In addition, delays in final investment decisions (FID) (due largely to escalating
construction costs and, in some cases, political uncertainty) mean further constraints on future LNG supplies.4 Industry analysts appear undecided as to whether the supply tightness (and consequent price pressure) may be eased by the proposed development of further LNG projects, including: • in Angola, and the Olokoka LNG project (OK LNG) in Nigeria, estimated for start-up in 2012; and • in Papua New Guinea, Russia, Brass LNG in Nigeria, Greater Sunrise in the Timor Sea and Browse, Gorgon, Wheatstone and Scarborough off north-west Australia, all estimated for start-up around 2014 to 2015.
3.4 Political risk
The geographical location of gas reserves leads to many LNG projects being situated in areas of high political risk. The development of LNG projects in areas such as Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Yemen requires sponsors to manage significant risk on LNG projects. However, the capacity to do this is not without limits. Total and the Shell–Repsol–YPF joint venture announced suspensions of final investment decisions in respect of their respective LNG projects in Iran, citing high political risks and political pressure. Another factor relevant to the high political risk of many LNG projects is increasing resource nationalism by host governments, particularly in the context of high commodity prices and pressure to achieve the best possible returns on the nation’s resources. There are numerous examples, including the recent further reopening of LNG prices under long-term contracts for LNG supply from the Indonesian Tangguh project, and the decision of foreign sponsors to proceed with the Sakhalin II LNG project in Russia, despite the dilution of their interests as a result of Gazprom becoming a majority participant. Even in seemingly low political risk environments, such as the United States and Australia, LNG projects are affected by political considerations. The difficulty in obtaining local approvals for LNG import terminals in certain areas of the United States is well known and the development of further LNG projects in north-western Australia has been hampered by the difficulty in obtaining regulatory approval for sites for the onshore facilities. As the natural gas market underlying LNG diversifies, so too do its interests align. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is an informally structured group of the world’s largest natural gas exporters which, between them, are estimated to control up to 60% of global proved and provable gas reserves and approximately 50% of current global gas exports. Indications in early 2008 were that some natural gas exporters, notably Russia and Iran, had mooted further cooperation between the GECF members in the areas of gas pricing, infrastructure and consumer relations. Such cooperation was regarded by some commentators as tantamount to the formation of a ‘gas OPEC’. Given the sensitivity surrounding LNG pricing and the increasing roles of national oil companies and host governments in some GECF
4 For example, no new liquefaction projects were sanctioned in 2008.