oie e HISTORY READER - J f/f i th , f c i] f , | / | |) i j ! j / ~— ~~The Postmodern History Reader “This is an authoritative selection of texts representing fairly all the principal positions in the current debate about the status of historical knowledge after modernism”. Keith Jenkins’ superb introduction adroitly sorts out the issues and points the way to further profitable discussion for the near future. The collection amply illustrates that the “discourse of history” has entered a new era.’ Hayden White, University of California, Santa Cnet ‘With clarity of purpose'and a discerning eye for the apt text, Keith Jenkins has puilled: together majar postmademism themes for advertunnus his torians,’ Joyce Appleby. Liniversty of Californie, Los Angeles The Postmodern History Render is the most comprehensive collection of influ ential tests on historiography and postmedernism yet compiled. Keith, Jenkins expertly selects from the books and journal articles across the whole Nistoriographical range that have boen key ta the transforming debates. This unique seader is a clear intioduetion to the impact of postmodemism ‘on historical debate, allowing easy access to one of the more stimulating, land exciting, areas of current history It provides: * extracts from influential historians, such as Barthes, Joyee, White, Foucault and Boudsillard + individual introsuctions to each carefully defined debate + advice of further reading, ‘many thoroughly up-to-date a5 well as ‘classic’ pieces * texts from. a range of subdisciplines- in history and theory * arguments both for and against postmodernism * access to key writings which are not normally readily available Presented in a format that is bath easy to use and challenging, The Post- ‘modern History Reader will serve as an invaluable course text and. reference tool for students and postgraduatesCopyrighted materialThe Postmodern History Reader Edited by KEITH JENKINS AQ London and New YorkFirst pubtohed 1997 by Raqutlege + bars Seu ikon Park, Abingdon, Oxon, ORS 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routed 20 Madisan Ave, New York NY 10016 Reprinted 1998 Transferred to Digital Printing 2006 © 1997 Introduced and edited by Keith Jenkins Typeset in Palatino and Helvetica by Intype Londom Limite Al rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utlioed in any form. or by any elector mechanical, or ether means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recerding, er in any information storage or retrieval fystem, without permission in writing from the publishers. Beh Lrg Caalesing abit Dts A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library af Congress Cataloguing in Pubication Duta ‘A catalogue record for this book as been requested ISBN O-115-19901 0-81-1390 (pbkFor Maureen, Philip and PatzickCopyrighted materialContents Acioneledgemnents xi ‘Likeith Jenkins Introduction: an being open about our closures 1 PART |_OW HISTORY IN THE LIPPER CASE: SOR AND AGAINST POSTMODERN HISTORIES 2 Jean-Francois Lyotard "The postmodern condition 36 3 Jean Baudrillard ‘The illusion of the oni 30 4 Elizabeth Ermarth quel to histor fd 5 Diane Elam ‘Ramuneing the postmodern 65 inne 6 Robert Young White mythologies: writing History and the Wes! EA ‘Lisin Chambers ‘Migrancy, culture, identi 7 fi Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Literary criticism und the politics of the New Historicism 54 9 Christopher Norris Postmadernizing history: right-wing revisionism and’ the uses ofthroryconrenre 10 Bryan Palmer ‘Critical theory, historical materialism, and the ostensible eid of Mariani: the of theory revisited 103 PART II_ON HISTORY IN THE LOWER CASE: FOR AND AGAINST THE COLLAPSE OF THE LOWER CASE The discourse af history 7 uae ta hrc mci we sitll clic to (normal) historical practice 139 Telling it as you like it: postmodernist history and the flight nt ict 158 16 Geotfrey Elton ‘Return fi al 17 Gabrielle Spiegel ‘History, historicism, and the social logic uf the text int the Midale 180 PART III NUANCED O8 AMBIGUOUS OTHERS 18 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob Telling the truths about history 208 19 Tony Bennett Outside literature “Texts im history 226 20 Susan Stanford Friedman ‘Making history: reflections an feminism, narrative, ant desire BIcontents PART IV_DEBATES FROM THE JOURNALS Exteacts fam Past and Present 239 21 Lawrence Stone History and postmodernist 2a2 22 Patrick Joyce History and postmoderaism 24 23 Catrlona Kelly “History and postmodernism 20 24 Lawrence Stone “History and postmodernism 255 25 Gabrielle Spiege! History ard pontmoderniso 260 Extracts from History and Theocy za 20.£ R. Ankeramit Historiography anu pastmodernisra a 27 P. Zagorin Historiography and postmosernim. reconsicderations 208 Extracts from Social History 313 28 Neville Kirk History, language, ideas and postencdermismi: w materialist view © 315 29 Patrick Joyce The od of sociat history? uu 30 Geoffrey Eley and Keith Nieid Starting over: the present, the postonoderm and the moment of sacl story 386 Patrick Joyce The end of social history? A brie to Eley and Nietd 380 Extracts from Hi: and Theory ad Sau! Friedlander (ed.) Probin, the Limits of Representation: The Holocavst Debate 38 32 Saul Friedlander Probing the limits of representation 38733 Hayden White ‘Historical emplotment and the problem of truth a 34 Hans Kellner “Newer again” is naw 25 Wult Kanstainer ‘Frew exception la exemplum: the new approaches ta Naziste Ef | ‘The Holocaust and problems esentation 418 ‘37 Berel Lang 4s it possible to misrepresent the Holocmust? le ib iogea Inde of names |Acknowledgements ‘The author and publishers would like to thank the following whe have Kindly given permission for the use of copyright material; every effort hhas been made to contact copyright holders; any queries should be addressed to Routledge, London. J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (1984); reprinted by permission of Manchester University Press. J. Baudrillard, The ltusion of the End (1992); reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers and Stanford University Press. E. D. Eemarth, Sequel to History (1992; reprinted by permission of the author and Princeton University Press. D. Elam, Romcing the Postmodern (1992) and Feminism and Deconstruction (1994); reprinted by permission of Routledge. R. Young, White Mythologies (1990); reprinted by permission of Routledge. 1. Chambers, Migrancy, ‘Culture, kdentity (19945; reprinted by permission of Routledge/Comedia. E. Fox-Genovese, “Literary Criticism and the Politics of the New His- vorieism’, in H. A. Veeser (ed.) The New Historicfem (1989); reprinted by ‘permission of Routledge. C. Norris, *Postmodemising History: Right Wing Revisionism and the Uses of Theory” (1988), reprinted by per+ mission of the author and Southern Review. B. Palmer, "Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, and the Ostensible End of Mandsm”, in the Inlernational Review of Social History (1993) 38; reprinted by permission of the author, the International Institut soor Saciale Geschiedenis, andl Cam- ‘bridge University Press. R. Barthes, The Discourse of History (1967): reprinted. by permission of Cambridge University Press. M. Foucault “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in, Language, Counter-Mernry, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews with an Introduction by Donald F. Bou- chard, Copyright © 1977 Cornell University Press; reprinted by permission of Comell University Press. H. Kellner, Language and His: forical Representation (1989); reprinted by permission of the UniversityAckwownepa: of Wisconsin Press. R. Berkhofer, “The Challenge of Pooties to (Normal) Historical Practice”, reprinted by permission of Poetics Today, © 1988, Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, Tel Aviv University. G, Him- melfarb, “Telling It As You Like It” (Oct 16, 1992) reprinted by permission of the author and The Times Literary Supplement, G. Elton, Return ta Essentials (1991); reprinted by permission of The Roysl His- torical Society and Cambridge University Press. G. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages” (1990) reprinted by permission of the author and Speculum. |. Appleby, L. Hunt and M. Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (1995) reprinted by permission of W, W. Norton, Inc, T, Bennett, Outside Literature (1980); reprinted by permission of the author and Routledge. T. Bennett, “Texts in History”, in D. Attridge et al. (eds) Poststructuralism and the Question of History (1987); reprinted by permission of the author and Cambridge University Press, 8S, Friedman, "Making History: Feminism, Narrative and Desire”, in D. Elam and R. Wegman (eds) Feminism Besiie itself (1995): reprinted by permission of Routledge. ‘The contributions by L. Stone, P. Joyce, C. Kelly and G. Spiegel from the journal Past and Present: A Journal of Historica Studies (131, 1991 and 135, 1992 (Stone); 133, 1991 Goyee and Kelly) 135, 1992 Spiegel); reprinted by permission of the authors and Past and Present, © The Past and Present Society. The contributions by FR. Ankersmit and P. Zagorin from History and Theory: reprinted by permission of the authors, History avid Theory and Wesleyan University © Wesleyan University “The contributions by N. Kirk, P. Joyee, G. Bley and K. Nield from Social History (19, 2, 1984; 20, 1, 1995; 20, 3, 1995 and 21, 1, 1996 respectively); are reprinted by permission of Routledge. S. Friedlander, Probing: the Limits of Representation (1992); reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., Copyright © by the Presi dent and Fellows of Harvard College. H. White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth”, in S, Friedlander (ed.) Probing the Limits of Representation (1992); reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press © by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. ‘The contributions by H. Kellner, W. Kanstetner, R. Braun and B, Lang (History and Theory 33, 2, 1994 and 34, 1, 1995 (B. Lang)); reprinted by permission of the authors, History and Theory and Wesleyan University © Wesleyan University. I would like to thank friends and colleagues for their advice and com- ments on this Reader; in particular, Peter Brickley has been, as usual,constructively critical. I would also like to thank Katherine Shakespeare and Marjory Heron of the Chichester Institute for their help in tracking down pieces which appear in this volume — and many mare besides, Keith Jenkins October 1996Copyrighted material1 Keith Jenkins Introduction: on being open about our closures Today we are surrounded by Readers either on pestmodernism itself or on aspects af pastmoderniam and something else: thus, postmadernism and feminism, postmodernism and literature, pestmodemism and archi- ‘tecture, and 30 on. But, at the time of writing (etober 1996) | am unaware of the existence of @ volume on postmodernism and history: A Postmodern History Reader. | suppose i's nat ton dificult to aee why this should be the ease. Protected by a continued adherence to common sense empiricism and realist notions of rapresertation and truth, most historians — and certainly mast af those who might be termed “academic” or professional "proper” historians — have been resistant to that pastmod- emism which has effected so many of their colleagues in adjacent discourses. Their residual disinterest in and/or hastily to philosophy has ennbied them to cling 10 an astensible “a” or antithearetical position Yet even historians like these are beginning to realize that what is going on In the wider intellectual world has some importance for historical work(s) (historiography), whilst a minority have actually gone over {0 theory, this haemorrhaging causing various “traditionalists” (drawn from across the left-right ideological spectrum) to take to the banicades lest “history a8 we have known it” should be subverted. Consequenty, what ‘this increasingly engaged debate means, is that both under- and post- graduates are likely to hear on their courses at least faint echoos of this meeting of minds and interests, whist, on a small number, the impact of ‘theory in general and postmodernism in particular may have already become an important element in the understanding of historical dis- course, Indeed, postmodamism may even have become constitute of historical cansciqusness. This Reader is based on the boliot that history is theoretical “all the way down,” and that all history students should nat only consider ‘the question of the nature of history/historiography in its various anto-logical, epistemological, methodolcgical and ideologicaliscursive ‘manifestations, but thar they should be especially aware of that theorizing which currently lives under the rubric af pestmadernism. As a Readar this ‘book is therefore complied primarily ~ though obviousiy not exclusivety — for an introductory audience. This is not realy a book for the intited, the insides. It is for newcomers, It is a Reader compiled particularly tor teachers of, say, undergraduate/postgtaduate students and very obvi- ously for the students themselves: teachers who are aware of the impact postmodernism is having or could be having on hestoriegraphy and who will know some af the debates in some of the journals and books wherein they are contained, and who would like (at least) to introduce this writing to thelr classes, Indeed, such teachers might be considering establishing cr modifying @ course on “the natura of history” and would therefore like to have a convenient collection of readings to provide the basis far such an offering: a course book. In that sense this is a very teacherly tex. It pulls together a crass section af infiuential andlor representative works: both advocating and criticizing postmodern approaches to histeriography. This is not to say the readings collected here are nicaly balanced, however. Far although this Reader presents extracts tram works as ‘engaged in a series af oppositional debates (and thus, | suppose. gives a further tease of life to “binary appestions”) | hopa the weight af the readings come down in favour of postmodernism.” In this Reader ! am supporting postmodern approaches in general because | think that through them historiography can bs studied in ways that are bath chal- enged and challenging: in ways which may help students lose their “theoretical innocence." itis hoped, for example, that they question the dows which states that the: “proper” study of the past is a study “for its own sake": that the only legitimate study of the past i8 one which di Interestedly and objectively understands it “on its own termes," and that “proper” historians should always attempt to get to "the truth of the past." This Reader is thus dedicated to the kdea that postmodem approaches are currently amongst the most stimulating and exeiting available, Such approaches enable historians to be increasingly retiexive as to what they think history is, and to explicity position themselves within andjor against traditional discourse. in its mainstream realest, empiricist, objeciivist, documentarist, inwar caso, _liberal/plural expressions, orthedox discaurse stil advocates working pratticas now seen, In the light af the postmodem, as both extremely problematical and demonstrably idestogical. ‘So much for some indication of the purpose of this Reader. Whet |— —iwrnepuerion want to do in the rest of this Introduction is to explain some of the assumptions and thus the position | bring fo posimadernism and history — how | read postmodernism and history — and haw these are “refiectac™ In the organization of the Reader and the selected exacts. | have divided the rest of this Introduction into three sections to achieve this. In Section 1 (On Fostmodemity, Postmademism and History) | sketch in what I think is meant by the term postmodermity (the teem which is ‘arguably tha best concept under which to signify aur socio-econamic, political and cuttural condition} and the term pastmodarnism (as signifying, the best way of making sense of various expressions at the level of theory). | then examine the general implication of these concepts for what passes under the signs of History/history. Thus, in Section 2 (On the Collapse of the Upper Case and Collateral Damage} | look at what | shall by then have explained and termed “the collapse of the upper case,” arguing that the impact of this collapse is felt nol only on Upper case history, but indirectly on lawer ease “proper” history too. In Section 3 (The Organization of the Readings) | thon draw up ~ in the light of the discussions in Section 1 and 2 — what | think “metaphorically” underlies pastmodem attitudes toward history/historiography, and the way in which historians’ reactions to these can be put into five differant. categories, which explain tho way in which the readings in this volume havo been organized, | conclude with brist remarks on some of the limits of this Reader. SECTION 1: ON POSTMODERNITY, POSTMODERNISM, AND HISTORY AAs | Nave argued on annther occasion, | think that we live today within the general sncia-ecenemic and peltical condition of postmedernity? | don't think we have a choice about this. For postmodernity is not an ideology or position we can choose te subscribe to or not, postmedernity is precisely our condition: it Is our historical fate to be living mow, As to how we should read the details of this moment - as, say, a period of post-Fordist flexible accumulation as opposed to modemist Fordism; as @ period of capitalist de-differentiation; as a period of late capital; as part of a general time-space compression invoiving spatial reorganizations or as a combination of all of these and other factors — is subject to much debate.” But | would like to leave such detaits for now, important as they are, and argue more generally that the condltion ef postmodernity andthe postmodern theoretical expressions cancemitant with it are due to the ‘overall failure of that experiment in social living we can term “modernity.” ‘That is, the general failure, as measured in its own terms, of the attempt, from the elghteenth century in Europe, to bring abaut thraugh the appi- cation of reason, science and technology, a level ef social ang politcal well-being within social formations which, lagisiating for increasingly gen- erous emancipation of their subjects/cizens, we might characterize by saying that they ware tying. at best. to became "human rights com- munities.” ‘Obviously this general failure has not Been unvelleved; over the last two: hundred add years there have been many substantial successes, But, notwithstanding these, | think thet we can now see that the two (contradictory) Eurocentric ideolagical/social system variants set to provide the vehicles for the universal emancipations of modemity = a bourgeois version and a proletarian version most cogently articulated (as it has turned oul) by various totalitarian} Marxisms — have now either faded enough for us to rethink our assumptions, or have disinte- grated enough for us to revise our earlier hopes.‘ Accordingly, it is our existance at this disappointing stage that. particularly in the West, has given rise to either a series of jaded or nostalgic reassessments of medernily or ta a range of radical ertiques which stil stubbarnty hold out for an emancipatory future beyond modernity, And itis argquatay here, in the variously ariculated interconnactons of such reappraisals. as 10 what has gone wrong and why, that theorists have undertaken datailad critiques of the foundations not only of modernity but of that longer Westar Tradition of which madernity can be seen as just ane particular episode, These eritiques which are historically unique in thelr sophisti- cation, intensity and scale, conclude that there are not {and nat have ‘here ever been) any “resl foundations” of the kind normalty considered 10 have underwritten the experiment of the madem. We must accept that we live and have always lived amidst social formations having no legitimating ontological, epistemological, methodelogi of ethical grounds for beliefs and actions beyond the status of an ultimately sel referencing (rhetorical) conversation. And it is the recognition of this, expressed ‘postist” formulations (poststructuralism, post-feminism, pest-colonialism, post-Marxism, neo-pragmatism...) at the level of ‘theory from the actuality of living within postmederity, which | want to refer to here under the general rubric of postmodemism,§ And at this point there is a sort af choice available, Far although | don’t think we can choose to live in postmademity ar not, we can (and many of us stilinTnopucTiON do) exercise bit of picking and choosing betwean the residues of old “cortaintist” modemisms (objecthily, disintorostedness, the facts, unbiasedness, Truth...) and rhetorical, postist formulations (readings, positionings, reality effects, truth effects...) rather than going for one or the other, Consequently, I think it is here, between old “certaintist’ and new rhetorical discourses, that the current “batties” aver “what is history” ‘and how historical knowledge Is methodolegically “made up" and to what end, live. Now, the detailed reasons for saying this are camplicated. Gut gen eralizing for now, the argument for saying that this Is where history is. located today rests not loast on the ideological importance given to history in modernist projects. For both bourgeois and proletarian versions of the modernist project — their obvious class differences notwithstanding laticulated 88 key elements in their respective Weologies a shared View of the pasthistory as a movement with an immanent direction, a. Pastfistory which was held to be going somewhere, differing only in the selection of “its” ultimate destination. For the bourgeoisie this was a. harmoniaus capitalism; for the proletariat global communism. Both bour geois and proletarian ideologies therefore expressed their historical trajectories in versions of the pasthistory articulated in the upper case (a8 History with a capital H) that is, a way of locking at the past in ors which assigned to contingent events and situations an objective significance by identiying their place and function wrihin a general schema of historical development usually construed as appropriately progressive. And today, with the collapse of the optimism of the mod- cemist project in ways which, metaphorically speaking, sink right down to its once astensibie roots, so we have witnessed the attendant collapse of histories in the upper case; nobody believes in those particular fan tases any more. But it is net only that postmodernism has made the upper case look absurd, as we now have towards it what Lyotard has called an attitude of “incredulity towards metanarratives," but history in the lower case too, Ht ig not only that we now appreciate that an upper case history Is a formal and thus empty mechanism to be filed according to taste. For whilst these metaphoricalfallegorical vorsions of tha past were one crucial part of modemist ideologies, another way of reading the past was also belng developed within the bourgeois version. This version Is just as Ideological as any upper case version ever was but, expressive of the more conservative elements of the bourgeoisie, this peculiar variant has become increasingly cultivated until, as more and more of the baKEITH JenKINS geaisie “made it,” it has achieved dominance. This version is, of course, history in the jower case. That is, history construed in “academic” and “panticularistic™ forms which, whilst insisting with as much force as any upper case history ever did that it was “proper” history, modestly eschewed metanarrative claims that it was discovering in the past mean- ingful trajectories, purposes and teleologias, Consequently, within increasingly bourgeois social formations that were able to jettison and co marginalize upper case "History,” this mere species of historiography has become so commonly accepted as boing identical to its genus that tno longer looks like & mere species at al, This is the version of history that most of us will have been brought up with. Stil ensconced within the universities and other academic institutions, this way of regarding the past (as the study of the past “for Its own sake" as distinct from the study of the past explicitly for the sake of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat) has thus become almost natural, ‘But in a culture nothing is natural. And in our culture, thanks not least to pestmadernism, this particular “naturalist fallacy" is now increasingly ‘transparent. For the attempt to pass off the study of history in the form of the ostensibly disinterested scholarship of academics studying the past objectively and “for its own sake” as “proper” history, is now unsus- tainable, History in the upper case has been undercut by theorists for reasons te do wih their own rethinking sf the modemist project, and the argumentative means to do this fundamental re-evaluation of the ‘foundations of thase relative falures has impacted upon the foundational ‘varies. of lower case history too. The result is the probkematicizatian of both History and history. Consequently, today we recognize that there never has been, and there never will be, any such thing as a past which Is expressive of same kind of essence. At tha same time, the ridiculous idea that the anty proper study of the past is “own-sakism” is recognized as just the mystifying way in which a bourgeoisie articulates its own interests as if they belonged to the past itself, As a result, because of the way the upper case has been undercut, not only do upper case claims to be producing “true” knowledge of the past look utterly problem- atic, but so do lower case claims too. Accordingly, the whole madernist Historyhistory ensemble now appears as a self-referential, problematical expression of interests, an ideological — interpretative discourse without any non-historicized access to the past as such. In fact history now appears to be just one more foundationless, positioned expression in a world of foundationiess, pasitioned expressions.rnc on SECTION 2: ON THE COLLAPSE OF THE UPPER CASE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE In the eccount 1 have just given. both upper and lower case histories: are affected by postmodem ertiques, but (as noted), because of the continuing discursive power of the bourgeoisie in the present historical culture of "our" social formation, Mis the collapse of the upper case that is seen as being the major — and in many analyses — the only casualty. The vast bulk of the literature about postmodernism and history talks of the way it undercuts the upper-case. In our social formation, where lower case history represents the “normal” way af finding out about and knowing the past, tower case mainstream academic historians: consider that the callapse of the upper case (of ideological histories) does not affect their practices, not registering the fact that their histories are every bit as ideological as those of the upper case. I mean such proper historians don't need ta be told by postmodam gurus like J. F. Lyotard (in The Postmadem Gondition)* that his definition of postmademism as “ipceedulty towards metanarratves” means that grand narratives {overarching poilosophias of history tke the Enlightenment story of the steady progress of reason and freedom. ar Marx's drama of the forward march of human productive capacities via class conflict culminating in proletarian revolution) aré a prior! impositions on the past rather than being based on the “objective facts.” Nor da they need to be told by Lyotard (in The Differandy’ that you cannot extrapolate from one category of “phrase regime” to another (say, from the category of cognitive reason which may help one find the facts, 10 speculative reason whereby, from the findings of cognitive reason one can legitimately infer that such facts are leading to the inevitable victory of the proletariat, or progress, oF whatever) as though the latier were absolutely entailed by the former. For “proper” historians know all about the absurdity of metanarratives land the problems involved in both inductivism and deductivism. Have drunk in with their milk the fact-vaive problematic. Have read — for goodness sake! — their Popper, their Cakeshott, their Hexter and their Eftan. indaed, i is precisely because they have done this reading, that Wt is perfectly clear why, for most “proper” historlans, debates about postmodemism look bath stale (1 mean, what's new?) and relevant (1 mean, $0 what?). Not being upper case historians themselves, the fact that such constructions ate new recognized as absurd doesn't seem 10 affect their own practices In any Way nar their own lower case “craft.” ‘Why should it? Thus they can carry on doing what they have alwaysweITH JeneINs bean deing and ignore postmodem theorizing with impunity. In that sense pestmedernism in particular (and one might add “theory” in general) deasn't seem to have much to do with them. ‘But on my reading it does. And as | read it at least some lower case historians recognize that it dees; recognize that the collapse of the upper case causes collateral damage to the lower. For if his is not the caso — it postmader type ertiques were actually restricted to the upper case = if postmodamism really was irrelevant to lower case histories, then we have some difficulty in expiaining why datenciers of proper” professional lower case history {trom Lawrence Stone to Gertrude Himmelfars, fram Carlo Ginzburg to Geottrey Elton et al.) seem to be so hostile to it. OF why they critique It and offen construct ad hominem arguments against its advocates, Of why, generally sceptics themselves, they fear post- medem-type scepticism which, in their eyes, seems nothing less than an irresponsible invitation to a “read the past any way you like retativism” and/or, even worse, nihilism. Of why they see posimodemism as destroying at least “history as we [sic] have known it” or, more extrava- gantly, the whole historical enterprise. And | think the answer to these queries is because such historians reluctantly sense (| put it na stronger than that) that postmodernism really dees have something to do with thom, Far fram it being the case: that postmodern eritiques only ettect the Ideological upper case, proper historians are naw increasingly raal- izing that f undercuts the working assumptions af the (ideciogical lower case too: that nothing Is sacred. in @ nutshell, then, my argument about the impact of postmodernism on the collapse of upper case history is that the collateral fall-out expert enced by lower ease history undercuts it too. To put tt another way, that We Can now see how both upper and lower case historias, being “metahistorical" constructions, are, like all constructions, ultimately arbt- trary ways of carving up what comes 0 constitute their field. Both upper and lower case histories are actually just theories about the past and how it should be appropriated. In particular, they are theories which, being sired, developed and made pragmatically useful to the “experiment ‘of the made” are now, with the end of that experiment, at their end toe, My argument is thus a sort of “end of history” argument. Not (necessarily) the end of history as such, but arguably the end of these Upper and lower case variants expressive of thet part af our recent Western past, in shor, the end af the pecullar ways in which modernity conceptualized the past; ihe way it made sense of i in upper and fower case forms. And it this Is s0. then alert Iawar case defenders are quiteINTRODUCTION correct to see postmodernism as signalling the end of history as they (ower case modernists) have known it. They tao live within the post: modem condition. It is because of the way postmodemism thearizes and prabiematic- lzes the entire: modernist Historyhhistory ensemble that students ought to be thus aware of the impact of postmaderism on history as such 50. that they can come to their own position on tha question of "the nature of history" nowadays. And to holp this awareness a litte further, | now want to very briefly sketch out the sort of lower case history that most students will meet on their courses. This history wil not reter to helt as lower case history of course but —in that universalizing tral of al ideology ~ forget the qualifying adjective and pass off its “species” of history as if it was history as such, That having been done, | then want to look at some of the ways in which thet history is now being undercut by post modarctype critiques. | take space to do this here because whilst in the literature it is (again as | have noted) overwhelmingly the upper case that seems to be affected by postmedemism, it is my argument that nothing escapes its impact. The next few paragraphs thus attempt to redress, wis-d-vis mainstream history culture, an obvious imbalance by stressing the way postmodern type critiques: subvert lower case history. For though not so powerful as it once was, most professional academic historians — and the students taught by them — stil subscribe ta a discourse which continues te constitute historiography through amploying lower case, realist, empiricist, objectivist, documentarist and liberal- pluralist ways of thinking about thelr discipline. What do each of these terms mean, then, and how do they add up to form a fairly coherent whole, the daxa against which posimodem approaches. are arguably Ccaunterposed? Let me look briefly at each of them in turn 80 that my argument as to the necessity of thinking aboutwwith, postmedemism can be further clartisd In @ perceptive essay, Gregor McLennan has argued that mest proper historians ‘stil run together realism and empiricism as the basis of their “discipline."* Such historians, says McLennan, claim ta hava enough experience to just know thal the past was once real. Their labours are Primarily divected towards describing that hitherto existing reality rather than constructing it, and the reality so disclosed in their accounts typically lakes the form of discrete/unique events distilled iby processes of source generation, source interrogation, etc.) into historical facts. In effect, there is thus @ characteristic confiation or stippage In cammansansa realism “from a belief in the reality of the past to an empiricist conception of thehistorian's practice.""* And McLennan has three paints to make about ‘thls First, empiricism is not entailed by realism. It only appears as if empiricism Is @ propery of realism rather than just being cantingantiy connected an occasion. Therefore fram the acceptance of the ontological actuality of the past no epistemology ar method of any kind whatsoever necessarily follws (in postmodem terms, nothing connects). Second, McLennan argues that the stil dominant antailmant of empiricism trom realism Is of two main types. One the idea that the historian appreachos ‘the past directly, oF two, uncovers bits of it descriptively. Thase constitute, says McLennan, the twa planks of empiricism, planks which, when slid together, allow us to speak of ontological empiricism or, when only the second plank is in place, of methodological empiricism. And McLennan is of the view that the latter position is now the predominant one. Few historians subseribe to the idea (though they occasionally lapse into it rhetorically) that the past as such is directly appropriated as opposed to the idea that as historians they work with tracesisources which, by the use of evidential investigation, are mobilized into narrative accounts rather than just falling inta shape under the weight of tho shoor accurnu- lation of “the facts." And, third, McLennan argues that nsithar type of empiricism is “acceptable as an account af what historians do,” in that any defence of realism requires the recognitian that “the indirectness. of access to the past is due in part to the incompleteness and range of the evidence and in part to the structuring role of thaory in any account of the ‘real world.” Consequently, though, mast empiricist histerians see theory €s “an unwelcome aberration which might rapidly spread into an Intellectual disease,” empiricism is nat only (a) a theory itself, but also (0) an Inadequate one.” Empicicism's quistude around theory can be Se6n Not S0 much 25 & rejection of theoretical underpinning tut rather 8 a consensus around a $8t of practical norms which discourage theory in the promation of “a commonsense embargo on ‘useless’ speculation as a diversion from everyday practical consciousness ~ including that of the practical historian.” For ompiricism as a method, just cannot account for the significance it givas to the selection, distribution and weighting of “the facts” in finished narratives. Tho facts cannot themselves indicate thelr signticance as though it ware inherent in them. To give significance to the facts an external theory af significance Is always nooded. And whilst McLennan points out that itis dificult to know how widespread andior how consciously or naively held professional historian's conflation of realism and empiricism is, nevertheless, | think the assumption is stilimrnoouetion made by historians that if you combing realism and empiricism the representation ol the past as it actually, objectively was, can be achieved. At any rate, this type of objectivity remains high an the agenda of the “proper” historian. AAs is title indicates, Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: The “Objec- tivity Question” and the American Historical Profession, examines the history of the desire by the: bulk of American historians for objectivity BUI Novick’s argument has a wider resonance, particulary his comment at the start of the book, that at the "very centre of the professional historical venture isthe idea and ideal of ‘objectivity. To be sure, says Novick, there is less confidence today than there was in the abilty to actually be objective — there is less talk of “letting the facte speak for themselves.” But that having been sald, Novick is surely correct to arguo ‘that despite recent relativistic Incursions info mainstream historiography, older usages endure, The principal elements of objectivity aro outlined by Novick thus: ‘The assumptions on which it [objectivism] rests include a commitment fo the reallly of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reallly, a sharp separation between... fact and value and, above all, between history and fiction, Historical facts are seen as prior ta and independent {not constituted by] interpretation... Truth is one, not erspestival. Whatever pattems exist in history are “found’, not "made"... The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or disin- Nerested, judge: it must never degenerate into that of advocate or, ‘even worse, propagandist. The historian’s conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and even- hhanderiness.... qualities... quarded by the insulation of the historical profession from social pressure or political influence, and by the individual historian avoiding partisanship or bias... the historan's primary allegiance Is to “the objective historical truth", and to pro- ‘tesslonal colleagues who share a commitment... to advance toward ‘that goal, Novick expresses here some familiar injunctions then. Few under- radvates and posigraduates will be unaware of the strictures 0 be balanced,” “unbiased,” “van-handed,” and “impartial.” And in the land of proper history the way 10 achieve this state of grace — moral and professional integrity taken as read — is through the demand that, abave all, historians shauld go back ta the sovereignty of the sources, to the primary evidence, Historians should not remain at tha level of secondaryKeITH JENKINS (and thus second-hand and soiled texts) which may still be — despite the above demand for historians to purge themselves of “interests” dangerously positioned. Back to the original sources — Ad Fontes ~ ‘thus the further dominant injunction urged on the “proper” historian. ‘That injunction echoes throughout the practices of those umpteen American professionals examined by Novick, and is re-echoed by the majority of historians in the United Kingdom. it stil occupies pride of place in those student orientated manuals and general intraductions to the proper way to pursue history (Elton, Tosh, Stanford al ai.)* The advice of the Injunction centras not just on the: squrcas but picks out ane type of source as having particular value the document. Consequently, there seems litle daub that Dominick LaCapra’s labeling of the proper historlan's metier as being documentarist is a pertinent one."* According to LaCapra, in the documentary made the basis of historical rasearch is, once again, hard facts. These hard facts are derived from a critical sifling of the traces/sources of the past, the purpose of such work being to furnish either narrative accounts or thick descriptions of documented facts, or to submit the “historical record to analytic procedures of hypo: thesis-formation, testing and explanation.""” In this process, LaCapra thinks that the historical imagination is limited to the modest task of filling in the inevitable gaps in the record and/or throwing new light on a phenomenon by finding new information, Additionally, adds LaCapra, to demolish the possibility of speculative theerizing, all sources tend to be treated In “documentary” terms as # there was a real hierarchy of sources wheraby those which seemed to be direct informational docu: ‘ments — bureaucratic reports, state papers, wills, eye-witness: accounts ~ are valorized. Other texts, if treated at all, are “reduced to elements that are elthet redundant or merely supplementary (and, if not chacked against ‘hard data, purely suggestive) with respect to privieged ‘infor ational’ documents.""* In this construction the really significant questions are those answerable by empltical and archival research Whilst this approach does not exactly prohibit interpretation (and whilst not unaware af the limited and ambiguous nature of documents as such), it falls to see such interpretive necessity or ambiguities as - as in posimodemism — radical opportunities and exciting gaps to be worked. Rather they are seen as problems to be eradicated and overcome, as biases to be detected, distortions to be rectified, and readings to be ‘balanced-out,” Here, as LaCapra comments, a wedge is driven between the presuppositions and methods ef the proper historian and “critical theory.” For while the latter may suggest new ways af seeing or enable— ——1wrnopuction the historian — generally in the conclusion of his-or her work — to “change voices" and “pronounce a few sententious abiter dicta,” any sustained relationship between proper history and an “opportunistic theory” is can- demned as unhistorical: such theory gets in the way of the factual objectivity that the discipline demands. Thus LaCapra links. document- arism back into Noviek-type objectivity: Fiecensiruction of the past, putatively “in its own terms," remains the overriding consideration, and the objective is to be as objective as possible by controling for “bias” or “subjective preferences"... The affirmation of an objectivist frame of reference may be fostered by anxiety over a “relapse” into “relativism,” and the charge af “projec tion” may be directed at the historian whose interpretation — or entire interpretative orientation — one rejects." Now, as Ihave already indicated and as we shall see further, postmodern ‘approaches not only ideotoglze any talk of “reconstructing the past an its own terms" but also, by embracing retativisttype variants, undercut both the correspondence theory of truth and problematicize the generally associated notion of intomal coherence and consistency found within the objectivist position. But, in passing, we might note that LaCapra also: cers another objection to documentarism; namely, that the documant. arist approach commis the “tachnicist fallacy.” Thal is to say, t commits. the fallacy of taking just one part of the technical instrumentation of history (source Investigation, otc.) as if it constituted its “essence.” It is a3 if the complicated epistemolngical, methodological, ideoiogical. prob fomatical positionings of historical representation could be solved “technically.” For as LaGapra puts it, this fallacy “takes what is in certain respects a necessary condition... of historiography and converts It into a virtually exhaustive definition."»° And ihe adds that this not only diverts attention from the way dacumemts and sources are themselves texts, but also plays. down the fact that as such they require a ertical reading that goes beyond traditional Quevienkriik: “to the extent that components cof a documentary made! constitute a necessary condition af professional historiography, the historian wil face the recurrent temptation of making a-telish of archival research." What is thus privileged, then, in the areas | have lighlly sketched in so far — raalism, empiricism, objectiviem and docurantarism — are positions which add up to the view that proper history really is history in the lower case (to recall, a mere spocias cf history after all, which, in this rendition, identities it with ms putative genus a5 if this species type Is identical to history as such),‘Thus it can be seen why lower case historiography should consider itset{ to be quiside of and/or antithetical to theory. In the above construal, proper, professional, scholarly, “for its own sake" histeriography is not seen as a theoretical expression at all but rather as, say, a concrete practice (Elton) or as a craft (Hexter), uncontaminated by “anti-historical™ (ideological) assumptions. So we witness attempts in lower case artho- oxy at “theoretical cleansing.” By holding that it is based on ant- theoretical and non-present-centrad concerns, lower case history pres- ents itselt as. (felatively) tree of contemporary interests and tuture- ofientated desires. Again, sll this Is stated clearly in the mainstream manuals and Introductory texts, To study the past academically so as to be able to deliver the past as it ostensibly was and not the past we would variously like it to be, is of paramount importance. Moreaver, that past is one which must be presented as clearly as possible in unam- biguous, plain, commonsense language. Lower case historians therefore overwhelmingly use a “communication” type of language, avoiding or in many cases not even being aware of the existence of the quite devas- tating critiques of this language form by, amongst others, Hayden White For these sorts of reasons, then. lower ease history defines its identity in terms of what it is not — against its “other” — against its alleged antithesis: namely ideological history as construed in the upper case, For as we have seen, this kind of history — when pejoratively construed in the lights of the lower case — Is not considered history at all, but improper. positioned ideology. it is a fake historiography which finds in ‘the past — because it puts them there — meanings, purposes, teleologies, ftc,, 10 be used for present-centred andjar future programmes, pro- grammes whieh form, trom this lower case position, generally radical political agendas of both the: left and right (but generally of the lett) as informed by, Say, Marxism, feminism, ethnic interests, and so on. From the perspective of the lower ease, then, upper ease history is seen as the ‘stuff of political correctness: as such it cannot be seriously considered of tolerated. ‘But what is most interesting here, of course, is how this banishment of upper case historiography beyond the boundaries of proper history casts an interesting shadow not aver the ideology of the upper case (whieh is quite correctly seen as being postioned: why shouldn't it be?) but on the putatively non-ideatogical lower ease, For an my reading lower case history is, as | have already suggested, bourgeois ideology. [Let me look briefly at this last statement because i is. important. 1 have noted already that whilst in the lower case version interpretationsiwrnepucrion ‘should be capable through synthesis of creating a “true” account of the past, unsynthesizable interpretations are a fact of lower case life, Out of necessity, then, such Interpretive flux has to be recuperated back into and normalized as a welcome featuro of the lower case, Its “flexibility” then being announced as indicative of fis “openness,” its willngness to “revise,” its tolerance towards the “unconventional.” Here lower case historiography gains eredit for its liberal pluralism, for ts guarantee of academic freedom as oppased ta the closures of uppar casa ideology. But in fact this only partly works, In practice liberal pluralism restricts its tolerances to thase histeries and historians wha variably subscribe to the values of “the academic” lower case. For if liberal pluralism accepts that any sort of representation of the past is permissible ~ i It looks as if due to its liberal tolerance “anything goes” — then clearly other typos fof historiography such a3 upper case versions driven by Marxist or feminist of ethnic concerns (ar even Whig ones} are not “not history” but just “different.” Consequently, at this paint lower case history has to Jose its innocence and become as positioned and as interested as any ther history, In preventing just anything counting as history, a tolerant ‘iberal pluralism in the lower case becomes an intolerant Liberal Ideology in the upper. Accordingly, what we hava here is the ideclagizatian/pottc ization ofall historios, such that we can naw begin to leghimately address {o the lower case all those questions it self addresses to the previausly construed ideological upper case. These questions in the end boil down to one: in whose interests is the particularstc history of the lower case masquerading as a universal? We can now see haw lower case history's ostensible non-present-centrednass is precisely what makes it ideo. logical. In fact, we ean see how lower caso history fufs the very erteria it self erects as a definition af “ideological For to argue, as lower case practitioners do, that the study of the past should not have anything to do with baing present/tuture orientated is, of course, exactly as present and future orientated as the argument that if should. Upper case historiography is generally quite explicit that itis using the past for, say, trajectory into a diferent future. The fact that the bourgeoisie doesn't want a different future (the fact, that as we saw above, it has now arrived at its proferrad historical destination — liberal, bourgeois, market capitalism) means that it doesn’t any longer need @ past-based future-orlontatad fabrication. Thus at this point, the olnt where the links between the past, present and future are broken because the present is everything, the past can be neutralized and studied not for our variqus sakes but for “is awn.” For this is exactlywives gemmms what is currently required, a history which is finished now that It has led right up to us. Thus to “pretend” not to be present-orientated is precisely what constitutes the present-centredness of the lower case. Accordingly, beth upper and lower case historias serve — by the way they variously situate themsetves in the present — their own past-sustained, suasive, present-centred needs and desires. ‘Lat ma now draw together the main paints | have been making about history in the lower case. I think that the above thumb-nail sketch ls very probably the thumb-nail impression which rast students coming to {and indeed coming from) the study af the “discipline” of history in, say, higher ‘education, will (with the exception of the last point - that proper academic history is actually liberal Keclogy) hold. The above construct — broad- brush and identifying only some of its components — is the still hegemonic discourse vis-a-vis the nature of history in our social formation. Accord- ingly. for convenience (for “summing up" purposes) this rendition of proper history might now be put into a tabular form so that I can go on to juxtapose against it postmodem-type critiques to which it is arguably vulnerable. So let us say that “proper history can today be read as boing: (1) realist, empiricist, objectivist and documentarist; (2) that it follows a nor-rhetorlesl, commensense, communication model of historical writing: (3) that it construes itself in the lower case wherein it transforms the “vice” of endless. interpretive “differences” into the “virlues” of beret pluralism; (4) that in its cwn rendition of liberal pluralism it portrays itself 2= anti-tneoretical, anti-a priori and as non present-centred: that It studies the past ostensibly for the pasts "ow sake" (own-sakism) 8 distinct from the study of the past for the ideological sakes af the proletariat, women, blacks... 90 that, (5) “other” histories are not really histories at all but takes. However, (6) what this construction conceals is the fact that it is not in any way (ax a mere species of history) identical to any putative genus; it is just one way of "doing history," $0 that both lower and upper case histories are ideologically positioned and modernist, and so are both susceptible to problematicization through what | want to call postmoder-type critiques, So, how is this construct problomaticized by postmadem critiques? Well, B3INTRODUCTION in a way thls is a difficult area to summarize, for as soon as you begin to actually look for them, critiques of empiricism, realism, documentarism, “own-sakism," ele, are everywhere. But for introductory purposes and concentrating on only one angle, most ertiques of lower case history seem to concern themselves with the implications of haw the historian’s referent — the thing to which historians refer as if it stands outside of representation, there to act as an independent resistance to wayward interpretations — is in fact constituted through the processes of represen tation, Consequently, it & this dissolution of the referent into representation which, for many lower case historians, signals the disso! Ution of their history by postmodern means. How does this dissolution of the referent through the processes of reptesentation work? Again, the detailed critiques of facticty (and of the empiricist methodology most closely associsled with il) are a legion, These include not only critiques: of 2 hermeneutic, phenomenological, Constructivist or deconstructionist type, but individual exponents ‘ram, say, Dilthey to Collingwood, Danto to Mandelbaum, Oakeshott to F. Q. Hirst, Richard Rorty to Hayden White, and so on (whilst other theorists are represented in some of the readings in this volume}. But in order to establish at this point the kinds of arguments which lower case exponents havo to engage with, | give thtae short examples which suggest that (a) facts are always facts within the way the “referred-to past” has been “put under a description” (here | draw on Arthur Oanta and Chris Lorenz); (b) allegadty referential Independent facts aro always theory dependant (here | draw an Alex Callinicos) and (6) the dissolution of the referent Into representation can be Seen, pace the way proper historians ses it, In positive ways (here | draw on Rlabert Gerkhofer). ‘The factualistiempiricist idea so rooted in traditional historical thinking, that if we can find “the facts” then this wail stop interpretive flux, fails because only theory can constitute what counts a3 a fact in the first place. When we talk sbout facts we always do s0 under a description, 80 that to claim that “x" is a fact can only mean thal the description it is under is adequate. Arthur Danto has made this point: when we talk about facts and reality we always refer to them within a specific frame ‘work of description. Phenomena. as such are therefore never the things explained, itis only phenomena as covered by descriations, so that when we speak of explaining them it must always be with reference to that descriplion: “So an explanation... must... be relativized ta a deserip- tion of that phenomencn,”= Danto's point has been ikestrated “historically” by Chris Lorenz who asks:How is it possible that with regard to an individual subject ~ National Socialism for instance — diferent historian keep referring ta different states of affairs as facts and keep roforring ta different statements fs true, and thus haw is it possible that there is no guarantee of consensus in history. This fact is explained by the circumstance that factual statements and their truth vary with their ‘ames of description... one realizes what "realty" looks like always depends ‘on a frame of description — and therefore a perspective ~ it comes, as no surprise that “reality” cannot be used as an argument in favour ‘of, or even for the “necessity” of, a particular perspective. [For] This presupposes a direct ft between reality and a specific linguistic framework ~ 3 presupposition linked up with naive realism and dis- ‘carded with empiricism in epistemology, It is rather the other way round: it is the historian who trigs to determing what the past “roally” Jooks ike... It is the historian, not the past, which does the dictating In history. The idea that factalteality can thus exist independently of the historian 20 as to stop what Hayden White has termed the “de-reslization of the event” is thus an implausible idea, For as Callinicos has put It (not at all approvingly — for later on in his text he wil try to reconnect fact and \valuo) statements about the abservable/authenticated facts always have an “ifreducibly conjectural” and thus. “theoretical” character. Conse- quently, it follows that, shauld some observation [fact] appear to refute a well- established theory, it is logically permissible to save the theory by ‘rejecting the basic statement reporting this inconvenient abservation [fact] perhaps by adjusting the... theory by means of which . results are interpreted. So instead af theary confronting — and being (ut to the test of — independently established facts, we have a clash between two theories — the one wi is apparently refuted by the ‘ebservation, the other the observation theory, if we explain away the observation [fact] we are preferring the fist theory to the second (Which we alter in erder to get nid of the observation (fact): if we ‘uphold the abservation [fact] we have chosen the second over the first, There seems to be no objective crtaria governing these decisions. It may come down, as W. V. Quine argues, to how well entrenched the theories are within the overall system of our belief, ‘or, if Richard Fron is right, it is a matter of aesthetic preference, noimrnopuction more a matter of rational adjudication than my liking one painting better than another Finally, these points ars fleshed out and possible conclusions drawn by Robert Berkhofer. | giva here the gist of Berkhafer's argument against “referential factualty” (his paper, “The Challenge of Poatics to (Normal) Historical Practice") is reproduced as Chapter 14."* Berkhoter’s argument is that inerary theory — poetics — undercuts the foundatians of normal professional historical practice by “denying the factuality that grounds the authority of history itseit” and thus releases It into new areas of possibilty” How does this work? Well, In normal historical practice it is the referential ‘acts which allegedly act as an independent check against the representations of the past by historians. It is on the basis of factuality that such values as accuracy. objectivity, and loyalty to the past as It really was, stand, But where, asks Berkhofer, do such facts come from? Nobody is denying, of course, that the actual ast occurred. Howover, the facts that constitute that now absent past and which get into representations have clearly been extracted from the now extant “traces of the past” and combined through Inference by historians into synthetic accounts that mere reference back to the facts as such could never entail, Therefore, because such factualty only becomes available for historical appraisal and debate as historiographical con: structs, the alleged checks an such historiography by the tants are never checks on or by independent facts but always checks on “aleady" ‘historicized ones. In other words, the effect normal histarians try to achieve in their representations is the fusion of the structures of interpre- tation and factualty to try and prove that the structure of interpeetation is the structure of factuality: Instead of shawing how the representation is structured "to fook fike total factuality.” Although normal historians try to reconcile disparate interpretations of the samo phenomenon by reference to the tacts (through the presumption that factualty possesses some sort of independent, coercive “realty"), in actuality most if nat all of what is presented as (actuality "is a special coding of the historian’s synthetic expository texts, designed to conceal their highly constructed basis." In Borkhofer's words: ‘That normal historical practice attempts to make its representations ‘appear ta present information as if wore a matter of simple reteren- tialty indicate that the premises of realism are basic: to the paradigm. ‘Realism enters historical practice to the extant that historians try to make their structure of factuaity seem ta be its own arganizing struc-WRITH JENKINS ture and therefore conceal that it is structured by interpretation represented as (flactualty. This is as true of analytic as narrative ‘expositions. For Berkhofer, then, the challenge coming from a pastist postics rmeans that normal historical practice is seen as a mode of coding words and texts according to “conventional presuppositions about representing ‘the past as if t was effectively always aleeady history." That such coding Is conventional, adds Berkhoter, also means that its ullimately arbitrary, in that realism is a chosen cultural and not a natural category of represor- tation. The upshot is that such beliefs about realism and the arbitrary coding of the past in the present as history arguably collapses the distinctions between representation and referentiaity, The signified (the past) is tus nought but the signifier thistory). No raferont tfactithe past) exists outside the history texts. themselves. Consequently, this capsizal of tha referential side into the representational side (what John Zammito calls "pan-taxtualiam’}” destroys the effect of overall factual authority 8 claimed for normal historical work: “domystifcation of @ historical enterprise, therefore, also delegitimizes i.” Such demystiication can thus “freo up” historians to toll many equally legitimate stories from various View points, with umpteen voices, emplatments and types of syrthesis. itis in that sense that we: can interpret the past "anyway we like.” And itis this conclusian which signals to many {normal} historians the end of thelr kind of history. By opening up histerical work to many possiblities of narrative structuring and interpretive coding than normal history in its ‘empicicalfactual, realist, cocumantarist, “Yor its awn sake” paradigm allows, it thus appears that one has indeed eliminated what, for Gerkh- ofer, poetics has promised to eliminate; namely, “the legtimating authority of factuality for history tsolf according to traditional premises." But Berkhoter dogsn't stop there. He goes on to ask: but why is this problem? Why are historians (in this context “narmal historians") worried by this opening up? And his answer, 2 quite correct one | think, is because “normal history orders the past for the sake of authority and therefore: power.""" As with metanarrative Nistorlans, normal historians must also "prove" their case by a single interpretive coding of the past, otherwise the arbitrary nature of the produced history becomes 30: evident that it loss fis intended natural effect and thus its privileged position as having represeried the past as it actually was. Te conclude Berkhoter’s argument. The only referent that he thinks: can be found for historical accounts is in the intentextualty which results— ——iwrnosuction {from the reading of sets of sources combinad with the readings of other historians of these same sources as synthesized in their expositions, ‘Thus Berkhofer fails to see much, it anything, in the distinction drawn by normal historians between fact and fiction, “Yor factual reconstruction is: really nothing but construction according to the working ‘fetions" (the discipline] of normal historical practice which, in tum, are the premises. of [an untenable}... historical realism and realistic mimesis." Iti these kinds of arguments, then, which have thus caused "postist” interpretations (often just referred to. demonically as “theory”) to be quite: corrertly seen by many traditional lower case historians as le-threat: ening to: thoit practices. Accordingly, the argument | have been putting throughout this Introduction — that history students ought fo be aware of this situation and ought to take seriously postmodemtype critiques ‘of both upper and lower case histories ~ Is an essential one if they are to become refiexive practitioners in control of their own way of stabilising their texts; # they are to have thelr “own semantic authority” and thus be “in contro! of thelr own discourse.” And to achiave this | hope that: the readings in this volume will make some contribution. All that is left for me to do now, therefore, is to say comething about how | have organized this Reader and selected the extracts which make i up rolative to the way | have — in my abave comments — put Mistoryfhistory “undar ‘2 description.” SECTION 2; THE ORGANIZATION OF THE READER, ‘The situation just sketched in — a situation whers pastmodem-type eri- tiquos arguably undercut both upper and lower cass histories ~ now allows me to suggest how historians have recently been taking up posi tions vis-4-vis this phenomenon. For what historians: make of the present condition (whether they radically welcome the naw apportunitis to work in the cracks opened up in upper and lower case orthodoxies or fearfully see in this capsizal the collapse of, if not the best of all possible worlds, a1 least the end of theirs) determines pretty much where they stand with regard to postmodern critiques of the History/history ensemble. Accordingly, | think i is possible to distinguish between at least tive ciferent categories of historian with regard 10 the general attiuce they adopt towards postmedem histories; two graups which 1 term radical, two which | would term traditionafst, and a fifth group (undecided or nuanced others) whe can see both the benefits and the drawbacks‘of postmodernism, combining positive and negative readings to “sult themselves,” Of course — and | add this caveat immediately — in any enabling categorization such as this, the boundaries between the cat- ‘egaries must be acknowledged as both blurred and subject to continuing seepage. Nevertheless, | think there are good reasons for adopting the chosen categorizations — and | turn te them now. First, then, | think we can distinguish a graup of radical theorists who. heterageneous though they may be as they bring to current debates different historical baggages and agendas, are nevertheless all positive about the Impact of postmodernism on history as such but especially about the collapse of the upper case. That collapse is seen as allowing People(s) who, hitherto negatively represented and/or ignored by Wester logocentric/phallocentric: metanarratives, have not yet had the opportunity to construct histories of their own; histories of eman and empowerment. This is a large group of historiansitheorists whi includes some of the biggest names (Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Baudril- lard, Spivak, Iragary, Fish and Rorty) as well as 2 host of others (Bauman, Laciau, Giroux, Young, Chambers ef al.) theorists who can ilve with the kind of deprivileging pestmademism causes; whe can live with upper and lower case histories that are demystiied, which avertly call attention to their own processas of production, flag their working assumptions, and incicata explicily and repoatadly tha constituted rather than the found natura of thair referent — the historicized past, ‘Second, there is a series of raafcal eriques. of history in the lower case made by historiansithecrists who accept the collapse of bath the Upper and lower cases but who, taking the collapse of the upper case a3 read, have tended to concentrate on the lower. This is & group which includes Barthes, Foucault, F. R. Ankersmit, Hayden White, Robert Berkhofer, Joan Scott, Diane Elam, David Harlan, Dominick LaCapra et al, some of whom are represented in this volume. ‘Third, there is a group which | would like to call traditionalists — people drawn in this volume overwhelmingly from the left. This graup, whilst happy te see the undercutting of lower case history by White and Ankersmit eft af, and who can generally admit (albeit somewhat reluctantly) that radical critiques of metanarrative histories have reduced ‘them to the status of extended metaphors/allegorias, still see the need te retain a hold en “right reason,” factualny, ruth, justice, ete, as bases for emancipation and empowerment along old fashioned tines, This group snes in postmadamism a potentially hapless relativism or even a thor- cough-geing niniism. Thay see in #s endless dferments. in its celebrationimrnopuction of difference and allerty, in its ant-ontolagical, ant-episteralogical, antt- methodological stance, a mode of thinking which “conveniently” under- cute their radical gestures such that postmodemism is seen as arising from, and working in the interests of, contariparary, commodliying can- sumer capitalism, This is a group which includes Christopher Norris, ‘Tey Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, Perry Anderson, David Harvey, Alex Callinicos, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Norman Goras ot al. These are theorists wha can go along with, say, recent pastmodam developments in iterary criticism and the tum against naive representationalist Ideas. ‘of language. This is @ group which ean acoept that ant-foundational philosophy has brought a new awareness as to the ways narrative structuring, emplotment and metaphor enter info our readings of the warld. They also accept, #0 far as history fs conoemed, thal we now have a much greater awareness as to the means of its construction, But, having gone this far, such theorists consider thora is no naed to go- along with utterly relativistic postmodem views, in that there are sill methods of comparing more or less plausible (historical) accounts in ways which do not give in to a fockloss relativism. Thay believe that there are stil ways of retaining the “facts” in order to rasist the: endless. play of simulation and deferment. Norman Geras has typically put the problem as helthey see i Hi there is no th, there is no injustice... i ruth is wholly relativized or Internaiized to particular discourses or language games... final ‘vocabulary, framework of instrumental success, culturally specific set ‘of boliets oF practices: cf justification, there is. no injustice... The ‘viotims and protestors of any putative injustice are deprived of their last and often best weapon, that of telling what really happened. They ‘can only tell their story, which is something else. Morally and pollt- cally, therefore, anything goes.” The argument from left traditionalists is that postmodernism's undercut: ting af any principled grounds for truth disables their attempts to resist capitalist practices and alternative scenarios. But for another group — group four, pasimedemism comes from, is in the interests of, and even belongs fo, not the right at all but the left. This is a group not of upper but of lower case traditionalists, a group which includes, say, Lawrence: ‘Stone, Perez Zagorin, Gertrude Himmetfarb, Geoffrey Elton, Carla Ginz- burg et al, all of whom speak in the name of “proper” history, For this group, postmodern history in the hands of lewer case radicals such as Ankersmit and White unprivieges its legitimate status. Having noKEITH JENKINS — objection whatsoever to the radical eriiques of the upper case by Lyotard ‘of al, historians like Stone see with unease the proper lower case baby being thrown away with the crazy upper case bath water. Their con- clusion is that with na viable upper or lower case history left, history as such disappears in the postmodernist ait, Accordingly, pretiy much on ‘the basis that something which doesn't benafit them and their view of history must benefit somebody etse, they are led tawards the conclusion ‘that postmodemism is a left phenomenon, in this way we can seq that ‘traditionalists of both Ieft and centre/centre-right consider — pracisaly because postmodernism seems to undercut their own practices — that such a postmodernism Is in the service of those they are unsympathetic to, Elthr way, we can see that traditionalists of beth the upper and lower case would like some sort of “certalntist” fx against the postmodern. | come now to the fifth group, This is a group of historians who might best be described as “undecided or nuanced others,” Its members can appreciate the advantages of postmodern demysiification but they remain nostalgic for, say, a definitive method which would again prevent a situ: ation of “anything goes”: which would privilegerlegtimate their particular readings, | am thinking here of such people as Joyce Apploby. Lynn Hurt, Margaret Jacob, Tony Bennett, Raphael Samual, ef al., people who stil hope that thelr positions are not just capricious choices but are capable of boing “underwritten.” ‘We naw have a situation where the historians In this volume can be Classified as follows: (1) Historians who like the collapse of the upper ease (Lyotard ef al} (2) Historians wha specially dstika the collapse of the: upper case (Christopher Norris at al). (@) Historians who like the collapse of the lower case (Robert Berkh- fer et at). (4) Historians who like the collapse of the upper case but not the collateral fall-out on the lower (Gertrude Himmeltard et al), (5) Historians (nvancediamblguous others) who can see the pluses and minuses of postmadernism and who mix postmodern post tions with older radical commiiments and practices (Tony Bennett et al). This constitutes the rationale for the inclusion of the above types of historian/theorist in this volume, I now want to explain how | have placed these five types into the four Parts which make up this Reader.imrnopuetion | have organized the extracts from the historians who fall into: the above five categories in fvo ways, ona where, within their Parts, ind vidual historians "stand alone," the other where they are embedded in a series of debates generally taken fram journals. That is, to spell this out, the first "half" of the volume is made up of three Parts: Part |: On History in the Upper case: For and Against Postmodam Histories (i.0., Lyotard et al. v, Norris et al.) Par Il: On History in the Lower case: Far and Against the Collapse ‘of the Lower case (La., Berkhofer et al v. Himmelfarb et al) Part Ill: Nuanced or Ambiguous Others (Le,, Bennett ef) In these three Parts the readings (overwhelmingly drawn from books) will be relatively short. This Is where historians “sland alone.” The extracts repreduced In them are, i you like, a. series of “postioned tasters"; a series of extracts which allow the divisions, the issues, and tho differ: ences between historians’ altitudes to the postmodern fo be cast in sharp relief. Part IV (in effect constituting the second “half” of the volume) will then bo made up of a series of debates taken averwhelmingly from the Journals wherein the positions outlined in Farts | to fll are articulated within particular arenas: within, say, Social History or the History of Ideas. These readings are generally longer than those in Pans | to ill, indeed, wherever possible | have tried to reproduce full articies, often complete with footnates, 80 that readers may have before them fairy self-contained Gebates. | think that in the: case of the extracts in Parts | to Il, readers wil have to go to the books anyway simply because from a book of, say, somo 200 pages, a taster is all that can be givan. But in the case of artictes, if these can be given pretty much in their entirety, then this avoids readers having to search aut often elusive back numbers of Journals. Having more or less complete articles which ara often part of an ongoing dabate also means that the juxtaposition of opposing views. sharpens the issues, and 0 may aid discussion by students In, say, seminar groups. Part IV ig thas made up of readings taken from the journals: Past and Present, Social History, and History and Theory; and Cone book: S. Friedlander (ed.) Probing the Limits of Representation: The Holocaust Debate, Cambridge, Mass,, Harvard University Press, 1992, At this point it may be useful to readers fo have tho contents of the book skeiched out in full and “in contextPART I: ON HISTORY IN THE UPPER CASE: FOR AND AGAINST POSTMODERN HISTORIES For Postmodem Histories: (1) J. F Lyotard, The Postmeder Condition @) J. Baudrillard, The lilusion of the Erad G) E, Ermarth, Sequel ¢o History (4) D. Elam, Romancing the Postmodern; Feruinism and Deconstruction ) R. Young, White Mythologies (6) L Chambers, Migraney, Culture, Identity Against Postmodern Histories: (2) E, Fox-Genovese, Literary Criticism and the Politic of the New Historicism (2) ©. Norsis, Postmadernizing History: Rigit-wing Revisionism and the Uses of Theory (3) B. Palmer, Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, and the Ostensile End of Marxism: Tae Poverty of Theary Revisitd PART II; ON HISTORY IN THE LOWER CASE: FOR AND AGAINST THE COLLAPSE OF THE LOWER CASE For the Collapse of the Lower Case: (1) R. Barthes, The Discourse of History @) M. Foucault, Nietesche, Genealogy, History @) H. Kellner, Language an Historical Representation (@) R. Berkhofer, The Challenge of Poctcs to (Normal) Historical Practice Against the Collapse of the Lower Case: (1) G. Hitimelfarh, Telling 11 As You Like fk: Postmodernist History an the Flight from Fact (2) G. Elton, Retuerm to Essentials (3) G. Spiegel, History, Historicism, and the Sacia! Logic of the Text in the Middle Agesmrnoouetion PART Ill: NUANCED OR AMBIGUOUS OTHERS (2) J. Appleby, L. Hunt, M. Jacob, Telling the Treth Abou! History (2) T. Bennett, Outside Literature: Texts in History (3) S. Stanford Friedman, Moking History: On Feminism, Nevrative and Desire PART IV: DEBATES FROM THE JOURNALS Past and Present (1) L. Stone, “History and Postmodernism” (2) P Joyce, “History and Postmodernism” (3) C. Kelly, “History and Postmodernism” (2) L, Stone, “History and Postmodernism” ) G. Spiegel, “History and Postmodernism” History and Theory (1) FR Ankersmit, “Historiography and Postmodernism" 2) P Zagorin, “Historiography and Postmadernism Reconsiderations” Social History (I) N. Kirk, “History, Language, Ideas and Postmodernism: A Materialist View" 2) P. Joyce, “The End of Social History?” (3) G. Eley, and K. Nield, "Starting Over: The Present, The Post modem and. the Moment of Social History" (4) P.Joyce, “The End of Social Histary? A Brief Reply to Eley and Nicld” History and Theory and S, Friediander (ed,) Probing the Limits of Representation: The Holocaust Debate (1) &. Friedlander, “Probing the Limits of Representation” (2) H. White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth” (3) H. Kellner, “Never Again’ Is Now” (@) W. Kansteiner, “From Exception to Exemplum” (5) R. Braun, “The Holocaust and Problems of Representation” (6) B. Lang, "Is It Possible to Misrepresent the Holocaust?” | now have just two final comments to make, bath cf which are to dowith what this volume has “left out." First, t will be obvious by now that thia Reader is primarily on postmodem-type thecries and historiography: en “the nature of historlography” under the impact of the “posts.” But Questions which often arise in this content are what, aftr all this thaoe- laing, de (or would) postmodern histories actually look like: how are they (or how would they be) different from modemist historiography? These aro not easy questions to answer. One thing we can be tally sure about is that (if they exist} they wil nat be Ikke “histories in the Upper caso.” Less. certainly, we might say that they wil not be much Fike lower case histones ether In thelr old realist, “for its own sake" formulations, But this Is stil to beg the question, to say what they won't be rather than what they will No, what are required, it is sill said, are concrete examples of the new. | have already suggested why this rathar raasonable request is ifi- ‘out to fulfil, For postmodern histories are “historias of the future,” are histories “which have not yet bean," than they are claariy not yet in existence. There are, however, in the already existing works of, say, Hayden White, Jean Baudrillard, Natalie Zeman-Davis, Simon Schama, Stephen Bann ef al, iniimations of postmoder-ype histories at least according to some “trend spotters,” (for example, Hans Keliner, F. R, ‘Ankersmt, Raphael Samuel, Linda Hutchaon and Rebert Berkhafer) But, as | say, i is difficult to find tnorough-going sxamplss of this new genre (Borkhoter, tor example, cites Grag Dening’s Mister Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre an the Bounty; Richard Price's Alibf's Warlé; lobert Rosenstone’s Mirror in the Shrine: American Encounters with Moi Japan). and. perhaps mare importantly hare, short extracts from such works which would be lustrative. Consequently, \think that here | can anly recammand that readers go ta Kellner at al. tor further reading and particularly to Berknoter’s recently published volume, Beyond the Great Store History as Text and Discourse. This is ene of the most comprehensive volumes so far praduced on the impact of postmedemism on history (and especially on history in the lower casa) and It pulls together much of the literature (Borkhofer’s footnotes, sunning to eighty-one pages, are a verttable gold ming}. So to my second and final point. This Reader, ko every other, has been compiled under many constraints: of word limits, of time pressure, of the potential readership, of my own familiarity with the areas under ‘scrutiny, of tho decision to organize the Reader in four parts, and so an. Obviously many things have been left out. Whole areas which could have been included hava been omitted entirely. From a different perspec-mrnocuetion tive, or with hindsight, a different set of readings could have been solacted, and a different organization of the text could have centred or marginalized them, Nevertheless, | hope in what follows | have given a helpful and workabte cross-section of readings which “are as thay ara” for the sorts of reasons | have triad to explain in this Introduction. Indead it Is for this reason that | have tried to sketch out the posttian I hold towards postmedemism and historiography. For my own position on postmodernism explains why this volurne has the shepe it has. What | have tried to do here is therefore what | think we all ought to try and do as we edit and abridge and present to others what makes sense 10 us; that Is, to be as “open about aur closures” as we possibly can. For at jeast this enables the reader to review his or her own pasition “and so make the adjustments necessary for dialogue." NOTES: “The-teasoe why this Render isnot necessarily balances and dlr-intereted i not lewst because, a8 hia isa Poco Histery Renter, a pecple coming to it might ressanably expect pastmodem resdings fo be what the book subsuantally eenains. Lookdng ‘hrough other Reeders | nd very feur examples of oppositional expuments having such space in them (fer example, in poetalonial Renders you don't see lots of Apologies for colonialism). ln paint of fact, however, becruse much of this Realer ia lrranges! in terns of debates Which do give bath pra and ant postions, then bere fs acuallya considerable “balance” within i, and hopefully bot pro and ant positions ‘il give “food for thought: 2. The next few paragraphs follow the argument which | put forward in my On “Wut Js Flstory?”: From Care an Ellon Jo Barly and Wie, Landon: Raullesge, 195. 3, The-various debates as to the rps af postmacernism and the nature of postmedemity can beconerientiy flowed in, for ensmple, Devid Harvey's The Condition of Posrmnd- aire Oxford: Blackwell 1989; T. Docherty, Postmaiernism: A Rene, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheabseat, 1293. 4. Askmilac argument to mine can be found la Jahr Gray's Enlghtcement's Wale, Londen: Routledge, 1995- though my postion is somevet different to i 5. This has been put somewhat diferenty by J.C. Alexander kn his Fie Stele Soil Thearye Relativinn, Rauction end the Probl of Ror, Landon: Vero, 1995. See als H. Bear's The fésal ofthe Posrnader: A History Lendce: Routledge. 1995. JF Lyotard, The Fostmatem Candition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954. 7. |. Lyotard, The Difenent’ Phaser fv Dispute, Minnenpetis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. For hostile treatment of Tar Diferend see Christopher Nomis’ What Wrong Bovtmodernst? Hemel Hempsteed: Harvester Wheatsheal 150, especially fe Introduction |S Soe Robert Young, Wie Mythologies: Writing Blistory arf the Wit, London: Routed, 1990, lan Chambers, Migraey, Cult, Meaty Landon: Routledge, 1984 9, G, Mclaewan, "History and Thecey” in, Lteature ad History, 1, 2, 1984, pp. 64 se also his Marzi: end the Matnoiis of Fisory. London: Vers, TST, pain.18, Mebernnan, “History and Theor” p. 161. 11 Bid p10. YD. Mebane, Marsiam ond the Mthalogies of History op. cit. p. 9. IB. F Novick, That Nile Dream The “Objectivity Quast” and okt Ameean Hise! rafsrinn, Cambeicge: Cambridge University Prost 1988 14 hid. pp. 2 ASG. Mton, The Prartce of Histone London: Fanta, 1989; J Thy Tie Pur af Histone London: Langman, seccent tion, 19H; M, Stanfond, A Cempanion tthe Stay af ‘itory Oxford: Blackwell, 154, 16D. LaCapra, Mistry and Caticiza, New York: Coerell University Pra 1865, p. 17 WF Bid p18 18 Bid p18 18. bid. pas, WO. Bid ps 18 2 Bid pp. 20-1 1B. See or example, H. Whit Pras, 1987, 128. A. Danto, Analytic Phitophy of History, Cambeldge: Cambro Undoersty Press 1865, pas 25, Lorena, “Historical Knowietge and Iletorical Realy: A. Plea for frtornal Roalsey” Hisory aud Theory, 33,3, 198, pp. 297-344 pp. 313-14. 235, A.Callinias, Tasves sad Nurative Releckons onthe Bhiosophy of istry Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p78 25, R. Merkhodes, "The Challenge ol Postics to (Norenal} Historical Practice,” Puetice Tg 9,2. 1588, pp. 415-52 1. Wid p38 20, bid. pp. 467, 29, | Zammit, “Are We Being Theoretical Yet)..." The fournel of Madere Miter 65, 1. 3992, pp. THS-814 p. AU 30, R. Methholen op. St p. 9, 31 Mes. p 488 2 =. ‘The Castnt of the For, Blinn: Jobs Hopkins University Tad pS. NN. Geras, "Language, Trth and Justice” Nw Left Revs, 208, 1985, pp. 11035, p. 110, pis 14, E.R. Ankeremit ane HL Keline, 4 New Phlosophy of History Larson: Rethion, 1995; Sarge, “Reding the Signs” (Parts and If) History Works jour, 2-2, Auruzmn 991, Spring 1992 L. Hutcheon, The Pitre Pastmadzraism, Lontoee Rented ge 195%; BR, Beskholet, Meyond the Gna! Stry Hiskvy a Test and Discourse, Cambridge, Masa Hiarvard University Press, 1995 15, Attention ought also to be Brought here 6 Alu Manlow's analysa/ survey of the ‘ontomporary Nstoriographical sceoe, Deconstructing History. Landers Rolle Morthcoring) Mansiow is also co-etor {with Robert Rosenstone) of 2 new journal ‘af istenographical theory ani entice, Ralkakiy dstry pulled by Reside the ties a yexe, fons July 1997, 36, D. MacCannel. Expy Meeting Grownis, London: Routledge, 152, p. 10.Part | On history in the upper case _ For and against postmodern historiesCopyrighted materialEDITOR'S INTRODUCTION: FOR POSTMODERN HISTORIES In this and the following two Parts, | have taken extracts, genorally trom books rather than journal articles, to llustrate debates aver hislory in the Upper and lower case. In this frst Part | have chosen extracts which | hope introduce readers to some of the possiblities opened up by abandoring the Upper case and some of the fears, paricularty from traditionalists on ‘the ideotogical left, occasioned by the loss ot what are, in effect, metanar. ratives, ‘The first shor extract is taken tram J. F. Lyoterd's The Pastmoder Coneition, first published i French in 1979 and in English in 1884, In it Lyotard has two attempts at defining postrodemism. In the frst he one reprinted here — Lyctards further definition of postmademism as invoking ‘nations of the sublime is found in his Appendix) he famousty detines post- modernism as “ineredulty towards metanarratives.” That is, postmodernism ‘akea as Incredible the notion that an idea. (especially an idea of a scientific, kind, including soierific histories in the upper ease) can be legitimated by reference to a metadiscourse of the kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, A grand narrative may be the "herenautics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational ....ar the eeation of wealth.” Such legitim- ations sre, as: Lyotard puts i, currently being dispersed "in clouds of narralive language elements." This radical, nominalistic pragmatism, illustrates the notion that various adleged unities (totalibes, holism, teleclogies) are at best Convenient fetions and, at woest, totalizing mysifications in which can be found intimations of totalitarianism. For Lyotard, redial indeterminacy, the paxpetual openness of possibilities and a sceptical atituds towards all posi- tions bearing down on vs wearing the tabol of Truth, is-one af the guarantees cof human treedam, For Lyotard it is not so much radical sowpticism that should be feared, but all those positions which claim “to know” — and know for sure, Jean Baudrilard pushes this type of pastmodemism towards its “logical conclusions”: towards nihilism. Unlike other pastmodernists wno in order to have an (albert arbitrary) position trem which ta Work, yoke “Dastist” scepti- clsm ta some reworked aspect of modernity (0 thal, for example, pest- Marcsts stil yoke “postist” atttudas to some sort of Marxist poltical desire, oF postfeminists sill yoke their position to something recognizably “fominine") Baudrillard has no adjective with which to precede postmod- cemnism: he is all postmodern. ‘The extract from Baudrillard given here is the beginning of his meditations Con history fom The Musion of the End (1882), Wis ificult fo summarize the many arguments running through this suggestive text but, in @ nutshell,wwrm@ouerion Bavoillard's argument is that there is neither rhyme nor reason in existence, ‘and no reason to think that history is purposive: that it has in it adiscoverabie fend. Baudrilard’s book signals “the end of andism." In fac, to think of history ‘83 going somewhere, to suffer from the Busion of ondism, is something Which today we have overcome. ‘We now live in a period in which hypar- reality allows us to understand that “realty” has always been based ypon a oundiationtess “simulacrurn.” In the extract given here Baudellard considers the conditions necessary for the creation of modernist-lype histories. and argues that these have disappeared, Accordingly, there will be a new sort of history in the future of @ type which we have not yet seen, histories “without end Diane Elam, in extracts taken trom ther Romancing the Postradem (1992) and Feminism and Deconstruction (1884) arquably continues in the Spit of Baudrillard (and Derrida). Again, Elam's general poslion is nat easy to summarize but, at the risk of some simplification, she is concerned to show that, precisely because “wornan” i something that hes previously bean defined through gendered (male Gominated) discourse, then we have never yet Known what “woman” is. Yet, to define “woman” as being some- thing in particular, that something, if baing realized (‘realizing woman”) closes dawn the endless possiblities of women of the future. Having some thing to realize reinvokes the ideas of essentials and historical teleology, Consequenty, Elam wants a future where women endlessiy re-invent ther (metaphorical! selves in ways which mademist-iype definitions stabilize ang ‘80 oppose the notion of “endless” becoming. In the first of the two extracts given here trom Aamancing the Postmodem) Elam invokes the nation of the future-anterior verb; the iden that what passes for our prosent is not a fullness oF a total presence since 4 Is always marked as a potential past of our own future; a present which “will not have been good enough.” This is a refusal, then, to abstract the present from history as the single point from which @ perspective on history Gain be adapted. “In place of the living present comes the recognition of Presence as a lost abject, grasped only in its passing ... “Tamortow was another day" In the second extract (Irom Feminism and Deconstruction) Elam begins from the question of what — from the position of the radical, metaphorical alterty of women ~ would it mean ta write a history of women, tending the work af Joan Scott and concluding that such a history (written in the future anterior) would be an endless repositioning and rewriting: “history wiriten in the: future anterior is @ message thal is handed fo an Unknown addressee and accepts that its mesning in part will have to depend Upon that adaressee, History rewritten for a public that will have to rewrite it ceaselessly" Here, “endism” is permanently banishedInTRapUeTION [EBzabeth Deeds Ermarth’s Soquel to History (1982) examines the way in which modernist notions of linear time are subverted by postmodern notions of rhythmic time, an ides of time that “radically modifies or abandons ‘together the dialictics, the teleology, the transcendence, and the putstive neutrality of historical time... it replaces the Cartesian cogita with a diferent subjectivity whose manifesto might be Cortdza's “| swing, therefore I ar.” Whether oF not postmodem rhythmic time invokes @ new type of history remains, fer Ermarth, an @pen question: "I attend mainly to how postmodern time works, what it offers, and what is implicit requirements, gains, and esses may be, The work that undermines history alse epens new questions ‘and provides naw opportunities in practice." In the extracts oftered here, 1 reproduce Ermanh’s Prologue and her conclusion "Goda: Gn Contingency.’ in the hope that readers will themselves be driven to the quite briliantly suggestive “book” in batweon. ‘The final two extracts = from Robert Young's Wiite Mythologies: History Wirting and the West (1980) and Iain Chambers’ Migraney, Culture, identity (1994) - shift the perspectives on postmodern possibilities in ethnic direc tions. For bath writers what might be termed modemist histories are examples of white, male, Euro-centred, metropolitan scrpts — a local script which, nevertheless, wrote from its temporal and spatal paniculanty "tne hisiery of the wari.” And for both, postmodernism is the ‘return of the Topressed'; as Young concludes, today. “as "History’ glvas way to the "Post- modem’, we are witnessing the

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