1

BEFORE THE FEDERAL SERVICE TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD

Appeal No._______(R)CS/2017

Ms. Naghma Adeeb, Ex-Lecturer (Political Science), Islamabad Model College

for Girls, G-10/4, Islamabad,
Address for purpose of Service
R/o House No.20, Street No.14, Sector-A, Bharia Enclave, Islamabad.

………….Appellant
VERSUS

1. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Capital Administration and

Development Division, Islamabad.

2. The Director General, Federal Directorate of Education, Islamabad.

3. Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Pak.

Secretariat, Islamabad.

4. The Accountant General of Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad.

………Respondents
<<<<<<>>>>>>
APPEAL UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SERVICE
TRIBUNALS ACT, 1973.

Respectfully Sheweth:

Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with non-payment of pensionary /

retiring benefits coupled with the impugned Revised Pay Slip No.GA-
VIII/PF/AR-25 dated 17.11.2017 whereby the representation of the appellant
which remained in correspondence between the Principal, Islamabad Model
College for Girls (Post Graduate) G-10/4, Islamabad and the Federal Directorate
of Education for grant of similar treatment of the case of Naheed Naushahi
reported as 2010 SCMR 11 in respect of regularization of service and payment of
back benefits for the period from 20.12.1999 to 13.07.2007 has adversely been
decided in terms of non-acceptance of the representation and downward sliding of
her pay and allowances without any Show Cause Notice or personal hearing
which were being drawn by her as disclosed through the impugned Revised Pay
Slip issued by the respondent No.4, and also Last Pay Certificate dated 22.11.2017
indicating rates and scale of pay which were never drawn by appellant and the
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recoverable amount of Rs.1,330,686/- on account of so-called overpayment of pay

and allowances from 13.07.2007 to 02.07.2017 which are illegal, unjustified, void
ab-initio, whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, without lawful authority, in colourable
exercise of power/ discretion virtually coram-non-judice and of no legal effects to
the rights of the appellant, hence this Service Appeal, inter-alia, on the following
facts and grounds:

FACTS

1. That the appellant started service career by joining the Federal Government
Higher Secondary School, G-8/4 Islamabad as Lecturer (BS-17) on ad-hoc
basis on 24.08.1989 for a period of six months. The ad-hoc appointment
was extended and despite the fact that she always performed her duties with
honesty, dedication and beyond the call of her normal duties, her services
were terminated w.e.f. 29.12.1990 but later on in pursuance of the policy
decision of the Federal Government regarding ad-hoc appointees she was
reinstated on 23.12.1993 and she remained in service till 20.12.1999 when
her services were again dispensed with and she was relieved of her duties.

2. That aggrieved from the order of relieving the appellant filed a

departmental appeal which was rejected on 04.07.2000. The appellant
accordingly filed Service Appeal in the Federal Service Tribunal at Lahore
Bench vide Appeal No.673(L)CS/2000. The appeal was finally decided by
the learned Tribunal on 16.03.2006 with the direction that the case of the
appellant be sent to FPSC irrespective of the category contained in the
order dated 21.10.1997 and it will be for the FPSC to consider her case and
take a decision in the matter. It was further directed that in the event any
difficulty is felt, the matter may be referred to the President of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan in terms of Section 23 of Civil Servant Act, 1973 and
that the entire process shall be completed within a period of six months
from the date of the copy of the order is received in the office of the
respondents.

3. That pursuant to the above direction of the Hon’ble Tribunal the case of the
appellant was sent to the FPSC where the appellant was also associated in
the process of interview to determine her fitness and the FPSC vide its
order dated 13.06.2007 decaled her fit for retention in service against the
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post of Lecturer in Political Science (BS-17) in the Federal Directorate of

Education. The Ministry of Education also issued Notification dated
07.08.2007 for her reinstatement / retention in service as Lecturer in
Political Science (BS-17) in F.G. College for Women whereas the matter of
determination of her seniority and payment for the intervening period from
20.12.1999 was kept pending till the receipt of the advice from
Establishment Division. She accordingly rejoined her duties on 13.07.2007
and her pay was fixed as per the pay last drawn by her at the time of
relieving from service on 20.12.1999.

4. That one of the colleagues of the appellant named Mrs. Naheed Naushahi
who was appointed as Lecturer alongwith the appellant, was relieved from
service alongwith the appellant in similar manner and was reinstated in
service through like process of determination of fitness by the FPSC and
was similarly placed with the appellant filed a Service Appeal No.1052(R)
CS/2006 in the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad for payment of all back
benefits from 20.12.1999 to 28.12.2005. The appeal was accepted vide
judgment dated 24.03.2009 with the direction to the respondent that the
appellant shall be entitled to the payment of full back benefits from
20.12.1999 to 28.12.2005 and the seniority in accordance with law. The
decision of the Tribunal was assailed by the Government in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court which was decided by the Hon’ble Court vide judgment
reported as 2010 SCMR 11 titled Federation of Pakistan Vs. Naheed
Naushahi. The operative part of the judgment is as follows:

“6. Thus we are of the considered opinion that the Service

Tribunal instead of granting relief as it is evident from the
concluding paras, with regard to the financial back benefits may
have referred the case to the department for establishing a
Committee for the purpose as noted above. Before parting with this
order it is to be noted that the department shall refer the case of the
respondent to the Committee, which will be constituted in view of the
above instructions contained in Sl. No.151 of the Code for
determining whether she is entitled for the claimed financial benefits
or not. However, the department is directed to dispose of the matter
in respect of her back benefits expeditiously but not beyond the
period of two months on receipt of this order”.
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5. That Mrs. Naheed Naushahi was accordingly allowed arrears of pay and
allowances for the period with effect from 20.12.1999 to 28.12.2005
alongwith other benefits. Although the appellant had not approached any
court of law but she had applied for extending of the benefit of the
judgment in the case of Naheed Naushahi and grant of payment of arrears
of pay and allowance from 20.12.1999 to 13.07.2007 and have pursued the
same from time to time. As the appellant and Mrs. Naheed Naushahi were
similarly placed in the matter of appointment, relieving and determination
of reinstatement / retention through the FPSC the appellant was entitled for
the similar treatment in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Pakistan.

6. That the case of the appellant remained in correspondence between the

College, the Federal Directorate of Education and the Establishment
Division. No formal result of this exchange of communication was ever
communicated to the appellant.

7. That in the meanwhile the appellant stood retired from service w.e.f.
02.07.2017 and result of her representation pending with the respondents /
state functionaries ultimately translated in the shape of an order of the
respondent No.4 in the form of issuance of Revised Pay Slip four and half
months after her retirement whereby she has been treated as a fresh
appointee on 13.07.2007 and her pay was accordingly revised from
13.07.2007 to 02.07.2017 and her last pay drawn has been reduced from
Rs.60690/- to Rs.55570/- and as a result of this re-fixation an overpayment
of Rs.1,330,686/- has been worked out and indicated as recoverable in the
last pay certificate issued on 22.11.2017 which is totally unjustified.

8. That the pay which has been drawn by the appellant was duly authorized by
the respondent No.4/AGPR and the same was drawn through computer
payroll of the AGPR throughout and not a single penny was received by the
appellant which had not been authorized by the AGPR Islamabad from time
to time. The DDO of the College had always remained in loop in the matter
of drawing pay and allowances from the AGPR and the appellant has not
operated independently at any point of time. Downward sliding of the pay
and working out overpayment on basis thereof is unjustified and is a total
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somersault by the AGPR, Islamabad and that too after the retirement of the
appellant. Even otherwise the amounts received in good faith are not
recoverable.

9. That the appellant joined service on 24.08.1989 and terminated on

29.12.1990 which was converted into reinstatement as per Cabinet Division
on 23.12.1993. She continued in service till 20.12.1999 when she was
relieved from service. She was reinstated / retained in service through the
process of determination of selection by the FPSC in pursuance to the
judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 03.04.2006 and she joined
on 13.07.2007. She continued serving the department till her date of
retirement i.e. 02.07.2017 and resultantly she had put in a continuous
service w.e.f. 24.08.1989 till 02.07.2017 and is entitled to end service
benefits for 28 years of service.

10. That in terms of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 an authority

competent to make order has power to undo it but the order cannot be
withdrawn or rescinded once it has taken legal effect and certain rights are
created in favour of any individual and principle of locus-poenitentiae
would be available. The respondent No.4 was simply debarred to revise the
Pay Slip on the touchstone on this law.

11. That it is also pointed out that Last Pay Certificate (LPC) represent the
payment last drawn by an officer and the rate and scale of pay indicated in
the Last Pay Slip issued on 22.11.2017 was never drawn by the appellant. It
is not the LPC but instead a hypothetical certificate issued by the AGPR,
Islamabad.

12. That the reduction of pay and allowances have been effected by the AGPR
Islamabad when the appellant was not in service and stood already retired
on 02.07.2017 and that too without any Show Cause Notice and
opportunity of personal hearing and that too after over four months of the
retirement of the appellant which is nullity in law per-in-curium because
she is no more a civil servant and no penalty whatsoever can be imposed
upon her after retirement. The payment drawn by the appellant under the
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authority of the AGPR tantamount to entitlement of the appellant and no

order of re-fixation of pay is admissible after retirement.

13. That the appellant is entitled to the identical treatment as has been meted
out to Mrs. Naheed Naushahi which has also been extended to her through
departmental action but on the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Pakistan. There is no denial that the appellant is similarly placed with Mrs.
Naheed Naushahi and she cannot be discriminated on the only ground that
she has not invoked litigation against the Government.

14. That it is well settled law in the case of Hamid Akhtar Niazi Vs. The
Secretary Estt. Division, Govt. of Pakistan and others reported as 1996
SCMR 1185 if the Service Tribunal or Supreme Court has decided certain
question of law that the benefits of the same should not be restricted to the
civil servants who litigated but to all similarly placed in the like
circumstances. The case of the appellant therefore fulfill the criteria set out
in the above judgment and she is entitled for all back benefits of service
including payment of arrears, grant of seniority and the promotion under
the prevalent service rules.

15. That even if the representation is rejected and the benefits of judgment in
case of Mrs. Naheed Naushahi are not extended to the appellant, there is no
occasion or cause of sliding down her pay which was duly authorized by
the AGPR Islamabad on 13.07.2007 on the basis of her pay last drawn on
20.12.1999 and which graduated with the passage of time till date of
retirement of 02.07.2017. The order of re-fixation is illegal, unlawful and is
nullity in the eye of law.

16. That the appellant has no other remedy except to seek the kind indulgence
by this Hon’ble Tribunal inter-alia on the following:

GROUNDS

a) The impugned Revised Pay Slip dated 17.11.2017 and also

Last Pay Certificate dated 22.11.2017 indicating recoverable amount
of Rs.1,330,686/- on account of overpayment of pay and allowances
from 13.07.2007 to 02.07.2017 are illegal, unjustified, void ab-initio,
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whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, without lawful authority, in

colourable exercise of power/ discretion virtually coram-non-judice
and of no legal effect to the rights of the appellant.

b) There is absolutely no legal or moral justification for issuing

the impugned Revised Pay Slip dated 17.11.2017, whereby the
representation of the appellant which remained in correspondence
between the Principal, Islamabad Model College for Girls (PG) G-
10/4, Islamabad and the Federal Directorate of Education for grant of
similar treatment of the case of Naheed Naushahi reported as 2010
SCMR 11 in respect of regularization of service and payment of back
benefits for the period from 20.12.1999 to 13.07.2007 has been
decided in terms of downward sliding of the pay and allowances of
the appellant thereby indicating that her representation has finally
been rejected by the competent authority as disclosed through the
impugned Revised Pay Slip issued by the respondent No.4.

c) The appellant has been victimized by the respondents for

none of her fault. The pay which has been drawn by her was duly
authorized by the respondent No.4/AGPR and the same was drawn
through computer payroll of the AGPR throughout and not a single
penny was received by the appellant which had not been authorized
by the AGPR Islamabad from time to time. The impugned action is
violative of Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic
of Pakistan, 1973.

d) The case of the appellant is at par with that of Mrs. Naheed

Naushai who was similarly appointed, terminated, reinstated and
finally declared fit for retention by FPSC in the same College /
Department and the relief granted to the aforesaid colleague of the
appellant firstly by the learned Federal Service Tribunal and the same
was slightly modified and confirmed by the apex Court vide
judgment reported as 2010 SCMR 11. The said benefit cannot be
denied simply because the former litigated for her rights while the
later did not. The cases of “Hameed Akhtar Niazi Vs. the Secretary,
Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and others (1996
 8

SCMR 1185). Tara Chand and others Vs. Karachi Water and
Sewerage Board, Karachi and others (2005 SCMR 499) and
Government of Punjab through Secretary, Education Civil
Secretariat, Lahore and others Vs. Sameena Parveen and others
(2009 SCMR – 1).

e) It is well settled principle of law that when the Tribunal or

Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan decides a question of law, the
same is also applicable to the non-litigant civil servants without
forcing them to file cases in the court of law. The dictum laid down
in the case of Hamid Akhtar Niazi Vs. The Secretary Establishment
Division, Government of Pakistan and others reported as 1996
SCMR 1185, has been violated by the respondent department, which
reads as follows:

“….If the Service Tribunal or Supreme Court decides a point

of law relating to the terms of service of a civil servant which
covers not only the case of civil servant who litigated, but
also of other civil servants, who may have not taken any legal
proceedings, in such a case, the dictates and rule of good
governance demand that the benefit of such judgment by
Service Tribunal/Supreme Court be extended to other civil
servants, who may not be parties to the litigation instead of
compelling them to approach the Service Tribunal or any
other forum”.

Reliance is further placed on the case law reported as:

i) 1995 PLC (CS) 188 (Lahore High Court)

“Public functionaries are not supposed to fix different

standard, criteria for different persons in similar situation
without change of circumstances”.

j) PLD 1999 Karachi, 372

“Where vested right had matured in favour of someone

through fulfillment of all requirement of law and adverse
action had been taken in exercise of executive power, such
action could be declared to e unlawful.” [p. 381] D.

f) The appellant has not been dealt with in accordance with the
law, which is violative of Article 4 of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
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g) The appellant has been subjected to severe discrimination by

the respondent-department by rejecting her representation as
disclosed through the impugned Revised Pay Slip issued by the
respondent No.4, and also Last Pay Certificate dated 22.11.2017
indicating recoverable amount of Rs.13,30686/- on account of
overpayment of pay and allowances from 13.07.2007 to 02.07.2017.
The appellant has not played any fraud / forgery but received
payment in good faith after approval of the competent authority.
Recovery totally unjustified. Reliance is placed on PLD 1992 SC –
207.

h) The executive authorities are bound to use discretion in a

just and fair manner while dealing with the cases of their sub-
ordinates, which has a great social impact and should not be lead by
personal whims and wishful thinking.

i) The impugned action is in violation of the principle of good

governance, social justice and principle of natural justice.

j) The case of the appellant was required to be considered

sympathetically, who has rendered her youth for the service of the
department and retired, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case reported as 1991 SCMR 104.

k) The reduction of pay and allowances have been made by the

respondent No.4 from the appellant without any Show Cause Notice
and opportunity of personal hearing and that too after over four
months of her retirement which is nullity in law per-in-curium
because she is no more a civil servant and no penalty whatsoever can
be imposed upon her after retirement. The payment drawn by the
appellant under the authority of the AGPR tantamount to her
entitlement and no order of re-fixation of pay is admissible after
retirement.

l) The appellant is being deprived of the benefit of judgment

passed in Naheed Naushahi for no fault of her own, as per declared
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Pakistan and therefore, left at the
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mercy of misconceptions, whims, prejudices and sweet will of the

respondents. The instant situation, therefore, warrants kind
indulgence and interference by this Hon'ble Tribunal.

m) In terms of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 an

authority competent to make order has power to undo it but the order
cannot be withdrawn or rescinded once it has taken legal effect and
certain rights are created in favour of any individual and principle of
locus-poenitentiae would be available. The respondent No.4 was
simply debarred to revise the Pay Slip on the touchstone on this law.
Reliance is placed on the following judgments:-

i) 2010 PLC (CS) 73

“There is no cavil to the proposition that by virtue of the

provision of section 21 of the General Clauses Act the power
of rescinding an order is available to the government till
decisive steps is taken and an authority competent to pass an
order is also empowered to undo such an order but this power
cannot be exercised in respect of an order which having taken
legal effect has created rights in favour of an individual,
unless it is shown that it was a void or illegal order or has
been passed without jurisdiction. The above principle
envisaged in section 21 of the General Clauses Act has been
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled
Government of Pakistan v Muhammad Himayat Ullah PLD
1969 SC 407. Engineer in Chief Branch V. Jalauddin PLD
1992 SC 207 Abdul Haque Indhar v Province of Sindh 2000
SCMR 907 and in a number of subsequent judgments. The
Chief Court on the basis of same principle placing reliance
on 2009 SCMR page 775 dismissed the civil revision”.

ii) 2009 PLC (CS) – 234 LHC.

“…Authority which can pass order is entitled to vary or to

rescind the same but such power does not include the power
or authority to take away a validly acquired right… Power of
rescinding till decisive steps are taken is also exercisable for
replacing or rectifying wrong steps taken by concerned
authority…. Such power is not available to such authority
when decisive steps have already been matured… Decisive
step is deemed to have been taken when order takes effect and
certain rights are created in favour of beneficiary of such
order… Authority which has passed an order can withdraw
same but only before decisive steps have been taken.. Moment
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the matter has been finalized and the other party has also
acted upon it, valuable rights created thereby cannot be
jeopardized by rescinding such order. [ p. 238] B.

iii) PLD 2008 Lahore 488.

“15…………The exercise of powers under special enactment

does not imply a power to review earlier orders in exercise of
inherent powers, unless the power of review is specifically
conferred by the said statute. Reliance in this regard is placed
upon the cases of Inayat Ullah Khan & Co. v Secretary Food,
Government of Punjab and 2 others (2006 YLR 656), Mian
Ghulam Mustafa and another v. Chief Conservator of Forest
Punjab and another (2004 PLC (CS) 527), Tanya Knitwear
(Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. First Women Bank Ltd. (PLD 2008
Karachi 29), Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1981 SC
94), Messers Haji Abdul Ghafoor Haji Muhammad v. Central
Board of Revenue and others (2004 PTD 2524), Dr. Shahnaz
Nadir v. The Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary
Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and 3 others (2005 PLC (CS)
88), National Development Finance Corporation v. Wafaqi
Mohtasib, Islamabad and others (2004 CLD 260) and
Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner Rawalpindi and
others (PLD 1970 SC 1).

The provision of the said section, which does not include the
power of review, cannot be stretched on the rule of beneficial
interpretation, which cannot be claimed on unreasonable
construction of law. Reliance in this respect is placed on
Messrs New Shaheen Trading Company through Managing
Director v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary
Ministry of Commerce and 2 others (2008 SCMR 17).

iv) 2007 PLC (CS) – 824 SC

“…Rule of locus poenitentiae is that the power of rescinding

is available to Government or relevant authorities to retrace
and undo the wrong order till a decisive step is taken…
Authority which had power to make on order had taken effect
and certain rights had been created in favour of an
individual, such an order could not be rescinded or
withdrawn to the detriment of the such individual.. Such is
not an unfettered power to be used at any stage in any
manner for undoing an order which having already taken
effect, has created vested rights… Spirit of rule of locus
poenitentiae is that once an order is given effect to and in
consequence thereof certain rights are created in favour of a
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person, such rights cannot be subsequently taken away. [p.

830] D & E”.

v) (2007 PLC (CS) 703).

Provision of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897

undoubtedly, had provided that power to pass an order
included the power to amend, vary or rescind it, but that
power being enshrined in the principle of locus –poenitentiae,
could not be exercised where the order passed was acted
upon and a valuable right had accrued in consequence
thereof

vi) [2010 PLC (CS) 1391 & 2011 PLC (CS) 852].
It is also pertinent to mention here that section 21 of General
Clauses Act, 1897 postulates that an authority which passes
an order is competent to vary, rescind or cancel the order
passed by the authority but such power is not absolute as the
same is subject to certain limitations. Where the order sought
to be varied or cancel is communicated to other party, a very
valuable right accrues to the party and the issuing authority
becomes functus offico to vary, rescind or cancel its earlier

vii) 2011 PLC (CS) 1151

Under principle of “locus –poenitentiae” the authority

competent to pass an order can get the same rescinded but
when an order has been passed and it has taken legal effect
then notwithstanding the power available to it under section
21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, the same cannot be
withdrawn unless and until it is established that the order was
obtained by practicing fraud or misrepresentation.

viii) 2012 CLC 1308

Mere issuance of communication of order, notification or by-

laws as provided by section 20 and 21 of General Clauses
Act, 1897, did not mean that it had taken final effect. Only the
doctrine of “locus –poenitentiae” would apply, when such
order or notification issued or communicated to the party
concerned, had fully acted upon, then the authority who
issued it, could not rescind or cancel the same.

ix) (2007 PLC (CS) 58; 2005 SCMR 1490).

Principle of locus –poenitentiae could only be pressed into

service to protect that legal rights based on lawful orders.
Principle of locus –poenitentiae was available to the
Government or relevant authorities which were competent to
make order and had power to undo it but such order could
 13

not be withdrawn or rescinded once it had taken legal effect

and had created certain rights in favour of any individual.

x) 1999 CLC 723

Authority competent to make order has power to undo same

but the order cannot be withdrawn or rescinded once it has
taken legal effect and certain rights are created in favour of
any individual. Authority can exercise the power of
modification and under provision of Section 21 of General
Clauses Act, 1897, the principle of locus –poenitentiae will be
available.

y) PLD 1991 973 Govt. of Sindh and another Vs. Sher

Muhammad Makhdoon and two others). Wherein it has been
held that vested right in favour of an employee cannot be
undone.

n) It is well settled principle of law that the discretion vested

with the authority is not unbridled but requires to be exercised fairly,
justly, honestly and keeping in view the circumstances faced by the
petitioners. The authority, nevertheless prefer to exercise discretion
arbitrary, malafidely, capriciously and whimsically; where-for the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases reported as 1995 SCMR 650 and
again reiterated in the case reported 2005 SCMR 25 has
authoritatively held as under:

1995 SCMR 650

“Discretion to be exercised has to be judged and considered

in the background of facts and circumstances of each case.
Discretion is not to be exercised on whims, caprices and
mood of Authorities. Exercise of discretion is circumscribed
by principle of justice and fairness.”

2005 SCMR 25

“Discretionary power---pre-conditions: Seven instruments

that are most useful in structuring of discretionary powers are
open plan, open policy statement, open rules, open findings,
open reasons, open proceedings and fair informal procedure.

Exercise of discretion – Principles: Functionaries of any

organization or establishment cannot be allowed to exercise
discretion at their whims, sweet will or in an arbitrary
manner, rather they are bound to act fairly, evenly and
justly.”
 14

1990 SCMR 999

“….All actions taken against civil servants with regard to

employment can be challenged on the ground of malafide of
law or malafide of fact. Malafide of law is involved where
authority not competent has taken an action or the mandatory
procedural requirements for taking the action or the
jurisdictional requirements for it remains unsatisfied. Mala
fide in fact relates to those cases where personal bias, grudge
or vindictiveness is the prompting force for action ostensibly
in proper form and content. The latter category of actions is
as much violation of terms and conditions of employment as
is the first category because public power is never entrusted
or reposed in functionary to be exercised or achieving
personal ends like unjust enrichment, vindictiveness or
revenge. Terms and conditions of service embrace bona fide
discharge of public duties by the repository of public power”.

Discretion becomes an act of discrimination. Reliance is placed on

the case law reported as 2001 SCMR 256.

2001 SCMR 256

“….Art. 2-A, 4 & 25 Equality of citizen, principle of …

Exercise of discretion by Authority…Scope ….Exercise of
discretion is not an act of discrimination…Discretion
becomes an act of discrimination only when it is improper or
capricious exercise or abuse of discretionary authority, and
the person against whom that discretion is exercised faces
certain appreciable disadvantages which he would not have
faced otherwise …Where the discrimination is not based on
any rational grounds bearing upon the subject dealt with, the
law offends against the principle of equality and is void [p.
264] D”.

2009 PLC (CS) 523 SC,

“….Held, while dealing with the cases where the aggrieved

party had alleged discrimination, the Court could not overlook
the implication thereof… Equal treatment of all similarly
situated was basis principle on which rested justice under the
law… If evenhanded justice was not administered, same could
have many adverse and negative effects on a society and could
cause discontentment and frustration in the social set up and
there could be no denial that social justice was an objective and
enshrined in the Constitution”.

2009 SCMR – 187- SC,

 15

“….Equal treatment of all similarly situated was the basic

principle on which rested justice under the law… If evenhanded
justice was not administered, same could have many adverse
and negative effects on a society and could cause
discontentment and frustration in the social set up and there
could be no denial that social justice was an objective and
enshrined in the Constitution”.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, on the point to remove

disparity, has authoritatively held in the case reported as 2005 SCMR
100 as under:-

“By Article 2-A of the Constitution, which has been made its
substantive part, it is unequivocally enjoyed that in the state of
Pakistan principle of equality, social and economic justice as
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed which shall be
guaranteed as fundamental right. The principle of policy
contained in Article 38 of the Constitution also provide, inter
alia, that the state shall secure the well being of the people by
raising their standards of living and by ensuring equitable
adjustment of rights between employees and employer and
provide for all citizens, within the available resources of the
country, facilities for work and adequate livelihood and reduce
disparity in income of individuals”.
P R A Y E R:

In view of the above facts and legal position, it is respectfully prayed

that this Hon’ble Tribunal on acceptance of the instant service appeal, may
graciously be pleased to:

i) Set aside the impugned Revised Pay Slip dated 17.11.2017 whereby the
pay of the appellant has been slashed downward and also Last Pay
Certificate dated 22.11.2017 indicating rates of pay which were
never drawn by the appellant and recovery amount of Rs.1,330,686/-
on account of overpayment of pay and allowances from 13.07.2007
to 02.07.2017 being illegal, unjustified, void ab-initio, whimsical,
capricious, arbitrary, without lawful authority, in colourable exercise
of power/ discretion virtually coram-non-judice.

ii) Direct the respondents to immediately extend all the benefits of

judgment passed in the identical case of Mrs. Naheed Nauushahi, by
the learned Federal Service Tribunal and the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reported as 2010 SCMR 11 and to make payment of arrears of pay
 16

and allowances from 20.12.1999 to 13.07.2007 to the appellant as

allowed to the aforesaid her colleague being similarly placed;

iii) Direct the respondents to allow pensionary benefits including leave

encashment and farewell grant on the basis of pay fixed after
extending benefit of the judgment in the case of Mrs. Naheed
Naushahi as per length of service calculated from 24.08.1989 to
02.07.2017;

iv) Any other relief which this Honorable Tribunal deems just and
appropriate in the circumstances of the matter may also be granted in
favour of Appellant and against the Respondents in the public
interest and interest of justice; and

v) Grant costs of the appeal.

(MS. NAGHMA ADEEB)

APPELLANT

THROUGH:

(YASSER RAHIM BHATTI) (ABDUL RAHIM BHATTI)

Advocate High Court Advocate
Supreme Court of Pakistan

(QAISAR RAHIM BHATTI) (FAISAL RAHIM BHATTI)

Advocate High Court Advocate High Court

SERVICE LAW CHAMBER, RAWALPINDI

Office No.4, Satellite Shopping Centre,
6th Road, Rawalpindi.
Ph: 4419270

AND

SERVICE LAW CHAMBER, ISLAMABAD

Bungalow No.778, Sector I-8/2,
Main Service Road, Islamabad
Mob.0300-5535354

Dated: December, 2017.

17
 18

BEFORE THE FEDERAL SERVICE TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD

Appeal No._______(R)CS/2017

Ms. Naghma Adeeb, Ex-Lecturer (Political Science),

Islamabad Model College for Girls, G-10/4, Islamabad,
………….Appellant
VERSUS

Federation of Pakistan through Secretary,

Capital Administration and Development Division,
Islamabad & others.
………….Respondents

APPEAL UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SERVICE

TRIBUNAL ACT, 1973

AFFIDAVIT

I, Ms. Naghma Adeeb, Ex-Lecturer (Political Science), Islamabad Model

College for Girls, G-10/4, Islamabad, R/o House No.20, Street No.14,

Sector-A, Bharia Enclave, Islamabad, do hereby solemnly affirm and

declare that the contents of the “accompanying appeal” are true and correct

to the best of my knowledge and belief and nothing has been concealed or

misrepresented there-from.

DEPONENT

Verified on oath at Islamabad on this _____ day of December, 2017 that the
contents of above Affidavit are true and correct and nothing has been
misrepresented therein.

DEPONENT
 19

BEFORE THE FEDERAL SERVICE TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD

Appeal No._______(R)CS/2017
Ms. Naghma Adeeb, Ex-Lecturer (Political Science),
VERSUS
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, CADD etc

APPEAL UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SERVICE TRIBUNAL ACT, 1973

INDEX
Sl. DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENTS DATED ANNEX PAGES
No.
1. Memo of appeal alongwith affidavit of appellant 08.12.2017 -- 1-17
2. Impugned Revised Pay Slip and Last Pay Certificate 17.11.2017 A & A-1 3
22.11.2017
3. Monthly Salary Statement June, 2017 1
4. Notification of retirement of appellant 14.04.2017 1
5. Appellant’s request for issuance of Last Pay 06.07.2017 1
Certificate with forwarding letter
6. CADD letter to Director (College, FDE – 21.10.2015 1
representation for similar treatment as of Naheed N.
7. FDE letter to Principal Islamabad Model College – 31.07.2015 1
representation for similar treatment
8. Appellant’s representation to Secretary, Education 25.05.2009 4
for regularization of adhoc service with covering
letter
9. M/o Education Notification of reinstatement 07.08.2007 1
10. FDE O.M - Consideration of Service of ex-adhoc 23.07.2007 1
lecturer
11. M/o Education letter – Consideration of service of 12.07.2007 1
ex-adhoc lecturer
12. FPSC letter to appellant – consideration of the 13.06.2017 1
services of Ex-adhoc Lecturer
13. FDE Notification of relieving of appellant 20.12.1999 1
14. Estt. Division Office Memo – extension in the 24.08.1999 1
period of adhoc appointment
15. Federal Directorate of Notification 25.02.1999 1
16. Federal Directorate of Education letter 19.03.1998 1
17. Pay Slip -- 2
18. Federal Directorate of Education letter 23.12.1993 1
19. Charge Assumption Report 23.12.1993 1
20. Federal Directorate of Education letter – 15.12.1990 1
termination of service w.e.f. 29.12.1990
21. Federal Directorate of Education Notification – Oct. 1989 1
appointment on ad-hoc basis
22. Offer of appointment as Lecturer 05.07.1989 1
 20

23. P.M’s Secretariat Office Memo 23.04.1989 1

24. Punjab University M.A degree -- 1
25. Accounts Officer letter to DDO 14.09.2017 1
26. Accounts Officer letter to DDO 24.08.2017 1
27. DDO letter to Accounts Officer 11.09.2017 1
28. Accounts Officer letter to DDO 14.09.2017 1
29. Tribunal Judgment with covering letter 03.06.2006 6
21.06.2006
30. F.G. Margalla College for Women letter 10.02.2011 1
31. Undertaking by Mrs. Naheed Naushahi -- 1
32. M/o Capital Administration & Development letter 15.10.2012 1
33. Federal Directorate of Education letter 22.08.2014 4
34. Pay Slip of Naheed Naushahi -- 2
35. Finance Division letter 12.01.2011 1
36. Federal Directorate letter 04.01.2011 1
--- Power of Attorney with copy of CNIC -- --- ---

(MS. NAGHMA ADEEB)

APPELLANT
THROUGH:

(YASSER RAHIM BHATTI) (ABDUL RAHIM BHATTI)

Advocate High Court Advocate
Supreme Court of Pakistan