Week  3.  The  Rise  of  Nationalism;  the  Demise  of  Empire    

Welcome   to   our   third   lesson   of   our   course   on   the   Emergence   of   the   Modern   Middle   East.   Our  
course   today   is   on   the   rise   of   nationalism   in   the   Middle   East,   on   the   one   hand,   and   the   demise,   the  
end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  on  the  other.    

Muslims   did   not   traditionally   connect   collective  

identity   with   territoriality.   Collective   identity   for  
Muslims  was  a  matter  of  religious  belief  and  not  
of  territorial   belonging.   But   under  the   impact   of  
European  ideas  during  the  19th  century,  the  idea  
of   territorial   nationalism  began   to   become  
more  acceptable.  Concepts  began  to  change,  and  
in   the   generation  of   Islamic   Reform   in   the  
late  19th   and   early   20th   century,  nationalism  
became  a  much  more  acceptable  idea.    

We  are  talking  about  three  forms  of  nationalism  in  this  period:  Turkish,  Arab,  and  Egyptian.  These  
nationalisms   were   the   property,   for   the   most   part,   of   an   intellectual,   elitist,   Westernizing,   urban  
minority.   Nationalism   was   not   the   province   of   the   masses   of   the   citizenry.   Nationalists   were  
especially   the   graduates   of   the   new   schools,   those   who   had   been   exposed   more   intensively   to  
Western  ideas.  The    

   
      
new   schools   produced   new   social   classes,   new   professions.   Teachers   for   the   new   schools   who   were  
teaching   new   subjects,   lawyers   and   judges   administering   new   European   inspired   legal   systems.  
These  were  the  people  who  were  the  most  supportive  of  the  new  nationalist  ideas.    

But   for   most   of   the   population,   the   people   were   still   very   deeply  
embedded   in   Islamic   tradition,   though,   what   exactly   tradition   meant   was  
beginning   to   change   also.   But   religious   leaders   still   wielded   considerable  
authority.   The   Ottoman   Sultan   at   the   end   of   the   19th   century,   Abdulhamid  
II,  claimed  to  be  the  Caliph  of  all  Muslims,  mobilizing  popular  support  for  
the  Ottoman  Empire  on  the  basis  of  their  Islamic  identity.  But  nevertheless,  
nationalist   movements   did   arise   and   in   response   to   a   variety   of   different  
challenges.    

   
 

 
3.1.  Turkish  Nationalism  

So,  what  were  the  challenges  that  led  to  the  emergence  of  Turkish  
nationalism?   In   Turkish   nationalism,   we   are   talking   first   and  
foremost   of   the   pressure   that   is   coming   from   Europe   and   the  
problem   of   secession   by   the   Christian   populated   territories   in   the  
European   part   of   the   Empire.   Ottomanism   failed   to   keep   the  
Christians  inside  the  Empire.  During  the  Tanzimat,  we  learnt  about  
the   equality   about   the   law   that   was   passed,   and   this   equality  
before  the  law  that  included  Christians  and  Muslims  was  supposed  
to   create  a  shared   Ottoman   identity.  But  it  did  not.  In  the   face   of  
Christian   secession,   Sultan   Abdulhamid   turned   to   pan-­‐Islam   to  
strengthen  the  bonds  between  the  increasingly  Muslim  Empire.  As  
Christians  seceded,  so  the  Empire  became  ever  more  Muslim.    

But  this  idea  of  pan-­‐Islam  and  uniting  the  people  on  the  basis  of  their  religion  was  becoming  less  
and   less   acceptable   to   the   new   Westernizing   Turkish   elite.   They   believed   in  Turkish   national  
solidarity   based   on   a   common   language,   Turkish,  European-­‐style.   The   Empire   now   was   almost  
entirely   Turkish   and   Arab.   Therefore,   the   emphasis   on   Turkishness   could   be   a   cause   of   tension   with  
the   Arabs,   especially   after   1908   when   the   Young   Turks   came   to   power.   So,   though   Turkish  
nationalists,   the   Young   Turks,   were   reluctant   to   push   Turkish   nationalism   too   far   not   to   create   a  
break  with  a  very  large  Arab  Muslim  population.    

Who   were   the   Young   Turks?   The   Young   Turks   were   young   military  
officers   and   bureaucrats,   the   graduates   of   the   Tanzimat   and   not   the  
usual  opponents  of  the  sultan,  not  the  local  potentates  or  the  unruly  
tribes  or  the  Christians.  It  is  the  Young  Turks  who  staged  a  revolution  
in  July  1908,  deposed  the  Sultan  in  April  of  1909  and  continued  with  
the   process   of   reform   in   the   military   with   German   advisers,   as   they  
continued,  like  their  predecessors,  building  new  schools  and  adding  to  
legal   reform.   The   Young   Turks   continued   as   their   predecessors,  
building   a   modern   infrastructure,   telegraph,   roads   and   railways,  
generally   modernizing   the   Ottoman   Empire.   Government   became  
ever   more   centralized,   even   the   development   of   an   effective   secret  
police.    
Many  of  the  revolutionaries,  those  who  carried  out  the  Revolution  of  1908,  were  military  officers  
organized   in   an   organization   that   was   called   the   Committee   of   Union   and   Progress,   in   short,   the  
CUP.   They   sought   the   salvation   of   the   Empire   and   the   restoration   of   the  1876   Constitution.   They  
believed   in  Turkish   nationalism,   in  Westernized   education   and   in   the  implementation   of   the  
Constitution.    

There   was   a   very   impressive  

impact  amongst   the   Young   Turks   and  
others   in  the   Muslim   Middle   East   of   the  
defeat   of  Russia   in   1905   by   the   Japanese.  
This  was  a  defeat  of  a  European  power  by  
an  Asian  power.  In  looking  for  the  success  
of  the   Japanese   against   the   Russians,  
many  in   the   Middle   East   focused   on   the  
fact  that  Japan  had  gone  in  the  direction  of  
constitutionalism,   whereas   the   Russians  
had   not.   Therefore,   the   idea   of   a  
constitutional   government   was   gaining  
ground  as  a  source  of  collective  power.    

But  also,  for  the  Young  Turks,  constitutionalism  meant  the  steady  shift  of  power  into  the  hands  of  
the   army   at   the   expense   of   both   the   sultan   and   the   bureaucracy.   They   also   believed   that   the  
resumption  of  parliamentary  life  would  ease  European  pressure.  But  it  did  not.  In  the  Balkans,  the  
Ottomans   continued   losing   ground.   And   in   1911   the   Italians   took   Tripoli   in   Libya.   In   1912-­‐13,   the  
Ottomans  lost  nearly  all  the  territory  they  had  left  in  Europe.    

In  1913,  the  CUP  assumed  complete  control,  which  they  

had   not   enjoyed   entirely   until   then.   But   they   did   not  
manage   to   do   much   before   the   outbreak   of   the   First  
World  War,  and  that  changed  a  great  deal.    

Since   the   second   half   of   the   19th   century,   there   had  

been  a  steadily  increasing  interest  in  the  history  of  the  
Turkish   people,   as   well   as   in   the   Turkish   language,   in  
Turkish   literature.   Ziya   Gökalp,   who   lived   from   1876   to   1924,   was   the   most   prominent   ideologue   of  
Turkish   nationalism.   He   rejected   Ottomanism   and   made   the   Turkish   nation  
the  basis  of  his  program.  But  as  long  as  the  Empire  continued  to  exist,  Turkish  
nationalism  as  a  practical  political  program  had  little  appeal  to  the  leadership  
and   to   the   general   public.   The   CUP,   those   sympathetic   and   supportive   of  
Turkish   nationalism,   continued   like   their   predecessors   with   Ottomanism,  
centralization   and   modernization.   It   would   take   the   end   of   Empire   for  
Gökalp’s  ideology  to  become  the  policy  of  the  new  Turkish  republic.    

This   emergence   of   Turkishness   and   Turkish   nationalism   gives   rise   to  

a  question  of  how  this  all  relates  to  the  notorious  Armenian  tragedy.  Now  we  
turn   to   this   so-­‐called   Armenian   problem.   Since   the   Empire  was   losing   territory   all   the   time,   what  
was   left   of   the   Empire,   which  essentially   was   the   area   of   Anatolia,   faced   increasing  
nationalist  challenges   by   others   that   served   to   reinforce   Turkish   identity   and  nationalist   passions.  
With  the  loss  of  the  European  provinces,  Anatolia  was  established  as  the  heartland  of  the  Turkish-­‐
speaking   people.   It   was   the   zone   of   their   prospective   self-­‐determination.   This   allowed   for   the  
emergence  of  the  Armenian  problem  as  a  potential  threat  to  the  Turkish  heartland.    

Anatolia   developed   impressively   like   the   rest   of   the  

Empire,   especially   in   the   west   of   Anatolia   during   the  
19th   century.   Eastern   Anatolia   remained   less  
developed   and   there   was   considerable   social   and  
political   tension   between   the   Armenians,   who   are  
Christians,  and  the  Kurds,  who  are  Sunni  Muslims,  in  
the  eastern  part  of  Anatolia.  There  were  Armenians  in  
all  of  Anatolia,  but  especially  in  the  eastern  provinces.  
During   the   19th   century,   an   Armenian   national  
consciousness   developed   very   much   under   the  
influence   of   Western   sources,   especially   through   the  
American   Protestant  missionaries   who   were   active  
amongst   the   Armenians.   The   Armenians  engaged   in  
provocations   against   the   Ottomans   to   attract  
European  intervention   on   their   behalf.   Cooperation  
with  Russia  meant  cooperation  of  the  Armenians  with  
the   traditional   enemy   of   the   Ottomans.   Tensions  between   the   Turkish-­‐
speaking   Muslims   and   the   Armenians   rose.   In   the  last   quarter   the   19th  
century,  there  were  massacres  of  Armenians  by  Kurdish  irregulars  of  the  
Ottoman  army  in  the  eastern  part  of  Anatolia.  A  combination  of  a  lack  of  
government  control,  with  suspicion  towards  the  Armenians  as  a  national  
movement  threatened  what  the  Turks  had  left  of  their  Empire.  These  two  
came  together  to  allow  for  the  terrible  massacre  of  the  Armenians  to  take  
place.  This  terrible  massacre  took  place  in  the  midst  of  World  War  One,  in  
the  early  years  of  the  war.  Armenians  in  eastern  Anatolia  had  fought  with  
the   Russians   against   the   Ottomans.   Other   Armenians   had   engaged   in  
guerrilla   operations   and   some   Armenian   populations   rose   against   the  
 O"oman'Empire,'1915'

See page for author [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Ottomans   during   the   war.   In   the   spring   of   1915,   with   the   British  
attacking  at  the  Dardanelles,  the  Russians  attacking  in  the  east  and  
the   British   apparently   advancing   on   Baghdad,   the   Ottomans   decided  
on   the   deportation   of   the   Armenians   in  eastern   Anatolia.   In   the  
process  of  this  deportation,  hundreds  of  thousands,  maybe  even  one  
million   Armenians   or   even   more   perished   because   of   the   harsh  
conditions,   dying   of   hunger,   disease   and   exposure.   Many   were  
murdered  by  local,  mainly  Kurdish,  tribesmen  and  villagers.    

Thus,  what  turned  into  the  Armenian  Genocide  was  part  of  a  larger  
transition,   the   transition   from   communal   identity   to   territorial   self-­‐
determination.   This   had   some   very   unfortunate   consequences   on  
the   ground.   The   transition   from   communal   co-­‐existence,   where  
religious  communities  lived  side  by  side,  Ottoman  style,  to  territorial  
nationalism,   European   style,   required   some   degree   of   territorial   contiguity.   The   need   for  
communities   now   to   acquire   territorial   contiguity   in   the   name   of   self-­‐determination   rather   than  
communities  just  living  side  by  side  created  unavoidable  clashes  between  the  mosaic  of  minorities  
within   the   Ottoman   Empire,   accompanied   by   horrific   bloodshed.   The   Balkans   of   those   days   (and  
latter-­‐day   Yugoslavia   of   the   1990s)   were   one   example.   The   Armenians   in   Anatolia   was   another.   Not  
all  products  of  modernity  and  change  had  positive  results.  Some  were  quite  catastrophic.  Indeed,  
the  Turkish-­‐  Armenian  clash  was  the  worst  example  of  this  unfortunate  reality.    

       
  
3.2.  Arab  Nationalism  

Turning   to   Arab   nationalism,   one   may   ask   what   were   the  

intellectual  origins  of  Arab  nationalism?  Arab  nationalism  had  two  
intellectual  sources:  one  Christian  and  one  Muslim.    

The   Christian   source   was   that   of   Christian   scholars   and   writers   in  

the  new  missionary  schools,  producing  new  scholarship  on  Arabic  
language   and   culture.   It   was   this   new   scholarship   on   Arabic  
language   and   culture   coming   out   of   the   new   missionary   schools  
that  made  a  major  contribution  to  the  evolution  of  the  idea  of  the  
Arabs  as  a  nation,  the  speakers  of  the  Arabic  language  as  a  nation.    

The   other   source   was   Islamic   Reform.   As   we   will   recall,   Islamic  

Reform   spoke   a   great   deal   about   the   revival   of   Arab   Islam,  
returning  the  Arabs  to  the  centrality  of  Islam,  the  primacy  of  the  Arabs  in  Islamic  civilization.  This,  of  
course,  contributed  to  the  sense  of  a  particular  Arab  nationalist  sentiment.  But  for  many  years,  with  
the   emergence   of   Arab   nationalism,   the   Arab   nationalists   did   not   demand   secession   from   the  
Empire.   Even   as   Arab   nationalists,   they   continued   to   recognize   the   legitimacy   of   the   Ottoman  
Empire,   the   legitimacy   of   the   Muslim   empire.   Their   demands   centered   on   decentralization,   and   not  
secession.    

Looking  at  the  Christian  intellectual  roots  of  Arab  nationalism,  one  must  first  recognize  that  during  
the   19th   century,   and   in   particular   the   second   half   of   it,   Syria   during   the   Tanzimat   was   a   country   of  
increased  order  and  a  much  more  intensive  and  better  connection  with  Europe.  One  of  the  results  
of  these  changes  was  that  there  was  a  very  significant  increase  in  the  school  system,  especially  of  
church  and  missionary  schools.  By  1914,  in  Syria,  there  were  some  500  French  schools.  There  were  
American   Protestant   schools   too,   one   of   which   became   the   American   University   of   Beirut,  
established  in  1866  and  still  in  existence  today.  American  and  French  missionary  schools  in  Lebanon  
brought  many  Arabs,  mainly  Christians,  into  close  contact  with  the  West.    

Ottoman  government  schools  did  the  same.  But  the  Arab  literary  
revival   through   the   printing   press,   journalism,   periodicals,  
dictionaries,  grammar  books  and  new  literature  was  very  much  a  
cultural   revival   in   which   Christians   were   preeminent.   The  
dissemination   of   new   ideas   in   this   cultural   revival   focused   very  
much   on   the   idea   of   nationalism,   and   Arab   nationalism   it   was.  
Just  to  mention  a  few  of  the  Christians  who  were  involved  in  this  
cultural   revival:   Nasif   al-­‐Yaziji,   Butrus   al-­‐Bustani,   Faris   Shidyaq  
(he   of   these   Christians   was   one   who   converted   to   Islam),  
Ya'aqub   Sarruf,   Faris   Nimr,   Jurji   Zaydan.   It   is   important   to  
mention   Faris   Shidyaq   as   one   who   converted   to   Islam   and   not  
the   only   Christian   ideologue   of   Arab   nationalism   who   did   that.  
This   was   maybe   a   recognition   by   the   Christians   of   the   very   close  
association,  in  the  end,  between  Arab  nationalism  and  Islam.    

But   these   Christians   in   Lebanon   and   Syria   were   different   from  

other   Christians   in   the   Empire   in   that   they   spoke   Arabic   just   like  
their   Muslim   neighbors,   very   different   to   the   Christians   of   the  
Balkans.   These   were   Orthodox   Christians   who,   as   opposed   to   the  
Maronite   Catholics,   were   not   a   compact   minority.   Catholic  
Maronites   were   very   heavily   concentrated   in   one   area   in   Mount  
Lebanon.   The   Orthodox   Christians   were   spread   all   over   the  
Ottoman   Empire.   They   had   an   interest   in   a   common   ground   for  
political   organization   with   Arab   Muslim   neighbors.   Spread   out   as  
they  were,  they  could  not  possibly  secede.    

There   was   also   tension   in  

the  Orthodox   Church   between  
the  Greek   clergy,   the   senior  
ranks,  and   the   Arabic-­‐speaking   clergy  
in   the   lower   ranks.   This   tension   within   the   church   between   Greeks  
and  Arabs  also  contributed  to  this  sense  of  Arab  distinction,  the  Arab  
difference,   Arab   nationalism   and   Arab   particular   identity.   There   was   a  
tendency  amongst  the  Christians  to  see  the  land  of  Syria  as  an  Arabic-­‐
speaking   geographic   and   political   entity.   Some   spoke   of   Syria.   Some  
went   beyond   Syria   in   terms   of   a   larger   state   of   Arabs,   which   would  
include  Iraq  and  Arabia.  Najib  Azuri  was  one  such  Christian  who  spoke  
of   a   much   larger   Arab   state.   He   was   a   Syrian   Catholic   Christian  
operating  out  of  Paris.    

So  the  question,  of  course,  arises  in  regard  

to  a  person  like  Azuri,  who  did  he  really  speak  for?  Apparently,  not  too  
many.  For  some  Christians,  a  more  liberal  empire  would  have  been  good  
enough.   For   others,   Arab   nationalism   and   its   essential   link   with   Islam  
could  be  dangerous  for  Christians  pushing  them  into  an  inferior  status.    

As  for  the  Muslim  public,  the  great  majority  of  them  were  not  attracted  
by   Arab   nationalism,   certainly   not   that   espoused   by   Christians.  The  
Muslim   Arabs   in   Syria   adopted   the   battle   cry   “Arabic   shall   not  
be  Christianized”   as   a   way   of   rejecting   this   form   of   Arab   nationalism  
coming  from  Christian  intellectuals.    

So   one   must   ask   now,   what   were   the   effects  of   Islamic   Reform   on   the  
emergence   of   Arab   nationalism?   Muslims  were   indeed   affected   far   more   by   the   arguments   of  
Islamic   reformers   about   the   primacy   of   the   Arabs   in   Islam,   and   blaming   the   Turks   for   Muslim  
decline,  than  they  were  influenced  by  Christian  intellectuals.    

       
  
For  Islamic  reformers  like  Rashid  Rida,  about  whom  we  have  already  
learnt,   the   revival   of   Arabic   studies   as   a   forerunner   to   the   revival   of  
Islam   was   absolutely   essential,   because   Arabic   was   the   language   of  
Islam.    

From   this,   it   was   a   very   easy   step   to   glorifying   the   Arabs   and   to  
speaking   of   the   essentiality   of   the   Arab   nationalism.   But   in   the   end,  
Arab   nationalism   only   really   captured   the   popular   imagination   after  
the   disappearance   of   the   Ottoman   Empire.   Only   after   a   special  
emphasis   on   the   role   of   Islam   in   Arabism   and   the   intimate   connection  
between   Arabism   and   Islam   did   Arab   nationalism   become   really  
popular   amongst   Muslims.   After   all,   Islam   was   at   the   very   heart   of   the  
cultural   heritage   of   the   Arabs.   If   one   were   to   ask   what   was   the  
greatest   contribution   of   the   Arabs   to   human   civilization,  
unquestionably  Arabs  would  argue  that  it  was  the  religion  of  Islam.    

Before   World   War   One,   Arab   nationalists,   for   the   most   part,   did   not   go   beyond   calls   for   greater  
autonomy   and   the   recognition   of   Arabic   as   an   official   language.   There   were   secret   societies   that  
promoted   Arab   nationalism,   but   they   had   very   little   weight   before   1914.   There   was   an   Arab  
nationalist   conference   in   Paris   in   1913,   but   all   they   did   was   to   demand   autonomy   in   the   Arab  
provinces,   not   secession.   They   also   demanded   the   recognition   of   Arabic   as   a   language   of  
government,   and   they   demanded   the   appointment   of   more   Arab   officials.   Was   this   about  
nationalism  or  just  self-­‐interest  of  the  Arab  educated  class  looking  for  good  jobs  in  the  government?  
It  is  hard  to  say.    
  
It  was  only  amongst  the  Maronite  Catholics,  that  compact  minority  of  Christians  in  Mount  Lebanon,  
who  had  very  clear  ideas  about  a  politically  independent  entity  protected  by  France.  But  that  was  
not  in  the  name  of  Arab  nationalism,  but  in  the  name  of  the  state  of  Lebanon.    

In  the  provinces  of  Iraq,  there  was  much  less  interest  in  Arab  nationalism,  much  less  than  in  Syria,  
for   example.   There   had   been   less   substantial   economic   development   and   change   in   Iraq   than   there  
had  been  in  Syria  during  the  19th  century.  There  was  a  very  large  Shi'ite  population  in  Iraq,  and  they  
saw   Arabism   not   as   a   nationalism   in   which   they   shared.   For   them,   Arabism   was   a   form   of   Sunni  
Muslim  revivalism,  and  in  that  they  had  no  interest.  The  Christian  catalyst  that  existed  in  Syria  did  
not   exist   in   Iraq.   There   were   very   few   Christians   in   Iraq,   not   intellectually   prominent   as   those   in  
Syria.   There   was   a   very   important   and   large   Jewish   minority   in   Iraq.   But   they   were   not   very  
politicized   and   generally   speaking   were   very   loyal   Ottoman   subjects.   The   Jews,   after   all,   had   no  
connections  with  Christian  powers  and  could  not  possibly  imagine  secession.    

After   1908   and   the   revival   of   the   Ottoman   parliament,   there   were   much   more   intensive   contacts  
between  Arab  representatives  in  the  Empire.  The  parliament  enabled  them  to  come  in  contact  with  
each  other,  and  this  added  to  the  appeal  of  Arab  nationalism.  But  again,  one  must  emphasize,  the  
great  majority  of  Muslims  remained  loyal  subjects  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  until  the  very  end.    

3.3.  Egyptian  Nationalism  

How   did   Egypt   differ   from   other  

Arabic-­‐speaking   lands?   After   all,   in  
Egypt   in   this   period,   we   speak   of  
Egyptian   nationalism,   something   we  
do   not   speak   of   in   countries   like   Syria  
or  Iraq.  So  how  did  Egypt  differ?  Egypt  
differed   from   other   Arabic-­‐speaking  
lands   in   the   sense   that   Egypt   was   a  
very   separate   independent   case   unto  
itself.   Egyptian   nationalism   emerged  
against   a   very   specific   reality   that  
existed  only  in  Egypt  and  not  in  other  Arab  countries.  That  is  the  
British   occupation.   There   was,   therefore,   a   specific   Egyptian  
rather   than   Arab,   Muslim   or   Ottoman   content   to   the   nationalist  
movement   that   emerged   in   Egypt.   It   had   a   specific   geographical  
and  political  definition.    

During   the   19th   century,   as  we   have   already   seen,  

Egypt  underwent   a   series   of   radical  changes,   the   foundations  
of  the   modern   state   of   Egypt  built   by   Muhammad   Ali.  Egypt  
underwent   an   economic   revolution   of   sorts,   basing   the  
economy   on   an   export-­‐oriented   agriculture,   particularly   the  
growing  of  cotton  for  export  and  the  sugar  industry.  There  was  
considerable  social  change  in  Egypt  in  the  19th  century;  the  new  school  system,  the  printing  press,  
journalism  and  legal  reform.  All  of  that  was  very  similar  to  other  parts  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  
introduction  to  the  world  of  ideas  and  the  lifestyle  of  Europe.    

Egypt   in   the   1870s   was   Egypt   in   a   situation   of   bankruptcy   and   ever-­‐increasing   international  
intervention   in   Egypt's   finances   to   ensure   payment   of   the   huge   debt   that   the   Egyptians   had  
accumulated   in   the   very   rapid   project   of   modernization   instituted   very   much   under   the   rule   of  
Khedive   Ismail.   In   1879,   Khedive   Ismail   was   removed   by   the   European   powers   in   favor   of   his   son  
Tawfiq.   Egyptian   Arabic-­‐speaking   officers   of   the   Egyptian   army   began   to   express   ever   increasing  
disapproval   of   this   international   influence   in   Egyptian   politics.   This   disapproval   of   the   Arabic-­‐
speaking  officers  was  also  representative  of  more  profound  trends  of  social  disaffection  inside  Egypt  
at  that  time.    

There  was  increasing  tension  between  the  Arabic-­‐speaking  Egyptians  and  the  older  upper  class  of  
Turco-­‐Circassians   officers   and   the   landowning   elite,   also   of   Turco-­‐Circassian   background   in   many  
places,   who   had   become   predominant   since   Muhammad   Ali's   assumption   of   power.   This   Turco-­‐
Circassian   elite   in   part   Turkish,   that   is,   Turkish   administrators   and   officers   who   had   remained   in  
Egypt   and   become   very   prominent,   or   Circassians   who   had   served   with   the   Mamluks   and   whose  
origins  were  in  the  Caucasus  and  had  become  part  of  the  new  ruling  elite  in  Egypt,  together  with  
Arab   Egyptian   landowners,   were   equally   interested   in   the   restriction   of   foreign   influence,   which  
naturally  eroded  their  stature  too.    

These   are   the   early   beginnings   of   a   very   clear   cut,   openly   expressed   Egyptian   identity.   Educated  
Egyptians  were  also  influenced  by  new  archeological  discoveries  of  the  Egyptians’  glorious  ancient  
 past.  There  was  a  creation  of  a  sense  of  continuity  between  Egypt's  
great  pre-­‐Islamic  past  and  its  Islamic  history.  This  had  great  impact  
on   collective   identity.   If   one   ventures   to   study   Egypt's   pre-­‐Islamic  
past,  one  is  touching  upon  a  core  issue  in  the  Islamic  interpretation  
of   history.   The  pre-­‐Islamic   past   in   the   Islamic   interpretation   of  
history  is  known  as  the  Jahiliyya,  the  period  of  ignorance.  There  was  
nothing   positive   to   say   about   the   pre-­‐Islamic   past   in   Egypt.   It   was  
this   period   of   ignorance   and   barbarism   that   was   succeeded   by   the  
great  civilization  of  Islam.    

But   if   one   is   beginning   to   value,   because   of   the   great   findings   of  

Pharaonic  Egypt,  that  the  pre-­‐Islamic  past  in  Egypt  was  something  to  
be   proud   of   and   something   to   be   seen   in   a   very   positive   light,   one   is   beginning   to   question   the  
Islamic   interpretation   of   history.   If   one   is   to   value   Egypt's   pre-­‐Islamic   past,   one   is   eroding   the  
centrality  of  Islam  in  the  Egyptian  collective  identity.    

Rifa'a   al-­‐Tahtawi,   who   lived   from   1801   to   1873   and   was   one   of   the  
leading   students   in   the   Muhammad   Ali   era   who   studied   in   Paris   from  
1826   to   1831,   under   the   impact   of   European   ideas,   spoke   frequently   of  
nations   and   countries   and   made   it   clear   that   a   nation   was   bound   to   a  
specific   territory.   Egypt   was   one   such   country.   The   Egyptians   were   a  
nation,   says   Tahtawi,   who   should   love   their   fatherland   like   the   Europeans  
love  theirs.    

Tahtawi's  writings  about  Egypt's  uniqueness  were  published  in  a  book  on  
the   historical   and   geographical   distinctiveness   of   Egypt   in   1869.   Khedive  
Ismail   built   a   national   library   and   a   museum.   The   introduction   of   pre-­‐
Islamic  history  into  Egypt's  schools  was  becoming  an  important  facet  
of  the  evolution  of  a  peculiar,  particular  Egyptian  identity.  Writers  like  
Ya'aqub   Sanu’   and   Abdallah   al-­‐Nadim   popularized   the   terms   of  
Egyptianness   and   Egyptians   in   the   1870s   and   the   1880s,   and   sounded  
the  slogan  of  “Egypt  for  the  Egyptians.”  It  was  against  this  background  
that   there   was   ever   increasing   opposition   in   Egypt   to   increasing  
foreign  influence.    

This   opposition   to   increasing   foreign  

influence  was  expressed  in  the  early  1880s  in  
the   Urabi  Rebellion,   a   rebellion   led   by   an  
Arabic-­‐speaking  Egyptian  officer  by  the  name  
of   Ahmad   Urabi,   who   rose   against   this  
increasing   foreign   dominance   in   Egyptians'   internal   affairs.   There   were  
various  reasons  for  the  disaffection  of  Ahmad  Urabi  and  his  fellow  Arabic-­‐
speaking   Egyptian   officers.   Their   promotion   to   the   highest   ranks   in   the  
military   was   blocked   by   the   Turco-­‐Circassian   elite.   Many   lost   their   jobs   in  
the  financial  crisis  of  the  1870s.    

In   1881   and   1882,   there   were   repeated   uprisings   of   the   officers   under   Ahmad   Urabi   against   the  
economic   situation,   against   the   Turco-­‐Circassian   domination   and   against   increasing   foreign  
intervention   in   Egypt's   domestic   financial   affairs.   Urabi   spoke,   for   the   most   part,   in   traditionally  
Islamic  terms,  but  he  also  used  the  slogans  of  Abdallah  al-­‐Nadim  on  “Egypt  for  the  Egyptians.”  

From   May   1882,   Egypt   became   increasingly  

rebellious  and  disorderly.  Riots  broke  out  in  Alexandria  
in  June.  The  European  quarter  of  the  city  was  sacked  by  
the  rioters.   In   July   of   1882,   the   British   navy  
shelled  Alexandria.   In   September   of   that   year,   the  
British  occupied   Egypt.   This   was   to   be   a   temporary  
occupation,  the  British  said.  But  in  the  end,  it  lasted  for  
no   less   than  70   years.   Ahmad   Urabi   was   exiled   to  
Ceylon,  today's  Sri  Lanka.    

Thus  begins  a  new  period  in  Egypt's  history,  the  period  

of   British   occupation.   This   period   of   British  occupation   generated   new   forms   of   political  
expression,  of   particularly   Egyptian   nationalism   against   the   background   of   the   peculiar   Egyptian  
status,   a   part   of   the   Ottoman   Empire   directly   occupied   by   the   British.   Egyptian   nationalism   became  
ever  more  vociferous,  especially  in  the  last  decade  before  World  War  One.    

Further  expansion  of  the  school  system  under  the  British  occupation  also  meant  further  expansion  
of   a   relative   freedom   of   speech   that   the   British   did   allow   in   Egypt,   more   so   in   Egypt   than   in   the  
Ottoman  Empire.  And  there  was  a  constant  growth  of  Egyptian  national  sentiment.  The  continued  
competition   with   the   Turco-­‐Circassians   over   positions   in   the   army   and   the   bureaucracy   also  
contributed  to  this  Egyptian  national  sentiment.    

Then,   there   were   other   specific   incidents   and   instances   that  

contributed   to   this   sense   of   Egyptianness.   In   1906,   there   was   the   very  
famous,  or  perhaps  one  should  say  infamous,  Dinshaway  Incident,  an  
incident   in   which   British   officers,   hunting   pigeons   in   the   village   of  
Dinshaway   in   the   Delta,   got   into   a   fracas   with   the   villagers   of  
Dinshaway,  at  the  end  of  which,  a  British  officer  died.  The  result  was  a  
trial  of  people  of  Dinshaway,  executions  of  some  of  them,  the  public  
flogging   of   many   others   and   a   huge   outcry   in   Egypt   against   the   British  
occupation  in  the  name  of  the  Egyptian  people.    

These  were  also  the  years  in  which,  in  Egypt  too,  there  was  influence  
of   the   example   of   Japan,   this   Asian   power   that   had   defeated   the  
European  power,  the  Russians,  in  1905,  which  also  gave  an  impetus  to  
the  sense  of  Egyptian  nationalism.    

1907   was   an   important   year   for   the   establishment   of   modern-­‐style   political   parties   in   Egypt.   One   of  
 these   was   the   nationalist   party   al-­‐Hizb   al-­‐Watani   led   by   Mustafa  
Kamil,  who  lived  from  1874  to  1908.  The  party  that  he  established  in  
the  name  of  nationalism,  watani  in  Arabic,  was  an  example  of  how  
the   Arabic   language   was   beginning   to   change   to   incorporate   new,  
modern  meanings  coming  from  Europe.  Originally,  the  word  watan,  
which   now   means   national,   meant   just   the   place   of   birth.   It   now  
came  to  mean  watan  in  the  French  sense  of  patrie.  Watan  acquired  
a   new   modern   meaning   in   connection   with   the   nationalist   idea.   It  
now   acquired,   like   European   nationalism,   this   sense   of   attachment  
and  loyalty.    

Kamil   was   an   exciting   orator   and   a   writer,   but   ideologically,   very  

inconsistent.   He   above   all   else   wanted   the   British   out.   He  
occasionally  supported  the  Khedive,  occasionally  went  along  with  the  Ottomans  or  Islam,  or  secular  
Egyptian   nationalism,   anything   that   served   his   immediate   political   needs.   Mustafa   Kamil   died   in  
1908  and  was  succeeded  by  his  far  less  illustrious  companion  Muhammad  Farid,  who  was  more  of  
an  Islamist  and  usually  pro-­‐Ottoman.    

 
Ahmad&Lu)i&al,Sayyid&(1872,1963)&
• !Established!Hizb%al(Umma%%
• !Journalist!and!lawyer!
• !Spokesperson!for!Egyp8an!na8onalism!and!
modernism!
• !Shi:ed!from!Westernizing!Islamic!reform!to!
uncompromising!secularism!
• !Rejected!religion!as!the!cohesive!element!of!
society!
By Zerida at en.wikipedia [Public domain], from Wikimedia Commons
• !Believed!in!territorially!defined!na8onDstate
!

Another  political  party  established  in  1907  was  that  established  by  Ahmad  Lutfi  al-­‐Sayyid.  The  name  
of   that   party,   Hizb   al-­‐Umma,   also   meant   essentially   the   nationalist   party.   Umma   originally   meant  
community,  as  in  the  community  of  believers.  But  now,  in  the  modern  era,  umma  had  also  come  to  
mean   the   people   in   the   modern   nationalist   sense.   So   Hizb   al-­‐Umma   also   meant   the   nationalist  
party,  if  one  is  to  translate  from  the  Arabic  into  the  English.    

Ahmad   Lutfi   al-­‐Sayyid   had   been   a   disciple   of   Muhammad   Abduh,   the   great   or   the   greatest   of   the  
Islamic  reformers.  Abduh  himself  in  his  later  years  had  become  supportive  of  Egyptian  nationalism.  
But   Ahmad   Lutfi   took   this   a   few   steps   further,   shifting   from   Westernizing   Islamic   reform   to  
uncompromising   secularism.   For   Ahmad   Lutfi,   secular   nationalism   meant   nationalism   on   a  
geographic,   historic   and   linguistic   foundation.   Nationalism,   as   far   as   he   was   concerned,   was   not  
about  religious  identity.  Ahmad  Lutfi  was  a  classic  European  liberal,  an  intellectual  giant  known  by  
his  generation  as  faylasuf  al-­‐jil,  the  philosopher  or  the  mentor  of  the  generation.  He  finally  rejected  
religion   as   the   cohesive   element   of   society.   Countries   must   be   guided   by   national   interests,   not  
religious  belief.  The  nation  existed  independently  of  the  Islamic  community.  Ahmad  Lutfi  believed  in  
a  territorially  defined  nation-­‐state.    

But,  as  the  British  historian  P.J.  Vatikiotis  has  pointed  out,  Ahmad  Lutfi  underestimated  the  political  
power   inherent   in   the   instinctive   adherence   of   Egyptians   to   their   Islamic   heritage.   Ahmad   Lutfi   also  
differed  with  those  who  sought  immediate  British  withdrawal.  In  his  mind,  the  British  presence  was  
actually   beneficial.   It   would   enhance   the   modernization   of   the   Muslims.   So   he   and   Muhammad  
Abduh   believed   that   Egypt   was   not   yet   ready   for   their   ideas,   and   the   continuation   of   the   British  
presence   could   actually   further   secular,   liberal   ideas   in   Egyptian   society.   Only   after   that   was  
achieved,  they  thought,  the  British  should  leave  Egypt.    

But   there   were   limits   on   nationalism   in   this   period   before   the   First   World  
War.  Very  many  people  still  had  a  very  strong  Islamic  Ottoman  allegiance.  
This  was  indicated  in  a  very  strange  incident  of  drawing  the  border  between  
Egypt   and   the   Ottoman   Empire,   in   a   negotiation   that   was   between   the  
Ottomans  on  the  one  hand  and  the  British  as  the  de  facto  rulers  of  Egypt  on  
the   other.   In   defining   the   boundary   between   Egypt   and   the   Ottoman  
Empire,   that   boundary   which   is   presently   the   boundary   between   Egypt   and  
Israel,   that   boundary   that   runs   from   Rafah   on   the   Mediterranean   to   Taba  
and  Eilat  on  the  Red  Sea.  In  drawing  that  line  in  1906,  there  was  a  dispute  
between  the  British  and  the  Ottomans  on  where  the  line  ought  to  go.  The  
Egyptian   public,   in   this   debate,   supported   the   Ottomans   against   Egyptian  
territorial   claims   because   these   territorial   claims   were   being   made   by   the  
British,  and  the  people  still  felt  the  strong  allegiance  to  the  Ottomans.    

There  were  also  continued  sectarian  tensions  between  Muslims  and  Coptic  Christians  in  Egypt.  The  
Coptic   Christians   in   Egypt   were   naturally   very   attracted   to   the   idea   of   a   secular   Egyptian  
nationalism.   Secular   nationalism   for   the   Christians,   like   in   other   parts   of   the   region,   was   very  
attractive.   It   was   an   ideology   that   would   allow,   in   the   name   of   secular   nationalism,   for   Christians  
and   Muslims   to   share   an   identity   as   equals.   If   the   community   is   to   remain   identified   by   Islam,   it  
would  make  it  much  more  difficult  for  the  Christians  or  for  other  minorities  to  enjoy  equality  with  
the  Muslim  majority.    

So  there  were  tensions  between  the  Copts  and  the  Muslims  in  Egypt.  These  
were   expressed,   for   example,   in   the   assassination   in   1910   of   the   Coptic  
prime   minister   of   Egypt,   Butrus   Ghali.   He   was   assassinated   by   a   Muslim  
who   accused   the   Copts   of   being   too   supportive   of   the   European   powers.  
Copts,   as   a   result,   became   somewhat   disappointed   in   the   nationalist  
movement   in   Egypt,   and   there   were   continued   Coptic-­‐Muslim   suspicions  
and  rivalry.  The  Copts  tended  to  stress  Egyptianness,  which,  as  already    
      
 
mentioned,   was   far   more   convenient   for  
them,   while   Muslims   still   attached   much  
importance  to  Egypt's  Islamic  identity.    

There   was   an   Arab   dimension   in   Egyptian  

nationalism,  but  it  was  not  very  central.  It  
was  much  more  related  to  the  hostility  to  
the   Turco-­‐Circassian   elite   than   to   Arab  
nationalism.   This   hostility   became  
increasingly   irrelevant   as   the   Turco-­‐
Circassians   assimilated   ever   more   into  
Egyptian  society.    

Now,  to  draw  some  conclusions  from  this  debate  about  nationalism.  Nationalism  remained  the  idea  
of  a  select,  educated,  urban  minority.  It  was  not  the  ideology  of  the  masses,  certainly  as  long  as  the  
Ottoman   Empire   continued   to   exist.   Most   people   were   still   influenced   in   the   main   by   Islamic  
tradition  and  by  religious  identity.  Indeed,  the  old  education  system  had  lost  much  of  its  power.  It  
no   longer   supplied   bureaucrats   and   judges   who   learned   in   the   new   schools.   Not   to   mention   the  
army  officers  who  were  at  the  vanguard  of  political  and  social  change.  But  in  the  villages  of  the  rural  
Middle   East,   the   old   order   was   still   very   strong.   The   Sufi   mystical   religious   orders   still   had   much  
sway  over  the  people  and  the  popular  world  view.  Islam  remained  an  important  component  of  the  
nationalist  movement,  and  one  could  not  effectively  mobilize  the  masses  without  it.  Islam  was  still  
very  much  at  the  center  both  of  Arabism  and  of  Ottomanism.  Both  Arabism  and  Ottomanism  were  
forms  of  nationalist  defense  against  the  West.  They  both  took  pride  in  the  past  greatness  of  Islam,  
and  in  political  terms,  they  both  sought  the  preservation  of  the  Muslim  empire,  albeit  in  different  
ways.    

3.4.  World  War  One  and  the  Demise  of  Empire  

In  World  War  One,  we  come  to  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  It  was  at  the  end  of  that  war  that  
the   Ottoman   Empire   collapses   and   ceases   to   be   a   political   body   of   the   Middle   East.   So   how   did  
World  War  One  change  things?  First  and  foremost,  World  War  One  brought  about  the  end  of  the  
Ottoman  Empire  that  had  ruled  the  Arab  countries  for  400  years.  And  from  the  ruins  of  the  Empire,  
the  modern  Middle  Eastern  state  system  was  built.    

When   we   discussed   the   “Eastern  

Question”   in   previous   lessons,   it   was  
noted   repeatedly   that   the   European  
powers   sought   to   preserve   the  
integrity   of   the   Ottoman   Empire   for  
the  sake  of  European  peace.  The  fear  
was   that   if   the   Ottoman   Empire  
collapsed   and   European   powers  
began   a   competition   to   take   over   the   Empire,   they   would   clash   with   each   other   and   create   a  
massive   European   war.   But   after   the   outbreak   of   World   War   One,   the   Europeans   were   at   war  
already,  so  that  logic  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  Empire  was  no  longer  relevant.    

The  Ottoman  decision  to  side  with  Germany  and  Austria  in  the  war  essentially  decided  the  fate  of  
the   Ottoman   Empire.   The   Western   powers,   Britain   and   France,   and   initially   the   Russians   too,   had  
every  reason  and  interest  now  to  seek  the  Empire’s  defeat  and  its  dismemberment.  From  an  early  
phase   in   the   war,   there   were   secret   talks   between   the   powers   about   carving   up   the   Empire.   The  
Russians   wanted   the   Straits,   the   Bosphorus   and   the   Dardanelles.   The   French   wanted   Syria,  
especially  the  coastal  area  and  Palestine  too.  The  British  wanted  Iraq,  because  of  the  Persian  Gulf  
and  India,  and  the  connection  from  there  to  the  Mediterranean,  which  created  a  challenge  to  the  
French  demands  there.    

 
In  early  1916,  a  British  and  a  French  official,  Mark  Sykes  on  the  British  side  and  François  Georges-­‐
Picot  on  the  French  side,  signed  the  notorious  Sykes-­‐Picot  Agreement  that  divided  the  Arab  parts  of  
the  Middle  East  between  Britain  and  France.  France  had  a  free  hand  in  Cilicia,  which  is  in  southern  
Anatolia,  coastal  Syria  and  Lebanon,  and  a  sphere  of  influence  stretching  eastwards  towards  Mosul,  
which  is  in  present-­‐day  Iraq.    

Britain  got  a  free  hand  in  Iraq  including  Basra  and  Baghdad,  and  a  sphere  of  influence  going  west  all  
the   way   to   the   Mediterranean.   In   this   agreement,   Britain   also   got   the   ports   of   Haifa   and   Acre   in  
Palestine,  and  much  of  the  rest  of  Palestine  was  put  under  an  international  administration  together  
with   France   and   with   Russian   agreement.   Russia,   however,   was   overtaken   by   revolution   in   1917,  
and  opted  out  of  the  colonial  spoils.    

Along   with   the   Sykes-­‐Picot   Agreement,   there   was   a   correspondence  

between   the   British   High   Commissioner,   Henry   McMahon,   and   the  
leader   of   the   Hashemite   family   in   Mecca,   Hussein   Ibn   Ali,   about   the  
future   of   the   Arab   provinces.   This   correspondence   took   place   in   1915,  
and  served  an  immediate  British  interest.  Because  of  her  Indian  interest,  
where  there  were  millions  of  Muslim  believers,  Britain  was  very  deeply  
concerned  by  the  Ottoman  Sultan’s  appeal  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  
to   Muslims   everywhere   to   join   in   jihad   against   the   enemies   of   the  
Empire.   The   British   were   therefore   in   search   of   an   Arab   Muslim   ally,  
with   whom   to   fight   against   the   Ottomans.   Thus   began   the   connection  
with  Hashemites.    

Who   were   the   Hashemites?   The   Hashemites   were   this   Muslim   family   of   very   prestigious   lineage.  
They   were   descendents   of   the   Prophet   Muhammad.   The   Prophet   Muhammad   was   himself   a  
member  of  the  house  of  Hashim.  The  leader  of  the  family  in  the  First  World  War  was  Hussein  Ibn  
Ali,   who   was   the   Emir,   that   is   the   ruler   of   Mecca,   the   Muslim   holy   city,   as   the   representative   of   the  
Ottoman  Empire.    

But   even   though   the   rulers   of   Mecca   on   behalf   of   the   Ottomans,   the   Hashemites   had   their   own  
grievances   with   the   Ottomans   and   had   great   aspirations   for   Arab   and   Islamic   leadership   on   their  
own,  independent  of  the  Turks.  In  the  summer  of  1915,  they  entered  into  these  negotiations  with  
the   British,   where   the   Hashemites   demanded   a   Caliphate   under   Hashemite-­‐Arab   rule   that   would  
rule  over  the  Arab  provinces  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.    

The   area   that   the   Hashemites  

demanded   in   this   correspondence  
with  the  British,  was  the  entire  area  
stretching,   as   we   can   see   on   the  
map,   from   the   southern   border   of  
Turkey   all   the   way   to   the   Indian  
Ocean,  and  from  the  Mediterranean  
in   the   west,   to   the   border   with   Iran  
in  the  east.    

The   demands   of   the   Hashemites  

from   the   British   did   not   include  
North  Africa.  They  did  not  include  Egypt,  either.  These,  at  that  time,  were  not  seen  as  part  of  the  
Arab  world.  They  did  not  see  the  Arabic-­‐speaking  peoples  of  the  Maghreb  who  were  under  French  
colonial  rule  as  part  of  the  Arab  world.  Egypt  under  British  occupation  was  not  demanded  either,  
also  because  the  Egyptians  were  not  seen  exactly  as  part  of  the  Arab  nation,  and  also  because  the  
Hashemites   were   realistic   enough   not   to   demand   of   the   British   a   territory   that   was   under   British  
occupation.    
So  in  this  correspondence  conducted  between  Henry  McMahon,  the  British  High  Commissioner  in  
Egypt,   and   Hussein   Ibn   Ali   of   the   Hashemites,   McMahon   agreed   with   certain   reservations   to   the  
Arab  demand.  The  question  is,  why  did  the  British  agree,  albeit,  with  various  reservations?  What  did  
the  British  want  to  achieve  through  this  negotiation?    

The  British  believed  that  the  Arabs  would  contribute  to  the  war  effort,  
if   they   rose   against   the   Turks.   If   they   had   a   promise   of   territorial   gain,  
they  would  indeed  rise  against  the  Turks,  and  thus,  contribute  to  the  
war  effort  against  the  Ottomans.  The  British  also  believed  that  siding  
with  Arab  nationalism  would  serve  Britain’s  post-­‐war  interests  in  the  
Middle  East  in  their  competition  with  the  French.  That  is,  if  they  had  
the  Arabs  on  their  side,  it  would  be  much  easier  for  them  to  exercise  
British   imperial   control   of   the   Arabic-­‐speaking   regions   in   the   Middle  
East.   The   Middle   East   was   also   important   for   imperial  
communications,   the   passage   to   India,   and   oil   for   the   great   British  
fleet,   were   found   in   the   Middle   East.   This   was   critical,   as   an   area   of  
communication,  to  the  backbone  of  their  imperial  power,  which  was  
in  India.    

So   what   were   the   reservations   that   the   British   made   in   the   McMahon-­‐Hussein   correspondence?  
First  of  all,  certain  areas  were  
excluded  from  the  Arab  state  
on   the   grounds   that   they  
were   not   purely   Arab.   This  
referred   especially   to   the  
“portions  of  Syria  lying  to  the  
west   of   the   districts   of  
Damascus,   Hama,   Homs   and  
Aleppo.”   British   promises  
also   related   only   to   “those  
portions   of   the   territories  
wherein   Great   Britain   was  
free  to  act  without  detriment  
to   her   ally,   France.”   These  
reservations  were  cause  for  great  controversy  after  the  war,  especially  on  the  question  of  Palestine.    

But  it  was  not  that  the  British  had  promised  the  same  territories  to  
different   players,   as   many   people   often   say   “Palestine,   the   twice-­‐
promised   land.”   It   was   not   so.   In   fact,   there   was   no   real,  
substantial   discrepancy   between   the   documents,   Sykes-­‐Picot   and  
the  Hussein-­‐McMahon  correspondence,  and  thereafter  the  Balfour  
Declaration.   Generally,   the   British   had   been   quite   consistent.   The  
correspondence  was  just  that,  that  is,  it  was  just  a  correspondence.  
It   was   not   an   agreement.   There   was   no   final   agreement,   but   just  
the  presentation  of  positions.    

The   Zionists   and   the   British   tended  

to   argue   for   a   long   time   that   the  
exclusion   of   Palestine   from   the   Arab  
state   was   on   the   basis   of   that  
sentence   that   speaks   of   the  
exclusion   of   the   “portions   of   Syria  
lying   to   the   west   of   the   districts   of  
Damascus,  Hama,   Homs   and  
Aleppo.”   But   to   explain   the  
exclusion   of   Palestine   on   those  
grounds   is   impossible.   The  
argument   that   the   Zionists   and   their  
supporters  made  cannot  be  sustained  by  the  text,  nor  the  reality  on  the  ground.    

What   the   Zionists   and   their  supporters   did   was   to   argue   that   by  the   word   districts,   the  
documents  meant   the   equivalent   of   the   Ottoman  province,   vilayet.   If,   as   we   see  on   the   map,   the  
Vilayet  of  Damascus  stretching  all  the  way  down,  including  what  is  today  Trans-­‐Jordan,  if  one  looks  
at  the  portions  of  Syria  west  to  the  Vilayet  of  Damascus,  that  would  exclude  Palestine.  If  indeed,  the  
word  districts  refers  to  vilayets.  But  as  we  can  see  on  the  map,  Hama  and  Homs  were  not  vilayets.  
And   to   the   west   of   the   Vilayet   of   Aleppo   is   only   the   Mediterranean   Sea.   So   the   exclusion   on   the  
ground  that  district  means  vilayet  is  impossible.  Palestine  could  not  have  been  excluded  on  those  
grounds.  What  they  did  mean,  in  the  exclusion  of  the  portions  of  Syria  lying  to  the  west  of  that  line,  
was   to   Mount   Lebanon   and   to   the   Maronite   population   in   Mount   Lebanon,   who   did   not   see  
themselves  as  Arabs.    

But   then   there   is   the   other   reservation,   the   sentence   which   says   that   the   promises   to   the   Arabs  
related   only   to   “those   portions   of   the   territories   wherein   Great   Britain   is   free   to   act   without  
detriment   to   her   ally,   France.”   It   is   in   accordance   with   that   sentence   that   Britain   could   not   have  
promised   Palestine   to   the   Arab   state   without   consulting   France.   After   all,   as   we   have   seen   in   the  
Sykes-­‐Picot  Agreement,  Palestine  is  an  area  in  which  the  French  share  responsibility  with  the  British.    

So  the  question  is,  why,  for  years,  did  the  British  try  to  explain  that  the  exclusion  was  on  the  basis  of  
this  impossible  vilayets  argument?  They  could  have  just  said  that  Palestine  was  excluded  because  of  
the   previous   secret   understanding   with   France.   But   in   the   aftermath   of   the   First   World   War,   to  
argue   that   the   territories   were   excluded   because   they   were   not   Arab   was   in   accordance   with   the  
principle   of   self-­‐determination.   Whereas   to   argue   in   the   name   of   secret   deals   with   the   French   or  
other  colonial  powers  was  no  longer  politically  correct  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  One.  In  the  
aftermath   of   World   War   One,   with   the   rise   of   anti-­‐colonial   powers   like   the   United   States   and   the  
Soviet   Union,   it   was   no   longer   possible   to   argue   according   to   the   old   imperial   rules   of   secret  
agreements  between  great  powers.  Self-­‐determination  was  the  name  of  the  game,  also  according  
to   the   principles   of   President   Wilson,   and   therefore   the   argument   about   either   inclusion   or  
exclusion  had  to  be  made  in  the  name  of  self-­‐determination,  even  if  in  terms  of  the  documentation,  
they  could  not  make  sense.    

Whatever   became   of   the   Arab   uprising  

that   the   British   had   hoped   for   in   their  
correspondence   with   Hussein   Ibn   Ali?  
Actually,   not   much.   Hussein   declared   his  
revolt  against  the  Ottomans  in  June  1916,  
accusing   the   Ottomans   of   their   religious  
deviation,   that   is,   they   were   not   Islamic  
enough,  too  secular,  too  reformist.  It  was  
not  really  in  the  name  of  Arab  nationalism.  
But   the   great   majority   of   Arabs   did   not  
rebel   and   they   remained   loyal   to   the  
Empire   and   were   very   unwilling   to   join   in  
an   uprising   against   the   Ottoman   Sultan,   who  
they   still   regarded   as   their   legitimate   leader.  
The   Arab   Revolt,   therefore,   was   really   not   a  
great   contribution   to   the   war   effort.   The  
contribution   was,   indeed,   very   minor.   In   the  
words   of   T.E.   Lawrence,   the   famous   Lawrence  
of  Arabia,  the  Arab  Revolt  was  nothing  but  “a  
side  show  of  a  side  show.”  The  British  in  Cairo  
had   been   unrealistic   in   their   views   about   the  
attraction  of  Arab  nationalism.  They  had  given  
Arab   nationalism   far   more   weight   than   the  
people  in  the  Middle  East  themselves  had  actually  attached  to  it.    

What   about   the   Jews   and   the  

Zionists,  and   the   new   reality   created  
by   the   First  World   War?   Palestine  
was   not   promised  to   the   Jews   either.  
It   is   true   to   say   that   it  was   not  
promised   to   the   Arabs   for  
the  reasons   that   we   have   already  
discussed,  but   Palestine   was   not  
promised   to   the  Jews   either.   So   let  
us   turn   to  the   Balfour   Declaration  
and   see   why   it  was   issued   and   what  
it   really   said.   The   very   beginning   of  
the   First   World   War   and   the   fact   that   it   meant   the   impending   dissolution   of   the   Ottoman   Empire  
gave   the   Zionists   an   opportunity   that   they   had   been   waiting   for.   If   the   Empire   was   going   to   be  
dismantled,  maybe  the  Zionists  could  secure  Palestine  for  themselves.    

The  British  had  their  own  interests  in  Palestine,  and  as  we  have  already  seen,  Palestine,  as  part  of  
the   general   Middle   Eastern   area,   adjacent   to   the   Suez   Canal   and   the  
passage   to   India,   was   very   important   to   the   British   for   their   imperial  
security.  Prime  Minister  Lloyd  George  was  one  of  those  who  was  quick  to  
recognize   the   imperial   interest   that   Britain   had   in   Palestine.   Lloyd   George  
was   also   a   man   with   a   considerable   measure   of   religious   upbringing,   and  
the  idea  of  a  British-­‐protected  Jewish  colony  appealed  to  him  as  a  person  
who  associated,  because  of  his  biblical  studies,  the  Jews  with  the  Holy  Land.    

In  1917,  when  the  Balfour  Declaration  was  issued,  the  Allies’  position  in  the  
war   was   in   a   rather   sorry   state.   The   war   was   slow   and   extremely   expensive  
in   human   life   to   the   participants   on   both   sides,   and   there   was   a   great   hope  
amongst   the   British   that   the   United   States   would   become   more   involved,  
and  that  Russia  would  not  withdraw  from  the  war  because  of  its  internal  difficulties,  and  would  stay  
involved  in  the  war.  The  British  thought,  if  they  expressed  support  for  Zionist  aspirations,  this  would  
help  propaganda  in  the  U.S.  and  in  Russia  to  secure  greater  support  in  both  of  these  countries  for  
the   war   effort.   So   they   believed   thanks   to   the   vast   Jewish   influence   that   existed   in   both   of   these  
countries.    

This   British   belief   that   support   for   Zionist   aspirations   would,   thanks   to   Jewish   influence,   help  
propaganda  in  the  U.S.  and  Russia,  and  therefore,  provide  great  assistance  to  the  war  effort,  was  a  
huge   exaggeration   about   Jewish   influence   in   these   respective   countries.   But   it   was,   nevertheless,  
exaggeration  or  not,  a  reason  why  the  British  issued  the  Balfour  Declaration.    

Now  we  must  turn  to  the  Declaration  itself  and  see  what  it  really  says.  In  this  letter,  from  the  British  
Foreign   Secretary   to   the   leader   of   the   Jewish   community   in   Britain,   the   leader   of   the   Zionist  
organization  in  England,  Lord  Rothschild,  the  British  government  in  the  Declaration  expressed  their  
sympathy  for  Jewish  Zionist  aspirations.  Sympathy,  not  support.  This  was  a  word  chosen,  one  may  
imagine,   with   great   caution.   The   British   were   being   extremely   limited   and   cautious   in   their  
commitment  to  the  Zionist  enterprise.  “His  Majesty’s  Government,”  as  we  see  in  the  Declaration,  
“view  with  favor,”  again,  less  than  outright  support,  “view  with  favor  the  establishment  in  Palestine  
of  a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  people.”  

So  let’s  dwell  for  a  bit  on  that  sentence.  “View  with  favor,”  not  outright  support,  “the  establishment  
in  Palestine,”  not  the  conversion  of  Palestine  into  a  Jewish  national  home,  but  “the  establishment  in  
Palestine   of   a   Jewish   national   home,”   and   that   could   be   on   a   very   limited   part   of   the   territory   of  
Palestine.  But  it  is,  indeed,  “a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  people”  that  on  the  one  hand,  needs  a  
recognition   of   the   Jewish   people   as   a   nation   with   a   right   to   self-­‐determination.   But   on   the   other  
hand,  it  does  not  speak  of  a  state,  it  speaks  only  of  a  national  home.  It  is  not  at  all  clear  what  that  
really   does   mean.   The   British   government   will   use   their   best   endeavors,   the   document   says,   “to  
facilitate   the   achievement   of   this   object,   it   being   clearly   understood   that   nothing   shall   be   done   that  
may  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of  existing  non-­‐Jewish  communities  in  Palestine.”  

So  let  us  dwell  for  a  moment  on  that  sentence.  Whatever  rights  may  be  recognized  for  the  Jews,  the  
British  are  also  saying  that  “nothing  shall  be  done  which  may  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights”  
of  other  communities  in  Palestine.  But  for  the  other  communities  in  Palestine,  two  points  should  be  
mentioned  here.  They,  the  other  communities,  only  have  civil  and  religious  rights.  No  national  rights  
are  recognized  for  the  other  communities  in  Palestine.    

Who   are  these  other  communities   in   Palestine?   They   are   defined   as   the   “non-­‐Jewish  communities”  
as   if   they   are   the   minority   in   Palestine   and   the   Jews   are   the   majority.   But   these   “non-­‐Jewish  
communities”  were  Arabs  (Muslims,  Christians)  having  an  identity  of  their  own  which  was  not  only  
to   be   judged   by   being   non-­‐Jewish.   There   is   no   recognition   of   their   separate   identity   nor   of   any  
national   rights   associated   with   that   separate   identity.   But,   “nothing   shall   be   done   which   may  
prejudice”  their  civil  and  religious  rights.  Therefore,  there  is  an  obvious  restriction  on  what  it  is  that  
the  Jews  can  actually  do,  when  they  do  obtain  some  kind  of  political  presence  in  Palestine.    

The  Zionists  understood  this  to  mean  the  support  for  a  Jewish  state  in  Palestine,  although  that  is  not  
what   the   Declaration   actually   says.   As   the   British   historian   Malcolm   Yapp   has   said   about   the  
Declaration,   it   was   virtually   meaningless   and   committed   Britain   to   nothing,   which   is   indeed   so.  
However,  one  must  add  that  after  the  war,  when  Britain  became  the  mandatory  power  in  Palestine,  
committed   to   the   League   of   Nations   to   implement   the   Balfour  
Declaration,  then  Britain’s  commitment  to  the  Jews  began  to  mean  a  lot  
more  than  just  this  Declaration.    

Now   we   come   to   the   question   of   how   the   war   ended   in   the   Middle  
East?   What   was   the   division   of   power   between   the   various   powers   that  
took   over   what   was,   in   the   past,   the   Ottoman   Empire?   The   British  
historian  and  journalist  Elizabeth  Monroe  defined  this  post-­‐war  period  
as   Britain’s   moment   in   the   Middle   East,   and   indeed,   Britain   was,   after  
the  First  World  War,  by  far  the  superior  power  in  the  Middle  East.  The  
Ottoman  Empire  had  come  to  an  end.  The  French,  who  were  completely  preoccupied  at  the  front  in  
France,   could   spare   only   token   forces   for   the   Middle   East.   Russia   was   completely   preoccupied   by  
revolution,   and   her   opting   out   of   the   war.   So   British   occupation   forces   were   in   most   of   the   Arab  
areas  of  the  Empire.  They  were  in  Syria,  they  were  in  Iraq  and  they  were  
in  Palestine.  And  there  was  only  a  small  French  force  in  Lebanon.    

Faisal,  the  son  of  Hussein  Ibn  Ali  who  had  led  the  Arab  rebellion  against  
the  Ottomans,  Faisal  at  the  end  of  the  war  was  in  control  of  an  Arab  state,  
the   capital   of   which   was   Damascus   in   Syria,   which   was   taken   with   the  
assistance   of   the   Arab   rebels   of   the   Arab   Revolt   at   the   end   of   the   war.  
Faisal   remained   in   this   Syrian-­‐Arab   state   under   his   control   until   1920,  
when  he  was  finally  evicted  by  the  French  with  actual  British  agreement.  
As  for  the  rest,  Britain  was  in  control  of  Egypt  and  the  Sudan.  Britain  was  
also  in  control  of  Arabia  under  various  degrees  of  British  influence.    

The   French   were   in   North   Africa,  

Morocco,  Algeria   and   Tunisia,   all   taken  
well  before  the  war:  Algeria  in  1830,  Tunisia  in  1881  and  Morocco  
in   1912.   Libya   had   been   under   the  Italians   since   1911.   So   the  
great  powers,  especially  Britain,  could  shape  the  region  now  more  
or  less  as  they  wished.  The  borders  of  the  Middle  Eastern  states  
were   now   drawn   by   British   and   French   officials   in   accordance  
with   all   sorts   of   imperial   interests   and   trade-­‐offs,   which  
eventually  shaped  the  borders  of  the  states  of  the  Middle  East.  It  
was   these   imperial   interests   that   shaped   the   borders   of   the  
Middle   East,   very   often   the   imperial   officials   with   rulers   in   their  
hands  rather  than  the  identities  of  the  peoples  in  question.    

Very  important  French  concessions  were  made  to  the  British  in  Palestine  and  in  Iraq.  According  to  
Sykes-­‐Picot,   as   we   have   already   seen,   Palestine   was   to   be   shared   between   the   British   and   the  
French.  But  after  the  war,  the  British  wanted  Palestine  for  themselves  and  had  no  interest  in  sharing  
it  with  the  French.  The  British  wanted  Mosul,  which  was  to  be  part  of  French-­‐influenced  Syria.  The  
British  wanted  Mosul  to  be  part  of  British-­‐influenced  Iraq.  Therefore,  the  French  conceded  both  in  
Palestine  and  in  Mosul  to  the  British.  In  exchange,  the  British  allowed  the  French  to  take  over  Syria,  
that  was  previously  in  the  hands  of  Faisal  and  the  Arab  rebellion,  and  to  expel  King  Faisal  from  Syria  
in  July  of  1920.    

Why  did  the  British  do  this?  Why  did  the  British  allow  the  French  to  take  Lebanon  and  Syria  clashing  
and  defeating  Britain’s  own  Arab  allies?  How  could  the  British  have  allowed  that  to  happen?    

To   understand   why   the   British   did   that,   one   has   to   understand   the   very   complicated   balance  
between  European  and  Middle  Eastern  interests  in  British  foreign  policy.  British  foreign  policy  was  
made  in  various  places.  Obviously  in  London,  but  in  Cairo,  too.  In  Cairo,  British  officials  were  in  great  
support  of  an  Arab  solution,  that  is  to  create  a  series  of  Arab  states  in  alliance  with  the  British  and  
not   necessarily   with   much   left   for   the   French.   But   in   London,   the   view   was   very   different.   From  
London,   it   was   indeed   very   important   to   give   the   French   what   the   French   deserved   according   to  
wartime  agreements  with  them,  even  though  they  had  very  little  power  in  the  Middle  East,  because  
for  the  British  foreign  policy-­‐makers  in  London,  France’s  importance  was  as  a  European  ally  against  
Germany.  As  a  European  ally  against  Germany,  France  was  much  more  important  than  any  territory  
in  Beirut,  in  Damascus  or  anywhere  else  in  the  Middle  East.    

In   the   aftermath   of   the   war,   important   Arab   provinces   of   the   Ottoman   Empire   were   divided   into  
territories   that   were   called   mandates,   given   to   the   British   and   to   the   French.   According   to   the  
conference   of   the   victorious   European   powers   in   San   Remo   in   April   1920,   the   mandates   were  
divided   in   the   following   fashion:   The   French   obtained   the   mandates   for   Lebanon   and   Syria;   the  
British  obtained  the  mandates  for  Palestine,  Trans-­‐Jordan  and  Iraq.    

But   what   is   a   mandate?   And   why   was   the   mandate   terminology   invented   in   the   first   place?   The  
mandate   was   an   essential   colonial   compromise   with   the   principle   of   self-­‐determination.   In   the  
aftermath  of  the  First  World  War  and  the  emergence  of  the  United  States  as  a  great  power,  and  the  
principles   put   forth   by   President   Wilson,   above   all   else,   the   principle   of   self-­‐determination,   one  
could   not   simply   ignore   the   principle   of   self-­‐determination   and   impose   endless   colonial   rule   on  
foreign   territory.   The   mandate   was   a   colonial   compromise   whereby   the   mandate   power   committed  
itself   to   guide   the   mandated   territory   to   self-­‐determination   and   independence.   Thus   it   was   the  
commitment   of   the   French   to   guide   Lebanon   and   Syria   towards   independence,   and   it   was   the  
commitment  of  the  British  to  do  the  same  in  Palestine,  Trans-­‐Jordan  and  Iraq.    

In   reference   to   Turkey   and   what   was   left   of   the   Ottoman   Empire,   the   Turks   were   coerced   into  
signing  in  their  defeat  the  Treaty  of  Sevrès  with  the  European  powers  in  August  1920.  The  Treaty  of  
Sevrès  was  a  reflection  of  the  European  desire  to  punish  the  Turks,  to  enhance  the  prestige  of  the  
European  powers  and  to  punish  the  Turks  as  an  Asian  power  who  had  urged  Muslims  everywhere  to  
rise  against  their  European  rulers.  They  must  pay.    
    
 

The   Greeks   landed   in   Izmir   in   May   1919.   This   was   an   extreme   humiliation   for   the   Turkish   people.  
Not   just   a   foreign   power,   but   a   foreign   power   who,   for   centuries,   had   been   under   Turkish  
domination.   There   were  
demands   of   the   Armenians   in  
eastern   Anatolia   for   an  
independent   state   of   their  
own.   The   Turkish   nationalist  
movement,   for   its   part,  
demanded   Turkish   control   of  
all  the  areas  within  the  national  
boundaries  that  were  inhabited  
by   a   Muslim   majority   at   the  
time   of   the   armistice   that  
ended  the  war.    

The   Treaty   of   Sèvres   that   was  

imposed  on   the   Turks   in   August  
1920   created  the   following  
extremely   humiliating  reality.  
There  was  to  be  an  international  
regime  for  the  Straits.  There  was  
to   be   an   Armenian   state   in  the  
east.  There  was  a  possibility  of  a  
Kurdish   state   in   the   east,   too.  
There   were   Italian   and   French  
spheres   of   influence   in   southern  
Anatolia,   Greek   control   of   eastern   Thrace   and   Izmir,   and   on   top   of   all   that,   international   financial  
controls  over  the  Turkish  economy.    

This   was   not   only   the   end   of   Empire,   but   the   conversion   of   Turkey   into   a   European   semi-­‐colonial  
dependency.  The  Turks  rose  in  rebellion  and  waged  what  for  the  Turks  would  be  a  glorious  war  of  
liberation.  That  Turkish  war  of  liberation  changed  the  reality  on  the  ground  to  such  an  extent  that  
Sèvres  became  a  dead  letter  and  was  replaced  by  another  treaty  later  on.    

Key$Sources$and$Suggested$Further$Reading$
•  Ayalon,(Ami,(Language'and'Change'in'the'Arab'Middle'East:'The'Evolu8on'of'Modern'Arabic'Poli8cal'
Discourse((Oxford(University(Press,(1987).(
•  Esposito,(John(L.,(Islam'and'Poli8cs'(Syracuse(University(Press,(1991).(
•  Hourani,(Albert,(A'History'of'the'Arab'Peoples'(New(York:(Warner(Books,(1991).(
•  Lewis,(Bernard,(The'Middle'East:'2000'Years'of'History'From'the'Rise'of'Chris8anity'to'the'Present'
Day'(London:(Weidenfeld(and(Nicolson,(1995).(
•  Dawn,(C.(Ernest,(“From(OSomanism(to(Arabism:(The(Origin(of(an(Ideology,”(in(Hourani,(Albert,(
Khoury,(Philip(and(Wilson,(Mary((Eds.),(The'Modern'Middle'East:'A'Reader((London:(I.B.(Tauris,(2011).(
•  Dawn,(C.(Ernest,(“Hashemite(Aims(and(Policy(in(the(Light(of(Recent(Scholarship(on(Anglo]Arab(
Rela^ons(during(World(War(I,”(in(C.(Ernest(Dawn,(From'OHomanism'to'Arabism:'Essays'on'the'
Origins'of'Arab'Na8onalism((Urbana:(University(of(Illinois(Press,(1973).(
•  Va^kio^s,(P.J.,(The'Modern'History'of'Egypt'(London:(Weidenfeld(and(Nicolson,(1969).(
•  Yapp,(M.(E.,(The'Making'of'the'Modern'Near'East,'1792O1923'(London:(Longman,(1987).(
•  Zürcher,(Erik(J.,(Turkey:'A'Modern'History((London:(I.B.(Tauris,(2004).(
(