BUKLOD NG SAULOG TRANSIT v.

MARCIANO CASALLA
G.R. No. L-8049 May 9, 1956

FACTS

Respondents filed a petition for a certification election for the purpose of

determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the Saulog
Inc. President of Buklod filed its answer stating that there is a CBA between
the company and them. Court rendered judgment directing a certification
election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the Saulog Transit
Inc. It was found that the CBA does not touch in substantial terms the rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment of all the
employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure

ISSUE

Whether or not a CBA that is incomplete will constitute a bar to

certification election.

HELD

No. The agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election
and even if there is a supplementary agreement, it having been entered into
after filing of the petition for a certification election, the same cannot and does
not bar a certification election. The contention that as section 13, Republic Act
No. 875, does not require that the agreement be in writing unless either party
request that it be reduced to writing, thereby insinuating that there had been a
verbal understanding before the written agreement was entered into, has no
bearing and effect in a case where there is a written agreement which the Court
of Industrial Relations found incomplete.
ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS-ATU (ATU-KILUSAN) v. HON. CARMELO C.
NORIEL IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET. AL

G.R. No. L-48367 January 16, 1979

FACTS

On September 13, 1977, the local chapter of the Federation of Free

Workers (Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation Chapter) filed a
petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of
the Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation. The petition alleged,
among others, that it commands the great majority of the rank-and-file
employees of the bargaining unit, and that more than 30 % of the total work
force supported its petition, attaching the signatures of said union members.
The petition admitted the existence of another union in the establishment, the
Associated Trade Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) and the existence of a CBA to expire
on October 31, 1977.

It was further alleged that there has been no certification election in the
company for the last twelve months preceding the filing of the petition. Both
the Company and the Associated Trade Unions opposed the petition on the
ground that it is contract-barred by virtue of the existence of a duly registered
CBA with the BLR entered into between the parties on May 10, 1977.

Petitioning union, on the other hand, assailed the validity of the said
CBA on the ground that the same had been executed five (5) months and
twenty-one (21) days prior to the expiration of the old CBA which was supposed
to expired October 31, 1977 and was not ratified by the members of the
bargaining unit. On January 9, 1977, the Med-Arbiter assigned to the case
issued an Order calling for a certification election.

From the aforesaid Order of the Med-Arbiter, the Associated Trade

Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. In a
resolution dated May 29, 1978, BLR Director Carmelo C. Noriel affirmed the
Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for an election, at the same time setting aside
its certification of the CBA concluded between the Synthetic Marketing and
Industrial Corporation and the Associated Trade Unions. Not satisfied with the
Trade Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) filed the instant petition for last-mentioned
resolution of the BLR Director, the Associated review with prayer for
preliminary injunction.

Petitioner brings the matter to the Supreme Court averring that there
was a denial of procedural due process when respondent Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the actuation of a Med-Arbiter ordering a
certification election. 1 Its labored effort, as will be shown, was none too
successful. It did try to impress on this Court that the Med-Arbiter was quite
arbitrary in granting respondent Union's plea for a certification election alleging
that there was neither "prior inquiry nor investigation of whatever kind.

ISSUE

Whether or not the renewed CB forged between the respondent company

and petitioner union constitutes a bar to the holding of a certification election

HELD

No. Record shows that the old CBA of petitioner ATU-KILUSAN with
respondent Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation was to expire on
October 31, 1977. However, 5 months and 21 days before its expiry date, or on
May 10, 1977, ATU-KILUSAN renewed the same with the consent and
collaboration of management. The renewed CBA was then submitted to the
Bureau of Labor Relations for certification on July 8, 1977, or approximately 3
months prior to the expiration of the outgoing CBA. In the meantime, on
September 13, 1977 (48 days before the expiration of the old CBA on October
31, 1977), a petition for certification election was filed by respondent union, the
Federation of Free Workers. Meanwhile, the renewed CBA between petitioner
ATU-KILUSAN and respondent company was certified on October 3, 1977 or
twenty-eight days before their old CBA was to expire. From the foregoing facts,
it is quite obvious that the renewed CBA cannot substitute a bar to the instant
petition for certification election. In the first place, the said CBA was certified
after the instant petition for certification had been filed by herein respondent
union, and its certification was conditioned upon the fact that there was no
pending petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

In the second place, the new CBA which was to expire on October 31,
1977. Hence, said new CBA was not yet in existence when the instant petition
for certification election was filed on September 13, 1977. Said new CBA was to
become effective on November 1, 1977 after the old CBA expires on October 31,
1977, and this, if no representation issue had arisen in the meantime, which is
not the case. Clearly, therefore, the contract-bar rule does not apply to the case
at bar. Finally it is indubitably clear from the facts heretofore unfolded that
management and petitioner herein proceeded with such indecent haste in
renewing their CBA way ahead of the 'sixty-day freedom period' in their obvious
desire to frustrate the will of the rank-and-file employees in selecting their
collective bargaining representative. To countenance the actuation of the
company and the petitioner herein would be violative of the employees'
constitutional right to self-organization.

GOP-CCP WORKERS UNION, ET. AL. v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS, ET. AL.

G.R. No. L-33015 September 10, 1979

FACTS

On April 20, 1964 the union and the two above-named corporations,
with plants in the same compound located at 62 Old Samson Road, Balintawak
Quezon City and alleged to be owned by one family, entered into collective
bargaining agreements which would be effective for three years. By means of a
supplementary agreement, the three-year term was extended to July 31, 1968.

On October 26, 1967, two CIR prosecutors filed in behalf of the union
and three dismissed employees a complainant for unfair labor practice against
the two firms and their three officers. It was alleged in the complaint that the
two firms failed to comply with their commitment to readjust the pay scales of
the union members and that the three employees were dismissed because of
their union membership and activities.

On the following day, October 27, the union, without any notice, staged a
strike and established picket lines at the plants of the two firms so as to
implement their protest against the unfair labor practices.

The CIR concluded that the strike was illegal, that it was in violation of
the collective bargaining agreements and that the union did not bargain in
good faith with the employers.
ISSUE

Whether or not in the absence of any restraining order issued by a

competent court, filing of MR with the CIR, suspends scheduled certification
election

HELD

No. No injustice was perpetrated against the appellant when the

certification election was held notwithstanding the pendency of its motions for
reconsideration and for the suspension of the election. The CIR rightly sensed
that those eleventh-hour maneuvers did not conduce to industrial peace and,
instead, fomented uncertainty on the matter of representation of the workers.
The prior collective bargaining agreement expired on July 31, 1968. Appellant
union, as the former collective bargaining agent, had lost the support of the
majority of the workers. The CIR held that appellant's motions were dilatory. It
should be recalled that, originally, appellant union had agreed to the holding of
the certification election. Foreseeing its defeat in the election, it resorted to the
expedient of asking for the suspension of the certification election.

Also, considering that the appellant union did not take part in the
election and that at present it has no member working for the company, it had
ceased to have any interest in the issues raised by it, that is, whether the CIR
erred in holding that the workers paid on a monthly basis should be allowed to
vote and that the votes of the strikers and the scabs should be segregated.
There is no point in resolving those issues at the behest of a union that has no
member working for the company.

FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES’ UNION (FEU) v.

HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA, AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF LABOR RELATIONS, ET. AL.

FACTS

On June 21, 1973, the National Labor Relations Commission certified a

three-year collective bargaining agreement between respondents Associated
Labor Union (ALU) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Company of the Philippines.
Said collective bargaining agreement was to be effective from February 1, 1973
to January 31, 1976.

On January 28, 1976, Registration Permit No. 8571-IP was issued to

petitioner FEU. On February 10, 1976, ten (10) days after the original expiry
date of the collective bargaining agreement, petitioner FEU filed a petition with
the Bureau of Labor Relations for direct certification or certification election, 1
with the written consent of 308 employees, or 77% of the 400-man bargaining
unit.

On February 20, 1976, respondent ALU filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a petition for the cancellation of the registration certificate of
petitioner FEU, 2 alleging that at the time of FEU's registration, respondent
ALU was the recognized and certified collective bargaining agent in the unit,
and that FEU had not submitted the required sworn statement that there is no
recognized or certified collective bargaining agent therein.

On February 23, 1976, respondent ALU prayed for the dismissal of R04-
MED-143-76 on the grounds, among others, that it has a pending petition for
the cancellation of FEU's registration certificate and that there is an existing
collective bargaining agreement, due to expire on January 31, 1977, which
constitutes a valid bar to the holding of a certification election.

Respondent Company likewise opposed the holding of a certification

election on the ground, however, that the petition therefor was filed late,
considering that it was filed ten (10) days after the expiry date of the collective
bargaining agreement.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was an existing collective bargaining agreement

which serves as a bar to the holding of a certification election

HELD

No. The Court upheld the view of the Bureau stating that
“notwithstanding the existence of a certified or recognized collective bargaining
agent, the policy of this Office sanctions a registration of new union during the
freedom period especially if it has become apparent that a substantial number
of union members has decided, to form a new labor organization, as aptly
illustrated in the case at bar. If the rule were otherwise, no recourse
whatsoever hall be accorded to members of a bargaining unit who would like to
make a free choice of their bargaining representative, thereby placing the
constitutional rights of the workers to self-organization and collective
bargaining in mockery, if not, in utter illusion.”

In the case at bar, it is doubtful if any contract that may have been
entered into between respondent ALU and respondent Company will foster
stability in the bargaining unit, in view of the fact that a substantial number of
the employees therein have resigned from ALU and joined petitioner FEU. At
any rate, this is a matter that must be finally determined by means of a
certification election.

It appearing that the extension of the life of the collective bargaining

agreement for a period of one year was not certified by the Bureau of Labor
Relations, it cannot, therefore, also bar the certification election. Only a
certified collective bargaining agreement would serve as a bar to such election.

Corollarily, therefore, petitioner's application for registration was not

premature, as it need not have waited for the expiration of the one-year
extension, the agreement having expired on January 31, 1976.