[ GR No.

976, Oct 22, 1902 ]

US v. MAXIMO ABAD +

DECISION

1 Phil. 437

LADD, J.:

The offense with which the defendant was charged and of which he has been convicted is that
defined in section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission, which is as
follows: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer of the Army of
the United States, or before any officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands,
whether such official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not,
in which oath the affiant in substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of
the United States of America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who
shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such
terms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."

The defendant is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of
amnesty if the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. Assuming, for the
purposes of the present motion, that the defendant is guilty of the offense, there is no evidence in
the record showing that it was committed pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military
insurrectionary authorities, or that it grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between
Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities, or that it resulted from internal political feuds
or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is covered by the amnesty it must be because
it is embraced within the words employed in the proclamation to designate the first class, of
offenses amnestied, namely, "offenses of treason and sedition."

If these words are to be given a construction in accordance with their strict technical
signification, there will be some difficulty in holding that they include the offense in question.
Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States
or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same
act as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
certain enumerated objects of a political character. A violation of an oath containing the
comprehensive engagements of that in question may be committed without by the same act
committing either the crime of treason or that of sedition as thus defined, as, for example, in the
case of a conspiracy to commit these crimes or to commit the crime of insurrection. (Act No.
292, sees. 3, 4, 7.) And, conversely, the crime of treason or that of sedition may be committed,
without a violation of the oath of allegiance when it is committed, as it, of course, may be, by a
person who has never taken such oath. The act, therefore, by which the offense of violation of
oaths of allegiance, as defined in section 14 of Act No. 292, is committed, is not necessarily
identical, although it may be in particular cases, with that by which the technical crime of treason
or that of sedition is committed. And in all cases the offense of violation of an oath of allegiance
involves, in a sense, an element, namely, the breaking of an express promise, which may not be
present in treason or sedition.

In the present case the act by which the defendant is found by the court below to have violated
the oath was that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the existence of certain
rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of
the existence and whereabouts of which he was cognizant at the time of the denial. If this act was
a violation of the oath, which upon the evidence in the case may be doubtful, it was probably
also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving
them aid and comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to be regarded as merely an
incidental circumstance forming no part of the essence of the crime of violation of oaths of
allegiance, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the
amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name.

We prefer, however, to base our decision upon a broader ground, and one which will cover all
cases of prosecution for the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance.

There are a variety of offenses in the criminal codes of all countries which are not directed
primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the state, the authority of the
government or the general public tranquillity. All or nearly all of the offenses created and denned
in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them are treason properly so called
(section 1), misprision of treason (section 2), insurrection (section 3), conspiracy to commit
treason or insurrection (section 4), sedition properly so called (sections 5 and 6), conspiracy to
commit sedition (section 7), seditious words and libels (section 8), the formation of secret
political societies (section 9), and finally the offense in question (section 14). The line of
distinction between some of these offenses is often difficult to draw. They are all closely related
and may all be embraced under the general description of offenses of a treasonable and seditious
nature. When the framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe
the purely political offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without
specially enumerating the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under
those two general heads.

Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign
or liege lord, or to the supreme authority of the state." (Century Dictionary. ) Sedition, in its
more general sense, is "the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, title "Sedition.") Technical terms of the law whqn used in a statute are ordinarily to
be given their technical signification. But in construing an executive act of the character of this
proclamation, as in construing a remedial statute, a court is justified in applying a more liberal
rule of construction in order to effectuate, if possible, the beneficent purpose intended. Certainly
a limitation of the words in question to their literal and technical signification would utterly
defeat the unmistakable general object of the amnesty. Upon such a construction treason, the
highest of all political crimes, a crime which may be punished by death under section 1 of Act
No. 292, would be included in the amnesty, while insurrection, which is a crime of precisely the
same nature and differs from it solely in being inferior in degree and punishable by fine and
imprisonment only, would be excluded, A construction leading to such manifest inconsistencies
could be accepted only when the language admitted of no other. We think the construction
suggested as the true one though somewhat less restricted than the precise legal signification of
the terms "treason" and "sedition?' might warrant, may be adopted without doing violence to the
language of the proclamation, and there is no room for doubt in our minds that by adopting that
construction we carry out the real intention of the President.

We hold, therefore, that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political
offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and seditibn," as used
in the proclamation. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation, and upon filing
in this court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that
he be discharged. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Smith and Mapa, JJ., did not sit in this case.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.

Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for
appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs,
Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court.

He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:

The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria,
Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows:

That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or
about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder stated, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing
allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of
allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the
Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the
following manner, to wit:

1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the
Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and
comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a Japanese soldier, which
went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and
accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when
some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed
several men in the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of
the same day, the same party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese
Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and
treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house;
that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after setting
fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby with numerous
bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and
there killed.

2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro
Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all
armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the
house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese
garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the
guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on
the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said
Jose Unson never returned.

3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel,
Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei
Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort,
went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla
suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing
themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of
him.

4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by
two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena,
Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese Military Police and the
accused conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison
where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the
Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.

5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting as an
informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a
guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained
up to September 20, 1944.

6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives,
for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where
he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.

7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization designed to support the
Imperial

Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that he took military training from the Japanese
and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that
he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the
Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the
mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese
Army in Mount Malipuño, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.

That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the
crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.

Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the
mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the
houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest,
effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and several spies of the enemy. The body
of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet
thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at
the same times as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei,
was never heard of. Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the
previous morning raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the
actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough weight to
prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.

With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in
the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only
the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses
Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last that was seen of Jose Unson,
was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation
having been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts
relate to the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower
court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the
accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The
accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in Gagalañgin, Manila.

In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to
accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present
throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied
suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this defense,
considering it rather as corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the
witnesses for the prosecution.

Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the
lower court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest
because appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and
accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the kempei office.

Counts five and seven were not proven.

Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one,
two, three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's
brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's brief compromises one hundred
thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of fact of the
lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is
unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes
against the victimized persons.

Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel
wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal
responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the
correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as decreed by
the lower court.

Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids
only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it
either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some prisoners;
that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the
mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in October
1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only after he
had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary
promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this testimony
of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of the witnesses,
for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement,
and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal
responsibility for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were
declared proven by the People's Court.

The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated
by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of
wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the
killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was
already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of
all" (James 2:10).

We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as
treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the
wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court,
there is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members
taking part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the
lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty the accused deserves is that of
reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law.

The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows:

That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the
crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.

The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of
the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act,
by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a
continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are
some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not
changing the nature of the offense committed.

For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the
death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Laurel vs. Misa Digested
Laurel vs. Misa

77 Phil. 856

FACTS:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, theaccusedadhered to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that hecannot be tried fortreason since
his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be
tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the
Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanentallegiance
tohis government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it ispresumed that
thePhilippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot besuspended; it is
eithersubsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather,it was
theexercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspendedallegiance.
Regarding thechange of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the
Filipinopeople – is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name of government,
fromCommonwealth to theRepublic of the Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of
Japanese occupation, all the political laws of thePhilippineswere suspended. Thus, treason
under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishablewhere the lawsof the land are momentarily
halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at
the time of the Commonwealth since it was underthe United States. Hence, the acts of treason
done cannot carry over to the new Republicwhere thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1582 March 28, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
DALMACIO LAGNASON, defendant-appellant.

Juan Medina Cue for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of treason, was
convicted and sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from the evidence. From the
time of the occupation of the Province of Occidental Negros by the American troops, there had
existed therein a band of men in arms against the Government of the United States, which band
was led by the defendant and which in October was campaigning through the northern part of the
province. In the southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio Papa. These two parties,
though in communication with each other, had formerly operated independently, but in each
month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed himself and his forces under the orders of
said Dionisio Papa. His band was constantly armed and kept together, and its object was to
establish an independent government.

On October 29, 1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in
said province, but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there stationed. During that night
two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with additional forces and early in the morning they
left the pueblo in search of the defendant. He was encountered with his party about three
kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked by the Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a
half. The defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty of his men were killed. On the
side of the Constabulary were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were acting as guides.
The defendant's band consisted of between seventy and eighty men. They had for arms five or
ten rifles, bolos, daggers, and one small cannon. The defendant when captured was armed with a
rifle, a revolver, and a bolo. Most of his men wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps.
They carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured, together
with the cannon.

Article 3, section, of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:

Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in
open court.

The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. L., 112), contained the following provision:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United
States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort within the United States of elsewhere, and shall be thereof
convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act of the treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons
shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and shall suffer death.
The statute law of the United States stood in that form, so far as we are informed, until the act of
July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second sections of that were as
follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That every person who shall hereafter commit the crime of
treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death,
and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or at the discretion of the court,
he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand
dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; said fine shall be levied
and collected on any or all of the property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which
the said person so convicted was the owner at the time of committing the said crime, any
sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot,
assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United
States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give
aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof,
such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or
by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any
he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court."

In the Revised Statutes of the United States these provisions appear in section 5331, 5332, and
5334, which are as follows:

SEC. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies war against
them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States
or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

SEC. 5332. Every person guilty of treason suffer death; or at the discretion of the court,
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten
thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his property, real and
personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such treason, any sale or
conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason
shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

SEC. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or gives aid or
comfort thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a
fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both of such punishments; and shall,
moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission are as follows:

SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the
United States, or the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against them
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death or, at the
discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and
fined not less than ten thousand dollars.

SEC. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States, or of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or comfort to anyone so
engaging in such rebellion or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not
more than ten years and he fined not more than ten thousands dollars.
The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes of treason, rebellion, and sedition.
Article 236 of that code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of Act No. 292, but that act, as
to treason and rebellion, is practically a reproduction of the sections quoted from the Revised
Statutes.

Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of the country, the question as to what
constituted, a "levying of war" within the constitutional definition of treason had been before the
Federal courts on several different occasions.

In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted the
definitions of the phrase "levying war" which had been given by different judges of the United
States, and declared through the Chief Justice what the latter afterwards said in Burr's case (25
Fed. Cases, 13), to wit:

That part of his disposition which bears upon this charge is the plan disclosed by the
prisoner for seizing upon New Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States. That this
plan if consummated by overt acts would amount to treason no man will controvert.

Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether an armed
resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5, 1) constituted a levying of
war or not, and was or was not treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts of
violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Government
was "levying war against the United States," and was therefore treason, whether it was done by
ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)

No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or insurgent so far as
the act of "levying war" is concerned. All of the cases tried before the United States courts have
grown out of insurrection. The case of Mitchell grew out of the "whisky rebellion" in western
Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of the Northampton Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of
Burr's attempts; the case of Hanway out of resistance to the fugitive slave law; and the case of
Greathouse out of the civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made under the second
clause of the Constitutional provision, namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It has been
said that the word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy and does not include a rebel.

If it were not for the provisions of the second section of the act of July 17, 1862, now section
5334 of the Revised Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, the case at bar
would present no difficulty. The defendant would be clearly guilty of treason and punishable
under the first section of Act No. 292. He was engaged in an attempt to overthrow the
Government and was captured after an armed contest. It matters not how vain and futile his
attempt was and how impossible of accomplishment. The acts performed by him constituted a
levying of war. Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall be punished by death,
or imprisonment for not less than five years. Section 5334 declares that one engaging in a
rebellion or insurrection against the United States shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than ten years. As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason,
the same act seems to be punished by both sections and in different ways.

This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case of United States vs. Greathouse (4
Sawy., 457 S. C.; 26 Fed. Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting in the circuit court. The
defendants in that case were indicted under the second section of the act of July 17, 1862 (New
Revised Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No. 292, sec. 3), for fitting out in the harbor of San
Francisco a privateer to aid the then existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in charging the
jury:

But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in the second section which would
not constitute treason, except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of inciting to a
rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the Senate, and read the several sections of the
acts together, the apparent inconsistency disappears. Looking at the act alone, we
 conclude that Congress intended (1) to preserve the cat of 1790, which prescribes the
penalty of death, in force for the prosecution and punishment of offenses committed
previous to July 17, 1862, unless the parties accused are convicted under the act of the
latter date for subsequent offenses; (2) to punish treason thereafter committed with death,
or fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, unless the treason consist in
engaging in or assisting a rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United
States, or the laws thereof, in which event the death penalty is to be abandoned and a less
penalty inflicted. By this construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions of the
different sections is avoided and effect given to each clause of the act. The defendants
are, therefore, in fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the protection and
privileges allowed to parties accused of treason, without being liable, in case of
conviction, to the penalty which all other civilized nations have awarded to this, the
highest of crimes known to the law.

Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said:

If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the present rebellion constitutes a
levying of war, it follows that in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress has
denounced the same crime; and that a party amenable to the second section for having
"engaged in the rebellion and given it aid and comfort," must also be guilty of treason by
levying war against the United States.

As, then, the offenses described are substantially the same, though a different penalty is
attached to their commission by the sections referred to, it was held by the court, under
the first indictment, which was in terms for treason, that the smaller penalty could alone
be inflicted, that the prisoners could not be capitally punished, and could therefore be
admitted to bail. On the same grounds it was considered that under the present
indictment, which pursues the language of the second section, the offense charged was
treason; that both the offense as described and the overt acts charged amounted to that
crime, and that the accused were entitled to all the privileges secured by the Constitution
or allowed by law to parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding, that in
consequence of the legislation referred to, penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In
determining, therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted under this indictment, it
will be proper to consider whether their acts constitute in law "a levying of war," for an
engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort amounts to a levying of war; while
at the same time we may also inquire whether their; acts are such as would, if done with
regard to a public enemy, constitute an adherence to him, "giving him aid and comfort."

As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, "treason against the United States is defined by the
Constitution itself. Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense. Its
construction is entrusted to the court alone."

Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for this crime and
the construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of Greathouse was that under
both sections the offense was treason, but when the treason consisted of engaging in an
insurrection or rebellion, it could be punished only by imprisonment for not more than ten years,
in other cases it could be punished under section 1 by death, or imprisonment for not less than
five years.

That the Commission when it used the phrase "levies war," in the first section of Act No. 292,
intended to give to it the meaning which it then had in the United States, can not be doubted.

It Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following language in speaking of the phrase
"levying war:"

But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the United
States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose
 language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely
conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our Constitution in the
sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it.

In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of the same phrase, said:

At the time the Constitution was framed, the language incorporated into it from the
English statute had received judicial construction and acquired a definite meaning, and
that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts of the United States.

No one can believe that the Commission intended to abandoned the well-recognized meaning
which the phrase then had and give to it a meaning entirely different. If that had been their
intention they would certainly have used other language, so that their intent not to adopt the
recognized meaning would have been manifest.

That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that phrase was
understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed, can not be doubted. Neither can it
be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion or insurrection" within the meaning of
the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections can only be reconciled in the manner
employed in the case against Greathouse, and that decision should be followed.

However, in respect to the penalty, it makes no difference whether the offense called rebellion in
section 3 of Act No. 292 in considered an offense different from that of treason defined in
section 1, or whether the decision in the case of Greathouse be allowed and the acts punished by
section 3 considered as of the same character as those punished by section 1. In either case the
punishment can not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.

There would be difference in respect to evidence to prove the two crimes. If rebellion and
insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be convicted under section 3 except on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by confession in open court. (Act of
Congress, March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not treason he could be convicted upon the
testimony required in ordinary cases. In United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the
constitutional provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of
the act of 1862 (our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as
the overt act of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide
whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase "owing allegiance to the United States," which is
found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of the act, makes a difference between the
two sections in the case at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both
by section 1 and section 3.

This court has decided two cases in which treason was charged. In the case of United States vs.
Antonio de los Reyes, February 23, 1904,1 the defendant was acquitted because no overt act of
treason was proved. In the case of United States vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 9322) the defendant
was acquitted because there were not two witnesses to the same overt act.

The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty however, from death to ten years and a
fine of $10,000, money of the United States, with the costs of this instance against the defendant.

Separate Opinions

ARELLANO, C. J., MAPA, JJ., concurs:

I concur in the result of this opinion in accordance with section 3 of Act No. 292, covering the
crime of rebellion.
MCDONOUGH, J.:

I am of opinion that the crime committed is that of insurrection and not that of treason, and that
the conviction should be had under section 3 of Act No. 292 for insurrection.

The case of the United States vs. Greathouse et al. (26 Fed. Cases, 18) does not seem to be in
point. The defendants there were charged with taking part in a rebellion against the Government
of the United States. There was no doubt at all that rebellion did not fall short of actual war and
of a state of war, and so Mr. Justice Field said: "It is not necessary that I should go into any close
definition of the words `levying war,' for it is not sought to apply them to a doubtful case . . . .
War of gigantic proportions is now waged against the United States . . . and all who aid in its
prosecution are guilty of treason."

In the case before us, however, it does not seem necessary to closely define the words "levying
war," for they have been applied in a case that is more than doubtful.

In the Greathouse case the learned judge met with a difficulty when he undertook to so construe
the section of the act of 1862, relating to the punishment for treason, and the section following,
defining the crime of rebellion or insurrection and prescribing the penalty for this latter offense
different from that prescribed for treason; and to justify his conclusions he held that all that
Congress intended by the act of 1862 was to preserve the punishment for treason committed
prior to 1862 as it was prescribed in the act of 1790 — "unless," as he stated, "the parties are
convicted under the act of 1862 for subsequent offense"— and to punish treason thereafter
committed with death. Š It must be confessed that the language used is not clear, and the
conclusion reached as to the construction of these two sections seems to have been strained to fit
the case the before the court.

Long after the civil war Congress caused the United States Statutes to revised, and the sections
of the act of 1862 were changed by omitting that part thereof relating to the liberation of the
slaves of those found guilty of treason, rebellion, or insurrection. That revision is found in
sections 5331 and 5332, defining and providing for the punishment of treason, and in section
5334, which defines and provides for the punishment of rebellion or insurrection. No reference
whatever is made in the revision to the act of 1790, nor can these sections be reasonably
construed to mean that treason committed before this revision, or before 1862, is punishable
differently from treason committed after the revision of the statutes. In case of doubt regarding
the proper construction of statutes the courts frequently refer to the debates of the law-making
body when the measure was under discussion. Judge Field in his opinion made reference to the
discussion in the United States Senate when the act of 1862 was being considered.

It appears," said the learned judge, "from the debates in the Senate of the United States
when the second section was under consideration — that relating to rebellion or
insurrection — that it was the opinion of several Senators that the commission of the acts
which it designates might, under some circumstances, constitute an offense less than
treason." The court, however, gave no consideration and no weight to this discussion,
apparently for the reason that there was no doubt that the rebellion, in which the
defendant was charged with participating, was "a gigantic war."

Since there seems to be now no reason, and since there was no reason at the time Congress
revised the statutes in 1873 and incorporated therein the provisions of the act of 1862 as sections
5331, 5332, 5333, and 5334, for preserving the penalty for treason committed prior to 1862 and
fixing another penalty for a like crime committed thereafter, it may be reasonably held that there
is no such distinction now. To hold that the acts described in section 1 of Act No. 292 of these
Islands constitute treason, and the acts described in section 3 of that act also constitute treason, is
to hold that the law provides contradictory punishments for the same offense; thus the
punishment for treason under the first section may be death or imprisonment for not less than
five years and a fine of not less than $10,000, whereas the punishment under the third section can
not be death, and may be imprisonment for any period less than ten years and for a fine in any
sum less than $10,000. It can not be that the law-making body intended such a contradiction and
such an interpretation of this law. It is much more reasonable to hold what the plain language of
the sections indicate as the debate in the Senate shows that it was the intention of the law-making
body to create a crime of a less degree and of less magnitude than that of levying was against the
Government, which new crime was designated as rebellion or insurrection.

It is easy to conceive that an insurrection may exist which does not amount to war. The three
tailors of Tooly Street who resolved that they were the people of England might be emulated
here by three natives who might assemble in public, proclaim the independence of the Islands,
carry a cross or a banner, fire their revolvers, or throw their bolos at the Constabulary, and then
take to their heels; but this would scarcely be held as a levying of war against the United States
or against the Philippine Islands. It may, however, be held, that a movement of that kind is an
insurrectionary movement. In other words, there may be a state of insurrection without being a
state of war — an insurrection of a less degree than war; although the insurrection may
eventually attain such proportions and such magnitude as to ripen into war.

In the Prize cases (67 U. S., Sup. Ct. Rep., 635) the learned counsel for the prosecution and the
Supreme Court gave clear definitions as to what constituted war and a state of war.

Mr. Wm. M. Evarts, the distinguished counsel for the Government in those cases, stated:

War is emphatically a question of actualities. Whenever the situation of opposing

hostilities has assumed the proportions and pursues the methods of war peace is driven
out, the ordinary authority and administration of the law are superseded, and war in fact
and by necessity is the status of the nation, until peace is restored and the laws resume
their dominion.

In the same cases Mr. Justice Grier stated:

A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents — the number,
power, and organization of the persons of the persons who originate and carry it on.
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of the
territory, have declared independence, have cast off their allegiance, have organized
armies, have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world
acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest is war.

The proof in the case at bar does not show such conditions or such a state of affairs as constitute
was within these definitions; nor do the acts of the defendants show that they were levying war.
The executive branch of the Government did not call upon the regular army for help to put down
the rising; material law was not proclaimed; the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus were not
suspended; the civil power remained supreme; the civil courts were open; and the resistance to
law was not such as to render the civil authorities powerless to cope with it; in fact, the
insurgents were easily put to fight by the Constabulary.

In 1902 the President of the United States proclaimed a state of peace in these Islands, except in
the Moro country. Nothing has since happened of sufficient importance or magnitude to cause
this court to acknowledge or to hold in this case that a state of war now exists. A few roving
bands of brigands, organized primarily for plunder, but pretending to the patriots and shouting
for Philippine independence in order the more readily to obtain help, immunity, and protection
from sympathizers are not to be considered as organized armies occupying territory and levying
war, especially when the civil authorities are able, without great difficulty, to purpose, capture,
and punish the robbers or insurgents.
It if be desired to have no division line between treason and insurrection, the Commission mar
readily repeal section 3 of Act No. 292. While that section remains as a part of the law, it should
be given considerable in a proper case.

I am of opinion, therefore, that section 3 of Act No. 292 was intended to cover the crime of
insurrection as distinguished from treason, and that the defendant should be punished pursuant to
the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 292 for the crime of insurrection.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

The defendant was charged with the crime of treason under section 1 of Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission. He was tried in the city of Bacolod on the 14th of January,
1903, by the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros, with
several others, and was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of death. He appealed to this
court. The following is the statement of facts disclosed by the evidence in this cause:

In the month of October of the year 1902, the municipal president of the town of Murcia, of the
Province of Occidental Negros, in the Philippine Islands, received a letter signed by Dalmacio
Lagnason and others who entitled themselves "generals" of a celebrated band. This band was
called "Babaylanes." This band had existed from time immemorial, and had lived in the
mountains in the southern part of the said province. The band was armed and during the days of
the Spanish Government had frequently attacked the then existing authorities. It had frequently
attacked the provincial government, and on the 29th and 30th of October, 1902, made an attack
against the United States Government, as constituted in the said pueblo of Murcia.

This letter was forwarded by the municipal president of Murcia to the senior inspector of the
Philippines Constabulary, Mr. John R. White, and at the same time information concerning the
same was given to a corporal, Bernardo Abasola, of said Constabulary, commanding the
detachment of said Constabulary in the said pueblo, who, on the said 29th day of October,
having information that there was a band of Babaylanes in the suburbs of said town, numbering
from eighty to one hundred and twenty men, went out to find them and finally located them in a
place called "Iglauaan," near the town of Murcia. Upon being satisfied of the existence of said
band, he returned to the town of Murcia and informed the senior inspector, Mr. White. The band,
taking note of the fact that the members of the Constabulary had withdrawn, advanced up to the
suburbs of the town of Murcia, deciding to enter the same, and for this reason the forces of the
Constabulary detachment were obliged to attack them, and did then and there have a skirmish
with the said band, until it retired to a place called Iglauaan, where they were first discovered.

The band was armed with Springfield rifles, a small cannon, bolos, and lances, and was
commanded by the defendant, Dalmacio Lagnason, the negro. At 7 o'clock in the evening of the
said 29th day of October,, the inspector, Mr. White, arrived at the town of Murcia with more
soldiers, and at 2 o'clock of the following morning Inspector Smith arrived with more forces.
These being combined, with Mr. White in command, at daybreak on the 30th of October, they
went out in pursuit of said band, following the tracks left by them the previous afternoon.

At 6.30 a. m. of the 30th of October, and in the same place where the party was located the
previous day, it was discovered by the said Constabulary forces. The band retreated until it
crossed the Caliban River, when it opened fire upon the Constabulary and a fight ensued at close
range, which enabled all the members of the band to be seen. The fight lasted approximately an
hour and a half. Two guides of the Constabulary called Tranquilino Toscano and Lazaro Guibon
died in consequence of wounds received from shots from Springfield rifles. Among the members
of the band Esteban de los Reyes, Rufino Rayo, and twenty other members were killed. The band
then took fight and was pursued by the Constabulary forces, which succeeded in capturing the
general, Dalmacio Lagnason, who, during the action was discharging a Springfield rifle at the
inspector, Mr. White, and later, during the same fight, attempted to discharge a revolver at Mr.
White, which arms were found upon his person at the time of his capture. There were also found
where the fight took place a small cannon, various talibones, lances, and two large wooden
crosses and various papers. A few days after the fight Simon Perje and Isidro Oyco were
captured in a small shank in the mountains near the place where the fight took place. One of
these was wounded in the thigh and the other in the knee. They confessed that they were
members of the party of Babaylanes under the order of Gen. Dalmacio Lagnason; that they took
a direct part in the action with the Constabulary forces on the 30th of October, in which action
they were wounded. Bernardo Talondata, Vidal Artegosa, Valeriano Talaman, and Luis and
Vicente Dimit testified before the president that a few days previous to the fight between the said
band of Babaylanes and the Constabulary, they were in a certain house when several armed men
presented themselves and compelled each of them to join the said band of Babaylanes under the
command of Gen. Dalmacio Lagnason and others; that they had complied with said request
against their will under fear of being maltreated or murdered. They were subsequently conducted
to various points, and finally to the country surrounding the mountains of Murcia, where, on the
30th day of October, an action took place betweenn the said band and the Government forces,
from which band, during the said fight, they escaped.

The testimony of the senior inspector of the Constabulary, Mr. White, given in open court in the
trial of the cause against the defendant, is as follows:

Q. Do you know any band in arms against the Government of the United States in this
province?

A. Yes, sir; I know the band of Dionisio Papa, camped in the southern part of this
province, and that of Dalmacio Lagnason, in negro, who is camped in the northern part.

Q. Do you know if any one of these bands, within the last few months, has attempted
to attack any town of this province?

A. About the end of the month of October last the band of Dalmacio Lagnason,
composed of some eighty men, armed, attempted to attack the town of Murcia and the
Constabulary detachment of the same place.

Q. Have the Constabulary forces had fight with this band; and if so, did they offer any
resistance?

A. Yes.

The COURT. Can you state the place of the fight?

A. Two fights were had near the barrio of Iglauaan, on the Caliban River, some three
kilometers from Murcia, the first on the afternoon of the 29th of October, and the second
at the same place at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 30th of said month.

Q. What was the result of these engagement?

A. The result was that in the first fight one of the band that attacked the town died, and
in the second twenty-one Babaylanes died, and Dalmacio Lagnason was captured, with
three Springfield rifles, a revolver, several talibones, lances, and other effects, among
which a small cannon also was found where the fight took place.

Q. When Dalmacio was captured did he have any arms?

A. Dalmacio had a Spriengfield rifle, a revolver, and a talibon.

Q. Can you state the names of the men killed among the loyal troops during the fight
to which you have referred?
A. They were Tranquilino Toscano and Lazaro Quiachon.

Q. Were Dalmacio and his people uniformed, or did they have any special distinction?

A. The greater part of Dalmacio's men had black shirts and white pants, and some had
black-peak caps.

Q. Did Dalmacio and his men resist the troops of the Government for some time, or,
on the contrary, did they scatter when the firing commenced?

A. The fight lasted an hour and a half.

Q. Among the bodies found in the enemy's camp, were any recognized?

A. The bodies of Esteban de los Reyes and Rufino Rayo were seen at the same place
where the fight took place, among the dead of the band.

Q. Did the guides of the loyal troops die by reason of gunshot wounds, or from bolos?

A. They died as the results of wounds caused by shots from Springfield rifles.

Q. How did you know of the existence of that armed band which attempted to attack
the town of Murcia?

A. One of the ways by which I knew was by letter which Dalmacio and other generals
of the band addressed to the president of Murcia, which was forwarded to me.

The COURT. Did you have any knowledge through other channels besides the letter
presented that the armed band under the command of Dalmacio Lagnason received orders
from Dionisio Papa, or operated independently?

A. I know that since the occupation of this province by the American troops,
Dalmacio Lagnason operated independently in the north, although in connection with
Papa, according to information I received from the military guarding this town. These
facts are proven by various documents captured on various expeditions made to the
mountains against said bands.

The COURT. Did Dalmacio Lagnason's band carry any flags during said fight?

A. They did not carry a flag, but two large, wooden crosses, which were captured in
the second fight and which were also distinguished in the first fight by the loyal troops.

The COURT. Could the Constabulary forces distinguish from their position during the
fight those who formed the enemy's band?

A. At the distance at which they were they could only distinguish the groups,
although, as I was advancing with my forces, I could distinguish and recognized
Dalmacio, who discharged his gun at me, and tried also his revolver, although the latter
did not work. Dalmacio later drew his talibon, which he flourished against me. The other
members of the band, who numbered seventy or eighty men, acted in a hostile manner,
sometimes advancing and other times retreating, but always maintaining resistance until
the moment of their flight.

The COURT. When you saw Dalmacio Lagnason, who shot at you, did you already
know that it was the same Dalmacio?
 A. As I had information that Dalmacio was black, I suspected immediately that the
one who pointed his gun at me was the same Dalmacio, because he was black, which
suspicion was confirmed, inasmuch as the party whom I supposed was Dalmacio, being
near me, surrendered himself, falling on his knees and confessing to be Dalmacio. This
fact was also confirmed by the other prisoners captured on the following day.

The testimony of Walter Smith, given at the trial, is as follows:

Q. As an inspector of Constabulary were you present at the fight which took place at
the pueblo of Murcia on the 30th of October last, and what was the nature of the enemy
who opposed you?

A. I was present at the said fight with a band of those called Babaylanes, under the
command of Dalmacio.

Q. Do you know if Dalmacio and his band were constantly organized and where they
located themselves?

A. According to official data, it is a band located between the towns of Calatrava and
Cadiz Nuevo, which was constantly armed, and assembled with the object of establishing
an independent government, contrary to that established in this province, and to
occasionally devote itself to robbery.

Q. Are you acquainted with any of those who formed part of this band of the enemy
which fought the Constabulary on the said date?

A. I am acquainted with Dalmacio Lagnason, who is now present.

Q. Of how many was the band composed, and with what arms were those who formed
the same provided?

A. Approximately it was composed of some seventy or eighty men, armed with five or
ten guns, bolos, lances, Springfield rifles with ammunition, a revolver, and a small
cannon.

Q. Were those who formed Dalmacio's band armed?

A. I can not state that all were, but I am sure the greater part were.

Q. Did Dalmacio's band offer resistance to the forces of the Government?

A. Yes; they offered resistance for an hour and a quarter or an hour and a half.

Q. What was the result of the fight on both sides?

A. On the enemy's side I saw five dead, but afterwards official information stated
twenty or twenty-five. On our side there were two killed who acted as guides, and whose
names I do not now remember.

Q. What was the reason of this fight?

A. Having received information that said band intended to enter the town of Murcia,
and continue to this capital, in view of which, to preserve order, it was decided to go out
and meet them, and they were found at a place called Iglauaan.

Q. During the fight, or afterwards, were some of the enemy's band made prisoners?
 A. Immediately after the fight Dalmacio was captured, and I returned to the town of
Murcia, having ordered that some soldier go out to recover the bodies, and on their return
they brought some prisoners who were captured in the cogon grass near the place where
the fight took place and who were presented to the officer in charge, Mr. White.

Q. In connection with the fight and the advance of Dalmacio's men upon the town of
Murcia, do you know if any injuries were caused to private individuals?

A. I am not aware of any injury to private individuals. I can say that according to
information, several private persons were invited to join the band of Dalmacio.

The testimony of Rosalio Teflora is as follows:

Q. Were you present in any fight during the last days of the month of October last?

A. Yes, sir; on the 30th of October, at the place called Iglauaan, of the town of
Murcia, against the band of Babaylanes commanded by Dalmacio, who desired to enter
the said town. I was under the orders of Senior Inspector White.

Q. What was the result of said fight?

A. We lost two guides, whom I saw fall at my side, wounded by a shot; and a little
while after, one of the enemy's shots smashed the butt of my gun. I do not know the
enemy's losses, because I returned to Murcia in compliance with the orders of my chief,
to look after wagons. Three guns, a revolver, and many bolos and lances were captured
from the Babaylanes, and the chief of the band, Dalmacio, was captured personally by
Inspector White.

Q. Besides Dalmacio, were others of said band captured?

A. Two others were captured in the brush near the place where the fight took place.

Q. Do you know the object of Dalmacio's plans?

A. All that I know is said band intended to attack and take the town of Murcia.

The foregoing facts, in my judgement, are sufficient to indicate that the said defendant, with his
associates, intended to overthrow the Government of the United States, as constituted in the said
town of Murcia, in the Province of Occidental Negros, in the Philippines Islands. The defendant
was a resident in the Philippine Islands, and owed allegiance to the United States Government in
the Philippine Islands. His acts, as disclosed by the proof in this case, show clearly that it was not
his intention to oppose the constituted authority in these Islands in the administration of the
Government, but to absolutely overthrow the Government.

Any organized attempt, by force of arms, on the part of persons joined together in a band, who
owe allegiance to the Government, to overthrow and destroy the constituted Government is the
levying of war against that Government. The evidence in this case of the United States vs.
Lagnason clearly shows that the defendant and his band intended to destroy the constituted
Government of the United States in the pueblo of Murcia in these Islands, and is therefore guilty
of the crime of treason. No formal declaration of war is necessary in order that parties shall be
guilty of levying war against the Government. War may exist without a proclamation to that
effect. Actual hostilities may determine the date of the commencement of war, though no
proclamation may have been issued, no declaration made, and no action of the executive or
legislative branches of the Government had. This is recognized by the proclamation of the
President William McKinley, issued on the 26th day of April, 1898, which is as follows:
 Whereas by an Act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, it is declared that war exists
and that war has existed since the 21st of April, 1898, including said day, between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain; and whereas it being desirable that
such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of
nations and sanctioned by their recent practices, it has already been announced that the
policy of this Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules
of the Declaration of Paris. (Buenaventura et al., 87 Fed. Rep., 927.)

Neither it is necessary for the Government to wait until those who are attempting to overthrow
the Government should make a showing of apparent power necessary to destroy the Government
or any part of the same before it may declare that those who are guilty of such an attempt are
guilty of levying war, and therefore guilty of treason. Neither it is necessary for the authorities of
the Government to call upon the military arm of the Government before such a condition may be
recognized on the part of the Government.

I can not give my consent to the doctrine enunciated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Willard, filed
in this case. I can not subscribe to the doctrine that the crimes described and defined in sections 1
and 3 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission are the same, and that the only
punishment which can be imposed under either is that provided for in section 3. Mr. Justice
Willard evidently reaches this conclusion upon the theory that the treason and rebellion or
insurrection are the same crimes, and that you can not have two punishments for the same
offense, and that if the statute does provide for two punishments for the same offense, then the
lesser penalty only, under the statue, can be inflicted. This latter doctrine may or may not be true,
but in my judgment the premises assumed here by which this conclusion is reached is not
justifiable. The legislative body in these Islands clearly created, by Act No. 292, two distinct
crimes or two distinct degrees of the same crime, with separate and distinct punishments.

Neither can I subscribe to the doctrine that this court should make no distinction between the
crime of treason, defined in section 1, and that of rebellion or insurrection, described in section 3
of said Act No. 292. The Commission intended to create separate and distinct crimes by said
sections.

No one will contest the statement that rebellion or insurrection is of the nature of the crime of
treason. Neither will the statement be contested that manslaughter is of the nature of the crime of
murder, but yet no lawyer will contend that the punishment should be the same nor that the
punishment provided for manslaughter is the only punishment which can be inflicted for murder,
and that those who commit manslaughter should be stigmatized with the allegation that they have
committed murder. At times the courts have great difficulty in distinguishing murder from
manslaughter, but when the distinction is once made, by evidence, then the courts have no
trouble in administrating the penalties created by the law for the respective crimes of murder and
manslaughter. So I am also persuaded that it is a most difficult task, at times, and in particular
cases, to make a clear distinction between treason and insurrection. The crimes are of the same
general class, and only differ in their magnitude and gravity. What may be in its incipiency a
mere insurrection, may come to be, in the final proportions which it assumes and the extent of its
purposes and possible results, high treason. Treason is the highest crime which a man may
commit against his government. This has always been so regarded. There are many instances of
record where men charged with high treason were tried and convicted, after their death, even,
and whose bodies were quartered by means of horses in the public square. A man who has been
found guilty of treason in never able to outlive the stigma that he has thus brought upon himself.

Neither can I secure the consent of my mind to agree with the finding of fact contained in the
opinion of Mr. Justice McDonough, that the accused in this case, under the facts proven, is guilty
of the crime of rebellion or insurrection and not that of treason.

Treason may be defined as an organized effort, on the part of those who have owe allegiance to a
government, to overthrow their government, and either to establish another in its place, or to
establish a state of lawlessness and rapine, while insurrection may be defined as a resistance, by
unlawful means, to the operation of some particular law, or to the constituted authorities. This
resistance may grow out of a misunderstanding of the purposes of the Government on the part of
individuals, or in the purposes, or the methods employed in the enforcement of a particular law.
It may be that those who are opposed to the purpose and operation of a particular law and the
wisdom of its enactment are as loyal, generally, to the existing government as any of the citizens
of the commonwealth, and may be perfectly willing to join with the loyal troops against the
enemies of the government and those who desired to totally destroy it. The Congress of the
United States appreciated these facts when it amended the law of 1790 by the acts of 1862, and
later by the act of 1875. Congress appreciated the fact that many loyal citizens might, from their
own standpoint, oppose, as has been done by unlawful means, the operation of a single law, and
that the stigma cast upon them by charging them with treason was entirely too severe. Congress,
therefore, provided for a lesser crime in the act of 1862, and called it rebellion or insurrection.
Many obnoxious laws have been repealed and better ones enacted in their stead, and the
condition of the whole people improved thereby by a determined opposition to them. As a result
of the interpretation by the courts of the law of 1790, as was given in the case of Mitchell in the
whisky rebellion, as well as that in the case of Frills, Shay & Brown, Congress saw and
appreciated that the odium cast upon such persons and the punishment provided for in said act of
1790 was entirely too severe, and therefore amended such act as indicated above.

The Commission, in enacting the present law defining treason as rebellion or insurrection, have
not lost sight of these considerations. The fact that the Commission intended to create two crimes
instead of one by sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 is further verified by the provisions of section
17 of said act, which provisions are as follows:

A foreigner, residing in the Philippine Islands, who shall commit any of the crimes
specified in the preceding sections of this act, except those specified in sections 1 and 2,
shall be punished in the same way and with the same penalty as that prescribed for the
particular crime therein.

This court has on more than one occasion found persons guilty of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection by that name, and the decisions in said cases were signed by all the judges. I see no
occasion now for concluding that those crimes should have been classified as treason.

We have also tried men and sentenced them to life imprisonment and death for robbery under
Act No. 518 of the Civil Commission. Is it possible that any person, in view of the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 292, can conclude that the punishment of imprisonment for ten years only
can be inflicted upon those who take up arms against the Government and by force and violence
attempt utterly to destroy it? We are not of the opinion that the Legislature of these Islands
intended to provide by law that those who are guilty of robbery or brigandage could not be
punished with imprisonment for less than twenty years, while those who are found guilty of
treason could not be punished with imprisonment for more than ten years. Such a conclusion is
unjustifiable.

The decision of the court below was justified by both the evidence adduced in the trial and by the
law, and therefore should be affirmed with costs in both instances.

COOPER, J., dissenting:

The defendant was charged, under section 1 of Act No. 292, with the crime of treason and was
convicted and sentenced to the penalty of death.

The section under which the conviction was made reads as follows:

Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the United States or
the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against them, or adheres to
 their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is
guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death or, at the discretion of the court,
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten
thousand dollars.

In the decision reached in the case by a majority of the court, distinct views were entertained, the
view held in common being that the defendant is guilty and should be punished with
imprisonment for the term of ten years and a fine of ten thousand dollars. It is said in the
majority opinion, delivered by Justice Willard, that the offense as defined in section 1 of Act No.
292 denominated treason, and the offense as defined in section 3 of said act denominated as
insurrection or rebellion, are of the same character and that each offense is treason; but that in
fixing the penalty, though the indictment is under section 1 of said act, and the offense of treason
as defined therein is punishable by death at the discretion of the court, yet the penalty prescribed
under the third section for the offense of rebellion and insurrection must be applied, which is
imprisonment for not more than ten years and a fine of not more than $10,000.

It is said in the concurring opinion by Justice McDonough that there are separate and distinct
offense defined and punishable in section 1 and section 3 of Act No. 292, the offense defined in
section 1 being that of treason and that defined in section 3 being that of rebellion or
insurrection; that the acts committed by the defendant constitute the offense of rebellion or
insurrection and not that of treason; and that the penalty to be applied must be that which is
prescribed in section 3 of rebellion of insurrection.

The conclusion reached in the majority opinion seems to result from an adherence to the case of
the United States vs. Greathouse (4 Sawyer, 457; 26 Fed. Cases, 18), decided by Mr. Justice
Field in a trial in the circuit court in which he presided.

In that case the defendant was on trial charged with the offense of rebellion or insurrection under
section 2 of the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, and not for treason under section 1 of said act.

Prior to the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, several cases had risen involving a construction of
the provision contained in section 3, article 3, Constitution of the United States, and the act of
1790 made under this provision of the Constitution.

There had been much discussion in the early cases as to what would constitute a levying of war
within the meaning of the term as used in the constitutional provisions. This discussion involved
both the question as to the acts which amount to a levying of war and as to the motive or purpose
of those engaged in the same.

At the time of the decision in the Greathouse case these questions had been well settled and the
result of the decisions was stated by Justice Field in the following language:

To constitute a levying of war there must be an assemblance of persons in force, to

overthrow the Government, or to coerce its conduct. The words embrace not only those
acts by which war is brought into existence, but also those acts by which was is
prosecuted . . . . The offense is complete, whether the force be directed to the entire
overthrow of the Government throughout the country, or to defeat the execution and
compel the repeal of one of its public laws.

Under the provision of the Constitution defining treason, the offense was complete whether the
force was directed to the entire overthrow of the Government or whether it was a rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof; but a distinction was
though to exist, at the time of the enactment of the law of July 17, 1862, between the offenses
defined in the same. As stated by Justice Field, it was the opinion of several Senators that the
commission of the acts which Congress designated in the law might, under some circumstances,
constitute an offense less than treason.
But the judges were of the opinion in the decision of the Greathouse case that Congress had not
created separate and distinct offenses by the enactment of the first and second sections of the act
of July 17, 1862; that by the first section of the act (secs. 5331 and 5332, U. S. Rev. Stat.), in
which treason is defined and made punishable by death, and by the second section of said act
(sec. 5334, U. S. Rev. Stat.) in which the offense of rebellion or insurrection is defined and made
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years, Congress has not done more than
created the offense of treason.

It must be borne in mind applying the Greathouse case here, as said by Justice Field in that case,
that treason against the United States is defined by the Constitution itself and Congress has no
power to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense, its power over the subject being
limited to prescribing the punishment for the offense.

The Philippine Commission was not restricted in this respect and had the power to divide the
offense of treason, such as is defined in the Constitution of the United States and as it had been
construed by the United States courts, into as many offenses as it saw fit and to affix such
punishment as was deemed proper to each class of cases.

Such considerations as evidently influenced the court in the Greathouse case with reference to
the power of Congress to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense of treason should have
no weight in the determination of the question here.

It is hard to conceive that in enacting Act No. 292, the Commission had in view the decision in
the Greathouse case, for, as stated, the Philippine Commission was unrestricted in its action to
define treason.

It is also difficult to understand that the Commission intended to punish the offense of treason by
imprisonment for not more than ten years and a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars when
the punishment for treason has in the first section, in express language, been fixed at death, or
imprisonment for not less than five years and a fine of not less than $10,000.

Such a confusion of ideas and terms can not be attributed to the Commission.

If we leave out of consideration the Greathouse case, the question seems hardly susceptible of
argument or discussion.

Nor can I agree in the views expressed in the concurring majority opinion.

The different between the "levying of war," which constitutes the crime of treason under section
1, and that of insurrection and rebellion as provided for in section 3, does not depend upon the
magnitude of the movement, but rather upon the intention and purposes of the persons engaged
in it.

If the intention is to utterly overthrow the Government and establish another independent
government in its place, and the person engaged in the act owes allegiance to the United States or
the Government of the Philippine Islands, the offense is treason and is punishable under section
1; while if the intention and purpose was simply to obstruct and resist "the authority of the
United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof," the offense is
rebellion or insurrection.

To resist the authority of the Government of the United States or the Philippine Islands, or the
laws thereof, by rebellion or insurrection, was regarded by the Commission as much less
culpable and of a less dangerous character to the Government than where the intention was to
entirely overthrow the Government and substitute an independent government in its stead. This
idea is fairly illustrated by a case recently decided by this court, in which the Government
through it officers was resisted in taking the census of the people in a certain pueblo, on account
of the belief of the people there that the taking of the census was intended to furnish means to
enable the Government to exercise its taxing power on the property in that particular section of
the country. Another illustration was the opposition made to the sanitary laws during the late
cholera epidemic among certain ignorant people, who believed that the sanitary inspectors were
engaged in poisoning the wells in the country, and opposed them in the performance of their
duties.

While persons engaged in such resistance to the laws and authority of the Government may be
guilty of rebellion or insurrection, they are not guilty of treason as defined in the first section of
Act No. 292.

What constitutes a "levying of war" has been given a definite meaning by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case Ex Parte Bollman (4 Cr., 75), and in the
elaborated opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall on a motion to introduce certain evidence
on the trial of Aaron Burr for treason (found in Note B, appendix; 4 Cr.). These decisions have
set at rest the question; they have been referred to in the majority opinion and need not be further
considered.

To constitute a levying of war it is not necessary that a state of war should exist in the sense that
armies must be organized and placed in the field; or that the executive branch of the Government
should have called upon the Regular Army for support; or that martial law should have been
proclaimed; or that the courts of the country should be closed and the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus suspended; or that the civil power should have been rendered powerless to cope
with the uprising; or that hostilities should assume such proportions that the world acknowledges
those engaged in it as belligerents and the contents as that of war, for if the movement has
assumed such proportions as entitle those engaged in it to the rights of belligerency, in modern
times those engaged in it are not generally punished for treason; to punish them all would be
equivalent to extermination.

I am not inclined to treat with contempt what are termed roving bands of brigands. In a number
of cases this court has had before it proof of the nature and character of the Katipunan
organization and its allied branches, under its various names in the Philippine Islands. The
subject has also been treated of in the reports of the Chief of Constabulary. The character and
extent of its operations is a matter of public notoriety. From all of which it may be well inferred
that it is of a much more serious character than is indicated in the concurring majority opinion. It
is not for the courts to treat such questions in any other way than from a legal standpoint. It is our
duty to enforce the laws which have been enacted, rather than to express our individual views
upon political questions that belong solely to the legislative power.

The offense of treason is not only the highest offense known to the law, but is the one most
dangerous to the existence of government.

The laws enacted by the Philippine Commission against treason are the only means of protection
to the Government. The legislative power has been fit to inflicted severe punishment upon those
engaged in these dangerous undertakings. A sufficient discretion is given the courts in fixing the
penalties. The discretion which has been left to the court in inflicting the penalties for the
infringement of the law is the only discretion which we can rightfully exercise.

The defendant and his followers constituted not only "a warlike assemblage, carrying the
appearance of force, in a situation to practice hostilities," but hostilities actually resulted. The
paraphernalia of war, even cannon, were evidence. The slain and wounded gave further evidence
of the character of the undertaking.

There was a levying of war within the meaning of section 1, Act No. 292, and all of the elements
of the crime of treason exist in the case. The punishment under this section should be inflicted.
TORRES, J., dissenting:

In Act No. 292, passed November 4, 1901, the crimes of treason and rebellion or insurrection are
not defined with proper separation, as they appear in the Penal Code, as offenses of a different
character, each with a separate classification under the penal law.

However, as the only law applicable to the offense with which Dalmacio Lagnason is charged is
Act No. 292, it is necessary to disregard the doctrines of the Penal Code and limit this decision to
determining the proper interpretation to be given to sections 1 and 3 of that act.

If according to section 1 it is treason to levy war upon the Government of the United States or
upon the Government of these Islands, or adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, then acts constituting rebellion or insurrection are
also acts of treason, for to rebel against the sovereignty of the United States or the Government
of the Philippine Islands is to levy war upon them.

Every act of public uprising or of open hostility against the sovereign power and the government
of the country or its agents by a band of rebels, is an act of war, and therefore, although treason
and rebellion are not synonyms in the language of the act in question, it is to be inferred from the
text of sections 1 and 3 that within the crime of treason that of rebellion or insurrection is
included as species is within genus, and that this crime is also of the nature of treason. The fact
that the death penalty is prescribed in the two sections in question is not an obstacle to this view
of the law, owing to the different degree of guilt presumed in each one of the two sections of the
act.

Upon the supposition that the offense committed by Dalmacio Lagnason is comprised within
section 1 of Act No. 292, and that he was the leader of the armed uprising and the one who put
himself at the head of the band which levied war upon the agents of the Government, he is the
one principally responsible for that overt act of opposition to the sovereignty of the United
States, which, although in accordance with the legal technology it should be classified as
rebellion, is, nevertheless, treason under the provisions of the act in question, and consequently
the proper penalty, in our opinion, is life imprisonment.

In the application of penalties, the principle which controls is that of production between the
offense and corresponding penalty prescribed by the law. It is permissible to disregard the rules
derived from this principle, for such an error would be contrary to the dictates of reason.

According to these principles, it is not just that the leader of the band should suffer only the same
penalty as that imposed upon his subordinates, who merely acted under him in the rebellion and
carried out his orders. There is unquestionably a higher degree of criminality on the part of the
leader, and consequently his criminal responsibility is heavier than that of his subordinates, who
merely carry out his felonious designs. In this case Isidro Oyco and Simeon Perje, subordinates
of Lagnason, were condemned to ten years' imprisonment and to the payment of a fine of ten
thousand dollars by a judgment which, not having been appealed, has become final with respect
to these two accused. This circumstance corroborates our view as to the propriety of condemning
the principal leader of a rebellion in accordance with section 1 of Act No. 292, his guilt having
been proven by the testimony of more than two credible witnesses.

Apart from the reasons above expressed, the circumstance that section 3 of the act in question
leaves it to the discretion of the court to impose upon a defendant a penalty of imprisonment of
from one day to ten years and a fine of from $1,000 to $10,000, is worthy of serious
consideration.

In section 1 the penalty is death or, at the discretion of the court, that of imprisonment at hard
labor from five years to life and a fine of not less than $10,000. Consequently, if the death
penalty is not imposed an accused might be sentenced under section 1 of this act to a period of
imprisonment of less duration than that which might be imposed in accordance with section 3
thereof, according to the view taken as to the gravity of the crime and of the greater or lesser
degree of the guilt of the defendant. Furthermore, in support of this opinion, the result of a long
and careful study of the article of the Constitution in point, of the provisions of law, and some of
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, cited in the majority opinion, we must
state that section 3 of Act No. 292 — taking it for granted that within the definition of the crime
of treason is included the offense of rebellion — fixes the responsibility of those who incite,
promote, abet, or take a secondary part in an insurrection, or give the insurgents aid and comfort,
and fixes as to them a lesser penalty than that prescribed for rebels falling within the provisions
of section 1 of the act.

Consequently, the act of levying war upon the Government of the United States or that of these
Islands is punished in the two sections in question. The chiefs and the leaders of the rebellion and
the principal rebels should be punished according to section 1 of the law, but their subordinates
and those who only take a secondary part in the acts of war or rebellion should be punished in
accordance with section 3 of the same act.

In our humble opinion, this is the way the act in question should be applied in cases of treason or
rebellion or in other cases arising under section 3.

In case the eighty men led by Dalmacio Lagnason had been surrounded and forty of them taken
alive as the result of a fight with the Constabulary, could all have been condemned to death or to
life imprisonment in accordance with section 1 of the act, because each and every one of them
was levying war upon and making armed resistance to the authorities of the Insular Government?
It might have been possible, but reason and good sense would have protested against the unjust
severity of the penalty as compared with the respective guilt of each one of the rebels. For the
same reason, inversely considered, we are of the opinion that the penalty prescribed by section 3
is inadequate for the offense committed by the defendant Lagnason, the principal leader of the
band. For that reason the court below, while condemning his two subordinates to suffer the
penalty of ten years' imprisonment and a fine of $10,000, condemned this defendant to death.

For the reasons stated in our opinion, the decision of the court below should be reversed and the
defendant sentenced to the penalty of life imprisonment, the payment of a fine of $10,000, and to
the payment of the costs of both instances.
PEOPLE V. PEREZ

FACTS:

-Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason and was sentenced to death by
electrocution.

-TC found the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, to
satisfy the sexual desire of the Japanese officers.

-The Solicitor General submitted an opposite view stating that the deeds committed by the
accused do not constitute treason. It further discussed that if furnishing women for immoral
purposes to the enemies was treason because women’s company kept up their morale, so
fraternizing them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts,
would be treason . Any act of hospitality produces the same result.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of the accused constituted the crime of treason.

HELD: NO. The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. What
aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose.

As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be
directly in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs.

His “commandeering” of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit.

Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve
their war efforts or to weaken the power of US. Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason,
which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstance of each
particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape as principal by direct participation. Without his
coordination in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.

Gonzalo D. David for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death
by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the
penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.

The information alleges:

1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu,

Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines
Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead
guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like
the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas
and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating
said Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same
date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other
person who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the
accused herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;

2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province
of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the
Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably lead
guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend
Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie
and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so
severe especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of
said tortures administered by the accused.

3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused
being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to
Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former
USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did
tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for
several days after which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said
accused.

The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with
murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed
on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the
court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by
treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty
and an armed band.

We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and
formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention
supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with
the foe unaccompanied by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not
be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question.

On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court
against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People
vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:

The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior
strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects
of the crime.

The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and
may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to
the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the
successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent
determination and planning.

So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is
merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance
movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a
large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was
itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which
enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal
rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even
terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.

But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary
to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent,
human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms
of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating
circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the
main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall
within the terms of the above paragraphs.

For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed
inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying
crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the
rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage
that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in
treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the
danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to
the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the
Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and
carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the
prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason
the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be
 summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the furtherance of the law's
aims.

Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants
spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The
appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the
legal accessories and costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.