CASE STUDY 2

MAIDAN: EASTERN PROMISES AND A NATION’S GUIDE TO MOVING FORWARD

Elena Tkacheva
Peace and Conflict Studies: PACS 604: Conflict Analysis
Fall 2017
December 4th
 2

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 2
I. ESTABLISHING THE CAUSALITY: MAPPING THE SYSTEMIC CONFLICT .................... 4
II. ESCALATION: WHAT WAS REALLY HAPPENING IN THE CONFLICT .......................... 7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 10
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 13

INTRODUCTION

What is Maidan – a tragedy or a necessary first step to the nation’s great democratic

future? Assuming the latter, what does it take to trigger such large-scale systemic change and

why it did it happen in Ukraine out of so many other former USSR countries? While the

political, economic and ideological situation is similar in many of the former Soviet states,

Ukraine’s Maidan phenomenon is unique because of a sudden and a significant leap it

triggered in relation to Ukraine’s geopolitical landscape. By Maidan (also referred to as

Euromaidan and Maidan Nezalezhnosti) we are referring to the events of late 2013-2014

when a peaceful protest following Yanukovych’s opting out of signing a trade agreement

with EU in favor of an agreement with Russia escalated to a violent, long-lasting civil was

that has gained an international conflict dimension. The 2013 events were not the start of the

conflict, but the breaking of the dam holding twenty-two years of systemic issues and this

analysis will, therefore, concentrate on the factors that built up to the escalation as opposed to

what followed. The thesis of this paper is that Maidan is the outcome of a systemic issue,

namely the constantly shifting focus in Ukraine’s foreign policy, that caused an ideological

rift between the government and the general population, resulting in the latter’s belief that the

government’s foreign policy is not in their best interest.

To elaborate on this, the primary objective of this analysis is not to focus on the

general population as a mere recipient, i.e. sufferer of violence, but as an actor making an

effort to claim their human rights, democracy and achieve economic opportunities. This will
 3

be done to demonstrate that despite the immeasurable losses suffered by the Ukrainian

citizens, this conflict is the foundation of the effort to satisfy the population’s needs. This

choice of focus is also due to a larger trend that most analytical frameworks applied to the

conflict in Ukraine do not assign the actor status to general population and portray it as a

reactive, instead of proactive element in conflict.

This paper will explore this unique case through the framework of Redekop’s

structural analysis depicted in chapter nine of From Violence to Blessing: How an

Understanding of Deep-Rooted Conflicts Can Open Paths of Reconciliation (2002). It will

answer the questions as to how the national idea, economic system, and foreign policy shaped

the environment that led to the 2013 escalation and the principle actors’ subsequent reactions.

It will accomplish this through the analysis of these drivers of a systemic conflict focusing on

the general population and its needs, how they stimulate the escalation of this conflict and are

being satisfied in the attempts to achieve peace.

The analysis will comprise three sections. The first one will address the political

events that lead up to the 2013-2014 escalation to establish the causality relation and to show

that the conflict started much earlier than 2013, i.e. establish the systemic framework and

demonstrate how the conflict intervention by the external actors mirrors the systemic power

struggle that had been in place since 1991. Part two will closely examine the 2013 escalation

in attempt to answer the question of what really happened in the conflict, and why and how it

achieved such great intensity. The third section will provide a summary of the findings and

discuss how the intervention of the external actors demonstrates that the systemic nature of

the conflict was perceived as a key to its solution and became the driving factor in the

attempts to achieve peace. At the risk of sounding naïve, this analysis will attempt to prove

that the conflict in Ukraine is a conscious effort of the population to reshape their destiny as a

nation, to redefine their country’s status, and to achieve an independent democratic state with
 4

greater economic opportunities for its citizens. It will primarily rely on reputable media

resources to provide illustrations of the theoretical conflict analysis framework.

I. ESTABLISHING THE CAUSALITY: MAPPING THE SYSTEMIC CONFLICT

2013 marked twenty-two years since the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and twenty-two

years from the formation of the modern sovereign state of Ukraine. According to Yu-Shan

Wu, since 1991 Ukraine’s foreign policy in relation to Russia and the West had fluctuated

five times, with each new leader changing the focus from being separatist and nationalistic to

bonding with the eastern neighbour (2017, 212). People’s revolution is not a stranger to

Ukraine either. In 2004 the citizens protested the unjust elections of a pro-Russia candidate in

the events later entitled The Orange Revolution, which led to the restaging of the elections.

Many experts, Aurel and Yu-Shan Wu among them, interpret Ukrainian geopolitics

and the by-product of the continuous power struggle between two titans: Russia and the

West, primarily represented by EU (Wu 2017, 197) (Aurel 2014); and Russian and the USA,

reflected in the publications by Rand Corporation (2015) and Daugirdas and Mortenson

(2014). They do not see the general population as the primary actor or the catalyst of the

conflict. For them it is more of a sufferer trapped between the more powerful actors. This

view is very logical, the illustration of how it works would be the sanctions against Russia.

The conflict in Ukraine presented an opportunity for the western agents to exercise power

through imposing sanctions and therefore causing an economic turmoil.

However, this paper argues that it is exactly the combination of the two – the

constantly changing message the Ukrainian leaders are sending in relation to the stance

between Ukraine and Russia, and the success of the Orange Revolution – that have been

shaping the conflict since 2013. This section will perform what UNDG refers to as a “Causal

Analysis of Conflict Factors” (2016, 5), providing the overview of the structural factors that

led to the Maidan escalation of the conflict using the structural framework for the analysis of
 5

this conflict. It will justify why the structural framework is applicable, identify the main

actors and analyse the structural conflict factors applicable to the conflict in question.

Firstly, one has to specify what that term structural conflict means and what factors

need to be considered in this type of analysis. According to the UNDG-ECHA Framework

for Conflict Analysis, structural analysis is approaching the conflict through examining

“pervasive and long-standing factors and differences” (2004, 5). Those are usually

accompanied by “proximate conflict factors” i.e. triggers that contribute to the escalation and

are related to the deeper issues and will be discussed in the subsequent section of this analysis

(2004, 5). The purpose of applying structural analysis framework is to address the root causes

of the conflict in order to establish sustainable solutions that ensure that the conflict will not

later digress into further cycles of violence (UNDG-ECHA 2004, 4). Lastly, the structural

analysis is sometimes referred to as systemic, and while some identify subtle differences

between the two, this paper will use the terms interchangeably.

In relation to Ukraine, we can observe several manifestations, i.e. factors of

structural conflict: illegitimate government, lack of economic opportunities, and access to

natural resources. Ukraine has been experiencing political turmoil ever since it gained

independence. Despite big promises, neither one of the presidents succeeded in fighting

corruption, Kravchuk resigned, Kuchma was discovered to have been governing in criminal

ways when his former employee released transcripts of the president’s communication

(Karatnycky 2005, 39). What followed were the elections that were deemed illegitimate, a

suspected poisoning of one of the candidates and the Orange revolution that resulted in a re-

election. What is interesting is that the candidate who was deemed illegitimate in 2004

(Yanukovych) was eventually elected 2010 after Yushchenko served just one term.

Subsequently, Yanukovych’s presidency was terminated during the 2013-2014 revolution.

 6

Overall, one can observe several tendencies in the country’s governance: broken promises,

criminal inclinations, and a government whose legitimacy and motivations are questionable.

The second big problem is a long-standing history of inadequate economic

opportunities. According to the article at The Economist, economic turmoil in Ukraine has

been long-standing and there is a clear dependency on the state of economic affairs in

Russia, as demonstrated by the hrivna fluctuations responding to the ruble crisis in 1998

(2014). -Overall, there can be outlined four periods in Ukrainian economy post 1991, and

only one of them (2000-2006) can be characterized as a period of relative stability and

economic growth. Moreover, Russia has long been known for manipulating Ukraine with the

promises of lower gas prices, which has significantly impacted Ukrainian foreign policy.

What is crucial to the current argument is that prior to the 2013-2014 revolution Ukraine

under Yanukovych was in process of negotiating a trade agreement that could potentially

radically change the economic dynamics and break the dependency on Russian economy.

While multi-faceted and spreading onto many spheres, both legal and economic, the EU-

Ukraine Association Agreement would allow Ukraine to enter the EU free trade zone with

possible implications of visa-free travel (Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, 2017)

and imply a gradual movement to the Europeanization of the state. Therefore, the agreement

was seen as a bringing a prospect of significant systemic change in terms of Ukrainian

market, and visa-free travel would also bring a change of status to the Ukrainian citizens and

set them apart from the majority of former-USSR countries.

Another aspect that contributes to understanding Maidan as a systemic issue is the

analysis of the key actors, which has been well-researched due to the fact that the conflict is

often seen as the by-product of a power struggle between Russia and the West mentioned

earlier. While many scholars address the question as to what multiple parties have something

at stake in the conflict, for the purpose of this analysis we will concentrate on these two
 7

primary actors: Russia and the West. According to the Bloomberg article by Peter Coy, Carol

Matlack, and Henry Meyer, Ukraine is strategic asset in terms of its geography, gas pipelines,

and agriculture. However, who the Ukraine will ally with will be determined by the aid it will

choose to accept, since it is a process of careful balances of its monetary needs and the donor

agenda (2014). It is clear that the conflict revealed two main actors who have the most

interest in the Ukrainian situation: EU and Russia. Ukraine has other alliances, both political

and economic with individual European and non-European countries; however, the reactions

of the EU and Russia identify them as the main actors who will be directly profiting from the

conflict. This is evident from the Russian invasion and the annexation of Crimea and the EU

pushing sanctions against Russia. However, since the focus of this analysis is the nation of

the Ukraine, it is important to consider what benefits each of these unions would imply for

common Ukrainians and which one they are more likely to lean towards. In order to achieve

that, we will switch to the analysis of the escalation of the conflict in late 2013.

II. ESCALATION: WHAT WAS REALLY HAPPENING IN THE CONFLICT

If one looks at other more newly-EU states with a struggling economy, they will

notice a trend of labor migration to wealthier western European countries. Already prior to

the conflict there are large Ukrainian populations in the neighboring Czech Republic, Poland

and Slovakia who are working illegally on tourist and Polish work visas, which is evident

from the frequent news reports from local media about the arrests of illegal work migrants,

mentioning Ukrainians among most frequent nationalities of the offenders, e.g. as reported

by one of the biggest news portals Novinky.cz, the official website of Czech police

policie.cz, and the Vysočina region police online weekly newspaper tydenikpolicie.cz,

eurofound.europa.eu. Therefore, a lax visa regime would make it easier for those seeking

work abroad.
 8

Secondly, given the history of economic relations with Russia and the constantly

changing ideological message, being closer to Europe would signify bigger opportunities,

becoming a part of the so-called civilized, lawful existence. And just when the goal was

within reach, Yanukovych abruptly denied the citizens these opportunities without a prior

propagation of why the union with Russia serves the needs of general population. Hence

while section I of this analysis has identified the key actors, this section addresses the catalyst

of the conflict – Yanukovych’s sudden change of mind cancelling the negotiations about

strengthening Ukraine’s relationship with EU and leaping towards Russia. The sudden

element is key to the formation of the initial protest movement, and it was further fueled into

extreme escalation by the proximate conflict factors defined in section one – the ethic factor,

human rights abuses, violent police and their breaching IHL.

Let us begin with the discussion of the ethnic factor in the Ukrainian conflict. Having

talked about the economic-political dependency on Russia, the ethic conflict between

Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians becomes self-evident. There is a clear East

versus West geographical division between the speakers of the two languages, which has

been taken advantage of by the Russian military during their invasion and the annexation of

Crimea. In general Russia allegedly positions itself as the protector of the ethnic Russians in

former-USSR countries, for instance the IntelliNews observer Naubet Bisenov speaks of the

authorities in Kazakhstan (where the ethnic-Russian population is the biggest minority)

placing a taboo on the discussion of ethnic conflicts and using measures such as limiting

internet access in case of such conflicts in order to avoid Russia’s intervention “under the

pretext of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers” (2015).

This and the multitude of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian language campaigns, e.g.

the 2012 pro-Russian billboard campaign “Do we really need the Russian language?”

(Novosti-N, 2012) arguing that Russian should be officially used in the regions where the
 9

majority of the population speaks it as their first language, and the fact that Ukrainian is the

only language with the official status, prove that linguistic identity is political identity. This

has been articulated by the Ukrainian journalist Ostap Drozdov in his viral Facebook post

appealing to the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine; he is asking his compatriots to

start using Ukrainian because the Russian-speaking population makes Ukraine a part of the

Russian world (2017). To sum up, the ongoing unease in the linguistic department is

symptomatic of the larger systemic issue of Russia’s economic manipulations of Ukraine. It

weakens the independence and unique national identity of the country by having it remain a

part of the Russian world. This narrative of false independence and national identity gave

shape to the escalation as a strife for claiming their independence for real (from the

interviews of the protestors filmed as a part of the "Winter on Fire: Ukraine's Fight for

Freedom" documentary).

This was the idea behind the protest that survived and pertained through the

subsequent escalation. Yet it was not the initial response of the population that was

extraordinary – the student population was merely repeating the once successful practice of

the Orange Revolution – a peaceful protest. It was the violent measure taken by the police to

cease the protest that brought about extraordinary consequences that brought the conflict to a

different level. During the October 24th, 2017 session of the PACS 604 seminar, we have

discussed the potential of spontaneous violence to change the conflict dynamics by getting

attention and being taken seriously as well as mobilizing people.

Judging from the footage of the protest depicted in “Winter on Fire”, the police’s

violent reaction was unprovoked by the protestors. The reports by The Guardian (Traynor

2014) and BBC News (Gatehourse 2015) confirm the extreme level of violence, human rights

abuses, use of humiliation, attacking medical personnel, alleged kidnappings

 10

Molotov cocktails, and the general atmosphere of mistrust towards the authorities, including

politicians like Klichko, members of the opposition who attempted to lead the negotiations

with the Yanukovych’s government during the first week of the protest. This violent response

strengthened the sentiment that the government’s choice of Russia over EU was not made

with the benefit of the common citizens in mind and the latter used this escalation as an

opportunity to build their own narrative of Ukraine as a nation. The protesters responded by

building barricades, therefore assuming the defender position in this conflict escalation, while

the first deaths of protesters at the hands of riot police created a point of no return, which

would imply that the violence will continue until the structural root causes of the conflict are

addressed.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, this analysis has traced multiple systemic factors that contributed to the

building up of the political situation that is conducive to people’s protest that can last long

enough for the steps to be made towards systemic change. Firstly, the previous experience of

a successful people’s revolution in 2004 sets the precedent that protesting can bring about

systemic change. What is different in the 2013 scenario is the extreme riot police violence,

but not only that. The second systemic issue is the history of unreliable leadership of the

country whose legibility is questionable (viz., the 2004 elections). While the media and the

government together can provide a smooth ground for a change in foreign policy, the 2013

leap was too abrupt. The government did not prepare the population for their last-minute

mind-change as to why the cancelled the long-awaited and potentially highly beneficial trade

agreement with EU. What decreased people’s trust in the leader who once lost elections due

to their illegitimacy is the fact that instead of responding to the situation, Yanukovych fled.

What adds to this is the evidence of the economic ties with Russia being the major force

influencing, at times controlling, Ukrainian economy. The agreement signified the

 11

permanent shift in this recurring pattern of gas prices manipulations. What is especially

interesting is how the involvement of the external actors after the escalation demonstrates

that the systemic nature of the conflict. It mirrors Ukraine’s constant fluctuation from one

ally to another, demonstrated in the power struggle, sanctions, rewards, annexation and

Russia’s military intervention. Each of the external actors is pulling strings to direct the

people’s revolution by withdrawing benefits, e.g. Russia putting a significant amount of aid

on hold (Bloomberg 2014), and EU compensating for the lack of aid provided and harsh

trade agreement conditions by offering visa-free travel in 2017. The proximal factors that are

symptomatic of the structural problems, such as the language-identity divide are used on

both sides of the barricades – in the annexation of Crimea and Ostap Drozdov’s appeal to

stop the national narrative of being a part of the Russian world. What it looks like is that the

alliance with EU will cause a gradual movement towards systemic change, since the trade

agreement implies many pre-conditions for Ukraine. Therefore, it would target the systemic

issues, which is the articulated goal of the people’s revolution. Moreover, the other proximal

factor, namely the lack of regard for human rights demonstrated by the riot police,

contributes to the population’s faith in the cause, since EU is traditionally considered as the

defender of those.

While the Bloomberg article points out that the war has exhausted Ukraine

financially (2014), the recent visa-related concessions by the EU foreshadow the direction

towards which the conflict will further develop. To sum up, the importance of this analysis

being guided by the structural framework and focusing on the Ukrainian population is that

identifying the people as the driving force of the conflict’s escalation implies that the

transition towards sustainable peace has to be achieved through the satisfaction of the

population’s needs. From the point of view of the population, he conflict was not

reactionary, but strategic, and their demands addressed the long-awaited systemic change
 12

under the emotional aegis of forming a new national narrative of true independence that is

no longer a simulation of the USSR power structure.

 13

Bibliography

Besemeres, John. "Peace in Our Time." In A Difficult Neighbourhood: Essays on Russia and
East-Central Europe since World War II, 421-36. Australia: ANU Press, 2016.

Bisenov, Naubet . "Ethnic clashes dent Kazakhstan's utopian image." Bne IntelliNews.
February 13, 2015. Accessed December 02, 2017. http://www.intellinews.com/ethnic-
clashes-dent-kazakhstan-s-utopian-image-
500444153/?source=kazakhstan&archive=bne.

Braun, Aurel. "TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW: Putin's Delusional Quest for Empire."
World Affairs 177, no. 2 (2014): 34-42. Accessed Nov 3, 2017.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43556200.

Coy, Peter, Carol Matlack, and Henry Meyer. "The New Great Game: Why Ukraine Matters
to So Many Other Nations." Bloomberg.com. February 28, 2014. Accessed December
02, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-27/the-new-great-
game-why-ukraine-matters-to-so-many-other-nations.

EurWORK European Observatory of Working Life. "Employment and working conditions

of migrant workers - Czech Republic.” Eurofound. Accessed December 03, 2017.
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-
information/national-contributions/czech-republic/employment-and-working-
conditions-of-migrant-workers-czech-republic.

Gatehouse, Gabriel. "The untold story of the Maidan massacre." BBC News. February 12,
2015. Accessed December 03, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31359021.

Karatnycky, Adrian. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 35-52.
doi:10.2307/20034274.

Kristina Daugirdas, and Julian Davis Mortenson. "CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE

UNITED STATES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW." The American
Journal of International Law 108, no. 4 (2014): 783-842. Accessed Nov 3, 2017.
doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.108.4.0783

"Mission of Ukraine to the European Union." EU-Ukraine Association Agreement – the

complete texts - Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. Accessed December 02,
2017. http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/page/open/id/2900.

Kalinichenko, Irina. "Bordy agitirujyt za russkij jazyk" Novosti-N. June 26, 2012. Accessed
December 02, 2017. https://novosti-n.org/ukraine_articles/read/3865.html.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson, and John Gordon. "The Geopolitical Roots and
Dynamics of the Ukrainian Crisis." In The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security:
Implications for the United States and U.S. Army, 3-16. RAND Corporation, 2015.
Accessed Nov 3, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2.8.
 14

Ostap Drozdov. Facebook. July 25 2017.

https://www.facebook.com/ostap.drozdov/posts/1371946136234608.

"Policisté na Vysočině kontrolovali zaměstnávání cizinců." Týdeník Policie. July 06, 2017.
Accessed December 03, 2017. http://tydenikpolicie.cz/policiste-na-vysocine-
kontrolovali-zamestnavani-cizincu/.

"Policie České republiky ." Policisté kontrolovali nelegální zaměstnávání a pobyt cizinců -
Policie České republiky. Mar 17, 2017. Accessed December 03, 2017.
http://www.policie.cz/clanek/policiste-kontrolovali-nelegalni-zamestnavani-a-pobyt-
cizincu-786034.aspx.

"Polští dohazovači vozí do Česka ilegálně cizí dělníky." Novinky.cz. July 13, 2016. Accessed
December 03, 2017. https://www.novinky.cz/ekonomika/405982-polsti-dohazovaci-vozi-do-
ceska- ilegalne-cizi-delniky.html.

Redekop, Vern Neufeld. From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep-Rooted

Conflicts Can Open Paths of Reconciliation. Toronto: Novalis, 2002.

Traynor, Ian, and Shaun Walker. "Ukraine violence: dozens killed as protesters clash with
armed police." The Guardian. February 20, 2014. Accessed December 03, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/ukraine-protesters-force-riot-police-
independence-square-kiev-battle-control.

UNDG. United Nations. Conflict Analysis Practice Note. 13 May 2016. https://undg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/Conflict-Analysis-Practice-Note-13-May-2016-Version.pdf

UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition, “UN Common Interagency Framework for

Conflict Analysis” (November, 2004).

“Why is Ukraine's economy in such a mess?” The Economist. March 05, 2014. Accessed
December 02, 2017.
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/ukraine-and-russia.

Winter on Fire: Ukraine's Fight for Freedom. Directed by Evgeny Afineevsky. Produced by
Den Tolmor and Evgeny Afineevsky. Netflix.com. October 9, 2015. Accessed
November 15, 2017.

Wu, Yu-Shan. "Pivot, Hedger, or Partner: Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between
Hegemons." In Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, edited by Dittmer Lowell, 197-
220. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.14.