IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar
Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks
for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75%
in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of
not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect
only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while
that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close
to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who
may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by
Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute
the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within
the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.
In the Matter of Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates (1946-1953); CUNANAN
FACTS:
RA 972 IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC INTEREST BECAUSE IT QUALIFIES 1,094 LAW
GRADUATES WHO CONFESSEDLY HAD INADEQUATE PREPARATION FOR THE
PRACTICE OF THE PROFESSION.
Public interest demands adequate preparation and efficiency, especially that legal
problems become more difficult.
i. RA 972 (BAR FLUNKER’S ACT 1953): in order that a candidate may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
a general average of 75% in all subjects, without falling below 0% in any subject.
1. This court passed and admitted to the bar, candidate who had obtained an
average only of 72 then raised to 75%.
2. Unsuccessful candidates of few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for and secured in 1951 the passage Senate Bill 12,
reduced the passing grade to 70% since 1946.
a. President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
the bill without its signature.
i. Any bar candidate who obtained 70% after July 1946 to Aug 1951,
71% 1952, 72% 1953, 73% 1954, 74% 1955 without a below 50% in any subject
shall be allowed to take oath.
ii. Any bar candidate who obtained 75% in any subject after July 1946
shall be deemed to have passed, such grades shall be added in computing the
passing the general average that said candidate may obtain any following
examinations.
b. After approval, unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, others who motioned for revision of exam
papers also invoked the law.
i. To avoid injustice, court reviewed motions for reconsideration.
Court did not find a reason to revise their grades. If they are admitted to bar, it
must be pursuant to RA 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to
all concerned whether they filed petitions or not.
3. Unsuccessful candidates who benefited section 1 totaled 1,168. 92 have
passed the subsequent examination and only 568 have filed either motions for
admission to bar pursuant to the Act or mere motions for reconsideration.
a. 10 candidates are to be benefited, each taken from 2 to 5 different
examinations, but failed to obtain passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
highest grades in different subjects with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach passing average as provided in RA 972.
b. Total number of candidates to be benefited is 1,094 with only 604 filed
petitions.
c. 33 who failed in 1946-1951 filed motions for reconsideration got denied.
d. 125 of 1952 and 56 of 1953 were pending.
e. Tribunal found no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.
ISSUE:
WON RA 972 is constitutional. NO.
HELD:
Portion of Art. 1 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and all of Art. 2
of said law are unconstitutional. Therefore, void and without force and effect.
Part of Art. 1 referring to the examinations following to the approval of the law
from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in
conformity with Sec. 10, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
Consequently:
a. All the above-mentioned petitions 1946 to 1952 are denied
b. All candidates in 1953 examinations, obtaining 71.5%+, without having a
grade -50% in any subject, are considered passed.
c. Permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members
of the Bar
1. Article 2 permits partial passing of examinations at indefinite intervals.
a. Does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary
b. Article not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.
i. Contrary to Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
2. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
a. Not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers.
b. Create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles.
c. Purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles.
3. GENERAL RULE:
a. A classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded.
b. Must be based upon substantial distinctions.
c. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must
be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and
other individuals who do not apply.
d. Must rest on some reason on which it can be defended.
e. There should be a a difference between the situation and circumstances of
all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state.
4. LAW NOT CONSIDERED GENERAL:
a. Operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all.
i. It was indicated why unsuccessful candidates prior 1946 were not
included.
ii. No record of examinations prior to 1946, does not mean they don’t
have right for equal consideration.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava,
the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter issued
scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,
and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law for
requiring such examination as condition precedent before members of the bar
may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the
Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition
or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent
Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice
of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution
of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent
Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the applications
of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge,
training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in
said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of
the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
#
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.
FACTS: On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take
the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so
as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can
practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time
he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned
formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors,
and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover,
the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established
in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training,
then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic
223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal
Profession – Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according
to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot
afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the
following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no
matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the
jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the
public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such
practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The
services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice
of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal
Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to
promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions
of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Rule 2.03 | June 17, 1993 | Regalado, JNature of Case: Original Petition
in the SCPetitioner: Mauricio UlepRespondent: The Legal Clinic, Inc.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced arechampertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive ofthe confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the barand that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended bythe said advertisements.
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines.
DOCTRINE:
The services offered by respondent include various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the
bar and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
FACTS:
•Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to order the respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law.”
•Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
•Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines.

•Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in
the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.State Bar of Arizona,
reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
•The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering.
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation
ortransaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein.
NOTE: Rule 2.03
- A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

•While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely

involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule.

•It is palpably clear that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real.

•In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore.

•It is clear that services offered by respondent fall within the ambit of the practice
of law. And only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in
good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of – YES.
The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such practice is not allowed.
Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals; the services it offers include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
RULING: The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LADAGA 350 SCRA 326
[2001]
FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bonocounsel
for a relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An
administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without
permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga
justified his appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative
and that he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such
counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew
his appearances as such counsel.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be
customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. It does not pertain to isolated court
appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent
was reprimanded.
#
Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga
(A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001)
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for “Falsification of Public
Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance
of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the
METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling.
Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga.
Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of
his compassion and high regard for her. This is the first time that respondent ever
handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He
appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore,
his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top
of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has
maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission
from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into
private practice? NO
Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants
from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. THERE
WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than
an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768).Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident
that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his
cousin in Criminal Case No.84885 does not constitute the “private practice” of the
law profession contemplated by law.
DECISION: Reprimanded.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all Issue
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an 1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a of the COMELEC.
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been 2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Held

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of 1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court…In general, all
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. held to constitute law practice.
#
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application
Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the
201 SCRA 210 practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
G.R. No. 100113 Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
September 3, 1991 device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In
general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether
Facts: Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as in or out of court.
chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod
allegedly lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged in the A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable
practice of law for at least 10 years. consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”
at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
Bar, respondent worked in his father’s law office for a short while, then worked examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2 years, which member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10
loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
Executive Officer of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of various companies. the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least 10 years.
 upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a
Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the
appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by to be the decisive factor.
law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective
power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for
the petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its
employees and also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment
papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession.
G.R. No. L-62909 April 18, 1989 These facts showed that petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent
employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining whether
vs. LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR or not there is an employee-employer relationship.
RELATIONS COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN,
private respondent.
#
Facts:
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORP. vs PAGALILAUAN
Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant” GR No. L-62909 1989
and received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of
P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban Facts: Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant”
received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered and received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which
terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his gradually increased to P320.00.
duties well.
On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would
Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to
ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on perform his duties well. Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The
appeal. Hence, this present petition. labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on
appeal. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the
Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban.
petitioner corporation and Aban.
Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate
Held: Aban to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three years
backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney’s fees. Should
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits
his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney’s fees.
(3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in
attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or
private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of
years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees. whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: 1. the
manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; 2. the mode of payment
A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private of wages; 3. the presence or absence of a power of dismissal and 4. the presence or
corporation or even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the absence of a power to control the putative employee’s conduct. Of the four, the right of
determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends control test has been held to be the decisive factor.
In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner,
dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted
the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer
in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to
hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by
defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining whether
or not there is an employee-employer relationship.
OMICO MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORP. V. VALLEJOS
Omico Mining & Industrial Corp. v. Vallejos
G.R. No. L-38974. March 25, 1975.
Antonio, J.
Doctrine:
Section 35 of the Rules of Court, Rule 135, not allowing judges, or other official
or employee of the superior courts or the OSG to engage in private practice] is
based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges, and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretions, and privileges of a judge of the CFI.
FACTS: While petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint filed by then
CFI Judge Catolico was pending resolution by the trial court, the latter filed a
petition to declare petitioners in default alleging that seven months had lapsed
since summons was served on petitioners. The court granted the petition.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal to the Supreme Court after their motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: WON judges can engage in private practice of law.
RULING: No. The inhibitory rule embodied in Section 25 of Rule 138 makes
it obligatory upon the judicial officers to give their full time and attention to their
judicial duties. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the
desire to promote the public interest.
CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008)
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor
who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by
the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa
of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the
punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation
proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance
as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant
administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed
an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel
for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his
defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found
sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official,
the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713.Consequently, for the violation
of the latter prohibition, respondent committed
a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the
respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection to former government lawyers
who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter
in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar,
respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall
within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials.
While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160,
being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under
RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to
a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay
and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden
to practice his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing
the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for breach of the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners, vs. CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,respondents.
G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
Nature of the Action: Special civil actions for Mandamus
Facts: Petitioners instituted two special civil actions of mandamus against
respondents, alleging that respondents Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded
them from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused
prosecuted before said tribunals; that they are entitled being attorneys duly
admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts. Meanwhile, respondents
maintained that according to Section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution, “No
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly. .
.appear as counsel before. . .any court. . .in any criminal case wherein an offer
or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office. . .”
Issue: Is the above prohibition applicable to petitioners?
Ruling: Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for
the accused in court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them
from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these
two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.
Ratio: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the said law applies to petitioners, being
members of the Congress. Furthermore, the words ‘any court’ refers not only to
civil courts but also to military courts, or a court-martial; that a court-martial is
a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an
administrative case. Thus, under certain conditions, another prosecution of a
defendant for the same offense would already constitute double jeopardy.
#
Marcos vs. Chief of Staff
FACTS: Alleged that the AFP Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded MARCOS and
CONDORDIA from their right to appear as counsel on the ground that they are
DISQUALIFIED/EXEMPTED/INHIBITED from SEC 17, Article 17 of the Constitution:
SEC. 17: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly
or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Congress during his term of office.
He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before
any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in
any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office…”
ISSUE: WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our
Constitution is applicable to the petitioners in the two cases. YES.
HELD: MARCOS AND CONCONDIA DISQUALIFIED TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR
ACCUSED IN COURT-MARTIALS. AFP DID NOT UNLAWFULLY EXCLUDED THEIR
RIGHTS. HENCE, PETITIONS FORMANDAMUS ARE DENIED WITH COSTS.
MARCOS/CONCORDIA: applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General
Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the
above quoted provisions of our Constitution.

Words “any court”, used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel “in
any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office,”
refers not only to civil, but also to military courts.

General meaning must prevail over restricted meaning UNLESS the nature of the
subject matter clearly indicates that limited sense is intended.

It would be a bar to another prosecution for the same case which would result
to DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

“If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment
will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend
the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance.

Restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, the plaintiff in error,
having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, could not be subsequently tried for
the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.”

In Sec 17, it is obvious that the reason of prohibiting appearance of members of the
Senate/House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martials, as for
inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of
civil courts’ judges is guaranteed by our Constitution.

Ubieadem ratio ibieademlexi

A court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction; cannot enforce a

contract, collect a debtor award damages in favor of an individual.

Judgment is a criminal sentence, not a civil verdict.

Proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt.

Court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by same authority that any other exists by,
and the military law is a branch of law as valid as the others.

It differs from other laws only because- it applies to officers and soldiers but not to
other members of the body politic, it is limited to beaches of military duty.