I.

Classification of Property
2005

2006

II. Right of Accession

III. Co-ownership

IV. Condominium

V. Waters, Minerals and Trademarks

VI. Possession

2005

HABAGAT GRILL VS DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER INC

454 SCRA 653

DECISION:

Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.

VILLAFUERTE VS CA
459 SCRA 58

DECISION:
When a person personally takes it upon himself to evict another from the former’s property, which
an act is in clear contravention of the law, he becomes liable for all the necessary and natural
consequences of his illegal act.

He who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession of a thing, so long as the
possessor refuses delivery, must request the assistance of the proper authority- a person’s
arbitrary conduct of fencing his property under the claim that he owns the same brazenly violates
the law and circumvents the proper procedure which should be obtained before the court.

SAMPAYAN VS CA

FACTS:

On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo
Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar
Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959,
PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having
been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. In their complaint, Crispulo and Florencia
asserted that they were co-owners pro-indiviso of the said lot, their mother Cristita Quita being
the ownerand actual possessor thereof. Upon the latter’s death and while they were absent from
the said lot, Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, allegedly built a house on the lot, to
their exclusion. After repeated demands, Cesar Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said
lot. Thus, they filed an action for unlawful detainer.

In his defense, Cesar Sampayan asserted that his occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the
lot’s true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Terrado, who were then residing in Cebu. The permission was
given by the lot’s overseer, Maria Ybanez. Sampayan further asserted that Crispulo and
Valencia’s action had long prescribed, inasmuch as the said lot had already been owned and
possessed by the spouses Oriol since 1960, as evidenced by the latter’s payment of taxes. The
Oriols, in turn, sold half the land to the Terrados. Together, they maintained possession of their
respective portions.

Both the plaintiff siblings and defendant Sampayan submitted their respective evidence consisting
of affidavits and tax declarations. Meanwhile, the MCTC judge also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises, where he found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection
have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced
improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question. The
MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that it is clear that defendants have been in possession
for more than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have been accion publiciana or
lenaria de possession. Upon appeal to the RTC, it reversed the decision, relying on the
involvement of Cristita Quita, plaintiffs’ mother, in a cadastral case involving the lot in 1957.
Sampayan then appealed to the CA, which denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical possession

DECISION:

YES. To begin with, the Court is at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC
judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat
“confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-
interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on
the land in question”, adding that “[N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon
a time been in possession of the land”, and categorically stating that “[T]he allegation that Cristita
Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property
since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked
claim, unsupported by any evidence”.
x x x

The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein, the Court of Appeals attached much
significance to the fact that private respondents’ mother, Cristita Quita, was an oppositor in
Cadastral Case No. 149. The Court ruled and held that the mother’s being an oppositor in said
cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors
in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.

HABAGAT GRILL VS DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER INC

FACTS:

On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot
situated in Matina, Davao City and covered by TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be
called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its
sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-
279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the
Habagat Grill in December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-
D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged that
as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on
that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered
into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of
the possession of said lot since then up to the present; that the reasonable rental value of said lot
is P10,000.00 a month.

Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat
Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20)
and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital issues in the case was the
location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three
members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer
representing Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining
where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No.
1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal Reservation
No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never
took oath as such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the
survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative.
After conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero submitted
their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934
square meters of the lot in question.

After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August
6, 1998 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC
appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same was docketed in Branch
12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered
judgment affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied
in the courts Order dated April 21, 1999.[5]

Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA. Granting respondents appeal, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible Entry

ISSUE:

Whether or not is entitled to the possession of the subject property?

DECISION:

Respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject property.

Spouses Benitez v. CA has held that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation,
but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of
acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x execution and registration
of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles. For one to be
considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch
of the property at all times. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondents’
predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public
instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993,
when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.

VILLAFUERTE VS CA

FACTS:

Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan-Villafuerte operated a gasoline station known
as Peewees Petron Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the premises of
three (3) adjoining lots at the corner of Gomez Street and Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. One of
these lots, is owned by several persons namely, Edilberto de Mesa, Gonzalo Daleon and his
brother Federico A. Daleon and Mrs. Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of appellee Perlita Tan-Villafuerte.

Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired their respective lots subject to the
lease by Petrophil Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline station being managed by the
Villafuerte couple. When the lease of Petrophil Corporation expired on December 31, 1988, the
Villafuertes obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de Mesa for a period expiring on
December 31, 1989.

As regards the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes were not as lucky. For, instead of obtaining
a lease renewal, what they received were demand letters from the brothers counsel ordering them
to vacate the premises. Instead of complying therewith, the Villafuertes simply ignored the
demand and continued operating the gas station.

Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the Villafuertes in the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Tres, Lucena City. No settlement was reached.

Villafuertes, upon expiration of lease contract with Edilberto de Mesa, the same was not renewed.
The spouses continued to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on the lot of de
Mesa despite the latters demand to vacate.

Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of several persons and without the
knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latters gasoline station by constructing
fences around it. Villafuertes countered with a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction against both Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon. The complaint seeks vindication
for the alleged malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs’ business premises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents can invoke the doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of
the Civil Code.

Whether or not it was improper for private respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order
to remove petitioners from the premises.

DECISION:

No.

Private respondents could not invoke the doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the Civil
Code.

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.

The doctrine finds no application when occupation was effected through lawful means such as in
this case where petitioners possession of the lots owned by private respondents was effected
through lease agreements

No.

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is
a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.
Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law, private respondents were held accountable
to petitioners for the various damages prayed for by petitioners in their amended complaint.

2006

DELFIN VS. BILLONES

485 SCRA 38
March 17, 2006

FACTS:

On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 213, of Panitan, Capiz, was executed by
Teresa Daos, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar, with the marital consent
of Cipriano Degala, husband of Teresa Daos, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa
Belo (spouses Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the signatures of Esperanza and
Estrella, as well as the thumb marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged
before a notary public. On 18 November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute
Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon, a new title, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17071, was issued in the name of the spouses Delfin

Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale involving
Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T-16804 was made between Teresa Daos, Trinidad
Degala, Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro Degala, on one part,
and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed, bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures
of the sellers, was likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses Delfin on 24
June 1980. The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and subdivided the
resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots.

On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners of Lots No.
213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and
possession and damages According to them, it was only in 1989 when they discovered that
Teresa Daos, sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965. Taking advantage
of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document purporting to be a mortgage, but
which turned out to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213,
respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering the property was fictitious and the signatures
and thumb marks contained therein were all forged because three (3) of the signatories therein
died before the alleged sale in 1960, namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza
Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946. As proof thereof, respondents presented
certifications on the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar
of Panitan, Capiz.

To counter respondent’s arguments, petitioners alleged that respondents action was already
barred by prescription and laches. Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the
subsequent owners of the subject properties, are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith,
whose titles to the lots at the time of the purchase were
all clean and free from liens and encumbrances

The appellate court annulled the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale covering Lot No. 3414.
The appellate court noted that: (i) Teresa Daos was a very old and sickly woman; (ii) she and her
children lacked formal education to fully comprehend the document to which they affixed their
signatures and/or thumb marks; (iii) P300.00 was inadequate consideration for a lot consisting of
1,565 square meters even in 1965; (iv) respondents were allowed to remain in the subject
properties; and (v) the questioned document was registered in the name of the spouses Delfin 15
years after the alleged date of its execution, when most of the alleged vendors have already died.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondents retained possession of the subject
properties.

DECISION:

Yes. Contrary to the appellate courts illation, respondents have not established possession of the
subject properties. Save for the lone testimony of Orlando Buday, a neighbor, that Rosario Degala
Daradar was the only one still residing in the properties in dispute, no other evidence was
presented to show that respondents are in actual occupation and possession thereof. Not even
Rosario herself testified. Doubts also arise as to the veracity of respondents claim of possession
since respondents themselves averred in their complaint that the spouses Delfin had immediately
taken possession of the subject properties in the same year that the sale was made, and
appropriated the produce found in the subject lots from then on.
One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 161836
February 28, 2006

FACTS:

In the early seventies, petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), the government-
owned and controlled corporation managing and operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway. This necessitated the acquisition and
occupation of some of the properties surrounding its premises. Expropriation proceedings were
thus initiated over most of the properties.
On 12 January 1996, the MIAA through its then General Manager, petitioner Francisco Atayde
(Atayde), received a letter from respondent Joaquin Rodriguez (Rodriguez) proposing to sell at
₱2,350.00 per square meter, one of the lots already occupied by the expanded runway but
assumed as not yet expropriated by the MIAA. The proposal did not ripen to a deal. Subsequently,
on 29 April 1996, Rodriguez bought the bigger lot a portion of which was occupied by the runway,
as well as all the rights to claim reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner
then, Buck Estate, Inc., for ₱4,000,000.00.
Petitioners claim that Rodriguez is a buyer in bad faith since prior to his purchase he was aware
of the MIAA’s occupation of the property and therefore proceeded with the purchase in anticipation
of enormous profits from the subsequent sale to the MIAA.

ISSUE:

Whether Rodriguez was a buyer in bad faith

DECISION:

No. The point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad faith, all that he
will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest thereon
from that point until full payment of the compensation by the MIAA. Besides, assuming the
question is of any consequence, the circumstances surrounding Rodriguez’s purchase may not
even amount to bad faith. Bad faith has been defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for an ulterior purpose, and
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.
There is nothing wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s investment. However,
Rodriguez can fault but only himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already
being used for a public purpose. It was a self-inflicted misfortune that his investment did not
generate the windfall he had expected. For ostensibly little did he know that he could not acquire
more rights than the previous owners had since the government taking had taken place earlier.

LEONIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS 503 SCRA 423

G. R. No. 141418
September 27, 2006

FACTS:

Prospero Leonin and his co-owners allowed his siblings, Evangelime and Pepito Leonin to occupy
Apartment C without paying any rentals. The owners of the property mortgaged it with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a loan in the amount of Forty Eight
Thousand Pesos (P48,000.00). They however failed to settle the said loan. As a consequence
thereof, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage and the property was sold at public auction to GSIS.
Prospero‘s brother, Teofilo Leonin (Teofilo), redeemed the property, upon which GSIS executed
a Release of Mortgage and turned over to him the owner‘s duplicate title. Teofilo later sold the
property by Deed of Absolute Sale to his daughter, herein respondent Germaine Leonin, for Forty
Eight Thousand Pesos (P48,000.00). A new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 95939 was
issued in her favor. After her father Teofilo‘s death, Germaine sent a letter to her father‘s siblings-
herein petitioners asking them to vacate Apartment C as their occupation thereof was by mere
tolerance and, at any rate, requiring them to execute a contract of lease with her. This demand
remained unheeded.
ISSUE:

Whether respondent had the right to possess the property upon the execution of a deed of
absolute sale and the issuance of a transfer of certificate of title in her favor.

DECISION:

Respecting the issue of whether germane has the right to possess the property upon the
execution of a deed of absolute sale and the issuance of a transfer of certificate of title in her
favor, the same must be resolved in the affirmative. It bears noting that Evangeline‘s and Pepito‘s
occupation of the property was on the mere tolerance of the former owners. Hence, when they
failed to heed Germaine’s demand to vacate, they had become deforciant occupants.

FELICIANO vs. SPOUSES ZALDIVAR 503 SCRA 233 POSSESSION

G. R. No. 162593
September 26, 2006

FACTS:

Remigia Feliciano filed a complaint against the spouses Zaldivar for the declaration of nullity of
TCT No. T-17993 and reconveyance of the property covered therein. The said title is registered
in the name of Aurelio Zaldivar. Remigia alleged that she was the registered owner of a lot, part
of which is that covered by both the above TCT and TCT No. 8502. It was originally leased to Pio
Dalman, Aurelio’s father-in-law. She attempted to mortgage the lot to Ignacio Gil, but the mortgage
did not push through. She vehemently denies ever executing a joint affidavit confirming the sale
to Gil and insists that TCT No. 8502 was never lost. The Zaldivars, on the other hand, claimed
that Aurelio bought the property from Dalman who, in turn, bought the same from Gil in 1951. Gil
allegedly purchased the property from Remegia, the sale of which was evidenced by the joint
affidavit of confirmation of sale that Remegia and her uncle purportedly executed before a notary
public in 1965. Aurelio then filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-8502 because when they asked Remegia about it, she claimed it had been lost. A
petition for partial cancellation of the said TCT was granted and TCT No. 17993 was issued in
Aurelio’s name. They also alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying the said property since 1947, openly, publicly, adversely, and continuously or for 41
years already.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remegia’s right to recover possession was barred by laches.

DECISION:

Remegia is the real owner. With respect to the claim of acquisitive prescription, it is baseless
when the land involved is a registered land since no title to registered land in derogation of that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of
possession by the Zaldivar’s is both immaterial and inconsequential. Neither can the spouses rely
on the principle of indefeasibility of TCT No. 17993 by virtue of the fact that TCT No. 8502 in the
name of Remegia has remained valid. Remegia’s title, thus, prevails over Aurelio’s, especially
considering that the latter was correctly nullified by the RTC as it emanated from the new owner’s
duplicate TCT No. 8502, which, in turn, was procured by Aurelio through fraudulent means.
Laches has not set in against Remegia as she merely tolerated the occupation by the Zaldivars
of the subject lot. Therefore, Remegia’s right to recover possession was never barred by laches.

GELLIA ALTIZO, et al. v. BRYC-V DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 203 SCRA 544

G. R. NO. 143530
September 26, 2006

FACTS:

Sea Foods Corporation Inc. (SFC) was the registered owner of Lot 300 situated in Zamboanga
City. It appears that in the early 60s, herein petitioners Gellia Altizo et al. started to occupy a
portion of Lot 300. In 1989, Altizo et al., together with other occupants of a portion of the said
land, organized themselves into an association, United Muslim Christian Urban Poor Association,
Inc. (UMCUPAI), for the purpose of negotiating the sale of the lands they occupy in their favor.
SFC and UMCUPAI subsequently entered into an agreement where SFC signified its intent to sell
to UMCUPAI Lot 300 and the latter‘s intention to buy the said lot at a stipulated price. SFC later
subdivided Lot 300 into three lots: Lot 300-A, Lot 300-B and Lot 300-C. Lot 300-A was thereafter
sold to UMCAPAI. It then sold to BRYC-V Development Corporation (BRYC-V) Lot 300-C where
Altizo et al. had constructed their houses. Over the objection of UMCUPAI, BRYC-V was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-121523. BRYC-V later asked, verbally and in writing, Altizo et
al. to vacate Lot 300-C but they refused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners Altizo et al. has the right of continued possession based on the
agreement they entered into with SFC.

DECISION:

Altizo et al.‘s occupation of subject lot was on the mere tolerance of the previous owner SFC.
Such right to occupy ceased when the SFC sold the subject lot to BRYC-V which has been issued
a title thereto, hence, entitled to its possession. Altizo et al. having withheld possession of subject
lot, despite BRYCV‘s demand, they have become deforciant occupants. Altizo et al.‘s claim that
they can continue to possess the subject lot, they having been granted by the previous owner
preferential right to buy Lot 300 under the Letter of Intent, does not lie. No right of possession,
which is the only issue in an unlawful detainer case, arises from such Letter of Intent which, as it
clearly states, merely signifies intent to, not actually transfer ownership.

2007
SPS. LUMBRES vs. SPS. TABLADA
G.R. No. 165831
February 23, 2007

FACTS:

on January 9, 1995 Spring Homes, former owner of the parcel of land in dispute, entered into a
pro forma Contract to Sell with the respondent spouses Tablada. The prepared typewritten
contract, with the blank spaces therein merely filled up, contains the designation of the parcel
sold, the price per square meter and the stipulation as to payment. After having been paid the
sum total of P179,500.00, which the respondents claim to be the full purchase price of the subject
lot, Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents. In the deed the
subject lot was already made to appear as covered by a TCT. Because the anticipated Pag-Ibig
loan failed to materialize, the P230,000.00, which, under the Contract to Sell, was supposed to
be paid upon release of the loan, was left unpaid.

Respondents later declared the subject lot for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real
property taxes thereon. Using their own funds, they caused the construction thereon of a
residential house, which they presently occupy. A Certificate of Occupancy was issued to them
and the house was declared in their names.

With the execution of the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale, the respondent spouses sent a
demand letter to Spring Homes for the transfer and release to them of the original or owner’s copy
of the TCT, who promised to deliver the said title and even apologized for the delay. However, to
their great dismay, the spouses subsequently learned that the TCT was canceled and a new one
issued to the petitioners. On account thereof, the respondent spouses filed with the RTC a civil
suit against the petitioners, Spring Homes and the RD of Calamba City for nullification of title,
reconveyance and damages.

It appears, however, that after the filing of the Civil Case the spouses Lumbres filed a civil case
before the RTC of Calamba City, against Spring Homes. The petitioners filed with the Register of
Deeds of Calamba City a Notice of Lis Pendens over all the properties registered in the name of
the said corporation, including the subject lot. The RTC issued an order attaching all of Spring
Homes properties, subject lot. Premiere Development Bank subsequently intervened because all
said properties had been mortgaged to it.

The petitioner spouses entered into a Compromise Agreement in the Civil Case with Spring
Homes and Premiere Development Bank, which was approved by the RTC. In that Compromise
Agreement, both Spring Homes and Premiere Development Bank recognized the rights and
interests of the petitioner spouses over the parcels of land The subject property (Lot 8, Block 3)
was among the properties covered by the aforementioned compromise agreement that were
judicially assigned, transferred and conveyed to the petitioners.

Meanwhile, due to the respondents’ alleged failure to pay the P230,000.00 unpaid balance as per
the Contract to Sell earlier adverted to despite demands, the subject lot was sold by Spring Homes
to the petitioners, again by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 22, 2000 for
and in consideration of the sum of P157,500.00. The mortgage on the lot was released by
Premiere Development Bank. Subsequently a TCT covering the subject lot was issued in
petitioners’ favor.
The instant case cropped up when, asserting their ownership of the subject lot on the basis of the
TCT the petitioners demanded of the respondents to vacate said lot and to pay them the rentals
due thereon. Their demands having come to naught, the petitioner spouses then filed in the MTCC
for ejectment against respondent Tabladas and all persons claiming rights under them. The
MTCC dismissed the petitioners’ ejectment complaint and ruled for the respondents.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. In The RTC reversed and set aside the MTCC
decision and ordered the respondent spouses to vacate subject lot to surrender the possession
thereof to the petitioners. In holding that the petitioners have superior right on the subject lot over
the respondents, the RTC, applying the provisions of Articles 1350, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil
Code, deemed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents void ab initio for want of
valid consideration. With their MR having been denied by the RTC in the respondent spouses
then went to the CA on a petition for review.

The CA granted the respondents’ petition, thereby reversing the assailed Orders of the RTC and
reinstating the earlier decision of the MTCC. Their MR having been denied by the CA,petitioners
are now before us via the instant recourse raising the following issues:

ISSUE:

Who, as between the petitioners and the respondents, is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of their respective claims of ownership thereof

DECISION:

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues laid out above, it must be stressed that the
present case is one forejectment. As such, our judgment hereon is effective only with respect
to possession. It does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the lot in question.
Upon scrutiny, however, the CA astutely observed that despite there being no question that the
total land area of the subject lot is 105 square meters, the Contract to Sell executed and entered
into by Spring Homes and the respondent spouses states, however, that while there is only one
parcel of land being sold, the Contract to Sell speaks of two (2) land areas, namely, “105 sqm”
and “42 sqm,” and two (2) prices per square meter differ.
The CA could only think of one possible explanation: the Contract to Sell refers only to a single
lot with a total land area of 105 square meters. The 42 square meters mentioned in the same
contract and therein computed at the rate ofP6,000 per square meter refer to the cost of the house
which would be constructed by the respondents on the subject lot through a Pag-Ibig loan.

Looking at that portion of the Contract to Sell, the CA found merit in the respondents’ contention
that the total selling price of P409,500 includes not only the price of the lot but also the cost of
the house that would be constructed thereon. We are inclined to agree. The CA went on to say:
It could be argued that the contract to sell never mentions the construction of any house or building
on the subject property. Had it been the intention of the parties that the total selling price would
include the amount of the house that would be taken from a loan to be obtained from Pag-Ibig,
they could have specified so. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the contract to
sell is an accomplished form. [Respondents,] trusting Spring Homes, could not be expected to
demand that another contract duly reflective of their agreements be utilized instead of the
accomplished form. The terms and conditions of the contract may not contemplate the inclusion
of the cost of the house in the total selling price, but the entries typewritten thereon sufficiently
reveal the intentions of the parties.
The position of the [respondents] finds support in the documents and subsequent actuations of
Bertha Pasic, the representative of Spring Homes. [Respondents] undeniably proved that they
spent their own hard-earned money to construct a house thereon after their Pag-Ibig loan did not
materialize. It is highly unjust for the [respondents] to pay for the amount of the house when the
loan did not materialize due to the failure of Spring Homes to deliver the owner’s duplicate copy
of the TCT.

If the total selling price was indeed P409,500.00, as [petitioners] would like to poster, said amount
should have appeared as the consideration in the deed of absolute sale dated January 15, 1996.
However, only P157,500.00 was stated. The amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 15, 1996 was not only a portion of the selling price, because the Deed of Sale dated
December 22, 2000 also reflected P157,500.00 as consideration. It is not shown that [petitioners]
likewise applied for a loan with Pag-Ibig. The reasonable inference is that the consistent amount
stated in the two Deeds of Absolute Sale was the true selling price as it perfectly jibed with the
computation in the Contract to Sell.

We find the CA’s reasoning to be sound. At any rate, the execution of the January 16, 1996 Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents effectively rendered the previous Contract to Sell
ineffective and canceled. Furthermore, we find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the first sale
to the respondents was void for want of consideration. As the CA pointed out in its assailed
decision:

Other than the [petitioners'] self-serving assertion that the Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed
solely for the purpose of obtaining a Pag-Ibig loan, no other concrete evidence was tendered to
justify the execution of the deed of absolute sale. They failed to overcome the clear and convincing
evidence of the [respondents] that as early as July 5, 1995 the latter had already paid the total
amount of P179,500.00, much bigger than the actual purchase price for the subject land.

Having stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of the respondent spouses is valid
and with sufficient consideration, the MTCC correctly applied the provisions of Article 1544 of the
Civil Code. Article 1544 reads:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners, as the second buyer, registered their Deed of
Absolute Sale, in contrast to the Deed of Sale of the respondents which was not registered at all
precisely because of Spring Homes’ failure to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT, the
respondents’ right could not be deemed defeated as the petitioners are in bad faith. Petitioners
cannot claim good faith since at the time of the execution of the Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case, they were indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject lot was previously sold
to the respondents. In fact, they were already aware that the respondents had constructed a
house thereon and are presently in possession of the same.
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is the first to
register the second sale because such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. For
the second buyer to displace the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) from the time of acquisition until the title
is transferred to him by registration.

Hence, there was nothing to cede or transfer to the petitioners when the Compromise Agreement
was entered into insofar as the subject lot is concerned as it was already sold to and fully paid for
by the respondents as early as January 16, 1996 when the Absolute Deed of Sale was executed
in their favor by Spring Homes. More so that Spring Homes has no more to sell to the petitioners
when it executed in the latter’s favor the second deed of absolute sale on December 22, 2000.

The respondents are the current occupants of the subject lot. They had constructed their
residential house thereon and are living there at present. The action for ejectment was fashioned
to provide a speedy, albeit temporary, remedy to the dispossessed party while the issue of lawful
possession or de jure possession is pending or about to be filed. The remedy of ejectment ought
to maintain the status quo and prevent the party-litigants from further aggravating the situation
and causing further damage.

2008

ONG V REPUBLIC
548 SCRA 160

FACTS:

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized
representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for
Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They
alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property
having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August
24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept
of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such possession entitles them to acquire the property.

DECISION:

No, Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain
because the law requires possession and occupations.
QUIZON V JUAN
554 SCRA 601

FACTS:

In her Complaint, respondent alleged that she acquired a parcel of land situated in Sitio Bullhorn,
Aranguen, Capas, Tarlac, with an area of 10.2 hectares from Melencio Nuguid (Nuguid) by virtue
of a Deed of Sale executed on 11 December 1996. Respondent claimed that on 9 August 2000,
petitioners, conspiring and confederating with each other and through the use of force and
intimidation, entered a portion of her property without her knowledge and consent. On 21 August
2000, petitioners once again went back to the premises and destroyed the wooden fence set up
by respondent, as well as the fruit-bearing trees and rice plantation found therein. Four days later,
petitioners supplanted respondents wooden fence with an iron fence, enclosing an area of about
one hectare (subject property), over which they maintained control and possession up to the time
of filing of respondents Complaint with the MCTC.
In their Answer, petitioners countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2207 lacks cause of
action, for respondent does not have any legal right over the subject property. Petitioners Quizon
and Zablan insisted that they are the lawful owners and possessors of the subject property and it
was the respondent who, without any authority from petitioners Quizon and Zablan, invaded and
occupied the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent has prior physical possession.

DECISION:

No, Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing
is subject to the action of one’s will of by the proper acts and legal formalities establish for
acquiring such right.

REPUBLIC V IMPERIAL
555 SCRA 314

FACTS:

On 07 March 1966, Imperial Credit Corporation purchased from a certain Jose Tajon a parcel of
land in Antipolo City as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. In December 1997,
through judicial consignation, respondent paid the remaining balance, caused the release of the
mortgage constituted thereon and consolidated ownership in its name. The property was
thereafter privately surveyed and approved on 25 January 2000.On 14 February 2000, Imperial
Credit filed before the RTC a petition for the registration of a parcel of land. The petition alleged,
among others, that Imperial Credit was “subrogated [to] former owner Jose Tajon, who has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of land, x
x x being a part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07
March 1966.” At the hearing, only respondent’s duly authorized attorney-in-fact, Ricardo Santos,
testified on the fact of respondent’s actual possession of the said land. Aside from the transfer
documents, the other documentary evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, a
tracing cloth plan, a survey description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu
of the geodetic engineer’s certificate, and a report by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) stating that the property falls within the alienable and disposable
zone. On 21 November 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting respondent’s application for
registration. Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),seasonably appealed from the RTC’s Decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that
respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence that respondent and its predecessor-in-
interest have been in open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property since 12June 1945 or earlier. On 02 June 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the facts constitute an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession?

DECISION:

No, Possession is open when it is patent visible, notorious, and not clandestine; it is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional, exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominium over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit and notorious, when it is so conspicuous that is generally known and talk off by the
public or the people of the neighbourhood. Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.

ALINOV LOREZON
556 SCRA 139

FACTS:

On April 2, 1979, Angelica A. Lorenzo (Angelica), Lucia's daughter, bought the subject lot
for P10,000.00 under a Deed of Absolute Sale.3 Consequently, TCT No. T-15443 was canceled
and TCT No. T-155004 was issued in Angelica's name. The subject lot was declared for taxation
purposes in Angelica's name under Tax Declaration No. 14136.5

In the meantime, Lucia continued to pay, under her name, the real estate taxes due on the subject
lot from 1980 to 1987.6 Sometime in 1984, Lucia designated Vivian Losaria (Vivian) as caretaker
of the subject lot.7 Vivian built a 100-square meter house on the subject lot and resided
thereon. She took care of the fruit-bearing trees on the subject lot and delivered the fruits thereof
to Lucia every harvest season. She also notified tenants of the two adjacent properties owned by
Lucia when their rent was due.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has actual possession of the property.

DECISION:
Yes, It is well settled that actual possession of land consist in the manifestation of acts of
dominium over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property-
it is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act.

SALES V BARRO
573 SCRA 465

FACTS:

This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondent,
his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them before Branch 28 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila. In their complaint, the petitioners alleged among others that (1) they are
owners of the lot described and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. 262237 4 of
the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila; (2) the respondent constructed a shanty thereon
without their consent; (3) the respondent and his co-defendants have not been paying any rent to
the petitioners for their occupation thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-defendants refused the
formal demand made by the petitioners for them to vacate the subject lot; and (5) the Office of
the Barangay Captain of Barangay 464, Zone 46, 4th District, Manila issued the necessary
Certification to File Action.

In his answer, the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and essentially claimed
that (1) his construction of the temporary makeshift house on the lot was tolerated by the
petitioners, considering that he acted as the caretaker thereof; and (2) he does not remember
receiving any demand letter and summons from the barangay and so he was surprised to know
that an ejectment complaint was filed against him

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s ownership is the same with physical possesion

DECISION:

No, The word possession as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more
than physical possession not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.

ACAYLAR V HARAYO
560 SCRA 624

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint with the MTCC against petitioners for forcible entry. In his Complaint respondent
alleged that he bought the property from the spouses Pablo Acaylar, Sr., and Zoila DangcalanAcaylar on 14
September 2004. On the same day, respondent took possession of the subject property. On 19September 2004,
petitioner Pablo Acaylar, one of the spouses, using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject
property, cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen coconuts and other fruits, and
pastured his cows and other animals thereon. In his Answer, petitioner countered that he is in possession of his
parents' entire property since 1979 as administrator thereof. He built his house on the property and farmed the land
and it was impossible for him to wrest possession of the subject property from respondent, for he was already
occupying the same way before its alleged sale to respondent. Petitioner, thus, maintains that his possession over
the subject property is lawful from the start, as he was authorized by Zoila Acaylar to administer the same, making
respondent's suit for forcible entry before the MTCC the wrong remedy. During the Pre-Trial Conference,
respondent presented an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar (First Affidavit) attesting that she sold the subject property to
respondent for consideration and she did not give petitioner authority to either administer or remain on her and her
husband's property. The MTCC decided in favour of the respondents ruled that possession took immediately after
the execution of the Deed of Sale. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the award of possession in favor of respondent.
While it expressly recognized that petitioner possessed the subject property his possession was merely tolerated
by his parents, and that respondent, as purchaser of the subject property from the parents, the spouses Acaylar,
had better right to the possession of the same.The petitioners appealed with the Court of Appeals but dismissed
the petition
.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner had been in actual or physical possession of the subject property prior to respondent.

DECISION:

We find that petitioner had physical possession of the subject property prior to and at the time of its sale by the
spouses Acaylar to respondent. It is actually irrelevant whether petitioner possessed the subject property as the
administrator thereof. As the son of the spouses Acaylar, he could very well enter into possession of the subject
property either with the express permission or at the tolerance of his parents who owned the property. Petitioner
alleged, and respondent did not dispute, that petitioner had entered into possession of his parents' property as early
as 1979, and he even built his house thereon. Although Zoila Acaylar may have attested in her First Affidavit that
she did not appoint or designate petitioner as the administrator of her and her husband's property, she never
claimed that petitioner unlawfully or illegally entered her property when he built his house thereon. Both the MTCC
and the RTC decided in favor of petitioner since they considered him to have been vested with possession of the
subject property by virtue of the execution of the Deed of Sale. However, such a ruling violates one of the most
basic doctrines in resolving ejectment cases. We had long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve
in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, that is,
possession de facto; and they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is
to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with
such demand; The absence of demand to vacate precludes the court from treating this case,
originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of the unlawful detainer, since demand to
vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer.

PABLO D. ACAYLAR, JR VS. DANILO G. HARAYO

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint with the MTCC against petitioners for forcible entry. In his
Complaint, respondent alleged that he bought the property from the spouses Pablo Acaylar, Sr.,
and Zoila Dangcalan Acaylar on 14 September 2004. On the same day, respondent took
possession of the subject property. On 19 September 2004, petitioner Pablo Acaylar, one of the
spouses, using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject property, cut the tall
grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen coconuts and other fruits, and
pastured his cows and other animals thereon.

In his Answer, petitioner countered that he is in possession of his parents' entire property since
1979 as administrator thereof. He built his house on the property and farmed the land and it was
impossible for him to wrest possession of the subject property from respondent, for he was already
occupying the same way before its alleged sale to respondent. Petitioner, thus, maintains that his
possession over the subject property is lawful from the start, as he was authorized by Zoila
Acaylar to administer the same, making respondent's suit for forcible entry before the MTCC the
wrong remedy.

During the Pre-Trial Conference, respondent presented an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar (First
Affidavit) attesting that she sold the subject property to respondent for consideration and she did
not give petitioner authority to either administer or remain on her and her husband's property.

The MTCC decided in favor of the respondents ruled that possession took immediately after the
execution of the Deed of Sale.

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the award of possession in favor of respondent. While it
expressly recognized that petitioner possessed the subject property his possession was merely
tolerated by his parents, and that respondent, as purchaser of the subject property from the
parents, the spouses Acaylar, had better right to the possession of the same.

The petitioners appealed with the Court of Appeals but dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner had been in actual or physical possession of the subject property prior
to respondent.

DECISION:

We find that petitioner had physical possession of the subject property prior to and at the time of
its sale by the spouses Acaylar to respondent. It is actually irrelevant whether petitioner
possessed the subject property as the administrator thereof. As the son of the spouses Acaylar,
he could very well enter into possession of the subject property either with the express permission
or at the tolerance of his parents who owned the property. Petitioner alleged, and respondent did
not dispute, that petitioner had entered into possession of his parents' property as early as 1979,
and he even built his house thereon. Although Zoila Acaylar may have attested in her First
Affidavit that she did not appoint or designate petitioner as the administrator of her and her
husband's property, she never claimed that petitioner unlawfully or illegally entered her property
when he built his house thereon.
Both the MTCC and the RTC decided in favor of petitioner since they considered him to have
been vested with possession of the subject property by virtue of the execution of the Deed of
Sale. However, such a ruling violates one of the most basic doctrines in resolving ejectment
cases. We had long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, that is,
possession de facto; and they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de
jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.

Hence, the Deed of Sale conferring ownership of the subject property upon respondent is clearly
irrelevant in the present case. The Deed of Sale did not automatically place respondent in physical
possession of the subject property. It is thus incumbent upon respondent to establish by evidence
that he took physical possession of the subject property from the spouses Acaylar and he was in
actual possession of the said property when petitioner forcibly entered the same five days later.

Even if petitioner was not authorized by Zoila Acaylar to possess the subject property as
administrator, his possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents. As we
ruled in Arcal v. Court of Appeals[36]:

The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to comply with
such demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has
expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
In the instant case, there is no showing that either Zoila Acaylar or respondent made an express
demand upon petitioner to vacate the subject property. In the absence of an oral or written
demand, petitioner's possession of the subject property has yet to become unlawful. The absence
of demand to vacate precludes us from treating this case, originally instituted as one for forcible
entry, as one of unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful
detainer.

2009

DBP vs. Prime Neighborhood Association

587 SCRA 582

FACTS:

Y-Electric obtained a loan from the petitioner DBP which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
over a parcel of land but it failed to pay for it. Thus, DBP instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage and bought the said property at a public auction. After the lapse of the redemption
period without the property being redeemed, DBP Consolidated its ownership of the property.
Consequently, it filed Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was eventually
granted by the RTC.
However, respondent Prime Neighborhood Association filed its Opposition to the Writ of
Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). They claimed to represent third
persons in possession of the property in their own right and adverse to the mortgagor Y-Electric.
The RTC issued an order noting PNA’s opposition and denying its prayer for the issuance of a
TRO. Aggrieved, PNA appealed to the CA.

In the meantime, DBP demanded the PNA to vacate the premises of the subject property but the
latter refused. So, DBP to file a Motion to Issue an Order of Demolition but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of possession of the petitioner DBP should be recognized against the
respondent PNA.

DECISION:

The right of possession of the petitioner DBP should be not recognized against the respondent
PNA.

The Court ruled that the purchaser’s right of possession is recognized only as against the
judgment debtor (Y-Electric in the instant case) and his successor-in-interest but not against
persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter (such as the respondent PNA).

AQUALAB V PAGOBO
603 SCRA 435

FACTS:

Respondents’ great grandfather, Juan Pagobo, owned a large tract of land which, by virtue of a
homestead patent, was titled under OCT No. RO-2246 that was issued after the death of Juan
Pagobo. Shortly after the issuance of the said OCT, two lots which used to form part of the said
large tract of land were sold to Tarcela de Espina who then secured TCT No. 3294. Subsequently,
Tarcela sold the subject lots to Rene Espina who was issued TCT 17830 and TCT 17831.
Thereafter, Rene Espina sold the same to Anthony Gaw Kache who, in turn, was issued TCT
17918 and TCT 18177. Finally, Aqualab acquired the subject lots from Anthony Gaw Kache and
was issued TCT 18442 and TCT 18443.

On August 10, 1994, respondents filed a complaint against Aqualab and some other parties,
alleging that Aqualab had disturbed their peaceful occupation of subject lots in 1991. Aqualab, on
the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of prescription and no cause of action.

The trial court ruled that prescription has set in and thus, granted Aqualab’s motion to dismiss. It
also held that Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside
the said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aqualab is a buyer in good faith.

DECISION:

Aqualab is not a buyer in good faith.

A buyer of real property that is in the possession of a person other than the seller must be wary,
and a buyer who does not investigate the rights of the one in possession can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith.

In the instant case, it would appear that Anthony Gaw Kache, Aqualab’s predecessor-in-interest,
was not in possession of subject lots. Such a fact should have put Aqualab on guard relative to
the possessors’ (respondents’) interest over subject lots.

DACLAG V MACAHILIG
579 SCRA 556

FACTS:

Maxima executed a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners covering an unregistered parcel of
land. Later on, it was discovered that Maxima was not the owner of the subject land but the
respondents. Petitioners contended that they are possessors in good faith, thus, the award of
damages should not have been imposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are possessors in good faith.

DECISION:

The petitioners are not possessors in good faith.

Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character, except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases
from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence
or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact
from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode
of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interruption takes place
upon service of summons.

ARANGOTE V MAGLUNOB
579 SCRA 620

FACTS:
Petitioner Elvira Arangote acquired a parcel of land by virtue of a Last Will and Testament
executed by Esperanza who allegedly inherited the subject property. Thereafter, the petitioner
constructed a house thereon. However, respondents, together with some hired persons, entered
the subject property and built a hollow block wall surrounding the petitioner’s house. The petitioner
filed a complaint before the court. In their answer, the petitioners averred that they were co-owners
of the land with Esperanza who allegedly inherited the land from Martin I together with Tomas
and Inocencia (Martin II and Romeo’s predecessor in interest). They argued that Esperanza could
not have validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the rights provided for
under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

DECISION:

This claim is untenable.

The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:

Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
Every possessor in good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes
aware that what he believed to be true is not so.

In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the subject property was
issued and registered in petitioners name on 26 March 1993, respondents brought a Complaint
on 7 August 1993 before the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of
petitioner to the subject property on the basis that said property constitutes the inheritance of
respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no authority to relinquish
the entire subject property to petitioner. From that moment, the good faith of the petitioner had
ceased.

Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because
the rights mentioned therein are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to possessors in
good faith.

2010
Sarmients vs MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA)
G.R. No. 182953
632 SCRA 538
October 11, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) was the registered owner of the lot
in dispute which was placed under community mortgage program (CMP). Through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their
temporary houses and an office building. Sometime in 1992, petitioners sought for the annulment
of respondent’s title but it was dismissed by the RTC. Upon dismissal, respondent demanded
petitioners to vacate the premises. Petitioners asked for a one-year extension for them to look for
a place to transfer. However, it was repeatedly extended due to respondent’s tolerance.
Petitioners even propose to become members of MAHA so that they can be qualified to acquire
portions of the lot but they failed to comply with the requirements despite repeated demands.
MAHA then sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the lot. Unheeded, MAHA filed the
complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

In their answer, petitioners averred that they are the owners of the subject lot, having been
in actual physical possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into
the land. They likewise argued that the complaint was irregular and defective because its caption
states that it was for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action for failure by the respondent to
prove prior physical possession which is required in a complaint for forcible entry. On appeal,
RTC reversed the MTCC decision stating that MAHA was able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that petitioners’ occupation was by mere tolerance and their occupation became illegal
after MAHA demanded that they vacate the property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
ruling that the cause of action was an unlawful detainer case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have a superior right of possession over the property in question.

DECISION:

No.
The evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners’ stay and
gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. But
when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the
property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. Well settled is
the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him
which in the present case is an unlawful detainer case.
CUA LAI CHU, CLARO G. CASTRO, and JUANITA CASTRO vs. HON. HILARIO L. LAQUI
G.R. No. 169190
612 SCRA 22
February 11, 2010

FACTS:

November 1994: Philippine Bank of Communication (respondent) loaned P3,200,000 to the

petitioners. To secure the loan, petitioners executed in favor of private respondent a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage.

August 1997: the mortgage was amended, and the loan was increased by P1,800,000, making
the amount P5,000,000. For failure of petitioners to pay the full amount of the outstanding loan
upon demand, private respondent applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.

TRIAL COURT: Granted respondent’s motion for a declaration of general default and allowed
them to present evidence ex parte.

COURT OF APPEALS: Petitioners appealed. However, it was dismissed since the counsel for
petitioners failed to indicate the updated PTR Number in the said petition, which is a ground for
outright dismissal under B.M 1132. The court held that a proceeding for the issuance of a writ of
possession is ex parte in nature.

ISSUE:

Whether the writ of possession was properly issued despite the pendency of a case questioning
the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale even when petitioners were declared in default.

DECISION:

The Supreme Court held that since the private respondent had purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale, their right over the said property became absolute, vesting in it the corollary right
of possession.

Petitioners cannot oppose or appeal the court’s order granting the writ of possession in an ex
parte proceeding. The remedy of petitioners is to have the sale set aside and the writ of
possession cancelled in accordance with Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended:

SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later
than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and
the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage
was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof.

PTA v METROPOLITAN
G.R. No. 176518.
614 SCRA 41
March 2, 2010
FACTS:

Sometime in 2001, the spouses Denivin and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan) applied for and
were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (MBTC) in the amount of P4.79M
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over 8 parcels of land covered by different Transfer
Certificates of Title. Upon default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted with MBTC being
the highest bidder and for which a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. During the period of
redemption, MBTC filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, before a trial
court, by posting the required bond which was subsequently approved. In due course, St. Mathew
Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. (SMCATI), allegedly a third party occupying the parcels of land,
filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order against MBTC and the Provincial
Sheriff.

Eventually, the trial court issued a Joint Decision granting MBTC the writ of possession, on the
ground that SMCATI is not a third party against whom a writ of possession cannot be issued,
thusly: (1) the lease to SMCATI by the spouses Ilagans, as lessor, was for a period of one year
from the execution of the lease contract in 1998 – therefore, the lease should have expired in
1999; (2) the lease was not registered and annotated at the back of the title, and therefore, not
binding on third persons; and (3) the spouses Ilagans are the owners or practically the owners of
SMCATI – even if it has a separate personality, nevertheless, “piercing the veil of corporate entity”
is resorted to for the spouses Ilagan should not be allowed to commit fraud under the separate
entity/personality of SMCATI.

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision, the Parents-Teachers
Association, teachers and students of SMCATI (Petitioners), filed a Motion for Leave to file
Petition in Intervention, which was granted by the trial court. However, in a subsequent Order, the
trial court reversed its earlier Order by ruling that petitioners’ intervention would have no bearing
on the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are third parties against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued?

DECISION:

No.
Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of
the property. Thus, whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the trial court has to
issue it as a matter of course. However, the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of possession
ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property
claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Where such third party exists, the trial
court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession.

In this case, however, petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not
claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor, spouses Ilagan. Petitioner-teachers and students
did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely averred actual “physical possession of the
subject school premises”. Petitioner-teachers’ possession of the said premises was based on the
employment contracts they have with SMCATI. As regards the petitioner-students, the school-
student relationship is contractual in nature. As such, it would be specious to conclude that the
teachers and students hold the subject premises independent of or adverse to SMCATI. In fact,
their interest over the school premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school. Besides, their
contracts are with the school and do not attach to the school premises. Moreover, the foreclosure
of the current school premises does not prevent the SMCATU from continuing its operations
elsewhere. As such, petitioners cannot be deemed “third parties” as contemplated in Act No.
3135, as amended.

EMMANUEL C. VILLANUEVA, vs. CHERDAN LENDING INVESTORS CORPORATION

G.R. No. 177881
633 SCRA 173
October 13, 2010

FACTS:

Spouses Peñaredondo obtained from respondent Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation a loan
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. Despite demand, spouses Peñaredondo
failed to pay the obligation. Hence, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Cherdan
won the bid. Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the title to the property was
consolidated and a new title was issued in respondent’s name.

Writ of possession was issued for Cherdan, Emmanuel C. Villanueva moved for the
reconsideration of the order and the setting aside of the writ of possession on the ground that he
is the owner and is in actual possession of the subject property.

RTC granted Villanueva’s motion and ordered that the same be allowed possession of the
property pending finality of decision of the matter. And writ of possession previously issued in
favor of Cherdan was recalled.

Cherdan instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. CA granted the petition.

The CA held that the pendency of the case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings was not
a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession. The CA refused to apply Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which authorizes the giving of possession of the property to the purchaser or
last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adverse to the judgment
obligor, ratiocinating that the provision applies only to execution sales and not to extrajudicial
foreclosures of real estate mortgage under Act 3135.

ISSUE:

Whether a case for annulment of foreclosure is a bar to issuance of writ of possession.

DECISION:

YES. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
TCT. Time and again, we have held that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession
after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Upon the filing of an ex parte
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court issues the order for a writ of
possession. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and
approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the name
of the purchaser.
This rule, however, is not without exception. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which is made to apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by
Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to
a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment debtor.

GREGORIO ESPINOZA v. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS

GR No. 175380
616 SCRA 353
Mar 22, 2010

FACTS:

A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession (an ex parte proceeding) and an action
questioning the validity of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings (an ordinary action) may not be
consolidated after the lapse of the one year redemption period. Firematic Philippines sought a
loan from United Overseas Bank. It was represented by the spouses Espinoza who owned the
company. They mortgaged four parcels of land as collateral for the loan. Firematic defaulted on
the loan and the properties were auctioned off to the highest bidder. The highest bidder was UOB.
The certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds along with an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership of the property. UOB, respondent, then filed an ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. This was opposed by the petitioners who
movied for the consolidation of the proceedings (the issuance of the writ of possession and an
action for nullification of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale of the
property subject of this case. The RTC granted the motion of the petitioners and consolidated the
cases. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus at the CA. This too was granted.
RTC order was reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:

Whether a case for the issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated with the proceedings
for the nullification of extra-judicial foreclosure.

DECISION:

No. The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond if the redemption period has not yet lapsed.
If the redemption period has expired, then the filing of the bond is no longer necessary. Any and
all questions regarding the regularity and validity of the sale is left to be determined in a
subsequent proceeding and such questions may not be raised as a justification for opposing the
issuance of a writ of possession.
In other words, the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest . It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without
giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte
petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding
for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.On the other hand, by its nature, a
petition for nullification or annulment of foreclosure proceedings contests the presumed right of
ownership of the buyer in a foreclosure sale and puts in issue such presumed right of ownership.
Thus, a party scheming to defeat the right to a writ of possession of a buyer in a foreclosure sale
who had already consolidated his ownership over the property subject of the foreclosure sale can
simply resort to the subterfuge of filing a petition for nullification of foreclosure proceedings with
motion for consolidation of the petition for issuance of a writ of possession. This is not allowed as
it will render nugatory the presumed right of ownership, as well as the right of possession, of a
buyer in a foreclosure sale, rights which are supposed to be implemented in an ex parte petition
for issuance of a writ of possession.
The only exception would be if the writ of possession were filed for before the lapse of the 1 year
redemption period. This was not so in this case as the period had already lapsed.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. JAMES NG and ANTHONY NG,

G.R. No. 187556
620 SCRA 292
May 5, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents obtained loans from petitioner to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land
situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon. Subsequently, respondents failed to settle their
obligation; hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary
Public. The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of
Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on May 19, 1999. Upon failure
to redeem the mortgage, petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession but said petition was denied. In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for
Annulment of Certificate of Sale. Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and committing any act of
dispossession that would defeat respondents’ right of ownership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession of the subject property.

DECISION:

Yes. Even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of
possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is
shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so when,
as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the
purchaser. Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period,
entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely
a ministerial function. The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not
look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.

DE LEON V ALARAS
G.R. No. 181970; G.R. No. 182678.
626 SCRA 527
August 3, 2010

FACTS:

On January 15, 1993, petitioner Bernardo De Leon (De Leon) filed a Complaint for Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Makati City, against respondent PEA, as well
as its officers. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence
and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San
Dionisio, Paranaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more
than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question be
awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements
constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing
acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises.

RTC- The court a quo found merit in De Leons application for writ of preliminary injunction and
thus issued the Order dated 8 February 1993.

PEA filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion against the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief. On 30 September 1993, the Ninth
Division of this Court rendered a Decision discerning that the court a quo did not act in a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
against PEA.

PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a
salvage zone until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982.

Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a
public land so that De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer
ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect
De Leons nebulous right of possession. Accordingly, in its Decision dated 20 November 2000.

SC – reversed the decision of the RTC.

The aforesaid Decision of the SC became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration
was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon
and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession
of Lot 5155.

Acting on PEAs motion, the court a quo issued the first assailed Order (writ of execution) dated
15 September 2004. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the September 15, 2004
and April 29, 2005 Orders of the RTC of Makati City.

Subsequently, De Leon filed a second special civil action for certiorari with the CA seeking to
annul and set aside the same RTC Orders dated September 15, 2004 and April 29, 2005, as well
as the RTC Order of July 27, 2005.

De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v. CA was to simply dismiss his complaint for
damages and nothing more, and that the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing a writ of execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He insists that he
can only be removed from the disputed property through an ejectment proceeding.

ISSUE:

The issues raised in the present petitions boil down to the question of whether PEA is really
entitled to possess the subject property and, if answered in the affirmative, whether the RTC
should proceed to hear PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition.

DECISION:

YES. As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment
or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated,and may not vary the terms of the judgment it
seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the
ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the
land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to
the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of
ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right
to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. This is precisely
what happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as
owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent
of his claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place
the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender
possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust
him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical
statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have
the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a
reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these
circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order
by the court for the removal of the improvements.

It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision,
but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the present case, it would be
redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to
possess the subject property. Contrary to DeLeons claims, the issuance of the writ of execution
by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this Courts decision in PEA v.
CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential
consequence of this Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and
at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of ownership and possession. To further require
PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would,
in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.

ROA v. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO EBORA

G.R. No. 161137
615 SCRA 231
March 15, 2010

FACTS:

A parcel of land, which was continuously, openly and adversely possessed by Santiago Ebora,
was mistakenly included by Chacon Enterprises in its application for original registration. As a
result, litigation arose between the heirs of Ebora and Chacon Enterprises.

During the case’s pendency, the heirs of Ebora sold the land to their co-heir Josefa Ebora Pacardo
(Josefa) and her husband Rosalio Pacardo. On the same day, the spouses Pacardo assigned the
property to Digno Roa, married to petitioner Lydia Roa. The corresponding deeds of absolute sale
and assignment were inscribed on original certificate of title (OCT) and a transfer certificate of title
was issued in the name of Digno Roa.

The case was resolved against Chacon Enterprises and in favor of the heirs of Ebora.

Thereafter the heirs of Ebora again adjudicated the land among themselves, pro indiviso. That
same day, a deed of confirmation of a prior conveyance by Josefa to respondent Samuel Sonnie
Lim of a portion was likewise inscribed on TCT No. T-48097. The issuance of new TCTs in the
name of Alejandro Ebora was likewise inscribed in the same. The lots were thereafter sold to
various respondents which resulted in the issuance of new TCTs in the names of the respective
vendees.

All these transactions occurred without petitioner’s knowledge and consent.

In view of the death of her husband, petitioner filed a petition for annulment and cancellation of
TCT No. 48097 and its derivative titles. The RTC ruled against the petitioner. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a superior right over the land as against the respondents

DECISION:

Yes. From the moment the disputed land was sold to the spouses Pacardo, the heirs of Ebora
lost all their rights and interest over the property.
Thus, the heirs of Ebora had nothing to adjudicate among themselves. Neither did they have
anything to transfer to the vendees or successors-in-interest. As such, the transferees of the heirs
of Ebora acquired no better right than that of the transferors. The spring cannot rise higher than
its source.

Whatever right a buyer, notwithstanding the fact that he is an innocent purchaser for value, may
have acquired over the disputed property cannot prevail over, but must yield to, the superior right
possessed by another buyer.

THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY

vs. THE METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 176518
March 2, 2010

FACTS:

Denivin and Josefina Ilagan were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over parcels of land. Upon default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was
conducted with Metropolitan Bank being the highest bidder and for which a Certificate of Sale was
issued.

During the period of redemption, a Writ of Possession was approved in favor of the Bank. On
June 30, 2005, the St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc., owned by the mortgagors and
therefore included in one of the foreclosed lands, filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for
Restraining Order.

ISSUE:

WON St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. is really a third person which cannot be bound
by the writ of possession issued by the Court.

DECISION:

Petitioners are not "Third Parties" against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued and
implemented. As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the
foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly
authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession. It is settled that
the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the
foreclosed property, upon ex parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right
to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period.
Since petitioners’ possession of the subject school premises stemmed from their employment or
enrollment contracts with the school, their right to possess the subject school premises cannot be
adverse to that of the school and of its owners. As such, the petitioners cannot be deemed "third
parties". The proper remedy for the petitioners is a separate, distinct and independent suit,
provided for under Act No. 3135.
SPOUSES CERTEZA vs. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 190078
March 5, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners obtained a loan from Philippine Savings Bank. Due to petitioners’ failure to pay their
obligation, an Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage was instituted. During the
auction sale, PS Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. A corresponding Certificate of
Sale was then issued in its favor and was later registered. A Writ of Possession was then
subsequently granted. On January 20, 2005, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Stay Issuance or Implementation of Writ of Possession. They further sought the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for allegedly having been conducted in
contravention of the procedural requirements prescribed in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 (Re: Procedure
in Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages).

ISSUE:

WON the auction sale conducted by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should
be declared null and void for failure to comply with the two-bidder rule.

DECISION:

The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135. It is impractical
and burdensome to require the two-bidder rule considering that not all auction sales are
commercially attractive to prospective bidders. The two-bidder rule is provided under P.D. No.
1594 with respect to contracts for government infrastructure projects because of the public
interest involved. In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages however, the private interest is
predominant. Therefore, the requirement that there must be at least two bidders is not as exigent
as in the case of contracts for government infrastructure projects. Circular No. 7-2002 Section
5(a) further states that:
Sec. 5. Conduct of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale –
The bidding shall be made through sealed bids which must be submitted to the Sheriff who shall
conduct the sale between the hours of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. of the date of the auction (Act 3135,
Sec. 4). xxx

The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have
more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. Therefore, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale
conducted in this case is regular and valid. Consequently, the subsequent issuance of the writ of
possession is likewise regular and valid.

Urieta vda. de Aguilar vs. Alfaro

G.R. No. 164402
634 SCRA 242
July 5, 2010

FACTS:
On August 3, 1995, petitioner, Asuncion Urieta, filed for a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Damages before the RTC of San Jose Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her
husband Ignacio Aguilar was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-9354 over a 606 sq meter
parcel of land in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. In 1968, Ignacio allowed
petitioner’s sister, Anastacia Urieta, mother of respondent Erlinda Alfaro to construct a house in
the southern part of the land and to temporarily stay therein.

In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition the lot. Petitioner asked respondents, who
took possession of the land after Anastacia died, to vacate the property but they did not heed her
demand.

Respondents asserted that on April 17, 1973, Ignacio and petitioner sold to their mother
Anastacia, the southern portion of the land as evidenced by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan which bears
the signatures of petitioner and her husband. However, petitioner denied having signed the
Kasulatan and averred that her signature in the Kasulatan is a forgery.

On September 21, 1998, the RTC ordered the respondents to vacate the subject premises and
denied their counterclaim for reconveyance. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s
decision. CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan since it is a notarized document and
disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent’s Kasulatan ng Bilihan confer a better right to posses than petitioner’s
Torrens title.

DECISION:

No. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership to the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire
property. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support
their claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioner’s
Torrens title.

MODESTO PALALI vs. JULIET AWISAN

G.R. No. 158385
612 SCRA 440
February 12, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner5 of a parcel of land in Sitio Camambaey,
Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698 hectares6 and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 147 in her name.7 On March 7, 1994, she filed an action for quieting of title
against petitioner Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied and encroached on the northern
portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.8 We shall refer
to this land occupied by petitioner, which allegedly encroached on the northern portion of
respondent’s 6.6698-hectare land, as the "subject property". Respondent prayed to be declared
the rightful owner of the northern portion, for the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration, and
for the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property.9

ISSUE:

Who between the parties has the better right to the subject property?

DECISION:

Palali. As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors’ actual,
open, continuous and physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war
era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the subject property). Petitioner’s witnesses were
long time residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew their neighbors and were
familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.

A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest, enjoys
the presumption of ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the property must
overcome such presumption by relying solely on the strength of his claims rather than on the
weakness of the defense.

MODESTO V URBINA
G.R. No. 189859
633 SCRA 383
October 18, 2010

FACTS:

This case originates from a complaint of recovery of possession filed by respondent Urbina
against the petitioners Modesto, with the RTC of Pasig sometime in 1983.

Urbina in his complaint alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Lower Bicutan,
Taguig.

According to Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to
occupy a portion of his property.

Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of said lot. However, before the
parties could finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began
claiming ownership over the lot.

The Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of the lands because it was still
government property, being part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner have a better right of possession since they were in actual, adverse,
public, and continuous possession of the property.

DECISION:

Yes. The Court resolved the issue by applying the legal provisions covering the subject property
which was P.D. No. 172 implementing guidelines M.O. No. 119 where one of the qualifications to
ownership is that one must have constructed a house in the proclaimed area for disposition on or
prior to January 6, 1986 and actually residing therein.
As reported by the special investigator and other land inspectors, it was the Modestos who were
the actual occupants of the area unlike Urbina who never occupied the land and instead has been
residing in Makati City.

SARMIENTA vs. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA)

G.R. No. 182953
632 SCRA 538
October 11, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) was the registered owner of the lot
in dispute which was placed under community mortgage program (CMP). Through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their
temporary houses and an office building. Sometime in 1992, petitioners sought for the annulment
of respondent’s title but it was dismissed by the RTC. Upon dismissal, respondent demanded
petitioners to vacate the premises. Petitioners asked for a one-year extension for them to look for
a place to transfer. However, it was repeatedly extended due to respondent’s tolerance.
Petitioners even propose to become members of MAHA so that they can be qualified to acquire
portions of the lot but they failed to comply with the requirements despite repeated demands.
MAHA then sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the lot. Unheeded, MAHA filed the
complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

In their answer, petitioners averred that they are the owners of the subject lot, having been in
actual physical possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the
land. They likewise argued that the complaint was irregular and defective because its caption
states that it was for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action for failure by the respondent to prove
prior physical possession which is required in a complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, RTC
reversed the MTCC decision stating that MAHA was able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that petitioners’ occupation was by mere tolerance and their occupation became illegal after
MAHA demanded that they vacate the property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling
that the cause of action was an unlawful detainer case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have a superior right of possession over the property in question.

DECISION:

No. The evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners’ stay
and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA.
But when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate
the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. Well settled
is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him
which in the present case is an unlawful detainer case.

MORES V YU-GO
625 SCRA 290
G.R. NO. 172292
July 23, 2010

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an injunction suit filed by plaintiff-appellants Yu-go et.al, alleging that,
sometime in March 1983, appellees Mores, pleaded to appellants that they be allowed to stay in
the subject property in the meantime that they did not own a house yet. Said property was co-
owned by plaintiff-appellants. They readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only
to the condition that the said stay would last until anyone of appellants would need the subject
property. Forthwith, appellees and their children occupied the same as agreed upon.
In November 1997, appellants made known to appellees that they were already in need of the
subject property. However, appellees begged that they be given more time. Extensions of time
were repeatedly given to appellee but, instead of heeding such demand, appellees hired some
laborers and started demolishing the improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999.

Consequently, appellants instituted the said action for injunction where they also prayed for the
reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally demolished. Appellees filed
their Answer where they denied the material averments of the complaint. They claimed that
appellees were the ones who caused its renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered
veranda and a concrete hollow block fence, at their own expense, and with appellants’ consent,
which renovation was made without altering the form and substance of the subject property. Also,
appellees argued that what they removed was merely the improvements made on the subject
property, which removal had not caused any substantial damage thereto as, in fact, it remained
intact. By way of counterclaims, they demanded payment of actual damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.

The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Mores ruling that Defendants, who
are possessors in good faith, were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they removed
only the improvements they introduced without destroying the principal building, after the plaintiffs
refused to pay them the reasonable value of the improvements. x x x
However, the appellate court disagreed that spouses Mores were in good faith, believing that the
relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is one between a lessor and a lessee,
making Article 1678 of the Civil Code applicable to the present case. The options given by Article
1678, the right of appropriating the useful improvements after reimbursing 50% of its value or the
right of removal of the useful improvements, are given by law to the lessor - the Yu siblings. Hence
the appellate court ordered the spouses Mores to pay the Yu siblings moral damages
worthP100,000 and denied Mores’ Motion for Reconsideration for want of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court awarding the Yu siblings moral damages in the amount
of P100,000 is rendered with grave abuse of discretion and is not in accord with the decisions of
this Court.

DECISION:

The petition has merit. The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the
improvements on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses Mores cannot
be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property.
Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one’s only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.

The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the
present case. Article 1678 reads:

If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which
the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor
upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements
at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement,
but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing,
and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.

There is thus no reason for the appellate court’s award of moral damages to the Yu siblings. We
agree with the trial court’s finding that the spouses Mores "removed only the improvements they
introduced without destroying the principal building, after the [Yu siblings] refused to pay them the
reasonable value of the improvements." When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement,
the Yu siblings should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the
improvements. Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores had the right
to remove the improvements.

VII. Usufruct
2005
SEPULVEDA SR VS PELAEZ

FACTS:

6 December 1972 – Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. with the CFI of Cebu for the recovery of possession and ownership of his ½
undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 28199, 18193 and
28316, 1/3 undivided share in several lots covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 28304. 35090, 18228,
28310, 26308, 28714, 28211, 28312 and 2822. All lots are located in Danao, Cebu.

The case also involved partition of such lots among the co-owners, payment of the purchase price
paid by the City of Danao to Pedro, Sr. and award of damages and attorney’s fees.The 11 lots
were among the 25 parcels of land which Dulce Sepulveda, mother of Pelaez, inherited from from
her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under a Project of Partition submitted by Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. as administrator of Dionisia’s estate.

Under the said project of partition – Pedro, Sr. is the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No,
28199 Pedro’s brother, Santiago Sepulveda is the undivided owner of ½ of the parcels of land
covered by TD Nos. 1818797, 18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles Pedro and Santiago were
also indicated as co-owners of 11 other parcels of land, each with an undivided 1/3 share thereof.
Pelaez alleged the following in his complaint:
His mother, Dulce died intestate on 2 March 1944. She was survived by Pelaez (P), by her
husband, Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda.Vicente Sepulveda, Dulce’s
grandfather, died intestate on 25 October 1930, when Dulce was only about 4 years old.
Carlota Sepulveda repeatedly demanded Dulce’s share in the 11 parcels of land but Pedro, Sr.
who was then Mayor of the Municipality of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce later on demanded the
delivery of her share in 11 parcels of land but Pedro, Sr. still refused. Pedro, Sr. claimed that he
needed to continue his possession of said property to reap the produce therefrom which he used
to pay the realty taxes on the subject properties. Pelaez also demanded the delivery of his
mother’s share on so many occasions, to no avail. Pelaez also narrated that Pedro, Sr. executed
an affidavit on 28 November 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died
intestate on 5 June 1921. (But the truth is Dionisia was survived by her 3 sons – Santiago, Pedro
and Vicente. Pedro, Sr. also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on 24 July 1968 over the property
covered by TD No. 19804 in favor of the City of Danao for P7,492. Such amount was received by
Pedro, Sr. without his knowledge.
In his answer, Pedro, Sr. admitted the execution of a deed of sale over the property sold to Danao
City but averred that the city failed to pay the purchase price. He claimed that Pelaez had no right
to share in the proceeds of the said share. Pedro, Sr. denied having received any demand for the
delivery of Dulce’s share from Carlota or from Pelaez. Pedro, Sr. died intestate during the trial.
Pedro’s daughter, Socorro Sepulveda Lawas was appointed administratrix of his estate. In
compliance with the Court’s decision in Lawas v. CA (GR # L-45809. December 12, 1986), Pedro,
Sr. was substituted by Socorro (as petitioner in this case).
To prove the delivery of Dulce’s share under the project of partition, Socorro presented the
following: Affidavit of Consolidation she executed in October 1940 covering 13 of the 25 parcels
of land whose deeds were put under her due to the Project of Partition. The CFI’s Order denying
Carlota’s motion for reconstitution of the records of SpecPro No 778-R and for the delivery of
Dulce’s share in the 11 parcels of land. The same Order declaring that Dulce, through her
grandchildren and her mother Carlota, had already received her share of the estate from Pedro,
Sr. as early as 10 January 1938.
According to Socorro, Dulce and Pedro had a verbal agreement that the 11 parcels of land would
serve as Pedro’s compensation for his services as administrator of Dionisia’s estate. Pedro
became the sole owner of Dulce’s shares upon the termination of SpecPro No 778-0 and
subsequent distribution of the shares of Dionisia’s heirs. Socorro adduced evidence that Santiago
Sepulveda died intestate and was survived by his wife, Paz and their then minor children but
Pelaez failed to implead them as parties-defendants in the complaint. Socorro further claimed that
Pedro declared the property covered by TD No. 18199 under his name for taxation purposes
since 1948; that the 11 parcels under Dulce in the Project of Partition had been declared for
taxation purposes also under Pedro since 1974; that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Pelaez, ruling that his action based on constructive
trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed and that he was entitled to a share in
the proceeds of the share in the proceeds of the sale to Danao City and that the partition of the
subject properties was in order. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification.

ISSUE:
Whether Pelaez is entitled to a portion in usufruct of the subject property?
DECISION:
Yes. Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled
to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate
children who has not received any betterment. The rights of the usufructuary are provided in
Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil Code.[18] In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held that:

Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled
to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime
corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not been
bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right
of the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is
provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored. Of
course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS CA

FACTS:
Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 481 (1968) setting aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City
owned by the NHA as reserved property for the site of National Government Center (NGC). Subsequently,
he issued Proc. No. 1670 (1977), which removed a 7-hectare portion from the 120-hectare land, giving
the usufructuary rights to the “xxx Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and
projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future survey, under the administration of the
Foundation. This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future
survey based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most particularly on the
original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision survey dated April 19-
25, 1968.” Over the years, MSBF occupied the area but it exceeded the 7-hectare subject of the usufruct
and occupied 16 hectares instead. By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek
to the north. On 1987, MSBF leased a portion of its area to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the
portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area. On November 1987,
Pres. Corazon Aquino issued MO 127 which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less,
remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the NGC. It also authorized the
NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public. On August 1988, acting pursuant to MO 127,
the NHA gave BGC 10 days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of
the 10-day period will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988
before the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
Both the NHA and MSBF conducted survey on the subject parcel of land.

ISSUE:

Whether the usufruct given to MSBF is only for a limited term?

DECISION:

Yes. ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or

association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of
such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct
shall be extinguished by reason thereof.

The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years.
A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or associations
lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual. This is especially
invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land.
Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article
605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the National
Government Center. However, MO 127 does not affect MSBFs seven-hectare area since under
Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area was already exclude[d] from the operation of
Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which established the National Government
Center Site.

2006

MORALIDAD vs. PERNES 497 SCRA 532

G.R. No. 152809, August 03, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Davao City which is the subject of the
controversy. The petitioner had worked in U.S.A. for years until retirement. Being single, she
would usually stay in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, at Mandug, Davao City
during her vacation and that in 1986, when she received news from Arlene that Mandug was
infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between
government troops and the insurgents, she immediately sent money to buy a lot in Davao City
proper where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. Petitioner wanted the property
to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City and made known
this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. Which reads: I, MERCEDES VIÑA
MORALIDAD, of legal age, single,…hereby declare: 1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs.
Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like; 2. That anybody
of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should maintain an atmosphere
of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another; 3. That anyone of my
kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however,
that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof; 4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform
with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own; 5. That any
proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest
kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better in
standing. In her retirement, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents’
on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour
which resulted in violent confrontations and the filing of suits at the barangay lupon and to the
Ombudsman for conduct unbecoming of public servants and at the MTCC, an ejectment suit for
unlawful detainer. The MTCC rendered judgment for the petitioner directing the defendants to
vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff. Respondent spouses
appealed to the RTC where the decision of the MTCC was reversed, holding that respondents’
possession of the property in question was not by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by
her express consent. It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of
improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision contemplates of a lessor-lessee
arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that
what governed the parties’ relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. Petitioner went
to the CA wherein her petition was denied on the ground that it is still premature to apply Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code considering that the issue of whether respondents’ right to possess
a portion of petitioner’s land had already expired or was already terminated was not yet resolved.
The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner
failed to establish that respondents’ right to possess had already ceased.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondents’ right to possess the land had been terminated.

DECISION:

The Court rules for the petitioner. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to
enjoy another’s property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another
temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate the same. It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated
July 21, 1986, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use
and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents
being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as
they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties" for the petitioner’s "nearest kins who have less in life in greater
percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better in standing." The established facts
undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among
the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy.
 2007

2008

2009

2010

VIII. Easements or Servitudes

2005

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION INC VS MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) of

PASIG, METRO MANILA

FACTS:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road to
Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The Fire Code required that the road had to be at least 3
meters in width so that fire trucks could pass in case of fire. The residents likewise needed the
road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters
out of the 1,791 sq/meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto
Ching Cuanco adjacent of E.R. Santos Street.On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig
approved an Ordinance authorizing the Mayo to initiate expropriation proceedings and
appropriate the funds therefore. The Ordinance state that the owners were notified of the intent
to purchase and they rejected the offer.

On July 21, 1993, the Municipality filed a complaint, amended on Aug 6, 1993 against the Ching
Cuancos for refusing to sell the land. The Municipality deposited with the RTC 15% of the market
value and the RTC subsequently issued a writ of possession over the property.
On Nov 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens under the name of
Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property.

The Municipality then constructed a cemented road with a width of three meters and was called
Damayan Street.

JILCSFI answered that the exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for
the benefit of the poor and landless. It alleged that the property is not the best portion for the road.
It also averred that it had been denied the use and enjoyment of its property.
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of JILCSFI, testified that
the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as
worship center. He averred that the realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing
of the ordinance for expropriation.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the
establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at
the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a
public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is
located at the middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into
two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship
center.

ISSUE:

Whether a property expropriated by the government must comply with the essential requisites of
right of way under the Civil Code?

DECISION:

No, a property expropriated by the government need not comply with the essential requisites of
right of way under the Civil Code The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for
an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and
route of the land to be taken[66] unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious.[67] Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine
necessity of public character.[68] Government may not capriciously choose what private property
should be taken.[69]
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street
to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that
although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however,
especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street.
This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a
road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical
necessity will suffice.[70]

Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in
the petitioners property and not elsewhere.[71] We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance
states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto.
Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion
of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the
respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.

BORBAJO vs. HIDDEN VIEW HOMEOWNERS, INC

450 SCRA 315

FACTS:

Jose C. Bontuyan (Bontuyan), Lucy Solon, Georgina Solon, Helen Solon and Vicente Solon, Jr.
(the Solons) were the registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land (Lot 10183-A), covering
an area of 13,910 square meters situated at Barangay Bacayan, Cebu City as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 73709 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. [3] At the
instance of Bontuyan, the property was surveyed on 19 May 1991 to convert it into a subdivision.
Borbajo also decided to develop into a subdivision the other properties adjacent to Hidden View
Subdivision I which she acquired. The incident prompted the homeowners of Hidden View
Subdivision I to inquire with the HLURB about the validity of the registration of the subdivision
road lots in the name of Borbajo. They also asked whether she had the necessary documents for
the development of Hidden View Subdivision II and ST Ville Properties. In a letter[13] dated 17
March 1997, HLURB Regional Officer Antonio Decatoria, Sr. replied that under the law the owner
or developer of the subdivision should have legal title or right over the road lots of the subdivision
and that if the title or right is in the name of other persons it follows that there is failure to comply
with the requirements of the law. The HLURB Officer pointed out that Hidden View Subdivision
II and ST Ville Properties had not filed an application for registration and license to sell with the
HLURB.[14]

On 10 August 1997, the homeowners caused the construction of a guardhouse at the entrance
of Hidden View Subdivision I and hired the services of a security guard to prevent unauthorized
persons and construction vehicles from passing through their subdivision. The measures
adversely affected the residents of the subdivisions at the back, as well as Borbajo herself since
her delivery trucks and heavy equipment used in the construction of her housing projects then on-
going had been effectively prevented from passing through the road lots.[15]

On 28 August 1997, Borbajo filed before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 58, an action for damages
and injunction against Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., spouses Marcelina A. Sarcon and Ely D.
Sarcon, Roberto Alvarez and Corazon Nombrado and Gilbert Andrales (respondents herein).
Borbajo prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing respondents to
maintain the status quo and to desist from preventing her delivery trucks and other construction
vehicles, and her construction workers, from passing through the road lots, and, after hearing on
the merits, that judgment be rendered making the restraining order or preliminary injunction
permanent and ordering the defendants to pay damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of right of way can exist

DECISION:

An easement can exist only when the servient and the dominant estates belong to different
owners.

DE LA CRUZ vs. RAMISCAL

450 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Respondent OLGA RAMISCAL is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner
of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioners SPS. ELIZABETH
and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ are occupants of a parcel of land., The subject matter of this case
is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which is being used
by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their
property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.[5]
Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared
a relocation survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and San Benito
Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the aforementioned pathway being
occupied by petitioners is part of her property.[6]

Through her lawyer, respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure
constructed by them on said pathway without her knowledge and consent. On the other hand,
petitioners, in their Answer, admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of
land on the northern side of respondents property as their pathway to and from 18 th Avenue, the
nearest public highway from their property, but claimed that such use was with the knowledge of
respondent.[9]

They asked respondent to give them a 1.50-meter wide and 40.15-meter long easement on the
eastern side of her property, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide
easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. Respondent did not want to give them the
easement on the eastern side of her property, towards Boni Serrano Avenue but, instead, offered
to them the said 1.10-meter wide passageway along the northern side of her property towards
18th Avenue, which offer they had accepted. [10]

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way

DECISION:

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of

another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA
466 SCRA 235

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly
made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as
required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. [2]

Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets.[3] The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,[4] which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.

Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for seven years. From
his house, he could use three streets to go to E. R. Santos Street, namely, Catalina Street,
Damayan Street and Bagong Taon Street. On cross-examination, he admitted that no vehicle
could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. [20]
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of JILCSFI, testified that
the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as
worship center. He averred that the realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing
of the ordinance for expropriation.[21]

The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the
establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at
the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a
public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is
located at the middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into
two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship
center.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an
easement of right-of-way

DECISION:

Where the property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the expropriator is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New
Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power
of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken[66] unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.

PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA

75 SCRA 591

FACTS:

The spouses Agustin Narciso and Aurora Narciso (the Narcisos, for short) were the original
owners of two (2) lots situated at Barrio Lagao, General Santos City, Cotabato.

On September 6, 1968, the Narcisos executed in favor of herein respondent, General Santos
Doctors Hospital, Inc. (GSDHI) an Option to Buy[4] the interior lot.

Years later, or on September 30, 1977, the exterior lot was mortgaged by the Narcisos to one of
the petitioners herein, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP). Upon the
Narcisos failure to pay the mortgage obligation, the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged
property (exterior lot) sold at a public auction on June 21, 1982 with PDCP as the lone bidder.
Accordingly, the Narcisos title covering the exterior lot was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No.
23202 was issued in the name of PDCP.

On April 18, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court at General Santos City, respondent GSDHI, claiming
that it has an easement of right-of-way over the foreclosed property.
Plaintiff alleged that the easement was a condition and primary consideration for its purchase
from the Narcisos of the interior lot so that the hospital it intends to build thereat would have an
access to the national highway

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent GSDHI has an easement of right-of-way

DECISION:

An easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
of the latter must refrain from doing or allow somebody else to do or something to be done on his
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.

2006

FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 158141
July 11, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots in the Tali Beach Subdivision and also two
parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. The subdivision was owned by respondent Far East
Enterprises, Inc. To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private
respondent's subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private
respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Hence, the latter barricaded the front gate of
petitioner's property to prevent petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads to access
said parcels. Petitioner then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for
preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent.

The trial court issued an Order for private respondent to remove the barricade and refrain
from hindering petitioner’s entry and exit from the subject properties and for the free passage of
petitioner in the subdivision of private respondent pending the litigation. Sometime thereafter,
petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials
to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and
occupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and
construction materials. On the other hand, petitioner prayed that his contractors, visitors, and
other representatives be allowed access and persons he has authorized be allowed to install
power lines over private respondent’s property. The trial court amended the writ granting
petitioner’s prayer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the amended writ and reinstated the original writ.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may be granted a temporary easement after the payment of the proper
indemnity

DECISION:

Yes. Under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the
construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement
is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. In the present
case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his
property, he has to pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus, petitioner may be granted a
temporary easement after the payment of the proper indemnity. Hence, the court ordered private
respondent to allow the right of passage thru the subdivision by the petitioner's visitors and guests,
contractors, construction workers, heavy equipment vehicles, and delivery construction materials.
But the Court did not allow the installation of electric power lines because it is a permanent
easement which is not covered by Article 656.

2007
LEE VS CARREON

FACTS:
Spouses Amadeo and Adelaida Carreon, respondents, are the owners of a house and Lots Nos.
8-B and 8-C located in Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 61049 and
56745, respectively, of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On the other hand, Anita Linda
Rodriguez is the owner of Lot No. 6213-A-2 covered by TCT No. 93402. It is situated within the
vicinity of respondent spouses’ lots. As there is no existing way from their property to the nearest
road, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Cebu City a complaint for
easement of right of way against Rodriguez, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-7426. During the
pre-trial, the RTC found that there is another servient estate, owned by Mr. and Ms. Anselmo
Jardin which could be used by respondents as a right of way. Respondents then filed a Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint to include spouses Jardin as co-defendants, the latter
being owners of Lots Nos. 6213-A-3, 6213-A-4 and 8-A located on the eastern side of
respondents’ property. On June 9, 1989, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Amended
Complaint. However, the lots of spouses Jardin were sold pendente lite to Leo Winston Brin Lee,
petitioner. As a result, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Amended Complaint
impleading petitioner as additional defendant. On September 10, 1993, the RTC granted the
motion. After trial, the RTC rendered Judgment in favor of respondents and against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that respondents have an existing right of way; and that had the trial court
considered certain testimonial evidence and respondents’ admissions, its conclusion and that of
the Court of Appeals would have been different.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents are entitled to an easement of right
of way on petitioner’s property.

DECISION:
No. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code reproduced as follows: ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of
way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. This easement is not
compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts. ART. 650. The
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites
should be met: 1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par.
1); 3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and 4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). All the above requisites are present here. Verily, we find
no cogent reason to disturb the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Judgment of the
trial court.

WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., and MIGUELA JIMENEZ-JAVIER VS ARB CONSTRUCTION

CO., INC.
G.R. No. 157285,
2007 February 16

FACTS:

The use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character.
The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. Petitioner Woodridge School is the usufructuary of a parcel of land in
the name of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela
Jimenez–Javier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot to that of Woodridge. Respondent ARB
Construction is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is
composed of four phases. Phase 1 of the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos
Alvarez Avenue. To provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision,
ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases. Petitioners’ properties sit right in the
middle of several estates: Phase 1 of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east
and Green Valley Subdivision in the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills Subdivision IV which
leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west, and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the
south. Petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. ARB refused
the offer and fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the properties of petitioners, thus, cutting
off petitioners’ access to and from the public highway. After failing to settle the matter amicably,
petitioners jointly filed a complaint in the RTC to enjoin ARB from depriving them of the use of the
disputed subdivision road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of proper
indemnity. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners relying on the ruling of the
Supreme Court in White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi (193 SCRA 765) stating that the
government automatically becomes the owner of the subdivisions’ roads the moment the
subdivision plan is approved, and thus is open to public use without any need for compensation.
Respondent ARB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
Trial Court’s decision and stating that the ruling of the Supreme Court in the 1991 case of White
Plains Subdivision is not applicable as it was not similarly situated as in the present case. However
the appellate court went on to rule that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as
there is no other existing adequate outlet to and from petitioners’ properties to the Marcos Alvarez
Avenue other than the subject existing road lot belonging to ARB. In addition, it awarded P500,000
to ARB as compensation for the wear and tear that petitioners’ use of the road would contribute
to. Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme
Court arguing that ARB is not entitled to be paid any indemnity since the contested road lot is a
property of public dominion pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code because the disputed road
falls under the category of “others of similar character” which is the last clause of Article 420 (1).
Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can be used by the general public without need
for compensation. Petitioners also assert that their initial offer of P50,000 should be sufficient
compensation for the right of way. Further, they should not be held accountable for the increase
in the value of the property since the delay was attributable to the stubborn refusal of ARB to
accept their offer.

ISSUES:

Whether the disputed road is a property of public dominion pursuant to the last clause of Article
420 (1), and, as such, is not a valid subject for legal easement.

Whether the offer of petitioners amounting to P50,000 is a sufficient compensation for their use
of the road.

DECISION:
With regard to the first issue, The Supreme Court says, no. The Court held that the road lots in a
private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road (Abellana, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals). Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner developer. The
use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character. The
road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. The local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road. In the present case, since
no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the title to the road lot is still
registered in the name of ARB, the disputed property remains private. With regard to the second
issue, the Supreme Court again says, no. In order to be entitled to a legal easement of right of
way, the following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3)
The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the present case, all of the
requisites are present except for number two. The appellate and trial courts found that the
properties of petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any adequate access to a public
highway except the subject road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue. Although it was shown
that the shortest distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek,
this alternative route does not provide an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed school.
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be
computed. Under Article 649, paragraph 2, it is stated: “Should this easement be established in
such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.” Having settled the legal issues, the
Supreme Court ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for the reception of evidence and
determination of the limits of the property to be covered by the easement, the proper indemnity to
be paid and the respective contributions of petitioners.
OBRA vs BADUA

FACTS:

Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by them
situated in La Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas.
Their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of
petitioners property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The
pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They claimed that this pathway
had been established as early as 1955.In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on
the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents access to the national
highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused. (The
spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they were declared in
default.) On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. It
held that respondents were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an
easement of right of way. It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern portion of her
property, respondents were able to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway.
It stated further that the new pathway is more than adequate for respondents use .Thus, the
applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioners property was not allowed.
The said Decision became final and executory. It must be noted that the new pathway used by
respondents, however, traversed the southern portion of petitioners property. Sometime in 2001,
petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted the use of
respondents new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioners action, respondents filed a
Motion to Enforce the July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the
RTC dismissing the case was based on the existence of a new pathway which they had been
using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was rejected by the trial courts. Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the
trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on
petitioners representation that she was allowing respondents to use the southern portionof her
property as an alternative pathway. Since the southern portion was an agreed pathway, petitioner
could not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the
passage. Hence, we have this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a property not
the subject of a pending case.

Whether or not there was a voluntary easement over the southern portion of Obra’s property

DECISION:

NO; Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts issuance of an order clarifying
its final and executory decision and effectively establishing an easement on petitioners property
without proper adjudication. An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive
portion of the decision. [A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final
judgment exceeds its jurisdiction and renders its order invalid. The resolution of the court in a
given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor
as to settlement of rights of the parties. Thus, where there is a conflict between the fallo and
the ratio decidendi or body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that
the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. The
rule applies when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal,
and can wholly be given effect without need of interpretation or construction. The amended
complaint filed by respondents revealed that their cause of action was the recognition of their
easement of right-of-way of more than one (1) meter wide and more than sixteen (16) meters in
length [which] traversed the northern portion of the property of defendants spouses Obra. As
prayer, respondents asked for the demolition of the concrete fence constructed by petitioner and
her spouse, that closed the pathway on the northern portion of Obras lot; the declaration of right-
of-way over said area in favor of respondents; and the payment of damages and attorneys fees.
When the RTC dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that respondents had no
cause of action against petitioner and her husband because they failed to satisfy one of the four
requisites for the entitlement of a right-of-way, namely that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway. The trial court took note of
the fact that the new pathway which incidentally traversed the southern portion of petitioners lot
is an adequate outlet to a public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative
pathway located south of petitioners lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents
failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial court: The
insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without basis considering that
there is another outlet adequate enough as an access route for them in their passage to the public
highway and the alleged inconvenience cannot be a ground for the opening of said old pathway.
NO; The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an easement of right-
of-way over the pathway located south of petitioners property, nevertheless, concluded that the
said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way which petitioner should
respect. The trial court was in error. It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final,
becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter
a final judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. To recapitulate, the dismissal
of the Civil Case meant that no easement was ever established on petitioner’s property. However,
the trial court, by issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that
limited respondents passage, effectively created a right-of-way on petitioners property in favor of
respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the parties. This directive
was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for having been issued
outside of the courts jurisdiction. Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary
easement of right-of-way, subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant,
and material to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in the Civil Case, still, the
conclusion that there was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis. The
records of the Civil case do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed
right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by the
parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough
to support the conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern
portion. More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should
be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must
be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
 2008

NAPOCOR VS PUREFOODS CORP

565 SCRA 17

FACTS:

Napocor sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in
four towns of the province of Bulacan for the construction and maintenance of its 500 KV
Transmission Line project in Northern Luzon. It filed a special civic action for eminent domain
before the trial court against the registered owners or claimants of parcel of lands affected. The
complaint alleged the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency
and necessity of acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land.

Only PFI, SDC, Moldex and the heirs of Trinidad filed their respective answers raising the issue
of just compensation of their property to be expropriated. A report submitted to the RTC
recommending that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the fair market value of
P 600/sq m for properties belonging to Moldex and P 400/sq m for properties belonging to the
rest of the respondents. RTC rendered a Decision based on the report, ordering payment of just
compensation by Napocor to name respondents with legal interest of 6%/annum until finality of
the Decision and at 12%/annum from its finality until full payment. CA affirmed RTC decision in
all respects except for the period during which the interest of 12% per annum would accrue.

NAPOCOR assailed the CA's reliance on the commissioners’ report in fixing just compensation
based on the full market value of the affected properties. NAPOCOR contends that only an
easement of right-of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed,
thus, only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be
paid to the affected property owners (Section 3A, R.A. 6395, as amended and the implementing
regulation of R.A. No. 8974).

ISSUE:

Whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties
should be paid to the affected owners.

DECISION:

No. The Court ruled that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market value of
the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion on the affected property.

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title
or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation of property rights
over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation."

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to
which the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value. The aforementioned
rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In addition to
the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if
any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be
deducted the value of the consequential benefits.”

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed
state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject
to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that
the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

QUINTANILLA VS ABANGAN

FACTS:

Controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed by petitioner Apolinardito C.
Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, petitioner Perfecta C. Quintanilla (Perfecta) against
respondent Pedro Abangan (Pedro) and respondent Daryl's Collection International, Inc.
(DARYL'S).

Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square meters,
located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly
owned all the properties therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito,
who is now the registered owner thereof.[4] Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of
their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished products. As they
wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant
estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994.

However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing an area of
1,164 square meters[5] (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to
DARYL'S on March 24, 1994,[6] and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the
servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence.

Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or
a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.

On June 21, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES

649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS SUPERIOR TO THE MERE CONVENIENCE RULE
AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE.

RULINGS:

We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to
discharge the burden of proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to
validly claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.[17] It should be remembered that to
be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.

ST MICHAEL SCHOOL OF CAVITE ONC VS MASAITO DEVT CORP

547 SCRA 263

FACTS:

Petitioner St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc. is owned by petitioners-spouses Crisanto S. Claveria
and Gloria M. Claveria. Respondents Masaito Development Corporation (Masaito) and Rexlon
Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon) own, operate, and manage Citihomes Molino IV, Bacoor, Cavite
(Citihomes). St. Michael is located outside the northern perimeter fence of Citihomes. Its
passageway occupies a portion of the 61-square meter lot described as Lot 4, Block 7, Phase 1
of Citihomes. The gate to the school is located at the subdivision’s northern perimeter fence and
is the only entrance and exit for the entire school population.

In 2001, Masaito advised petitioners to purchase Lots 1-9, Block 7, Phase 1, fronting the school
at Php 3,579,000. On April 6, 2001, Masaito sent another offer to sell Lot 4, Block 7 of the
subdivision with the right-of-way through the private roads/drainage facilities of Citihomes at the
price of PhP 2 Million. Petitioners refused both proposals, reasoning that the school did not need
the entire area mentioned in the first proposal. St. Michael also said that the second offer was
grossly overpriced.

Petitioners, with four other homeowners, filed a complaint against respondents before the Bacoor,
Cavite RTC, for easement of right-of-way with damages and preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO). The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action
the complaint as to four homeowners and with respect to St. Michael, on the ground that it is not
a registered owner of any property that is the subject matter of the easement case, hence not a
real party-in-interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner
of the subject lot, is not a real party-in-interest

DECISION:

The trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner of the subject
lot, is not a real party-in- interest. It will suffice under Art. 649 of the Civil Code that “any person
who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way.” Clearly, the school is a real party-in-interest since it has
established a right to use the passageway for the benefit of its students. More importantly, the
records reveal that petitioners-spouses are the owners of the lot where the school is located and
they are the incorporators, trustees, and officers of St. Michael. They are also authorized to
represent the corporation in the complaint and subsequent actions. Thus, petitioners are real
parties-in-interest and we rule that the dismissal of the complaint is patently erroneous and bereft
of any legal basis. Petitioners must be allowed to pursue their case before the trial court.

VALDEZ VS TABISOLA
560 SCRA 332

FACTS:

Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula a parcel of land. Contained in the deed of sale is a stipulation that the Sps. Valdez ‘shall
be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which
is not included in this sale’. Sps. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property.
Feeling betrayed by said act of Sps. Tabisula based on the deed of sale’s intended road right of
way, Sps. Valdez reported the matter the brgy. Lupon but it was in vain which constrained Sps.
Valdez to file a case for specific performance against the Tabisulas with the RTC. The Sps.
Tabisula contended that :1: Sps. Valdez and family also are the owners of two properties adjoining
the subject property, which adjoining properties have access to two public roads ; and 2: they
could not have agreed to providing petitioners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as
there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be
located, which was erected long before the subject property was sold to the Valdez’s; thus , the
easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs.

RTC dismissed the Sps. Valdez’s complain. On appeal, Sps. Valdez were again turned down.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided for in the deed of sale

DECISION:

The Sps. Valdez are not entitled to the right of way. An easement or servitude is “a real right
constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the
same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for
the benefit of another thing or person.” The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil
Code

2009

PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC.

593 scra 382

FACTS:
Caruff Development Corporation(now Legaspi Towers 300 Inc) owned several parcels of land
along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-
storey building on the mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the
building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps in the
adjacent lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760)

ISSUES:

Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump pumps constitutes as easement
of the property.

DECISION:

The SC ruled in the negative. Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. In the
case at bar Legaspi Towers 300 Inc. the owner of the property where the generator set and sump
pumps was built is also the same owner of the property where the condominium was
constructed. In fine, the properties are owned by the same person.

LIMENSE V RAMOS
604 scra 599

FACTS:

Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into five and
gave the divided lots to his daughters through a deed of donation on March 9, 1932. In 1981,
Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his property but could not because a
substantial portion of the respondent's building encroached upon portion of Limense property.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both oral and written
demands.
In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the Lozada daughters. After
subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina,
married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco
Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of
Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio
Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by
Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents.

RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right of way existed
in favor of respondents. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which
forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley. Joaquin filed
a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin died. His heirs then
elevated the case to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that

respondent's ot has an easement of right of way.

DECISION:
In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal
of obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could
have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC.
Such defense is in the nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT
No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is
improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at
present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred
in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered
exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.

Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-
in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has been
continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long
period of time.

The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters
in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by
their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted
in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.

2010

SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON vs. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN
610 SCRA 426

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon, together with her brothers and sister, inherited the
subjectproperty from her father. They divided the lot into Lot A, B, C, D, and E. Lots A, B, and C
were adjacent toa city street while D and E were interior lots. To give these interior lots access to
the street, the heirsestablished in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way that ran
exclusively along thesouthwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.Petitioner
Victoria became the owner of Lot A and constructed therein a residential house and
two garages. The other portions were sold by petitioner’s
co-heirs to the Tan’s.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the
heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.

DECISION:
Yes. An easement established by agreement of the parties could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement. However, since the agreement of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law when the
ownership of Lots B, D,and E was consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans. The
existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.

MACHADO V RATDULA
612 SCRA 546

FACTS:

A dispute between two parties concerning the right of way over private lands cannot be
characterized as similar to those enumerated under Section 3, parag.2(a) to (d) of Executive
Order 561.The statutory construction principle of ejusdem generic prescribed that where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentined.

SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON, Petitioners, vs. SPS. SANTOS AND
ERLINDA TAN,Respondent
610 SCRA 426

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon, together with her brothers and sister, inherited the
subjectproperty from her father. They divided the lot into Lot A, B, C, D, and E. Lots A, B, and C
were adjacent toa city street while D and E were interior lots. To give these interior lots access to
the street, the heirsestablished in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way that ran
exclusively along thesouthwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.Petitioner
Victoria became the owner of Lot A and constructed therein a residential house and
two garages. The other portions were sold by petitioner’s
co-heirs to the Tan’s.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the
heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.

DECISION:

Yes. An easement established by agreement of the parties could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement. However, since the agreement of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law when the
ownership of Lots B, D,and E was consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans. The
existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.
IX. Nuisance
2005

GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL INC VS JAC LINER INC

FACTS:

The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses
and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby
directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers;
and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from
the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use
the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, as well as alleging that the terminals itself are public nuisances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the terminals are public nuisances

DECISION:

No, the terminals are not public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate
business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort
of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow
of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court DECISION:

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra
in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention. (Underscoring supplied)[38]

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac[39] where the appellant-municipality similarly
argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal
Council via an ordinance, this Court DECISION: Suffice it to say that in the abatement of
nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This
appellant failed to do.

2006

AC ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP. 506 SCRA 625

G. R. No. 166744
November 2, 2006.

FACTS:
AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. Frabelle
(Respondent) is a condominium corporation whose condominium development is located behind
petitioner. Respondent complained of the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the
air-conditioning units of petitioner.

ISSUES:

(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings or a
nuisance per se?
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the
blower of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of
pecuniary estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

DECISION:

(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise
is not a nuisance per se. Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the
listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics
will not render the house an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of present living, noise
seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.

(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money.

(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as
to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.

PARAYNO vs. JOVELLANOS 495 SCRA 85

G.R. No. 148408
July 14, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some
residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure
or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer,
Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon
their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of
location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline
station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.

According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary
School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as
witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June
1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed
to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents
of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially
during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she
filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec
44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was
valid since the gasoline station is a nuisance per se.

DECISION:

Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent

municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of
a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is
not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it
cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people
of Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being
hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station
Commander recommended “to build such buildings after conform all the requirements of PP
1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the heart of the
thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the
allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.

2007
ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO
BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y
CUYAHEN, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 150194
March 6, 2007

FACTS:

In 1988, Roberto Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He made a project proposal with the
Governor for a public market to be erected. The same was approved and it was funded by the
Cordillera Executive Board. The project bidding was subsequently won by Lopez Pugong. Pugong
began erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and Tinoc’s councilors enforced a resolution to
demolish the structure being built on the ground that the structure is not being erected in the
proper area as specified by Tayaban and that the structure is a public nuisance and by virtue of
police power to protect general welfare.
Tayaban and some councilors then went to the site and demolished the structure. Pugong sued
Tayaban et al for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft Act). Pugong also
averred that the resolution reviewing the said local public development project (market) that the
council passed in 1989 was not posted in a conspicuous place as required by Sections 56 and
59(a) of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No. 7160). Tayaban lost and he appealed contending that he
demolished the structure by virtue of PD 1096 (National Building Code) and LOI 19 (removal of
illegal structures).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tayaban’s demolition of the structure is a valid exercise of police power by a LGU
officer.

DECISION:

No. The SC is not impressed with Tayaban’s contention that the subject demolition is a valid
exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common
right. In the present case, the acts of Tayaban have been established as a violation of law,
particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand though, as held by the OSG, Sec 56 and 59 of the LGC of 1991 is not applicable
as said law was not yet passed in 1989 hence there was no need for Tayaban to post the ’89
resolution in a conspicuous place. Also, Tayaban’s defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 and
PD 1096 is a mere afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they are going to
demolish because of these two laws but rather only on the ground that the market being built is
in the wrong place. Further, Tayaban actually never specified as to where he intended the market
to be built.

2008
 2009

Telmo vs. Bustamante

592 SCRA 552

FACTS:

Respondent put up concrete poles on his lot which the Petitioner and his men destroyed. The
petitioner reasoned that if he allowed the enclosures erected by the respondent, other residents
would be denied ingress to and egress from their own properties, thus, the concrete posts erected
by respondent were a public nuisance under Article 694 (4) of the Civil Code, more particularly a
nuisance per se, which may be summarily abated under Article 699 (3) of the same Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the concretes poles erected by the respondent are nuisance per se.

DECISION:

The concretes poles erected by the respondent are NOT nuisance per se.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.1 Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which
would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to
pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the
national road.

2010

X. Donation

2005

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS vs. DEL ROSARIO

449 SCRA 299

FACTS:

On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario
and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario (respondents) filed before the trial court a complaint for
Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters
(Property) situated in Kaypombo,[4] Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in
the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register
of Deeds. Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS
was occupying a portion of the Property through respondents tolerance and that of their
predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused to vacate the premises
despite their valid demands to do so.
In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPSs occupation of a portion of the Property was with the
express consent and approval of respondents father, the late Isaias Del Rosario (Isaias). DECS
claimed that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion (Donated Site) of the Property to the
Municipality of Sta. Maria (Municipality) for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a
regional trial court judge (Judge Natividad), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance.
KPPS started occupying the Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary
educational needs of approximately 60 children between the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the
donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter Donated Site. In fact, DECS
renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

ISSUE:

Whether or not donation of real property should be in public instrument

DECISION:

The donation of real property must be made in a public instrument otherwise it is void.

ABELLO vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS

452 SCRA 162

FACTS:

During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the campaign
funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for the Senate. In letters dated April 21, 1988,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66 for their
contributions. On August 2, 1988, petitioners questioned the assessment through a letter to the
BIR. They claimed that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not liable for donors tax.
The claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner.[1]
On September 12, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA, which was decided
on October 7, 1991 in favor of the petitioners. As aforestated, the CTA ordered the Commissioner
to desist from collecting donors taxes from the petitioners

ISSUE:

What are the elements of donation?

DECISION:
Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi.

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES vs. ANTONIO
BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY
453 SCRA 162

FACTS:

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954)
square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the
name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among
the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
entitled Josefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al.[4] Milagros Donio, the second
wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into
a Compromise Agreement[5] which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets
with Assumption of Liabilities[8] in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don
Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of
Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)[9] dated 31 July
1973. This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment
transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. [10] On 14
April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.[14] On Lot
No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
Estate[15] dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio
and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was
already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros
Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate[16] dated 9 November 1983.

ISSUE:

Whether or not title to property passes to the donee by virtue of donation

DECISION:

Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof.

C-J YULO & SONS, INC. vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC.
454 SCRA 279

FACTS:

On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the acceptance of
the donee
On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. T-91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.

Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the
perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged
and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said
portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the
donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The
lease to Gomez ended in 1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this
time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it
entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the
electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named
as Casa dela Merced. As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the
prior written consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion
of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles.

ISSUE:

What are the classifications of donation?

DECISION:

Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous.

SANTOS V ALANA
467 SCRA 176

FACTS:

Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-blood siblings
both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot located at 1339-B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila. It was registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos, under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. He died intestate on March 10,
1986.During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner which the
latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation (Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari)
was annotated on Gregorios title.On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a
Deed of Absolute Sale. On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No.
14278 in Gregorios name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioners name. On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia
Santos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, a complaint for partition and
reconveyance against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied
having sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is
inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether the donation is inofficious.

DECISION:

Under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person
may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will.

Dolar vs Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo.

475 SCRA 458

FACTS:

Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land. On September 16, 1981,
petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay Lublub.Then barangay captain
Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub. Following the execution of the deed
of donation, Brgy. Lublub immediately took possession of the donated property, which soon
became the site of several government office buildings and recreational facilities. Sometime in
June 1989, petitioner executed another deed[5] donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented by its
incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to
the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the same conditions expressly
set forth in the first. Barangay Lublubs peaceful possession of the donated area remained
undisturbed until mother Lots No. 4181 and 4183 were included in the published list of tax
delinquent properties for disposition. At the auction sale that followed, petitioner emerged as the
highest bidder and was, accordingly, awarded the property.

On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner filed against Brgy.
Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the
4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in question
had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply with the conditions of the
donation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there be a automatic rescission on donated property

DECISION:
If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or
reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with
the condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to the donor. Where, however, the
donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award
of the court can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not.

2006

POTENCIANO RAMIREZ VS. MA. CECILIA RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 165088
March 17, 2006

FACTS:

A Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights were allegedly executed by petitioner and
his wife, Dolores Ramirez, in 1993 and 1995 respectively in favor of respondent Ma. Cecilia
Ramirez. However, the death certificate presented showed that Dolores died in 1991 and,
consequently, could not have executed the assailed documents. Later on, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for annulment of the Deed of Donation, Waiver of Possessory
Rights and the title issued under the name of respondent. Petitioner claimed that respondent
caused the execution of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to acquire
ownership over the land and improvements. As a result, the certificate of title was issued under
her name and the tax declarations were also transferred in her name.
In her Answer, respondent alleged that it was her father’s idea to cause the preparation of the
Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to save on expenses for publication and
inheritance taxes. After trial, the RTC declared both parties in pari delicto, as participants to the
forgery, and ruled that they must bear the consequences of their acts without cause of action
against each other in accordance with Article 1412 of the Civil Code. The RTC further held that
the signature of Dolores on the Deed of Donation was a forgery while her signature on the Waiver
of Possessory Rights was genuine. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Dolores’ signature
on the Deed of Donation as well as her alleged signature appearing in the Waiver of Possessory
Rights were forgeries and likewise held that both parties are in pari delicto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner and respondent are in pari delicto.

DECISION:

Yes. As one of the modes of acquiring ownership, donations are governed by Title 3, Book III,
of the Civil Code. Donations inter vivos are additionally governed by the general provisions on
obligations and contracts in all that is not determined by the title governing donations. Hence, the
rule on pari delicto under the general provisions of contracts is applicable to the present case.
The Supreme Court affirmed that both parties are in pari delicto since respondent did not deny
petitioner’s allegation that the signatures of the latter’s wife are a forgery.
But Article 1412 is not applicable as the lower courts ruled. It is because said article applies only
when the cause of the contracts unlawful or forbidden but does not constitute a violation of the
criminal laws. Instead, Article 1411applies.Under Article 1411, it must be shown that the nullity of
the contract proceeds from an illegal cause or object, and the act of executing said contract
constitutes a criminal offense. On the first element, petitioner claims that the illegality stems from
the act of forgery which pertains to consent and not to the object or cause. The Court, however,
held that petitioner wrongly asserts that the donated real properties are both the object and cause
of the donation. In fact, the donated properties pertain only to the object. The cause which moved
the parties to execute the Deed of Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights, the motive
behind the forgery, is the desire to evade the payment of publication expenses and inheritance
taxes, which became due upon the death of Dolores. Undeniably, the Deed of Donation and the
Waiver of Possessory Rights were executed for an illegal cause. The second requirement is also
present as the act of forging corresponds to the felony of falsification under Section 4, Title IV of
the Revised Penal Code. Hence, neither of the parties may expect positive relief from the courts
from their illegal acts and transactions.

REPUBLIC vs. CARRASCO

510 SCRA 150

FACTS:

Respondent Efren M. Carrasco filed an application for registration of title over a 17, 637, sq. m.
of land, he alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered; that said
land is alienable and disposable and not within any military or whatever kind of reservation.
Among the documents attached to the application were the individual plan and technical
description of the land. Respondent’s Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996, therein
stating that he took possession of the land in 1990 from his predecessors, Norberto Mingao, who
has occupied the land for the last 25 years; the latter’s Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991,
thereunder waiving his claim over the land in favor of respondent. Petitioner Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Waiver is considered as a donation.

DECISION:

The Deed of donation cannot even be considered a donation because it does not comply with the
formalities required in order for a donation of an immovable to be valid pursuant to Article 749 of
the Civil Code because respondent’s acceptance thereof is lacking.

2007

FELICIANO CATALAN vs. JESUS BASA

G. R. No. 159567
July 31, 2007
FACTS:

On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board
of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military
service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married
Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Felicianoallegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half
of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On
December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of
Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance
of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and
Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes
sold the property donated by Felicianoto her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On
April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio,
as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even
if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14,
1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case
because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption
that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of
Mercedes Catalan.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation

Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally
in possession of the latter

Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

DECISION:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied
the petition.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract,
renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose
his competence to intelligently dispose his property.

By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that
at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalanhad lost total control of his mental
facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and
this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was
valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence
has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted
with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The
Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the
court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation
was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

and DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR (Region V)
G.R. No. 139285
December 21, 2007

FACTS:

Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of
268.5668 hectares. A portion of the said land is planted with rice and corn, while the remaining
portion is planted with coconut trees.

Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office several petitions for exemption
of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) under P.D. No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied by the Regional
Director of DAR, Region V.

Archbishop appealed several times until it was raised to the CA. The CA dismissed his petition;
holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention as the subject properties are
registered in his name. Archbishop argues that while the lands in question are registered in his
name, he holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his followers. Archbishop further argued that
the deeds of donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed numerous fiduciary
obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber, or mortgage the
subject lands. By this reasoning, Archbishop concluded that he is not the “landowner”
contemplated by PD 27 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6657.

ISSUE(S):

WON the Archbishop is entitled to assert only one right of retention as the subject properties are
registered in his name

WON the ruling in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land
Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao City which, he cites, ruled that
properties held by the Church are held by it as a mere administrator for the benefit of the members
of that particular religion is applicable

DECISION:

NO. THERE IS ONLY ONE RIGHT OF RETENTION PER LANDOWNER, and NO MULTIPLE
RIGHTS OF RETENTION CAN BE HELD BY A SINGLE PARTY
The laws simply speak of the “landowner” without qualification as to under what title the land is
held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether
the landowner holds “naked title” only or can exercise all the rights of ownership.
Archbishop was found to be the registered owner of the lands in question, and does not contest
that fact. For the purposes of the law, this makes him the landowner, without the necessity of
going beyond the registered titles. He cannot demand a deeper examination of the registered
titles and demand further that the intent of the original owners be ascertained and followed. To
adopt his reasoning would create means of sidestepping the law, wherein the mere act of donation
places lands beyond the reach of agrarian reform.

There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA
6657 has a provision for a landowner to exercise more than one right of retention. The law is
simple and clear as to the retention limits per landowner.

Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a
mere administrator, but his position does not appear under the list of exemptions under RA
6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from
the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao,
Inc. does not create another definition for the term “landowner.”

Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as the lands are
clearly not exempt under the law. He should not fear that his followers are simply being deprived
of land, as under both PD 27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation, which he may
then use for the benefit of his followers. His situation is no different from other landowners affected
by agrarian reform––they are somewhat deprived of their rights but somehow it is for common
good.

2008

2009

2010