
labour in times of economic prosperity and crisis,” Asia Pacific Business Review 8
(2002): 19–40.
22. Interview, October 31, 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
23. Interview, September 13, 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
25. Wong & Anwar, “Migran Gelap,” 180.
26. New Sunday Times, August 20, 1995.
27. The present exchange rate for the Malaysian ringgit (RM) (October 2013)
is 1$:3.2RM. In 2009 the family average income was RM 3,000 per month.
Although Malaysia has no comprehensive law on minimum wage, by then some
30,000 plantation workers nationwide received a minimum wage of RM 500–600
per month (The Malaysian Insider, June 6, 2009).
28. Lotte Kejser, “Illicit transnational movements: Impact and responses in
South East Asia” (paper presented at the conference Challenges of Global Migra-
tion and Forced Displacement, Kuala Lumpur, August 1–2, 2006), 10.
29. Tenaganita, Migrant workers: Access denied (Kuala Lumpur: Tenaganita,
2005), 26–34.
30. Kassim, “Foreign workers in Malaysia.”
31. Ibid., 1995: 1.
32. Wong & Anwar, “Migran Gelap,” 220.
33. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Labour migration in Malaysia and Spain. Markets,
citizenship and rights (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 76.
34. New Straits Times, May 16, 1991.
35. Interview, October 4, 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
36. Graziano Battistella, “Unauthorized migrants as global workers in the
ASEAN region,” Southeast Asian Studies 40 (2002): 350–371; Pillai, “Labour mar-
ket developments,” 142; Graeme Hugo, “Labour export from Indonesia: An over-
view,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 12 (1995); Elizabeth Ruppert, “Managing foreign
labour in Singapore and Malaysia,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
2053 (1999); Kassim, “The registered and the illegal” Bagoes Mantra, “Illegal
Indonesian labour” Wong and Anwar, Migran Gelap.
37. Wong and Anwar, “Migran Gelap.”
38. Interviews, September 13, 2006 and October 20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
39. Kanapathy, International Migration, 399.
40. The Malay Mail, December 9, 2004.
43. See also Anja Rudnick, Temporary migration experiences of Bangladeshi
women in the Malaysian export industry from a multi-sited perspective (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 177; Wong and Anwar, Migran Gelap, 192.
44. Annelies Moors and Marina de Regt, “Migrant domestic workers in the
Middle East,” in Illegal migration and gender in a global and historical perspective, ed.
Marlou Schrover et al. (Amsterdam: IMISCOE, 2008), 163.
Part II
Myth: Migrants are a threat to society.
Migrants are sometimes singled out as scapegoats for various societal

issues and depicted as an invasion, an infection, or an economic, identity, or
social threat. The “scapegoating mechanism” has been famously described
by the French philosopher René Girard. He suggests that when social
antagonism reaches levels that threaten society’s stability, the way out of
this dangerous situation is found in the “scapegoating” mechanism.1 A vic-
tim is identified as the cause of the social tension and is therefore sacrificed
in order to restore society’s peace and serenity. Certain political groups do
indeed pander to xenophobic fears during electoral campaigns in the hope
of gaining short-term political advantages. Of course, when anti-immigrant
(or far-right) parties become part of a ruling coalition, there is a larger risk
of a restrictive immigration policy.2 Crucially, an even more important fac-
tor is “the reaction of more mainstream conservative parties to the chal-
lenge of the far right’s message.”3 In fact, it is not uncommon that other
political groups adopt policy positions that were originally taken by the
radical right and that lend these ideas increased legitimacy,4 something that
has, for example, been seen in various European countries in the last few
years.
Scapegoating mechanisms are, however, not restricted to Europe but
can be observed in countries around the world. Two chapters in this sec-
tion on two distinct countries from different parts of the world show strik-
ing similarities in terms of myth-building and scapegoating. Both in Greece
(Tsoukala) and in South Africa (Crush and Ramachandran), racism and
xenophobia are widespread as a result of the threat perception attached to
migrants, heightened by numerous myths spread by various actors, includ-
ing government officials, law enforcers, opinion leaders, and journalists.
46 Global Migration
Politicians tend to use the migration discussion in order to divert the atten-
tion of the electorate from other serious social and political issues. More-
over, immigrants are often held responsible for various economic and
social problems of the receiving country, such as high crime rates or high
unemployment rates.
In addition, the settlement patterns of migrants are often depicted as a
threat to social cohesion. Li and Yu show the hypocrisy behind heated
discussions on parallel lives and segregation of immigrant communities,
considering the fact that white European immigrant groups in the United
States were themselves highly concentrated and segregated from other eth-
nic groups in the early 20th century. Moreover, many formerly segregated
historical neighborhoods over time turn into fashionable ethnic enclaves,
as certain immigrant groups become more demographically dispersed and
acquire a higher socioeconomic status.
Notes
1. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Continuum Impacts, 2005).
2. Marc Morjé Howard, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-
National Research,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 443.
3. Ibid, p. 451.
4. Jens Rydgren, “The Sociology of the Radical Right,” Annual Review of Sociology
33 (2007): 241, p. 255.
CHAPTER THREE
False Narratives in the

Migration Debate
Playing Games wth Immigrants’ Lives in Greece
Anastassia Tsoukala
Introduction
Arguably, the most difficult task a scholar has to assume when address-
ing immigration-related issues is that of deconstructing prevailing realities
on both sides of the border, that is, among human rights defenders as well
as lawmakers and law enforcers. Uncovering truth is thorny not only
because it often requires hard empirical and intellectual efforts to propose
what after all remains a subjective view of the overall story but also because,
in its rawness, truth may eventually become counterproductive. How can
one denounce harsh immigration and asylum policies, in the name of the
fight against racism and xenophobia, and plausibly expect them to be
amended, if it is admitted that these policies may express the view of part,
if not the majority, of the host society? How can one successfully counter
the dominant legitimizing narratives of the war on illegal migrants, which
rest upon regular amplifications of the migratory threat, if it is acknowl-
edged that such amplifications are actually seen by both officials and sig-
nificant parts of the host society as a politically correct process likely to
conceal creeping racism and xenophobia?
48 Global Migration
To frame it in another way, when it comes to immigration and asylum

policies, more often than not all stakeholders seem to act according to
similar conceptual patterns that are respectively structured around two
assumptions. On the one hand, in a clearly pedagogical position that also
satisfies political interests at stake, human rights defenders act as if the
objectives of receiving refugees and normalizing immigrant integration in
a multicultural context were shared by most members of their society. If
this assumption was being called into question it would entail their tem-
porary defeat in the ideological/political battle they are engaged in. On the
other hand, in seeking to legitimize increasingly restrictive if not inhuman
immigration and asylum policies, government and security officials act as
if this continuous hardening of social control mechanisms was necessary
to cope with an array of major security threats. If this assumption was
being denied it would oblige them to admit that these policies are intrinsi-
cally racist and serve, above all, political/electoral interests while satisfying
the needs of a rising security market. As both sides are trapped, for differ-
ent reasons, in deliberately untrue policymaking processes, the question is
not so much to see who believe in their respective narratives, and why do
they do so, but rather to analyze how these narratives are being structured
and broadcasted against an implicitly and even explicitly racist back-
ground. This shifts our attention from a theoretical question to a more
empirical one that, by definition, is closely related to the effects thus pro-
duced in a given host society.
Needless to say, these effects are more visible in countries deprived of
strong parliamentary traditions, solid civil societies, and a functioning,
well-trained, and independent judiciary, able to check government behav-
ior based on constitutional or international human rights guarantees.
Rapid democratization, as was the case in southern European countries
from the 1970s on and in Central European countries from the 1990s on,
may seem reassuring enough to guarantee the smooth functioning of both
international and domestic political fields, but it certainly cannot effi-
ciently uproot longstanding authoritarian mentalities among state officials
and ordinary people alike. To the extent that the authoritarian mindset
perceives social reality in hierarchical terms, its prevalence eases the way
for racist and xenophobic ideas to root and grow up. Denouncing the per-
sistence of and, above all, the broad adhesion to such mental schemes even
among liberal and left-wing politicians and voters is, however, politically
undesirable as it would deconstruct the political myth of the successful
transition to democracy of these countries and, consequently, would call
into question the democratic consistency of several EU countries. On
the other side, the denial of the importance of these mental schemes
False Narratives in the Migration Debate 49
delegitimizes the urge to introduce powerful antiracist policies, practices,

and campaigns in these countries, thereby facilitating further expansion of
racism and xenophobia.
Having said this, it should be specified that, though the roots of racism
and xenophobia entangle state officials and human rights defenders alike,
the increasing hardening of immigration and asylum policies across Europe
cannot be equally attributed to all of them. The latter occasionally contrib-
ute, indirectly and unwillingly, to what lies at the heart of the policies the
former seek to introduce and legitimize. The social construction of the
migratory threat, as one of the key justificatory grounds of immigration
and asylum policies, is primarily set up by government officials and law
enforcers, along with certain opinion leaders and journalists, and broad-
casted by the mainstream media. I will therefore focus on this conceptual
background of the relevant policymaking to highlight certain facets of the
overall process of othering. In so doing, I will not review the key aspects
of this process1 to stress instead the (un)willing dishonesty of the argu-
ments it is based on. This approach seeks to go beyond the predictable
artificiality both of constructed interpretations of the social reality2 and the
discursive means used to stir fear and unease; it also aims at distancing
moral panics from moral concerns to show how such a representation of
the immigration issue relies on distortion and lies that are being broad-
casted to satisfy an array of political interests at stake. This is not meant to
minimize the fact that the social construction of the migratory threat is
ideologically driven to the extent that it complies with the value-loaded
worldview of policymakers and parts of the host society. The question is
rather to show how moral concern goes along with amoral consideration.
The ground the correlated political interests rest on is amoral because their
pursuit essentially reflects the stakeholders’ quest for power. This quest is
by definition insensible to human suffering and comprises little, if any,
concern about human life.
To address the way immigrants and asylum seekers are being turned
into multifaceted threatening social figures, I will proceed with a twofold
analysis likely to provide us with an overview of certain salient aspects of
the amplification of the migratory threat process, and of the way the imple-
mentation of this pattern intermingles with prevailing racist stereotypes
and political interests in a host society. The theoretical part of the analysis
will therefore be completed by the study of the Greek case, which is
believed to be representative on this matter.
A typical example of Southern Europe’s transition to democracy, Greece
also illustrates the regional rapid shift from immigrant-sending to immi-
grant-receiving countries,3 along with the subsequent demonization of
50 Global Migration
immigrants and asylum seekers, especially amidst the present debt crisis.
From the late 1980s on, high Greek growth rates implied a rising demand
for labor, especially for unskilled labor that Greeks no longer wished to
accept. Whether seen as final destination or transit country, Greece thus
became attractive to (un)documented immigrants who, regardless of their
formal qualifications, were often employed in low-paying jobs, mainly in
the informal sector.4 In the 21st century, following the introduction of
harsher immigration policies in Italy and Spain that changed the direction
of African immigration toward Greece, and the continuous flow of refu-
gees fleeing Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, Greece has been increas-
ingly used as one of the main gateways to the Schengen area. Yet, the
combined effect of the application of the Dublin II and III Regulations,
which prevent asylum seekers from using Greece as a transit country; the
gradual setting up of a highly restrictive EU immigration policy that has
practically blocked the access to most alternative points of entry into the
Schengen territory; the brutal collapse of the Greek labor market due to
the present debt crisis, which entails a sharp rise in unemployment and
further prevents immigrants from occupying low-paying jobs because
nowadays these tend to be occupied by nationals; and the shortcomings of
Greek immigration and asylum policies,5 led to the stagnation in Greece of
a growing volume of immigrants and asylum seekers that live under miser-
able conditions. Frequently demonized during the 1990s and 2000s,
immigrant groups and asylum seekers lie nowadays at the heart of a brutal
securitization process6 that rests upon a web of discursive and nondiscur-
sive practices as political statements, expanding coercion, and media-
broadcasted negative stereotypes are intertwined with rising racist violence
on the part of citizens and law enforcers.
Constructing the Threatening Other

A Broad-Sweeping Multifunctional Process
From the 1960s on, analysis of the construction of social enemies has
gained growing importance among sociologists, criminologists, anthropolo-
gists, political scientists, and linguists. Despite their diversity, all these analy-
ses see in the creation or reproduction of categories of social outcasts one of
the reactions of a community that, being embedded in social and political
crises, seeks to confirm its values and to foster social bonds.7 As I have
shown elsewhere,8 the defining of a given society as a value-loaded frame of
action often follows an oppositional pattern, according to which collective
identities are also shaped in negative terms, that is, through the constant
confrontation with what they are not. In this oppositional interaction

between an allegedly homogeneous community and those who are not
deemed to belong to it, be they deviant nationals or foreigners, the exclusion
of the outcasts is highly important because it involves the inclusion of all the
others.9 Once turned into an inverse mirror of the community’s ideal image,
the outsider becomes the necessary conceptual boundary of this image, the
condition sine qua non of the very existence of such a collective identity.
What ultimately is a consensus-making process through the designa-
tion of moral boundaries that exclude the social enemies of the day10 is
closely related to an array of specific political, bureaucratic, and economic
stakes. Politicians thus seek to strengthen their position in the political
realm by reaffirming their own engagements and mobilizing their elector-
ate around its need to be protected from the threatening Other.11 In doing
so, they also minimize the effects of their loss of control over domestic
politics in an increasingly globalized political arena that is further weak-
ened by the current attacks of the neoliberal market against the established
political order and the ensuing systematic crisis of capitalism. As this rap-
idly evolving political landscape undermines the conceptual bases of sov-
ereignty, national identity, and the keeping of law and order on a territorial
basis, the position of the politicians at the domestic level is weakened
because the political affiliation becomes increasingly vague. Many politi-
cians seek therefore to legitimate their role to their electorate by stirring its
fears through the designation of new social enemies.12 Scapegoating is all
the more facilitated by the fact that third-country nationals are of little, if
any, interest to domestic politicians as they are usually deprived of the
right to elect and to be elected in their country of residence.
The prevailing image of a social enemy further allows law enforcers to
associate their correlated policies with budget claims and the ongoing
repositioning of their agencies in the security field by widening the span of
their competencies, and by facilitating the promotion both of their know-
how and technologies. These power struggles within the security field are
also to be found in the private sector, not only because social control of the
so-called groups at risk is henceforth entrusted to private security agencies
too, but also because the expansion of control technologies cannot be dis-
sociated from the role played in the matter by private or semipublic indus-
tries producing this type of equipment for public security agencies.13
Regarding the mass media, the fueling of the fear of the threatening Other
frequently serves as a support to certain political discourses, thereby estab-
lishing a mutually reinforcing relation between political and media dis-
courses. To be solidly established, the dangerousness of the social enemies of
the day has to be regularly confirmed by politicians, law enforcers, and moral
52 Global Migration
entrepreneurs. Once confirmed by them, these themes are further fueled by

the media, thus creating a circular circuit of constructing and broadcasting
social threatening figures.14 While satisfying the interests of certain political
elites, this media representation of the otherness offers an unfailing source of
strong sensations to the public and, to the extent that it may sustain sensa-
tionalist media campaigns, it guarantees significant economic benefits.
When the Threat Is Deemed to Stem from Immigrants

The abovementioned political, economic, and corporatist interests that
lie beneath the creation of any social outcast are also to be found at the
ground of the social construction of the migratory threat in Europe. In this
specific case, the social acceptance of the image of the threatening migrant
is mostly to be related to the rise in irrational anxieties and fears since the
late 20th century. Under the combined effect of the Europeanization pro-
cess, the decline of ideologies in the post–Cold War era, the globalization
process, the breathtaking technological progress, and the instability of
postmodernity, European populations have lost most of their previous cer-
tainties and reference points, while experiencing the rapid deterioration of
their standard of living, and witnessing growing precariousness or even
the socioeconomic exclusion of entire sections of their society. This increas-
ing shrinking of their social and economic position has become all the
more stressful since the outburst of the current international financial cri-
sis. The way the transformation of immigration into a social problem inter-
acts with socioeconomic crises has been analyzed by many EU and U.S.
scholars, who show that anti-immigrant feelings usually emerge when the
citizens of a country worry about the state of their national economy and
believe immigration is detrimental to employment,15 when they fear social
decline,16 or when they associate immigration with sovereignty-, border
control–, and law and order–related issues.17
The spread of these crisis-inspired perceptions is reinforced by the
gradual modification of the very functionality of immigration in the EU
economies since the late 20th century. In the globalization context of
postindustrial societies, immigration corresponds less and less to the needs
of the economic growth of the EU societies. In actual fact, this growth is
nowadays characterized both by a low demand for labor and a new deploy-
ment of the production process according to flexible criteria, manifested
by the shifting of production to Balkan and third world countries. The
current attacks of the neoliberal market against the established political
order, and the ensuing international financial crisis, have further weak-
ened domestic labor markets,18 especially in crisis-stricken southern
Europe where nationals are struggling to occupy even some of these low-
paying jobs that until recently were reserved for immigrants. The latter are
thus being placed at the heart of most social conflicts and claims as a bur-
den that host societies have to get rid of at all costs.
At the discursive level, the social construction of the threatening migrant
often relies on the well-known pattern of the deviance amplification
scheme, following strict binary criteria. The us/them division thus rests
upon the alleged otherness of the target group and the multiform threat
it is believed to pose to the host society.19 Since the late 20th century,
the construction of the migratory threat has been structured around five
frequently overlapping points according to which immigrants are pre-
sented as (1) culturally inassimilable for diverging from the dominant cul-
tural pattern; (2) economically unwanted for reducing employment
opportunities for nationals, contributing to the growth of the informal
economy, and downgrading urban areas; (3) demographically undesirable
for threatening the alleged racial purity and national identity of the com-
munity; (4) socially dangerous for being highly involved in criminal activi-
ties that range from petty crime to organized crime and fundamentalist
terrorism; and (5) morally dubious for swindling government officials in
order to get into the country and for cheating the welfare services, once
settled in the country.
In all the aforementioned cases, immigrants may be easily demonized
due to their relative political, social, and economic powerlessness. Regular
migrants certainly enjoy rights, of which undocumented migrants are
deprived, but they are often employed in subordinate, precarious, and
badly remunerated jobs, and they can always be the subject of the nonre-
newal or even withdrawal of their residence permit. Immigrants may be
further demonized insofar as their foreign status goes along with an ethnic
and/or religious identity other than the dominant one in the host society.
Demonization then rests upon a series of overlapping categories, where
the targets of the process may be indistinctly asylum seekers, regular or
undocumented migrants, and foreigners or nationals belonging to a given
ethnic and/or religious community. The ensuing stigma goes beyond the
first-generation migrants to encompass second- or third-generation ones.
These not-so-perfect-citizens remain somewhat suspicious and keep on
meeting social integration problems in most EU countries.20
The Migratory Threat and Greek Politics

Like all Southern European countries, in the 1990s Greece shifted
from being an immigrant-sending to an immigrant-receiving country.
54 Global Migration
Nowadays, more than half of the immigrant population originates from

Albania. The other groups of immigrants and asylum seekers come mainly
from other Balkan countries, Eastern Europe (Russia, Georgia, Ukraine,
Moldavia), Africa (Egypt, Somalia, Nigeria), and Asia (Philippines, India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Afghanistan).21 There are also an important
number of EU citizens from Bulgaria and Romania.
In the 2010s Greece became the main point of entry for irregular
immigration into the European Union, without, however, having ever
introduced coherent immigration and asylum policies.22 Presently, the
management of the immigration issue is essentially conceived in terms of
coercion, ranging from the construction of immigrant detention facilities
that are notorious for their substandard detention conditions23 to the con-
struction of a fence along the Greek-Turkish land border. Once completed,
in December 2012, the border fence pushed immigrants and asylum seek-
ers to enter Greece by sea, thereby causing the death of many individuals
due either to risks inherent in such sea crossings or to illegal refugee push-
backs, which have provoked the reaction of the European Commission24
and the vivid concern of human rights defenders.25
While providing domestic labor markets with a cheap workforce, be it
legal or not, the significant arrival of immigrants from the 1990s on led to
the emergence of a multicultural society that was met with suspicion if not
hostility by the majority of Greeks and even triggered successive waves of
Albanophobia.26 Racism and xenophobia, in constant rise throughout the
2000s,27 reached a peak in the 2010s, during the present debt crisis, and
especially after the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party entered the Parliament in
June 2012.28 According to the Greek Ombudsman, there were more than
281 racist attacks between January 2012 and April 2013, leading to at
least four murders and 400 injuries; of these 281 cases of racist violence,
71 were alleged to have involved Golden Dawn members or supporters
and 47 police officers.29 The sharp rise in racism and xenophobia may be
seen as a predictable side effect of the devastating debt crisis and, hence,
be considered as an essentially conjectural phenomenon. Yet the total
impunity of the assailants and the lack of action from state authorities,
which have been constantly denounced by the Ombudsman and human
rights defenders,30 along with the fact that racist aggressions never raised
any broadly shared social concern, suggest a deeply rooted phenomenon
that is arguably to be related to Greece’s cultural background.
What is usually hushed is that, until recently, the mainstream society
lived in denial of its historical track record marked by violent rejections of
cultural diversity—evidenced, for instance, from the overtly hostile recep-
tion it reserved in the 1920s for ethnic Greek refugees from Asia Minor,
the equally unfriendly reception it reserved in the 1990s for ethnic Greek
refugees from the Black Sea region, or the everlasting marginalization of
the Greek Roma.31 In adhering to a self-gratifying representation of their
community, suitably cleansed by racism and xenophobia, most Greeks
perceived themselves as a historically tolerant people with a long-standing
tradition of hospitality.32 Racist aggressions, even lethal ones, against immi-
grants were invariably seen as marginal events that more often than not
were somewhat justified by the many different problems posed to Greeks
by the massive arrival of immigrants, be they regular or undocumented.
Targeting Immigrants and Electoral Games

In admitting that “social problems” are the outcome of “long-standing
and day-to-day constructions made by persons and groups”33 to serve ide-
ological and political interests,34 many scholars have highlighted the
increasing politicization of the immigration issue in the post–Cold War
era. Racist and xenophobic discourses, as well as those related to the
(in)efficiency of border controls, are therefore criticized not only for their
inhuman and society-dividing qualities but also for the way they are being
used in the electoral games of the mainstream political parties that are
seeking to mobilize the electorate on a(n) (anti)racist basis.35
Seeing in immigration an electoral earning contribution ground is judi-
cious. The issue is so broad and passionate that it can easily occupy the
front of the political scene for more or less long periods. Politicians may
thus divert the attention of their electorate from other serious social and
political issues to obtain their temporary marginalization. This manage-
ment of the political agenda is all the more precious in times of social and
economic crisis when societies undergo deep changes that call into ques-
tion hard-earned social and political rights, and throw or threaten to throw
many people into misery or precariousness.
Quite unsurprisingly then, in the debt-crisis era the immigration issue
lies at the heart of all Greek government discourses that seek to counter
the loss of legitimacy of the mainstream political parties due to the disas-
trous socioeconomic effects of the austerity measures imposed by the
Troika, that is, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central
Bank, and the European Commission. Following a standard scapegoating
pattern, immigrants are held responsible for what in fact is the direct out-
come of the strict implementation of the international creditors’ instruc-
tions, that is, the brutal impoverishment of middle and lower social strata.
While the country is presently facing a humanitarian crisis,36 with more
than 40,000 homeless people, around 300,000 people relying on charities
56 Global Migration
to get basic food and medical help, a significant proportion of households

living in conditions of extreme material deprivation, and 1.36 million peo-
ple being jobless in July 2013,37 the blame for expanding misery and
despair is mainly put on the immigrants. They bear the blame for down-
grading urban areas, thereby rotting the everyday life of nationals and
chasing away tourists; they also bear the blame for the rise in unemploy-
ment, the collapsing welfare state, and mounting insecurity. Their discur-
sive transformation into the main source of the increasing torment of
Greek society not only blurs the genuine causes of the humanitarian crisis
but also provides the government with the possibility of promising solu-
tions to a problem that in fact it cannot handle. Hence, instead of admit-
ting loss of control over domestic politics, at the official launch of the 2012
campaign period Prime Minister Samaras proclaimed: “Our cities have
been occupied by illegal immigrants; we will take them back,”38 thereby
designating immigrants as accountable for social distress and legitimizing
in advance future harsh anti-immigrant measures.
The efficiency of this recurrent immigration-focused setting up of the
political agenda is greatly facilitated by the fact that more often than not
the electorate knows little about the technical aspects of the issue. Hence,
it can be widely satisfied by the adoption of symbolic measures. These may
be limited to simple declarations of intent, lead to the introduction of mea-
sures hardly if at all implemented, or give rise to genuinely implemented
measures the efficiency of which remains, however, limited. What matters
in fact for government officials is to counter the image of government
powerlessness by broadcasting the reassuring impression of rational plans
of action that are stemming from a government apt to firmly control both
the borders and the territory of the country. The adoption of new measures
and the introduction of new pieces of legislation are particularly efficient
in this quest for symbolic power because, as Murray Edelman has rightly
noted, “the promulgation of laws promising to solve or to reduce prob-
lems, even if everything indicates that they will not be successful, can be
very efficient to quieting down dissatisfied people and to conferring legiti-
macy on the established authorities.”39 Governing through speech acts
thus leads to disconnecting political statements and lawmaking from rel-
evant results and, hence, from reliable monitoring mechanisms likely to
call into question either the existence of the migratory threat or the ineffi-
ciency of the measures introduced to cope with the alleged threat.
In April 2012, a few weeks before the general elections, Greek police
and health workers started force-testing Athens’ sex workers for HIV and
then uploaded onto a publically accessible police website the full name,
date of birth, nationality, photographs, and medical record information of
those tested HIV positive. All of them were kept in jail on charges of inten-
tionally causing grievous bodily harm, a felony. As most of Athens’ sex
workers are immigrants, what was presented as a public health–oriented
warning campaign was actually a name and shame campaign targeting
immigrants, who were vilified by Health Minister Andreas Loverdos as
“health bombs” that “had exploded and their blast was going beyond the
ghetto to reach the active Greek society,”40 thus posing “a death trap for
hundreds of people.”41 This campaign was in line with prior statements of
the health minister who, a few months before, had depicted HIV as an
immigration-grounded disease that “was transmitted by the illegal female
migrant to the Greek customer, the Greek family,”42 and had promised the
immediate deportation of all foreign sex workers tested HIV positive with-
out, however, introducing any effective measures in this sense.
Human rights defenders vividly denounced these practices for violating
sex workers’ privacy, right of freedom, and confidentiality on their health
condition. They pointed out that these discriminatory measures were not
only transgressing international and EU treaties that Greece had ratified
but also were completely counterproductive in terms of HIV prevention
because, far from stopping new infections, the scapegoating of sex workers
would only worsen the stigmatization of people living with HIV. Nonethe-
less, their voices remained marginal. According to a poll conducted in May
2012, 80.6 percent of those interviewed approved the name and shame
campaign,43 while TV channels and the mainstream printed press further
fueled the moral panic by including disclosure of the sex workers’ per-
sonal data. The question of guaranteeing protection of public health by
disclosing the personal data of Greek customers who tested HIV positive
was, however, never raised.44 In actual fact, the mainstream media were
sharing the public order and health ministers’ point of view that immigra-
tion was a major threat posed to public health, as it “had also led to the
reappearance of forgotten diseases, such as tuberculosis, cholera and
malaria,” so that Greeks were living on “a ready to explode health bomb
that should be dealt with in a serious and responsible way, avoiding all
kinds of populism.”45 Apparently ignoring the fact that malaria is not
transmitted by humans, the health minister also dismissed official data
that tuberculosis infection rates had been constantly falling since 2004,
while the rise in HIV infections was actually reflecting a rise in drug users,46
to proclaim that the joint operation with the police would rapidly tackle
the problem “not in a few months but in a few days.”47
Scaremongering stories rapidly faded away as soon as the electoral
game was over. Sex workers remained in jail for almost one year, under
deplorable conditions, without receiving any treatment. All of them were
58 Global Migration
eventually acquitted by the court because it was shown they were not
aware they were carriers of the disease as they did not have access to the
public health care that would have allowed them to get tested.
The Criminal-Migrant Thesis

Notwithstanding the association of the migratory threat with economic
and cultural themes, relevant public discourses always rest upon the asso-
ciation of immigration with crime, thereby justifying the constant rein-
forcement of border controls and the introduction of restrictive immigration
and asylum policies.48 The predominance of this thesis has further entailed
the gradual weakening of any distinction between immigrants and asylum
seekers, and the ensuing sharp fall of the number of asylum seekers being
granted a refugee status. From the 1990s on, an increasing number of poli-
ticians, government leaders, and security officials across Europe have been
sharing the view that most asylum seekers were fleeing misery rather than
armed conflicts or persecutions in their country of origin.49
Resting on (pseudo)scientific analyses, statistical data, and common
sense, the criminal-migrant thesis is frequently put forward by politicians,
opinion leaders, and journalists, thus creating a security short-circuit that
renders immigration synonymous with insecurity.50 Insecurity in this con-
text is a broad-sweeping term that encompasses an array of deviant and
criminal acts, ranging from incivilities and petty crime to organized crime
activities, which are believed to be committed by immigrants alone or in
cooperation with native criminals. One of the major arguments of the
defenders of the criminal-migrant thesis is the overrepresentation of for-
eigners in police and prison statistics. In Greece, it is pointed out that
immigrants are highly involved in crime and that they amounted to 63
percent of the prison population in January 2013.51
Despite its apparent rationality, linking immigration with crime by rely-
ing on police and prison statistics brings up many methodological prob-
lems and inevitably induces error. In actual fact, any comparison of the
crime involvement of immigrants with that of nationals is by definition
problematic because immigrants in Greece are not only usually young
men, unmarried and poor52—each one of these elements representing by
itself a crime-generating factor—but also are often discriminated against in
the criminal justice system of their country of residence due to the very
functioning of the system itself.53 First, as most arrested immigrants have
neither a permanent address nor the external social support (family, per-
manent job, social networks) that is usually taken into account as a factor
facilitating social reintegration, they are not ordered probation because
they do not meet the legal conditions for a probation order. Second, the
absence of these legal conditions further explains the foreigners’ overrep-
resentation among pretrial detainees. Immigrants are therefore placed in
custody more often than nationals charged with equivalent crimes. Third,
the absence of the abovementioned legal conditions also prevents foreign-
ers from being conditionally released from prison on parole. Immigrants
then remain in prison for longer periods than nationals charged with
equivalent crimes. Fourth, the imprisonment rate of the former is also
increased owing to the detention of many immigrants awaiting deporta-
tion. Last, the overrepresentation of foreigners in prisons has to be related
to the poor quality of their defense during their trial. In Greece, from the
1990s on lawyers and journalists have regularly denounced the fact that
foreigners are not always assisted by an interpreter during their trial.54
Similar biases also lie beneath the very construction of police and prison
statistics to the extent that both of them are actually reflecting police and
judicial production, along with its variations, during a given period. As
regards police statistics, the usual methodological problems related to data
classification methods55 go together with the fact that the police knowl-
edge on crime varies according to several criteria. The police tend to know
more about crimes that are under considerable social and political pres-
sure, or about crimes that do not require much time and manpower to
solve. Furthermore, the police pay much more attention to crimes which,
when solved, have positive effects on their image.56 Needless to say, this
attitude is closely associated with the prevailing political agenda of the day.
In Greece, for example, where the government wishes the fight against
counterfeiting to be prioritized in order to protect the crisis-stricken
domestic shopkeepers from unlawful competition, the police have two
options: to conduct long, expensive, low-profile investigations likely to
dismantle criminal networks operating on a transnational basis and involv-
ing at their higher grades both Greek and foreign criminals, who might as
well escape; or to conduct rapid, low-cost, and spectacular operations
focusing on the lower and most visible part of the network, the street level
that involves numerous undocumented immigrants who most probably
will be arrested.57 In the beginning of the debt crisis, when pressure put on
the government by shopkeepers was relatively low, the police paid little
attention to the street level and targeted instead the hard core of criminal
networks to obtain significant results in terms of seized counterfeit articles
rather than arrests.58 As time went by, the more shopkeepers were severely
hit by the debt crisis, the more they put pressure on the government and
the more the police focused on the street level. The subsequent rise in
arrests of undocumented immigrants went along with spectacular and
60 Global Migration
broadly covered police operations by the media. Municipal policemen and

riot police were often chasing immigrants across the streets, and were
engaged in clashes with nationals who were seeking to prevent immigrants
from being arrested, thereby creating the impression of the efficient execu-
tion of a difficult and even risky task, without, however, having any seri-
ous impact on the criminal networks’ activities.
The data on the crime involvement rate of foreigners are further biased
due to three other reasons. First, police statistics deal only with the offi-
cially recorded criminality. Foreigners thus tend to be overrepresented for
they are usually involved in highly visible criminal activities such as offenses
against property, drug trafficking, prostitution, and counterfeiting. Second,
presenting global data on their criminal involvement may produce spec-
tacular figures but it also causes errors because many foreigners have been
arrested only for immigration-related offenses59 that do not pose any threat
to internal security. Last, foreigners are usually involved in crimes charac-
terized by low solution rates. This does not allow us to draw any reliable
conclusions because their crime involvement rate may be in fact much
lower than that presented by the police data. For example, knowing that in
2011 the Greek police resolved 16,714 cases (17.2 percent) of the recorded
96,925 theft-burglaries, how are we to evaluate the fact that the resolved
cases involved 7,310 foreigners and 9,397 nationals? In the same year, in
crimes characterized by high resolution rates, such as drug-related offenses,
Greek offenders numbered twice as many as foreign ones. Throughout
2011, immigrants were clearly overrepresented in homicides while they
were plainly underrepresented in frauds.60 In other words, crime-related
reality is so complex and opaque that it is simply impossible to draw any
reliable conclusions regarding foreigners’ crime involvement. The criminal-
migrant thesis is therefore simply revealing the political convictions of its
defenders instead of suggesting a rational assessment of the issue.
Though they are well known to police officers and journalists, the
abovementioned factors are taken into account neither by politicians and
law enforcers, nor by the media. The criminal-migrant thesis occupies a
central place in the public debate on a permanent basis, thus justifying the
introduction of any measure presented as appropriate to guarantee law
and order. In launching the 2012 electoral campaign, Prime Minister
Antonis Samaras proclaimed: “We will transfer all illegal immigrants to
reception centers, in former army camps, to deport them.”61 His statement
was actually in accordance with the opinion of a significant part of the
electorate as, according to the abovementioned poll, 61.3 percent of those
interviewed were in favor of creating detention centers even for asylum
seekers.62
This broad social support for measures likely to control undocumented

immigrants and asylum seekers did not fade away when, in August 2012,
the government instituted a police sweep operation to detain and deport
undocumented immigrants, termed Operation Xenios Zeus.63 The opera-
tion was justified by the minister of public order and citizen protection in
the name of the fight against irregular immigration because “the country
perishes. Ever since the Dorian invasion 4,000 years ago, never before has
the country been subjected to an invasion of these dimensions [. . .] this is
a bomb on the foundations of the society and the state.”64 In the first seven
months of the operation, around 85,000 persons were subjected to abu-
sive stops and searches on the streets and hours-long detention at police
stations. Of these, fewer than 6 percent were eventually arrested for unlaw-
ful entry and stay in the country.65 While the small percentage of undocu-
mented immigrants actually apprehended confirms the arguments of
human rights defenders, who denounce ethnic profiling and arbitrary
deprivation of liberty,66 the very introduction of the operation has been
seen by the left side of the political spectrum as a government effort to win
voters back from the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party by exhibiting its capac-
ity to impose law and order in Athens where the disastrous effects of the
austerity measures had acquired shocking and highly visible dimensions.
Operation Xenios Zeus gave birth to new immigrant detention facilities
that actually increased the number of cases of ill-treatment by law enforc-
ers. In its 2012 concluding observations on Greece, the UN Committee
against Torture expressed “its serious concern at persistent allegations of
torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials during arrest or
detention.”67 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture also
issued reports on ill-treatment, including torture, in police stations and in
immigrant detention facilities in Greece.68 These criticisms, along with
recurrent denunciation of the substandard detention conditions in all
immigrant detention facilities,69 became so prevalent in the public debate
that they involuntarily hushed the fact that the operation was resting upon
a string of lies.
First, while police and government officials mention the spectacular
number of foreigners subjected to control in order to evidence the opera-
tion’s success, they do not specify that this result actually reflects the fact
that persons with a legal right to be in Greece have been repeatedly sub-
jected to these checks. Second, linking the success of Operation Xenios
Zeus to the number of foreigners detained in the new immigrant detention
facilities, where almost half of the detainees are asylum seekers, dismisses
the fact that, as the EU Commission has recently reminded, it is illegal for
asylum seekers to be held in closed detention facilities because they are
62 Global Migration
not criminals.70 Third, the claim that Operation Xenios Zeus represents a
key move toward the “taking back of urban centers from immigrants” is
deliberately untrue. Detained asylum seekers cannot be deported as long
as the evaluation of their claim is pending; in many cases, undocumented
immigrants cannot be deported at all either because their country of origin
is at war, they are entitled to make an asylum claim, they carry no travel
documents, there are no diplomatic relations between Greece and their
country of origin, or their country of origin is unwilling to cooperate with
Greek authorities; in other cases, undocumented immigrants are eventu-
ally deported following very long, time- and money-consuming proce-
dures. Last, police officials attribute lower rates of crime in Athens to
Operation Xenios Zeus, thereby presenting it as a success. Indeed, in the
first quarter of 2013 police statistical data show a significant decrease in
crimes against property in the department of Attica. Yet, given the very low
number of foreign offenders arrested in the context of the Operation
Xenios Zeus, it is unclear whether these results stem from indiscriminate
identity checks or instead from more effective policing of actual criminal
behavior.71
While the Operation Xenios Zeus serves symbolic political functions
rather than law-and-order ones, its impact on immigrants’ and asylum
seekers’ lives is far from being incidental. Since its launching, two detain-
ees have died due to lack of medical care; dozens of other detainees have
attempted suicide in despair of the length as well as of the inhuman and
degrading conditions of their detention;72 several hundreds of detainees
have participated in hunger strikes to claim their liberation or repatriation
within a plausible delay; and most detainees have been suffering from
many different health problems, ranging from respiratory tract infections
to skin diseases or depression, due to the long duration of their detain-
ment under deplorable conditions.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to combine theoretical and empirical analysis to
highlight both organization-grounded and politically led biases in the way
politicians shape public perceptions about immigration. The findings
clearly suggest the rationale of immigration policies is diverging from their
formal justification. Greek government officials aim above all at appealing
to their electorate by stirring fear and unease, through extensive use of lies,
instead of introducing coherent immigration policies likely to be beneficial
to both nationals and immigrants. Demonized immigrants are thus being
turned into key pieces of domestic electoral games that are being played
against their lives, as is shown by the naming and shaming campaign of

sex workers and the police, Operation Xenios Zeus.
However important, electoral games should not draw our attention
away from the fact that this dishonest and essentially inhuman policymak-
ing also reflects the racist convictions of Greek politicians. In January 2014,
Public Order Minister Nikos Dendias stated that the quality of undocu-
mented immigrants in Greece was “tragic,” and further explained, “the
migrant from the ex-Soviet Union that goes to Sweden has some kind of
level. Greece gets migrants from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, who have a dif-
ferent culture, they belong to a different world. That’s our misfortune.”73
On the other side, the initial choice and the success of this policymaking
have been greatly determined by the implicit and explicit racist background
of the mainstream society.74 It is telling that by the end of 2013 protests
against the Greek border control policies that have (in)directly caused the
death of numerous asylum seekers and immigrants at sea were only gather-
ing a few hundred protestors who, more often than not, were human rights
activists and people engaged in radical left parties. Generally speaking, the
rise in volume and seriousness of racist aggressions from the 1990s on did
not meet with any social disapproval powerful enough to curb the recourse
to dishonest anti-immigrant statements by politicians, be they government
officials or members of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party.
This synergy, the correlated short-sighted electoral policies, and the
mismanagement of the immigration issue were well illustrated in February
2013 by the repeal of the reform of the 2010 Greek citizenship law, the
first to offer second-generation immigrants a potential entitlement to citi-
zenship. In line with one of the 2012 electoral promises of the Conserva-
tive party, this repeal was also satisfying the voters both of Golden Dawn
and the populist Independent Greeks party. Its judicial justification, that
is, the unconstitutionality of the 2010 citizenship law due to the absence
of assessment of the individualized genuine bonds between applicants and
the Greek nation,75 was vividly criticized by immigrant rights defenders76
but was largely approved by the majority of Greeks who were seeing in
these naturalizations an abusive intrusion of foreigners in the national
community and subsequent erosion of the national identity.77 Until now,
and despite its engagement to rapidly amend citizenship law facilitating
the naturalization of second-generation immigrants,78 the government has
not introduced any relevant bill into Parliament. This implicit prevalence
of the right of blood means that around 200,000 children of immigrants
born in Greece or who came to the country at a young age are still left in a
precarious legal position, while Greece is the only homeland they have
ever known.
64 Global Migration
Notes
1. For a thorough analysis of these aspects, see Anastassia Tsoukala, “Looking
at Immigrants as Enemies,” in Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement into and within
Europe, eds. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 161–
192.
2. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Irving Velody
and Robin Williams, eds, The Politics of Constructionism (London: Sage Publications,
1998).
3. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Immigration into Greece, 1990–2003: A South-
ern European Paradigm?” European Population Forum 2004, accessed January
27, 2014, http://aei.pitt.edu/1078/1/UNECE_paperV3-1.pdf; Anna Triandafylli-
dou and Michaela Maroufof, “Immigration towards Greece at the Eve of the 21st
Century. A Critical Assessment,” IDEA Working Papers 4 (March 2009), accessed
January 27, 2014, http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2009/10/idea
_wp4_greece2.pdf; Anna Triandafyllidou and Michaela Maroufof, “Greece: Report
Prepared for the SOPEMI Meeting,” Paris: November 30–December 2, 2011.
4. In most cases, immigrants were employed in agriculture, fishing, construc-
tion, manufacturing, and domestic work. In the early 2000s, the labor market
became further attractive due to the construction of the Olympic venues.
5. Anna Triandafyllidou and Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration
Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gate-Keeping Serving
the Labour Market,” European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011): 251;
Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, The Norwegian Helsinki Com-
mittee, and Greek Helsinki Monitor, “A Gamble with the Right to Asylum in
Europe. Greek Asylum Policy and the Dublin II Regulation,” 2008, accessed on
January 30, 2014, http://www.evasp.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=99:greek-asylum-policy-and-the-dublin-ii-regulation&Itemid =117
&lang=en.
6. Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency,
Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11 (2005): 171.
7. Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Howard
Becker, Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963).
8. Anastassia Tsoukala, “Boundary-Creating Processes and Social Control,”
Alternatives. Global, Local, Political 33 (2008): 139.
9. Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’
Societal Issues,” in Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion
and Exclusion, eds. Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (London: Pinter, 1995),
59 f.
10. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961).
11. Murray Edelman, Pièces et règles du jeu politique (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 129;
Anastassia Tsoukala, “Looking at Immigrants as Enemies,” op. cit.; Desmond R.
Manderson, “From Zero Tolerance to Harm Reduction: ‘The Asylum Problem,’”

Refugee Survey Quarterly 32 (2013): 1
12. Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Govern-
mentality of Unease,” Alternatives. Global, Local, Political 27 (2002): 63; Jef Huys-
mans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London:
Routledge, 2006); Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino, “Politics of Exception
and Unease. Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the
UK,” Political Studies 56 (2008): 766.
13. Frédéric Ocqueteau, Polices entre État et marché (Paris: Sciences Po, 2004);
Claire Rodier, Xénophobie business (Paris: La Découverte, 2012), 17–60.
14. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and
Rockers (London: Routledge, 1972); Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis. Mugging,
the State and Law and Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Stanley
Cohen, Jock Young, eds., The Manufacture of News. Deviance, Social Problems and
the Mass Media (London: Constable, 1981); Teun Van Dijk, Communicating Racism.
Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk (London: Sage Publications, 1987); Philip Jen-
kins, Intimate Enemies. Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain (New York:
Aldine de Gruyter, 1992); Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics.
The Social Construction of Deviance (London: Blackwell, 1994); Alessandro Dal
Lago, Non-persone. L’esclusione dei migranti in una società globale (Milan: Feltrinelli,
1999); Regina Lawrence, The Politics of Force. Media and the Construction of Police
Brutality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Anastassia Tsoukala, “Le
traitement médiatique de la criminalité étrangère en Europe,” Déviance et Société 1
(2002): 61; Angelina Peralva and Eric Macé, Médias et violences urbaines (Paris: La
Documentation française/IHESI, 2002); Chas Critcher, Moral Panics and the Media
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003); Anastassia Tsoukala, “Looking at
Immigrants as Enemies,” op. cit.
15. Jack Citrin et al., “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of
the Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59 (1997): 874–875; Thomas
Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, “Contemporary American Attitudes Toward
U.S. Immigration,” International Migration Review 30 (1996): 539.
16. Thomas Ohlemacher, “Public Opinion and Violence Against Foreigners in
the Reunified Germany,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 23 (1994): 223.
17. Thomas Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, op. cit., 533.
18. Yanis Varoufakis, Joseph Halevi, and Nicholas Theocarakis, Modern Political
Economics: Making Sense of the Post-2008 World (London: Routledge, 2011).
19. Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Immigration
in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies,” Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political 27 (2002): 21.
20. Sergio Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Inte-
gration, Immigration, and Nationality in the EU (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
21. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Immigration into Greece, 1990–2003: A
Southern European Paradigm?,” op. cit.; Anna Triandafyllidou and Michaela
Maroufof, “Immigration towards Greece at the Eve of the 21st Century. A Critical
66 Global Migration
Assessment,” op. cit.; Anna Triandafyllidou and Michaela Maroufof, “Greece:

Report Prepared for the SOPEMI Meeting,” op. cit.
22. Anastassia Tsoukala, “La réforme du droit grec en matière d’immigration.
L’entrée et l’éloignement des étrangers non communautaires,” Revue de science
criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 4 (1994): 747; Anastassia Tsoukala, “Le con-
trôle de l’immigration en Grèce dans les années quatre-vingt-dix,” Cultures &
Conflits 26/27 (1997): 51; Nicholas Sitaropoulos, “Modern Greek Asylum Policy
and Practice in the Context of the Relevant European Developments,” Journal of
Refugee Studies 13 (2000): 105; Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, The
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Greek Helsinki Monitor, “A Gamble with the
Right to Asylum in Europe. Greek Asylum Policy and the Dublin II Regulation,”
op. cit.; Anna Triandafyllidou and Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration
Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gate-Keeping Serving the
Labour Market,” op. cit.
23. Council of Europe/CPT, “Report to the Government of Greece on the visit
to Greece from 19 to 27 January 2011,” January 10, 2012, accessed June 7, 2013,
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24. European Commission, “Refugee Push-Backs Are Illegal,” November 19,
2013, accessed January 30, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/justice/commission
-push-back-refugees-il-news-531791.
25. Amnesty International, “Greek Authorities Put Lives in Danger by Pushing
Refugees and Migrants back to Turkey,” July 9, 2013, accessed January 30, 2014,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/greek-authorities-put-lives-danger-pushing-refu
gees-and-migrants-back-turkey-2013-07-09; Pro Asyl, “Pushed Back. Systematic
Human Rights Violations against Refugees in the Aegean Sea and at the Greek-
Turkish Land Border,” November 7, 2013, accessed January 30, 2014, http://
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26. Vassilis Karydis, I eglimatikotita ton metanaston stin Ellada (Athens: Papazis-
sis, 1996); Anastassia Tsoukala, “Le discours grec sur la criminalité des immigrés,”
Hommes & Migrations 1218 (1999): 77; Aphroditi Koukoutsaki, ed., Ikones eglima-
tos (Athens: Plethron, 1999); Anastassia Tsoukala, Metanastefsi kai eglimatikotita
stin Evropi (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2001); Christopher Lawrence, “Re-Bordering the
Nation: Neoliberalism and Racism in Rural Greece,” Dialectical Anthropology
29 (2005): 315; Vassilis Karydis, “Immigration and Crime,” in Crime and Punish-
ment in Contemporary Greece, eds. Leonidas Cheliotis and Sappho Xenakis (Oxford:
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(2012): 390.
27. Aristos Doxiadis and Manos Matsaganis, “National Populism and Xeno-
phobia in Greece,” Populist Fantasies: European Revolts in Context, eds. Catherine
Fieschi, Marley Morris, and Lila Caballero (n.l.: Counterpoint, 2013), 31–97,
accessed November 12, 2013, http://counterpoint.uk.com/wp-content/uploads
/2013/10/Populist-Fantasies-European-revolts-in-context.pdf#page=20.
28. Dimitris Dalakoglou, “Neo-Nazism and Neoliberalism: A Few Comments

on Violence in Athens at the Time of Crisis,” Working USA. The Journal of Labor and
Society 16 (2013): 283.
29. The Greek Ombudsman, Press Release, September 25, 2013, accessed Sep-
tember 28, 2013, http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/pronracistviolencereport
-2013.pdf.
30. Human Rights Watch, Hate on the Streets, July 10, 2012, accessed July 8,
2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/07/10/hate-streets-0; The Greek Ombuds-
man, Press Release, September 25, 2013, op. cit.; Council of Europe, ECRI State-
ment on Racist and Xenophobic Political Activities in Greece, December 10, 2012,
accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.unhcr.gr/1againstracism/en/%CE%B5cri-state
ment-on-racist-and-xenophobic-political-activities-in-greece.
31. Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Integration of
Immigrants in Greece,” in The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Con-
temporary Europe, ed. Andrew Geddes and Adrian Favell (Aldershot: Ashgate,
1999), 113–116.
32. Anna Triandafyllidou, “Racists? Us? Are You Joking? The Discourse of
Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy,” in Eldorado or Fortress? Migra-
tion in Southern Europe, eds. Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis, and Charalambos
Tsardanidis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 186–205.
33. Philippe Corcuff, Les nouvelles sociologies. Constructions de la réalité
sociale (Paris: Nathan, 1998), 17.
34. Murray Edelman, op. cit., 46–47.
35. Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’
Societal Issues,” op. cit.; Roza Tsagarousianou, “Mass Communications and
Nationalism: The Politics of Belonging and Exclusion in Contemporary Greece,”
Res Publica 2 (1997): 271; Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, op. cit.;
Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and
Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe,” New Political Science
26 (2004): 23.
36. Alex Politaki, “Greece Is Facing a Humanitarian Crisis,” The Guardian,
February 11, 2013, accessed September 7, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/feb/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-eu.
37. “Greek Unemployment Rate Hits 27.6 Percent in July,” I Kathimerini, Octo-
ber 10, 2013, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w
_articles_wsite2_1_10/10/2013_522451.
38. “Samaras: ‘Tha epanakatalavoume tis poleis mas’,” Ethnos, March 29,
2012.
39. Murray Edelman, op. cit., 57.
40. Martha Kaïtanidi, “Tromos AIDS gia 3.000 pelates,” Ta Nea, May 3, 2012.
41. Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, “The Women Greece Blames for Its HIV Cri-
sis,” Independent, July 25, 2012, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.independent
.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-women-greece-blames-for-its-hiv-crisis-7973313
.html.
68 Global Migration
42. Aris Hadjigeorgiou and Dani Vergou, “Na apelathoun oi ierodoules foreis
tou AIDS,” Eleftherotypia, December 16, 2011.
43. Vassilis Labropoulos, “Xenoi dikastes gia ti metahirisi ton ierodoulon apo
tin EL.AS,” To Vima, December 11, 2012.
44. Athina Athanassiou, I krisi os “katastasi ektaktis anagkis” (Athens: Savvalas,
2012), 31f.
45. Stelios Vradelis, “‘Skoupa’ tora kai stin ygeia,” Ta Nea, April 2, 2012.
46. Anastassia Yamali, “Diapsevdoun ton Loverdo oi KEELPNO kai ECDC gia
ta peri ‘ygeionomikis vomvas’,” I Avgi, April 3, 2012.
47. “Loverdos: ‘Ygeionomiki vomva’ to kentro tis Athinas,” NewPost, March 31,
2012, accessed September 8, 2013, http://newpost.gr/post/116638/loverdos
-ygeionomiki-vomva-to-kentro-tis-athinas.
48. Aphroditi Koukoutsaki, op. cit.; Anastassia Tsoukala, Metanastefsi kai
eglimatikotita stin Evropi, op. cit.; Evelien Brouwer, Petra Catz and Elspeth
Guild, Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism. A Changing Dynamic in European Law
(Nijmegen: Instituut voor Rechtssociologie, 2003); Mary Bosworth and Mhairi
Guild, “Governing through Migration Control: Security and Citizenship in Brit-
ain,” British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 703; Fani Kountouri, O metanastis
ston elliniko Typo: 1950–2005. I periptossi tis efimeridas Ta Nea, EKKE, Working
Paper 15 (2008); Tanya Maria Golash-Boza, “The Criminalization of Undocu-
mented Migrants: Legalities and Realities,” Societies without Borders 5 (2010): 81;
Christina Pantzou, “I hameni nifaliotita: Metanastefsi kai ratsistikos logos sta
MME,” UNHCR, September 27, 2013, accessed October 29, 2013, http://www
.unhcr.gr/1againstracism.
49. Monica den Boer, “Crime et immigration dans l’Union européenne,” Cul-
tures & Conflits 31/32 (1998): 105–106; Christoph Butterwegge, “Mass Media,
Immigrants and Racism in Germany. A Contribution to an Ongoing Debate,”
Communications (1996): 207–208; Gina Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and
Asylum Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Nicola Lacey and Lucia
Zedner, “Legal Constructions of Crime,” in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology,
eds. Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, and Robert Reiner (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2012).
50. Vassilis Vamvakas, “Alvanoi metanastes ston imerisio typo: anaparastaseis
tis lathraias iparxis,” Dokimes 5 (1997): 7; Aphroditi Koukoutsaki, op. cit.;
Anastassia Tsoukala, “Le traitement médiatique de la criminalité étrangère en
Europe,” op. cit.; Alexandra Moschopoulou, I eglimatikotita ton metanaston
(Athens: Sakkoulas, 2005); Lia Figgou et al., “Constructing the stereotype of
immigrants’ criminality. Accounts of fear and risk in talk about immigration to
Greece,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 21 (2011): 164.
51. “Metra asfaleias gia tis filakes anakoinose o ipourgos Dikaiosinis,” April 3,
2013, accessed September 8, 2013, http://www.policenet.gr/portal/arthra-dimo
sieymata/2013/03042013-10573.html.
52. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Immigration into Greece, 1990–2003: A
Southern European Paradigm?” op. cit.
53. Anastassia Tsoukala, “Le discours grec sur la criminalité des immigrés,”
op. cit.: 78–79; Loïc Wacquant, “’Suitable enemies’: Foreigners and Immigrants in
the Prisons of Europe,” Punishment & Society 1 (1999): 215; Athanasia Anto-
nopoulou and Angelika Pitsela, “Foreign Nationals as a Minority Group in the
Criminal Justice System of Greece: From Offending to Victimization of Non-Greek
Population,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2013): 1.
54. Ioanna Courtovic, “To nomiko kathestos ton metanaston ergaton stin
Ellada,” in Ta dikaiomata ton metanaston ergaton kai ton oigeneion tous, eds. Christos
Theodoropoulos and Athanassia Sikiotou (Athens: Hestia, 1994), 192; O Ios, “I
glossa tis katadikis,” Eleftherotypia, June 26, 2005, accessed July 17, 2013, http://
www.iospress.gr/ios2005/ios20050626.htm.
55. Georgios Antonopoulos, “The Limitations of Official Statistics in Relation
to the Criminality of Migrants in Greece,” Police Practice and Research 6 (2005):
251.
56. Monica den Boer, “Crime et immigration dans l’Union européenne,” op.
cit.: 116–117.
57. Discussion with one of the advisors of the Greek Home Secretary (February
2011).
58. Greek police statistics, 2011, accessed June 16, 2013, http://www.astynom
ia.gr.
59. Unlawful entry and stay in the country, forgery, etc.
60. Greek police statistics, 2011, accessed June 16, 2013, http://www
.astynomia.gr.
61. “Samaras: ‘Prepei na anakatalavoume tis poleis mas’,” To Pontiki, March 29,
2012, accessed July 8, 2013, http://topontiki.gr/article/32961.
62. Vassilis Labropoulos, “Xenoi dikastes gia ti metahirisi ton ierodoulon apo
tin EL.AS,” op. cit.
63. Xenios Zeus was the ancient Greek god of hospitality. On the inversion of
concepts as a communication strategy likely to legitimize the debt crisis–related
authoritarian mode of governance, see Anastassia Tsoukala, “On (Il)Legality,
Anomia and Violence in Contemporary Greece,” 7th Conference of the ECPR,
Bordeaux, September 4–7, 2013.
64. Stelios Kandias, “N. Dendias gia metanasteftiko: eisvoli aneu proigoum-
enou, i hora hanetai,” Skai News, August 6, 2012, accessed July 17, 2013, http://
www.skai.gr/news/greece/article/209833/n-dendias-gia-metanasteutiko-eisvolian
eu-proigoumenou-i-hora-hanetai.
65. Human Rights Watch, Unwelcome Guests. Greek Police Abuses of Migrants
in Athens, June 2013, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/node/116078
/section/2.
66. Human Rights Watch, op. cit.; Council of Europe, Report on Greece, 16
April 2013, accessed July 17, 2013, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2053611.
67. United Nations/Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations:
Greece, June 27, 2012, accessed July 8, 2013, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc
/UNDOC/GEN/G12/436/26/PDF/G1243626.pdf (paragraph 10).
70 Global Migration
68. Council of Europe/CPT, “Report to the Government of Greece on the Visit

to Greece from 19 to 27 January 2011,” op. cit.
69. Council of Europe/CPT, “Report to the Government of Greece on the Visit
to Greece from 19 to 27 January 2011,” op.cit.
70. EU Commission on Migrant Detention Facilities in Greece, November 14,
2013, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrMON
rpCKQw
71. Human Rights Watch, Unwelcome Guests, op. cit.
72. The authorities are permitted to detain foreigners up to a maximum of
18 months (Returns Directive 2008/115/EC, art. 15.1).
73. “Dendias Criticizes Dublin Regulation, Says Quality of Undocumented
Immigrants Is ‘Tragic’,”, I Kathimerini, January 30, 2014, accessed January 31, 2014,
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_30/01/2014_536933
74. For a thorough analysis of the mutually reinforcing relation between
securitizing actors, audience, and context, see Thierry Balzacq, “A Theory of
Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants,” in Securitization Theory:
How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 1–31.
75. Council of State, Decision 460/2013. For a thorough analysis of the Court’s
decision: Dimitris Christopoulos, “What Next for Greek Nationality Law?” Euro-
pean University Institute, February 18, 2013, accessed June 10, 2013, http://eudo
-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/806-what-next-for-greek-nationality-law.
76. “Migrant Groups Slam Government over Greek Citizenship Law”, I
Kathimerini, February 27, 2013, accessed July 13, 2013, http://www.ekathimerini
.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_27/02/2013_484682.
77. Constantine Tsoucalas, “Greek National Identity in an Integrated Europe
and a Changing World Order,” in Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing Inter-
national Order, eds. Harry Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis (New York: Pella,
1993), 57–78; Rodanthi Tzanelli, “’Not My Flag!’ Citizenship and Nationhood in
the Margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003),” Ethnic and Racial Studies
29(1) (2006): 27–49.
78. “Antisyntagmatiko ekrine to StE ton nomo Ragousi gia tin ithageneia,” To
Vima, February 5, 2013, accessed November 18, 2013, http://www.tovima.gr
/society/article/?aid=496838.
CHAPTER FOUR
Migration Myths and Extreme

Xenophobia in South Africa
Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran
Introduction
The plague of xenophobia in postapartheid South Africa has been vari-
ously labeled the “dark side of democracy,”1 a “new pathology,”2 “apartheid
vertigo,”3 and evidence of the “demonic” nature of South African society.4
Such arresting images seek to represent a deeply troubling reality mani-
fested in the hostility, discrimination and alienation endured by African
migrants and refugees in the country.5 Everyday animosity regularly spills
over into violence against migrants and refugees.6 Some of these incidents
reach the scrutiny of the media and officialdom, but most remain invisible
and unremarked. The involvement of state functionaries in violence
against migrants is also well documented.7 One recent study suggests that
there are striking parallels and interconnections between police actions
and popular violence against migrants.8 The police regularly engage in
high-profile but ultimately ineffectual campaigns to purge cities of
migrants. The public not only approves of these actions, but seeks to imi-
tate them when police campaigns fail (as they usually do).
Police sweeps are seen by government as a perfectly legitimate tactic to
rid the country of “illegal foreigners” (in the language of the Immigration
Act). However, it can be less sanguine about egregious cases of police bru-
tality when they come to wider public attention. For example, in 1998, six
white officers of the South African Police Services (SAPS) East Rand Dog
72 Global Migration
Unit set attack dogs on three Mozambican migrants who were badly
mauled and then physically and verbally abused (Figure 4.1).9 The inci-
dent was recorded in a police “training video” and later televised nationally
and internationally. Condemned by government as evidence of the persis-
tence of racism in postapartheid South Africa, and by the trial judge as a
“callous, cowardly, brutal and cruel” act, all six officers were sentenced to
jail terms of between four and seven years. Fifteen years later, in February
2013, eight black members of the SAPS arrested a 27-year old Mozambi-
can taxi-driver, Mido Macia, handcuffed him to the back of a police van,
and dragged him through the streets of Daveyton near Johannesburg in
full view of a large crowd of onlookers.10 Macia died in police custody
several hours later. The official response to this case had echoes of the first
15 years earlier. The assault and murder of Macia was perpetrated by black
officers and could not be interpreted as evidence of racism in the police
services. But, like the incident in 1998, it was not seen as xenophobic
either. In both cases, the xenophobic content of the attacks was down-
played and they were instead portrayed as “isolated” incidents perpetrated
by “rogue individuals” (Figure 4.2). To acknowledge that they were evi-
dence of a deep-rooted, systemic, and enduring problem would mean that
the state would have to face up to the entrenched nature of xenophobia in
the country rather than throwing the book at the few perpetrators who
happened to be caught on video.
The large-scale xenophobic violence that swept South Africa in May
2008 could not so easily be written off as the actions of isolated individu-
als, however. Mobs of South Africans with makeshift weapons rampaged
through residential areas in a number of different cities for over a week.
They targeted the properties and businesses of migrants and refugees in
their communities, causing widespread destruction. Individuals and whole
families were attacked and in one particularly shocking incident, a Mozam-
bican man was burned alive. The victims fled their communities en masse
and took refuge in makeshift camps. An estimated 100,000 men, women,
and children were displaced, 30,000 residential properties were destroyed,
over 600 people were seriously injured, and over 60 were murdered.
While the police did not directly participate in the looting and killing, crit-
ics have charged that they were largely indifferent to the mayhem. One
commentator argues that “the relationship between policing practices and
the mob violence was, from the start, a close, if mercurial, one.”11
A recurring pattern of aggression against migrants and refugees contin-
ued after May 2008.12 In 2009, for example, some 3,000 Zimbabweans
were forcibly displaced from the farming region of De Doorns in the West-
ern Cape.13 During 2012, 238 incidents were recorded by the UNHCR
Figure 4.1 East Rand Dog Unit, 1998.
Figure 4.2 Official Response to Police Murder of Mido Macia, 2013.

74 Global Migration
with 120 deaths and 7,500 persons displaced. In recent years, migrant
traders, particularly from Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities,
have been widely targeted.14 An estimated 120 Somali and 50 Bangladeshi
shopkeepers were killed in townships in 2012. The UNHCR also estimates
that 62 migrants were murdered in South Africa during the first six months
of 2013 and around 130 separate episodes of attacks on foreigners were
reported. This exclusionary violence resulted in the displacement of some
5,000 persons and left 73 persons seriously wounded. Violent xenophobia
has thus become a regular feature of South African life. One migrant rights
group notes that while xenophobic violence has not declined, many inci-
dents are no longer being included in press reportage, conveying the erro-
neous impression that “xenophobia was no longer a problem.”15
The fact that most of the violence occurs in marginal urban locations of
informal settlements, townships, and inner-city suburbs has prompted
intense debate over the nomenclature and identification of the underlying
cause(s). Explanations for the events of May 2008 fall into three general
categories: what we call “xenophobia denialism,” “xenophobia minimal-
ism,” and “xenophobia realism.” The denialists reject the argument that
xenophobia played or plays any role in violence against migrants and refu-
gees. The minimalists argue that although xenophobia might exist, it is an
epiphenomenon that does not get at the root causes of violence. The real-
ists suggest that xenophobia is a pervasive phenomenon throughout South
African society and that there is a predisposition to resort to violence on
the part of a considerable number of South Africans.
In a previous study for the UNDP, we highlighted some of the key char-
acteristics of contemporary forms of xenophobia.16 Drawing on examples
from diverse national contexts in the global North and South, we broad-
ened the definition of xenophobia from “dislike or fear of foreigners” to
include other important dimensions. At the outset, xenophobia consists of
highly negative perceptions of noncitizen groups on the basis of their citi-
zenship and foreign origin. Xenophobia is disseminated through public
discourses that repeatedly denigrate migrants and refugees by making
them easy scapegoats for various problems and challenges faced by the
receiving society. Xenophobia is not simply about negative attitudes held
by citizens, politicians, and state officials. Hostile and distorted percep-
tions of migrants and refugees usually combine with discriminatory prac-
tices and shoddy treatment of such groups by citizens and state institutions.
Violence against migrants represents escalating and extreme manifesta-
tions of xenophobia.
In this chapter, we conceptualize “extreme xenophobia” as a heightened
form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived
Migration Myths and Extreme Xenophobia in South Africa 75
as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded and expressed through

aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees. The antipathy to migrants
and refugees is acute and the threat perception attached to their presence
is glaring and intense, influenced by numerous myths and biases. Citizens
hold migrants responsible for the crime rate, bringing disease, and “steal-
ing” jobs, services, and resources and view them as being “illegally” in the
country. Moreover, perceptions of a rapid increase in the number of
migrants intensify the levels of threat attached to them. Rights and entitle-
ments for residents are directly and in a discriminatory fashion linked to
citizenship, drawing the boundaries between those who are seen to belong
and others who are not. High levels of migrant antipathy lead to recurrent
episodes of violence.
In South Africa, extreme xenophobia assumes many connected forms
that are not simply about the dislike of all migrants. Instead, contempt is
reserved for certain kinds of migrants, especially those from other African
countries. Migrants from African countries with common ethnic and cul-
tural characteristics as South Africans (such as Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland) are tolerated to a degree. But those from most other African
countries are loathed by the majority of South Africans, with particular
opprobrium reserved for Zimbabweans, Nigerians, and Somalis. Extreme
xenophobia promotes negative stereotypes, which view poorer migrants as
“criminals” and “antisocial” elements; incorporates very strong elements of
fear and anxiety over the presence of migrants and their presumed nega-
tive social and economic effects on the citizenry; asserts the superiority of
South Africans and the inferiority of migrant groups; and manifests in acts
of violence and wanton brutality against migrants and refugees.
The policies and practices of state institutions reinforce extreme xeno-
phobia by undermining rights and aggravating insecurity. In South Africa,
this involves verbal abuse, harassment, and extortion of migrants and refu-
gees by the police, officials in charge of immigration, and other govern-
ment agencies. Inflammatory speeches and comments about migrants and
their activities by politicians and government officials harden mythologies.
Policies actively diminishing rights and entitlements for migrants and ref-
ugees strengthen institutionalized discrimination and widen the gap
between citizens and migrants. Police failure to protect migrants’ lives and
property from police and other government personnel during physical
attacks inevitably marks them out as “soft targets,” worsening their vulner-
ability to citizen aggression. The prosecution of perpetrators is nonexistent
or inadequate, leading to a culture of impunity. As we show in this chapter,
xenophobic discourse frequently exaggerates numbers and homogenizes
and typecasts unwanted migrants into a small number of categories. Until
76 Global Migration
recently, they were generally referred to as “illegal aliens” but this term has
fallen into disuse with the 2002 Immigration Act, which rebranded them
as “illegal foreigners.” In practice, South Africa’s migrant stock consists of
a complex variety of different groups. First, there are Europeans (mainly
from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands) who immi-
grated in the apartheid period. Immigration from Europe all but ended
after the fall of apartheid. Second, there are migrants who come to work
on South Africa’s mines and farms under contract. This migrant labor sys-
tem has existed for decades and has outlived the end of apartheid. Third,
there are temporary migrants who enter the country of their own accord
(mainly from neighboring states and often irregularly) to work in sectors
such as services, construction, and agriculture or in the informal economy
of South Africa’s large cities. Fourth, there are professionals, skilled
migrants, and students who come on temporary residence or work per-
mits and are increasingly from other African countries. Finally, there are
forced migrants who come from some of Africa’s crisis states in search of
asylum (particularly the DRC, Somalia, and Zimbabwe).
Xenophobia Denialism
Xenophobia denialism is exemplified by the official response of the
South African state to the May 2008 attacks on migrants and refugees,
which refuted that they were motivated by xenophobia or that xenophobia
even existed at all (Figure 4.3). As then-President Thabo Mbeki publically
stated in an address to commemorate the victims of the attacks, he had
never met a xenophobic South African and anyone who called South Afri-
cans xenophobic was himself guilty of xenophobia: “None in our society
has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked
criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia.”17 The argument
that attacks on migrants and refugees are acts of criminality, not xenopho-
bia, became state orthodoxy long after the man himself was stripped of the
presidency by his own party. In 2010, for example, the minister of police
characterized attacks against migrants as “crimes of opportunity” where
criminal or antisocial elements take advantage of the situation to engage in
such misdeeds.18 After a Zimbabwean man was stoned to death in Lim-
popo in 2011, police spokesperson Zweli Mnisi echoed this view: “Once
you start talking about xenophobia and Afrophobia, you are talking about
semantics. It [the crimes against foreigners] is crime disguised under xeno-
phobia [emphasis ours].”19 On another occasion, Mnisi is quoted as saying
that “holistically speaking, South Africans are not xenophobic and many
cases are merely crime.”20
These views on the causes of violence against migrants and refugees

come from the highest levels of the South African government. In mid-
2013, for example, following an upsurge of violent assaults on Somali
shopowners, the minister of international relations and cooperation, Maite
Nkoana-Mashabane, announced that “the looting, displacement and kill-
ing of foreign nationals in South Africa should not be viewed as xenopho-
bic attacks, but opportunistic criminal acts that have the potential to
undermine the unity and cohesiveness of our communities.”21 The Cabinet
also issued a public statement on the violence, calling on communities to
be vigilant against “the possible resurgence of criminal violence targeting
foreign nationals.”22 The statement continued: “[The] Cabinet is cautious
not to label this violence as xenophobia because preliminary evidence indi-
cates that these acts may be driven primarily by criminality.”
Xenophobia denialism has also shaped official South African responses
to criticism from the international community. In 2006, for example, Afri-
can Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) report pointed out
that xenophobia was a serious issue for South Africa and urged the govern-
ment to tackle it through concerted action.23 After his country visit to
South Africa in 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human
Figure 4.3 Xenophobia Denialism.

78 Global Migration
Rights of Migrants similarly urged the South African government to imple-

ment much-needed efforts to safeguard migrant rights and improve their
limited assimilation into South African society.24 A review of the govern-
ment response to the APRM report argued that official efforts to address
xenophobia were weak and diluted further by attempts to reject its very
existence.25 Xenophobic violence perpetrated by agents of the state and
South African citizens continue to be explained away by politicians as
criminal acts by isolated, antisocial elements.
The government’s position on xenophobic violence has been echoed by
some researchers and political commentators. An article from the Institute
of Security Studies, for example, notes that “these acts are indeed criminal
activities: robberies under the guise of xenophobia.”26 Others have sug-
gested that only a very small group of individuals engage in such acts and
that these episodes are not symptomatic of prejudice against migrants at
large within South African society:
We must ask ourselves whether xenophobia is perhaps a label we have
slapped on a phenomenon that has been inadequately analyzed or under-
stood. Are our beliefs around xenophobia just lazy thinking? Do we really
collectively hate outsiders to the extent that we are willing to murder them,
loot their businesses and homes and go so far as to set them on fire . . . Were
we a truly xenophobic nation then the phenomenon would manifest across
all sectors of the population—across different races, different classes, and
different neighborhoods.27
In other words, according to this view, South Africa can only really be
considered a “xenophobic nation” when all sections of society engage in
violence against migrants and refugees.
A variant of this argument deploys the term “innocent violence” to
suggest that in the “profoundly and multi-variously lawless” spaces of
urban South Africa, antimigrant sentiments coalesce seamlessly with “a
mix of motivations and multitude of rationales” to produce violence.28
The “nightmare of a struggle for survival” has been turned into the
violent exclusion of those who are even more defenseless than indigent
citizens. This suggests that the principal motivation for the violence was
looting, and “outsiders” were “the most convenient target, not because
they were especially hated.” The perpetrators supposedly chose to cloak
their criminality in antimigrant terms in order to gather local support for
their actions.
Another form of denialism was articulated by the Human Sciences
Research Council, which shifted the blame for the violence of May 2008
from xenophobia to the state’s dereliction of its duties and, in particular, its
failure to control the country’s borders: “It is essential that government

move urgently and effectively to protect South Africa’s borders and points-
of-entry. No migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic
tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and peo-
ple can come and go as they please.”29 In this view, violence against
migrants is the natural consequence of a failure by the state to control
migration. Others have also blamed the failures of the South African gov-
ernment to participate in “effective physical monitoring and control of its
land borders.” The problem, according to this view, is that the state has not
seriously engaged with the “foreign threat” and does not “see any reason to
keep people out, not even when uncounted numbers of Zimbabweans are
fleeing the insupportable situation in their country.”30
It is hard to comprehend how South Africa’s draconian border and
immigration controls can be considered soft or lenient. Intensified border
and immigration enforcement has been a priority concern for the post-
apartheid state.31 At the height of the violence in May 2008, officials were
still trying to deport displaced victims who they claimed had entered
South Africa “illegally.” State agencies have typically focused on identifying
irregular migrants among victims of violence and then deporting them,
reinforcing the biases and prejudices that fueled the violence to begin
with. Even the Parliamentary Task Team assigned to investigate the events
of May 2008 recommended that displaced migrants from affected areas
who were in an irregular situation should be deported.32 Rates of detention
and deportation of migrants have been exceptionally high, comparable
only to enforcement in Western countries such as the United States, which
spend significantly more on deterrent measures. Deportation levels rose
from 91,000 in 1994 to nearly 300,000 in 2008. Between 1994 and 2004,
an average of 127,000 migrants was deported annually.33
Xenophobia Minimalism
A number of academic commentators argue that while xenophobia may
exist, it cannot be invoked to explain violence against foreigners by South
Africans. One study contends that the term xenophobic violence assumes a
taken-for-granted hostile opposition between foreigners and South Afri-
cans even though the aggression has been leveled at citizens too in particu-
lar areas.34 The term supposedly holds a “certain descriptive plausibility”
but ultimately fails to evaluate in a compelling manner the processes at
play and, more importantly, how to handle them. Thus the relationship
between South Africans and non–South Africans cannot be understood
purely as one of unyielding antagonism under all circumstances.35 Another
80 Global Migration
suggests that violence against migrant shopkeepers cannot be seen as

xenophobic because South African shopkeepers are equally at risk.36
Other minimalists take a similar view. The Council of Anthropologists
of Southern Africa suggests that “contrary to the current South African and
international political consensus, the presence of people who are deemed
to be ethnically, racially or nationally different is not at the core of the
problem.”37 Another study argues that xenophobia is “more symptom than
cause” of a profound social disorder, pointing instead to what it calls a
wide range of intersecting conditions (“the causal high-pressure systems”
in South Africa’s postapartheid trajectory) that manufactured the violence
of May 2008.38 An edited book released shortly after May 2008 proposed
that “xenophobia is too easy a label” to encapsulate this “shocking moment”
in the nation’s history, making the term a convenient alibi for a “much
more profound social and political malaise.”39 The volume’s editors go on
to assert that xenophobia was a “secondary symptom” rather than the pri-
mary cause of the violence.
One strand of minimalism sees the violence as a signifier of a broader,
deepening social crisis in South Africa tied to the incomplete (some would
say botched) postapartheid project of equality and access for the disen-
franchised black majority and intense competition for scarce resources
(such as jobs, shelter, and services). According to this view, the effects of
the inadequate transition have been felt most acutely in marginal urban
locations where much of the violence has occurred and where difference
has become the site around which the palpable anger and frustrations of
those left out has been expressed. One contributor to the aforementioned
book argues that a “simple focus on xenophobia,” conceived as hatred
along lines of identity derived from differences in citizenship status, is
misleading because it fails to engage with the complex underlying social
determinants.40 Rather, in a situation where “poor people viciously attacked
other poor people,” violence must be understood as rooted in intensifying
class inequalities due to unequal economic growth that have produced
“experiences of relative deprivation” and “perverse cultures of entitle-
ment.”41 That is, the unmet mounting expectations of indigent South Afri-
cans made them strike out at those who were spatially and structurally
closest to them.
Another chapter—entitled “Behind Xenophobia in South Africa”—
elaborates the relative deprivation argument, suggesting that the relation-
ship between violence and the economic circumstances of poor people is
not that their poverty compelled them to viciously target others, but the
“sense of unfairness engendered by inequality, of being discriminated
against” produced fierce antipathy toward those seen, accurately or
inaccurately, to enjoy more than they did.42 A study of the response of civil
society to the violence of May 2008 also argues that xenophobia is an epi-
phenomenon with underlying structural causes: “Within the processes of
uneven and combined development of both capitalism and civil society
. . . deep structural forces are responsible for xenophobia.”43
Certainly, the incidence of violence in May 2008 was strongly correlated
with the geography of poverty. But this simply begs the question of why
not all poor areas (including many in which migrants and refugees resided)
erupted or why poor South Africans were not attacking each other with
similar ferocity. The economic insecurity of the offenders may account for
their extreme anxiety and heightened dissatisfaction, but it does not
explain why only certain groups were and are singled out for deadly
assault. Furthermore, if economic competition between poor residents
and migrants is the underlying cause of aggressive hostility, it does not
explain why rich and privileged groups who do not face direct or even
indirect competition from these migrants also espouse these prejudices,
especially when their lives are not touched negatively at all.
By focusing on xenophobia as an “irrational fear of foreigners” (as many
dictionary definitions characterize the phenomenon), some argue that
blame has been unfairly laid on the indigent, desperate offenders, divert-
ing attention away from the government, state practices, and other broader
processes. One study, for example, contends that the failure to address the
needs of the urban poor through real and continuous improvements to
informal settlements creates “vulnerable, precarious and dangerously com-
bustible conditions” where “competition for very scarce and increasingly
downgraded resources will intensify,” compromising the lives of both “for-
eigners” and indigent South Africans.44
When vicious attacks on migrants are conceived primarily as the out-
come of limited material realities and economic competition between citi-
zens and “foreigners,” then the frames of reference are automatically loaded
against the latter. Seen in such terms, resentment and antipathy toward
migrants and other “outsiders” becomes an inevitable, inescapable aspect
of the social landscape, justifying stringent controls over immigration and
exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) of migrants. Needless to say,
this distinction further invigorates the underlying rationale for xenopho-
bia, the very idea that the presence of migrants and refugees poses a per-
petual threat to the legitimate insiders.
Similarly, the crisis of frustrated hopes and the crisis of governance that
South Africa is currently undergoing, particularly at local levels, have little
if anything to do with the presence of migrants, which in itself suggests
that these connections need to be constructed more carefully. Otherwise,
82 Global Migration
we may end up reproducing the very prejudices that need to be con-

fronted. One cannot deny that there is some degree of rivalry between
locals and migrants and there may well be undesirable aspects attached to
it. However, migrants represent a very small minority in terms of numbers
and as a share of the total population in the country, leading us to believe
that the detrimental effects of this economic competition have been seri-
ously overstated.
Xenophobia Realism
National opinion surveys and in-depth qualitative interviews with
groups of South Africans and migrants conducted over the best part of two
decades lead to the inescapable conclusion that xenophobic attitudes are
highly prevalent in South Africa among all social, economic, racial, and
class groups. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has
been monitoring the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans toward
migrants and refugees since the late 1990s.45 These surveys provide
unequivocal evidence of deep-rooted and pervasive hostility and animos-
ity toward migrants and refugees in the country. Three general findings are
of relevance to our argument: (1) the nature and strength of myths about
migrant and migration; (2) the level of public endorsement of coercive
state measures to keep migrants out of the country and to remove those
who are present; and (3) the degree of willingness to resort to coercion and
violence against migrants.
First, with regard to migration myths, South Africans clearly believe
that the country is being overrun by migrants and refugees who pose a
very direct threat to their interests as citizens. The actual numbers in the
country are a source of considerable controversy. There is a consistent ten-
dency for politicians, officials, and the media to exaggerate the numbers
for alarmist effect.46 Inflated figures for “illegal foreigners” are always in the
millions and acquire a life of their own once they enter the public realm
although they have no sound statistical basis.47 For example, the oft-
repeated figure for the number of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa is
3 million while more considered estimates put the number at between
500,000 and 1 million. For obvious reasons, the numbers of irregular
migrants in the country is difficult to gauge. But given the ease with which
people from neighboring states can enter through regular channels, and
the documented preference of migrants for temporary rather than perma-
nent stay, these numbers are unlikely to be anywhere close to the inflated
numbers of popular mythology. With regard to documented migration,
the 2011 South African Census recorded 1.6 million noncitizens in the
country (or just 3.2 percent of the total population). In Gauteng (the
industrial heartland of the country), the figure was 7.1 percent but in
every other province at least 96 percent of the population were citizens
(Table 4.1). The figure for noncitizens includes many who immigrated
during the heyday of white immigration from Europe during the apartheid
era.48 In 2011, South Africa issued a total of 106,173 temporary residence
permits (of which 20,173 were for work purposes). Just 10,011 perma-
nent residence permits were issued (2,060 for work).49
Yet, 90 percent of South Africans interviewed by SAMP in 2010 said
that there are “too many” migrants in the country.50 Forty-four percent
agreed with the statement that “many foreigners living in South Africa are
illegal immigrants.” More than half of all respondents (63 percent) agreed
that migrants diminish the resources available for citizens. Around 60 per-
cent felt that migration leads to unemployment for citizens. One in two
agreed that migrants contribute to growth in crime rates. Conversely,
acceptance for the benefits associated with migration was much lower.
Only one-third of citizens acknowledged that migrants have a beneficial
effect on skills shortages experienced by South Africa.
Focus groups conducted by researchers immediately before the 2008
violence exposed elevated levels of anti-migrant antipathy, much sharper
than in any other previous round of focus group interviews.51 Only one
participant among the focus group members articulated anything positive
Table 4.1 Number and Proportion of Citizens and Noncitizens in South Africa,

2011
No. of No. of % % %
Province citizens noncitizens Citizens Noncitizens Unknown
Western Cape 5,650,462 180,815 96.0 3.2 0.8
Eastern Cape 6,437,586 57,938 98.4 0.9 0.7
Northern Cape 1,125,306 10,128 98.8 0.9 0.3
Free State 2,663,080 50,599 97.8 1.9 0.3
Kwazulu Natal 10,113,978 111,254 98.1 1.1 0.8
North West 3,439,700 120,390 95.9 3.5 0.6
Gauteng 11,952,392 848,620 91.9 7.1 1.0
Mpumalanga 3,983,570 103,573 96.8 2.6 0.6
Limpopo 5,322,134 138,375 96.9 2.6 0.5
Totals 50,688,208 1,621,692 96.1 3.2 0.7
Source: Based on data from SSA, “Census 2011,” Statistical Release PO301.4, Pretoria,
2012, Table 3.6. A breakdown by country of citizenship and country of birth is not yet
available. In general, since citizenship is not easy to acquire in South Africa, citizenship
figures are a reasonable surrogate for migrant stocks.
84 Global Migration
about migrants living in South Africa. Respondents across race and class
lines openly tied migrants to all sorts of social problems including unem-
ployment, crime, housing shortages, and poor service delivery. Humani-
tarian assistance provided by the South African government to those
displaced by the violence was perceived as “preferential treatment” for
migrants. Respondents repeatedly asserted that South Africa was facing a
migration crisis due to the “massive influx” of African migrants and
endorsed strict immigration controls.
Ironically, the language and imagery used by citizens to justify the
exclusion of outsiders is heavily influenced by the idioms of apartheid,
such as the repetitive use of the term “influx control” by respondents.52
The media and officialdom frequently resort to aquatic metaphors and
imagery when describing the “threat” posed to the country, as if migration
was a kind of extreme natural event. “Foreigners” do not enter or cross
borders into South Africa, they “flood” in “tidal waves” and “swamp” the
country.53 Figure 4.4 neatly encapsulates the common belief that Africa is
a sea of poverty, misery, and chaos and that South Africa is a beacon of
peace, stability, and prosperity that is in imminent danger of being sub-
merged by its neighbors.
The SAMP survey showed that South Africans are strongly supportive
of coercive state measures to stop the entry of migrants and refugees and
Figure 4.4 Representation of Africa as a Threat to South Africa.

to remove those already in the country, even suggesting that the state
does not go far enough. Over a third (36 percent) agree there should be
a total prohibition on migrants entering South Africa to work, and as
many as 63 percent agree that there should be “strict limits on entry.” Only
8 percent agree that government should let in anyone who wanted to
enter. Three in five South Africans favor the construction of electrified
fences on the country’s borders, a policy that was last implemented during
the apartheid era. A slightly higher share (63 percent) would like the
armed forces to be responsible for border enforcement, linking migration
unambiguously to issues of national security. More than half of all South
Africans are dissatisfied with the current immigration enforcement and
support higher government budgets for it. Nearly half want all migrants
to carry their identity documents with them at all times, another throw-
back to the pass laws of the apartheid regime when black South Africans
were forced to carry similar documents or risk arrest and incarceration
(Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 South African Attitudes to Migrants and Refugees, 2010

Support Oppose
(%) (%)
Attitudes to Immigration Enforcement
Army to patrol borders 63 10
Electrify fences on South Africa’s borders 62 18
Allocate more money for border protection 53 17
Foreigners to carry identity cards at all times 49 20
Penalize those employing foreigners 33 33
Attitudes to Deportations
Deport migrants who have committed crimes 74 8
Deport migrants not contributing to economy 53 18
Deport migrants with HIV/AIDS 35 28
Deport all foreigners 24 47
Attitudes to Refugee Protection
Test refugees for HIV/AIDS 41 29
Grant asylum to those escaping war/persecution 38 23
Put refugees in special camps near the border 31 32
Grant permanent residence after five years 18 44
Increase refugee intake in South Africa 11 57
Source: Jonathan Crush, Sujata Ramachandran, and Wade Pendleton, Soft Targets:
Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa After May
2008. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 64, Cape Town, 2013, 36–38.
86 Global Migration
The South African government’s policy of arrest and deportation of

migrants is widely supported by citizens, despite doubt (even within gov-
ernment) of its efficacy. In fact, many South Africans want the use of this
punitive measure to remove all sorts of migrants. For example, one in two
South Africans would like to banish migrants who are not working. One
in three citizens want migrants with HIV and AIDS to be expelled. And
one in four want all migrants, irrespective of their standing in South Africa,
to be deported.
South Africans also do not want refugees to rebuild their lives in South
Africa. Support for mandatory HIV testing for refugees finds favor among
over 40 percent of citizens. Close to one-third want refugees and asylum-
seekers to live in segregated camps near the border. Such a constrained
approach to asylum poses a significant challenge for people who come
to South Africa in search of safety. The reluctance to provide asylum to
persons in need and to support refugee protection is rooted in the belief
that a large number of persons seeking asylum in South Africa are not
genuine refugees. Regrettably, the opinion of South Africans is almost
identical to that of the ruling ANC, which has claimed, without substan-
tive evidence and in an immigration policy document that does not con-
tain a single reference to xenophobia, that 95 percent of refugee claimants
are bogus.54
South Africans do not feel that migrants in the country should be
entitled to various basic rights including legal protection, police protec-
tion, access to social services, and antiretroviral therapy (ART) for HIV. As
Table 4.3 shows, close to 90 percent feel that citizens are always entitled to
these rights. However, only half think that these same rights should be
extended to migrants legally in the country. And just a third believes that
refugees should always enjoy legal and police protection and access to
Table 4.3 South African Attitudes Toward Rights for Citizens and Migrants
Legal Irregular
Citizens migrants Refugees migrants
% always % always % always % always
Right to legal protection 87 48 31 18
Protection by police 90 54 36 22
Access to social services 92 50 28 16
Treatment for AIDS 93 65 55 44
2008. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 64, Cape Town, 2013, 32.
social services. Less than 20 percent think that irregular migrants should
be entitled to these protections. The majority also think that these migrants
are not entitled to HIV treatment. What these findings suggest is a great
reluctance on the part of the majority of South Africans to extend basic
rights (guaranteed by the South African Constitution) to migrants. The
particularly negative response to rights for refugees and irregular migrants
reinforces an environment in which coercive state measures to deny rights
and enforce migration controls (such as deportations) meet with little
opposition from the populace.
Another important finding from the SAMP surveys concerns the will-
ingness of South Africans to turn belligerent attitudes into hostile actions.
In the late 1990s, nearly one-third of South Africans were willing to engage
in some form of collective action against migrants. The results from the last
two surveys in 2006 and 2010 reveal similar inclinations (Table 4.4).
Moreover, the events of May 2008 appear to have had very little moderat-
ing influence. One in six South Africans (15 percent) were ready to
collectively use force against migrants in both 2006 and 2010. Those will-
ing to resort to violence against migrants actually increased from 9 percent
in 2006 to 11 percent in 2010. In 2011, 10 percent of the adult South
African population (over the age of 15) would have amounted to around
3.6 million people.
In effect, 13 million South Africans are willing to report the presence
of migrants to the authorities and over 3.5 million are willing to use
violent means to force them out. One in four said they would use violence
to prevent migrants from running a business in their locality. Nearly a
Table 4.4 Likelihood of Taking Action against Migrants

2006 2010
Willingness to: (%) (%)
Report them to police 40 36
Report them to employer 31 27
Report them to community organization 34 27
Stop them running a business in their area 32 25
Stop them from moving into the neighborhood 30 23
Prevent their children from being in the same classroom 26 20
Get people together to force them to leave 15 15
Use violence against them 9 11
2008. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 64, Cape Town, 2013, 39.
88 Global Migration
quarter are ready to stop them from living in their neighborhoods, and
one in five do not want migrant children to interact with their own chil-
dren. These South Africans not only want little to do with migrants in
“their” residential areas and educational institutions, they are comfortable
using violence to achieve and maintain this “social distance” from migrant
groups.
Given the considerable latent potential for the expression of extreme
xenophobia among a sizable minority of South Africans, the key question
is where, and under what conditions, this potential is likely to be realized.
In-depth analyses of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 provide impor-
tant insights into this question, as well as challenging the stark determin-
istic links of the xenophobia minimalists.55 Fieldwork at the affected sites
has revealed that a great many of those who were assaulted were not new
migrants, having lived in the area for many years. While their numbers
had grown, the increase was not abrupt or excessive.56 Several studies have
focused on the particular factors and “triggers” prevalent in the areas
affected by violence. In all the locations where violence occurred in 2008,
local groups and persons organized as well as guided the attacks in order
to extend their own power and authority in these settlements.57 Violence
occurred in areas that were already unstable and volatile with established
pasts of forceful, organized conflict, such as taxi, gang, and political vio-
lence, and where incidents of crime were much higher compared to other
locations.
These localized conditions have been characterized as the “micro-
politics of violence.”58 The common element is the struggle for local lead-
ership, which permitted the appearance of illegitimate, violent forms of
politics and community organizing by manipulating local residents’ hostil-
ity toward “noncompliant,” undesirable outsiders. The second element is
the absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms and in their
absence, the use of vigilantism and mob violence to resolve conflicts and
other social matters involving migrants. A third factor is the “culture of
impunity” existing in South Africa and its tolerance for public violence and
especially xenophobic violence, which in turn encourages residents to tar-
get migrants repeatedly for individual and political gain. The influence of
local conditions and “triggers” is therefore decisive in shaping extreme
xenophobia.
Since cycles of xenophobic violence may appear to end as abruptly
as they appear, the follow-up question is when, and under what condi-
tions, expressions of extreme xenophobia terminate. The report on May
2008 of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) found
that although local leaders were able to intervene successfully in some
contexts, in many others, the violence ended only after the “source of con-
flict”—the migrants—had been completely removed and their properties
confiscated, and not because peace had returned to these communities.59
Termination is really only possible when strong restraints are imposed on
the actual and potential perpetrators through sustained intervention of
law enforcement agencies or the army. In other words, violence may not
necessarily subside even after the offenders have purged “their” spaces.
This certainly helps explain why the intense violence of May 2008 sub-
sided but sporadic violence has continued. For example, the culture of
impunity that existed prior to May 2008 has been reinforced by the
poor prosecution of perpetrators and failure to impose harsh sanctions
on their behavior.60 Such an environment of general permissiveness
can only encourage more aggression given the high potential for violent
action.
The South African government’s reaction to the purge in mid-2008 and
its “management” of the large-scale humanitarian crisis has been charac-
terized as deeply discriminatory.61 Despite being exposed to shocking
aggression and displacement, the terms and quality of protection were
determined by the victims’ status as “foreigners” and what was seen to be
their temporary residence in South Africa. In many areas, state authorities
encouraged those affected to leave the country, facilitating their hasty
departure or “voluntary deportation” and undermining the eventual pros-
ecution of offenders. Agencies such as police were similarly disinclined to
negotiate on behalf of the victims for fear of alienating local residents and
in some cases, actively aided the offenders or like them, looted the victims’
properties.
Although the number of individuals who participated in the violence of
May 2008 may have been relatively limited, the social legitimacy of these
actions was widespread.62 Around a third of the South Africans surveyed
by SAMP expressed indifference about the violence: 28 percent said they
felt no guilt for the attacks and 15 percent felt that migrants and refugees
deserved this treatment.63 Sixteen percent of white and 15 percent of black
respondents said the attacks were justified. Among the most common rea-
sons given for the violence were that migrants were involved in crime
(cited by 62 percent), they take jobs from South Africans (62 percent),
they are “culturally different” (60 percent), they “cheat” South Africans (56
percent), they use South African health services for free (55 percent), and
they take housing away from South Africans (52 percent). When South
Africans try to explain why the extreme violence of May 2008 occurred, in
other words, they draw on the reservoir of myths and stereotypes of
migrants as job-stealers, cheats, thieves, and culturally different.
90 Global Migration
Conclusion
The antimigrant violence that swept across South Africa in 2008 has
prompted considerable commentary and analysis. Initially bewildered by
the unexpectedness and ferocity of the violence, the South African govern-
ment settled on a position that the deaths, destruction, and displacement
were the work of criminal elements in the affected areas. Certainly, the
actions of the perpetrators were crimes under South African law, but that
is not the same thing as saying that the rationale for these and subsequent
attacks was criminality rather than xenophobia. Ex-President Mbeki’s
position has remained the official stance of the South African government
in response to May 2008 and the five years of xenophobic violence that
have followed. In this chapter we designate the official position as xeno-
phobia denialism. Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in
the face of a large body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illus-
trates a continuing lack of political will (first evident in the mid-1990s) to
own the problem and act against one of the most destructive and anti-
democratic forces in postapartheid South Africa.
The majority of academic commentary on the violence of May 2008 has
also eschewed xenophobia as an explanation, seeing it instead as an epi-
phenomenon or symptom of a deeper malaise. Neo-Marxism has fallen
into disfavor in many parts of the world but remains alive and well among
a generation of South African academics who cut their teeth in the 1980s
and 1990s. These scholars seek a materialist explanation for the violence,
generally viewing it as the outworking of structural economic inequalities
and the capture of the ANC by neoliberalism, with the consequent inabil-
ity of the state to effect a fundamental transformation and redistribution of
wealth and resources in the country. For the xenophobia minimalists,
grinding poverty, inequality, and fierce competition for resources in the
country’s impoverished informal settlements will inevitably lead to victim-
ization of the most vulnerable.
This chapter takes the position that both xenophobia denialism and
xenophobia minimalism ignore the evidence that the majority of South
Africans hold extremely negative views about migrants and refugees and
want the state to exercise greater coercive power to purge the country of
their presence. These views are suffused with a powerful set of migration
myths about migrants and their supposed threat to the interests of citizens.
We argue that xenophobia realism is the only way to make sense of the
phenomenon of extreme xenophobia (that is, the translation of hostile
attitudes into violent actions). The primary challenge for xenophobia real-
ists is to explain why, if hostility is so widespread, violence tends to be
more confined, targeted at poorer neighborhoods in the cities. Research on

the causes of the nationwide violence of May 2008 provides two answers.
First, whether and where animosity translates into actions depends on
community-specific dynamics such as the nature of local leadership, the
absence of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the character of policing.
Second, all of the common myths about migrants are offered by residents
to explain why the attacks take place. Migration myths are not epiphe-
nomena or post-hoc rationalizations; they have powerful mobilizing and
animating effects spurring those who believe them into acts of extreme
xenophobia.
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) for funding the research on which this chapter is based. Our
thanks for their assistance to Wade Pendleton, Vincent Williams, Washeelah
Kapery, Maria Salamone, Abel Chikanda, Sachel Singh, and Bronwen
Dachs.
Notes
1. Jonathan Crush, “The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and
Human Rights in South Africa,” International Migration 38 (2001): 103.
2. Bronwyn Harris, “Xenophobia: A New Pathology for a New South Africa?”
in Psychopathology and Social Prejudice, eds. D. Hook and G. Eagle (Cape Town:
UCT Press, 2001), 169.
3. David Matsinhe, Apartheid Vertigo: The Rise in Discrimination against Africans
in South Africa (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
4. Loren Landau, ed., Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and
Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press,
2012).
5. Francis Nyamnjoh, Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Con-
temporary Southern Africa (London: Zed Books, 2006); Jonathan Crush and Sujata
Ramachandran, “Migration, Xenophobia and Human Development,” Journal of
Human Development and Capabilities 11 (2010): 209; Belinda Dodson, “Locating
Xenophobia: Debate, Discourse, and Everyday Experience in Cape Town, South
Africa,” Africa Today 56 (2010): 2; Zaheera Jinnah, “Making Home in a Hostile
Land: Understanding Somali Identity, Integration, Livelihood and Risks in Johan-
nesburg,” Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 1 (2010): 91; Jonathan Crush and
Godfrey Tawodzera, “Medical Xenophobia and Zimbabwean Migrant Access to
Public Health Services in South Africa,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40
(2014): 655.
92 Global Migration
6. Michael Neocosmos, “The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics: Reflec-
tions on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa,” Journal of Asian and African Studies
43 (2008): 586; Aidan Mosselson, “‘There Is No Difference Between Citizens and
Non-Citizens Anymore’: Violent Xenophobia, Citizenship and the Politics of
Belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 26
(2010): 641; Tara Polzer and Kathryn Takabvirwa, “Just Crime? Violence, Xeno-
phobia and Crime: Discourse and Practice,” SA Crime Quarterly 33 (2010): 3;
Andrew Charman and Laurence Piper, “Xenophobia, Criminality and Violent
Entrepreneurship: Violence Against Somali Shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape
Town, South Africa,” South African Review of Sociology 43 (2012): 81; Thiven
Reddy, “The ‘Cabbage and the Goat’: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa,” Amer-
ican Historical Review 44 (2012): 3; Oswell Rusinga, Richard Maposa, and David
Tobias, “Contested Alien Spaces and the Search for National Identity: A Study of
Ethnicity in Light of Xenophobic Violence on Migrants in South Africa,” Migration
and Development 1 (2012): 206.
7. Darshan Vigneswaran et al., “Criminality or Monopoly? Informal Immigra-
tion Enforcement in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36 (2010):
465; Rebecca Sutton and Darshan Vigneswaran, “A Kafkaesque State: Deportation
and Detention in South Africa,” Citizenship Studies 15 (2011): 627; see also Video:
“Kwere-Kwere, South African Brutal Cops—South Africa,” accessed January 2,
2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBuQU0uP6BM
8. Jonny Steinberg, “Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom and
Xenophobia in South Africa,” British Journal of Criminology 52 (2012): 345.
9. Video: “A Brutal Legacy—South Africa,” accessed January 2, 2014, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=haA9u7HfHYo
10. Video: “South African Police: Mozambican Taxi Driver Dies After Being
Dragged Through Johannesburg,” accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=7XdFmQCKE5E
11. Jonny Steinberg, “Security and Disappointment,” op. cit., p. 347.
12. Jonathan Crush, Sujata Ramachandran, and Wade Pendleton, Soft Targets:
Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa After
May 2008. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 64, Cape Town, 2013; Judith Hayem,
“From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic Violence and National Subjectivity in
South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39 (2013): 77.
13. Jean-Pierre Misago, “Violence, Labor and Displacement of Zimbabweans in
De Doorns, Western Cape,” Migration Policy Brief No. 2, Consortium of Refugees
and Migrants in South Africa, Johannesburg, 2009; Annie Robb and Ali Davis,
“Toil and Trouble. Fire Burn. Cauldron Bubble: Xenophobia and Civil Unrest in
De Doorns, South Africa,” Report for Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town, 2009.
14. Andrew Charman and Laurence Piper, “Xenophobia, Criminality and Vio-
lent Entrepreneurship,” op. cit.
15. “Protecting Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Immigrants in South Africa
During 2010,” Report by Consortium of Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
(CoRMSA), Johannesburg, 2011.
16. Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran, “Xenophobia, International

Migration and Human Development,” Human Development Report Research
Paper 2009/47, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), New York, 2009.
17. Thabo Mbeki, “Address of the President of South Africa at the National
Tribute in Remembrance of the Victims of Attacks on Foreign Nationals,” accessed
January 2 2014, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08070410451001.htm
18. “Minister Tackles Xenophobic Attacks,” IOL News, July 12, 2010, accessed
January 2, 2014, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/minister-tackles-xenoph
obic-attacks-1.489525#.UKFRbY6hC5Q
19. Maureen Isaacson, “Attacks on Foreigners are Xenophobic,” Sunday Independent,
June 21 2011, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent
/attacks-on-foreigners-are-xenophobic-1.1086047#.UKO5No6hC5R
20. Nickolaus Bauer, “Diepsloot: Crime, Xenophobia—Or Both?” Mail &
Guardian, May 28 2013, accessed January 2, 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05
-28-diepsloot-crime-xenophobia-or-both
21. Khadija Patel, “SA Government Reiterates: It’s Crime, Not Xenophobia,”
Daily Maverick, June 8, 2013, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.dailymaverick
.co.za/article/2013-06-08-sa-government-reiterates-its-crime-not-xenophobia/#
.UsXhfPRDt8E
22. Republic of South Africa, “Statement on the Cabinet Meeting of 29 May
2013,” accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/
media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-meeting-29May2013
23. African Peer Review Mechanism, “Country Review Report: Republic of
South Africa,” Midrand, 2006, 24.
24. United Nations, “Mission to South Africa: Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of Migrants,” Human Rights Council, Seventeenth Session,
A/HRC/17/33/Add.4, 18, New York, 2011.
25. APRM Monitoring Project, “Implementing the APRM: Views from Civil
Society. South Africa Report,” Johannesburg, 2011, 58.
26. Emmanuel Maravanyika, “Is It Really Xenophobia,” Polityorg.za, July 16,
2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.polity.org.za/article/is-it-really-xeno-
phobia-2010-07-16
27. Glenn Ashton, “Xenophobia Redux” South African Civil Society Informa-
tion Services, July 7 2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://sacsis.org.za/site
/article/510.1
28. David Coplan, “Innocent Violence: Social Inclusion, Identity, and the
Press in an African Democracy,” Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media
Studies 23 (2009): 64.
29. Adrian Hadland, ed., “Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Developing
Consensus, Moving to Action,” Report by Human Sciences Research Council,
Pretoria, 2008, 26.
30. David Coplan, “Crossing Borders,” in Go Home or Die Here: Violence,
Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa, eds. Shireen Hassim,
Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008).
94 Global Migration
31. Jonathan Crush and Belinda Dodson, “Another Lost Decade: The Failures
of South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Migration Policy,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en
Sociale Geografie 98 (2007): 436.
32. Parliament of Republic of South Africa, “Report of the Task Team of Mem-
bers of Parliament Probing Violence and Attacks on Foreign Nationals,” Cape
Town, 2008, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.parliament.gov.za/content
/Tast%20Team%20Report%20Xenophobic%20Attacks.pdf
33. Jonathan Crush and Abel Chikanda, “Forced Migration in Southern Africa,”
in Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
34. John Sharp, “‘Fortress SA’: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa,” Anthro-
pology Today 24 (2008): 1.
35. Ibid.
36. Andrew Charman and Laurence Piper, “Xenophobia, Criminality and Vio-
lent Entrepreneurship,” op. cit.
37. Sharp, “‘Fortress SA’,” op. cit.
38. Strategy & Tactics, South African Civil Society and Xenophobia (Johannes-
burg: Strategy & Tactics and Atlantic Philanthropies, 2010).
39. Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby, eds., Go Home or Die Here:
Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa (Johannesburg:
Wits University Press, 2008), 6.
40. Devan Pillay, “Relative Deprivation, Social Instability and Cultures of Enti-
tlement,” in Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Dif-
ference in South Africa, eds. Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 93.
41. Ibid.
42. Stephen Gelb, “Behind Xenophobia in South Africa: Poverty or Inequality?”
in Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in
South Africa, eds. Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby (Johannesburg:
Wits University Press, 2008), 79.
43. Baruti Amisi et al., “Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban’s Structured
Social Divisions,” Politikon 38 (2011): 79.
44. Melinda Silverman and Tanya Zack, “Housing Delivery, the Urban Crisis
and Xenophobia,” in Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention
of Difference in South Africa, eds. Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008).
45. Jonathan Crush, “The Dark Side of Democracy,” op. cit; Jonathan Crush et
al., The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa,
SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 50, Cape Town, 2008; Jonathan Crush, Sujata
Ramachandran, and Wade Pendleton, Soft Targets, op. cit.
46. Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera, eds. Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migra-
tion, Survival (Cape Town and Ottawa: SAMP and IDRC, 2010), 3.
47. Ibid. 4.
48. Sally Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa’s Immi-
gration Policies, 1910–2005 (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009).
49. Statistics South Africa (SSA), “Documented Immigrants in South Africa,
2011,” Discussion Document D0351.4, Pretoria, 2012. According to SSA, no data
on documented immigration is currently available for the period 2005–2010.
50. Jonathan Crush, Sujata Ramachandran, and Wade Pendleton, Soft Targets,
op. cit.
51. David Everett, “‘That Violence Was Just the Beginning’: Views on ‘Foreign-
ers’ and the May 2008 Xenophobic Violence as Expressed in Focus Groups Staged
at That Time,” Report for Atlantic Philanthropies, Johannesburg, 2010.
52. Influx controls refer to the coercive mechanisms (including pass laws) that
the apartheid state uses to control the movement of black South Africans around
the country; see William Beinart and Saul Dubow, eds., Segregation and Apartheid
in Twentieth-Century South Africa (London: Routledge, 1995).
53. One of the authors once wrote an op-ed in a prominent South African
newspaper taking issue with the postapartheid immigration enforcement policy.
The article was published under the paper’s own headline as Jonathan Crush,
“And Still Aliens Flood SA” The Star, November 14, 1996. For other examples, see
Aquilina Mawadza and Jonathan Crush, “Metaphors of Migration: Zimbabwean
Migrants in the South African Media,” in Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Sur-
vival, eds. Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera (Cape Town and Ottawa: SAMP and
IDRC, 2010), 363.
54. African National Congress (ANC), “Peace and Stability: Policy Discussion
Document,” Johannesburg, 2012, accessed January 3, 2014, http://www.anc.org
.za/docs/discus/2012/peacev.pdf
55. Loren Landau, Exorcising the Demons Within, op. cit.
56. Jean-Pierre Misago, “Disorder in a Changing Society,” in Exorcising the
Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa,
ed. Loren Landau (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012).
57. Jean-Pierre Misago, Loren Landau, and Tamlyn Monson, Towards Tolerance,
Law, and Dignity: Addressing Violence Against Foreign Nationals in South Africa
(Johannesburg: ACMS, 2009); Jean-Pierre Misago et al., May 2008 Violence Against
Foreign Nationals in South Africa: Understanding Causes and Evaluating Responses
(Johannesburg: ACMS, 2010).
58. Jean-Pierre Misago, “Disorder in a Changing Society,” op cit.
59. SAHRC, Report on the Investigation into Issues of Rule of Law, Justice and Impu-
nity Arising out of the 2008 Public Violence Against Non-Nationals (Cape Town,
2010).
60. Aleambong Nkea, “Justice System’s Response to the May 2008 Xenophobic
Violence in South Africa and Its Impact on Access to Justice for Migrants: A Study
of Greater Johannesburg” (MA diss., University of Witwatersrand, 2010).
61. Tamlyn Monson and Jean-Pierre Misago, “Why History Has Repeated Itself:
The Security Risks of Structural Xenophobia,” SA Crime Quarterly 29 (2009): 25.
96 Global Migration
62. Jean-Pierre Misago et al., May 2008 Violence Against Foreign Nationals in
South Africa, op. cit.
63. Jonathan Crush, Sujata Ramachandran and Wade Pendleton, Soft Targets,
op. cit., 40.
CHAPTER FIVE
International Migration and

Immigrant Settlement in
the United States
Wei Li and Wan Yu
Introduction
As a “nation of immigrants,” the United States historically and contem-
porarily has attracted the largest number of international migrants1 in the
world. The United Nations estimated the United States as the home of
roughly 20 percent of the 214 million worldwide international migrants
by 2010. The pace of increasing international migrants in the past two
decades is unprecedented. Almost 46 percent of all international migrants
migrated to the United States during this period when their share of total
population grew from 9.1 percent to 13.5 percent.2 Moreover, primarily as
the result of changing U.S. immigration admission policies, the source
regions of international migrants to the United States have drastically
shifted in the past half century: 75 percent of all international migrants in
1960 came from Europe whereas 53.3 percent hailed from Latin America
in recent years (Table 5.1). Such rapidly changing faces have brought fast
changes to places and to the nation in terms of socioeconomic profiles of
residents, changing labor force, local landscapes, and political makeup.
However, the changing international migrant profiles and settlement
patterns have also raised concerns about national identity and about
whether immigrants pose security threats to the United States. In
98 Global Migration
particular, the myth and complaint are that the contemporaneous largely
Asian and Latin American immigrants incline to cluster together spatially,
and that the resulting ethnic enclaves damage immigrant integration and
even pose a threat to society as separate and isolated communities. How-
ever, U.S. immigration history demonstrates historical clustered settle-
ments among immigrant groups were not uncommon, due to their
unfamiliarity with the new environment and the need for social support.
Whether immigrant clusters sustained or dissolved over time have much
to do with their own wills as well as the socioeconomic and political struc-
tures within U.S. society. Therefore, the reasons why immigrants settle in
a clustered pattern and what makes their settlement change over time and
across space are an interesting subject worthy of further research. More-
over, this has a policy dimension on how to debunk this myth and to make
receiving societies fair and just for all residents, native-born and immi-
grants alike.
In this chapter, the U.S. census data (the official statistics of the United
States) will be used to document the changing trends and settlement pat-
terns of international migrants in the United States, and the national
debates regarding immigration. The focus will then shift to presenting a
continuum of immigrant settlement types and their implications for immi-
grant integration, public policy, and the society.
International Migration: Trends, Settlements, and Debates

Changing Faces of an “Immigrant Nation”
U.S. immigration admission policies have shifted drastically in the past
half century: the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act marked a funda-
mental change by eliminating quotas based on racial preference and set-
ting family reunification as the most important selection category (up to
80 percent of annual immigrant quotas). The 1990 Immigration Act, in
response to a rapid globalization trend, emphasized recruiting skilled and
wealthy international migrants by tripling annual employment-base visas
and setting up new visas, for example, H1-B (for skilled temporary
migrants) and EB-5 (for investors). Such important policy changes, cou-
pled with geopolitical events and development or destitution in immigrant
source countries, have facilitated the increasing volume and diversity of
international migrants to the United States, and the resulting “changing
faces,” that is, demographic profiles, of the largest country of immigrants
in the world.
Table 5.1 Population and Migrant Composition in the United States, 1960–2009
Total foreign % FB in % in % in Latin % in % in
Birthplace born Pop Africa FB Asia FB America % in FB Europe FB Oceania FB
2005–20091 37,342,597 12.4% 1,394,088 3.7% 10,066,515 27.0% 19,884,943 53.3% 4,951,980 13.3% 203,721 0.5%
20002 31,107,889 11.1% 881,300 2.8% 8,226,254 26.4% 16,086,974 51.7% 4,915,557 15.8% 168,046 0.5%
19902 19,767,316 7.9% 363,819 1.8% 4,979,037 25.2% 8,407,837 42.5% 4,350,403 22.0% 104,145 0.5%
19803 14,079,906 6.2% 199,723 1.4% 2,539,777 18.0% 4,372,487 31.1% 5,149,572 36.6% 77,577 0.6%
1970 9,619,302 4.7% 80,143 0.8% 824,887 8.6% 1,803,970 18.8% 5,740,891 59.7% 41,258 0.4%
1960 9,738,091 5.4% 35,355 0.4% 490,996 5.0% 908,309 9.3% 7,256,311 74.5% 34,730 0.4%
Total Growth % in American % in

Year population rate Black % in TP Asian5 TP Latino/a % in TP White % in TP Indian TP
2005–20091 301,461,533 7.1% 37,264,679 12.4% 13,201,056 4.4% 45,476,938 15.1% 224,469,780 74.5% 2,423,294 0.8%
20002 281,421,906 13.2% 34,658,190 12.3% 10,242,998 3.6% 35,305,818 12.5% 211,460,626 75.1% 2,475,956 0.9%
19902 248,709,873 9.8% 29,986,060 12.1% 7,273,662 2.9% 22,354,059 9.0% 199,686,070 80.3% 1,959,234 0.8%
19804 226,545,805 11.5% 26,495,025 11.7% 3,500,439 1.5% 14,608,673 6.4% 188,371,622 83.1% 1,420,400 0.6%
1970 203,211,926 13.3% 22,580,289 11.1% 1,538,721 0.8% NA NA 177,748,975 87.5% 827,255 0.4%
1960 179,323,175 NA 18,871,831 10.5% 980,337 0.5% NA NA 158,831,732 88.6% 551,669 0.3%
Sources:
1
2005–2009 data are from American Community Survey, Table C02003 on Population of One Race.
2
1990 and 2000 data are from decennial Census; 1990 data come from 1990 Census of Population CP-1-1 Gernal Population Characteristics of US;
2000 data come from Census 2000 Summary File 1 Table P.7 and Summary File 3 Table PCT19.
3
1960–1980 foreign-born data come from Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, 1999, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population
of the United States: 1850–1990,” Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C. 20233-8800.
4
1960–1980 Race data are from www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab01.xl.
5
1960–1980 Includes both Asian and Pacific Islanders.
Notes: Single race or ethnicity data are used for 2000 and 2005–2009 data; all percentages are calculated based on raw data.
Changing International Migrants and Population

The current debate on immigration largely relates to the “changing
faces” of the country. Table 5.1 showcases changing numbers and source
regions of international migrants, as well as changing racial-ethnic compo-
sition in the United States during the past half century. From 1960 to the
late 2000s, the total foreign-born population grew importantly (from less
than 10 million to more than 37 million, a growth of 284 percent), and
much faster than that of the total population (at 68 percent) for the same
period. The proportion of foreign-born in the total population has steadily
grown from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 12.4 percent in 2009. The group with
the most dramatic growth in both numeric and percentage terms has been
migrants from Latin America (led by Mexicans) with an increase of almost
19 million and 21 times in the past half century. They now constitute the
majority of all foreign-born population in the United States. Asian migrants
grew more than 19 times and by 9.6 million, and now account for 27 per-
cent of all foreign-born and have surpassed the growing pace of Latin
American migrants in recent years. On the other hand, African migrants
grew more than 38 times to 1.4 million and now represent 3.7 percent of
the total foreign-born. All three source regions have benefited tremen-
dously from the 1965 immigration law: in the 1970s alone, the first decade
the law was enacted, immigrants from these three regions increased by
142 percent, 208 percent, and 149 percent respectively. In contrast, the
number and percentage of European migrants declined in the past five
decades, with a 32 percent decrease in population, and from almost three-
quarters in 1960 among all foreign-born they are now merely 13 percent
of the total.
The impacts of increasing numbers and changing source regions of
immigration are also reflected in the changing racial-ethnic makeup of the
nation. Although the percentage of foreign-born in the United States only
ranks 13th worldwide, the influx of international migrants and the birth of
their children and grandchildren have profoundly changed the nation’s
population composition. As late as 1980 non-Hispanic white people still
accounted for 83 percent out of the total population, but were only at 74.5
percent in 2010 and their total number grew by 19 percent, the lowest
among all major racial-ethnic groups. During the same period, the largely
U.S.-born African American population grew by 41 percent, and it is rela-
tively stable in its percentage of the total population. The immigrant-rich
Latino/a and Asian American populations grew, respectively, 211 percent
and 277 percent. Recent estimates indicated that African Americans,
Asians, and Latinos/as accounted for 79 percent of the national population
International Migration and Immigrant Settlement in the United States 101
growth in 2000–2009, especially among the young population.3 Such rap-

idly changing faces of the nation have yielded heated debates centering on
immigration but also on issues such as national identity and dominant
culture, which will be discussed in subsequent sections.
Changing International Migrant Profiles

Beyond the change in numbers and source regions of international
migrants, their demographic and socioeconomic status (SES) also shifted
in recent decades. Table 5.2 documents such changes in the past two
decades and reveals the diversification of contemporary immigration. In
these two decades, the human capital level of international migrants has
become more bifurcated. Overall the education attainment level has
improved with a higher proportion among immigrants possessing at least
bachelor’s degrees, more than five percentage points higher than the U.S.-
born in the late 2000s. However, their proportion with less than high
school education is also higher than the U.S.-born. Their spoken English
capability has declined with higher percentages reporting they have lim-
ited English proficiency (LEP), a group that now constitutes almost half of
all immigrants (Table 5.2).
However, there are large variations among immigrants from different
major source regions: 43 percent of migrants from Asia and almost one-
third from Africa, Europe, and North America have at least bachelor’s
degrees, whereas more than half of Latin American migrants have less than
a high school education. All immigrants from continents other than Latin
America have a large majority with good spoken English capability; Latin
American migrants again fare the worst with 60 percent and more with
LEP. Similar variations exist in SES as well. Reflecting national economic
structure but higher than the U.S.-born population, only small percent-
ages of immigrants engage in the primary sector. All immigrant groups
but Latin Americans have lower percentages than the U.S.-born in this
sector. In contrast, immigrants from Europe and Latin America have higher
percentages working in secondary sectors than the U.S.-born. Across the
board, the percentages of immigrants engaging in wholesale and retail
trade decrease over time and are lower than for the U.S.-born. Among
all immigrant groups, with the exception of Latin Americans, professional
and related services became the number one industry, with Africans
having the highest percentage among all groups. Similarly, occupation
prestige among immigrants has also improved, as managerial and profes-
sional specialty jobs became first among all immigrant groups but Latin
Americans in the 2000s, and their percentages are higher than for the
Table 5.2 Human Capital and SES of Major Immigrant Groups, 1990–2000s
Place of Birth Total foreign-born Africa Asia

Year 1990 2000 06-08 1990 2000 06-08 1990 2000 06-08
1
Education attainment
No high school diploma 41.2 38.2 36.2 12.1 13.6 21.1 24.2 21.1 21.1
Bachelor degree or higher 20.4 24.0 23.3 47.1 42.8 34.2 38.4 43.1 42.5
Self-reported spoken English capability2

Not speak English at all, speak well 47.0 48.5 49.8 23.4 24.3 27.3 49.9 46.5 44.5
or not well
Speak English very well or only 53.0 51.5 50.2 76.6 75.7 72.7 50.1 53.5 55.5
English
Socioeconomic status/SES3
Industry
Primary sector (Agriculture, 4.2 2.6 2.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.5
forestry, fishing, & mining)
Secondary (Construction, 31.1 28.5 27.5 21.5 18.0 18.4 26.6 23.5 20.4
manufacturing, transportation)
Trade (Wholesale and retail) 22.5 14.5 13.3 21.6 15.1 14.7 26.1 16.0 15.2
Other Tertiary sector5 22.7 19.7 20.2 26.5 18.2 16.5 22.2 19.3 19.7
Professional and related services 19.4 26.8 29.0 29.6 38.4 41.8 24.0 30.8 34.3
Other Quaternary sector6 NA 7.8 7.4 NA 9.8 8.1 NA 9.7 9.9
Occupation
Managerial and Professional 22.2 24.9 25.6 36.6 36.2 33.5 31.5 38.4 42.1
Specialty
Service 18.1 20.5 22.9 16.4 19.0 22.5 14.8 15.1 16.4
Technical, sales, and administrative 25.3 23.7 21.9 29.3 28.2 25.9 32.2 27.9 26.5
support
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 18.6 16.5 13.8 11.7 11.7 12.9 12.5 12.1 9.5
Precision production, craft, and 12.0 12.1 13.7 5.5 4.7 4.9 8.1 6.0 5.3
repair
Farming, foresty, and fishing 3.8 2.3 2.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.2
Income (US$)
Median Household income 28,314 39,444 NA 30,907 41,196 NA 35,318 50,554 NA
Per capita income 15,033 21,543 30,225 20,117 25,836 31,977 16,661 26,222 37,349
Notes: unless otherwise noted, all numbers shown in this table are percentages.
Data for 1990 and 2000 are from decennial census, whereas data for 2006–2008 are from ACS, which has
different data collection methods and should be used with caution when making comparisons.
1
Age 25 years and older. Source: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/ppl-160.html.
2
Person 5 Years and older.
3
Foreign-Born Persons age 16+ who had worked within the previous five years.
4
Calculation based on per capita data of Mexico, Caribbean countries, Central America, and South America.
5
Including public utilities, business and repair services, personal services, entertainment, and public
administration; because 1990 data categories “communication and other public utilities” are in one industry
type, 1990 data in this category includes data in the following quaternary category.
6
Including information, communication, finance, insurance, real estate, rental.
102
Total
Europe Latin America North America Oceania U.S.-Born
1990 2000 06-08 1990 2000 06-08 1990 2000 06-08 1990 2000 06-08 2000 06-08
36.5 23.5 21.5 57.9 56.1 50.5 27.4 17.6 18.4 23.0 19.8 22.3 16.7 31.5
18.0 29.2 31.0 9.1 9.6 9.9 22.1 33.3 34.6 24.2 28.6 28.7 24.5 18.2
26.1 27.7 26.1 60.3 61.5 63.8 5.0 5.6 5.7 17.5 17.8 14.9 2.4 1.9
73.9 72.3 73.9 39.7 38.5 36.2 95.0 94.4 94.3 82.5 82.2 85.1 97.6 98.1
1.7 0.8 0.7 7.4 4.5 4.2 2.1 1.3 1.3 2.8 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.8
31.9 25.5 23.6 34.4 33.1 33.2 25.5 21.3 19.6 24.4 22.1 18.5 24.4 22.2
21.1 14.2 13.2 21.5 13.8 12.4 18.7 14.0 12.3 18.7 13.0 12.6 15.9 15.4
22.9 17.7 18.1 22.5 21.1 21.6 24.2 14.8 15.9 26.7 18.2 18.2 18.3 18.8
22.4 31.2 33.9 14.2 22.0 23.6 29.5 37.3 39.5 27.3 33.9 37.9 29.8 32.4
NA 10.5 10.5 NA 5.6 5.1 NA 11.3 11.4 NA 11.5 11.5 9.7 9.4
30.1 35.8 38.1 11.6 12.4 12.4 37.9 44.9 47.8 32.0 35.9 38.6 29.5 30.9
14.5 15.6 17.0 22.3 25.6 28.3 9.5 11.5 11.7 15.8 17.4 18.5 15.7 17.2
27.2 26.8 25.6 19.6 19.9 18.0 33.1 28.2 27.1 29.2 27.1 27.3 31.3 30.5
12.8 10.6 8.8 25.8 21.6 17.8 8.3 7.4 6.4 11.2 11.1 7.6 0.7 0.6
14.1 10.9 10.2 13.9 16.4 19.8 9.8 7.6 6.7 9.3 7.9 7.7 10.4 10.0
1.3 0.3 0.2 6.9 4.2 3.6 1.4 0.4 0.3 2.4 0.5 0.3 12.5 10.9
30,892 42,763 NA NA 33,519 NA 30,186 46,850 NA 35,067 51,425 NA 42,299 NA

20,904 29,747 46,966 10,7404 15,607 21,251 21,904 35,329 54,747 19,200 30,177 38,444 21,592 26,540
Sources:
1990 data come from 1990 Census of Population CP-3-1 Population Characteristics for foreign-born of
United States.
Detailed educational language, household income, and occupational data in 2000 comes from Census 2000
Foreign-Born Profiles (STP-159) http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl
.html
2010 Foreign-born total data come from American Community Survey 2005–2009 detailed tables of
United States, http://www2.census.gov/acs2009_5yr/prod/TablesProfilesSubjectTables/United_States/.
2000 and 2010 detailed data on occupation and industry by birth region come from PUMS data on 2000
census 5% sample and 2006–2008 American Community Survey 3-year estimate sample.
103
U.S.-born. Asian immigrants, in particular, have higher percentages in this

job category than all other groups but North Americans (mainly Canadi-
ans). Among Latin American migrants, managerial and professional spe-
cialty jobs rank second to last. Despite higher job prestige, however,
African and Asian immigrants still earn considerably less per capita
compared to European and North American immigrants, but still more
than the U.S.-born.
Changing Places by International Migration

Immigrants in general are still an urban-bound population. According
to the American Community Survey (ACS) 2007–2009 data, almost
95 percent of all immigrants in the United States settle in metropolitan
areas, which make their spatial distribution at the metropolitan level
more reflective of current geographical change. Table 5.3 shows that atop
the 10 metropolitan areas housing the largest foreign-born population
have been steadily New York, Los Angeles, and Miami in the past two
decades. Among these top 10 metropolitan areas, the drastically growing
ones are the Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth, both in Texas; some other
gateway metropolitan areas, such as Washington-Baltimore and San
Diego, have been losing their edge in accommodating immigrants. Differ-
ences exist among various immigrant groups. New York and Washington-
Baltimore have been the top two metropolitan areas for African immigrants,
despite the rapid growth of the Atlanta and Houston metropolitan areas.
Asian immigrants steadily concentrate in the Los Angeles and Orange
County, New York, and San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont metropolitan
areas, with notable population growth in the Chicago, Houston, and Dal-
las–Fort Worth ones. European immigrants still live in traditional gate-
way, such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles and Orange County;
North American migrants gradually move to the south, notably the Miami
and Phoenix metropolitan areas in the Sun Belt. Latino/a immigrants have
been concentrating in the New York, Los Angeles and Orange County,
and Miami metropolitan areas, but in the meantime increasing numbers
of Latino/a immigrants have settled in the Houston and Phoenix areas.
For Oceania immigrants, the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont area has
gradually become the primary gateway area, whereas San Diego has been
losing its edge among them. Therefore, major traditional gateway metro-
politan areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, still maintained their
status as the biggest immigrant gateway cities in the United States in the
late 2000s; meanwhile metropolitan areas in the south and southwest,
such as Houston, Dallas–Fort Worth, and Phoenix, increasingly attracted
more immigrants to settle, and as such function as new immigrant

gateways.
The spatial distribution of contemporary immigrants has not only
changed at the metropolitan level, but also the settlement of immigrants
has transformed within metropolitan areas as they became increasingly
suburbanized in the past two decades. In the 1990s, immigrant settle-
ments experienced unprecedented spatial change in terms of the rapid
suburbanization process. Although the foreign-born population in central
cities and suburbs had both grown, those in suburban areas increased
dramatically and almost doubled within a decade, much faster than the
growth of the foreign-born population in central cities. This drastic
increase of the suburban foreign-born population compared with the
central city population indicates the accelerating suburbanization of
immigrant settlements. After 2000, this suburbanization process has
been continuously increasing. As Table 5.4 demonstrates, in the 2000s
only 5.4 percent of immigrants lived outside metropolitan areas. Among
the foreign-born population in the United States living inside metropolitan
areas, only 25 percent of them lived within central city perimeters in
2009 (the percentage dropped from 28 percent in 2000), whereas the
rest have chosen to live in suburban areas within the past decade. This
declining share in the inner city and increasing share in suburban areas
among the foreign-born population reflect the continuous suburbaniza-
tion of contemporary immigrant settlements, which has previously been
argued by many scholars.4 Among different immigrant groups, most
experienced a slight decline in terms of the percentage of rural population
and a slight growth in population in metropolitan areas, except Latino/a
immigrants whose rural population increased from 5.7 percent in
2000 to 6.1 percent in 2009, a reflection of their following jobs to
work and live in rural areas. Moreover, among those immigrants in
urban areas, the percentages of the suburban population of most immi-
grant groups has increased in the past decade, whereas immigrants
from North America make up the only foreign-born group increasing their
share of the population living in central cities and declining in suburban
areas.
Several main reasons can be discerned for the suburbanization of con-
temporary immigrants. Immigrants suburbanize as part of the overall resi-
dential suburbanization among contemporary American metropolises.
Changing immigrants’ human capital, SES, and financial resource level
enables certain immigrants to directly settle in upscale suburban areas
with good schools and better amenities. Industrial and commercial subur-
banization, especially those high-tech industries moving to the suburban
Table 5.3 Top Destinations of Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1990–2009
Total foreign-born population African
MSA* 1990 2000 2007–2009 1990 2000 2007–2009
No. 1 Los Angeles New York New York New York New York New York
No. 2 New York Los Angeles Los Angeles Washington Washington Washington
No. 3 Miami San Miami Los Angeles Los Angeles Atlanta
Francisco
No. 4 Chicago MiamiChicago Houston Boston Los Angeles
No. 5 Anaheim Chicago
San Chicago Atlanta Boston
Francisco
No. 6 Washington Washington Houston Atlanta Minneapolis Minneapolis
DC
No. 7 San Diego Houston Dallas Dallas San Francisco Dallas
No. 8 San Dallas Washington Boston Dallas Houston
Francisco
No. 9 Houston Boston Riverside Newark Houston Philadelphia
No. 10 Riverside San Diego Boston Oakland Chicago Chicago
Total U.S.-born population Latin American

MSA* 1990 2000 2007–2009 1990 2000 2007–2009
No. 1 New York New York New York Los Angeles Los Angeles New York
No. 2 Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles New York New York Los Angeles
No. 3 Chicago Chicago Chicago Miami Miami Miami
No. 4 Philadelphia Washington Philadelphia Chicago Chicago Houston
DC
No. 5 Detroit Philadelphia Dallas–Fort Anaheim San Francisco Chicago
Worth
No. 6 Washington San Houston Houston Houston Dallas
DC Francisco
No. 7 Houston Boston Washington Riverside Dallas Riverside
DC
No. 8 Boston Detroit Detroit San Diego Washington Phoenix
No. 9 Nassau Co. Dallas-Fort Phoenix Washington Phoenix Washington
Worth
No. 10 St. Louis Houston Miami Dallas San Diego San
Francisco
Sources:
2007–2009 data come from American Community Survey 2007-09 3-Year Estimates.
2000 data come from Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3).
1990 data come from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 1990 5% sample.
* Only the primary city of each MSA is listed here.
106
Asian European
1990 2000 2007–2009 1990 2000 2007–2009
Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles New York New York New York
New York New York New York Chicago Chicago Chicago
San Francisco San Francisco San Francisco Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles
Washington Washington Chicago Philadelphia San Francisco Boston

Anaheim Chicago San Jose Nassau Co. Boston Miami
San Jose Seattle Washington Boston Washington San Francisco
Chicago San Diego Houston Detroit Philadelphia Philadelphia

Oakland Boston Seattle Washington Detroit Washington
San Diego Houston Dallas Newark Miami Detroit

Honolulu Detroit San Diego Bergen Seattle Seattle
North American Oceanian

1990 2000 2007–2009 1990 2000 2007–2009
Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles San Francisco San Francisco
Detroit New York New York Honolulu Los Angeles Los Angeles
Boston Boston Miami San Francisco Honolulu Honolulu
Seattle Detroit Seattle Oakland New York Sacramento
New York San Francisco Detroit Sacramento Sacramento New York
Anaheim Seattle Phoenix New York Seattle Seattle
Tampa Miami Boston Anaheim Salt Lake City Salt Lake City
San Diego Tampa Tampa San Diego Washington Portland

Fort Phoenix San Francisco Washington Portland Riverside
Lauderdale
Riverside Chicago Chicago Seattle San Diego Dallas
107
Table 5.4 Urban and Suburban Settlement among Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1990–2009
North Latin
Total Africa Asia Europe Oceania
America America
Household Location 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
Not in metropolitan area 5.4 5.4 3.1 2.6 3.6 3.4 6.5 6.4 12.1 10.8 5.7 6.1 9 7.6
Central city 28.3 25.2 34.6 30.2 27.5 24.3 25.9 23.7 14.9 15.1 30.2 26.2 20.7 20.7
1
In metropolitan Outside central city 35.7 37.5 38 41.2 39 41.8 39.4 40.6 37.6 37.2 32.5 34.1 38.7 38.8
area Central city status 30.5 31.9 24.3 26 29.9 30.5 28.3 29.2 35.5 36.9 31.7 33.6 31.6 32.9
unknown2
Sources: 2009 data come from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 2007-09 3-years Estimates; sample Microdata Series (IPUMS) 2000
census 5% 2000 data come from Integrated Public Use.
Notes:
1
Household locations outside a metropolitan area’s central city (or cities), but within the remainder of the metropolitan area.
2
The smallest identifiable geographic unit for the 2000 census 5% sample and for ACS 2007-09 is the PUMA, containing at least 100,000 persons. For
this sample, METRO is derived from the variable PUMATY00. For the 200–20-09 ACS sample, metropolitan classifications are based on metropolitan
boundaries from 2000. Because of the large population threshold, central city status is unknown for some cases in metropolitan areas.
areas, favors highly skilled immigrants as well as attracting those in service

industries. Such shifting job locations prompt immigrants as well as the
U.S.-born to find jobs and live in suburbs. The changing immigration poli-
cies as well as social movements advocating diversity in suburban housing
also contribute to positive impacts on the suburbanization of immigrant
settlement in contemporary America.5
Changing National Debates on International Migration

The rapidly changing faces and changing places in the United States,
the largest and one of the major immigrant-receiving countries in the
world, in the past two decades, inevitably has raised some eyebrows.
The national debates on immigration in the United States are connected
to other receiving countries but also exhibit their own uniqueness.
Parallel Lives and Social Cohesion

Among some major immigrant-receiving countries, especially in Europe
and Canada, one focus of the debates surrounding immigration is on par-
allel lives and social cohesion.6 The notion of parallel lives denotes that
the segregation of immigrants or minorities in residential areas, schools,
and workplaces lead to a separate and different life from the dominant
society. Social cohesion is defined as an “ongoing process of developing
a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity
(. . .) based on a sense of hope, trust, and reciprocity.”7 “Parallel lives”
are deemed to undermine social cohesion. The debate has intensified
as a result of a number of terrorist attacks since 9/11. These terrorist attacks
brought to the forefront issues of integration, or lack thereof, of especially
Muslim migrants and their descendants, and the fear of homegrown ter-
rorists within Western countries, which house large and increasing num-
bers of Muslim migrants. Several well-publicized incidents occurred in
recent years: the cartoon controversy in Denmark involved a published
cartoon demonizing the founder of Islam, which caused furor among
some Muslims across the country and later caused an international politi-
cal issue. The French government restricted Muslim women’s dress
code, which mirrors many Western receiving countries’ concerns on immi-
grants’ cultural and religious traits in relation to their integration into the
receiving society. A former German central bank board member made
remarks accusing Muslim immigrants of refusing to integrate and thus
undermining the receiving country’s future. This caused a huge public
uproar and political discussion on immigration in the country. The recent
anti-immigrant unrest in Sweden, a country that has long been considered

as immigrant-friendly in Europe, resulted in a week-long racial and
ethnic riot, which caught public concerns on immigrant ghettoization
and their cultural integration into the country. The irony, however, is
that such “ghettoization” is in part due to the state’s own policies for
refugee settlement, which place new arrivals in public housing in certain
suburbs.8 The concern is that those concentrated settlements of interna-
tional migrant groups who are deviant in their religious or ideological
beliefs and cultural or behavior norms from the mainstream societies
undermine social cohesion and societal function in receiving countries,
thus posing societal threats. For example, Cantle contests that the high
level of residential segregation will contribute to parallel lives of residents
in different ethnic communities and have detrimental impacts on the
society.9
In the United States, neither parallel lives nor social cohesion are
commonly utilized in academia or mass media, although the essences
of these debates are reflected in the dominant discourses in immigration
studies. This is particularly true in the debates of residential segregation
and around national identity as a result of the changing faces of the nation.
While segregation is tied to parallel lives among different groups, the
notions of “Asianization” or “Hispanization”/“Latinization” as the result of
rapid increase and changing sources of immigration is perceived as a
threat to social cohesion and national identity. More questions remain
to be answered, however. For instance, are segregation and parallel lives
the same or consequential, that is, will segregation lead to parallel lives?
Are segregation and parallel lives “negative or positive,” and to whom?
Is social cohesion the ultimate goal for immigrant integration? And under
what circumstances is social cohesion possible and an utmost goal for a
society? It is impossible to address all these questions in this short chapter.
We, therefore, focus on the studies and debates on social cohesion/national
identity and their manifestations in segregation/parallel lives.
International Migration and National Identity

The biggest and most controversial policy and political debate regard-
ing international migration currently in the United States is on undocu-
mented migration. In the past decade, there has been an unprecedented
increase in the number of undocumented international migrants, report-
edly at 10.8 million as of early 2009 (down from 11.6 million at
the prerecession peak a year earlier).10 Researchers using similar or differ-
ent sources and methods have reached drastically different conclusions
regarding the economic contributions made by, or financial burdens cre-

ated as a result of, undocumented international migration. For instance,
Hinojosa-Ojeda estimates that the proposed comprehensive immigration
reform debated in Congress to provide a pathway for legalization of
undocumented migrants would “generate an annual increase in U.S. GDP
of at least 0.84 percent. This amounts to $1.5 trillion in additional GDP
over 10 years.”11 On the other hand, Camarota estimates that households
headed by migrants in an irregular situation are “creating a net fiscal
deficit of almost $10.4 billion” in 2002 and “if there was an amnesty for
illegal aliens, the net fiscal deficit would grow to nearly $29 billion.”12
Immigrants as a whole are often considered as taking jobs away from
Americans, which includes undocumented low-skilled migrants and
highly skilled international migrants in the form of H1-B visa holders
at both ends of the job spectrum (see the chapter by Gordon in this vol-
ume). In the debates surrounding immigration and its impacts, those
immigrants who do not speak English or who do not speak it well and are
inactive in American civic life and politics are perceived as not accultur-
ated/assimilated. In contrast, those who are active in the political arena
either in massive protests (as in the case of May 1, 2006, march for immi-
grant rights in several major U.S. cities) or electoral politics, and/or have
financial capabilities to do so, are feared for “taking over” our urban areas
or the nation.
Therefore, there are more than just economic arguments for undocu-
mented as well as legal immigration. In Who Are We? The Challenges to
America’s National Identity, the late Samuel Huntington argued that “Amer-
icans should recommit themselves to Anglo-Protestant culture, traditions
and values” as the core for American identity even “long after the WASP-
ishers descendants of its founders have become a small and uninfluential
minority.” The need for such recommitment is that he considered, among
other reasons, “the salience and substance of this culture were challenged
by a new wave of immigrants from Latin America and Asia” in the late 20th
century. Huntington was also concerned that recent demographic trends
indicate that by the late 21st century Anglo-Americans would be the
minority population in the United States.13 As such it is widely perceived
that the “changing faces” of the nation are a challenge to the American
national identity, if not a threat to U.S. society. As well, this notion can be
seen as advocating “cultural cohesion,” or a dominant culture, as the foun-
dation of national identity. Therefore, there is a need to deconstruct the
immigration discourses and search for the connections of national identity
in changing America, and how such debates are manifested spatially with
different immigrant segregation levels and settlement forms.
Segregation and Immigrant Communities

Segregation research has been persistent in social science, including
studying both forced and voluntary segregation. A large portion of the
research has focused on the causes and consequences of the segregation of
African Americans in urban areas, including both urban ghettos and sub-
urban concentrations, as the result of the legacy of slavery, racial discrimi-
nation, and urban spatial structure. The analyses and debates surrounding
the historical legacy and contemporary reflection run deep and broad in
academia and media. Societal conditions and institutional racism have
made segregation of African Americans a prolonged and profound phe-
nomenon in U.S. society.14
The debates on whether segregation of immigrant communities poses
societal threats are often informed by academic research on degrees of
concentration or separation/segregation based on available statistical and
spatial data analyses including census data–based analyses, as well as on-
the-ground observation of, or participation in, immigrant lives in such
ethnic concentrations. These debates, spatial, socioeconomic, cultural, or
political in nature, sometimes become lost to sight in the measurements
themselves, without fully comprehending and thoroughly examining the
dynamics and reasons for which such concentrations are bounded by and
contribute to.
Contemporary segregation between immigrant groups and white Euro-
pean Americans is a major subject that has been prevalent in American
academia. However, historically white European immigrant groups them-
selves were also highly concentrated and segregated from other ethnic
groups. For example, in the early 20th century the Irish were clustered in
New England, where seven out of the 11 cities with the largest Irish-born
population in the nation were located. Similarly, Chicago then housed the
largest number of Swedish Americans with 150,000 strong, which counted
for 9 percent of the city population. There was a lively “Swede Town” with
“a large mass of exclusively Swedish signs, that Anderson, Petterson, and
Lundstrom were here conducting a Swedish general store, a Swedish
bookshop, a Swedish beer saloon.”15
The study on segregation of immigrants is closely tied to that of assimi-
lation (see the chapter by Modood in this collection), a dominant ideology
in U.S. immigration studies. A high degree of segregation between immi-
grant and dominant groups is seen as hindering immigrant assimilation to
American society, whereas a low degree of or no segregation is often per-
ceived as a sign of successful assimilation socioeconomically as well as
spatially. Classic straight-line assimilation theory by the Chicago School of
Sociology in the early 20th century adopted the plant ecological term of
“invasion and succession” to describe new immigrant groups, upon arrival,
often concentrated in inner-city cheap housing and segregated from main-
stream society. Over time and across generations, these immigrant groups
achieved upward mobility socioeconomically by moving up the societal
ladder and spatially by moving out to the suburbs (known as “spatial
assimilation”).16 The older immigrant ghettos or enclaves in inner cities
would then be occupied by newer waves of immigrants who repeated the
same process, something common among European immigrants. The
assimilation theory got a revamp in the late 20th century with the seg-
mented assimilation theory.17 It attests that immigrants assimilate to differ-
ent American societal segments with three different outcomes: those who
still follow classic time-honored straight-line assimilation; those who
assimilate to the American underclass stuck in poverty; and those who are
economically assimilated but socioculturally maintain their ethnicity dif-
ferently from the dominant white European American mainstream. This
rejuvenated theory has been widely examined and tested among different
groups, places, and countries.18 Observed deviation from the three-prong
pattern includes those assimilated culturally but not economically, for
instance, the Filipinos/as in the United States.19
Regardless of whether segmented assimilation best or adequately cap-
tures today’s immigration reality and integration to American society, this
theory has spatial implications in terms of what degree of segregation and
what forms of communities there are among contemporary immigrants in
the United States. Darden and Fong, while comparing 10 metropolitan
areas each in Canada and the United States in the early 2000s, reject the
spatial assimilation theory as they found out that among the six immigrant
groups they examined in the United States, Asian Indians were the least
segregated whereas Iranians were the most segregated from the white
European population, with Chinese, Filipinos/as, Latinos/as, and those
from the Caribbean somewhere in between. Moreover, such differential
degrees of residential segregation do not perfectly align with their socio-
economic statuses (SES) either, as the groups’ SES rank, from high to low,
Asian Indians, Iranians, Filipinos/as, Chinese, Caribbean, and Latinos/as.20
Logan differentiated immigrant communities from ethnic enclaves, describ-
ing the former as middle- and upper-class immigrants voluntarily forming
concentrations whereas the latter as those who are low-income and less
educated and who form concentrations without many choices.21
We will focus the remaining sections of our chapter on the Chinese
immigrant settlements. We select this group because it has the longest
immigration history and remains the largest among U.S. Asian groups. It
has been racialized from historically being a “middleman minority” in the

American South to contemporarily being depicted as a “model minority”
in the American white versus black racial hierarchy. Despite much smaller
in numbers than Mexicans, immigrant Chinese are nevertheless fourth
among all foreign-born groups in the American labor force,22 and a rather
bifurcated group in human capital as well as in SES. Moreover, the Chinese
historically have one of the most segregated settlement forms, such as Chi-
natown, as well as the whole spectrum of contemporary settlements,
which altogether make Chinese immigrants somewhat unique but also
representative of the diversifying immigration in the United States.
Changing U.S. Immigrant Settlements and Consequences

More than 160 years ago the first wave of Chinese immigrants arrived
in the Port of San Francisco to join the California gold rush. Since then,
with the exception of the 61-year-long state-sanctioned Chinese exclusion
era from 1882 to 1943, there have been about 100 years that their num-
bers have kept growing and community forms evolving. Each community
form, from those concentrated in inner cities or suburbs to no concentra-
tion at all, develops with particular sets of dynamics and has different
impacts and implications.
Chinatowns—Ethnic Ghettos to Enclaves

In the eyes of mid-19th-century Americans and European immigrants,
the first wave of Chinese immigrants was culturally probably not different
from today’s Muslims in the Western world: they dressed so differently in
traditional Chinese dresses and men had braids required by the then–Qing
dynasty government. They spoke a different language (various forms of
local dialects in Guangdong Province) that almost no one else understood,
and believed in a different religion, Buddhism, that few could compre-
hend. They were largely tolerated during the gold rush although a “foreign
miner tax” was imposed on them; they were even desired and recruited by
the Central Pacific Railroad Company and other employers as labor was in
high demand during the building of the Wild West. However, as soon as
those goals were accomplished and they started competing against other
laborers in the urban labor market, a political movement on the platform
of “the Chinese Must Go” rose and they were scapegoated for taking away
Americans’ and European immigrants’ jobs and being deemed unassimi-
lated.23 They were pushed to retreat to segregated inner-city neighbor-
hoods as sanctuaries, including the nation’s largest and oldest Chinatown
in San Francisco. These Chinatowns were among the most segregated his-
torical neighborhoods in the nation. To mainstream society, Chinatowns
were characterized as racialized minority ghettos occupied by isolated,
inassimilable, and perpetual foreigners. Thus, mainstream society’s per-
ceptions of Chinatowns were usually associated with images of unsanitary
and overly dense neighborhoods filled with gambling, prostitution, gang-
sters, and other crimes. Thus, historically, Chinatowns in the United States
were portrayed and described with a full range of negative connotations.24
To people outside Chinatown, residents in historical Chinatowns surely
lived a “parallel life” as the largely male Chinese residents (as a result of
both Chinese cultural tradition and the U.S. discriminatory laws against
Chinese female migration) had few interactions with the outside world. In
San Francisco, the Chinese residents stayed within Chinatown’s perime-
ters as venturing out of it resulted in violence against them.
However, this is not to suggest that they were in complete social isola-
tion or that they had taken their fate at face value. The Chinese fought and
won some important legal battles all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court
whose rulings have had profound impacts on all racial-ethnic groups even
today. For instance, the 1886 Yick Wo v. Hopkins case ruled that the imple-
mentation of a San Francisco city ordinance by the Board of Supervisors
who refused to issue operating permits to any Chinese laundries had racial
overtones and violated the equal protection clause in the 14th Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution; and the 1898 Wong Kim Ark v. US ruling
declared that all children born in the United States were American citizens
regardless of whether their parents were eligible for naturalization or not.25
As such, the apparently parallel-lived early Chinese immigrants, who by
law were unable to become U.S. citizens, nevertheless intricately became
involved with the U.S. legal realm and politics. On the other hand, the
dozens of U.S. Chinese exclusion laws during this period made them the
first group of “irregular migrants” crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, which
resulted in border patrols and raids.26
Contemporary Chinatowns in major U.S. cities are drastically different
from those of more than 100 years ago. The Immigration Act in 1965
enabled record numbers of Chinese immigrants to be united with their
family members who already had been living in the United States for gen-
erations. Chinatowns thus experienced their renaissances due to the influx
of newly arrived immigrants. Continuously functioning as a “port of entry”
for new immigrants, contemporary Chinatowns in metropolitan areas
have been viewed as geographical areas for contests between forces of
transnational capitalists and labor migrants, including those who are
undocumented. Chinatowns possess economic potential for newly arrived
immigrants to find jobs and make a living, but they are also local mani
festations of global economic forces, as transnational corporations and
capitalists make investments and displace poor and old immigrants.
Chinatowns are still considered as ethnic enclaves, where the Chinese,
largely those with lower SES, comprise the majority of the residents who
live densely inside an area of a few blocks. Chinese-owned businesses and
signs dominate street scenes, and often serve and promote Chinatown as a
tourist site.27
The San Francisco Chinatown, rightfully or wrongly referred to as the
informal capital city of Chinese America, is dubbed as an example of a
global ethnopolis.28 By 2009, within the six census tracts that were officially
assigned as Chinatown by the city of San Francisco, Chinese composed
more than 76 percent of the population. The 2000 Census data show that
among these Chinese residents, 85 percent were born in foreign countries,
73 percent have less than a high school diploma, 86 percent have jobs in
nonprofessional occupations with merely 7.0 percent self-employed, and
most of them have very low household income. Moreover, these residents
are overwhelmingly renters (95 percent) living in multiunit rental housing
(89 percent), which was mostly built before 1950 (86 percent). Hence, the
San Francisco Chinatown is undoubtedly an enclave with low social-eco-
nomic status. However, this long-lasting enclave is not socially or eco-
nomically isolated from, or a threat to, American society. In fact, it has
become the breeding ground for generations of Chinese American political
leadership inheriting the historical legacy of involvement in fighting for
immigrant rights and civil rights. Two of the four current San Francisco
city and county supervisors of Asian American background, David Chiu
(elected the president of the Board of Supervisors) and Jane Kim, used to
work in the Chinatown Community Development Center, a community
organization widely credited as training a pipeline of community organiz-
ers and future political leaders.29 As a result of recent elections, both San
Francisco and Oakland, each with a large Chinatown, currently have a
Chinese American mayor for the first time in history.
Satellite Chinatowns? “EthniCities”30

After WWII, waves of Chinese foreign students obtained mainstream
jobs after graduation from college, while U.S.-born Chinese Americans
started to move to the suburbs, which altogether formed a dispersed set-
tlement pattern. However, global geopolitics (e.g., political uncertainties
in Taiwan and Hong Kong regarding their respective future) started to
Table 5.5 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics in Selected Areas,
2000s*
Chinatown, Flushing, Rowland Fremont, Chandler,
SF NY Hts, CA CA AZ
Demography
Population (total): 2005–2009 15,761 250,949 47,864 200,932 242,522
Non-White Population 13,665 134,876 36,769 125,654 50,689
(total): 2005–2009
% African American in total 1.5% 3.0% 1.2% 3.0% 4.3%
Pop: 2005–2009
% Asian American in total 83.8% 42.3% 55.2% 46.6% 6.7%
Pop: 2005–2009
% Latino in total Pop: 2.2% 17.3% 30.6% 14.2% 22.3%
2005–2009
Chinese Population (total) 12,326 42,059 14,015 28,744 2,159
2000
Chinese Male (total) 5,571 20,705 6,808 13,995 1,031
Chinese Female (total) 6,755 21,191 7,207 14,749 1,128
Chinese Population: 12,096 61,611 17,052 34,678 4,131
2005–2009
Chinese % among Non-White 88.5% 45.7% 46.4% 27.6% 8.1%
2005–2009
Chinese % in Total 76.7% 24.6% 35.6% 17.3% 1.7%
2005–2009
Place of Birth
Foreign Born among 84.9% 82.1% 79.9% 72.4% 68.5%
Chinese population
Households (total) 2000 8,133 89,553 14,193 68,302 62,289
Non-White Households 6,635 38,172 13,507 31,361 11,368
(total) 2000
Chinese Households (total) 5,839 13,320 4,204 9,009 762
2000
Chinese Households % 88.0% 34.9% 31.1% 28.7% 6.7%
among Non-White
Chinese Households % in 71.8% 14.9% 29.6% 13.2% 1.2%
Total
Educational Attainment
No schooling completed 23.3% 6.0% 1.6% 1.5% 0.1%
Less than H.S. diploma 50.2% 24.6% 9.6% 8.1% 8.7%
H.S. diploma/GED 11.7% 20.8% 17.0% 8.4% 13.3%
Some college/A.A. degree 8.2% 16.2% 24.1% 17.4% 19.2%
Bachelor’s degree 5.5% 21.6% 30.6% 33.4% 22.2%
Master’s or higher degree 1.2% 10.8% 17.8% 31.3% 36.5%
(Continued)
Table 5.5 (Continued)
Chinatown, Flushing, Rowland Fremont, Chandler,
SF NY Hts, CA CA AZ
Employment
Chinese Occupation % Category
% High Tech 0.9% 6.3% 4.1% 11.3% 6.5%
% Professional 13.3% 26.2% 34.3% 39.1% 57.2%
% All others 85.8% 67.5% 61.6% 49.6% 36.3%
Chinese % Self-Employed 7.0% 10.5% 15.5% 9.3% 11.6%
Chinese % Labor Age 52.9% 74.2% 80.5% 76.6% 73.0%
Population
Chinese % Full-Time 92.6% 89.0% 84.5% 90.7% 66.2%
Employment
Chinese Average Household $22,932 $49,858 $60,437 $104,920 $91,577
Income 1999
Housing
Chinese % Homeowner 4.6% 54.0% 69.8% 77.8% 79.7%
Chinese % Renter 95.4% 46.0% 30.2% 22.2% 20.3%
Chinese % Housing Type
Owner-occupied, 1 unit in 0.4% 20.3% 69.5% 73.1% 70.5%
structure
Owner-occupied, 2–4 units 2.2% 10.5% 1.5% 1.2% 0.0%
in structure
Owner-occupied, >4 units in 2.1% 21.1% 0.6% 1.8% 0.0%
structure
Renter-occupied, 1 unit in 4.6% 8.0% 10.1% 9.2% 3.2%
structure
Renter-occupied, 2–4 units 6.7% 11.2% 6.7% 2.4% 2.8%
in structure
Renter-occupied, >4 units in 82.9% 28.4% 11.6% 12.3% 23.6%
structure
Chinese Age of Housing
1995–2000 0.3% 3.1% 12.8% 16.7% 44.4%
1990–1994 0.9% 2.4% 6.3% 8.3% 26.0%
1990–2000 1.1% 5.5% 19.2% 25.1% 70.4%
1980–1989 3.5% 9.9% 32.1% 32.9% 20.4%
1970–1979 3.0% 11.3% 24.9% 22.6% 2.4%
1960–1969 6.0% 20.2% 20.2% 12.5% 4.1%
Before 1960 86.3% 53.1% 3.6% 4.7% 2.8%
Sources: 2000 U.S. census data SF4; 2005–2009 ACS five-year estimates.
Note: * all data are 2000 unless otherwise noted. 2000 census and 2005–2009 ACS data
cannot be directly compared.
The table is modified from Table 4 in Li and Zhong, 2009, “Geographic Distribution and
Settlement Patterns: Chinatown and Suburban Concentrations,” pp. 17–27 in Policy
Research Office of the Overseas Chinese Affairs ed. New Perspectives on Chinese and
Chinese Americans in North America. Beijing, China: Overseas Chinese Press (in Chinese).
prompt well-off Chinese immigrants to seek safe havens for their families
and investments in American cities and suburbs. This stimulated the ini-
tial small-scale residential and commercial concentrations out of China-
town but within the central city. It signified the start of transforming
Chinese settlement patterns, mirrored by the emerging Chinese communi-
ties and capital flowing into the declining neighborhoods, such as Flush-
ing in Queens or Brooklyn, New York, and the Richmond District in San
Francisco. They are customarily referred to as “satellite Chinatowns,” as
the Chinese population grows out of the congested inner-city Chinatowns
and leaps forward to other areas in the city. When “satellite Chinatowns”
are initially developed, the Chinese residents still rely on inner-city China-
town for jobs, shopping, and socialization.31 These communities often
have lower population density and a lower percentage of Chinese popula-
tion, and the Chinese residents’ SES is higher than those in Chinatowns
but lower than those living in suburbs. Table 5.5 represents some charac-
teristics of Chinese Americans living in Community District Seven of New
York City’s outer borough Queens County, which includes Flushing neigh-
borhoods. They reveal the characteristics of the Flushing community such
as relatively low socioeconomic status, old housing stocks, a high percent-
age of households as renter-occupied, and comparatively low educational
attainment (30.6 percent without a high school diploma). The general
socioeconomic status of the community is an intermediate level between
inner-city Chinatown and the suburbs. Moreover, by 2009, Chinese immi-
grants in New York had been continuously concentrating in Flushing,
whereas the population of Chinese in lower Manhattan, Chinatown, had
declined since 2000.32
These communities have evolved under dynamics that are different
from early Chinatowns. They emerged as a result of an influx of post-1965
immigrants characterized with heterogeneity in their source regions (from
various parts of China or other places in the world), mother tongues (dif-
ferent dialects), and socioeconomic status. While many came because of
the family reunification clause in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act to reunite with their families, others were professionals or business
people seeking a safe haven for their investments and/or a better future for
themselves and their children. Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs and
investors heavily invested and set up businesses along the then-deteriorating
or vacant Main Street.33 According to a Taiwanese immigrant banker, a
group of them saw the opportunity and decided to buy businesses block
after block to safely land their investment.34 Scholars analyzed this type of
newer Chinese concentrations and reached the conclusion more than 20
years ago that they are “Chinatown No More.”35 This type of immigrant
settlement is more diverse compared to Chinatowns in terms of popula-

tion composition. Flushing, for instance, has been cited as the example of
Asianization and Hispanization in the past two decades with percentages
of both groups increasing in the 2000s.36 This diverse community also
produced the first ever Asian American representative on the New York
City Council, John Liu, an immigrant himself, who was elected to repre-
sent District 20 in Queens in 2001. By 2009, he became the first Asian
American who ever won a citywide office and now serves as the comptrol-
ler of the city of New York.37 In contrast, despite longer history and politi-
cal involvement in the Manhattan Chinatown area, the first Chinese
American representing their district was not elected until 2009. The first
ever Chinese American Congress member representing New York City was
elected in 2012.
Multiethnic Suburbs: Ethnoburbs

Increasing immigrant settlement accompanied by a thriving Pacific Rim
economy is reflected on the landscape in terms of multiethnic suburbs or
“ethnoburbs,”38 where Chinese have a noticeable presence. The newly
emerged ethnic settlement form is demographically composed of new
immigrants as well as U.S.-born persons of various racial-ethnic back-
grounds. It is also economically fueled by immigrant businesses and their
transnational financial connections with Asia, such as the ethnoburbs in
San Gabriel Valley in suburban Los Angeles, or by economic restructuring
that facilitates high-tech and tertiary industries, such as ethnoburbs in
Silicon Valley.
In major metropolitan areas, these ethnoburbs emerged as “ports of
entry” for new immigrants instead of, or in addition to, traditional China-
towns. In other words, Chinese settlements have become multicentered in
the same metro area. Transnational settlement patterns are prominent in
ethnoburbs. Dubbed “flying trapeze” or “spacemen,” these transnational
entrepreneurs have homes in both Asia and the United States while con-
ducting business and frequently traveling across the Pacific Rim and
beyond. Their families live in “astronaut/split households” with husbands
in Asia and wives/children in the United States, or their children become
“parachute kids” who live alone without their parents present. Issues
related to wealthy Chinese immigrants, who build and live in “monster
houses,” have generated heated debates in some upper-class neighbor-
hoods.39 Rowland Heights, an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County,
and the city of Fremont in the San Francisco Bay Area are two good exam-
ples of ethnoburbs, although they are formed with somewhat different
dynamics. Both of them possess suburban characteristics such as single-

family detached houses, higher home ownership rate, relatively high
household income and educational levels (48.4 percent of Chinese immi-
grants in Rowland Heights and 64.7 percent of those in Fremont have at
least a college degree), yet with a high percentage of immigrants in the
population. However, the transnational-trade prominent Rowland Heights
and high-tech concentration of Fremont also differ in terms of the percent-
age of the labor force in high-tech industries or holding professional jobs,
and the percentage of the labor force that is self-employed. Moreover,
Rowland Heights also has a higher percentage of Chinese in both total
population and number of households (see Table 5.5 relevant columns).
Located in the eastern part of the San Gabriel Valley, Rowland Heights,
formerly a white-dominant middle-class suburb, has experienced drastic
demographic change in the past three decades. Before 1980, 78 percent of
the total population in Rowland Heights was white. During the 1980s,
however, a large number of Korean and Filipino/a Americans moved to
this suburb, making 30 percent of the population Asians, including 11
percent Chinese residents. The ethnic profile became further diverse after
1990 when more wealthy and middle-class Chinese families continued to
settle in. One of the reasons for the inflowing Chinese Americans is the
development of an industrial agglomeration of high-tech firms and small
businesses in areas adjacent to Rowland Heights, such as City of Industry
and Diamond Bar. The increasing number of businesses attracts many
skilled Chinese immigrants seeking jobs in eastern San Gabriel Valley and
attracts transnational entrepreneurs opening their import/export busi-
nesses to share infrastructures. Thus both these skilled Chinese migrants
and transnational business owners started to settle down. Rowland
Heights, with spacious and relatively newer housing stocks (51 percent
built after 1980; see Table 5.5), a quiet living environment, a beautiful
hilly landscape, and most importantly, a previous immigrant settlement
that provided a relatively welcoming environment, became one hot spot
for Chinese families to live in. Table 5.5 shows the percentage of whites at
Rowland Heights dropped to 23 percent in the total population for the
first time, whereas Chinese increased to 36 percent of the population—a
percentage that almost tripled in the past two decades. Different from the
suburbanization process of Chinese Americans, the emergence of Rowland
Heights as a new Chinese residential concentration is also largely due to
the new immigrants directly settling in Rowland Heights: around 80 per-
cent of the Chinese at Rowland Heights are foreign born and according to
the 2000 Census, 41.2 percent of them entered the United States from
1990 to 2000, which indicates almost half of the Chinese in Rowland
Heights are new immigrants. Moreover, among these new immigrants in

the past decade, 56 percent of them arrived in the United States after 1995.
In addition, the new immigrants, usually with higher socioeconomic sta-
tus than the previous immigrants, started to settle down in suburban areas
such as Rowland Heights as their first stop at the United States, not only
to seek better occupations with their professional skills, but also to open
transnational businesses with their financial capital. Thus, Rowland
Heights, as a multiethnic suburb, gradually became the “port of entry” of
contemporary Chinese immigrants.
Up north in the San Francisco Bay Area, Fremont is the fourth largest
city after San Jose, San Francisco, and Oakland. It was not incorporated
until 1956; and its biggest firm, a GM plant, opened in 1963 (which was
later turned into a Toyota joint-venture, closed down during the late 2000s
financial crisis as the last automobile assembly plant in California, then
reopened as an electric car manufacturer). Until then, the area was largely
occupied by farms and orchards with a total population of around 20,000.40
Today this city is the home of about 1,200 high-tech, life science, or clean
technological firms and part of the Silicon Valley.41 About 47 percent of the
city’s residents are Asian Americans, both Asian Americans and Chinese
rapidly growing since 2000 (Table 5.5). It has been dubbed “Global Sub-
urb” or “Little Asia” by mainstream media. With some high-quality schools,
the city has attracted suburbanized Chinese Americans and newly arrived
Chinese immigrants alike. The real estate prices around the prestigious
Mission San Jose High School went up drastically and prospective resi-
dents overbid one another in order to live in the vicinity so their children
could attend that school. Asian American parents mounted protests in
early 2000s when a proposal to redraw school district boundaries would
result in some students being put in a less well-performing local high
school. This and other contentious debates also prompted more Asian
Americans to become directly involved with local electoral politics, which
makes it an example of an ethno/technoburb.42 The five-member Fremont
Unified School District Board of Education has two Chinese Americans
(including the vice president), and one of the current city council mem-
bers is another Chinese American.
“Uptown” Communities: Invisiburbs?

Some Chinese American communities display a dispersed pattern,
yet the cultural and social ties and institutions still connect coethnics
together. Kwong (1987) first raised the idea of downtown versus uptown
Chinese American communities—in New York City “downtown” refers to
Manhattan Chinatown whereas “uptown” refers to the suburban well-off

Chinese whose disperse settlement pattern fits the assimilation model.
These “uptown” Chinese exhibit a scattered spatial pattern, living near
their jobs and good schools. Such communities can be identified as
“invisiburbs,” that is, invisible ethnic suburbs (such as Austin, Texas).43
The eastern suburb of the Phoenix metropolitan area—the city of Chan-
dler—can be considered a good example. Chandler is home to a small
number of Chinese Americans, whose percentage among the total popula-
tion and households is barely 1.7 percent and 1.2 percent respectively
(Table 5.5). A high percentage of these Chinese residents are connected
to high-tech industries and many work in professional occupations with
substantial incomes. Their proportion of the foreign-born population is
also lower than those in other Chinese American communities shown
in Table 5.5.
In the past two decades, however, the rapid economic growth of the
Phoenix metropolitan area has been coupled with the growth of Chinese
immigrants in Chandler. Specifically, from 1990 to 2000, Chandler’s Asian
American community growth, in terms of percentage of the Asian popula-
tion compared with the total population, ranked the third highest among
cities in the Phoenix metropolitan area. This rapid growth of the Chinese
population in Chandler was mainly a result of the high-tech industry
boom during the 1990s, which attracted a large group of Asian immigrants
settling in East Valley suburbs.44 Consequently, the Chandler Chinese resi-
dents are largely professionals, and they are perceived by a city official as
“assimilated without any problems.”45 Their settlements do not demand
spatial concentration, resulting in the spatial outcome of a Chinese “invisi-
burb.” Although the residential patterns of Chinese in Chandler are spa-
tially dispersed and to some extent “invisible,” ethnic businesses and
services still prefer to agglomerate to attract more coethnic clients, which
makes ethnic commercial landmarks recognizable. For example, in 1998,
the Asian store Lee Lee Oriental Supermarket moved from Mesa to Chan-
dler to seek the larger customer market.46 The supermarket soon became
one of the largest pan-Asian supermarkets in Phoenix with more than 50
employees, which later attracted more than 10 restaurants into the same
plaza and adjacent corners, making the site “an ethnic hub” of the subur-
ban Phoenix metropolitan area. Thus, although the residential concentra-
tion is not spatially apparent, the emerging and rapidly developing ethnic
businesses in a way reflect the rapid population growth of Chinese immi-
grants in Chandler, Arizona.
Despite the scattered residential pattern, invisiburbs are not immune to
the heated national and local immigration debates as well as governmental
policies. There was an infamous police raid of suspected undocumented

migrants in Chandler in 1997. In response, the city passed a 1999 ordi-
nance that only allowed police to check immigrant status for serious crime
suspects. This ordinance was appealed in February 2010 by the City
Council “to allow the Police Chief the authority to change immigration
enforcement procedures.”47 Furthermore, the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070
law in spring 2010 could affect immigrants’ perception of the locality as
well as their choices for where to settle. The general public is concerned
about whether executing the SB 1070 immigration law would result in
racial profiling, and another new Arizona law that prohibits ethnic studies
in K–12 public schools.48 Both of these laws may impact low-skilled
undocumented immigrants’ and highly-skilled migrants’ settlements,
especially for immigrant families who have relatively high spatial and
social mobility. Similar cases happened at Farmers Branch, Texas, where
long-term white middle-class residents adopted community policies to
exclude immigrant residents moving in, as a way to defend the commu-
nity’s white middle-class status.49
In summary, the past decade presented a consistency of, as well as dis-
tinction from, the immigration trend since the late 1960s. The accelerated
globalizing economy has presented a newer stage since the 1990s, which
consequently affected those developed countries by cutting labor costs by
moving labor-intensive sectors overseas while attracting investors and
employing a relatively higher-skilled labor force, resulting in diverse immi-
grant characteristics. The spatial outcome of this new immigration, accom-
panied by the well-established Chinese American population, made
contemporary Chinese settlements a continuum that represent and mani-
fest a globalization trend, including Chinatowns as “global ethnopoles”
and suburbs as “EthniCities,” ethnoburbs, and “invisiburbs.”
Social Cohesion, Parallel Lives, and Immigrant Communities

How does such a spectrum, or continuum, of U.S. Chinese settlements
relate to the social cohesion and parallel lives debates? For the question
of whether segregation leads to parallel lives, the answer is probably, at
least in historical times—when the Chinese laborers were legally barred
from immigration, when all Chinese immigrants could not become natu-
ralized citizens, and when they were forced by de jure and de facto discrimi-
nation policies and practices to segregate them into Chinatowns, they
lived a “parallel” life. It was drastically different from the mainstream soci-
ety, even when they were involved in the society in different ways, such as
legally challenging discriminative laws and their settlements serving as
tourist attractions. The issue at stake, then, is whether such a parallel life
is perceived as a threat to mainstream society. When the Chinese lived
their own lives and were not interacting with the outside world, the
Chinatown ghettos were left alone. But when social vice and disease were
perceived to spread out of Chinatown and the Chinese themselves, and
had negative impacts on Euro-Americans, there were cries about the
menace of Chinatowns.
The continuum of immigrant communities presented in the previous
section reflects today’s reality in terms of spatial forms and degree of con-
centration. None of them are static but fluid and can change along either
direction: immigrants either become less concentrated or more concen-
trated over time. The direction in which a particular community evolves
depends on the volume, human capital level, and socioeconomic status
of new immigrants, local responses (both policies and daily actions in
facilitating or discouraging such settlements), and the opportunities and
challenges beyond the particular communities/areas in question. A low
immigrant inflow is less likely to cause further concentration of existing
immigrant communities. A large inflow of highly educated immigrants
with good command of English and professional careers may or may not
yield to further concentration of existing communities or create new ones,
depending in part on what they choose to do. The former are in the case
of ethno/technoburbs like Fremont, and the latter in invisiburbs like Aus-
tin. Increasing a large inflow of the family reunification type of immigrants
who have either low human capital levels or whose human capital is not
fully recognized or utilized in the United States is likely to yield further
concentration due to lack of choices or alternatives, as in the case of Chi-
natowns and older ethnoburbs such as Monterey Park in Los Angeles. If
receiving contexts are perceived as welcoming, such as government assis-
tance, help by community organizations, and positive interactions with
neighbors, immigrants may incline to congregate in such communities.
On the other hand, if there is tough legislation targeting immigrants or
with perceived and real racial profiling, immigrants tend to steer away
from these communities.50 What happens outside these communities also
influences the way they evolve; better job and/or housing opportunities or
better school choices in other areas may prompt migration out of existing
immigrant concentrations and reduce their density.
At both ends of the immigrant community continuum, there are some
forms of community cohesion. For instance, enclaves are more or less “cohe-
sive” ethnically, whereas invisiburbs are somewhat cohesive socio
economically. In the middle of the spectrum, there is less “community
cohesion” but rather the need for more cross-group interactions due to
diverse demographics, socioeconomic characteristics, cultural traditions, and

political pursuits. The old social order has been altered as a result of changing
faces and places, and establishing a new one requires negotiations and power
sharing, and may be painful for many or perceived as threats by some.
Are immigrants in these different forms of communities in the spectrum
living parallel lives? The degree of differential cultural and community
lives compared with those of mainstream society decreases in terms of
scope and degree from Chinatowns to invisiburbs, but does not necessar-
ily diminish. Such differences may be cultural, economic, political, and/or
social. Do parallel lives harm social cohesion? The answer may lie in the
societal desire and requirement: historically segregation/parallel lives of
minorities and immigrants reinforced the dominant societal structure and
as such enhanced “social cohesion.” Contemporarily, the diversity brought
in by waves of new immigrants from different cultural, racial, and religious
backgrounds and source countries may challenge the very notion of
national identity, and solutions vary. For instance, during the 2010 Cen-
sus, the U.S. Census Bureau spent considerable financial resources to place
advertisements in non-English media, including print, radio, and TV, in
reaching out to the “hard-to-count” population, including immigrants
who do not understand or speak English, in order to ensure their partici-
pation in the census count. Additionally, ethnic media themselves and vol-
unteers donated time and resources to educate new immigrants and other
minorities about the U.S. census process and its importance. These non-
English ethnic media outlets themselves are often cited as indicators of
immigrants living parallel lives and not integrating into the mainstream
society. We should pause and ask, did the Census Bureau, the prime statis-
tical agency for the U.S. federal government, in so doing promote immi-
grants’ parallel lives, or rather utilize venues not available in the mainstream
media to serve the changing societal needs? Do ethnic media only contrib-
ute to the social isolation of immigrants, or also provide them an outlet to
learn about their new homeland and assist them to integrate into it?
In conclusion, from an academic perspective, it is useful to continuously
measure the degree of segregation/separation among different groups and
the various spatial forms of, and the lives within, immigrant communities;
in addition to searching underlying causes and possible solutions. From a
policy perspective, various forms of immigrant settlement and communities
are here to stay and evolve, maybe in different directions. It is more
imperative to understand the natures and consequences of immigrant
communities, to ensure equal opportunity for all, to provide a conducive
working and living environment, to eliminate discrimination in various
forms and degrees, to provide motivations and incentives for two-way
integration, to promote a just society for all residents, and to introduce

policy interventions in order to achieve such goals.
Notes
1. We prefer to use the term “international migrants” rather than “immigrants”
although they may be used interchangeably at times, given that the former
includes all the foreign-born population in the country: naturalized U.S. citizens,
legal permanent residents, people who are on temporary visas, as well as the
undocumented.
2. Calculation based on http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp
3. Sabrina Tavernise, “In Census, Young Americans Increasingly Diverse,” The
New York Times, February 4, 2011, accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/02/05/us/05census.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y
4. Richard D. Alba et al., “Immigrant Groups in the Suburbs: A Reexamination of
Suburbanization and Spatial Assimilation,” American Sociological Review 64 (1999):
446; Wei Li, ed., From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in
Pacific Rim Countries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); Audrey Singer,
Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds., Twenty-First Century Immigrant
Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2008).
5. Daniel Hiebert and David Ley, “Assimilation, Cultural Pluralism, and Social
Exclusion among Ethnocultural Groups in Vancouver,” Urban Geography 24
(2003): 16–44; Wei Li, Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).
6. Jan Rath, “Debating Multiculturalism Europe’s Reaction in Context,” accessed
July 7, 2013, http://hir.harvard.edu/print/debating-multiculturalism?page=0%2C2
7. Dick Stanley, “What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research
Perspective of the Federal Government’s Social Cohesion Research Network,”
Canadian Journal of Sociology 28 (2003): 7.
8. Steven Erlanger, “Burqa Furor Scrambles French Politics,” The New York Times,
August 31, 2009, accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01
/world/europe/01france.html?_r=2&ref=muslim_veiling; Michael Slackman, “Ger-
man Banker Resigns Amid Outcry,” The New York Times, September 10, 2010,
accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/europe/10
germany.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail0=y; Kevin Sullivan, “E-mail, Blogs, Text
Messages Propel Anger Over Images,” The Washington Post, February 9, 2006,
accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2006/02/08/AR2006020802293.html; Colin Freeman, “Stockholm Riots Leave
Sweden’s Dreams of Perfect Society Up in Smoke,” The Telegraph, May 25, 2013,
accessed December 25, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
sweden/10080320/Stockholm-riots-leave-Swedens-dreams-of-perfect-society-up-in
-smoke.html
9. Ted Cantle, “Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review

Team” (Home Office, London, 2001).
10. Michael Hoffer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unau-
thorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009,”
accessed December 28, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publi
cations/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf
11. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raising the Floor for American Workers The Economic
Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Washington, DC: Center for Ameri-
can Progress American Immigration Council, 2010), p. 2.
12. Steven A. Camarota, “The High Cost of Cheap Labor Illegal Immigration
and the Federal Budget,” accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.cis.org/articles/2004
/fiscal.pdf
13. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National
Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. xvii; Samuel P. Huntington, “The
Hispanic Challenge,” Foreign Policy (March 4, 2004): xvi.
14. Ron. J. Johnston, Michael Poulsen, and James Forrest, “Moving On from
Indices, Refocusing on Mix: On Measuring and Understanding Ethnic Patterns of
Residential Segregation,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010): 697;
Ceri Peach, “‘Ghetto-Lite’ or Missing the G-Spot? A Reply to Johnston, Poulsen
and Forrest,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010): 1519; Richard
Wright, Steven Holloway, and Mark Ellis, “Reconsidering Both Diversity and
Segregation: A Reply to Poulsen, Johnston and Forrest, and to Peach,” Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (2011): 167.
15. Roger Daniel, Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in
American Life (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011, 2nd ed.), pp.142, 170.
16. Caroline R. Nagel, “Rethinking Geographies of Assimilation,” The Profes-
sional Geographer 61 (2009): 400.
17. Alejandro Portes and M. Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented
Assimilation and Its Variants,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 530 (1993): 74.
18. For example, “Special Issue: Theorising Integration and Assimilation,” Eth-
nic and Racial Studies 33, 7 (2010).
19. Philip Q. Yang, Asian Immigration in the US (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
2012).
20. Joe Darden and Eric Fong, “The Spatial Segregation and Socio-economic
Inequality of Immigrant Groups,” Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities,
eds. Carlos Teixeira, Wei Li, and Audrey Kobayashi (Don Mills, ON: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012).
21. John R. Logan, Richard D. Alba, and Wenquan Zhang, “Immigrant Enclaves
and Ethnic Communities in New York and Los Angeles,” American Sociological
Review 67 (2002): 299.
22. CBO (Congressional Budget Office), “The Role of Immigrants in the U.S. Labor
Market: An Update,” Congress of the United States, accessed July 26, 2013, http://
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11691/07-23-Immigrants_in_Labor_Force.pdf
23. Iris Chang, The Chinese in America: A Narrative History (New York: Viking,
2003), p. 3; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian
Americans, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Little, Brown, 1998).
24. Kay Anderson, Vancouver’s Chinatown Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875–
1980 (Montreal, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991); Michael S. Laguerre,
The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown, and Manilatown in American Society
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
25. Chang 2003, op. cit.
26. Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era,
1882–1943 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
27. Peter Kwong, The New Chinatown, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang,
1996); Jan Lin, Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change (University
of Minnesota Press, 1998); Min Zhou, Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an
Urban Enclave (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
28. Laguerre 2000, op. cit.
29. Gerry Shih, “Mayor Lee Leads Growing Asian-American Clout,” The New
York Times, January 15, 2011, accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/01/16/us/16bcmayor.html?tntemail1=y&_r=1&emc=tnt&pagewanted
=all
30. The term originally appeared in Curtis C. Roseman, Hans-Dieter Laux, and
Gunter Thieme, eds, EthniCity: Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Change in Modern
Cities (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
31. Kwong 1996 and Lin 1998, op cit.; Min Zhou, Contemporary Chinese Amer-
ica: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation (Philadelphia: Temple
32. Ford Fressenden and Sam Roberts, “Then as Now—New York’s
Shifting Ethnic Mosaic,” The New York Times, Jan 22, 2010, accessed July 26,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/23/nyregion/20110123-nyc-
ethnic-neighborhoods-map.html?scp=5&sq=Jan%2022%20New%20York%20%
20Flushing%20Chinese&st=cse
33. Christopher Smith, “Asian New York: The Geography and Politics of
Diversity,” International Migration Review 29 (1995): 59.
34. Author interview, 1999.
35. Hsiang-Shui Chen, Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary
New York (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
36. Christopher J. Smith and John R. Logan, “Flushing 2000: Geographic
Explorations in Asian New York,” in From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New
Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries, ed. Wei Li (Honolulu, HI: University of
Hawaii Press, 2006), Table 5.
37. http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/comptroller/bio.shtm
38. Wei Li, “Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: The Chinese Ethnoburb in
Los Angeles,” Urban Studies 35 (1998): 479.
39. Li (2009), op. cit.
40. http://www.museumoflocalhistory.org/oldmuse/history6.htm
41. http://www.fremont.gov/index.aspx?NID=184
42. Wei Li and Edward Park, “Asian Americans in Silicon Valley: High Technol-
ogy Industry Development and Community Transformation,” in From Urban
Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries, ed. Wei
Li (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).
43. Peter Kwong, The New Chinatown (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987); Emily
Skop and Wei Li, “From the Ghetto to the Invisiburb: Shifting Patterns of
Immigrant Settlement in Contemporary America,” in Multi-Cultural Geographies:
Persistence and Change in U.S. Racial/Ethnic Geography, ed. John W. Frazier and
Florence L. Margai (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2003); Wilbur
Zelinsky and Barrett A. Lee, “Heterolocalism: An Alternative Model of the Socio-
spatial Behaviour of Immigrant Ethnic Communities,” International Journal of
Population Geography 4 (1998): 281.
44. Alex Oberle and Wei Li, “Divergent Trajectories: Asian and Latino Immi-
gration in Metropolitan Phoenix,” in Suburban Immigrant Gateways: Immigration
and Incorporation in New U.S. Metropolitan Destinations, eds. Audrey Singer, Susan
Hardwick, and Caroline Brettell (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998).
45. Author interview, 2001.
46. Amanda Chan, “Lee Lee Becomes an Ethnic-Foods Hub,” The Arizona
Republic, June 29, 2009, accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.azcentral.com
/arizonarepublic/arizonaliving/articles/2009/06/29/20090629leelee0629.html
47. http://www.chandleraz.gov/newsrelease.aspx?N_UID=1582
48. Nicole Santa Cruz, “Arizona Bill Targeting Ethnic Studies Signed into Law,”
The Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2010, accessed July 26, 2013, http://articles
.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512
49. Caroline B. Brettell and Faith G. Nibbs, “Immigrant Suburban Settlement
and the ‘Threat’ to Middle Class Status and Identity: The Case of Farmers Branch,
Texas,” International Migration 49 (2011): 1.
50. Gabriel J. Chin et al., “A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate
Bill 1070,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 25 (2010): 47; Arizona Legal
Studies Discussion Paper No. 10-24, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1617440; Li 2009, op. cit.
Part III
Myth: Migration always harms the prospects of developing coun

tries by causing a brain drain.
Even though it is beyond doubt that the exit of a large number of

workers may have negative repercussions in the sending societies, the four
chapters in this section show that the relationship between migration and
development is complex. Migration can have both positive and negative
consequences for economic development in countries of origin, depending
on the nature of the migration and the links it establishes between sending
and receiving countries.
In particular the “brain drain” phenomenon has been widely discussed
by scholars and policymakers since the mid-1960s. From the developing
countries’ perspective, the emigration of skilled individuals has been seen
as a threat to economic development. Yet, as shown by several authors in
these chapters, skilled migration is not an unconditional bad thing for
developing countries sending migrants to developed countries. In fact, the
sending of remittances and the return of migrants with new skills can off-
set the loss of migrants and may even lead to a “brain gain.” Yet, as shown
by Hercog and Siegel as well as by Sarkar and Sharma in their chapters,
restrictive measures aimed at forcing return by limiting options for perma-
nent settlement are likely to be counterproductive. Instead, incentive mea-
sures such as the opening of possibilities for longer and productive stays
for labor migrants and students can be an effective means for tying skilled
migration with development goals. Such long-term migration can more-
over come to the benefit of both sending and receiving societies. Accord-
ing to Rottas and Givens, the brain drain discussion not only locks
developed and developing countries in unnecessary conflict, it also masks
much of the potential benefits that would come from a more cooperative
global regime of high-skilled migrants.
The sending of remittances is an important way for long-term migrants
to contribute to economic development and alleviate poverty in their
countries of origin. Even though it is a misconception that remittances
always exert positive impacts on an economy, since their effect depends on
the country’s real economy and the way remittances are used (see the
chapter by Oda), overall they provide a crucial source of income for devel-
oping countries that often represents more than half of a country’s GDP.
CHAPTER SIX
High-Skilled Migration
A New Way Forward for Europe, the United States,
and the World
Andrew Rottas and Terri Givens
Introduction: Transatlantic Cooperation and Competition

The public debate surrounding immigration has always been susceptible
to the formation of myths. Immigration policy and enforcement capture
the public’s attention like few other issue areas—but outcomes are filtered
through a complex labyrinth of legal and political actors. This makes it
easy for misinformation, whether accidental or purposeful, to spread. This
is especially true in the area of high-skilled immigration. With interested
and well-funded actors on both sides of the debate about the flows of
high-skilled migrants, and with an often relatively opaque system (even by
the byzantine standards of the world of immigration policy), myths about
flows and outcomes of high-skilled immigration have been quick to
propagate.
In the United States and Western Europe, understanding several of these
myths is especially critical to clarifying the role of high-skilled immigration
in these countries and the world at large. The first two myths have been
essential to creating the myth of necessary conflict between states over
high-skilled immigration. The first myth is that skilled immigrants make
up a small percentage of immigration as a whole. This perception of
educated migrants as an extremely rare and exceptional commodity makes

competition seem inevitable.1 The second myth is that “brain drain” means
that skilled immigration is an unconditional bad thing for the developing
countries sending immigration to developed countries.2 This myth not
only locks developed and developing countries in unnecessary conflict, it
also masks much of the potential benefits that would come from a more
cooperative global regime around high-skilled migrants. The third myth is
that America is losing the race for skilled immigrants. This perception is
built on the extreme zero-sum mentality created by the first two myths.
Understanding the reality of global high-skilled migration flows in recent
years makes the case that the European Union and the United States
have more room for partnership than the current popular understanding
would allow. The fourth myth addresses the perceived necessity of conflict
of interest between native high-skilled workers in the United States and
Western Europe and highly skilled immigrants and, with them, arguments
that high-skilled immigration might undermine competitiveness in the
long run. The final myth reinforces that immigration policies do not
exist in a vacuum by addressing claims that any particular developed state
stands to benefit developing countries or, to a lesser extent, its own native
high-tech workers, by slashing high-skilled immigration flows. In combi-
nation, these myths have helped to shade the potential for positive global
outcomes associated with the migration of highly skilled immigrants.
Overcoming these myths is an essential first step for moving global man-
agement of skilled migration in directions that will benefit all actors
involved.
One final and important note: it is not the goal of this chapter to develop
an exact formula for the number of high-skilled immigrants that any given
state should pursue. Nor is it the goal of this chapter to conclusively state
whether high-skilled immigration is “good” or “bad” for any specific party.
There is a great deal of empirical work on both of these questions, and we
do not seek to replicate these efforts. Rather, this chapter addresses com-
mon misconceptions in the dialogue around high-skilled migration and
notes where the popular dialogue around this issue diverts significantly
from work done on these questions. Finally, we will offer a few potential
implications for bringing the dialogue around high-skilled immigration
more in line with the issues as they are currently understood.
What Is a “Highly Skilled” Migrant?

Though high-skilled immigration is a term that has been used extensively
in the debate on immigration, its definition is still not the subject of total
High-Skilled Migration 135
consensus. Though the general idea—workers with specialized skills

developed either through professional training or education—is largely
agreed upon, specific measures vary from study to study and government
to government. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms “high-skilled”
and “skilled” migrants will be used interchangeably and should be taken
to refer to immigrants with tertiary education, or skills equivalent to a
tertiary education. This is an intentionally broad definition, to encompass
as much of the discussion about the topic as possible while still staying
within the generally understood meaning of the term. A wide range of
studies and organizations use variations on this definition, and it is the
standard most often turned to by the world’s governments when measur-
ing the flows of these workers around the world.3
One characteristic that we are largely setting aside for the time being is
the placement or wages of the immigrant in the receiving country. Some
studies4 have included this factor, and it is certainly an important compo-
nent of determining how efficiently a receiving country is making use of its
highly skilled immigrants. And, in many of the developed countries, immi-
gration quotas reserved for high-skilled immigrants are linked to the acqui-
sition of a high-skilled job in the receiving country. However, there are
countries that select on “skill”—usually education—levels without requir-
ing (or even necessarily intending) to place those immigrants selected in
high-skill jobs. As such, to include this as necessary in the definition would
exclude a relevant portion of the phenomena that this chapter will discuss.
Myth 1: High-skilled immigration is a “niche” area of immigration, as highly skilled

immigrants account for a very small portion of migration flows in the
United States and Western Europe.
In the United States and Western Europe, both the public and policy-
makers tend to treat high-skilled immigration as separate from immigra-
tion more generally. In both regions, support for the immigration of highly
skilled workers is consistently higher than support for immigration in
general.5 Benjamin Johnson, executive director of the American Immigra-
tion Council, notes that, in the United States, “too often the immigration
debate is driven by images on television of people jumping over fences.
The debate has been stuck in the idea that it’s all about illegal and low-
skilled workers.”6 In Europe, meanwhile, Thilo Sarrazin (at the time a sit-
ting board member of the German central bank) struck a chord with
conservatives with his claims that immigration was making Germany
“dumber”: that the “limited education of immigrants—coupled with their
high birth rate—meant Germans are becoming dumber in a simple way.”7
However, the division between “immigration” and “high-skilled immi-

gration” is not nearly as stark as these statements would lead one to believe.
Highly skilled immigrants are not, in fact, an exceedingly rare component
of overall migration flows. In the United States, for example, in the 1980s,
migrants with a college degree made up less than a fifth of the population
of working-age immigrants. Migrants without a high school degree, mean-
while, represented almost 40 percent of that population. However, accord-
ing to a recent report from the Brookings Institute, now almost 30 percent
of the population of working-age immigrants have at least a college degree.
This is actually higher than the proportion of immigrants who do not have
a high school diploma. And this ratio is relatively low when compared to
other states that have put less of an emphasis on family reunification and
more of an emphasis on the skills of incoming immigrants. In the United
Kingdom, highly educated immigrants represent more than 10 percent
greater a share of the population of immigrants than do immigrants with a
low level of education.8 In Germany, meanwhile, the share of immigrants
with a college degree has increased from 30 percent in 2005 to 44 percent
today.9
To put it plainly, high-skilled immigration has become a major compo-
nent of immigration in the developed world. The popular political debate
has largely lagged behind this development. While increasing the ratio of
high-skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants is a viable policy goal
for those who choose to pursue it, painting a picture of a two-tiered system
with masses of uneducated immigrants contrasting with a handful of
select, well-educated ones is, at best, a relic of a bygone era. (This, of
course, leaves aside entirely the fact that most countries of immigration
need a balance of both types of immigrants to fill their labor market.) This,
in turn, means that rhetoric that paints the contest for high-skilled immi-
grants as an intensely zero-sum one is similarly out of date. Decades ago,
when any state could hope to capture only a small number of highly edu-
cated immigrants, a slight increase in the success of one state could leave
another state at a serious disadvantage. Today, though, developed states
around the world are bringing in highly educated immigrants at an unprec-
edented rate.
Myth 2: Migration from developing to developed countries is best characterized as

a “brain drain”—a high-cost, low-benefit proposition for developing nations.
Both the United States and Western Europe have been criticized for
perpetuating the “brain drain.” This is the argument that the West’s demand
for highly educated workers draws the “best and the brightest” workers
from the Third World, which slows the development of human capital in
these states. Admittedly, brain drain is something of a loaded term, with
implicit assumptions about economic and social welfare, both individually
and globally. Furthermore, some object to it because it minimizes the
agency of the migrants choosing to leave the sending country. However, it
is a phrase that has significant impact on the public debate, and it is thus
especially important to discuss when evaluating public conceptions and
myths about high-skilled migration.
Evidence of the importance of brain drain in the public debate about
high-skilled migration is readily available: Canadian Minister for Demo-
cratic Reforms Tim Uppal recently expressed concerns about the impacts
of brain drain from India to Canada.10 The brain drain has been discussed
recently as a threat to states as varied as Russia,11 Cuba,12 Israel,13 and Tai-
wan.14 This phenomenon has even been decried in legislation that was
adopted in the U.S. Congress in 2013. Among the declarations of policy
goals in H.R. 656 from 2013 is the following passage:
helping to reverse the so-called “brain drain” or emigration of skilled, edu-

cated persons from Africa, particularly in the science and technology, edu-
cation, and health sectors—a phenomenon that threatens to imperil African
productivity, economic growth, and global competitiveness necessary to
improve development and human welfare in Africa and undermine United
States interests in having robust and growing African countries with which
to foster enduring economic and political partnerships.15
There are certainly legitimate concerns about the significant flows of

high-skilled migrants from the developing world to the developed. It is
not a myth that there are likely some negative outcomes to the developing
world in losing workers in which so much has been invested. In one clear
example, the flow of medical professionals from countries desperately in
need of their services to developed countries is a serious cause for con-
cern.16 And these concerns are made worse by the amount of money that
developing states spend educating these citizens, only to lose them to
developed states after, or in the late stages of, their training. Studies have
found that the losses associated with just the loss of doctors in sub-Saha-
ran Africa could climb into the billions of dollars.17 Much of the early
study of brain drain argued that distortions similar to this had a significant
negative impact on the labor markets of developing countries, and that
these distortions were where most of the costs associated with brain drain
could be found.18 Clemens and Pettersson provide a more recent version
of this argument,19 where economic stagnation in Kenya, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe in the 1990s and early 2000s is linked to the emigration of

significant numbers of physicians. Similarly, an implicit connection is
drawn between the emigration of health care professionals and political
instability in countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Angola.
While there are clearly downsides to these migration flows, recent stud-
ies have made a convincing case that there are also some very significant
benefits. Comparisons between the costs and benefits of these flows are
not so conclusive as to call the entire concept of brain drain a myth. And,
in fact, even if the benefits far outweighed the negative impacts, there is no
reason to lose sight of concerns surrounding the undesirable consequences
of the brain drain on developing states. However, as the examples above
demonstrate, much of the popular and political discussion of high-skilled
immigration from less developed to developed states has remained fixated
almost entirely on this early understanding: around the idea that the
migration of high-skilled workers from developing to developed countries
is entirely negative for developing states. There are several reasons to
believe that this is not likely to be the case.
Even skeptics of the benefits of this type of migration concede that it is
“highly likely” that these flows provide a global net benefit for welfare.20
The reasoning behind this is fairly simple: the benefits of migration to a
developed country for the migrants themselves are so overwhelmingly
high that it would take enormous costs elsewhere (likely to the developing
state) to cancel those benefits out. Given the consistently mixed results of
studies on the impact of these flows on developing countries, however, it
is unlikely that such a conclusive cost, at least of that magnitude, exists.21
However, truly challenging this myth does not hinge on whether there are
benefits of migration to the immigrant, but rather whether there are ben-
efits of this type of migration to the sending state. This leads to a key ques-
tion: how likely are at least some of the benefits of migration to any
particular high-skilled immigrant to find their way back to the sending
state?
Recent studies do, in fact, indicate that more highly skilled immigrants
remit at a higher level to their sending state. Early studies seemed to indi-
cate that there was no relationship between the skill level of the migrant
sent and the amount of remittances returned to the sending state.22 How-
ever, these studies relied merely on country-level data, making it impos-
sible for them to separate the impact of education from the impact of
characteristics of the relationship between sending and receiving states. A
recent study in the World Bank Economic Review used microdata, which
allowed them to separate the impact of education on remittances for each
migrant. This innovation shows a strong positive relationship between
level of education for a migrant and the amount that they remit, condi-
tional on whether they remit at all.23 Combining these impacts shows an
overall positive effect, though these impacts are highly variable by destina-
tion. This study provides strong evidence that, on the whole, developing
countries are likely to bring in significantly more remittances by sending
out more qualified workers. While this finding does not completely allevi-
ate the concerns raised by brain drain, it does demonstrate that developing
states can at least expect an increased return for their investment in skilled
migrants, even if they do migrate to the developed world.
These positive findings do not come without cautions, though. A recent
UN report warned that many of the countries that have been most harmed
by brain drain, and which would benefit most from the remittances high-
skilled workers generate, also have some of the least efficient mechanisms
of transferring funds back home. The total remittances sent to sub-Saharan
Africa in 2010 could have generated an additional $6 billion for recipients
if transfer costs were just at the global average.24 Of course, as startling as
that figure is, it also contains another important fact. While the costs of
educating and losing high-skilled migrants are high, as discussed above,
the potential benefits can be even higher. Correcting these problems could
help both the sending and receiving states to maximize the benefits of
high-skilled immigration, without depriving the migrant of the substantial
gains of migration. There is a second positive impact on developing coun-
tries that has been understated in the popular and political discourse sur-
rounding brain drain. Recent analysis has demonstrated the ways that
return migration, in which highly skilled migrants travel to a more devel-
oped state for a period of time, gaining skills and/or income, and then
return to their country of birth, can help to balance the negative impact of
the absence of those skilled workers for the time of their emigration.25,26
This phenomenon can occur both with student and professional immi-
grants. This study predicts that this phenomenon is likely to occur under
existing conditions. As an important side note, these conditions do include
substantial limitations on available work opportunities in host countries,
as exist in most Western states. Additionally, they require that the skills
developed by the migrants be highly desired in their country of birth.
However, neither of these requirements exceeds parameters that should be
expected to be maintained for the reasonable future.
However, the measurable benefits of this phenomenon have been
extremely limited. One survey of immigrants who had a faculty appoint-
ment in chemistry, biochemistry, or engineering in the United States
before 1993 found that slightly less than 10 percent of the migrants were
likely to return to their home country before the age of 65.27 Furthermore,
those immigrants who were doing better in their field (as measured by
publications) were less likely to return to their home country. There is
no question that this is a particularly difficult case for the likelihood of
return migration. This is because this particularly group represents some
of the immigrants who have made the most success in the United States,
and who would thus be least likely to return to their home country. How-
ever, it offers reasons to be less optimistic about the rate of general return
migration, especially among the most talented and highly prized skilled
workers.
Even beyond this skepticism, though, there is another important factor
that might blunt the impact of return migration. Even when immigrants
do engage in return migration, the benefits of that decision to the country
of birth can be severely mitigated by the specific details of the return case.
One study of English-speaking Caribbean immigrant communities found
that return migration often occurs at the end of a worker’s cycle of produc-
tivity—frequently late enough that they are at or near retirement age in
their country of birth. As a result, these workers come with relatively out-
of-date skills, little contribution to the workforce, and professional net-
works and links that are not likely to be of much use to the country of
birth.28
Finally, a third underappreciated benefit of high-skilled migration may
actually be essential to the long-term development of highly skilled work-
ers in developed states. The significant gains available through migration
that become available, with education, to the potential immigrant in the
developing country act as a tremendous incentive to complete that educa-
tion. Different studies estimate different rates at which high-skilled work-
ers from average developing countries leave. While skilled emigration
rates vary at a high rate from region to region, studies have placed the
global rate between 7 and 8 percent.29 By region, rates of emigration for
workers with a tertiary education can range from closer to 5 percent for
South America, South Asia, and Eastern Europe to more than 40 percent
in the Caribbean.30 At either level, that represents a significant loss of
investment in human capital for these countries. However, while signifi-
cant, these flows beg a prior question: what would the available pool of
educated migrants look like without the incentive that the possibility of
migration provides?
A study in the Journal of Development Economics makes the case, both
theoretically and empirically, that this incentive is essential to fostering
interest in education in developing states.31 While this study argues that
some version of the brain drain effect exists, and it can have significant
consequences, especially where the developed state reliably picks off the
best available workers from the developing state, it comes after a brain
gain effect. This is where students motivated by the possibility of being
one of the relative few able to experience the tremendous welfare gains of
migrating to the developed world choose to pursue advanced education
that they otherwise would not have. Even though the developed states
take a nontrivial number of those who complete their education, the
developing state is still left with more educated workers than it might have
otherwise seen.
However, the ability of developed states to more effectively select the
best candidates for skilled migration from developing states can under-
mine the logic of brain gain detailed above. If citizens of developing coun-
tries are confident that only the most exceptional students stand a chance
of migration, it reduces the incentive for marginal students to further their
studies.32 This is an area where the interests of developed and developing
states are truly opposed—developed states would like to select only the
best candidates. Currently, of course, there are many reasons to doubt
whether existing immigration systems in developed countries do so at a
great enough rate to trigger this effect. However, this risk should be kept
in mind as developed states compete to “improve” their selection mecha-
nisms to choose only the most exceptional candidates. A maximally effi-
cient filtering system might end up decreasing the number of high-skilled
workers to all nations in the long run.
These conditions all offer significant optimism for the long-term impact
on the sending country of the migration of their highly skilled workers to
other countries. However, all of these potential benefits come with con-
cerns about how they actually apply to the real world. Each of them relies
on at least some degree of policy cooperation from the receiving countries,
as well as efforts by the countries of birth to capitalize on the available
opportunities. However, competition between developed countries for
skilled immigrants offer incentives for each country to defect on these
policies.
This fact leads to an important conclusion for developed countries
interested in maintaining the flow of skilled immigrants: there is far more
room, if not a serious need, for cooperation between developed and devel-
oping countries in this area than has been evidenced to this point. These
myths have masked an important point: the United States and the Euro-
pean Union have serious incentives to cooperate. There is potential for a
classic “tragedy of the commons” problem in the area of high-skilled immi-
gration. This could occur as developed countries race to pick off the best
of the high-skilled migrants, and in doing so, they simultaneously run the
risk of undermining the mechanisms that have created a stronger pool of
migrants that they all enjoy. By working together and with developing
countries, they can achieve a more optimal outcome for all parties.
Myth 3: The United States is losing the contest for high-skilled immigrants.
Of course, the choice for highly skilled immigrants is usually not only
between a single developed country and their home country. Highly skilled
immigrants are, certainly at least relative to most immigrants, able to
choose between potential destinations. While the particular myth we have
chosen to display here is that the United States is losing the contest for
high-skilled immigrants, it is a myth created by a common issue in West-
ern Europe and the United States—a poor understanding of what the
global movement of skilled migrants looks like. As a result, myths about a
country’s performance in recruiting highly skilled immigrants (and usually
myths that portray the state of the home country’s ability to attract these
immigrants as dire) spring up frequently.
The title of Vivek Wadhwa’s new book, The Immigrant Exodus: Why
America Is Losing the Race to Capture Global Entrepreneurial Talent, perfectly
captures the tone of these dire warnings.33 Other American observers who
have warned of a waning American advantage in attracting highly skilled
immigrants include Fareed Zakaria34 and a recent report from the Kauffman
Foundation.35 New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the Partnership
for a New American Economy make the following statement on their
website: “The country that attracts the world’s best, brightest and hardest-
working will lead the global economy. America has long been that country.
But our broken immigration system has put that status in jeopardy, creating
obstacles for existing businesses and driving new ones overseas. The time
has come to fix our immigration system, renew our economy and keep the
American Dream alive.”36
However, others do not seem to believe that Europe is doing much bet-
ter. Articles in the United Kingdom have warned of a British brain drain,
with skilled professionals “fleeing” the country.37 Their concern is only
matched by Germany, where articles warn that “skilled immigrants opt for
Britain over Germany.”38
While there are arguments for and against raising and lowering the level
of highly skilled workers in any country, these levels of panic have little
grounding in reality. As discussed above, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany have all drawn record-high percentages of their
recent immigrants from those with college degrees or higher. While the
recent global economic downturn decreased the numbers of skilled
migrants into many countries, they also decreased the number of migrants
in total. Certainly, any of these states could draw higher levels of skilled
immigrants than they do today, given different policy choices. But this has
little to do with competition from other developed states. As mentioned
above, the United States is drawing higher percentages of skilled immi-
grants than it ever has before. There is no doubt that most developed
countries take fewer high-skilled immigrants than they could possibly
attract, but this is a choice of policy rather than a consequence of scarcity.
In fact, the United States has maintained its numbers of students and
skilled workers in recent years, while Europe has seen its share grow.39
Because the available supply of highly skilled migrants continues to grow
rapidly,40 attempts by countries to woo skilled immigrants have not proven
zero sum. Between 2000 and today, China and India have added over a
million college graduates in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and
math) fields.41 These expanding fields more than outpace the increased
rates at which developed countries have recruited these workers.
Admittedly, not every new addition to the high-skilled market is of the
quality that appeals to leading firms. Obviously, there is some degree of
zero-sum competition for the limited pool of the top talent in the world.
Just as clear, though, is that the global labor force is providing the skilled
workers that developed states need, as long as they are willing to reach out
and find them. In this sense, dire reports about the need for high-skilled
immigrants should focus less on the possibility of losing immigrants to
other countries and more on finding the correct policy to meet the needs
of the receiving country. Ideally, reducing the emphasis on competition
between states would allow for a more sensible discussion about designing
a global labor migration regime that benefits all parties—including send-
ing states. And meeting these needs means not only finding the best avail-
able migrants in the short term, but building a sustainable system that
encourages the development of high-skilled workers around the globe.
It is in this way that the oft-admired “points system” policy of Canada,
which has been held up as a desirable example for other developed states
to follow, may not, in fact, be a good model for other states. Canada selects
heavily based on education and professional skills, and takes more skilled
workers than they have the ability to employ in positions that will require
these skills. While this has led to Canada being able to attract more skilled
immigrants than might be expected, it violates many of the principles dis-
cussed above. Were all states to follow this example, the impacts on the
sending states would be severe. In the end, it could lead to a decreasing
pool of skilled labor available to all states.
The first step to replacing much of the unnecessary competition between
the United States and the European Union in this area with mutually
beneficial cooperation is to address these myths head on. These myths

have combined to create unnecessarily intense levels of conflict between
the United States and the European Union, which, in turn, has the poten-
tial to create suboptimal outcomes across the area of high-skilled immigra-
tion. A better understanding of the realities of global high-skilled migration
flows today, as well as the ways that states can benefit from cooperation
around these issues and of the adverse consequences conflict can bring for
all involved, could lead to better outcomes for all involved.
Myth 4: The presence of highly skilled immigration can do nothing but

hurt native highly skilled workers, and disincentivizes native students
from pursuing these paths of education and training.
There is strong evidence that an influx of highly skilled workers can
have serious negative consequences for native workers with the same
skills. At saturation levels, the presence of imported competition has been
shown to lower wages for native workers in the same field.42 This is a seri-
ous consequence of high-skilled migration, and one that receiving coun-
tries must be careful to manage. This has led to a concern that the ability
of migration flows to depress wages will cause students not to pursue edu-
cation in these fields, eventually leaving the receiving country worse off
than it would have been without the importation of highly skilled work-
ers. However, the accounting ledger for the impact of high-skilled migra-
tion on native high-skilled workers does not end with that fact. High-skilled
workers in a country benefit from strong migration flows of highly skilled
workers in several ways—ways that have the potential to balance out a
short-term depression of wages to leave the native high-tech industry
stronger than before.
The first, frequently cited, benefit of the importation of high-skilled
workers is that these immigrants tend to far outpace the native population
when it comes to job creation.43 These jobs have empirically been concen-
trated in these same high-tech industries in which the immigrants have
developed skills. This means that bringing in highly skilled immigrants is
likely, in the long term, to increase the availability of high-skilled jobs
available. This high demand for workers could help recoup some of the
downward pressure on wages originally brought by migration. Addition-
ally, the growth of the industry will encourage native workers to pursue
these skills.
Second, because of social network effects, the presence of high-skilled
immigrants tends to concentrate geographically in specific regions.44 This
confers a labor market advantage on that region, which helps it to develop
a cluster of high-tech industry. These clusters can be a significant advan-

tage to that region and, with it, the receiving state. Developing a cluster
“brand” and grouping businesses together can help to make all of the busi-
nesses more competitive and, in doing so, can strengthen the industry.
These geographical clusters can then lead to increased innovation and
improve technical education in the area.45 This is known as a “Silicon Val-
ley” or “Cambridge” effect—not surprisingly, two areas with particularly
high concentrations of highly skilled immigrants. These advantages, in
turn, help to spur the receiving country to produce new technologies, bet-
ter products, and more well-trained workers. These effects can push back
against the consequences of short-term wage decreases, helping to solidify
long-term growth in high-tech industries and in the native production of
high-skilled workers. By strengthening the global brand of a country, it can
also help to increase the value of its workers around the world. In this way,
a properly managed high-skilled immigration policy can be a tremendous
boon for the long-term competitiveness of a country in the high-tech mar-
ket, and as well the long-term health of its native high-skilled labor
population.
Myth 5: The United States (or any developed country) should slash high-skilled migration
to protect developing countries, or its native high-skilled workers.
Much of the time, it seems that the debate around high-skilled migra-
tion has remained hyper-aware of the competition between states for these
immigrants. In fact, this chapter will later make the case that states, and
many of those who support an increase in high-skilled migration, have
been too quick to point to this competition in shaping policy. However,
there are some odd blind spots concerning this reality in the discussion
about high-skilled immigration policy, especially in the United States.
Limitations on high-skilled immigration have been justified on two major
grounds. The first is protecting native workers from (presumably cheaper)
competition from highly skilled immigrants. The second is to protect
developing countries from the negative effects of “brain drain.” However,
to a varying extent, both of these arguments rely on placing the receiving
state in a vacuum—assuming that the decision to restrict immigrants
means that those immigrants will then simply return to the country of
their birth.
Before moving further, we should note that the level of high-skilled
migration that is optimal for these parties and, for that matter, for the
receiving state, is an empirical question. The answer to this question varies
based on a wide variety of factors, some of which have already been
touched on in this chapter. For now, we will set aside the question of
whether or not any specific amount of high-skilled migration is good or
bad for native workers or developing countries. Rather, we will examine
the implications of unilateral cuts in migration, the logic of which is often
underpinned by assumptions that high-skilled migration has costs for
both of these groups.
To begin, the assumption that any given state can address issues of brain
drain by cutting its levels of high-skilled migration seems an extremely
tenuous one. As mentioned above, legislation from 2013 in the U.S. Con-
gress calls for American immigration policy to help to “reverse” problems
of brain drain globally. A similar argument is common in Western Europe—
that the high-skilled immigration policies of various European states,
especially those drawing highly-skilled immigrants from Africa, under-
mine development goals through the negative impact of brain drain.46
However, even for the United States, which draws the most highly-skilled
immigrants in the world, the idea that reducing the number of these immi-
grants allowed into the country, or even cutting them entirely, will make a
significant impact in the developing world is extremely unlikely.
This idea, of course, relies on the assumption that if the United States
(or any developed country) stopped taking immigrants, they would then
lose interest in immigrating and return to their home country. Or, at the
very least, that those immigrants would trickle to other countries, but
eventually a significant number of immigrants would be displaced and
return to their home country. However, there is little reason to believe that
would be the case. Immigrants want to use the skills they have developed
to improve their lives, and there is little evidence that they are frequently
wedded to a single destination. Further, there are plenty of countries who
have expressed an interest in increasing the quality and quantity of high-
skilled immigrants that they bring in. If any given country cuts back on its
acceptance of migrants, it is likely that the migrants who made the deci-
sion to go to a developed country would still make that decision. They
would simply choose a new developed country. This is not to say that it is
impossible for developed countries to mitigate the effects of brain drain,
but to do so would require a coordinated effort on the part of most of the
major recipients of high-skilled immigrants. And such an effort would,
hopefully, work to find a balance between the needs of the developed and
developing countries, and the rights of immigrants to improve their lives
and best use the skills that they have worked so hard to develop.
A similar problem, meanwhile, plagues countries that want to unilater-
ally cut high-skilled immigration to protect their native workers. As men-
tioned above, high-skilled immigration can be part of a powerful and
self-reinforcing network that helps a state to maintain, strengthen, and

grow its native high-tech industry and, with it, to develop its high-skilled
workers and create the sort of environment that allows for the develop-
ment of better native workers. Arguing that cutting high-skilled immigra-
tion will help native workers, however, seems to rely on the logic that
ending high-skilled migration will lock in the receiving country’s high-
skill industries where they currently sit, that it will simply become a mat-
ter of native workers dividing up the benefits of the already-existing share
of the cutting edge for the foreseeable future. And, as shown above, a
country that already has a sizable lead in high-skill industrial capacity can
expect to grow faster than other countries. So, if nothing else changed, that
might be the outcome. However, the highly skilled workers that are being
turned away are not likely to disburse randomly and are not likely to sim-
ply return to and stay in their home countries—they will collect in a dif-
ferent state, and those flows will help to push high-tech development in
their new home. Soon, the formerly receiving state can expect to find its
position on the cutting edge threatened and its high-skilled workers, along
with its entire high-skill industries (and all of the important economic
benefits that those industries bring) endangered. While this is a far cry
from the sort of immigrant-number comparison hysteria that drives
unhealthy levels of competition between states, it is important to acknowl-
edge the reality that global forces will impact outcomes from decisions
around high-skill immigration.
The debate around high-skill immigration, then, looks very different
once some of the key myths surrounding it meet reality. Highly skilled
immigrants make up a much larger percentage of immigration into devel-
oped states than is generally acknowledged in the public dialogue. High-
skilled immigration flows have the potential to be far more beneficial to
the states exporting the workers than has generally been accepted. Amer-
ica and, for that matter, most developed nations are not losing, nor are
they in tremendous danger of soon losing, the race for skilled immigrants.
Highly skilled immigrants are not always damaging competitors to highly
skilled native workers in the states to which they immigrate. And slashing
the influx of these immigrants might not protect native workers, or the
states from which these highly skilled workers have emigrated.
Conclusion
As the two main high-skilled immigrant-receiving areas of the world,
the United States and Western Europe are bound to find areas of both
cooperation and conflict in developing different policy approaches to what
are usually similar problems. In the case of skilled migration, there is a

great deal of room for cooperation left between the United States and
Western Europe, and between developed and developing countries.
Exploiting this potential for increased cooperation could increase the wel-
fare benefits of high-skilled immigration to all parties involved. Moving
away from the current perception of the “conflicts” surrounding high-
skilled immigrants, whether between receiving countries, between send-
ing and receiving countries, or between native workers and immigrants,
and toward a framework that better reflects the way that the facts on the
ground demonstrate the potential for tremendous benefits from carefully
managed cooperation could improve outcomes immeasurably. The first
step toward such an outcome, though, is to clear up the myths that have
been responsible for fostering such an artificially hostile environment
among the public and policymakers of both developed and developing
states.
Notes
1. For an example of a book in this vein, see Vivek Wadhwa, The Immigrant
Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Race to Capture Global Entrepreneurial Talent
(Philadelphia: Wharton Digital Press, 2012).
2. S. P. Sukhatme, The Real Brain Drain (Bombay: Orient Longman Limited,
1994), provides one example of a book in this vein.
3. International Center for Migration Policy Development. Highly Skilled Migra-
tion. Presented by ICMPD at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on International
Migration, UNHQ, New York, NY, October 26 and 27, 2005.
4. Jonathan Chaloff and Georges Lemaitre, “Managing Highly-Skilled Labour
Migration: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD
Countries,” OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Papers, No. 79,
March 18, 2009.
5. Hamutal Bernstein, “Transatlantic Public Opinion on Immigration: Impor-
tant Lessons for Policymakers,” Press Release of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States, October 26, 2012.
6. Tara Bahrampour, “Report Documents Dramatic Shift in Immigrant Work
force’s Skill Level,” Washington Post, June 8, 2011.
7. Allan Hall, “Migrants ‘Make Germany Dumb’ Says Central Banker in Aston
ishing Outburst,” The Daily Mail, June 11, 2011.
8. Michael Looney and Adam Greenstone, Ten Economic Facts About Immigra-
tion Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project at Brookings, September 2010, policy
memo available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010
/9/immigration%20greenstone%20looney/09_immigration.pdf
9. FOCUS News Agency. “In Germany Come More Immigrants with Higher
Education,” November 26, 2012.
10. Yudhvir Rana, “Canadian Minister Expresses Worry over Brain Drain from
India,” The Times of India, November 12, 2012.
11. Iona Vinogradova, “A Tale of Two Russias,” BBC Russian Service, November
27, 2012.
12. Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, “Cuban Immigration Reform & Brain Drain,”
Havana Times, October 31, 2012.
13. Sheldon Kirshner, “New Haifa U President Warns of Israeli Brain Drain,”
The Canadian Jewish News, November 12, 2012.
14. Samantha Huang, “Taiwanese Entrepreneurs Saying Goodbye to the U.S.,
Hello to China,” Forbes.com, November 6, 2012.
15. H.R. 656—African Investment and Diaspora Act. H.R. 656.IH. 112th
Congress.
16. Matt McAllester, “America Is Stealing the World’s Doctors,” New York Times
Magazine, March 7, 2012.
17. Kate Kelland, “Doctor Brain Drain Costs Africa $2 Billion,” Reuters, Novem
ber 25, 2011.
18. Simon Commander, Mari Kangasniemi, and L. Alan Winters, “The Brain
Drain: Curse or Boon? A Survey of the Literature,” in Challenges to Globalization:
Analyzing the Economics, eds. Robert Winters, E. Baldwin, and L. Alan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 235.
19. Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson. “New Data on African Health
Professionals Abroad,” Human Resources for Health 6 (1) (2008).
20. Simon Commander, Mari Kangasniemi, and L. Alan Winters, “The Brain
Analyzing the Economics, eds. Robert Winters, E. Baldwin, and L. Alan (Chicago:
21. B. Lindsay Lowell and Allan Findlay. “Migration of Highly Skilled Persons
from Developing Countries: Impact and Policy Responses: Synthesis Report,”
Great Britain. Department for International Development. International Labour
Office. Social Protection Sector, International Migration Branch. 2002.
22. Riccardo Faini, “Remittances and the Brain Drain: Do More Skilled Migrants
Remit More?” The World Bank Economic Review 21 (2007): 177.
23. Albert Bollard, David McKenzie, Melanie Morten, and Hillel Rapoport.
“Remittances and the Brain Drain Revisited: The Microdata Show That More
Educated Migrants Remit More,” The World Bank Economic Review 28 (2014):
132.
24. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Harnessing
Remittances and Diaspora Knowledge to Build Productive Capacities,” Least
Developed Countries Report 2012.
25. Christian Dustmann, Itzhak Fadlon, and Yoram Weiss, “Return Migration,
Human Capital Accumulation and the Brain Drain,” Journal of Development
Economics 95 (2011): 58.
26. Karin Mayr and Giovanni Peri. “Return Migration as a Channel of Brain
Gain,” National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper No. 14039,
May 2008.
27. Patrick Gaule, “Do Highly Skilled Migrants Return Permanently to Their
Home Countries?” Accessed June 18, 2013, http://www.voxeu.org/article/brain
-drain-one-way-street-new-evidence-us-academics
28. Marlon A. Bristol, “Brain Drain and Return Migration in Caricom: A Review
of the Challenges,” Caribbean Studies 38 (2010): 129.
29. Frederic Docquier, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk, “Brain Drain in
Developing Countries,” The World Bank Economic Review 21 (2007): 193.
30. Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra, Caglar Ozden, Sonia Plaza, William Shaw,
and Abede Shimeles. “Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and
Investments,” World Bank Publishing, April 26, 2011: 111–116.
31. Michel Beinea, Frédéric Docquiera, and Hillel Rapoport, “Brain Drain and
Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Development Economics 64
(2001): 275.
32. Simon Commander, Mari Kangasniemi, and L. Alan Winters. “The Brain
Analyzing the Economics, eds. Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan Winters (Chicago:
33. Vivek Wadhwa, The Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Race
to Capture Global Entrepreneurial Talent (Philadelphia: Wharton Digital Press,
2012).
34. Fareed Zakaria, “Broken and Obsolete,” Time, June 12, 2012.
35. Vivek Wadhwa, AnnaLee Saxenian, Richard Freeman, and Alex Salkever,
“Losing the World’s Best and Brightest: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,
Part V,” Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2009.
36. http://www.renewoureconomy.org/neweconomy
37. Palash R Ghosh, “British Brain-Drain: Highly Skilled Professionals Fleeing
UK,” International Business Times, November 7, 2012.
38. “Skilled Immigrants Opt for Britain over Germany,” The Local, October 19,
2012.
39. OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2012: Country Note: United
States,” 2012.
40. “Measuring the International Mobility of Skilled Workers (1990–2000):
Release 1.0,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3381, 2004.
41. Dana Hersh and Adam Cooper, “The Competition That Really Matters: Com-
paring U.S., Chinese, and Indian Investments in the Next-Generation Work Force”
(Washington, DC: The Center for New American Progress, 2012), http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/08/21/11983/the-competition
-that-really-matters/
42. George J. Borjas, “The Labor Market Impact of High-Skill Immigration.”
National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper No. 11217, March
2005.
43. Madeline Zavodny, Immigration and American Jobs. American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research and the Partnership for a New American Econ
omy, December 2011.
44. OECD, Regions at a Glance: Skilled Immigration in OECD Regions. Accessed
June 18, 2013, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/reg_glance-2011-en/03/10/index
.html;jsessionid=c7xgu5cpsymj.delta?contentType=&itemId=/content/chapter/reg
_glance-2011-15-en&containerItemId=/content/serial/19990057&accessItemIds
=/content/book/reg_glance-2011-en&mimeType=text/html
45. M. Hosein Fallah, “Technology Clusters and Innovation,” Current Issues in
Technology Management. Stevens Alliance for Technology Management 9 (2005): 1.
46. For an example see http://www.fairpolitics.nl/europa/cases/blue_card
CHAPTER SEVEN
Promoting Circular International

Migration of the Highly Skilled
Metka Hercog and Melissa Siegel
Introduction
Migration of skilled workers from developing countries has increased
substantially in recent years. Traditionally, such patterns raised fears on the
ground of the associated brain drain as human capital formation is consid-
ered to be of central importance to development and for the reduction of
poverty levels. Therefore, any loss of skilled workers through migration
was considered harmful to the achievement of development goals. Clearly,
this is a crucial issue for middle- and low-income countries, essentially
because their share of tertiary educated workers remains very low com-
pared to high-income countries. Despite significant expansion of higher
education in developing countries, gross enrollment ratio in tertiary edu-
cation remains low at 7.7 percent for low-income, compared to 26.2 per-
cent for middle-income and 72.1 percent for high-income countries in
2010.1 Recently, though, the positive effects of skilled migration have come
to the center of the debate, with eyes on the diaspora as a suitable resource
for mobilization for development, possibly outpacing foreign aid.2 Among
other effects, the benefits that highly skilled return migrants can bring to
their home countries are increasingly regarded as extremely important for
Thank you to Elaine McGregor, Graciela van Der Poel, and Simone Tenda for their helpful
research assistance.
development, and many countries are seeking ways to benefit from the
experiences of diaspora. The dominance of remittances and low-skilled
migration in discussions on migration and development3 has been replaced
by the effects of skilled migrants, which bring about the transfer of knowl-
edge and skills by either returning or moving back and forth between their
countries of origin and countries of destination.
This chapter examines policies concerning skilled mobility. We discuss
the central role played by positive incentives, as well as the ineptness of
restrictive measures, to influence the decision of migrants to return or
otherwise engage in development activities in the country of origin. The
common myth that host countries should avert brain drain by limiting
options for longer migration from developing countries neglects the over-
whelming importance of the ability of migrants to gain skills during their
stay abroad. By showing interest mainly in limiting the number of years
skilled workers are allowed to stay in their territory, host countries fail to
support contributions to development as they do not take into account the
complexities of migration. A stable position in host countries allows
migrants to have better opportunities for economic and social engagement
in their countries of origin. Destination countries can thus support circular
migration and its impact on development by enabling possibilities for
immigrants to have longer and productive stays.
Due to their differing positions, we examine the situation of sending
and receiving countries with regard to skilled migration separately. We
shed light on what ways they can contribute to tying skilled migration
with development goals and provide an evaluation concerning which
policy options are considered most favorable. Destination countries can
support circular migration and its impact on development by enabling
possibilities for immigrants to have longer and productive stays. Sending
countries need to combine diaspora programs together with developing
the socioeconomic conditions that set the context for return. The expecta-
tions of improved home country conditions are a requirement for
mobilizing the diaspora in a sustainable and effective manner. Finally, this
chapter concludes that besides single country policies and bilateral
approaches on specific migration channels, the amount of regional and
global initiatives is limited and there is a lack of evaluation mechanisms of
their effectiveness.
Why Promote Return and Circular Migration?

The 2005 concluding report of the Global Commission on International
Migration (GCIM), established by the United Nations Secretary-General
Promoting Circular International Migration of the Highly Skilled 155
and a number of interested governments in 2003 with a mandate to pro-

vide the framework for a global response to the issue of international
migration,4 noted that “the old paradigm of permanent migrant settlement
is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration.”5 It is
commonly accepted that mobility of people has acquired a much more
temporary character than it used to have. Globalization and related secto-
rial shifts in employment require an increased supply of highly skilled
manpower, which is flexible and able to respond to the changing needs of
economies. Faster and cheaper transportation also enables people to return
and travel between countries easily, while technological progress intensi-
fies communication practices and, hence, makes transnational networks
even easier. As a result of these more fluid patterns, it is often more appro-
priate to describe the mobility of people as circulation instead of return.
While return migration assumes a one-time mobility back to the home
country, circular mobility better describes the continuity of moves from
one country to another. Acknowledging this change in migration patterns,
a range of policymakers advocate measures in support of circular mobility
as it is seen as a good opportunity for development of countries of origin.
GCIM, the International Organization for Migration, the European Com-
mission, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the World Bank, and the
House of Commons International Development Committee, all point out
the benefits of circular migration. Such focus on the interests of develop-
ing countries is obvious from GCIM’s 2005 report, which called for the
need to grasp developmental opportunities that circular mobility provides
for countries of origin.6 However, circular migration is supported not only
by developing countries, but also by different parties who have a stake in
migration because of the belief that the circularity of migrants brings ben-
efits to all sides when managed properly. The Global Forum on Migration
and Development (GFMD), which in 2007 succeeded GCIM as the UN-
initiated platform for addressing migration and development interconnec-
tions at the global level, therefore, describes circular migration as “the fluid
movement of people between countries, including temporary or perma-
nent movement which, when it occurs voluntarily and is linked to labor
needs of countries of origin and destination, can be beneficial to all
involved.”7 In a more recent paper, MPI defines circular migration in a
more dynamic and nonprescriptive way by describing it as a continuing,
long-term, and fluid pattern of human mobility among countries that
occupy what is now increasingly recognized as a single economic space.8
Circular migration has gained so much popularity in different policy
circles because of the general idea that it can lead to benefits for all stake-
holders, the so-called triple-win situation. Circular migrants are more
likely to send remittances when they have prospects of moving between

countries. Moreover, especially with regard to skilled migrants, they ben-
efit their countries of origin by contributing to the transfer of specialized
skills and knowledge. Receiving countries gain from circular migration by
meeting labor market shortages. Temporary admissions are also more
politically palatable, which, for electorates who can feel threatened by
increasing immigration, is incredibly important.9 Furthermore, employers
in receiving countries benefit from having a pool of labor that is already
experienced and tested on their labor market. Last but not least, immi-
grants can also benefit from the possibility of safer mobility between coun-
tries. Policy initiatives that encourage circular migration for the benefit of
the migrants give them options for continuous engagement in countries of
origin and in their host countries.
Most of such circular migration is happening spontaneously and is by
no means a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, after recognizing the impor-
tance of migrant communities for development, there has been an increased
interest of national and international actors in how different policies can
foster and manage international migration in such a way that it profits the
parties involved. Especially with regard to skilled migration, there has
been a dramatic shift in the perceived need for action. Instead of prevent-
ing brain drain, policymakers are now making efforts to facilitate brain
circulation by encouraging mobility of professionals as well as supporting
different kinds of transnational networks for making use of the knowl-
edge, skills, and capital that diasporas have acquired abroad. Some of
these policies are planned unilaterally at a national level, but most com-
monly and also with the most success such policies require bi- or multi-
level engagement.
The Position of Countries of Destination and Countries of Origin

Countries of Destination
As evidenced from recurrent debates on immigration, some receiving
countries regard permanent migration of low-skilled workers as undesir-
able.10 Therefore, return and circular migration programs designed by host
countries focus mainly on this category of migrants. Conversely, most
high-income countries encourage immigration and often, also the settle-
ment of highly skilled migrants. During the last decades, several countries
have introduced new measures, in addition to temporary schemes, to
admit highly skilled migrants on a permanent basis. The Canadian Federal
Skilled Worker Program, for example, allows skilled workers to apply for
permanent residency without prior experience in Canada when they sat-

isfy a set of criteria following a points system.11 Likewise, upon achieving
a sufficient number of points, highly skilled migrants who come to Austra-
lia either independently (subclass visa 189) or nominated by a state or
territory government (subclass 190) are granted an automatic permanent
residence permit.12
On a global scale, considerable attention is also given to the American
H-1B visa that offers a renewable, three-year visa allowing highly skilled
migrants to work in the United States.13 The original intention of the pro-
gram was that the skilled migrants would return back to their home coun-
tries after the expiration of the visa. However, constraints were later
loosened in favor of permanent migration, with almost half of H-1B visa
holders adjusting to a permanent status.14 As for European countries, the
migration of highly skilled migrants is in essence envisaged as temporary.
For example, the French immigration and integration law, passed in 2006,
allows for granting the Skills and Talent visas to highly skilled foreigners
with the requirement that they will return to their home country within
six years.15 This is, however, not compatible with the EU Directive on
long-term residence status, which grants non-EU nationals permanent
residence after a person has lived legally in an EU state for a continuous
period of five years. Several governments attempt to enforce return by
giving only temporary options for migration, appraising that migrants
would have less incentive to return after long stays in the host country.
There are, however, many options available to transfer the temporary resi-
dence status into a permanent one after a number of years residing in a
country, although the requirements for such permits are demanding. In
Germany,16 it is now possible for the highly skilled migrants to obtain a
permanent residence status from the outset, but this option is limited to a
small group of people who can meet the highly demanding requirements
(Section 19 AufenthG).
These examples point to tensions in many developed countries where,
on the one hand, national policies aim to attract highly skilled labor
yet, on the other hand, countries are accused of poaching talent from
developing countries. These concerns put pressure on policies designed to
stimulate development and prevent brain drain, particularly in sensitive
sectors, such as health and education. From a developmental perspective,
it is debatable whether destination countries who publicly express support
for the positive impacts of migration should include the possibility of
permanent settlement for some migrants. Migrants who are permanently
and successfully settled in their host country are increasingly seen as
having the best capacity to contribute to development in the country of
origin.17 This view is confirmed by the often-cited example of California’s

Silicon Valley and the contribution of its entrepreneurs of Chinese, Indian,
and Taiwanese descent to their countries of origin. Immigrant entrepre-
neurs rely heavily on ethnic resources from their home countries and, in
many ways, facilitate trade and investments. Many of them regularly travel
back and forth without any concern for their position in the host coun-
try.18 Well-established high-income migrants are more likely to visit their
countries of origin to set up businesses, monitor their subsidiaries, or
engage in any other way when they have a secure residency status in des-
tination countries. Following such reasoning, destination countries can
support circular migration not only by temporary migration programs, but
rather by enabling possibilities for longer if not permanent stays. In that
way they can acquire valuable experiences and accumulate more capital
for investments in their home countries. Though allowing highly skilled
migrants to stay for a longer period is, in most cases, intended to maximize
the benefit of their presence, this also has the positive side effect of enabling
migrants to accumulate enough capital and knowledge while abroad so
that their eventual return—whether permanent or temporary—can have
positive effects for development. It is important to note that it is not all
returns that will lead to multiple-win scenarios. Enabling migrants to pro-
long their residence permits in order to establish themselves better in a
host country is one of the crucial conditions for successful economic rein-
tegration upon return or temporary visit to their home countries. In addi-
tion to this, policies that prevent, or make it difficult to extend their
permits also make migration unattractive in the first place. One of the
main criticisms of the no longer existing German Green Card program was
that it allowed highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries to stay in
Germany for up to five years with no possibility for renewal.19 Especially
in the current period of international competition for skilled workers, it is
hardly feasible for the continental European countries, such as Germany
or France, who are barely competitive in this race compared to the tradi-
tional immigration countries, to attempt to prevent their settlement by
strict regulations on a period of stay. The main destination countries are in
fact observed to practice interjurisdictional competition, adopting favor-
able provisions that would surpass the earlier immigration initiatives of
their competitors.20
Next to permitting longer stays, the receiving countries’ governments
also have the capacity to promote beneficial return or circular migration
by permitting the movement of migrants back and forth. Such situations
can be facilitated by several policy options. First, migrants should not
be punished with a worse position for acquiring a residence permit in
their host country if they return to their home countries for a certain
period. For instance, migrants who are applying for permanent residency
in the United States are not allowed to leave the country without seeking
special permission.21 That is currently the case also in the Netherlands,
where migrants who have stayed out of the country for a year lose the
rights they have acquired for permanent residence. The situation is differ-
ent for those migrants that came to the Netherlands as knowledge migrants.
If they receive a permanent employment contract, they obtain a residence
permit for five years, which enables them to apply for a permanent resi-
dence permit upon complying with the material conditions and integra-
tion requirements.22 The situation with regard to permitted absences
from the receiving country’s territory has improved with the adoption of
the EU Blue Card Directive. It allows EU Blue Card holders to return to
their home countries for a consecutive period of up to one year and in total
for 18 months during the five years required for acquiring EU long-term
residence status.23
Allowing for dual citizenship is a second policy option for enabling
migrants to be engaged in both countries. Dual citizenship is supported
on the grounds of the already mentioned examples of migrants who are
intensively involved in their origin countries and their new countries of
settlement because of their well-settled position. While the interests of
origin countries in maintaining the link with their diaspora are clear,
dual citizenship is sometimes controversial for receiving countries, fear-
ing that it may lead to thin citizenships and split loyalties.24 Such con-
cerns are not generally raised with respect to dual citizens among
developed countries, but are seen as more problematic when one of the
citizenships is from a developing country.25 Despite statements of an
observed “tendency toward more liberal tolerance of multiple national-
ity,” where even countries that are in principle against dual nationality
have “largely facilitated the retention of a previous nationality,”26 it is
closer to the mark to speak of divergent tendencies with some countries
taking a more restrictive approach toward multiple citizenships in
recent years. For example, in 2003, the Netherlands reduced the num-
ber of exceptions to the renunciation requirement, making it harder for
new citizens to be involved in their countries of origin since, along with
their citizenship, they lose many rights that can enable more intensive
involvement.27
A third policy option that encourages circularity of highly skilled
people is preferential treatment toward people who have in-country
experience. In-country work experience adds additional points in the
point systems of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Also, people who
have completed their studies in one of the countries’ universities are

treated preferentially in the point systems in these countries. In the Neth-
erlands, a person who has completed a master’s degree or a doctorate from
a Dutch university can, within three years of graduation, obtain a one-year
residence permit to look for employment without a prior job offer.28
Giving preferential treatment to people with in-country experience has
positive implications in terms of accepting a labor force that is to a certain
extent accustomed to and familiar with the situation in the country. Acqui-
sition of country-specific human capital is another important reason for
an internationally mobile labor force to choose the same destination coun-
try for successive migrations. In addition to preferential access to work
permits, temporary labor market access on a renewable basis is discussed
as another option for multiple reentries to a receiving country, which
can also have a role in encouraging migrants to return.29 Being able to
spend a certain period of time in a home country (or any third country)
and still have easier access to immigrate at a later stage gives migrants
greater freedom to choose where and when they want to live and work.
Returning to their home countries is not treated as a one-time move, where
any consecutive move would be equally as difficult as their first migration
to that country. Such a policy provides an advantageous position by
allowing them to be involved in activities in their home country without
the fear of completely losing those privileges in the destination country.
Such fears have often made migrants reluctant to return to their home
countries.
A fourth policy used by receiving countries, meant to encourage return
to the home countries, is the taxation of foreign workers. Some countries
implement schemes with compliance bonds for both employers and work-
ers, which may include that part of the salary of a worker that is withheld
and deposited in a savings account accessible only in the country of origin.
Realizing their dubious fairness, such compulsory savings are used mod-
erately, mainly for health care workers, as the impact of their emigration is
considered especially sensitive for many developing countries. Although
this policy tries to build incentives for return, it does not change the situ-
ation in the home country, which was in many cases a reason for emigra-
tion in the first place. A policy of savings accessible upon return does,
however, have an advantage compared to some other programs by allow-
ing migrants to stay in a receiving country if they wish to do so. Compared
to the ethical codes of practice in recruitment of health care workers,
as exercised in the United Kingdom, which is criticized for restricting
the freedom of movement of health professionals from certain countries,30
the mentioned policy allows for continued migration, though under less
favorable conditions for an individual. On the positive end, forced accu-

mulating savings can help migrants to ease their reintegration in the send-
ing country.
A fifth important way for the host countries to make the option of return
more attractive is to enable the transferability of social security benefits.
Those who have contributed to the social security system for a longer
period and with large amounts of money because of their high incomes
should be able to claim their contributions in the case of return to their
home countries. The European Commission has emphasized this point by
stating that contributions should be paid to a migrant after return in the
form of a pension or as a lump sum payment.31 This policy is meant
to remove the disincentives for return because this lack of portability
may hinder the circulation of permanent resident and second-generation
immigrants.32
It is, however, acknowledged that some migrants will never return to
their home countries permanently, irrespective of policy incentives. For
that reason, policies that facilitate diaspora connections are in place (for
instance, IOM’s Return of Qualified Nationals program). Though it is the
sending countries that are more engaged in setting up networks and data-
bases of expatriate professionals, receiving countries can also facilitate this
process and encourage international cooperation of institutions. An exam-
ple of such an initiative is the Diaspora Networks Alliance, launched by
the U.S. government with the purpose of engaging diaspora in promoting
growth in the countries of origin.33
All things considered, it can be observed that there are several ways for
the destination countries to influence the return and circularity of move-
ment of migrants. Depending on the perception of the possibilities in
sending countries, these policy measures have to be more or less encour-
aging and can range from removing disincentives to return, to building
new incentives to ease reintegration in the sending country. Destination
country governments have some programs, specifically designed for that
purpose, while there are other policies that do not necessarily have this
effect as their prime objective but nevertheless encourage circulation in a
positive way. It is claimed that destination countries have a better effect on
promoting circularity when they remove the obstacles rather than when
they try to direct particular flows.34 When return migration happens on a
forced basis or because of the lack of options, it might not lead to the
desired outcomes. On account of premature departure, migrants might
not have had the opportunity to accomplish the set plans in terms of gen-
erating savings, recovering the investment tied to migration, or preparing
themselves for return.
Countries of Origin
Countries of origin are also increasingly exploring schemes where the
human capital of expatriates can be used for the benefit of the home coun-
try’s socioeconomic development. While the destination countries focus
their programs on circularity for the low-skilled, countries of origin work
mainly on luring back the well-financed and highly skilled migrants as
they can benefit their home countries in terms of financial capital, transfer
of knowledge, and a link to the professional market abroad.
Traditional policy measures aim at ensuring the return of citizens who
have moved abroad under certain schemes. Colombia’s COLFUTURO is
an example of such a program, which gives students a scholarship credit
to pursue graduate studies abroad but requires them to return to Colom-
bia in order to qualify for a 50 percent waiver of the loan, or else fully
repay the debt.35 Other programs are less strict in their obligations for
recipients of scholarships and require them to work in the home country
for a shorter period of time after graduation. For example, Slovenia’s
Human Resources Development and Scholarship Fund requires recipients
to work in Slovenia for the equivalent period of time that they have been
receiving the scholarship.36
More common policies simply facilitate the return of skilled nationals,
for example by offering financial as well as nonfinancial incentives, rather
than imposing an obligation. Economic supports to employers and to
returnees in the form of salary top-ups or temporal tax exemptions are put
in place to compensate for the loss of income incurred due to return from
a higher-income country. For instance, Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de
Ciencia y Technologia (CONACYT) offers grants to universities and ben-
efits for researchers to provide incentives to repatriate researchers who
reside abroad.37 Other examples include subsidized mortgages, organized
exchanges for professionals from abroad in order to maintain active con-
tact, and duty-free purchases.38
It is not only income differences between home and host countries that
should be addressed to induce skilled individuals to return. Administra-
tive burdens upon return can also work as deterrence. Such hindrances
can make it very difficult for migrants to transfer social capital accumu-
lated in a receiving country.39 Skills and experiences from a receiving
country are often not recognized and are difficult to transfer into their
positions in their home country. In order to facilitate the positive return
migration, human resource policies should ensure that time spent abroad
with all acquired professional accomplishments should count for deter-
mining salaries and positions upon return to a home country.40 The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) highlights difficulties for

African professionals who work abroad. They mention problems of cum-
bersome recruitment processes that lead to prolonged job searches and an
apparent lack of trust in African governments among expatriates.41 Simi-
larly, Italian migrants are very doubtful about Italy’s program to attract
researchers. The main reasons for negative responses were short-term
appointments and the system’s lack of transparency.42
This points to another pertinent issue. Any kind of policy focusing
on return is difficult to manage when the working conditions in a home
country have not changed. As repatriation programs often do not tackle
the conditions that initially led to emigration, countries need to consider
a broader set of policies that create an environment in which the skilled
are encouraged to return. Policies of return migration may be divided
into individual-based approaches and policies that target the working
environment.43 In contrast to aiming at return migration on an individual
basis, the latter approaches focus on medium- to long-term solutions
with the intention of stimulating return by improving the general institu-
tional problems. Indicative of the need to improve social and economic
factors in sending countries are results from the study on potential return-
ees to four Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam),
which show that skilled migrants generally only return after significant
changes have occurred. The study highlights the need to improve the
overall infrastructure within the country, including basic services such as
health and education. The authors conclude that individual returnees usu-
ally do not drive social change but rather respond to it.44 Stated in a differ-
ent way, an International Labour Organization report on migrant workers
therefore posits: “migration can contribute positively to development
where a country is already poised to develop; it cannot, however, create
such a condition.”45
There are many ways in which governments can encourage return
migration by improving the general environment. Some of the suggested
policy measures include strengthening national innovation systems, offer-
ing competitive funding for research projects, rewarding merit instead of
seniority, creating centers of excellence, strengthening public-private part-
nerships, and the quality of tertiary education, which can lure expatriate
professionals back home.46
Virtual return is an innovative solution for migrants who do not wish to
return but still wish to remain connected. An example of this type of pro-
gram is TVR/MIDWEB of the IOM. There are a large number of knowledge
networks linking home countries to expatriate professionals, which can
be utilized for exchange of knowledge. An example of an active and
successful diaspora network is the South African Network of Skills Abroad,

which was initiated by the University of Cape Town and is now managed
by the National Research Foundation. Mobilizing nationals living and
working abroad to exchange ideas and knowledge within institutionally
organized networks gives the country of origin an opportunity to learn
from their experiences as well as to access professional networks in which
diaspora is active abroad.47
The described approaches are complementary to each other. An impor-
tant point to make is that repatriation programs and diaspora policies
should be used in combination with measures that change the social and
economic factors contributing to emigration in the first place. For the suc-
cess of any kind of policies aimed at return or circular migration, it is
necessary that the conditions in the origin country have improved or are
expected to in the near future. Otherwise, any kind of return migration
will not benefit any of the involved parties. Consequently, return policies,
either temporary or permanent, have to bear in mind the importance of
the conditions in home countries and make return a viable option. Since
many migrants have strong attachment to their home countries, contacts
do not have to be created or forced by the involved governments, but
rather just facilitated or enabled by removing the obstacles that so often
limit the obvious options.
Bilateral Approaches
Bilateral approaches are those that are agreed upon between two coun-
tries (the sending and the receiving one). There are many different exam-
ples of bilateral policies that can directly or indirectly stimulate return. In
this section, we outline some of them, explain their positive and negative
sides, and give examples of their practical implementation. This is not an
exhaustive list of bilateral policy approaches stimulating return, but rather
a broad overview of different polices that have the potential to contribute
to return and circular migration.
Circular migration policies that grant entry to the highly skilled is an
approach that has benefits for destination countries while often adding
conditions of return. A disadvantage of this approach is the withdrawal of
the automatic right to long-term residence after living in the country for a
period of time. An example of this type of approach is France’s concerted
management agreements for migration flows where the host country
receives the skills and added labor force for a certain number of years but
then requires the migrant to return to the country of origin. Upon return
they are theoretically able to transfer their skills and knowledge between
France and the main countries of origin. At the same time, this program
obliges the country of origin to collaborate in migration and transit control
and to address irregular migration. In response, origin countries benefit
from development cooperation, and students and professionals have
access to the French labor market through the “Skills and Talent scheme.”48
The agreement allows the nationals of the country of origin to access the
occupations specified in a particular list for third-country nationals. The
declared objective of the scheme is to also encourage human capital devel-
opment in developing countries by enforcing circular migration. However,
very few permits have been issued under this scheme. The peak year since
its inception was 2009, when 368 permits were issued, but this number is
still far off the envisaged quota of two thousand per year.49 When the
Dutch government attempted to introduce a circular migration program, it
acknowledged that little was known about how this should be imple-
mented in practice. In order to understand the risks and opportunities, a
pilot project was started in 2010 and the government established agree-
ments between employers in the Netherlands and the respective country
of origin in relation to cooperation on return conditions. Although there
have been difficulties with this first implementation due to the financial
crisis among other factors, there is still interest in such a program because
of the plethora of positive effects.50,51
A different type of agreement was signed between France and the Phil-
ippines by which 20 percent of the immigrant’s income is retained by the
employer or the government and is only transferred to the immigrant
upon completion of the contract and return on the condition that this
money will be used for an entrepreneurial activity. Canada has also signed
several compulsory savings agreements with a number of countries.52 This
clearly raises ethical issues about people being forced to use their money
in a specific way. Restrictions of compulsory savings schemes undermine
the needs of migrants who may wish to use their income for a different
purpose. They are a clear example of how policy tools designed to pro-
mote return often neglect the autonomy of migrants, thus undermining
their control over the decisions that they wish to make. They also make the
misguided assumption that migrants are usually equipped with the right
skills to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Finally, there are no studies
assessing their suitability and effectiveness, which gives even less support
to such disputed instruments.
There are also programs that allow the exchange of young professionals
between countries for limited amounts of time. To continue with the
example of France, we can mention several agreements signed with both
developed and developing countries. In their case, all exchange periods
are between 3 and 18 months, with strict time limitations. All agreements
are negotiated on the basis of reciprocity and annual quotas. The exchanges
can create ties between developed and developing countries. For some
countries the agreement is established with the aim of cooperating with
the process of economic restructuring (Hungary, Poland) or with support-
ing countries that are seeking occupational and professional training
schemes (Argentina, Morocco, Senegal). Critics have, however, argued
that when the agreements are made and signed, there is little attention to
the estimated number of migrants already in the country, the employment
rate and type of skills of the migrants, the jobs and skills required in the
receiving country, and the labor supply and skills profile of those applying
for the exchange.53
Bilateral social security arrangements allow migrants to bring their
social security entitlements back home or to another country. European
Union member states have signed many such agreements. Sometimes they
are concluded at a bilateral level but often a country will give this right to
all migrants (for example, the Netherlands). The transfer of migrant work-
ers’ social security payments to their countries of origin is an important
financial return incentive. The transfer of social security benefits is a sig-
nificant and stable form of remittances. Such policies have, however, had
a limited proved effect on return migration; one important reason is that
they are relatively new. Countries of origin can also deduct tax from the
pensions earned abroad, unless otherwise determined by a bilateral agree-
ment. For the Philippines, social security agreements in countries with
large numbers of Filipino workers (Saudi Arabia and Japan) have been
unsuccessful or are pending. Similar agreements with the country’s South
Asian neighbors have not been successful. In Tunisia, the transfer of social
security benefits had the opposite effect as it induced migrants to stay lon-
ger in the country of destination in order to maximize return benefits.54
Improving the position of migrant workers through social security coordi-
nation between two signatory countries also can come in a different form.
For example, India has signed several bilateral social security agreements
with European countries, which provide for exemption from social secu-
rity contributions for migrant workers with a short-term contract, mean-
ing a contract of up to 48 months in Germany and 60 months in Belgium
and France.
Supporting returning experts and their reintegration in the home econ-
omy is one of the core issues in migration and development policy for
destination countries. Often migrants have been gone for some time and
have had a different socialization process and thus have a more difficult
time when returning. Reintegration programs are envisaged to smooth
this transition and be a key factor in determining the developmental

impact of return migrants. These programs can support reintegration by
providing (1) various loans and assistance schemes for returnees who
intend to start a business in their home country; (2) return bonuses to
assist in the establishment of livelihood or professional training before
return; (3) assistance with skills recognition; (4) assistance with technol-
ogy transfer; and (5) assistance for judicial and administrative problems,
that is, tax policy, divorce, guardianship.55 For example, Germany’s Return-
ing Experts Programme supports graduates and experts who have com-
pleted their studies or training in Germany and who wish to return to their
countries of origin. Links are established with businesses, research institu-
tions, NGOs, or government institutions in the country of origin in order
to assist potential returnees in finding a relevant placement.56
Localized co-development projects are more likely to have success in
achieving more sustainable local infrastructure and entrepreneurial activi-
ties in the country of origin. Success seems to be closely linked to coordi-
nation between NGOs, migrant organizations, and government institutions;
however, different country policies lead to mixed results. Factors affecting
sustainability of return are largely beyond the control of destination coun-
tries and have much more to do with country of origin policies. Critics
often describe these programs as forced removals and question the safety
of those who return. Though it may seem like a friendly policy, they are
not generally conceived as a development project. Uptake is generally low,
and the costs are high.
Twinning programs are often set up between two countries to transfer
skills and knowledge. They usually include training in another country
and then returning home. For example, in Egypt, the UK Department of
Health established a program to improve medical services for geriatric
care, pathology, and mental health and so established a fellowship pro-
gram for Egyptian doctors to come to the United Kingdom for additional
experience. A scheme between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of
Congo consists of partnerships between hospitals in both countries to
facilitate the training of Congolese staff. These partnerships are supported
by the IOM. Twinning programs are not always directly related to
migration. For example, Health Canada in cooperation with PAHO/
WHO developed a project to foster connections between Canadian and
foreign educational establishments. The collaboration between the univer-
sities of Ottawa and the West Indies, for example, has led to the establish-
ment of a nurses’ training curriculum in Canada. The success of these
programs is unclear and their implementation is ad hoc and project
based.57
Regional Approaches
Regional approaches are those policies or agreements that are
adopted by several countries. In this section we discuss some regional
approaches that may enhance circular migration or return of the highly
skilled.
EU mobility partnerships are agreements made between the EU mem-
ber states and specified third countries to facilitate migration.58 These
agreements raised a lot of expectations since they included many countries
at the negotiating table and took a multifaceted approach to managed
migration. The partnerships must be ratified by each member state of the
European Union individually, and this has proven to be less ideal. Although
the partnership agreements are designed to be multilateral, the reality is
that they are not binding agreements, and the enforcement appears mainly
driven by its bilateral nature with a relative small number of member state
countries engaging in them. Agreements have already been signed between
the European Union and Moldova,59 Cape Verde,60 Georgia, Armenia,
Tunisia, Azerbaijan, and Morocco, but few EU member states have actually
taken action with regard to their implementation. Moreover, the develop-
mental dimension of the partnerships may conflict with the competition to
attract the best and the brightest. The legal basis for such partnerships is
blurry since competences are split between the different member state
national levels and the European Union. Bilateral agreements are consid-
ered preferable by the member states since they give more sovereignty
with regard to migration policy.
The Caribbean Single Market and Economy Agreement of the Carib-
bean Community (CARICOM) is another regional agreement that allows
people with a bachelor’s or higher degree to move freely among member
countries. In addition, there is a push to extend freedom of movement
rights to all CARICOM nationals. The Community has also formulated a
scheme to encourage skilled professionals to work overseas on a rotational
basis, meaning that they go overseas for three years and then return in
order to limit the effects of a loss of skilled labor on Caribbean communi-
ties. The Caribbean agreement includes a compulsory savings scheme,
where 25 percent of the migrants’ wages are automatically remitted to the
respective governments to assure minimum foreign currency flows. A 5 to
8 percent share of the remittances is retained by governments to cover
administrative costs, and the rest is placed in the migrant’s accounts at the
end of the season. In a 2002 survey this was welcomed by most Caribbean
migrants (as disciplining their savings habits), although, as previously dis-
cussed, there are also drawbacks to compulsory saving schemes.
The Euro African Partnership for Migration and Development from

2006 and specifically the Regional Centers of Excellence component rep-
resent a strategy to attract highly skilled migrants back to African coun-
tries. These centers are partnerships between European and African
universities. The actors involved have indicated a commitment to the
development of knowledge and know-how and of measures aiming to
guarantee that sufficient skills are available for the development of African
countries.61 As part of this partnership there is the aim to facilitate the
return of students to their countries of origin at the end of their studies
abroad, although it is not clear how this will be accomplished in practice.
It is hoped that creating these centers will help draw highly skilled migrants
back to their countries of origin with productive use of their knowledge.
The IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) project,
launched in 2001, makes it possible for African professionals in Europe
and North America to return to give assistance and expertise in a number
of fields, including health care, on a long-term, temporary, or virtual basis.
The initiative has facilitated the return of health workers and also sup-
ported hospital twinning and other diaspora activities in several African
countries. Returnees contribute directly and indirectly by also serving as
mediators. Diaspora–host relationships have been positive. Several were
willing to volunteer unpaid leave time or take extended leave, as well as to
contribute supplies, materials, and equipment to colleagues in their home
country. Several also wished to involve their children in activities contrib-
uting to the development of their country of origin. Thus far, there seems
to be enthusiasm on all sides for the project. It is not yet possible to see the
larger effects of the project, but an initial pilot evaluation already made
recommendations for improvements. One example is the need to proac-
tively match volunteers with national human resource needs. In the proj-
ect, psychiatrists were the most common volunteers among the participants,
whereas the most acute shortages among Ghanaian health professionals
were in obstetrics and gynecology. It should, however, be noted that the
number of participants in this pilot project is small, so it is difficult to
measure the impact of the activities of the returned health workers. The
evaluation also noted a lack of commitment from the African governments,
due to its small-scale investments.
The Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment
of Health Workers gives a framework for international recruitment of
health workers that has been signed by the Commonwealth countries. The
code not only helps to uphold the rights of migrant health workers and
seeks fairness and transparency but also can be used to facilitate return.
Governments recruiting from other Commonwealth countries are advised
to reciprocate through the transfer of technology, skills, and technical and

financial assistance to the country concerned; through training programs
for those recruited; and through arrangements to facilitate the return.62
Overall, the Code applies to many countries and tries to always keep a
developmental perspective. It facilitates the exchange of knowledge,
enables return and helps to promote fairness in recruitment and employ-
ment. The Code, however, is not a legally binding document, which gives
it only a limited scope.
Global Approaches
Given that migration is a sensitive topic and that it is difficult to gain
consensus for many country governments on the issue of migration man-
agement, there are only a few global approaches. Only two major global
approaches to return migration of the highly skilled were found in the
research stemming from this chapter: (1) the WTO Symposium on Mode
4 of the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS), and (2) the Trans-
fer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN). In addition to
this, there are some other ways in which the return of the highly skilled
features in debates. For example, the Report of the Global Commission on
International Migration (2005) explicitly recommends the formulation of
policies and programs by states and international organizations that maxi-
mize the developmental impact of return and circular migration. The
European Commission, in a Communication in 2005,63 mentioned that
circular migration and brain circulation are encouraged by stimulating
transferability of pension rights and qualifications and developing reinte-
gration programs in the countries of origin. It strives to build on existing
experience (i.e., TOKTEN, MIDA) and to stimulate cooperation between
researchers and research institution in origin countries. Regardless of these
recommendations and concrete measures, surprisingly little has been
achieved on a global level to support return and circular migration. The
remainder of this section elaborates further on the two main global
approaches identified above.
The General Agreement of Trade and Services (which is a framework
supported by the World Trade Organization) allows for a freer flow of
service workers, which also may help to induce return or circular migra-
tion due to easy movement. It has been suggested that the GATS may
constrain sending governments’ flexibility in human resource planning
in the health sector. In reality, the section of the GATS dealing with
professionals has been little used by developing countries, and the World
Health Assembly has requested that the Director General cooperate with
the WTO to address the possible effect of trade agreements on interna-

tional health workers.64
The TOKTEN is probably the oldest and most successful brain circula-
tion program facilitating the transfer of competencies and remittances
without requiring permanent return. The program facilitates the return
of professionals in the diaspora for periods ranging from two weeks to
three months. The program (initiated in 1977) is intended to help reverse
brain drain in developing countries by using the services of highly quali-
fied national expatriates in transferring recent knowledge, technology,
and business and management practices to developing countries through
national professionals (scientists, engineers, physicians, economists, envi-
ronmentalists, and business executives) and by using technical expertise
and policy advice to promote institutional capacity building. Volunteers
have facilitated short courses for trainers currently working in the
health system in their countries of origin. Some of the advantages of the
approach are that the consultants’ cultural and linguistic knowledge
and their knowledge of the context and constraints operating in their
home country help greatly in identifying needs. TOKTEN consultants
earn one-quarter of the fee of traditional international expert consultants,
which increases the financial efficiency of the program but deters partici-
pation by diaspora members who are dependent on their professional
earnings.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we gave an overview of possible approaches and exam-
ples of policies that are designed to stimulate the return of highly skilled
migrants. It is clear that policy approaches that directly aim at stimulating
return or circular migration come in various forms. A number of these
have been discussed throughout the chapter, although it is acknowledged
that this is not an exhaustive list. Examples include visa restrictions, com-
pulsory savings schemes, temporary youth exchange programs, bilateral
social security arrangements, productive return and reintegration pro-
grams, and temporary or virtual returns. At the same time, there are a large
number of policies that are not necessarily targeted at the stimulation of
return migration but still manage to give incentives to do so: for example,
those that foster an environment conducive to investment, openings of
new institutions, and the like. Policy approaches come at many different
levels: unilateral approaches from countries of origin and host countries,
bilateral approaches, regional and a limited number of global initiatives.
Due to the nature of migration management between home and host
countries and the reluctance of states to cede much sovereignty in this

realm, bilateral agreements seem to dominate the policy sphere.
Many of the approaches have not, however, been evaluated to see if they
are reaching their current goals. Too often, policies are set up without
proper evaluation mechanisms. When the Netherlands tested the Blue
Birds circular migration project, it was soon ended because of the low
interest in the project. It is true that many of the programs discussed in
this chapter will have longer-term effects, which are difficult to measure at
this time; however, more short-term evaluations surely need to be done to
better understand the context in which migrants make decisions about
their future mobility. This will assist in identifying whether our current
policy framework logically addresses the challenges they are intended to
address such as brain drain, and additionally identify whether the imple-
mented policies are in fact impacting people’s mobility choices.
It is clear from the policy review presented in this chapter that restric-
tive migration and an emphasis on temporary permits are not effective in
encouraging circular migration, which has been recognized in several
declared policy objectives. A consensus is growing that successfully settled
migrants are in the best place to contribute to their home countries. There
are, however, still large discrepancies between declared objectives and the
practical implementation of policies.
It is most important to understand the root causes and incentives to
migrate in the first place since they also play in the decision to return.
Decisions to migrate or return are complex and multidimensional.65 Both
the literature and the respective perspectives from professionals abroad
suggests that there is a general agreement with regard to the importance
of the political, economic, and social conditions in the home country,
which have a direct impact on circulation policies and return migration. If
there are persistent doubts with regard to reintegration possibilities, it is
unlikely that professionals would chose to return permanently. The condi-
tions that induced the decision to migrate need to be addressed in the
context of return migration. Political stability and transparency are key
aspects that are often taken into account by highly skilled migrants when
they consider return migration. This therefore highlights the need for
sound policy reforms that take place within a context of political and eco-
nomic stability.66
While key factors are necessary in the country of origin, such as infra-
structure, political openness, and policy reforms in the general health and
educational systems, a mobility-friendly migration policy at both ends is a
must for the facilitation of return. Key factors that often act as constraints
or obstacles to return migration are not solely in terms of a relatively higher
income or financial incentives. At the same time, reintegration in the home

country is of serious concern. If individuals do not foresee a smooth inte-
gration back into the working or societal system, they may feel too inse-
cure to return.67 If they can return temporarily to implement a project,
then this may be less likely to affect their decision and may represent an
important developmental step achieved through the sharing of knowledge
accumulated abroad.
Policy routes that facilitate individuals to interact according to their
transnational tendencies and that stimulate circular migration should be
discussed when considering policy agendas and their implementation.
Therefore, more consideration should also be granted to the potential ben-
efits that could result from double citizenship, multientry visas, and the
transferability of social benefits and pensions.
Notes
1. World Bank EdStats, accessed April 8, 2013, http://datatopics.worldbank
.org/education/
2. David A. Phillips, Development without Aid (London/New York: Anthem
Press, 2013).
3. Martin Ruhs, “The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future
International Migration Policy,” International Labour Review 145 (2006): 1–2;
Graeme Hugo, “Care Worker Migration, Australia and Development,” Special
Issue of Population, Space and Place, March 2008.
4. Global Commission on International Migration, accessed July 10, 2012,
http://www.gcim.org/
5. Global Commission on International Migration, “Migration in an Intercon-
nected World: New Directions for Action” (GCIM, 2005).
6. Ibid.
7. Global Forum on Migration and Development, “Human Capital Develop-
ment and Labor Mobility: Maximizing Opportunities and Minimizing Risks”
(background paper for Roundtable 1, GFMD, 2007), http://www.migrationpolicy
.org/research/MPI-GlobalForum_circularmigration.pdf
8. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, “Circular Migration and
Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward,” Migration Policy
Institute (2007), accessed April 5, 2009, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs
/MigDevPB_041807.pdf
9. Manolo Abella, “Policies and Best Practices for Management of Temporary
Migration” (paper presented at the International Symposium on International Migra-
tion and Development, UN Population Division, Turin, Italy, June 28–30, 2006).
10. Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, “Immigration and Politics,”
Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 99.
11. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (SOR/2002-227), ss 75,

78–83.
12. Migration Regulation 1994, Part 2, Division 2.6, Regulation 2.26AC.
13. Immigration and Nationality Act 214(g)(4).
14. Kathleen Newland, Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, and Aaron Terrazas, “Learn
ing by Doing: Experiences of Circular Migration,” Insight: Program on Migrants,
Migration and Development, Migration Policy Institute (2008).
15. LOI n 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration,
Article 2. II, 3.
16. Section 19 Aufenthaltsgesetz (2005 Residence Act).
17. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, “Circular Migration
and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward,” Migration Policy
18. Luis E. Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller, “Assimilation
and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among
Contemporary Migrants,” AJS 108, 6 (May 2003): 1211.
19. Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmerman, “High-Skilled Immigration
Policy in Europe,” DIW Discussion Papers 1096, Berlin, January 2011.
20. Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competi-
tive Immigration Regimes,” University of Toronto Legal Studies Series, Research
Paper No. 883739, 2006.
22. Artikel 3.59a Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000). Accessed April
5, 2009, http://www.st-ab.nl/wettennr04/0345-011_Vreemdelingenbesluit_2000
_Vb_2000.htm
23. Article 4, Chapter II of Directive 2003/109/EC and Article 16 (3) of
Directive 2009/50/EC.
24. Craig J. Calhoun, Nationalism (Open University Press, 1997); Peter J.
Spiro, “Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship,” Emory Law Journal 46
(1997): 1411–1485; Harald Waldrauch, “Rights of Expatriates, Multiple Citizens
and Restricted Citizenship for Certain Nationals,” in Acquisition and Loss of Nation-
ality. Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses,
ed. Rainer Bauböck et al. (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 359–379.
25. Anja Wiesbrock and Hildegard Schneider, “Circular Migration and Mobil-
ity Partnerships” (briefing paper for the DG Internal Policies, Policy Department,
Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Brussels: European Parliament, 2009).
26. Kay Hailbronner, “Nationality in Public International Law and European
Law,” in Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European
Countries. Volume 1: Comparative Analyses, ed. Rainer Bauböck et al. (Amsterdam
University Press, 2006), 82–83.
27. Betty de Hart and Ricky van Oers, “European Trend in Nationality Law,” in
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries.
Volume 1: Comparative Analyses, ed. Rainer Bauböck et al. (Amsterdam University
Press, 2006), 337.
28. Staatsecretaris van Justitie, “Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Justitie van
12 december 2008, nr. 2008/30, houdende wijziging van de Vreemdelingencircu-
laire 2000” (Admission Scheme for Highly Educated Migrants); Paragraaf B15/11.1
Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000.
29. Anja Wiesbrock and Hildegard Schneider, op.cit., 2009.
30. Mike Rowson, “The Brain Drain: Can It Be Stopped?” Health Exchange (2004):
21–23.
31. EC Communication, “Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orien-
tations” (Communication from the Commission to the Council, 390 final, of
September 1, 2005).
33. USAID, “Diaspora Network Alliance: Framework for Leveraging Migrant
Resources for Effective Development and Diplomacy,” USAID, 2005, accessed July
7, 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM860.pdf
34. Kathleen Newland et al., “Learning by Doing: Experiences of Circular
Migration,” Insight: Program on Migrants, Migration and Development, Migration
Policy Institute (2008).
35. Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Taizo Takeno, and Quentin Wodon, “Student
Migration to the United States and Brain Circulation Issues, Empirical Results, and
Programmes in Latin America,” in The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes
and Development Impacts, ed. Andrés Solimano (Oxford University Press, 2008).
36. Slovene’s Human Resources Development and Scholarship Fund, accessed
July 9, 2012, http://www.sklad-kadri.si/en/
37. Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Taizo Takeno, and Quentin Wodon, “Student
Migration to the United States and Brain Circulation Issues, Empirical Results,
and Programmes in Latin America,” in The International Mobility of Talent: Types,
Causes and Development Impacts, ed. Andrés Solimano (Oxford University Press,
2008).
38. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, “Linking Temporary Worker Schemes with
Development,” Migration Policy Institute (2007). accessed April 5, 2012, http://
www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=576
39. Kristin M. Ray, Lindsey Lowell, and Sarah Spencer, “International Health
Worker Mobility: Causes, Consequences, and Best Practices,” International Migration
44: 2 (2006): 181.
40. Mary Haour-Knipe and Anita Davies, “Return Migration of Nurses” (ICNM
2008), http://www.intlnursemigration.org/assets/pdfs/return%20migration%20
ltr.pdf
41. Stephen Bach, “International Mobility of Health Professionals: Brain Drain

or Brain Exchange?” in The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and
Development Impact, ed. Andrés Solimano (Oxford University Press, 2008).
42. Sonia Morano Foadi, “Key Issues and Causes of the Italian Brain Drain,”
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 19: 2 (2006): 209.
43. Kristian Thorn and Lauritz B. Holm-Nielson, “International Mobility of
Researchers and Scientists: Policy Options for Turning a Drain into a Gain,” in The
International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and Development Impact, ed. Andrés
Solimano (Oxford University Press, 2008).
44. Robyn R. Iredale, Fei Guo, and Santi Rozario, Return Migration in the Asia
Pacific (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003).
45. International Labour Organization (ILO), “Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant
Workers in the Global Economy,” Report VI, International Labour Conference,
92nd Session (ILO, 2004), 30.
46. Kristian Thorn and Lauritz B. Holm-Nielson, “International Mobility of
Researchers and Scientists: Policy Options for Turning a Drain into a Gain,” in The
International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and Development Impact, ed. Andres
Solimano (Oxford University Press, 2008).
47. Jean-Baptiste Meyer and Mercy Brown, “Scientific Diasporas: A New
Approach to the Brain Drain” (paper prepared for the World Conference on
Science, UNESCO-ICSU, June 26–July 1, 1999).
48. David Khoudour-Castéras, “Neither Migration nor Development: The
Contradictions of French Co-development Policy” (Paris: CEPII, 2009).
49. “La carte de séjour: compétences et talents,” Ministère de l’Intérieur,
accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Immigration
/L-immigration-professionnelle/La-carte-de-sejour-competences-et-talents
50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Migration and Development. A Perspective
from the Netherlands” (paper presented at the Global Migration Group Sympo-
sium: Overcoming Barriers: Building Partnerships for Migration and Human
Development, May 27–28, 2010, Geneva).
51. MGSOG, “Evaluation of the Blue Birds Circular Migration Project in the
Netherlands” (Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2012),
accessed August 25, 2013, www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1344262652
.pdf
52. Asmita Naik, Jobst Koehler, and Frank Laczko, “Migration and Development:
Achieving Policy Coherence. Examples of Working-Level Policies and Practices
from Albania, Canada, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
the UK and Elsewhere,” IOM Migration Research Series 34 (2008), accessed July
3, 2012, http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS_34.pdf
53. Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development
Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Coun-
tries” (a study for Oxfam Novib, Oxford: International Migration Institute, 2006),
accessed July 3, 2012, http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/engaging-diasporas
-hein-de-haas.pdf
54. Robert Holzmann, Johannes Koettl, and Tara Chernestky, “Portability

Regimes of Pension and Health Care Benefits for International Migrants: An
Analysis of Issues and Good Practices,” Social Protection Discussion Paper 0519
(2005) (Washington, DC: The World Bank); Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas:
How Governments and Development Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement
in the Development of Origin Countries” (a study for Oxfam Novib, Oxford:
International Migration Institute, 2006), accessed July 3, 2012, http://www.imi
.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/engaging-diasporas-hein-de-haas.pdf
55. EU Commission, “On Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships
between the European Union and Third Countries” (communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM, 2007).
56. ECDPM & ICMPD, “Migration and Development Policies and Practices: A
Mapping Study of Eleven European Countries and the European Commission,”
commissioned by SDC, 2013.
57. International Organization for Migration, “Recruitment and Placement of
Foreign Health Care Professionals to Work in the Public Sector Health Care in
South Africa: Assessment” (presented at the First Global Forum on Human
Resources for Health, Kampala, March 5, 2008).
58. Rahel Kunz, Sandra Lavenex, and Marion Pannizon, “Multilayered Migra
tion Governance: The Promise of Partnership” (Routledge, 2011).
59. EU Council, “Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the
European Union and the Republic of Moldova,” Communication from the EU
Council (2007).
60. Ibid.
61. RA Plan, “Euro-African Partnership for Migration and Development” (paper
presented at the Rabat Declaration in the framework of the Ministerial Euro-
African Conference on Migration and Development, 2006).
62. Commonwealth Secretariat, “Code of Practice for the International
Recruitment of Health Workers and Companion Document” (Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2003).
63. “Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations” (2005).
64. Kimberly Hamilton and Jennifer Yau, “The Global Tug-of-War for Health
Care Workers” (Migration Information Source, 2004).
65. Tine Davids and Marieke van Houte, “Remigration, Development and
Mixed Embeddedness: An Agenda for Qualitative Research?” International Journal
on Multicultural Societies 10, 2 (2008): 169.
66. Graciela Van der Poel and Melissa Siegel, “Perspectives of Return Migration
from African Health Professionals” (MGSoG Policy Brief, Maastricht University,
2010).
67. Ibid.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Student Migration from India

Implications for the Origin and the Host Countries
Shantanu Sarkar and Rashmi Sharma
Introduction
Migrants have been at the center of many debates, and sometimes
negative perceptions, in both their origin and destination countries. In
destination countries migrants have been held responsible for many
domestic problems, such as increasing unemployment and crime rates,
and have been considered to negatively influence the culture of the host
society. In countries of origin, emigrants are accused of draining the
country of its human and financial resources (the so-called brain drain).
This chapter attempts to focus on a particular type of migration—
student migration—and the myths and realities associated with it. Three
issues surround student migration. First, it is often assumed that student
migration is temporary in nature. Second, it is argued that it only benefits
the sending or the source country, depending on who discusses it. Finally,
there are representations of migrant students as a burden on the host
economy. This chapter investigates the validity of these claims by looking
at the example of student migration from India, a major migrant-sending
This chapter is based on Working Paper No. 8 of the IMDS Working Paper Series,
ZHCES, JNU.
country. It evaluates the implications of student migration for the source

country (India) and the host countries (major destination countries for
Indian students, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Australia).
International Student Mobility: An Overview

For a long time, international student migration has been discussed
only marginally by scholars around the world, as it was seen as a minor
phenomenon, secondary to issues such as labor mobility and family
reunion. Recent data suggest, however, that student migration has
increased manifold in the last four decades. The number of international
students increased from 0.8 million in 1975 to 4.3 million in 2011,1 regis-
tering a fivefold increase during this period. The increasing volume of
international student migration has turned this into an important issue for
policymaking in both sending and receiving countries.
The growth in student migration can be attributed to various factors,
such as rapid economic globalization, the internationalization of higher
education, an emergence of a tacit understanding in favor of exporting
education to generate revenue (particularly in the developed countries),
the commercialization of higher education, and an increasing demand
for professionals for filling the gaps in the industrial and service sectors
having a multinational presence. However, the most important factor lead-
ing to the international migration of students to the developed countries is
the desire for a better quality degree with more market value and credibil-
ity, giving them a better standing in the labor market. The increasingly
global nature of the employment market has led to a rise in the demand for
foreign degrees, which is complemented by the internationalization of
higher education.
In spite of being a global phenomenon, student migration has been
highly concentrated on a few major destination countries. Five countries,
namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Ger-
many, account for almost 80 percent of the stock of foreign students. Fig-
ure 8.1 provides a glimpse of the distribution of international students in
the most favored educational destinations in the world. In 2007, nearly
half of the international students (45 percent) went to the United King-
dom, the United States, and Australia, while 20 percent of international
students went to Germany and France.2
Destination countries are increasingly attracting international students
not only to collect study fees, but also for long-term socioeconomic ben-
efits associated with highly skilled migration. Regarding the immediate
Student Migration from India 181
Figure 8.1 Distribution of International Students in Destination Countries.
financial implications, universities around the world are facing a signifi-

cant decrease in government funding and are therefore looking for alterna-
tive financial sources. The fees paid by international students have given
universities a much needed alternative funding source. In terms of long-
term socioeconomic benefits, many developed countries are facing the
problem of an ageing and shrinking population. This has created a widen-
ing gap between the demand and supply of high-skilled personnel. Stu-
dent migrants provide a solution to such demographic problems, since
after completing their studies they become high-skilled workers ready to
fill relevant vacancies in the labor market. The competition for interna-
tional student migrants has increased in recent years, as more countries are
entering the market. Universities are using different strategies to attract
student migrants, such as advertising their high-quality education system,
the better lifestyle available by remaining in the host country, and a wider
variety of future job prospects. Such strategies have been supported by
efforts of the respective governments to facilitate the entry and residence
of student migrants.
It is furthermore a misconception that student migration is always tem-
porary. In fact, a sizable proportion of student migrants intend to stay for
a considerable amount of time in their country of destination after com-
pleting a course of studies. Therefore, it can be said that student migration
may become a prelude to permanent migration.3 The myths associated
with student migration discussed above will now be analyzed by discuss-

ing the example.
Student Migration from India

India is a major source country of student migrants. Today, a larger
number of Indians cross their national borders in order to pursue foreign
education than ever before. This phenomenon is also called the other
stream of skilled migration. Apart from regular employment migration,
this other stream of skilled migration has been taking place through the
academic gate. The mobility of Indian students is not only limited to coun-
tries that have traditional ties with India like the United Kingdom, or to
countries that attract the largest overall numbers of foreign students every
year like the United States. Rather, in the past few decades, the movement
of Indian students has become increasingly diverse, including destinations
such as the European Union (e.g., Germany, France) and Oceania (e.g.,
Australia, New Zealand). There exists a kind of competition among the
host countries to attract students from developing countries by tailor-mak-
ing their immigration policies to be suitable for international students.
This competition among countries like the United States, the United King-
dom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Singapore as well as
non–English-speaking countries like France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands has brought even the Ivy League institutions to India and to other
South Asian countries to identify and select the best minds. Figure 8.2
shows the distribution of Indian students among the various developed
destination countries. More than half of the Indian students migrating
abroad for higher education went to the United States in 2011, making it
the top destination of Indian students. The United Kingdom occupies the
second spot with 24 percent followed by Australia, receiving 7 percent of
Indian students.
Various reasons can be attributed to such a massive increase in the
number of Indian students going abroad to pursue higher education. First,
Indian universities do not have the capacity to absorb all applicants, espe-
cially in professional courses. For a country of more than 1.1 billion peo-
ple, there are only around 400 universities. Approximately more than 90
percent of the students who aspire to enter the Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy (IIT) or Indian Institute of Management (IIM) do not succeed due to
capacity constraints, so the top 40 percent among them go abroad for
higher education.4 Second, India has a policy of positive discrimination in
higher education, reserving 50 percent of seats or as high as 69 percent in
the southern state of Tamil Nadu for students from underprivileged and
Figure 8.2 Distribution of Indian Tertiary Students in Receiving OECD Coun

tries, 2011
backward castes. Thus, a large number of bright students belonging to the

upper castes are not able to get admission in courses and institutions of
their choice. Third, a foreign degree is considered superior to a degree
provided by most Indian institutions, and it is valued highly in the job
market. Fourth, middle-class parents are willing to support their children’s
education in universities abroad, and banks provide educational loans at
low interest rates. Almost all leading banks in India offer a loan for foreign
education to students.
The fact that student migration is not a minor phenomenon in India can
be further highlighted by looking at the migration of Indian students to
the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. The United States has
been the top destination country of Indian students for higher education
for about eight years in a row. In 2004, the share of Indian students among
all foreign students in the United States went up to 14 percent from
10 percent in 2001. Data collected by the U.S. Institute of International
Education’s Open Doors 2005 survey revealed that in 2004–2005 India
retained its first position in the U.S. university enrollments (followed by
China, Korea, Japan, Canada, and Taiwan) for the fourth year in a row. In
2005–2006, the numbers of applications from Indian students have been
reported to have registered a 23 percent increase over the previous year,
the highest among all countries. The United States still continues to grow
as the most favored destination for Indian students. According to data
released in November 2007, the international student population in the
United States rose from 564,000 in 2005–2006 to 583,000 in 2006–2007,
and for the sixth year in a row Indian students accounted for the largest
number of international students in the United States.5 In 2012–2013 the
total number of international students had increased to 819,644.6 Accord-
ing to a 2008 survey that monitored student flow, the population of Indian
students in the United States went up by 10 percent from 76,503 in 2005–
2006 to 83,833 in 2006–2007; the number doubled in the last decade.
Moreover, Chennai seems to be one of the largest exporters in the country.
In fiscal year 2006–2007, 38,274 student visas were issued from across the
country, of which the Chennai consulate gave out 19,973. Correspond-
ingly, between October 2007 and April 2008, 50,316 student visas were
issued from across the country, of which the Chennai consulate alone
accounted for 24,975.
Figure 8.3 shows that the number of Indian students going to the
United States has been increasing over the years. In 1995–1996, the num-
ber of Indian students was 31,743, while in 2012–2013 this number had
increased to 96,754. Internationalization of higher education has been a
major driving force for this. Also, with a rising middle class in India being
Figure 8.3 Number of Indian Students Going to the United States, 1995–1996
to 2012–2013.
able to afford foreign university programs (either through family funding

or through education loans) and universities actively recruiting them,
Indians have become one of the largest groups of international students in
the United States. One possible explanation for this increase in the flow of
Indian students to the United States is the acceptance of India’s three-year
bachelor degree program for entry to U.S. graduate schools. Earlier, the
United States accepted students in its graduate schools only after they
completed 16 years of formal education (12 + 4). Indian students were
required to study one year postgraduation before they could take any
entrance test to American universities. The change in rule was targeted
toward opening the doors of higher studies in American universities to a
massive Indian pool of bachelor’s degree holders.
Yet, in 2010–2011, the number of Indian students in the United States
started falling and Chinese students became the largest group. Due to its
economic recession, the United States as a destination country became less
attractive to Indian students, as there were fewer opportunities for finan-
cial assistance from universities and more limited prospects of finding a
job after graduation. It appears that many Indian students have chosen
other destination countries instead, such as, for example, Australia.
The United Kingdom is the second most preferred destination of
Indian students for two reasons: its traditional relations with India and
the quality of higher education associated with British universities. The
United Kingdom has a long history of hosting international students,
including Indians. In 1998 there were 3,300 Indian students in the
United Kingdom, which rose to 10,900 students in 2003.7 According to
data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), the number of
Indian international students in the United Kingdom rose from 19,205 in
2005–2006 (5.8 percent of total international students in the United
Kingdom) to 23,835 in 2006–2007. Britain attracts more foreign interna-
tional students than any other country except the United States and has
grown in stature as one of the most important centers of the global educa-
tion economy.
In 2006, 19,737 student visas were issued by UK embassies in India. In
2005 the embassies received 26,551 student visa applications from Indian
students, which increased by 27 percent in 2006, rising to 33,600. Yet,
Indian students in the United Kingdom have faced a lot of problems amidst
the uncertainties and volatility of its immigration laws. In 2006, a large
number studying in British universities converted their student visa into
the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) category and later regret-
ted their decision due to a change in the immigration law. After graduation
many switched to the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme as in-country
applicants, but the changes introduced by the UK government dismantled

all their plans.8
Be that as it may, due to its established reputation of quality education,
the United Kingdom continues to attract a large number of Indian students.
In 2007–2008, there were 25,905 studying in the United Kingdom, the
second largest group of immigrant students after Chinese. At present,
Indian students are still the second largest group, but the gap between Chi-
nese and Indian students has widened after 2010–2011. One possible
explanation for this is the fall in the value of the rupee in comparison to the
pound, making education in the United Kingdom costlier for Indian stu-
dents. The changes in UK immigration law in 2012, which made it difficult
to work after study, are most likely another reason for this decline. Indeed,
these changes to the migration law have been tremendously criticized by
UK universities themselves, which fear seeing their position as a large
recruiter of foreign students compromised.9
Australia has emerged as another important destination for Indian stu-
dents in the last few decades. As in the case of the United States and the
United Kingdom, India is second only to China as the top source country
for Australia’s international education industry and has recorded the high-
est growth in enrollments among the top 10 source countries followed by
China (18.9 percent), Thailand (11.9 percent), and the Republic of Korea
(11.3 percent). The data for international student commencements show
a 25.9 percent increase between 2006 and 2007. As indicated above, India
showed the highest growth among the top 10 countries with an increase of
87.8 percent from 2006. The statistics for the year 2009 indicate that
enrollments of Indian students have been around 120,913. Therefore,
India accounts for around 19.13 percent of total international student
enrollments. If we compare this with the number for 2007, which was
around 59,000, we can observe that the numbers have doubled in two
years. This large increase shows that India has the potential to become one
of the highest suppliers of students to Australia.
There are, however, also certain factors that could cause a decline in
student migration from India to Australia. The increasing occurrence of
violence against students (several cases of crime against Indian students,
some even leading to death),10 a strict migration regime (immigration
rules were modified to tackle the alleged problem of bogus students),
and the closure of private colleges (which did not meet the standards
set by the Australian federal and state governments) have affected the
number of Indian students going to Australia. In recent years there has
thus been a decline in the number enrolling at Australian universities
(Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Indian Student Enrollments and Commencements (Year to Date), 2008–2012
YTD March Enrollments YTD March Commencements
Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Higher Ed. 21,329 21,796 19,488 12,680 9,603 5,464 5,043 3,229 2,107 2,682
VET 27,585 45,958 49,658 35,234 26,099 8702 12,380 8,952 8,062 6,395
ELICOS 4,853 5,358 969 359 454 3353 3,007 558 247 276
Schools 67 91 122 91 75 18 37 33 25 19
Other 343 514 249 100 95 170 178 92 32 61
All sectors 54,177 73,717 70,486 48,464 36,326 17,707 20,645 12,864 10,473 9,433
Growth 36.1% −4.4% −31.2% −25.0% 16.6% −37.7% −18.6% −9.9%
Source: The High Commission of India in Australia, “Guidelines for Indian Students Wishing to Study in Australia,” http://www.hcindia-au.org
/students_guidelines.html.
The data from Table 8.1 show that Indian student enrollments increased
by 36.1 percent in 2009, but from the year 2010 onward, there has been a
decline in the number of Indian students. The total Indian student enroll-
ments have decreased from 73,717 in 2009 to 36,326 in 2012, which is a
decrease of 50.7 percent. This reduction in the number of Indian students
has negatively affected the finances of many private colleges, resulting in
their closures due to bankruptcy. During 2009–2010, around 64 colleges
and vocational institutions closed in Australia. Indian student migrants
were a major source of revenue for these institutions. In order to counter
these adverse conditions, the Australian government has remodified stu-
dent visa rules and prepared guidelines for helping students by making
them aware of conditions that they would experience while coming to
Australia on a student visa.
Dynamics of Student Mobility: Implications for India

Strategic Implications: Increasing Role of Education Fairs
The increasing reliance on the revenue generated by exporting higher
education to international students has sprouted competition among the
universities and many other higher education institutions across devel-
oped countries. There is an extensive use of various marketing techniques
to attract more and more international students paying extremely high
fees. One important technique is the organization of educational fairs in
the source countries. Since the beginning of the new century education
fairs have been organized in the host countries as a method of reaching out
to the prospective student migrants. With every passing year, the numbers
of fairs and their venues have increased. Initially these fairs were con-
ducted in major cities but now they are also organized in smaller cities.
The fairs are organized jointly by universities and Indian institutions that
specialize in international education consultancy. Organizations like
Edwise International, IDP, and the Chopras conduct these fairs, where uni-
versities from countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Canada, Singapore, and New Zealand come together at a single
platform and interact with prospective students and their parents or guard-
ians. Educational fairs make the application, selection, visa issues, and
other related procedures quick and easy for the aspirant students.
Economic Implications
The cost of studying abroad has remained a big hurdle for many
aspiring international students. Apart from academic or tuition costs, a
student has to incur expenses for food and lodging in the destination
country. Australia has an advantage in this respect as living costs and stu-
dent fees are affordable and less than those in the United Kingdom or the
United States. In the case of Indian students, a large part of the funding for
their foreign education comes from their family. It has been estimated that
the emigration of students leads to an annual outflow of $13 billion.11 The
fees paid by the student migrants (who are mostly from developing coun-
tries) are a kind of silent backlash of foreign exchange received through the
much debated remittances, which are considered to be a one-way flow of
money from the destination country to the source country.12 The heavy
amount of expenditures by Indians for getting a foreign education can be
broadly perceived as a form of investment in education. Foreign degrees
are considered to help students not only in securing better employment
opportunities at home, but also as a way to enter the employment market
of the destination country through the academic gate.13 Moreover, there is
a common perception that a foreign degree leads to a better remuneration
package.
Dynamics of Student Mobility in the Host Country

Student Migration Turning into Permanent Migration
It can be argued that international migration of students comes under
the ambit of temporary migration. However, a closer look shows that
this temporary migration sometimes turns into permanent migration. A
substantial percentage of the foreign student population joints the work-
force of their host country and thus becomes a permanent or temporary
component of the diaspora. This fraction has been increasing over the
years and the contribution of student migration in diaspora formation
has therefore become an important area of research. Many international
students try to remain in the destination country after the completion
of their courses by applying for jobs to get a work visa or enrolling in
another course. Often international students start looking for a job in
order to get a work permit to prolong their stay in the destination country.
A job offer not only solves their monetary problems but also provides
them an opportunity to earn foreign work experience, which adds value
to their resume. Many migrant-receiving countries have opened up
opportunities for international students to stay on and work after complet-
ing their courses. This serves two purposes for them: financing their
expensive higher education and filling short-term high-skilled labor
shortages.14
In Australia, there is a common perception that Indian students are

more interested in acquiring a permanent residence (PR) status than the
content of the course they are enrolled in. While providing a detailed
insight into various motives behind the enrollment by Indian students
in Australian universities, Baas15 argues that Indian students primarily
come to Australia because of the possibility of obtaining permanent
residence status after completing their courses. Studying in Australia is
thus seen as a way of settling there. Baas classifies Indian students in
Australia into three groups.16 The first group consists of students who did
not consider obtaining a permanent residency when they got enrolled.
These students come to Australia because they were unable to get admis-
sion in their first- or second-choice countries like the United States
and United Kingdom owing to stringent visa regulations, high competi-
tion, or high education cost. Australia provided them the opportunity
to get higher education abroad at a comparatively low cost. However,
during their stay in Australia they are influenced to obtain permanent
residency from migrants around them. Some of these students who
dreamed of studying in the United States or United Kingdom were
unsatisfied with the quality of education in Australia, and for them
obtaining permanent residence was a kind of compensation for the huge
investment they had made in their Australian education. The second
group consists of students who always wanted to acquire permanent
residence or a work permit after completing their courses as they had
planned to work in Australia for at least several years. These students had
taken heavy loans to finance their Australian education, and for them
earning money to repay their debts would be easier and less burdensome
in Australia compared to India. Apart from money, they would also gain
the experience in an international work environment. The third group
consists of people whose foremost endeavor was to acquire permanent
residency, and they migrated as students in order to do so. This group of
students contributes prominently to the expansion of the Indian diaspora
in Australia. They basically take courses that provide maximum points
according to DIMA and are enrolled in universities that are also called PR
factories. Therefore, sometimes they even have to enroll for courses they
are least interested in. Baas suggests that the majority of Indian students
are in the third group, and that’s why the notion in the Australian educa-
tion sector is that Indian students are more interested in Migration Occu-
pations in Demand (MODL) and less in the course outline. Thus, it can be
observed that the majority of students transform their temporary migrant
status to permanent residents and become a part of the diaspora in the
long run.
Australia immigration rules have undergone modifications a couple of

times in the last few years. Strict immigration measures have influenced
student migration to Australia as it has become very difficult to get
permanent residency for students. Overseas students graduating in a
field that falls under the Skilled Occupation List (SOL), the Critical Skills
List (CSL), or the category of MODL have a good chance to obtain
permanent residence status. However, the Skilled Occupation List (SOL)
is reviewed every year with additions and deletions of occupations
from the list. This volatility negatively impacts student migrants as
many occupations are removed while the students are completing their
studies.
In response to falling rates of student migration from India (Table 8.1),
the Australian government in 2011 lowered the requirements under
the student visa program in an attempt to boost the student inflow.
Major changes were the reduction in financial requirements when apply-
ing for a student visa, the availability of a two-year poststudy work visa
to all graduates with an Australian bachelor’s degree, and the abolishment
of a minimum English level for visa applicants who want to study
English.
Similar developments can be observed in the United Kingdom and
the United States. In the United States, one of the most important routes
to become a member of the high-skill workforce is as a graduate student
or as a postdoctoral scholar. Most foreign students and scholars enter the
country with either an F1 visa issued to full-time students, or a J1 visa
issued to students and scholars in a field of specialized knowledge that
enables them to participate in specialized training programs. During
2000–2004, between 600,000 and 700,000 persons annually entered the
country on student visas. Figure 8.4 shows that the proportion of doctoral
students in the United States who plan not to return to their home country
is very large for the two largest origin Asian countries.17
The figure shows that over 80 percent of Indian students who finished
their PhD in the United States intend to stay there. More than 60 percent
of Indian students have received job offers from American employers after
completing their PhD.
The United Kingdom has followed the opposite direction from the
general trend of facilitating student migration in other places in Europe
such as Germany.18 The UK government abolished the possibility for
foreign graduates to remain on a working visa for two years after comple-
tion of their studies. This policy has been criticized by universities
and think tanks, among others.19 The UK government is now launching
different messages aimed at maintaining the attractiveness of the United
Figure 8.4 Potential and Effective Loss for the Country of Origin of Students
Who Finished Their PhD in the United States.
Kingdom as an important destination for student migrants.20 This

illustrates how the positive impact of student migrants on the host econ-
omy compels policymakers to modify their policies in order to attract
and encourage student migrants. Just to provide one example, it was esti-
mated in a recent study that in the English city of Sheffield, hosting two
universities with a large number of foreign students, international students
would make a net total contribution to Sheffield’s GDP in 2012–2013 of
£120.3 million.21
Concluding Remarks
Owing to the importance of quality higher education in shaping their
future, an increasing number of students from developing countries are
migrating to the developed countries, thus making student migration a
major flow around the globe. The growing economies of South and South-
east Asia are among the major sending countries, and the universities of
the developed countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Australia are competing with one another to capture a larger
share of the international education market. The reason behind their
efforts in attracting student migrants is the financial contribution in the
form of fees and boarding and lodging expenditures of the student
migrants. Since education has become a highly profitable export com

modity, governments in these countries are framing immigration and work
policies to help their universities attract international students and are
supporting this sector to flourish. In some cases where stricter policies
have restricted the inflow of student migrants, the government has under-
taken steps to modify policies so as to facilitate student migration.
On the supply side, the universities have found a perfect alternative
to dwindling government funds in the recruitment of international stu-
dents (who are generally full fee-paying students of higher fees than
home students) to meet their expenditures. Besides, the host countries,
whose domestic population is aging as well as shrinking, have also found
a way of filling their high-skilled labor shortages, which is becoming
an important reason to attract international students. Countries that are
finding it difficult to fill high-skilled labor shortages from within the
domestic population can make use of the high-skilled international stu-
dent migrants to fill the gaps. Thus, a lot of emphasis is being put on the
recruitment of international students. Global rankings of universities have
now become an annual affair, which provide students an index to compare
universities worldwide. Today students have more than one global ranking
to compare the credibility of the universities. Strategies are being designed
by the universities depending on the characteristics of the market. On
the demand side, students have a growing desire to acquire a foreign
degree to achieve an edge in the labor market as it provides them a global
exposure.
As the examples of Australia, the United States, and the United King-
dom show, many universities in the developed countries are formulating
different strategies to attract students from developing countries like China
and India. Governments in most receiving countries are also playing a
facilitating role by making work and visa permits easier. Many education-
exporting countries are now allowing the students to stay for a few years
and participate in their labor markets even after completing higher stud-
ies, because recruitment of international students has several benefits for
the receiving countries such as financing their expensive higher education
and filling short-term labor shortages. Moreover, receiving countries
regard international students not only as a major source of skilled human
resources, but also as a means of gaining political mileage as foreign stu-
dents become their long-term ambassadors in the international political
arena. As former British prime minister Tony Blair observed: “Wherever I
travel I meet international leaders who have studied in Britain. Dynamic,
intelligent people who chose Britain because we offer high-quality educa-
tion and training. This is good news for the UK. People who are educated
here have a lasting tie to our country. They promote Britain in the world,
helping our trade and democracy.”22
It is a worldwide trend that students are turning from temporary into
permanent migrants as they tend to settle in the host country and join the
workforce. A student’s educational voyage to a foreign country is not only
limited to an educational one but goes way beyond it. One of the major
factors that students consider before choosing their education destination
are future economic opportunities. As a result, the countries providing a
combination of good universities and job opportunities top the preference
list of international students. Student migration sometimes acts as a first
step toward gaining permanent residence.
Notes
1. “OECD 1: US Share of Foreign Students Drops,” University World News
(2007), accessed July 27, 2009, http://www.universityworldnews.com/article
.php?story=2007101812234565
2. The destination countries for international students have increased as more
countries compete to attract international students. The top three countries that
attract most student migrants are the United Kingdom, United States, and Austra-
lia. These countries are the major players in the international student market,
while the top two source countries of international students are China and India.
For more see, OBHE, “International Mobility: Patterns and Trends” (London: The
Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, 2007), accessed December 9, 2011,
www.obhe.ac.uk/documents/download?id=14
3. Christiane Kuptsch, “Students and Talent Flows—the Case of Europe: From
Castle to Harbour?” in Competing for Global Talent, ed. Christiane Kuptsch and
Eng Fong Pang (Geneva: IILS and ILO, 2006), 33–61; Stephen Castles and Mark
J. Miller, The Age of Migration (UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009).
4. Student migration is not only responsible for brain drain but also results in
draining of foreign exchange from the origin country. The silent backlash of for-
eign exchange via the fees paid by the student migrants had been reported by
researchers working in the area of student migration. A report by Associated
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham) suggests that an
amount of US$13 billion is spent on foreign education by Indian student migrants.
See, “Indian Students Spend US$13 Billion p.a. Abroad,” The Financial Express
(2008), accessed November 3, 2011, http://www.financialexpress.com/news
/Indian-students-spend-13-bn-pa-abroad/285419
5. “Leading Places of Origin of International Students, 2005/06–2006/07,”
Institute of International Education’s Open Doors Report on International Educa-
tional Exchange, accessed December 9, 2011, http://www.iie.org/opendoors
6. “Top 25 Places of Origin of International Students, 2011/12–2012/13,”

Institute of International Education’s Open Doors Report on International Educa-
tional Exchange, accessed March 13, 2013, http://www.iie.org/opendoors
7. British Council, “IDP Education Australia and Universities UK,” Vision 2020:
Forecasting Student Mobility—A UK Perspective (2004).
8. “Indian Students in UK Left Vulnerable,” Express India (2007), accessed
January 10, 2014, http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid
=82020
9. “How to Ruin a Global Brand. Foreign Students Are Going Off English Uni-
versities,” The Economist (April 5, 2014), accessed May 27, 2014, http://www
.economist.com/news/britain/21600129-foreign-students-are-going-english-univ
ersities-how-ruin-global-brand
10. “Australia Condemns Indian Student’s Killing; Police Say Attack Not
Racial,” The Times of India (January 4, 2010), accessed March 27, 2014, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/Australia-condemns-Indian-students-killing
-police-say-attack -not-racial/articleshow/5408792.cms
11. “Indian Students Spend US$13 billion p.a. Abroad,” The Financial Express
(2008), accessed November 3, 2011, http://www.financialexpress.com/news
/Indian-students-spend-13-bn-pa-abroad/285419
12. Binod Khadria, “International Competition for S&E Students and Workers:
An Evaluation of Trends and Policies in India and South-East Asia,” Institute
for the Study of International Migration (2006), accessed February 20, 2013,
http://isim.georgetown.edu.
13. Binod Khadria, “Migration in South and South-West Asia,” Regional Study
No. RS 6, Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the GCIM (Geneva: Global
Commission on International Migration, September 2005), accessed September
20, 2007, www.gcim.org
14. Binod Khadria, “Uncharted Contours of a Changing Paradigm: Skilled
Migration and Brain Drain in India,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 28, No. 1
(2006), Web exclusive feature topic: Immigration, available at http://www.hir
.harvard.edu/articles/1445
15. Michiel Baas, “Students of Migration: Indian Overseas Students and the
Question of Permanent Residency,” People and Place, 14 (1) (2006): 8–23.
16. Ibid.
17. Graeme Hugo, “Migration in the Asia-Pacific region,” GCIM (Geneva:
Global Commission on International Migration, September 2005).
18. Matthias M. Mayer, Sakura Yamamura, Jan Schneider, and Andreas Müller,
“Immigration of International Students from Third Countries. Study by the German
National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN),” European
Migration Network, Working Paper 47, 2012, accessed May 27, 2014, http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/
reports/docs/emn-studies/immigration-students/10a._germany_national_report_im
migration_of_international_students_final_en_version_en.pdf
19. IPPR, “Britain Wants You! Why the UK Should Commit to Increasing
International Student Numbers,” November 28, 2013, accessed May 27, 2014,
http://www.ippr.org/publications/britain-wants-you-why-the-uk-should-commit-to
-increasing-international-student-numbers
20. In order to rectify the adverse effects of the restrictive policies on the educa-
tion sector, the UK prime minister proposed the following ideas: encouraging more
foreign universities to set up in the United Kingdom; packaging the “study in the
UK” offer more persuasively to international students; designing the UK student
visa offer to attract “the brightest and the best,” “for example, giving PhD students
in STEM subjects only a three-year wait before they can apply for citizenship rather
than the normal five years.” Accessed October 15, 2013, http://monitor.icef
.com/2013/10/uks-new-immigration-rules-signal-more-welcoming-approach-to
-international-students/
21. A report for the University of Sheffield by Oxford Economics, “The Eco-
nomic Costs and Benefits of International Students,” Oxford Economics, January
2013, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.259052!/file
/sheffield-international-students-report.pdf
22. British Council, “IDP Education Australia and UniversitiesUK,” Vision
2020: Forecasting Student Mobility—A UK Perspective (2004).
CHAPTER NINE
Changing Dynamics of Remittance

Flows and Their Impact on
the Economy
The Case of Pakistan
Hisaya Oda
Introduction
As of 2010, up to 215.7 million people were reported as living away
from their homelands on both short- and long-term bases.1 These migrants
Part of this chapter was presented at the 20th International Association of Historians of
Asia (IAHA), held at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, November 14–17,
2008, and the international workshop on Diaspora and Development: South Asian
Diaspora Engagement in South Asia, held at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National
University of Singapore, September 27–28, 2012. The author benefited from comments
and suggestions from participants. I am, of course, responsible for any remaining errors.
The data used in Section 4 were obtained from a joint survey by Pakistan’s Punjab Economic
Research Institute and Japan’s Institute of Developing Economies. The author is deeply
grateful to M. Jameel Khan, former Director of PERI, for arranging the field surveys in
Sargodha, and for advice provided at every stage of the research. I am also deeply indebted
to PERI field staff members for their help during the field survey. This study was supported
by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 23510334.
had varied rationales: some are temporary migrant laborers who have left
their families behind; some migrate permanently with their families to the
new destination in search of new opportunities; others study abroad. In
the field of economic development, the phenomenon of overseas migrants
sending remittances to their home countries—typically developing coun-
tries—has grown increasingly important as a research topic in recent years
as both absolute and relative remittance flow amounts have constantly
increased. This chapter contributes to existing studies by examining three
myths related to remittances and migration from economic viewpoints,
using the case of Pakistan, which has long depended on remittances from
overseas and is one of the largest receivers of such remittances.
While official development assistance to developing countries has not
grown significantly in recent years, the volume of remittances has continu-
ously increased. This pattern raises expectations that remittances can serve
as an alternative external source of development funds and can thus help
alleviate poverty in developing countries. However, remittances are not
necessarily a desirable source of external capital, at least for the macro
economy. Accordingly, the first myth discussed in this chapter is the per-
ception that remittances always exert positive impacts on an economy. If
remittances are relatively large compared to the size of the recipient coun-
try’s real economy, and if remittances are used not to help fund the living
expenses of remaining family members but merely to fund short-term
speculative investment and wealth accumulation, then inflowing remit-
tances may induce excess liquidity and thereby destabilize a developing
country’s vulnerable economy. This chapter investigates these possibilities
and attempts to temper the solely optimistic view of remittances.
The second myth concerning remittances posits that benefits springing
from migration and the consequent receipt of remittances are evenly dis-
tributed. Although remittances can have negative economic impacts,
migration has been considered an important household strategy for achiev-
ing various aims such as escaping poverty at the micro level. However,
migration opportunities are clearly not evenly distributed among house-
holds, as some households have no access to such opportunities even if
they need them. This chapter examines this issue because it poses a serious
challenge for poor households in rural areas where employment opportu-
nities are scarce and other options to improve daily lives are limited.
The third myth addressed in this chapter is the perception that remit-
tances always flow from developed countries to developing countries. It
reflects the existing literature, in which the majority of studies focus on
such a remittance flow pattern. However, a gradual increase in remittances
from developing to developed countries has occurred in recent years.
Changing Dynamics of Remittance Flows and Their Impact on the Economy 199
Money flows from family members at home to migrants in the destination

country are of particular interest. These are known as reverse remittances.
Although no evident economic impact of these reverse remittances has
been identified till now, a brief narrative analysis is presented.
In this chapter, remittances are defined as private money flows from the
migrant overseas to his or her home country. Migration refers to interna-
tional labor migration unless specifically stated otherwise. The structure of
this chapter is as follows: First, an overview of the trends and characteris-
tics of remittance flows to Pakistan is provided and recent developments
are identified. Second, the impact of remittances on the economy is dis-
cussed. In particular, excessive remittance flows are argued to possess the
potential to destabilize a developing country’s economy. Third, the factors
behind migration decisions and the uneven distribution of migration
opportunities are analyzed based on data from rural Pakistan. Fourth, the
current state of reverse remittances and related issues are discussed. The
last section concludes the chapter.
Changing Dynamics of Remittance Flows to Pakistan

Although measuring the stock of overseas migrants poses difficulties,
one government report estimates that four million Pakistanis were living
abroad in 2005.2,3 The Middle East hosts the largest concentration of
migrant Pakistanis, with almost two million residing in the region, 1.1
million of whom are in Saudi Arabia and 500,000 in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Other major destinations are the United Kingdom, which
has a Pakistani population of 800,000, the United States (600,000), and
Canada (250,000). Remittances from these Pakistanis have played an
important role in Pakistan’s economic development at both the macro and
micro levels; this is discussed in the third section of this chapter. Overseas
remittances have steadily increased since 2001, reaching US$13.1 billion
in fiscal year 2012, which ran from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012 (hereafter
the fiscal year is called “FY”). This figure, the highest ever, amounted to
around 5.7 percent of Pakistan’s GDP during FY2012. This section provides
an overview of the historical trend of overseas remittances to Pakistan and
discusses their changing dynamics.
Gulf Oil Boom and Remittance Flows to Pakistan

Up to the mid-1970s, remittance flows to Pakistan were limited due to
the relatively small pool of overseas migrants and the nature of emigration.
Given that many migrants to the United Kingdom and United States in
earlier periods were often accompanied by their families, many migrants

did not need to transfer money to Pakistan because no family members
remained behind. The economic boom in the Gulf region triggered by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ decision to quadruple
the oil price during 1973–1974 marked a turning point in migration pat-
terns. Using increasing oil revenues, Gulf countries embarked on develop-
ment projects on an unprecedented scale, which created a huge demand
for labor, particularly for manual construction workers. Pakistani workers
jumped at these opportunities.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government (1971–1977) also started providing
institutional support to these emigrating laborers, facilitating their migra-
tion to the Gulf region. For example, the Bureau of Emigration and Over-
seas Employment was established in 1971 by merging the following
government departments: National Manpower Council, Protectorate of
Emigrants, and Directorate of Seamen’s Welfare. Its main functions are to
regulate and monitor recruitment activities by overseas employment pro-
moters and facilitate overseas job recruitment. In addition, an Emigration
Ordinance was promulgated in 1979, replacing the Emigration Act of
1922. In the same year, the Overseas Pakistani Foundation was established
to address the welfare of overseas Pakistanis and their families.
Only 3,500 labor migrants left for the Gulf in FY1971, but by FY1977,
this number had increased to more than 140,000. These workers were
classified as temporary migrants: they left their families behind but had
to return to Pakistan once their visas had expired. This contrasts sharply
with the migration to the United Kingdom and the United States, which
was characterized as permanent. As the number of migrants to Middle
Eastern countries increased in the 1970s, so did the amount of remit-
tances to Pakistan. In FY1973, remittances totaled US$136 million, and
in FY1983, 10 years later, the amount had increased to US$2.9 billion,
which exceeded the value of Pakistan’s exports in that year (see Figure
9.1). However, this momentum was short lived. The number of Pakistani
migrant workers fell in the 1980s, mainly due to the Gulf region’s eco-
nomic downturn and increased competition from migrant workers from
countries such as Bangladesh and the Philippines. The number of
migrants who left for the Gulf shrank to 56,677 in FY1986. Remittance
flows began falling from their 1983 peak. This declining trend continued
until 2001.
However, these figures need to be interpreted with caution. This
declining trend is based on official figures, which record remittances
made only through formal channels such as money transfers through
banks, post offices, and authorized money transfer services companies
such as Western Union and MoneyGram. Although decreasing numbers

of Pakistani migrant workers can explain the declining amount of
official remittances to some extent, the official figures make it difficult
to determine if the actual amount of remittances decreased. This diffi-
culty reflects the fact that migrants became increasingly dependent on
remittances made through informal channels, such as hundi/hawala sys-
tems.4 The amount of money transferred by these methods is unre-
corded and quite substantial because of speed, convenience, and
anonymity. If these transactions were fully recorded, the size of remit-
tances would far exceed the amount of foreign direct investment and
private debt/equity.5
The system of hundi is more or less analogous to transfer through the
formal banking system. Instead of banks, however, the system is operated
by a hundiwallah (hundi dealer). A migrant (sender), for example, in Dubai
contacts a hundiwallah in Dubai to send money to his family in Pakistan.
After receipt of money from the migrant, the hundiwallah instructs his
counterpart in Pakistan to deliver money to the doorstep of the migrant
family. The two dealers then balance their mutual accounts by various
methods. Maimbo reported that roughly US$4 billion of remittances were
sent to Pakistan through informal channels in 1997, which far exceeds
Figure 9.1 Historical Trend of Pakistani Migrants Workers and Remittances.

that year’s official remittance amount of US$1.409 billion.6 They note that
the hundi system is “deeply entrenched in Pakistan.”7
Rapidly Increasing Remittance Flows since 2001

The declining trend in official remittance flows to Pakistan reversed
after September 11, 2001. This change is apparent not only for Pakistan
but also for many other developing countries. The 9/11 terrorist attacks
on the United States changed the transaction patterns of remittances
between countries. Pakistan’s official remittances were US$920 million
in FY2001, but increased sharply to US$2.3 billion in FY2002. Since then,
remittances have been constantly increasing, reaching US$13.1 billion
by FY2012. As examined later, a huge rise in remittances from the
United States and steady increases in remittances from the Gulf region are
behind this.
Changes are taking place not only in terms of remittance amounts
but also the composition of remitting countries. Since the mid-1970s,
remittances from the Middle East accounted for, on average, at least
60 percent of total remittances to Pakistan. From FY1977 to FY2001, the
largest share came from Saudi Arabia, followed by the United Arab Emir-
ates (see Table 9.1 and Figure 9.2). In FY1985, the share of remittances
from the Gulf region exceeded 80 percent of total remittances, and Saudi
Arabia’s share alone exceeded 50 percent. This tendency continued until
FY2001.
Remittances from the United States increased significantly following the
9/11 attacks. In FY2001, they amounted to US$143.4 million, but jumped
to US$795 million in FY2002, making the United States the largest source
country. In FY2002, U.S. remittances amounted to one-third of total remit-
tances. The U.S. share remained the largest until FY2009.
Remittances from Gulf region countries have also changed. The United
Arab Emirates’ economic development has attracted many migrant work-
ers, in turn generating a significant increase in remittance flows from the
United Arab Emirates to labor-exporting countries, including Pakistan.
Remittances from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan have not only
matched but also sometimes exceeded remittances from Saudi Arabia in
recent years. The latest official remittance figures indicate that, in FY2012,
Gulf countries sent 61 percent of the total remittances to Pakistan, with
the United Arab Emirates’ share being 21.6 percent and Saudi Arabia’s
share being 28.0 percent; the U.S. share was 17.7 percent. Given a UK
share of 11.5 percent, 90 percent of official remittances to Pakistan came
from the Gulf, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Table 9.1 Shares of Remittances to Pakistan by Source Country
(%)
1973 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
USA 7.3 5.1 3.5 4.3 10.8 10.7 8.8 13.2 33.3 31.2 27.3 22.2 22.2 19.9 17.7
UK 53.0 8.5 8.6 5.6 9.2 8.3 8.0 8.0 6.5 9.0 7.1 7.8 7.8 9.8 11.5
Saudi Arabia 5.8 27.5 45.6 50.9 40.8 42.1 33.9 29.8 16.1 15.1 19.4 20.0 20.0 21.5 28.0
UAE 0.0 20.4 12.4 12.4 9.3 13.5 16.2 18.6 20.1 17.2 16.9 21.6 21.6 22.9 21.6
Other Gulf 17.6 22.7 16.1 19.7 17.7 12.7 24.6 19.5 9.6 12.3 15.2 21.6 15.4 13.9 11.3
Countries
Other Countries 16.3 15.8 13.7 7.2 12.2 12.7 8.6 11.0 14.5 15.3 14.0 6.8 13.0 11.9 9.9
Total Wokers’ 136.0 577.7 1,744.1 2,445.9 1,942.4 1,866.1 983.7 1,086.6 2,389.1 4,168.8 6,451.2 7,811.0 8,904.9 11,200.0 13,186.6
Remittances
(US$millon)
Source: State Bank of Pakistan website, http://www.sbp.org.pk.
Figure 9.2 Volume of Remittances to Pakistan by Source Country.
Factors behind the Trend of Increasing Remittance Flows to Pakistan

As briefly touched on earlier, two main reasons exist for the dramatic
changes in official remittance flows; namely, the sudden increase in remit-
tances from the United States and a steady increase in remittances from the
Gulf region. The shift of wealth from the United States to Pakistan offers
one explanation for the sudden rise in U.S. remittances. Immediately after
the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government froze the American bank accounts
of Muslim individuals and groups suspected of being associated with ter-
rorism.8 This caused Pakistanis in the United States to fear that their
accounts might be suspended in the future, which induced them to shift
their wealth to their home country for safety.9
At the time, Pakistan was placed under IMF programs and recovering
from decade-long macroeconomic instability and low economic growth.
Its recovery accelerated after 9/11, when President Musharraf (1999–
2008) pledged to cooperate with the international community on the “war
on terror.” This decision opened the door for external debt reduction by
the Paris Club, which eased the Pakistani government’s fiscal position and
improved its balance of payments. The United States, as well as other
developed countries such as Japan, also resumed sending economic aid to
Pakistan, which had been suspended following Pakistan’s nuclear testing

in May 1998. These positive developments stimulated Pakistan’s economic
growth. Pakistan enjoyed an economic boom in the mid-2000s; it achieved
9.0 percent GDP growth in FY2005.
This economic boom was timed perfectly, because Pakistanis in the
United States were looking for somewhere to deposit their wealth safely
and hoping to gain economically at the same time. Pakistan’s rapid eco-
nomic growth and improving prospects attracted U.S.-based Pakistanis,
and remittances from the United States began flowing into Pakistan
through official channels at unprecedented speeds. This trend worked
very well for the first half of the 2000s. The correlation coefficient between
GDP growth rates and U.S. remittances during 1999 to 2006 is 0.773,
which shows a relatively strong positive relationship between the two
variables.
It is important to note that the nature of migration to the United States
differs from that to the Gulf region. Fundamentally, most migrants who
send remittances from the Gulf region are temporary migrant workers,
whereas those in the United States tend to be permanent migrants. In
addition, migrants to the United States tend to be better off than those in
the Gulf.10 Therefore, remittances from the Gulf region differ markedly
from U.S. remittances: the former primarily help finance the daily needs of
family members and relatives left behind, whereas the latter at least partly
reflect the search for economic profits.
Remittances from the Gulf region steadily rose as a result of the favor-
able economic conditions induced by higher oil prices. A rush of construc-
tion work provided job opportunities to many foreign workers, including
Pakistanis. Though the UAE economy suffered briefly following the finan-
cial crisis of 2008, triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, generally,
the economies of the Gulf region still benefit from higher oil prices and
continue to attract overseas workers.
Besides the increasing number of Pakistani migrant workers to the Gulf
region, Koch and Sun suggest that increasing remittances also reflect that
Pakistani workers have become more skilled.11 Where most migrant work-
ers used to be unskilled or semiskilled, the proportion of skilled workers
has increased in recent years. These increased skill levels have contributed
to further remittances to Pakistan from the Gulf region.
Altruism also explains some of the recent rises in remittances from the
Gulf region. Economic deterioration affecting the poor leads altruistic
migrant workers to remit more to their families, who need more help.12
The economic slowdown and high inflation in the late 2000s in Pakistan
may have led such a process to occur.
Moreover, 9/11 helped to increase remittances both directly and indi-

rectly. In the aftermath of 9/11, the international community, including the
United States, began to crack down on informal channels for transferring
money to prevent terrorists from using them. This tighter control led over-
seas migrants, including Pakistani workers, to use formal channels.13 This
shift from informal to formal money transfers generated a significant
increase in remittances recorded through official channels.
In addition, government efforts to encourage formal financial transac-
tions have increased remittances. In January 2001, the Pakistani govern-
ment introduced several incentive schemes. One such scheme is the
foreign exchange remittance cards (FERC). Under this scheme, overseas
Pakistanis who remit more than a specified amount of foreign currency per
annum through formal channels are entitled to benefits such as quicker
immigration clearance on arrival and departure, duty credit, and free issu-
ance and renewal of passports on an urgent basis. Amjad reports that
$1,032 million flowed in under this scheme since its introduction until
December, 2012.14 Furthermore, overseas remittances are exempt from
tax, irrespective of their purpose, meaning overseas Pakistanis can send
money to their families for any purposes without taxation. This lucrative
scheme has likely encouraged wealthy overseas Pakistanis to invest in
Pakistan through remittances.
At the same time, financial institutions have been instructed to be more
efficient and customer-friendly by speeding up the remittance process and
increasing accessibility to customers. These directions are embodied in the
Pakistan Remittances Initiative, jointly launched by the State Bank of Paki-
stan, the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis, and the Ministry of Finance in
early 2009 to enhance the flow of remittances through official channels.
This initiative allows for reducing both remittance costs and transit times.
It also brings various financial institutions such as Pakistan Post and for-
eign exchange companies under one umbrella and provides efficient trans-
actions between senders and recipients. For example, remittances can be
withdrawn in as many as 10,000 locations in Pakistan through commer-
cial banks, exchange companies, and post offices.15 These schemes rein-
forced the other effects of 9/11 and no doubt facilitated the sending of
remittances through formal channels.
The First Myth: Are Remittances Good for the Economy?

While official development assistance to developing countries has
declined, continuously increasing remittances have drawn attention as
an alternative financial source of economic development and poverty
alleviation. This possibility has motivated studies of remittances’ macro-

economic and microeconomic impacts. A stereotype view of remittances
holds that they help the poor and contribute positively to the economy.
This is the first myth examined in this chapter. Indeed, many studies show
that remittances contribute to poverty reduction. The cross-country analy-
sis of Adams and Page indicates that poverty rates fall by 3.5 percent if
remittances per capita increase by 10 percent.16 Arif uses Pakistan’s nation-
wide household data to show that foreign remittances help to alleviate
poverty.17 Ahmed points out that Pakistani households receiving remit-
tances have a 12.7 percent lower probability of being poor than those that
do not.18
Evidence on the relationship between remittances and economic growth
is mixed, and a consensus is yet to emerge. One view posits that remit-
tances contribute little to economic growth because they are usually spent
on daily consumption and housing construction, which are considered
unproductive.19 An alternative view holds that even if remittances are used
only for consumption, they can positively influence growth through mul-
tiplier effects.20 Consistently, Ahmed also finds remittances positively affect
GDP growth using a CGE model.21 Others argue, however, that remit-
tances slow down economic activity by reducing incentives to work and
thereby decreasing labor supply from households in receipt of remit-
tances.22 Nonetheless, a technical difficulty always occurs in analyzing the
impact of remittances on macroeconomic growth because empirical analy-
sis relies on either official or estimated figures, which are unlikely to truly
represent actual remittances.
As explained in the second section of this chapter, since 2001, remit-
tances to many developing countries, including Pakistan, have begun to
increase. It is important to analyze how this rapid increase has affected the
Pakistani economy. In particular, what impact has the increase in invest-
ment-oriented remittances, such as those from the United States, had on
the Pakistani economy? This question is important because senders and
recipients of investment-motivated remittances have different characteris-
tics from those who send remittances to help with recipient households’
daily living expenses.
Descriptive studies have been conducted, including newspaper articles,
on the purposes and effects of U.S. remittances since 2001.23 According to
many of these reports, remittance recipients purchased real estate in big
cities such as Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi because no other business
offers the same profit. This massive surge of investment from overseas in
the real estate market, in turn, led land prices in these areas to rise sharply.
In particular, property prices soared in Lahore, Pakistan’s second largest
city.24 For example, average prices of housing in Johar Town, one affluent
Lahore locality, increased by 400 percent in five years after the 9/11 attack.
It was also reported that the price of one plot in Defense Housing Author-
ity (DHA), another affluent area in Lahore, increased as much as 1,000
percent during the same period, indicating the Pakistani real estate market
experienced a mini bubble-like boom.25 Although a lack of data on land
prices in Pakistan makes obtaining rigorous empirical verification of this
difficult, it is a fact that real estate development in urban areas of Pakistan
has increased since the mid-2000s. Housing development occurred on
previously unoccupied land between Rawalpindi and Islamabad on the
Grand Truck Road. The suburbs of Lahore underwent rapid real estate
development, which quickly changed the landscape. In addition, there
has been widespread construction of condominiums, aimed at overseas
Pakistanis.
The rapid increase in remittances used for investment or speculative
purposes almost certainly generated excess liquidity, which helped fuel the
real estate boom. Though some price adjustments occurred in 2005, con-
tinued inflows of remittances and genuine demand for real estate pushed
prices further upward. Compared with real estate prices in 2005, prices
have gone up around 250 percent in DHA, Lahore and have shot up 700
percent in Bahria Town, also in Lahore, between 2005 and 2013.26
Many remittances may also have been invested in the stock market or
used to purchase consumer durables such as automobiles. The Karachi
Stock Exchange 100 index (KSE100) had experienced stagnation for a
long time, but after 9/11, it rose sharply as the Pakistani economy recov-
ered and remittances increased. Before 9/11, the KSE100 stood at 1,140
points. One year later, in mid-September 2002, it exceeded 2,000 points,
and by the beginning of 2008, it had reached 15,000 points (see Figure
9.3). However, the recession and the financial crisis induced by the
Lehman Brothers collapse led the index to fall to 5,300 points at the begin-
ning of 2009. But by July 2012, it had recovered to reach 14,000 points.
Clearly attracted by higher economic growth in the mid-2000s, portfolio
investments and investment-motivated remittances flowed in to reinforce
the KSE100’s upward trend.
Since 2001, sales of new cars have increased along with remittances. A
car is not only a means of transportation but also a valuable asset in a
country like Pakistan with persistent inflation and few financial instru-
ments. Purchasing cars can be considered investment in this light. Fewer
than 35,000 cars were sold in FY2000, a number that increased to more
than 200,000 in FY2007. Strong demand and limited production capacity
in Pakistan resulted in customers waiting up to six months for a new car.
Although the introduction of car loans and higher economic growth sub-
stantially boosted new car sales, excess liquidity induced by remittances
facilitated household purchases of luxury consumer durables such as cars.
Government policy also helped heat the economy. Since 2001, the gov-
ernment has encouraged remittances through formal routes by providing
incentives to overseas Pakistani migrant workers as noted in the previous
section. Generally, government incentives tend to encourage remittances
through formal channels. However, these incentives might have induced
excessive remittance flows. Surplus remittances, in turn, generate excess
liquidity and increase economic volatility. After 9/11, given the limited
investment opportunities in Pakistan, the excess liquidity stimulated
investment in search of short-term profits in real estate and the stock mar-
ket, which raised both real estate values and stock prices. Moreover, there
is a possibility that overseas remittances cause the recipient country’s
exchange rate to appreciate, which may in turn adversely affect export
competitiveness.27 Currently, developing countries welcome remittances
as an important external source of funds, and hence impose few regula-
tions or restrictions on them. However, governments may need to regulate
remittance flows in future in order to avoid economic instability caused by
excessive remittance flows.
Figure 9.3 The Trend in the KSE100.

The Second Myth: Are Migration Opportunities Evenly Distributed?

The previous section argued that remittances from overseas may
have exerted negative economic effects. Nevertheless, labor migration
provides a mechanism for households to finance daily consumption and
supplement their investment funds. However, opportunities to migrate,
particularly overseas, are not evenly distributed among households. Some
households have no access to migration opportunities even if needed,
and they cannot therefore reap the benefits of migration. This is a
particularly serious issue for poor households in rural areas, where employ-
ment opportunities are scarce and other options to improve daily lives
are limited. A general perception that migration opportunities are evenly
distributed, the second myth, is explored here.
Several factors influence household migration decisions. These differ
from place to place and vary among households, depending on factors
such as location, household social and economic status, and surrounding
environment. This section focuses on households in rural areas of devel-
oping countries where poverty prevails and households have strong incen-
tives to engage in international (overseas) labor migration. Using data from
villages in Pakistan, the relationship between land ownership and migra-
tion decisions at the household level is examined to confirm the uneven
distribution of international migration opportunities. The hypothesis
examined here is that size of initial landholdings influences migration
decisions.
Landholding and Migration Decisions

Because land is the dominant asset and therefore the main source of
income and power in a rural society, possession of land and size of land-
holdings influence various household decisions, including migration.
According to existing studies, land influences migration decisions in
several ways.28 Most of these studies argue from an economic viewpoint.
In terms of financing international labor migration, large landholders
can afford to pay the associated costs, whereas small and marginal land-
holders and the landless face difficulties.29 On the other hand, the
opportunity costs of migration tend to be higher for large landholders
because they need manpower to manage their agricultural activities, and
losing household members to migration can be economically damaging.30
This factor does not impact small landholders. Limited farming incomes
mean that small landholders have strong incentives to engage in labor
migration.
As land represents power and social status in a rural society, these also
affect household decisions. Large landholders, who have not only greater
economic power but also higher social status, may find migration an unat-
tractive option because they would lose their status in the migration
period. Anecdotal evidence supports the view that land has a social impact
on migration decisions, but this effect is difficult to quantify.
The final decision on migration depends on all these factors, as well as
expected remittances. Because of these intricate relationships, existing
studies have yet to reach a consensus regarding how land ownership affects
migration decisions at the household level. This section presents further
evidence on this issue.
Empirical Analysis
Three villages in the Sargodha district of Pakistan’s Punjab province
were randomly selected for inclusion in the survey, which was conducted
between February and March of 2005. A total of 89 households were
chosen for interview, made up of 27, 37, and 25 households from villages
A, B, and C, respectively. Households were selected randomly from each
category of migration status according to their prevalence in the village.
The number of sample households per village was weighted according to
the actual number of village households.
Households were classified into three categories according to migration
status: (1) nonmigrant households are households having no migrants; (2)
internal (domestic) migrant households have internal labor migrants; and
(3) international migrant households have international labor migrants.
Table 9.2 shows the incidence of labor migration at both household and
individual levels.
In terms of selection of sample households, two issues need to be con-
sidered. First, to avoid sample selection bias that might arise from includ-
ing landless households remaining in the village at the time of survey, only
landowning households are included in the survey. Landless households
tend to have greater mobility, partly because they are neither economically
nor socially bound by land. In addition, landless households that migrate
are likely to have different characteristics from those that do not. Hence,
excluding migrating landless households helps to generate a more appro-
priate sample for estimation. Second, households with returning migrants
were excluded because remittances sent during the migration period might
have changed their economic status. Third, households with both internal
and international labor migrants at the time of the survey were excluded
for simplicity.
Table 9.3 shows the mean and the standard deviation of landholding of
each type of household: nonmigrant, internal migrant, and international
migrant households. The results show that the mean landholding size
among international migrant households is larger than for either of the
other two household types. The mean landholding size among internal
migrant households is slightly larger than that of nonmigrant households.
To determine if these differences are significant, the Bonferroni correction
procedure was applied, with the result shown in Table 9.4. The results are
as follows: (1) a statistically significant difference exists in terms of mean
size of landholding between international migrant households and inter-
nal/nonmigrant households; and (2) a statistically significant difference in
the means of land sizes between internal migrant households and nonmi-
grant households is not observed. Taking the mean size of land owned by
nonmigrant households as the reference, the mean land size owned by
international migrant households is 6.82 acres larger. It is also 5.67 acres
larger than the mean size of that owned by internal migrant households.
The differences in landholding size among household types arise from
ability to finance migration costs. The high cost of international migration
seems to be a barrier to marginal/small landowners. The overall cost of
international migration, including fees to overseas employment promoters
(recruiting agents), at the time of survey ranged roughly from Rs. 100,000
to Rs. 200,000 (from about 1,000 to 2,000 US dollars), depending on
destination, visa type, migrant’s skill level, and so on.31 In addition, such
costs need to be paid up-front.32 As the size of a household’s landholding
increases, it is better able to finance overseas migration, whereas these
high costs prevent small and marginal landowners from emigrating.
International remittances are typically larger than internal remittances.
Although the opportunity costs of migration rise with landholdings, remit-
tances are sufficient to compensate for the losses incurred by migration.
Therefore, the more land a household owns, the more likely it is to engage
in international labor migration. As for the nondifference observed in size
of land between internal and nonmigrant households, it can be concluded
that the cost of internal migration is not a serious issue for all farm house-
holds, even small/marginal landowners. The decision to migrate internally
therefore depends not on land but other factors such as the number of
adult males in the household.
The demand for international migration is particularly high among poor
households, which are characterized by smaller landholdings in a rural
society. However, our study has indicated that international migration is
less prevalent among these households. Those who can afford to emigrate,
or can do so through other means, can leave the country for work.
Table 9.2 Incidence of Labor Migration at the Household Level
Incidence of Labor Migration at the Household Level
Village Village Village
A B C Total Ratio (%)
Non-Migrant Households 16 26 15 57 64.0
Internal Migrant Households 5 5 4 14 15.7
International Migrant Households 6 6 6 18 20.2
Total 27 37 25 89 100.0
Incidence of Labor Migration at the Individual Level

Village Village Village
A B C Total
No. of sample individuals (1) 193 282 158 633
No. of labor migrants (2) 13 15 15 43
Internal (domestic) migrant 7 7 6 20
International (overseas) migrant 6 8 9 23
(2)/(1) (%) 6.7 5.3 9.5 6.8
No. of male aged from 16-60 years old (3) 51 79 56 186
(2)/(3) (%) 25.5 19.0 26.8 23.1
Table 9.3 Comparison of Landholding Size by Type of Migration

Non-Migrant Internal Migrant International Migrant
Household Household Household
Mean (acres) 7.73 8.26 14.29
Standard deviation (acres) 5.89 5.27 11.53
Table 9.4 Results by the Bonferroni Correction Procedure for Comparison of

Mean Landholding
Non-Migrant Internal Migrant
Households Households
Internal Migrant 0.53 n.a
Households (1.00)
International Migrant 6.56*** 6.03*
Households (0.004) (0.067)
Note: Figures indicate the difference between the row mean and the column mean
(acres). P-values appear in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level. * indicates
significance at 10% level.
The Third Myth: Do Remittances Always Flow from Developed Countries to Developing Countries?
The third myth examined by this chapter is that remittances flow
from migrant members in developed countries to their families in develop-
ing countries. In fact, flows also occur in the other direction; that is,
reverse remittances, defined as flows of money from families or communi-
ties in the home country to their migrant member living overseas, typically
in a developed country. These flows contrast with remittances sent home
by migrants in developing countries to their families in developed
countries.
This type of money flow is not new. Remittances to migrants for settling
in their destination during the initial phase of migration are not rare in
either domestic or international migration. Apart from this, a recent news-
paper article reports that a new type of remittance flows to migrants, which
was not noticed before, appears to be on the rise. Money is remitted to
migrants who already settled and is used to help daily life at the destina-
tion. Specifically, this phenomenon was observed among migrants in the
United States during the economic recession triggered by the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. Families in Mexico sent money to support their migrant mem-
bers in the United States who became unemployed during the recession.33
Similarly, reverse remittances increased from the Dominican Republic to
the United States. It is reported that the number of such transactions
swelled by a significant amount in 2008.34 Reverse remittances occur not
only in the United States but also in other countries. For example, Senega-
lese migrants in Italy have reportedly received remittances from their
families.35
This evidence indicates that reverse remittances intended to help
migrants at their destinations are increasing. Therefore, the question
remains if this is the case. In fact, a lack of reliable data makes determining
the magnitude of such flows difficult. A report by Ratha examined changes
in foreign currency deposits, which are likely to be held by migrants or
their families, to measure reverse remittances from Mexico, the Dominican
Republic, and India, and found that such deposits declined in late 2008.36
This probably constitutes evidence of reverse remittances, but the authors
note that “reverse remittances are most likely miniscule—and seem to be
declining—compared to the size of remittance flows received by develop-
ing countries.”37
Migration for educational purposes is another possible cause of reverse
remittances. A study by Mobrand finds that educational expenditures con-
stitute the largest component of reverse remittances from rural Korean
families to their city-dwelling relatives.38 In the context of international
migration, the process of globalization seems to have increased this type of

flow among middle-class families. International students depend on finan-
cial support from their families for living expenses and tuition fees if they
do not receive a government or university scholarship.
According to one media report, around 5,000 Pakistani students resided
in the United States in 2012, which is a major destination for students.39
The United Kingdom and Australia have probably accepted even more
students. Guesswork based on limited available information suggests that
about 25,000 Pakistanis studied abroad in OECD countries in 2012. Now
let us calculate a hypothetical amount of reverse remittances for educa-
tional purposes. Suppose a family has one international student living
abroad in an OECD country. The family sends US$1,000 per month to the
student or US$12,000 annually for living expenses. This implies that the
families of 25,000 OECD-based Pakistani students would send an annual
total of US$300 million through this type of reverse remittances. This
amount equals about 2.3 percent of total official remittances received in
FY2012. Even if tuition fees were added, the total amount of reverse remit-
tances would not exceed 5 percent of total remittances. Although this is a
hypothetical figure based on an unsubstantiated number of students that
ignores the possibility of remittances sent through informal channels, and
is most likely an underestimated figure, the amount of this type of reverse
flow seems small.
An Indian newspaper reported that outward remittances (i.e., reverse
remittances) increased with greater numbers of students studying abroad
and Indians traveling abroad.40 The size of Indian reverse remittances was
US$9.6 million in 2005, increasing to US$808 million by 2009, US$436
million of which was used for educational and travel purposes. Given the
size of inward remittances to India, which stood at US$47 billion in the
same year, the amount of reverse remittances seems negligible.
By conceptualizing reverse remittances as a form of reciprocity, a study
by Mazzucato considers not only flows of money and goods but also ser-
vices rendered to migrants as part of remittances.41 Based on a survey of
Ghanaians in the Netherlands, the study notes that raising migrants’ chil-
dren, taking care of migrants’ investments in housing and businesses at
home, and helping migrants obtain legal documents to regularize their
stay abroad are the major services provided to migrants. It remains open
to debate whether or not these services should be considered reverse
remittances, but the study successfully points out that reciprocal exchanges
in the form of remittances and services underscore the existence of implicit
contracts or agreements between migrants and their relatives left behind as
argued in the literature.42
Overall, some anecdotal evidence exists but academic studies regarding

reverse remittances are scarce. Further studies should be conducted to
examine the magnitude of these remittances and their effects on both fami-
lies back home and the economies of the migrants’ home countries.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, three myths concerning remittances and migration were
examined from an economic point of view, focusing on the case of Paki-
stan. First, although remittances have recognized economic benefits, the
chapter discussed the possible negative implications that arise from exces-
sive inflows of remittances as a response to the first myth. Unlike foreign
direct investment, the purpose of which is known before arriving in its
destination, households can spend their remittances according to personal
preference—including using them for speculative purposes to make quick
profits. Such remittances create excess liquidity in the economy, which
stimulates spending on real estate, stocks, and luxury consumer durables.
This spending causes the economy to overheat, thus increasing economic
volatility.
As population movements may increase with globalization in the future,
remittance flows into developing countries are also expected to increase. In
2011, remittance flows to developing countries totaled US$372 billion.
This amount was expected to reach US$467 billion by 2014.43 Considering
the negative effects of excess liquidity, governments in developing coun-
tries should be alert to the possibility of excessive remittance flows. At the
same time, to promote the use of remittances for productive purposes,
governments should improve the investment climate, perhaps by provid-
ing infrastructure.
Second, this chapter examined household migration decisions. It showed
that migration opportunities are not evenly distributed among households,
contrary to the second myth. Not all poor households can afford to engage
in costly international labor migration. Poor farm households, character-
ized by small landholdings, cannot cover such high costs. Only households
able to pay the high costs of migration, or possessing other means of emi-
grating can leave the country for work. These findings support the argu-
ment that migration and remittances increase inequalities among households
as the better-off households able to engage in international migration grow
richer through remittances while poor households unable to emigrate
remain poor.44
Third, this chapter discussed reverse remittances, which are money
flows in the opposite direction, that is, money flows from families to
migrant relatives overseas. Despite media reports on this dynamic, the

magnitude of reverse remittances and their impacts on both families back
home and the migrants’ home economies seem limited. Reverse remit-
tances for various purposes have been observed but the third myth still
prevails. Inflowing remittances dominate such reverse flows.
Notes
1. The data used here come from Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2012
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).
2. Ministry of Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis, Year Book 2004–2005
(Government of Pakistan, 2005).
3. The definition of an overseas Pakistani is a Pakistani citizen who has migrated
to another country or an individual of Pakistani ethnicity born outside Pakistan.
4. For a detailed description of informal money transfer systems, see Leonides
Buencamino and Sergei Gorbunov, “Informal Money Transfer Systems: Oppor
tunities and Challenges for Development Finance,” DESA Discussion Paper 26
(New York: United Nations, 2002).
5. See Mohammed El Qorchi et al., “Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An
Analysis of the Informal Hawala System,” IMF Occasional Paper 222 (Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003).
6. Samuel Munzele Maimbo et al., Migrant Labor Remittances in South Asia
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 13.
7. Ibid, 13.
8. Presidential Executive Order 13224, issued on September 23, 2001. In a
speech made on September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush stated: “We will
starve the terrorists of funding.” See Rensselaer Lee, “Terrorist Financing: The U.S.
and International Response,” Report for Congress, Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress, 2002, accessed March 5, 2013, http://www.law
.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31658_12062002.pdf
9. This is documented in a couple of literatures. See, for example, Rashid Amjad
et al., “How to Increase Formal Inflows of Remittances: An Analysis of the Remit-
tance Market in Pakistan,” Working Paper (London: International Growth Centre,
2013): 6. See also Adnan Adil, “Pakistan’s Post-9/11 Economic Boom,” BBC News,
September 21, 2006, accessed November 17, 2013, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk
/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5338402.stm
10. Pakistani migrants to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s were mainly
skilled people and professionals including medical doctors. Pakistanis who arrived
in the United States during those decades were from relatively well-off families and
were well educated. See Hisaya Oda, “Pakistani Labour Diasporas and Remittances:
With Special Reference to Emigration to the United States,” International Journal of
South Asian Studies 4 (2011): 82–83.
11. Udo Koch and Yan Sun, “Remittances in Pakistan—Why Have They Gone
Up, and Why Aren’t They Coming Down,” IMF Working Paper, WP/11/200
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011): 9. For discussions on the
upgrading of skills by Pakistani migrant workers, see also Amjad et al., “How to
Increase Formal Inflows of Remittances,” 10–13.
12. See Oded Stark, The Migration of Labor (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
13. In fact, many Pakistani migrants still use informal channels for transferring
money for a number of reasons. Using these channels is easy and serves to deliver
money to the recipient household’s doorstep.
14. See Amjad et al., “How to Increase Formal Inflows of Remittances,”
41–42.
15. Ibid., 8.
16. Richard H. Adams Jr. and J. Page, “Do International Migration and Remit
tances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?” World Development 33 (2005):
1655.
17. G. M. Arif, “Effects of Overseas Migration on Household Consumption,
Education, Health and Labour Supply in Pakistan” in International Labour Mig
ration from South Asia, ed. Hisaya Oda (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies,
2004).
18. Vaqar Ahmed et al., “Remittances and Household Welfare: A Case Study of
Pakistan,” ADB Economics Working Paper Series 194 (Manila: Asian Development
Bank, 2010): 19.
19. Most remittances tend to be used for everyday consumption by recipient
households. Based on a survey of villages in Pakistan’s Punjab province, about 65
percent of recipient households used remittances—most of which flowed in from
the Gulf countries—primarily for daily living expenses. See Hisaya Oda, “The
Impact of Labor Migration on Household Well-being: Evidence from Villages in
the Punjab in Pakistan” in Globalization, Employment, and Mobility: The South Asian
Experience, eds. Hiroshi Sato and Mayumi Murayama (Basingstoke: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2008): 299.
20. See Haroon Jamal, “Remittances Inflow, Growth and Poverty: The Case of
Pakistan,” in International Labour Migration from South Asia, ed. Hisaya Oda (Chiba:
Institute of Developing Economies, 2004).
21. Ahmed et al., “Remittances and Household Welfare,” 13–14.
22. See Ralph Chami et al., “Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capi-
tal for Development?” IMF Working Paper, WP/03/189 (Washington, DC: Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2003): 21.
23. See, for example. Shahid Javed Burki, “The Diasporas’ Economic Role,” in
Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality (Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005): 275–
281, and Amjad et al., “How to Increase Formal Inflows of Remittances,” 2. For
newspaper articles, see Noshad Ali, “How Long Can Metric Rise of Property Prices
Last?” Daily Times, October 4, 2004, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www
.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2004/10/04/story_4-10-2004_pg7_23, and
Adil, “Pakistan’s Post-9/11 Economic Boom,” September 21, 2006.
24. See Ali, “How Long Can Metric Rise of Property Prices Last?” October 4,
2004.
25. See Adil, “Pakistan’s Post-9/11 Economic Boom,” September 21, 2006.
26. Shahram Haq, “Uptrend in Real Estate Market Unlikely to End Anytime
Soon,” The Express Tribune, August 17, 2013, accessed December 8, 2013,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/591200/uptrend-in-real-estate-market-unlikely-to-end
-anytime-soon/
27. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, and Suzan Pozo, “Workers’ Remittances and
the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts,” World Development 32 (2004): 1414.
28. For a review of the literature on the relationship between land ownership
and migration decisions, see Leah K. VanWey, “Landownership as a Determinant
of International and Internal Migration in Mexico and Internal Migration in
Thailand,” International Migration Review 39 (2005): 145–148.
29. Such studies include Paul Winters et al., “Family and Community Networks
in Mexico-U.S. Migration,” Journal of Human Resources 36 (2001): 167, and Hisaya
Oda, “Dynamics of Internal and International Migration in Rural Pakistan,” Asian
Population Studies 3 (2007): 174–175. On the other hand, several studies argue
that poor and landless males have the highest propensity to migrate abroad despite
the considerable travel cost. See, for example, Richard H. Adams Jr., “The Economic
and Demographic Determinants of International Migration in Rural Egypt,” Journal
of Development Studies 30 (1993): 162.
30. Several authors have explored this. See Ijaz Nabi, “Village-End Consider-
ations in Rural-Urban Migration,” Journal of Development Economics 14 (1984):
132, and Oded Stark and J. E. Taylor, “Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The
Role of Relative Deprivation,” The Economic Journal 101 (1991): 1170.
31. The figure was obtained from an interview with villagers during the survey.
The average daily wage for manual laborers was Rs. 200 per day in Lahore in 2005
(Government of Pakistan: Economic Survey 2011, Islamabad). The service fees to
the recruitment agent are substantially more than the poor can afford.
32. About 90 percent of international migrants paid the cost of migration up-
front for all migration channels. See G. M. Arif, “Recruitment of Pakistani Workers
for Overseas Employment: Mechanisms, Exploitation and Vulnerabilities,” 29.
Working Paper 64 (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2009).
33. Marc Lacey, “Money Trickles North as Mexicans Help Relatives,” New York
Times, November 15, 2009, accessed January 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/11/16/world/americas/16mexico.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all
34. Dilip Ratha, “Reverse Remittances? Yes, Not Really,” People Move, World
Bank, February 20, 2009, accessed November 16, 2013. http://blogs.worldbank
.org/peoplemove/reverse-remittances-yes-but-not-really
35. Martin Davies, “Reverse Remittances in Italy,” Public Radio International,
October 1, 2012, accessed January 4, 2014. http://pri.org/stories/2012-10-01
/reverse-remittances-italy
36. Dilip Ratha et al., Migration and Development Brief 10 (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2009).
37. Ibid.
38. Erik Mobrand, “Reverse Remittances: Internal Migration and Rural-to-
Urban Remittances in Industrializing South Korea,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 38 (2012): 393–394.
39. This figure is taken from Noman Ahmed, “Higher Education: Visa Denials
a Myth for Drop in Pakistani Students in US,” The Express Tribune, April 12, 2012,
accessed January 20, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/363168/higher-education
-visa-denials-a-myth-for-drop-in-pakistani-students-in-us/
40. “Outward Remittance of Education, Travel on the Rise,” The Economic Times,
June 14, 2009, accessed January 20, 2012, http://articles.economictimes
.indiatimes.com/2009-06-14/news/28415970_1_remittances-usd-capital-account
-transaction
41. Valentina Mazzucato, “Reverse Remittances in the Migration-Development
Nexus: Two-Way Flows between Ghana and the Netherlands,” Population, Space
and Place 17 (2011): 454–455.
42. This idea is theorized as the New Economics of Labor Migration. Migration
decisions are not taken by individuals but they are collectively taken within a
group of related people such as a household. Members of the group view migra-
tion as part of their strategy to not only maximize income but also to overcome the
constraints and risks facing them. See Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New
Economics of Labor Migration,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 173–178,
and Stark, The Migration of Labor.
43. The figure is taken from Dilip Ratha and Anil Silwal, “Remittance Flows in
2011—an Update,” Migration and Development Brief, No. 18 (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2012).
44. Richard H. Adams Jr., “The Effects of International Remittances on Poverty,
Inequality and Development in Rural Egypt,” Research Report 86 (Washington,
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1991): 37–38.
About the Editors

opment (ICMPD), Brazil’s Ministry of Labour, and LexisNexis, among oth-
ers. He has published widely in the area of European migration law,
Lisbon and Stockholm (Hart, 2014, with Cian Murphy) and EU Immigration
and Asylum Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, with Peers,
Anja Wiesbrock is a Senior Policy Advisor at the Research Council of
Norway. She has previously worked as a Researcher at the Department of
Private Law, University of Oslo and as an Assistant Professor in European
Law at the University of Maastricht. She has also been a Visiting Researcher
and Lecturer at several institutions around the world, including Harvard
Law School, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), Dokuz Eylul Uni-
versity (Izmir), and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). Her main
research interests focus on EU free movement law, EU migration law, pub-
lic procurement, and state aid, and she has published widely in these
Jonathan Crush holds the Research Chair in Global Migration and Devel-
opment at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario,
and an Honorary Professorship at the University of Cape Town, South
Africa. He is the founder and director of two African research networks:
the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) and the African Food
Security Urban Network (AFSUN). He has published extensively on
migration issues in Africa and the global South including, most recently,
the co-edited books Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival (with
Daniel Tevera) and A New Perspective on Human Mobility in the South (with
Rudi Anich, Susanne Melde, and John Oucho).
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas is a visiting professor at the Department of
Political and Social Sciences of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.
She graduated with degrees in history and anthropology from the Univer-
sity of Barcelona and holds a master cum laude and a PhD cum laude in
social sciences (2010) from the University of Amsterdam. Her PhD thesis,
which has been awarded the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) bien-
nial prize for the best sociological dissertation defended in the Nether-
lands, analyzed immigration policies in Malaysia and Spain. She has also
worked on immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands, local
integration policies and political discourses on immigration in Spain, and,
together with Sébastien Chauvin (UvA), on a theoretical conceptualization
of the irregular immigrant from a comparative perspective.
Terri Givens is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government
at the University of Texas at Austin. She has conducted extensive research
on the politics of immigration, radical right parties, and antidiscrimination
policy. Her most recent publication is the book Legislating Equality: The
Politics of Antidiscrimination Policy in Europe (Oxford University Press).
Jennifer Gordon has been a Professor of Law on the faculty of Fordham

University School of Law since 2003. She teaches courses in the fields of
immigration law, labor law, and legislation/regulation, and writes about
the regulation of the low-wage workplace, restructuring global labor
migration, and the relationship between law and social change. Her book
Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights was published in 2005
by Harvard University Press. Prior to joining the Fordham faculty, in 1992
she founded the Workplace Project, a nationally recognized nonprofit
immigrant worker center. She has received a MacArthur Prize Fellowship
and was named one of the top lawyers under age 40 in the United States
by the National Law Journal and “Outstanding Public Interest Lawyer of the
Year” by Equal Justice Works. She is a 2013–2014 Open Society Fellow,
researching innovative approaches to the regulation of global labor recruit-
ment in the context of low-wage guest worker programs.
Metka Hercog is a political scientist who specializes in labor migration
and international development processes. She is a lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Basel. She obtained her PhD in public policy from Maastricht Uni-
versity, the Netherlands. Her thesis investigated the effects of government
policies on the choice of destination country for highly skilled migrants.
She worked at the ILO, Labour Migration Branch, as a program officer,
and as a scientific researcher for the Cooperation and Development Center
at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and for the University of
Lausanne. She was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study
of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown University in Washing-
ton, DC (2010) and has conducted extensive fieldwork in India in con-
junction with Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Ms. Hercog
obtained an MSc degree in international development studies from Utrecht
University and a university degree in political science with specialization
in international affairs from the University of Ljubljana.
her PhD in geography from the University of Southern California in 1997.
She is a Professor at the Asian Pacific American Studies/School of Social
Transformation and the School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Plan-
ning at Arizona State University, United States. Her research is on urban
ethnicity and ethnic geography, highly skilled international migration and
transnational connections, and financial sector and minority community
development, focusing on the Chinese and other Asian groups in the
Pacific Rim. Her research has been funded by the U.S. National Science
Foundation, Canada-U.S. Fulbright Foundation, and the Government of
Canada. She is the author of Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in
Urban America (2009, paperback 2012; the 2009 Book Award in Social
Sciences, Association for Asian American Studies, University of Hawaii
Press); editor of From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communi-
ties in Pacific Rim Countries (2006, University of Hawaii Press); co-editor of
Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities (2012; Oxford University
Press), Landscape of Ethnic Economy (2006; Rowman and Littlefield), and
two journal theme issues; and co-author of 88 other scholarly articles. She
was a member of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Race and Ethnic Advisory Com-
mittees on the Asian Population and served as its elected chair (2010–
2012) and vice chair (2004–2009). She was the Fulbright Visiting Research
Chair at Queen’s University, Canada (2006–2007) and among the inaugu-
ral class of the National Asia Research Associates with the National Bureau
of Asian Research and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(2010–2011). She is a member of the International Steering Committee of
the International Metropolis Project and the North American Director for
the International Society of Studying Chinese Overseas.
Hisaya Oda is Professor of Economics in the College of Policy Science at
Ritsumeikan University, Japan. His research focuses on rural development
and migration issues in South Asia. Oda completed his undergraduate
studies at Keio University, Japan, with a bachelor’s degree in business and
commerce in 1987, and received a master’s degree in economics from Vir-
ginia Tech, United States, in 1996. Before joining Ritsumeikan University
in 2009, he worked as a senior researcher for the Institute of Developing
Economies in the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Some
of his recent publications include Inclusiveness in India: A Strategy for
Growth and Equality (edited with S. Hirashima and Y. Tsujita, Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2011) and “The Determinant of Rural Electrification: The Case
of Bihar, India” (co-authored with Y. Tsujita, Energy Policy, 2011). He
serves as a member of the international editorial board of Migration and
Development.
Sujata Ramachandran is a Research Associate with the Southern African
Migration Program (SAMP) based at the Southern African Research Centre
at Queen’s University (Kingston, ON, Canada). She has conducted extensive
research on Bangladeshi migrations in India. Trained as a geographer, her
research interests include South-South migration, diaspora development
engagement, and migrant integration in receiving countries. She recently
co-authored a report on public attitudes and xenophobia in South Africa.
Andrew Rottas is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at the
University of Texas at Austin. His dissertation focuses on the relationship
between border agreements and conflict between states. Prior to beginning

at the University of Texas, he was a research associate at the Council on
Foreign Relations, where he specialized in trade, immigration, and border
security issues.
Shantanu Sarkar is a Doctoral Scholar in the School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has a master’s degree in
economics from Jawaharlal Nehru University. His area of research is
international migration with special focus on student migration from
India. The title of his MPhil dissertation is Migration of Indian Students to
Global Cities: A Study with Special Reference to Two Cities in Australia. His
PhD thesis focuses on the migration of Indian students to Germany and
the Netherlands. He was associated as a research scholar with the Project
on International Migration and Diaspora Studies (IMDS), instituted by the
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India at the Zakir
Husain Centre for Educational Studies, School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He was a member of the research
team of the India Migration Report 2009 and the India Migration Report
2010–2011 (Cambridge University Press).
Rashmi Sharma is a graduate student at Zakir Husain Centre for
Educational Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
India. She has been the Senior Researcher in the International Migration
and Diaspora Studies (IMDS) Project at Zakir Husain Centre for Educational
Studies. She has completed her master’s in both commerce and education,
and has completed her MPhil in economics of education. She is a member
of the Research Team of the India Migration Report (IMR) Series, two issues
of which are published and the third one, on Europe and Africa, to be
published shortly. Her interest areas include economics of education,
international academic mobility, teacher migration, and teacher education.
She has published papers on teacher migration, student migration, gender
and migration, and migration and its developmental aspects.
Melissa Siegel currently works as an Associate Professor and Head of
Migration Studies at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and
UNU-MERIT where she heads the Migration and Development research
group of UNU-MERIT and the Migration and Development research theme
of the Maastricht Center for Citizenship, Migration and Development
(MACIMIDE). She currently holds positions as a Research Associate at the
Center on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) and as an Associated
Researcher at the International Migration Institute (IMI) at the University of
Oxford. She manages several migration research projects and coordinates
the Migration Studies Specialization and Migration Management Diploma

Program while lecturing and supervising bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD stu-
dents. She has several publications in the area of migration studies mainly
focused on the causes and consequences of migration with a strong focus
on migration and development issues.
Anastassia Tsoukala, PhD in law and criminal sciences, is Professor of
Criminology at the University Paris 11 and Senior Researcher at the Uni-
versity Paris 5 (Sorbonne). She is assistant editor of the French political
science quarterly Cultures & Conflicts and co-editor of the book series
Transnational Crime, Crime Control, and Security for Palgrave Macmillan.
She is working on the design and implementation of security policies in
Europe with regard to immigration, counterterrorism, and football hooli-
ganism, and on the social construction of threat. She is the author of Foot-
ball Hooliganism in Europe: Security and Civil Liberties in the Balance (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009) and co-editor (with D. Bigo) of Terror, Insecurity and
Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (Routledge, 2008).
Wan Yu is a doctoral candidate in the School of Geographical Sciences and
Urban Planning of Arizona State University. She received her MA degree in
geography and urban planning from Miami University of Ohio, and her BS
degree in urban and environmental sciences from Peking University,
Beijing, China. Her research interests are in the fields of ethnic settlements,
highly skilled migrants, international students, return migration, and
Chinese American experiences. Specifically, her work focuses on Chinese
international students and highly skilled migrants in the United States, as
well as Chinese highly skilled returnees from the United States back to
China.

He spent several years lecturing and researching issues on migration at the
universities of Ife and Lagos, Nigeria, and while working for the ILO (Addis
Ababa), United Nations (Swaziland), and UNFPA (Dakar). A former Presi-
dent of the Union for African Population Studies and member of the World
Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Migration, he is now Chief
Executive, Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos, member of
The Hague Process on Refugee and Migration Policy, and Coordinator,
Network of Migration Research on Africa. He also serves on the editorial
advisory boards of key international migration journals. He is a member of
several scientific associations, including IUSSP. He has published numer-
ous scientific articles, books, and monographs on aspects of Africa’s com-
plex development agenda, especially international migration and regional
integration. These include: International Migration within, to and from Africa
in a Globalised World (Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, ed., 2010); Seeking
Greener Pastures Abroad: A Migration Profile of Nigeria (Safari Publishers,
Ibadan, with van der Wiel, 2010); International Migration and National
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Leiden, co-edited, 2007); and Migra-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa (Uppsala, 2007). A book—Migration in the Ser-
vice of African Development: Essays in Honour of Professor Aderanti Adepoju
(ed. John Oucho, 2011)—acknowledged his four decades of research on
African migration issues.
Jorge A. Bustamante is a Mexican sociologist with a PhD from the
University of Notre Dame (Indiana, United States), where he has held an
endowed chair (Eugene Conley Professor of Sociology) since 1986. He
was also the founder and first President of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte,
a research and degree-granting institute located in Tijuana, Mexico, from

member of the University of Texas at Austin, El Colegio de México in
Mexico City, the University of Notre Dame, the National University of
Mexico, and the Institute of Political Sciences of Paris. He has served as
Coordinator of the Committee of Social Sciences for the National Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology for the President. He served as
Correspondent for the OCDE-Sopemi for 10 years until 2004. He was
appointed as UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants as
of July 29, 2005, a position he held until June 2011. On January 3, 2005,
the Permanent Committee (Comisión Permanente) of the Legislative
Power of Mexico produced a resolution, which was voted unanimously, to
nominate Dr. Jorge A. Bustamante for the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Busta-
mante was notified by the president of the American Sociological Associa-
tion that he was selected as the 2007 recipient of the Cox-Johnson-Frazier
Award, one of the two highest granted to a sociologist in the United States.
On October 26, 2010, the Mexican Bar Association awarded Dr. Busta-
mante the National Jurisprudence Award for his work in favor of the
human rights of migrants. On December 13, 2011, he was appointed by
the Mexican Senate as an advisor to the director of the National Commis-
sion of Human Rights of Mexico.
(Montreal, Canada) University. In 2011, he was appointed the United
ducted official visits to Albania, Tunisia, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and Qatar. He
has also dedicated thematic reports to the detention of migrants, the protec-
tion of migrants’ rights at the external borders of the European Union, cli-
mate change and migration, and global migration governance. He is guest
professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (2010–2015). He has
given many conferences, published numerous articles, and written or (co-)
edited seven books: Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years after 9/11—Ter-
rorisme, Droit et Démocratie: 10 ans après le 11 septembre 2001 (2012); Recueil
de droit des réfugiés: Instruments, Jurisprudences et Documents (The Refugee

Law Reader) (2010, 2012); Les migrations internationales contemporaines—
Une dynamique complexe au cœur de la globalisation (2009); Penser
l’international, Perspectives et contributions des sciences sociales (2007); Forced
Migration and Global Processes—A View from Forced Migration Studies (2006);
Mondialisation des échanges et fonctions de l’État (1997); and Droit d’asile: De
l’hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires (1995). He heads the Mondialisation et
Droit International collection at Éditions Bruylant-Larcier (Brussels). He is
a member of several editorial boards: Journal of Refugee Studies, International
Journal of Refugee Law, Refuge, Droits fondamentaux, and the European Jour-
nal of Human Rights. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and was a
Fellow (2008–2011) of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.
Andrew Geddes is Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield
(United Kingdom). He has been awarded an Advanced Grant by the Euro-
pean Research Council (2014–2019) to work on a project analyzing inter-
national migration governance (the MIGPROSP project). He specializes in
the comparative and international analysis of politics and policymaking
with a particular interest in international migration. He has published a
large number of books and articles on European and international migra-
tion, as well as work on British elections and British relations with the
European Union. Between January 2008 and September 2011, he was
Head of the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield. He has
been awarded fellowships at the European University Institute and Free
University of Berlin. Between 2009 and 2011 he was a member of the Lead
Expert Group appointed by the UK government’s Chief Scientific Advisor
to oversee production of the report Migration and Global Environmental
Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities.
Centre for Migration Law (www.jur.ru.nl/cmr), and Chairman of the
Standing Committee of Experts on international immigration, refugee, and
criminal law (Meijers Committee). He wrote a PhD on defending group
rights in civil courts (1981), was Dean of the Faculty of Law (1993–1995),
and was one of the founding editors of Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht, a
yearbook on Dutch and international case law on immigration, refugees,
and race relations published since 1975. He was a member of the Network
of Experts on Free Movement of Workers (1992–2013). He is a member of
the Odysseus Network of Experts on European Migration and Asylum
Law. He has published on the social and legal status of immigrants, immi-
gration and race relations legislation and policies, legal integration of
immigrants, and nationality law. In the past 15 years he has coordinated a

series of international comparative research projects concerning the legal
status of migrants.For his publications see: http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr
/research/publications-author/groenendijk/
India Migration Report: The Continents of Africa and Europe, and planning for
Transformation, and School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning
at Arizona State University, United States. Her research is on urban ethnic-
ity and ethnic geography, highly skilled international migration and trans-
national connections, and financial sector and minority community
development, focusing on the Chinese and other Asian groups in the

Pacific Rim. Her research has been funded by the U.S. National Science
Foundation, Canada–U.S. Fulbright Foundation, and the Government of
Canada. She is the author of Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in
Urban America (2009, paperback 2012; the 2009 Book Award in Social
Sciences, Association for Asian American Studies, University of Hawaii
Press); editor of From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communi-
ties in Pacific Rim Countries (2006, University of Hawaii Press); co-editor of
Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities (2012, Oxford University
Press), Landscape of Ethnic Economy (2006, Rowman and Littlefield), and
two journal theme issues; and co-author of 88 other scholarly articles. She
was a member of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Race and Ethnic Advisory Com-
mittees on the Asian Population, and served as its elected chair (2010–
2012) and vice chair (2004–2009). She was the Fulbright Visiting Research
Chair at Queen’s University, Canada (2006–2007), and among the inaugu-
ral class of the National Asia Research Associates with the National Bureau
of Asian Research and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(2010–2011). She is a member of the International Steering Committee of
the International Metropolis Project, and the North American Director for
the International Society of Studying Chinese Overseas.
Index
Adams, Richard H. Jr. and J. Page, Blair, Tony, on international students,

207, 218n16 193–194
African Americans, 10, 12, 14, Bloomberg, Michael, 142
15–16, 17, 100 border fences, 54, 66n25, 85
Ahmed, Vaqar, et al., 207, 218nn18 Borjas, George, 12
and 21 brain drain, 133–134, 136–142, 146
Albanophobia, 54
American Community Survey (ACS) Camarota, Steven A., 111, 128n12
2007–2009 data, 104 Cantle, Ted, 110, 128n9
amnesty for illegal aliens and net Caribbean Single Market and
fiscal deficit, 111 Economy Agreement, 168
Arif, G. M., 207, 218n17 Chandler, Arizona, 123–124
Arizona’s SB 1070 law, 124 Chicago School of Sociology, 112–
assimilation, 111, 112–113 113
assimilation, segmented, 113 Chinatowns: Brooklyn, NYC,
assimilation, spatial, 113 119; “Chinatown No More,”
asylum: criminal-migrant thesis, 119–120; Chinese immigrant
58; demonization of asylum- entrepreneurs and investors, 119;
seekers, 53; deportation Chiu, David, 116; Community
and, 62; Dublin II and III District Seven of NYC, 119;
Regulations and, 50; Greece contemporary Chinatowns,
and, 49–50, 54, 61, 63; 115–116; demographic and
immigration and asylum socioeconomic characteristics in
policies, 48, 49; migratory selected areas (2000), 117–118
threat and, 49; Operation (table); ethnic ghettos to enclaves,
Xenios Zeus, 61, 62; South Africa, 114–116; “ethnicities,” 116–120;
76, 85, 86; xenophobia and, Flushing, NYC, 119, 120; global
76 ethnopolis, 116; Kim, Jane, 116;
236 Index
Liu, John, 120; Monterey Park, Los 157; EU mobility partnerships,

Angeles, 125; parallel lives and, 168; Euro African Partnership for
124–125; San Francisco, 116, 119; Migration and Development, 169;
satellite Chinatowns, 116–120; evaluation of approaches, 172;
Wong Kim Ark v. US ruling, 115; facilitating the return of skilled
Yick Wo v. Hopkins case, 115. See nationals, 162; France and, 164–
also international migration and 166; General Agreement of Trade in
immigrant settlement in the United Services (GATS), 170–171; German
States Green Card program, 158; Global
Chiu, David, 116 Commission on International
circular international migration of Migration (GCIM) report (2005),
the highly skilled, promoting, 154–155; Global Forum on
153–177; administration burdens Migration and Development
to return, 162–163; American (GFMD), 155; globalization, 155;
H-1B visa, 157; approaches to, government encouragement of
bilateral, 164–167; approaches return migration, 163; immigrant
to, global, 170–171; approaches entrepreneurs and, 158;
to, regional, 168–170; Belgium International Organization for
and the Democratic Republic Migration (IOM), 163; introduction
of Congo and, 167; benefits of to, 153–154; IOM’s Migration for
circular migration, 155, 156; Blue Development in Africa (MIDA),
Birds circular migration projec, 169; IOM’s Return of Qualified
172; brain circulation, facilitating, Nationals program, 161; localized
156; brain drain, 157; Canada co-development projects, 167;
and, 165, 167; Caribbean Single longer stays, 158; management
Market and Economy Agreement, of international migration, 156;
168; circular migration, definition mobility-friendly migration policy,
of, 155; COLFUTURO program, 172–173; mobility of people, 155;
162; Commonwealth Code of mobilization for development,
Practice for the International 153–154, 158, 162; movement
Recruitment of Health Workers, of migrants back and forth,
169–170; compulsory savings, 158–159; Netherlands and, 165;
160–161; concerted management Philippines and, 166; policy
agreements for migration flows options encouraging circularity,
(France), 164–165; concluding 158–161; positive effects of skilled
remarks about, 171–173; Consejo migration, 153; preferential
Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia treatment, 159–160; reintegration
(CONACYT), 162; countries of in the home country, 173;
origin, 162–164; decisions to reintegration programs, 166–167;
migrate or return, 172; destination remittances, 154, 156; Report of the
countries, 156–161; Diaspora Global Commission on International
Networks Alliance, 161; dual Migration (2005), 170; resident
citizenship, 159; EU Directive permits, 158; return migration,
on long-term residence status, 155, 161, 162, 163, 172–173;
Index 237
salary top-ups or temporal tax ethnoburbs, 120–122; Fremont,

exemptions, 162; “Skills and California, 120, 122; Rowland
Talent scheme,” 165; Skills and Heights, 120, 121
Talent visas, 157; social security EU mobility partnerships, 168
arrangements, bilateral, 166; social Euro African Partnership for
security benefits, transferability Migration and Development, 169
of, 161; South African Network European Committee for the
of Skills Abroad network, 164; Prevention of Torture, 61
spontaneity and, 156; taxation of
foreign workers, 160; temporary false narratives in the migration
admissions, 155, 156; Transfer debate (Greece), 47–71;
of Knowledge through Expatriate Albanophobia, 54; conclusion
Nationals (TOKTEN), 170, concerning, 62–63; construction of
171; triple-win situation, 155; the migratory threat, overlapping
twinning programs, 167; points in the, 53; crime
virtual return, 163–164; ways involvement rate of foreigners,
for destination countries to bias in, 59–60; criminal-migrant
influence, 161 thesis, 58–62; Dendias, Nikos, 63;
Clemens, Michael and Gunilla domestic labor markets, weakening
Pettersson, 137, 149n19 of, 52–53; Edelman, Murray, 56;
COLFUTURO program, 162 electoral games and targeting
Commonwealth Code of Practice for immigrants, 55–58; European
the International Recruitment of Committee for the Prevention of
Health Workers, 169–170 Torture, 61; foreigners in prisons,
community cohesion, 125–126 overrepresentation of, 58–59;
compulsory savings, 160–161 Golden Dawn party, 54, 61, 63;
concerted management agreements Greek Roma marginalization, 54;
for migration flows (France), Greek-Turkish land border fence,
164–165 54, 66n25; immigrants demonized,
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 53, 62–63; immigration and
Technologia (CONACYT), 162 the economic growth of the
Council of Anthropologists of EU, 52; immigration in the EU,
Southern Africa, 80 modification of functionality
of, 52; introduction to, 47–50;
Darden, Joe and Eric Fong, 113, migratory threat and Greek
128n20 politics, 53–62; multifunctional
Dendias, Nikos, 63 process (broad-sweeping), 50–52;
Diaspora Networks Alliance, name and shame campaign in
161 Greece, 56–57; Operation Xenios
Drum Major Institute, 9 Zeus, 61, 62; politicization of the
dual citizenship, 159 immigration issue, 55–57; racism,
Dublin II and III Regulations, 50 54–55, 63; racist convictions of
Greek politicians, 63; reform of the
Edelman, Murray, 56 2010 Greek citizenship law, 63;
238 Index
right of blood, 63; scapegoating, 40; employers, dependency

55–56; scaremongering, 57; on, 36–37; Employment Act
Schengen area gateway, 50, (Malaysian), 36, 37; formula
64n4; social construction of the of “open entry” yet “closed
migratory threat in Europe, 52, 53; membership, 28; guest worker
threatening other, constructing of programs, common assumption
the, 50–53; torture in Greece, 61; about, 29; guest worker programs
xenophobia, 54–55 of Malaysia, 41–42; guest workers,
Fitzgerald, David Scott, 6 logic behind term, 40–41;
foreign-born population of the U.S., illegal migrant workers, 35–36;
growth of, 100 Immigration Act (Malaysian),
foreign exchange, silent backlash of, 31, 37; introduction to, 27–29;
189 irregular migrants, 35, 40, 41;
Fremont, California, 122 limitations on temporary workers,
Frisch, Max, 28 39–40; Malaysian migration
policies, 29; mass repatriation
General Agreement of Trade in programs, 39; medically unfit
Services (GATS), 170–171 status, 39; open entry, 32–36;
ghettoization, 110 recruitment agencies, role of,
Girard, René, 45 33–36; resort to illegality, 42;
Global Commission on International Ruhs, Martin and Philip Martin,
Migration (GCIM) report (2005), 29, 42n11; sanctioned bondage,
154–155 37; settlement of guest worker
global ethnopoles, 124 programs in receiving societies, 28;
global ethnopolis, 116 taxation of migrant labor, 37–38;
Global Forum on Migration temporality of migrant workers,
and Development (GFMD), 39–40; temporary labor schemes,
155 27–28; term guest worker,
Golden Dawn party, 54, 61, understanding the, 27; trade
63 unions and, 33, 36
Greece. See false narratives in the
migration debate (Greece) Highly Skilled Migrant Programme
guest worker programs, revisiting (HSMP), 185–186
the myth of (case of Malaysia), high-skilled migration, 133–151;
27–44; absconding/running Africa and, 137, 138; benefits
away, 37; bans on, 33; certified of, 138, 139, 140, 144–145;
skilled workers, 40; closed benefits to the U.S., 12;
membership, 36–40; costs of Bloomberg, Michael, 142; brain
legal migration, 35; demand drain, 133–134, 136–142, 145,
for foreign labor, controlling 146; British brain drain, 142;
of, 32–33; demands for closure “Cambridge” effect, 145; China
of, 31–32; demands for farm and, 143; Clemens, Michael and
labor, 29–31; effect of the Gunilla Pettersson, 137, 149n19;
temporality of migrant workers, clusters of high-tech industry, 145;
Index 239
competition between states for, the, 133–134; myths concerning,

145, 147; conclusion concerning, 135–147; native highly skilled
147–148; creation of myths about, workers and, 144–145; negative
133; definition of, 134–135; outcomes of, 137; as a niche area
division between “immigration” of immigration, 135–136; optimal
and “high-skilled immigration,” level of, 145–146; Partnership
136; education and, 140; Europe for a New American Economy,
and, 143; Germany and, 135, 136, 142; “points system” policy of
142; global net benefit for welfare, Canada, 143; policy cooperation,
138; high-skilled immigration, 141; protection of native highly
definition of, 134–135; The skilled workers, 145, 146–147;
Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is remittances and, 138–139; return
Losing the Race to Capture Global migration, 139–140; Sarrazin,
Entrepreneurial Talent (Wadhwa), Thilo, 135; saturation levels, at
142; impact of global forces the, 144; “Silicon Valley” effect,
on decisions concerning, 147; 145; support for the immigration
implications of unilateral cuts in of highly
migration, 146–147; India and, skilled worker, 135; “tragedy of the
143; introduction: transatlantic commons” problem, 141;
cooperation and competition, United Kingdom and, 136,
133–134; Johnson, Benjamin, 142; United States and, 136;
135; limitations on, justifications unnecessary competition between
for, 145; as a major component the U.S. and the EU, 143–144;
of immigration, 136; medical Uppal, Tim, 137;
professionals and, 137; myth U.S. competition for, 142–144;
1: high-skilled immigration is U.S. H.R. 656, declaration of policy
a “niche” area of immigration, goals in, 137; Zakaria, Fareed, 142
135–136; myth 2: migration Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raul, 111, 128n11
from developing to developed human capital and SES of major
countries is best characterized as immigrant groups (1990–2000s),
a “brain drain,” 136–142; myth 3: 101–104
the U.S. is losing the contest for hundi systems and remittances,
high-skilled immigrants, 142–144; 201–202
myth 4: presence of highly skilled Huntington, Samuel, 111
immigration can do nothing but
hurt native highly skilled workers, immigrant communities and
and disincentivizes native students, segregation, 112–114
144–145; myth 5: the U.S. (or The Immigrant Exodus: Why America
any developed country) should Is Losing the Race to Capture Global
slash high-skilled migration to Entrepreneurial Talent (Wadhwa),
protect developing countries, or 142
its native high-skilled workers, “immigrant nation,” changing faces of
145–147; myth of necessary an, 98–99
conflict between states, creating Immigration Act (1990), 98
240 Index
Immigration and Nationality Act major immigrant groups (1990–

(1965), 98, 100 2000s), 101–104; Huntington,
Immigration Policy Center of the Samuel, 111; immigrant clusters,
American Immigration 98; “immigrant nation,” changing
Council, 5 faces of an, 98–99; Immigration
Immigration Reform and Control Act Act (1990), 98; Immigration and
of 1986, 7 Nationality Act (1965), 98, 100;
international migration, 212 immigration reform and GDP, 111;
international migration and international migrant profiles,
immigrant settlement in the changing, 101–104; international
United States, 97–130; African migrants and population,
migrants, growth in population changing, 100–101; international
of, 100; American Community migration, changing places by,
Survey (ACS) 2007–2009 data, 104–109; introduction to, 97–98;
104; amnesty for illegal aliens and invisible ethnic suburbs, 123;
net fiscal deficit, 111; Arizona’s SB Latin America migrants, growth
1070 law, 124; Asian and Latin in population of, 100; Latino/a
American clustering, 98; Asian and Asian American populations,
migrants, growth in population of, growth of, 100; limited English
100; assimilation, 111, 112–113; proficiency (LEP), 101, 111;
Camarota, Steven A., 111, 128n12; “Little Asia,” 122; multiethnic
Cantle, Ted, 110, 128n9; Chandler, suburbs (ethnoburbs), 120–122;
Arizona, 123–124; “changing faces” Muslim migrants, 109–110;
of the U.S., 98–99, 100, national debates on international
111; community cohesion, migration, changing, 109; national
125–126; conclusion concerning, identity and, 110–111, 126;
126–127; Darden, Joe and Eric non-Hispanic white people, total
Fong, 113, 128n20; demographic population of (2010), 100; pace of
and socioeconomic characteristics increasing international migrants,
in selected areas (Chinatowns 97; parallel lives and social
2000), 117–118 (table); cohesion, 109–110; percentage
demographic and socioeconomic of international migrants in the
status of international migrants of U.S. (2010), 97; population
international migrants, 101–104; and migrant composition in the
destinations (top) of foreign- U.S. (1960–2009), 99 (table);
born population in the U.S. proportion of foreign-born
(1990–2009), 106–107 (table); in the total U.S. population,
education attainment level, 101; 100; racial-ethnic makeup of
foreign-born population growth, the U.S., 100–101; residential
100; Fremont, California, 120, segregation, 110; Rowland
122; ghettoization, 110; global Heights, 120, 121; segregation
ethnopolis, 116; H1-B visa holders, and immigrant communities,
111; Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raul, 111, 112–114; social cohesion, parallel
128n11; human capital and SES of lives, and immigrant communities,
Index 241
124–127; source regions of fear of, 15; conclusion concerning,

international migrants to U.S., 17; demographics changes, 6–7,
97, 100; spatial distribution of 14; discrimination, 15; economic
contemporary immigrants, 105; and worker’s rights arguments,
suburbanization of contemporary tensions between, 9–10; economic
immigrants, 108 (table), 109; argument, 5–7; economists’
trends, settlements, and debates findings, disaggregating, 12–15;
concerning international migration, employer sanctions, 7, 11, 19n18,
98–114; undocumented migration, 20n21; employers and “immigrant
110–111; “uptown” communities work,” 10–11; enforcement of basic
(invisiburbs), 122–124; urban workplace laws, 11; example of
and suburban settlement among (garbage collectors), 11; farm labor,
foreign-born population in the 10; Fitzgerald, David Scott, 6; high
U.S. (1990–2009), 108 (table); school dropouts (native) and, 12;
urban-bound populations of high-skilled immigrants, benefits
immigrants, 104–105; U.S.-born to the U.S. of, 12; immigration
African American population, impact on African Americans, 16;
growth of, 100; U.S. Census Immigration Reform and Control
Bureau, 2010 Census, 126; Act of 1986, 7; introduction to,
U.S. immigrant settlements and 3–5; “jobs Americans won’t do,”
consequences, changing, 114– analysis of, 10–12; labor market
124; visas, 98; Who Are We? The intervention, 11; in localities,
Challenges to America’s National 13–14; low-skilled immigration,
Identity (Huntington), 111; Wong 12; low wage jobs, immigrant
Kim Ark v. US ruling, 115; Yick view of, 7; low-wage jobs and
Wo v. Hopkins case, 115. See also black workers, 16; low-wage
Chinatowns workers and, 15–17; meatpacking
International Organization for industry example, 11; minimum
Migration (IOM), 161, 163, 169 wage, 16; net economic effect
invisible ethnic suburbs, 123 of immigration, 13; number of
undocumented immigrants in
Johnson, Benjamin, 135 the U.S., 4; Pitts, Steven, 16;
Journal of Development Economics, 140 reformulation of antidiscrimination
The Jungle (Sinclair), 11 law, 11; Shierholz, Heidi, 12, 13;
“silent raids,” 7; Traub, Amy, 9;
Kim, Jane, 116 unauthorized workers, hiring of, 7;
undocumented immigrants, legal
labor migration, dynamics of, protection of, 7–9; unemployment
3–26; “adverse effect wage,” 11; and, 16; U.S. economy and the
advocates’ core economic and impact of immigrants, 5–7; wages,
workers’ rights arguments, 5–9; 11; worker’s rights argument,
African Americans and, 10, 12, 14, 7–9; workforce competition, 15;
15–16, 17; availability of jobs, 6; workplace protective laws (U.S.),
Borjas, George, 12; competition, 7–8
242 Index
limited English proficiency (LEP), Obama, Barack, 7

101, 111 Operation Xenios Zeus, 61, 62,
“Little Asia,” 122 63
Liu, John, 120
Loverdos, Andreas, 57 Pakistan: changing dynamics of
remittance flows and their impact
Maimbo, Samuel Munzele, et al., on the economy, 197–220;
201, 217 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S.
Malaysia. See guest worker programs, and, 202, 206, 209; Adams,
revisiting the myth of (case of Richard H. Jr. and J. Page, 207,
Malaysia) 218n16; Ahmed, Vaqar, et al.,
Mbeki, Thabo, 76 207, 218n18and 21; Arif, G.
Migration for Development in Africa M., 207, 218n17; composition
(MIDA), 169 of remitting countries, 202;
minimum wage, 16 concluding remarks about,
Mnisi, Zweli, 76 216–217; cost of international
Mobrand, Erik, 214, 220n38 migration, 212; definition of
Monterey Park, Los Angeles, migration, 199; definition of
125 remittances, 199; development
multiethnic suburbs (ethnoburbs), funds, remittances as an alternative
120–122; Fremont, California, source of, 198; distribution of
120, 122; Rowland Heights, 120, migration opportunities, 198,
121 216; dynamics of remittance
Muslim: 9/11 terrorist attacks on the flows to Pakistan, changing,
U.S. and, 109, 204; parallel lives 199–206; economic impact of
and social cohesion, 109–110 remittances, 198, 216; education
myths: migrants are a threat to and migration, 214–216; excess
society, 45–46; migrant workers liquidity, 208; factors behind the
cannot get equal rights, 1–2; trend of increasing remittance flows
migration always harms the to Pakistan, 204–206; financial
prospects of developing countries institutions and remittances, 206;
by causing a brain drain, 131–132. flow of remittances, 198; foreign
See also high-skilled migration; exchange remittance cards (FERC).,
Pakistan: changing dynamics of 206; FY1973 remittances, 200;
remittance flows and their impact FY1977 to FY2001 remittances,
on the economy 202; FY1983 remittances,
200; FY1985 remittances,
national identity, 97, 110–111, 202; FY2001 remittances, 202;
126 FY2002 remittances, 202;
Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite, 77 FY2011 remittances, 216; FY2012
non-Hispanic white people, total remittances, 202; government
population of (2010), 100 policy and remittances, 209; Gulf
number of people living away from oil boom and remittance flows to
their homelands, 197 Pakistan, 199–202; historical trend
Index 243
of Pakistani migrants workers and rapidly increasing, 202–204;

remittances, 201 (fig.); household remittances from Gulf region
migration decisions, 210, 211, countries, 202; remittances from
212, 213, 216; hundi systems and the U.S., 202; reverse remittances,
remittances, 201–202; incidence of 199, 202, 214, 215, 216–217;
labor migration at the household shares of remittances to Pakistan
level, 213 (table); international by source country, 203 (fig.); size
migration, 212; international of Indian reverse remittances, 215;
remittances, 212; introduction taxation, 206; trend in the KSE100,
to, 197–199; investments and 209 (fig.); volume of remittances,
remittances, 208; Karachi Stock 198; volume of remittances to
Exchange 100 index (KSE100), Pakistan by source country, 204
208, 209; landholding, results (fig.)
by the Bonferroni Correction parallel lives and social cohesion,
Procedure for comparison of 109–110
mean, 213 (table); landholding Partnership for a New American
and migration decisions, 210– Economy, 142
213; landholding size by type Pitts, Steven, 16
of migration, comparison of, political groups and xenophobia,
213 (table); land size owned by 45
international migrant households, preferential treatment, 159–160
mean, 212; Maimbo, Samuel
Munzele, et al., 201, 217; racial-ethnic makeup of the U.S.,
Mazzucato, Valentina, 215, changing of shoes, 100–101
220n41; Mobrand, Erik, 214, racism, 45, 47, 54–55, 63
220n38; myth (first): concerning Ratha, Dilip, 214, 219n34
remittances and the economy, remittances, 138–139, 154, 156, 189,
206–209; myth (second): 198. See also Pakistan: changing
concerning distribution of dynamics of remittance flows and
migration opportunities, 210–213; their impact on the economy;
myth (third): concerning flow reverse remittances
of remittances from developed Report of the Global Commission on
countries to developing countries, International Migration (2005),
214–216; myths concerning 170
remittances, 198; new car sales, restrictive immigration policy, 45
208–209; number of Pakistanis return migration, 139–140, 155, 161,
living overseas, 199, 217n3; 162, 163, 172–173
property prices and, 207–208; reverse remittances, 199, 202, 214,
purposes and effects of U.S. 215, 216–217
remittances since 2001, 207; Ratha, Rowland Heights, 120, 121
Dilip, 214, 219n34; real estate, Ruhs, Martin and Philip Martin, 29,
207–208; relationship between 42n11
remittances and economic growth,
207; remittance flows since 2001, San Francisco Chinatown, 116
244 Index
Sarrazin, Thilo, 135 80–81; government’s position on

scapegoating, 55–56 xenophobic violence, 78; HIV
scapegoating mechanism, 45 testing for refugees, mandatory,
segregation: between immigrant 86; Human Sciences Research
and dominant groups, 112; Council, 78; illegal foreigners,
immigrant communities and, inflated figures for, 82; “illegal
112–114; “invasion and foreigners” brand, 76; Immigration
succession,” 113; parallel lives Act (2002), 76; “innocent
and, 110; residential, 109, violence,” 78; introduction to,
110, 113; segmented assimilation, 71–76; language and imagery in,
113 84; large-scale xenophobic
Shierholz, Heidi, 12 violence (2008), 72; Macia,
Sinclair, Upton, 11 Mido, and police brutality, 72;
skills and talent visas, 157 Macia, Mido, official response to
South Africa, migration myths and police murder of (2013), 73 (fig.);
extreme xenophobia, 71–96; May 2008 attacks on migrants
academic commentary on the and refugees, 76, 79, 80, 81,
violence of May 2008, 90; 88–89, 90, 91; Mbeki, Thabo,
African Union’s African Peer 76; “micropolitics of violence,”
Review Mechanism’s (APRM) 88; migrants and refugees, South
report, 77, 78; asylum and, African attitudes to (2010), 85
86; attitudes toward migrants (table); migrant stock of South
and refugees in South Africa, Africa, 76; migration control and
83–86; attitudes toward rights xenophobic tensions, 79; migration
for citizens and migrants, myths, 82–83; Mnisi, Zweli,
86–87; “Behind Xenophobia in 76; Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite,
South Africa,” 80–81; border 77; number and proportion of
and immigration controls, 79; citizens and noncitizens in South
citizenship status and, 80; Africa (2011), 83 (table); number
collective action against migrants, of South Africans willing to use
support for, 87; conclusion violence against migrants, 87;
concerning, 90–91; Council of police brutality, 71–72; policies
Anthropologists of Southern and practices of state institutions,
Africa study, 80; crisis of hopes 75–76; rates of detention and
and crisis of governments, 81; deportation of migrants, 79;
cycles of xenophobic violence, recurring pattern of aggression
88; documented migration, against migrants and refugees,
2011 South African Census on, 72, 74; representation of Africa
82–83; East Rand Dog Unit, as a threat to South Africa, 84
1998, 71–72, 73 (fig.); economic (fig.); research on the causes of
competition and, 80–81; examples May 2008 violence, 91; rights
of xenophobia denial, 76–78; for citizens and migrants, South
forms of extreme xenophobia, African attitudes toward, 86
75; geography of poverty and, (table); rivalry between locals
Index 245
and migrants, 80, 81, 82; social fairs, role of, 188; F1 visa/J1 visa,
legitimacy of extreme violence, 191; foreign degree as superior,
89; social problems and migrants, 183; government encouragement
84; South African Human Rights of, 193; Highly Skilled Migrant
Commission (SAHRC) report on Programme (HSMP), 185–186;
termination of extreme violence, high-skilled labor shortages,
88–89; Southern African Migration 193; Indian student enrollments
Programme (SAMP), 82; statistics and commencements (year to
concerning migrants, 82–83; date), 2008–2012, 187 (fig.);
studies on xenophobia in South international competition
Africa, 79–81; support for coercive for international students,
state measures to stop migrants 192–193; international student
and refugees, 84–86; taking action commencements data, 189;
against migrants, likelihood of, international student mobility: an
87 (table); urban poor and, 81; overview, 180–182; international
violence (extreme), termination students and Sheffield, England,
of, 88–89; xenophobia (extreme) GDP (2012–2013), 192;
conceptualized, 74–75; xenophobia introduction to, 179–180; major
as an “irrational fear of foreigners,” destination countries, 180,
81; xenophobia denialism, 74, 194n2; Migration Occupations in
76–79; xenophobia minimalism, Demand (MODL), 191; mobility
74, 79–82; xenophobia realism, of Indian students, 182; number of
74, 82–89; “xenophobic nation,” Indian students going to the U.S.
78; xenophobic violence, 79–80 (1995–96 to 2012–13), 184 (fig.);
South African Network of Skills other stream of skilled migration,
Abroad network, 164 182; permanent migration and,
student migration from India, 189–192; positive discrimination
179–196; academic gate, 189; and higher education, 182–183;
American employers and, 191; potential and effective loss for the
to Australia, 186–189, 190–191; country of origin of students who
Blair, Tony, on international finished their PhD in the U.S.,
students, 193–194; capacity of 192 (fig.); reasons for, 182–183;
Indian universities, 182; castes, silent backlash of foreign exchange,
183; Chennai and, 184; Chinese 189, 194n4; Skilled Occupation
student migration, 186; concluding List (SOL), 191; to the United
remarks about, 192–194; Critical Kingdom, 185–186, 191–192; to
Skills List (CSL), 191; distribution the United States, 183–185, 191;
of international students in violence against students, 186
destination countries, 181 (fig.); student visas, 184, 185, 191
dynamics of student mobility:
implications for India, 188–189; taxation of foreign workers, 160
dynamics of student mobility in the Transfer of Knowledge through
host country, 189–192; economic Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN),
implications, 189; education 170, 171
246 Index
Traub, Amy, 9 workplace protective laws (U.S.),

TVR/MIDWEB program, 163 7–8
World Bank Economic Review, 138
Uppal, Tim, 137
“uptown” communities (invisiburbs), xenophobia: asylum and, 76; Greek,
122–124 54–55; poverty and, 81; threat
perception and, 45. See also South
virtual return, 163–164 Africa, migration myths and
visas: EB-5, 98; F1/J1, 191; H1-B, 98; extreme xenophobia
multientry visas, 173; skills and xenophobia, extreme, 74
talent visas, 157; student visas, xenophobia denialism, 54, 74, 76–79
184, 185, 191 xenophobia minimalism, 74, 79–82
xenophobia realism, 82– 89
Who Are We? The Challenges to xenophobic violence, 79–80
America’s National Identity
(Huntington), 111 Yick Wo v. Hopkins case, 115
Wong Kim Ark v. US ruling, 115
workers’ compensation, 8 Zakaria, Fareed, 142

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Global Migration

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Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Anja Wiesbrock, Editors

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.

This book is printed on acid-free paper

Manufactured in the United States of America

Tables and Figures ix

Chapter One Global Migration Issues: Myths and Realities 1

Part I Myth: Developed countries are being

Part II Myth: Migration only takes place from

Part III Myth: Migration is economically negative. 195

About the Editors 271

5.8 Contribution of Mexican Immigrants to the U.S. Treasury,

professor of sociology of law at the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands;

chapters in such varied places as Milan, Brussels, Barcelona, New Delhi,

Dr. Diego Acosta Arcarazo

Global Migration Issues

In the United States, discussions have been ongoing to adopt migra-

Are Migrants Poor, Numerous, and a New Phenomenon?

Globalization and Actors

Convention and other international and regional instruments. This

Migration Policies: Changing Paradigms

large populations residing abroad. Indeed, almost five million British

Aims and Structure of the Book

migration is made up of such flows. The authors introduce us to a new

Part III addresses the third myth, “migration is economically negative.”

ian economy by providing a product that is not only economically impor-

who remain and work in U.S. territory without authorization. A similar

history of normalization of detention policy, from a temporary and

others, such as in the examples in this section, offer innovative solutions

language and integration tests as a precondition for family reunifica-

for the rights of migrant workers in terms of residence, employment, and

process but a concerted effort by employers to undercut unions and reduce

Myth: Developed countries are being swamped by migrants.

Furthermore, it is a popular misconception that it is the poorest, most

Migration Is Historically Normal

Foundations: Migration as a Historical Phenomenon

in remigration5 occurring after years or decades of gainful employment in

Table 2.2 Background Causes and Geographical/Temporal Specifics of Migra-

acquaintanceship with the recipients. Trustworthy information sufficient for

approximately 11 million Africans transported as slaves to the Americas

background, and religious orientation. Additionally, colonization was seen

Labor and Settlement Migration in the Context of Rapid Globalization

decades- or centuries-old migration history linking Europe with overseas

Communication links were rapidly extended (regular postal services; tele-

Europe as Migrant Destination since the 19th Century

soldiers, or police officers or had been seen by the indigenous popula-

brought renewed cross-border fluctuation of work-seekers, this time on a

12. Out of a variety of publications: David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman

Why Do People Migrate?

This chapter is based on an earlier version published in J. Hagen-Zanker (2010), “Modest

This chapter aims to review the spectrum of economic migration theory

theory developed in the 1980s sees migration as a household decision and

The Level of Analysis

Table 3.1 Theories of Migration Defined by Level of Analysis

Macro Theories of Migration

Neoclassical Migration Theories

A contemporary application of this theory could be the case of Ban-

Dual Labor Market Theory

This model can—to some extent—explain postwar trends in many

World Systems Theory

Table 2.2 Background Causes and Geographical/Temporal Specifics of Migra-