Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Note: This Notice should be attached in front of the index in the respective manual
Date 20.09.06
Date 05.10.05
To ensure that all changes to any of the documents contained in this manual are
carried out and distributed in a controlled and authorised manner.
2. Control
A list of all revisions and amendments shall be included in each controlled copy of
this General Technical Manual.
A record will be kept of the Frog client list in order that each client can be sent
revisions to the Client Technical Manual.
The owner will return a document transmittal for controlled manual and updates to
Reflex Marine.
The control, revision and distribution of this and the Client Technical Manual will
be the responsibility of the Technical Director.
Reflex Marine will ensure that the equipment and operating instructions remains
in conformity with the EC Machinery directive.
As per the Machinery directive, Reflex Marine will submit a copy of the technical
file to EC type examination body for review when changes are made to the
technical file. The EC type examination body may then issue an updated
examination certificate where deemed necessary.
4. Partial Revision
Where previously one minor change would constitute a full revision complete
with hard copy issue of manual index, revision list; partial revision may be
controlled by electronic distribution of updated sections.
Full revision are indicated by updating the manual to a whole integer i.e. revision
10, partial revision refers to decimal revisions i.e. revision 10.1.
5. Web Site
The web site will not be linked from the main Reflex Marine web site, and will
only be found by persons who are informed of its existence.
The FROG comprises two main assemblies. Firstly, the stainless steel outer
framework containing foam filled polyethylene buoyancy panels and, secondly, a
spring-dampened seating assembly mounted on a central column.
The outer framework protects passengers from impacts and contains the buoyant
blocks that ensure the FROG floats and is self-righting in water. At its base is a keel
weight that assists in rapid self- righting.
The outer shell lands on three tripod feet, which provide shock absorption and ensure
that the FROG is stable on uneven surfaces or when landing on a heaving vessel. The
outer shell has three large open accesses that allow rapid unimpeded exit.
During transit passengers are secured in full bucket seats, with full harnesses to
protect them against whiplash and falling. The seats are mounted on a sprung carriage
to provide protection against heavy landings. The sling assembly is designed to
prevent rotation.
All materials have been selected specifically to minimise corrosion in the marine
environment.
CE Marking
This manual makes reference to CE marking of the FROG, however not all Frogs are
supplied with CE marking. The FROG units with the CE declaration of conformity
are identified with a CE marking plate. For non-CE marked units please disregard all
references to CE marking in this manual.
Pay Load:
- 3 x 90kg persons seated plus 20 kg luggage per person.
- or: 1 person seated plus 1 in a stretcher.
- or: 330 kg of freight (evenly distributed).
Dimensions:
- Nominal Width 1 2.50m
- Nominal Width 2 2.20m
- Nominal Height 2.90m
Tare Weight:
- 485 kg
Verification:
- EC type examination by DNV Norway
- Design reviewed by independent certifying authority Bureau Veritas.
- Manufactured to ISO 9002.
Materials:
- Outer framework - All 316 and A4 Stainless Steel
- Buoyancy - Polyurethane Foam filled Polyethylene Tanks
Impact Behaviour:
- The Seats are suspended on a damping spring designed to protect passengers
from impacts up to 4m/s. This has been verified in full impact testing.
- The capsule is also highly resistant to lateral impact designed to withstand
2m/s impact. Also verified in full scale impact testing.
Other Features:
- Full height bucket seats
- Quick release seat harness buckle
- Four-point harness protects against whiplash
- Grab Handles
- Stretcher protective frame and support base.
- Secondary Back-up slinging
- Angle of Stability – 35 degrees (1-3 passengers)
Options:
- Low Temperature unit, certified to -40 degrees C.
- Weather proof storage cover
- Luggage stowage box and nets
- Tool Kit
National Regulations:
- UK, PUWER/ LOLER
The model number for each FROG will be stamped on a plate, which is attached to
each FROG.
2. Part Numbers
In the drawing / part numbering system, each drawing or part is assigned a three part
number as shown below :-
A B C
Part no. F 01 001
Part “A" Refers to the product type or name and consists of 1 letter.
Part “C" Refers to the ‘actual part’ and provides a unique part number.
Every FROG built will be assigned a build serial number. These serial numbers will
be allocated sequentially in the order in which they are built.
For Model FS the serial numbers will start from FS 001, and continue FS 002, FS 003
etc.
The serial number for each FROG will be stamped on a plate, which is attached to
each FROG.
Where material grades and material traceability is deemed to be safety critical these
components will require unique component numbers - where appropriate these will be
allocated by Reflex Marine and Stamped or etched as required.
Components that require unique identification are referenced in the Parts list section
in this manual.
For M16 bolts, where etching is impractical, batches of bolts will be colour coded and
a note added to the mill certificate to identify the colour coded bolts with a particular
mill certificate.
Frog should be indelibly marked with the following information. (See drawing
number F-01-110 for template).
i. CE Mark.
ii. Description of Equipment.
iii. Model.
iv. Serial Number.
v. Manufacturers Address.
vi. Year of construction.
vii. Mass of usual configuration/ Mass without Payload (Tare weight).
viii. Safe Working Load (SWL).
ix. Maximum Gross Mass (MGM).
x. Maximum number of Passengers
2. Decal - Vinyl stickers located on outside of buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Note: MDPE Buoyancy requires preparation of surface for good contact adhesion.
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny.
3. Decal - Vinyl stickers located inside of LOWER buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Note: MDPE Buoyancy requires preparation of surface for good contact adhesion.
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny
4. Operating Instructions - located inside of UPPER buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Note: MDPE Buoyancy requires preparation of surface for good contact adhesion.
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny
Positioned as follows:
RETROFLECTIVE TAPE
OPERATING
INSTRUCTIONS
CE PLATE
LOAD TEST PLATE
RETROFLECTIVE
TAPE
‘BUOYANCY
REFLEX LOGO & BLOCKS B & C…’
WEB/ TEL NO.
i. With permanent marker, write "TOP B" and "BOTTOM B" on respective
lower buoyancy fittings for columns B and C.
3 SEATED
A
C B
1 SEATED +
STRETCHER
A
C B
KEEP FEET
INSIDE FROG
2.38 SAFETY STICKERS REV1 Page 2 of 2
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All items in the parts list is divided into two groups, critical and non-critical
components. The critical components are defined as follows:
Components in which if failure were to occur, then there would be a high risk to the
safety of the passengers in the FROG. The critical components are all connected to
the Main Support Tube, which is the prime structural component in the design. All
components defined as critical are identified in the parts list.
2. Fastener Specifications
3. Certification
4. I.D. Numbers
Parts given I.D. numbers will be marked in accordance with section 2.3.
F-01-051 30 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (PERIPHERAL BRACE + CAP PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-052 18 M10 PLAIN WASHER (CAP PLATE + SEAT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-053 6 M16, 90 LONG HEX BOLT (CENTRAL BRACE TO KEEL PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
Page 1 of 4
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F-01-057 3 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (FLOOR RETAINER PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-058 3 M20, 200 LONG HEX BOLT (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-059 3 M20 WASHER (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-060 3 M20 NYLOCK HEX NUT (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-061 1 M10, 75 LONG HEX BOLT (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-062 2 M10 WASHER (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-063 1 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-064 3 M16, 80 LONG HEX BOLT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-065 3 M16 NYLOCK HEX NUT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-066 3 M10, 80 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
HARNESS ANCHOR POINTS)
F-01-067 3 M10, NYLOCK HEX NUT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE HARNESS N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
ANCHOR POINTS)
F-01-068 3 M10 BUTTON HEAD SCREW, 35 LONG (SEAT FIXING COLLAR / N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
HARNESS ANCHOR)
F-01-069 3 M10 SLIM HEX NUT (SEAT COLLAR/ HARNESS ANCHOR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-070 6 M10, 60 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (SEAT FITTING) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-071 6 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (SEAT FITTING) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-072 1 M10, 80 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (STRETCHER FRAME) N - A4 S/ STEEL N STRETCHER
F-01-073 1 M10 WINGNUT (STRETCHER FRAME) N - A4 S/ STEEL N STRETCHER
F-01-074 12 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUTS (LOWER BUOYANCY) (GRP ONLY) N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-075 OBSOLETE
F-01-076 OBSOLETE
F-01-077 8 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUTS (SEAT GRATE SUPPORTS) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-080 2 M48 HEX NUT (FINE THD) (LOCK/SUPPORT NUT) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-081 2 M16 BOLT 70 LONG c/w Cross Hole (LIFTING EYE PLUG) Y CC A4 - GRADE 80 (MIN YIELD Y LIFTING POINT
600N/mm2)
F-01-082 4 M16 WASHER (LIFTING EYE PLUG) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-083 2 M16 NUT (LIFTING EYE PLUG) Y - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-084 2 TAMPER PROOF SEAL (LIFTING EYE PLUG) N - STAINLESS STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-085 1 M24 WASHER (BACK-UP EYE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-086 1 M24 NUT (BACK-UP LIFT EYE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-087 1 TAMPER PROOF SEAL (BACK-UP EYE) N - STAINLESS STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-088 24 M12 SPRING WASHER N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-100 1 GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL N - - N NOT SUPPLIED
F-01-101 1 CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL N - - N INFORMATION
F-01-102 1 TRAINING VIDEO N - - N INFORMATION
F-01-105 1 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS N - - N BUOYANCY
F-01-106 1 STICKERS N - - N BUOYANCY
F-01-107 AUX OPERATING INSTRUCTION (NORWEGIAN) N - --------------------------------------- N BUOYANCY
F-01-110 1 CE MARKING PLATE N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N FRAME
F-01-111 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (COARSE THD) Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-111-M40 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (COARSE THD) LOW TEMP Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-112 1 2 LEG SLING - 10FT LONG (INC SHACKLES) Y LTC, MC ------------------------------------- Y SLING
Page 2 of 4
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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION; 13.1
GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL DATE: 05.10.05
SECTION: 2.5 PARTS LIST & MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
Page 3 of 4
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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION; 13.1
GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL DATE: 05.10.05
SECTION: 2.5 PARTS LIST & MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
Page 4 of 4
BACK TO INDEX
FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION: 2
GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL DATE: 19.12.01
SUBJECT: 2.61 LOAD TEST PROCEDURE NO. FP02 Page 1 of 1
NOTE: The Load Test is to be carried out by an independent test house with
nationally recognised accreditation in accordance with ILO 152.
Test Load
The TARE WEIGHT of the FROG = 485 kg *
The maximum PAYLOAD of the FROG = 330 kg
(3 x (90kg person + 20 kg luggage))
Therefore the MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT = 815 kg *
The PROOF LOAD applied = 2 x the MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT
= 2 x 815 kg = 1630 kg
Therefore the test weight to be applied = 1630 kg - 485 kg = 1145 kg *
The distribution of the test weight should be as follows:
540 kg on the seats and spread equally between them.
- 605 kg placed on the floor and distributed evenly.
Test
Both the main lifting eye path and the back-up lifting eye path must be tested.
This must be clearly indicated on test certificate. Also reference ILO 152 on
certificate.
The Unit should be lifted and held Static for minimum of 3 minutes.
Test plate
A test plate will be issued and attached by the test house, which should show:
* NOTE. The TARE WEIGHT of the FROG is approximately 485 kg but may vary
slightly from model to model. The above weights are therefore given only as an
illustration, and each Frog must be weighed prior to load test.
After the load test has been carried out, a visual inspection of the FROG must be
carried out to ensure that no damage to the frame or any of the critical components
has taken place. In particular, the Lifting Eye Plug and bolts should be visually
inspected for any signs of over stress, particularly in the area round the boltholes. This
inspection must be carried out by a Competent Person.
At sub-zero temperatures, most types of steel become more brittle and are therefore
more likely to fail under impact or cyclical load conditions.
However, stainless steels are far less affected by low temperatures than mild or carbon
steels and it is for this reason that stainless steel is used in cryogenic applications.
Most of the steel used in the Frog is 316L stainless steel, apart from the seat and floor
gratings. However we still require certification to prove that the 316L stainless steel
used in the Frog has acceptable ductility levels at – 40 C.
In order that the Frog can be rated for use down to –40C , all of the Critical
Components need to have material certification which states that the 316L material is
safe for use at –40C. The critical components are those specified in the Critical Parts
List in section 2.5 of this manual.
This includes the Lifting Set which needs to be replaced by one using DYNEX rope
construction. (See specification below)
All of the Critical Components on the standard Frog are manufactured from 316L
stainless steel. (except for the lifting set). Although it is known that 316L stainless
steel has good impact properties at –40 C, the mill provides material certification at
room temperature only, i.e. 20 C. It would be prohibitively expensive to have Charpy
tests carried out by the mill at –40 C; therefore separate Charpy tests need to be
carried out at –40 C on samples of the actual batches of material used in the
manufacture of the Critical Components.
It is not necessary, or indeed practical to carry out Charpy tests on all of the
components on the Critical Parts list. e.g. nuts, washers and other small items which
are too small to machine Charpy test pieces from. For this reason Charpy tests need
only be carried out on the following items:
The above Charpy tests must be carried out by an accredited metallurgical test house,
and the results must be endorsed by the test house as being acceptable. As a
guideline, the Charpy values obtained at – 40 C should not be more than 5% less than
the values obtained at +20 C.
For – 40 C operation, wire ropes are not acceptable and polyethylene ropes have to be
used instead. The specification for the lifting set is generally as set out in the General
Technical Manual, except that the wire ropes are replaced by DYNEX 75 ropes which
are made from Dyneema SK75 fibres. The detailed specification to be as follows:
One leg @ 360 ins. x 16mm Dynex rope terminated with hard eyes
One leg @ 368 ins. x 16mm Dynex rope terminated with hard eyes both C/W wear
sleeves
Min Breaking Load: 27.4 Tonnes
Fitted to a HA22ML master link with a 3.25 tonne nut & bolt Polar type bow shackle
on each leg. (Pin to be less than 20mm dia.)
Earth wire to be attached between Master link and Main Lifting shackle.
Load test to be in accordance with BS1290 to SWL 2000 kg. Each leg to be tested
individually to 4000 kg.
Test certificate serial no. to be stamped on the master link and each lower ferrule with
suffix (-1 & -2)
The certification provided will be the same as that for the standard wire rope sling set
with the addition of the a Certificate of conformance for the master link and shackles
stating that they are safe for operation at – 40 C.
Certification
The Client certification package will be the same as for the standard Frog, with the
addition of the low temperature C of C for the seat harness.
The Reflex Marine certification package will have the additional Charpy test
certificate for the tests as detailed above.
Marking
The unit shall be marked as per section 2.3 of the technical. i.e. units shall be marked
with Model Number FS01-M40
Each new build of the FROG will require to have a complete set of certification and
documentation as specified below.
All Frog users will be supplied with copies of the following certification and
documentation.
* - For CE marked Frogs the EC Declaration of Conformity and the Client Technical
Manual will be translated into language of the country (EC Member state) in which
the machinery is to be used.
Reflex Marine will retain copies of the above certification and additional certification
as specified below. If required, the applicable certification below can be made
available for review by Clients.
" Material certification for all Critical and Non-critical components
" Inspection and Repair History
" Weld Procedures/ Welder qualifications
" NDT approval (PCN)/ NDT Reports (where applicable)
" Manufacturing Signed Checklist and Route Cards
Shipping – Preparation
The Frog should be shipped in seated mode.
Prior to shipping the seat harnesses should be secured by tightening the seat harnesses
and tying the buckle together. This will prevent set harness flapping and damaging seat.
It is recommended that the Frog is covered for shipping either with a Frog weather-proof
cover or other heavy duty tarpaulin material.
Shipping – Containerisation
The Frog will not fit in a standard or High-cube container. If Frog is transported on Flat
rack it must be secured. Recommended securing points are peripheral floor brace/ floor
grating, back-up lifting eyebolt. To protect it from excess loading, the main lifting eye
should not be used as a securing point
Shipping – Crating
Reflex Marine currently use the following types of pallet and crating for the Frog. All
types are suitable for Forklift handling. Contact Reflex marine for more details.
Handling – Forklift
Handling of the Frog with Forklift truck may damage the underside of the Frog (Landing
feet or Main column), therefore it is not recommended unless the unit is secured to pallet
specifically for forks.
Handling – Crane
When lifting the Frog with short chain or strop, the temporary shackle should be fixed to
the Back-up eyebolt. Care must be taken not to damage the Frog lifting set.
Storage
The Frog has been designed to cope with the harsh conditions on an offshore installation
or vessel, however it is important to protect the unit as much as possible from any
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
The FROG Personnel Transfer Capsule (PTC) is a new design of personnel transfer
device designed to provide increased protection when carrying out personnel transfers
between vessels / installations by crane.
Crane personnel transfers are carried out for a wide variety of reasons including
routine, urgent operational and emergency (medical) reasons.
The Frog PTC is intended for use as a transfer capsule. Personnel should only use the
equipment following proper briefing in its operation. Personnel should at all times be
seated and properly strapped in using the harnesses supplied. The Frog is not intended
for use as a work-basket.
The Frog should also only be used with properly designed and maintained lifting
equipment. It should be noted that some national regulations require cranes to be
specifically certified for man-riding operations.
Note: It should be noted that the regulations governing personnel transfer operations
vary greatly from country to country and it is imperative that operators of the
equipment establish the relevant requirements for the area of operation.
The Frog has been designed to ensure passengers safety even when operating in the
most demanding conditions.
There are a large number of factors that affect the safe conduct of all marine personnel
transfer; crew skill and experience, met-ocean conditions, landing area, vessel station
keeping response, visibility, line-of-sight, and so on. A combination of many factors
will determine the risk involved in a transfer.
It is important that all environmental and operational factors are taken into account in
the pre-transfer risk assessment. Assessing the impact of these factors on operational
risk is best done by competent persons experienced in use of the equipment and the
local conditions.
Vertical impacts2
Passengers are protected during heavy landings and take-offs from a vessel deck of up
to 4.0 m/s by the properties of the feet and spring-mounted seat. This protects
passengers up to currently recommended operating limits.
Lateral impacts2
Passengers are also protected from lateral impacts by the framework and seat harness.
Lateral impacts are only likely to arise due to sway caused by offlead when lifting.
The passengers will be protected up to and beyond the 2m/s maximum expected
impact speed (based on a 6 degree 30m line offlead). The central column may deform
on lateral impact and therefore it is important that the equipment is inspected after any
impact.
Stability2
The unit has a low centre of gravity and a tripod base, providing stability on uneven
surfaces or on a pitching / rolling vessel. The polyurethane coated landing feet are
also a non-skid design keeping grip on deck surfaces. The static angle of stability has
been tested to 35 degrees, for a load of 1-3 passengers.
The Frog is designed to stay firmly on the deck of the vessel whilst passengers are
transferring in and out of the Frog. The crane operator has the responsibility to maintain
slack in the line upon landing to allow for the vessel movement. The recommended
limits in this section are based on the use of the standard Frog sling length of 30ft/ 9m.
For the use of shorter slings an additional risk assessment combined with dry runs
should be performed to establish safe operation routines and weather conditions. (See
section 3.6 crane operator guidance).
Compiled by: Authorised by:
Track record2
The Frog has been used in heavy weather conditions and has been reported to be
stable and perform well in high winds (when used in conjunction with non-rotating
wire rope forerunner and swivel).
The Frog has an inbuilt damping system which prevents passengers from experiencing shock
loads up to a relative landing and take-off velocities up to 4m/s.
The maximum recommended sea state, or significant wave height, for the operation of the Frog
is determined by the maximum relative velocity between the Frog (or hook) and the landing
deck.
The calculation for relative velocity used here is based on the European offshore crane
standard, EN 13852-1:2004. Whereby the maximum anticipated relative velocity between a
load and a vessel deck, is given by the following;
Relative velocity A Hook velocityC D E (Vessel deck velocity 2 D Boom tip velocity 2)
* Equal to 1.67m/s (100 m /min, 330ft/min) for lifts below 5 tonnes. Higher crane hook speeds
may be available, and it follows that the higher the available crane speed the higher the
possibility of a heavy landing or take off. However, with a qualified crane operator, it is
considered unlikely that the Frog will be landed at full hook speed on a deck rising at full
speed, or vice versa.
If there are concerns about heavy landings operators may wish to consider the following
methods to reduce risk of heavy landings and take-off; Dry runs without passengers, Landing in
centre of deck where less vessel movement, Transfer of less passengers to increase damping,
hook speed indicator.
KEY
Low risk of high landing or take-off velocity, and exceeding Frog personnel
"
damping.
Increasing risk of high landing or take-off velocity. Consideration of hook
speed and consideration of all other factors is recommended to ensure
"C
controlled landing and take-off. Dry run to gauge risk (without personnel) also
recommended.
High risk of high landing or take-off velocity. Not suitable for routine
X
operations unless a specific hazard analysis can demonstrate otherwise.
Note 1: We emphasise that users should not rely on these recommendations alone. Persons
best placed to judge the risk of specific transfers are the onsite persons that have
experience of the local conditions and equipment to be used. All factors should be
evaluated together in their pre-transfer risk assessment.
Note 2: We recommend that crews conduct dry runs without passengers when there are
concerns about conditions to help assess risk of transfer.
Parameter Recommendation
40 knots (equivalent to 20 m/s). Frog is very stable in high
Wind Speed wind. Limiting factor is usually crane operability or control of
Load.
Crane operator should have clear view of the pick up and set
Visibility
down areas
Vessel motion/ Frog Pitch 10 o, Roll 10 o. (Frog stable up to 35 o For load of 1-3
Stability Passengers. In static test)
Able to maintain position within a 5m (15ft) radius If high risk
Vessel station-keeping of vessel losing position recommend disconnect Frog for
passenger embarkation
Landing area Clear of obstructions, protrusions, trip and fall hazards
Ice and spills must be cleaned from landing area prior to
Landing area – ice/ spills
Transfer
Recommended 6m x 6m clear space (20ft x 20ft) Based on +/-
1m landing accuracy + 1m entry and exit path for personnel.
Landing area on vessel
Smaller deck spaces require individual risk assessment with
consideration of reduced weather limits.
Landing area on Recommended 4m x 4m clear space (13ft x 13ft). Based on
installation +1m entry and exit path all round the Frog.
Crane operator Briefing video within 1 month. Local authority requirements
experience for personnel transfer must be adhered to.
Deck crew experience Briefing video within 1 month.
Passenger training Briefing video within 1 month.
Radio communication must be established between the crane
Communications
operator and the vessel deck crew and master.
Crane must be of certified for use for lifting personnel and
Crane construction
properly maintained.
FS01 units: +50C to -20C
Temperature
FS01-M40 units: +50C to -40C
! Carry out a Pre-transfer hazard analysis and plan each operation using a ‘Transfer
Log’ (see Section 3.4).
! Ensure that passengers and crews are fully briefed prior to an operation.
! Ensure also that the vessel crews are fully briefed on the planned operation. Pre-
transfer planning call and video briefings of the crew should be considered.
! Ensure the host vessel is briefed prior to the transfer (highlight potential hazards).
PASSENGER DETAILS
Passengers are requested to sign below if they consent to undertaking a basket transfer detailed above.
Important note to passenger – Certain national regulations place constraints on the use of personnel
transfers. Please ensure you are aware of any local regulations prior to proceeding.
PERSON IN CHARGE
Hazards identified :
Have operating instructions in the capsule been read and understood YES / NO
Has the condition of the transfer capsule and associated equipment been checked YES / NO
PRE-TRANSFER
1. Supervisor - Conduct pre-transfer hazard analysis (see manual sections 3.3 and 3.2)
2. Supervisor - Conduct inspection of equipment prior to use (see next page)
3. Supervisor - Brief all persons
i. Crane operator iii. Passengers
ii. Deck crew iv. Vessel - Master, Deck crew
4. Passengers - Wear recommended P.P.E. (Personal Protective Equipment), P.F.D.
(Personal Floatation Device), and survival suit where applicable.
Note: Send P.F.D. to vessel prior to transfer to avoid rush
LIFT-OFF
LANDING
* Note - If risk of vessel losing position or crane line snatch (e.g. vessel to vessel transfers) it is
recommended to disconnect the Frog for passenger exit and entry
OPERATING LIMITS
REV6/20.07.05/AIG Page 1 of 2
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REV6/20.07.05/AIG Page 2 of 2
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Recommended Tools.
1 – 6mm Hex Key (for M10) (Seat, Stretcher Frame)
2 – 8mm Hex Key (for M12) (Buoyancy)
3 – 17mm Wrench (for M10) (Seat)
4 – 19mm Wrench (for M12) (Luggage Box)
5 – Box/ Bag for Loose Fittings
6 – FROG Diagrams
Refitting the Seats is the reverse of the Conversion. Please note the following:
Tighten Fittings for Lower buoyancy unit and Seat to low torque hand tight only. Over-
tightening of these bolts can lead to damage of Buoyancy inserts or Seat.
Appropriate man overboard rescue and recovery arrangements should be in place and on
standby during transfers (e.g. standby vessel equipped with a fast rescue craft ready to
launch).
For selection of the PFD type most suitable for Frog operations the following factors are
considered;
In the event of immersion of the Frog the operator should have contingency to
immediately rescue the passengers from the water. (Without fast rescue contingency
personnel transfer should not take place.)
In the event of immersion of the Frog, the Frog will provide sufficient buoyancy,
keeping the Frog in an upright position and keeping passengers upper body out of the
water, providing passengers with a clear breathing channel.
If, while the Frog is immersed, the passengers decide to exit from the Frog to either
evade hazards (such as waves or rising water level) or as part of their recovery effort,
their PFD should not impede their exit either through it’s bulk, compatibility with the
seat harness, or excess buoyancy force.
Therefore the required features for the PFDs for use with the Frog are;
(i) To provide sufficient buoyancy for passenger awaiting recovery in water.
(ii) Design suitable for passenger to exit Frog while immersed.
(iii) Compatibility/ ease of use with seat harness during transfers. Entry to the Frog/
Donning harness and buckling up, and exiting the Frog/ un-buckling and exiting.
(iv) Design that will not automatically inflate while passenger is strapped into seat
harness.
Different PFDs provide different performance depending on their application. These can be
divided up as follows:
PFDs with buoyancy up to 100N are for use in inshore waters, or where persons may
have to wait a short period for rescue. PFDs with buoyancy of 150N-275N are
designed for offshore/ open water use, or where persons may have to wait prolonged
period for rescue.
PFDs which provide face up in-water support to the user regardless of physical
condition are termed offshore lifejackets. PFDs that require the user to perform
swimming or postural movements to keep their face out of the water are described as
buoyancy aids.
In rough offshore water, with personnel wearing heavy clothing, any PFD with 50N or less
may be ineffective. For use with the Frog, rescue and recovery means should be on standby
during the transfer, therefore there should be no requirement for the rescuees to be afloat in
the water for any length of time. Additionally a larger PFD may impede the passenger exit of
the Frog as part of the rescue effort.
It is the operator’s duty to decide what PFD is most suitable for their operation.
Recommended PFDs
Reflex Marine have evaluated the 5 most common types of PFDs used in the offshore and
marine sector and has the following comments about their suitability for use with the Frog.
Recommended: PFD suited for use with Frog. Flat buoyancy panels are
unobtrusive and allow passengers easy entry and exit from Seat harness.
PVC coated type is also recommended for durability of PFD. RML
recommend that any PFD of this type is tested with seat harness in Frog
for compatibility.
Additional considerations.
1. Reflex Marine recommended that a number of PFDs, specifically designated for use
with the Frog, are marked as ‘FROG USE ONLY’ and are kept in a safe, clean storage
area near the transfer muster area.
It is recommended that the Platform and Vessel retain at least six PFDs each,
specifically for transfer purposes. This number will allow a second group of three
passengers to don PFDs and be prepared to embark, whilst the first group is being
transferred. The PFDs from the first transfer group can then be sent back with the
Frog for the third group, and so on.
2. Deck crew should ensure that when passengers are exiting the Frog, the passengers
move clear of the landing area to the designated safe area before removing PFDs.
3. Passengers using the PFDs for the first time should be given assistance by the deck
crew. PFDs should be tried by all crew as part of any practical training given.
Personnel transfers in an offshore environment should be subject to strict controls and clearly
defined operating instructions.
With the following additional controls in place it may be allowable for personnel transfers
using the Frog Personnel Transfer Capsule to be used during the hours of darkness:
The risk assessment for the task shall be comprehensively reviewed prior to
commencing operations. The lifting plan and risk assessment shall be approved in
writing by the Offshore Installation Manager or appointed deputy.
The operator should have contingency to immediately rescue the passengers from the
water e.g. Fast Rescue Craft. Without fast rescue contingency personnel transfer
should not take place.
The crane boom is fitted with adequate floodlights to illuminate the crane hook and
Frog unit. The crane operator must maintain a clear line of view with the Frog unit at
all times.
The takeoff and landing areas are illuminated to a level of at least 20 lux or greater.
The Frog unit is fitted with a strobe light to allow clear locating by all parties
The hoisting, transit and landing paths of the Frog unit are predefined in the lifting
plan and are adhered to.
Radio contact is maintained throughout the entire lifting operation between the crane
operator and the take-off and landing site.
An unmanned trial run which covers as a minimum the take-off, transit and landing
paths of the Frog should be conducted prior to commencing personnel transfers. The
crane operator should confirm readiness to proceed on completion of the trial run.
For the standard 30ft / 9m sling provided with the Frog, it is generally recommended
that approx. 10 ft / 3m of slack is paid out once the unit has landed on the vessel,
however, the required amount may vary according to sea state and vessel motion
response. The crane operator should pay out sufficient slack to avoid snatching,
although, should avoid paying out more than is necessary as the section of sling
hanging could constitute a hazard to crews alighting or entering the capsule.
It is also recommended that the crane operator slew the boom ‘down weather’ from the
capsule. This will provide more time to crane operator / crews to react in the event of
a failure of the vessel’s station keeping.
(6.8m)
(9m)
(6m)
Reflex Marine recommend the use of a 30ft / 9m sling however for operations where
the 30ft sling is not suitable then a 20ft / 6m or 10ft / 3m sling can be supplied.
It should be noted that using shorter slings increases the risk of snatching - Using the
20ft / 6m sling, 10ft / 3m of slack will provide a 17.3ft /5.3m allowable offset before
the sling becomes taught from the crane hook weight – this does not however account
for vessel heave. And for a 10ft / 3m sling, 8ft / 2.4m of slack will provide 9.8ft / 2.7m
(allowable offset).
Using a shorter sling set also increases risks associated with the hook block being in
close proximity to the passengers alighting.
Note: The operating limits in section 3.2 are defined for Frog with sling length of 30ft/
9m. For transfers using shorter sling additional risk assessment combined with dry
runs should be performed to establish safe operation routines and weather conditions.
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
Tag Lines (Hand Line) are not supplied with the Frog. However if users wish to use tag
lines for handling the Frog the following should be considered: -
Tag lines should be attached to the floor grating and 30x30 brace at the edge of the
doorway. (See below)
Reflex Marine suggest one or two 3m lines are practicable for handling the Frog,
however length of line used is at the discretion of the deck crew.
" Deck crew using taglines will be standing closer to frog during landing, which
increases the risk of impact or caught in between.
" Ensure taglines are not tied or caught on any adjacent equipment of structures
" Ensure taglines are clear of knotting and deck crew have suitable hand and eye
protection
The Frog is supplied with 3 luggage storage nets that are located in the corners of the
Frog against the lower buoyancy blocks. This forms a pocket in which luggage can be
stored. (see photo)
All luggage items should be stored in the corners so that they do not constitute a tripping
hazard for passengers exiting the Frog.
The nets are constructed of elastic shock-chord (or bungee) and will stretch to contain
items in an area roughly 600mm x 500mm. Items of luggage that are too large for the nets
should be secured to the floor grating.
The floor grating is spaced 25mm x 50mm therefore small items should be bagged to
prevent items falling through floor.
To prevent any ‘doubling up’ of luggage, as a rule, passengers should place luggage to
their right when entering the Frog.
3. Lace/ Fasten cover from top 6. Secure around the floor/ base with ties
(Note - access steps required) provided.
It is essential that inspections be carried out by a Competent Person who should have
the appropriate practical and theoretical knowledge and experience of the equipment.
This will enable them to detect defects and weaknesses and to assess their importance
in relation to the safety and continued use of the equipment. It is essential that the
Competent Person is sufficiently independent and impartial to allow objective
decisions to be made.
It is imperative for the safe operation of the FROG that each unit be periodically inspected
and tested in accordance with procedures and schedules set out in this section of the technical
manual.
Competent persons
It is essential that inspections be carried out by a competent person who should have the
appropriate practical and theoretical knowledge and experience of the equipment. This will
enable them to detect defects and weaknesses and to assess their importance in relation to the
safety and continued use of the equipment. It is essential that the competent person is
sufficiently independent and impartial to allow objective decisions to be made.
The lifting slings of the FROG are considered to be the most exposed item and the most
susceptible to damage and corrosion. Additionally, visual inspection of the non-rotational
wire rope is problematic due to the varying direction of wire lay through the rope.
Procedure
Inspected by
Position/ Company
Signature
3. Backup Eyebolt
Sliding Sleeve and
4.
alignment bolt or roll pin.
Keel plate M48nut and
alignment bolt or roll pin.
5.
Orientation plate or
blocks
6. Frame and Seat base
7. Buoyancy
8. Landing Feet
9. Seat Harnesses
NOTES:
Diagrams
Procedure
Complete all of the items detailed below followed by the inspection items on the six-monthly
inspection. All inspection should be carried out by a competent person.
1. Remove and visually inspect the Lifting Eye Plug for damage. Replace according to
the amount of usage of the Frog (*see below) or on recommendation from the
Competent Person/ inspector.
2. Remove and visually inspect the two M16 Lifting eye securing bolts for damage.
Visually inspect the two M16 holes in the Main support tube for damage.
Replace appropriate parts according to the amount of usage of the Frog (*see Table 1
below) or on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector. Bolt torque to
210N/m.
3. Visually inspect the Back-up Eyebolt, nut and split pin in situ.
Replace on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector. (*see ‘Other
replacement parts’ below)
4. Remove the Keel Plate Nut and visually check that the threads at the bottom of the
Main Support Tube are in good condition.
Replace appropriate parts according to the amount of usage of the Frog (*see Table 1
below) or on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector.
6. Carry out a full load test as prescribed in the Load Test Procedure (Sect 2.61).
7. Complete an inspection report on the above, which should be signed and dated by a
Competent person. (an example is attached overleaf)
Replacement of Frog parts is controlled on a risk based approach, whereby the higher the
usage of the Frog the more frequently parts should be replaced. Usage is defined in the table
below.
Table 1
Notes:
Annual Inspections are still carried out per procedure for Normal and Low usage,
however provided the Annual Replacement Parts show no signs of damage or strain,
then they do not need to be changed out annually.
Operators opting for a lower frequency parts change out routine shall need to monitor
usage on a periodic basis to ensure that the low usage limits indicated in the table
above are not exceeded. Any doubt over the amount of transfers conducted then the
maintenance strategy should revert back to High Usage. This should also be
considered if there is any suspicion of impacts or overloads.
When ordering Replacement Parts Kits, it is important to ensure the correct kit is ordered for
the Frog in question. Prior to ordering the kit, establish the Frog Serial Number which is
stamped on the Load Test Data Plate. The Number is typically FS-xxx or FS-xxx-M40 where
xxx represents a three digit number starting at 001. The Part Numbers for the (5) Annual
Replacement Parts Kits are as follows and copies of the Tabulated Drawing are included after
this procedure.
The maximum period prior to changing out the critical lifting components listed in the Annual
Inspection procedure shall be 3 years.
It should be noted that this recommendation applies to change out of components parts only
and does not replace or alter the inspection intervals as proscribed by the relevant legislation
Inspected by/
Position
Signature
3. Backup Eyebolt
5. Replace Sling
6. Load Test
7. Report/ Documentation
Six Monthly Inspection
1. Lifteye plug
2. Lifteye plug M16 Bolts
3. Backup Eyebolt
Sliding sleeve and
4.
alignment bolt or roll pin.
Keel plate M48nut and
5. alignment bolt or roll pin.
Orientation plate or blocks
6. Frame and Seat base
7. Buoyancy
8. Landing Feet
9. Seat Harnesses
10. Seat Harnesses (sit-in)
11. Load Test Plate
12. Lifting Set
13. Report/ Documentation
Where the FROG has sustained substantial damage, a detailed Examination of the unit
should be carried out and details of all damage should be recorded in a “ Damage
Report”. Details of the cause of the damage should also be recorded, if known. If
damage to the frame has occurred, welds should be examined for cracks using dye
penetrant.
Details of all repairs or modifications carried out should be recorded and copies of
damage and repair/modifications reports should be sent to the party controlling the
use of the FROG and also to Reflex Marine Limited.
Attached:
Serial No.
Manufacturer
Provisions
This declaration states that the above mentioned equipment complies to the European
Council Directive 98/37/EC.
Notified Body
DNV-2002-OSL-MD-0064
European Standards
PLACE OF USE OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS TO AND FROM SUPPORT VESSELS
USER GROUPS OPERATORS – INSTALLATION SUPERVISOR, QUALIFIED CRANE OPERATOR, QUALIFIED BANKSMAN OR
PASSENGER – ALL CREW
MAINTENANCE – COMPETENT PERSON, EXPERIENCED LIFTING ENGINEER
PURPOSE OF USE PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS
PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FOR EMERGENCY/ COMPASSIONATE REASONS
PRECAUTIONARY RIG EVACUATIONS
TRANSFER OF CASUALTIES (PROVISION FOR STRETCHER CASUALTY AND PARAMEDIC)
REFERENCES REFLEX MARINE FROG GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL
REFLEX MARINE FROG CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL
REFLEX MARINE FROG TRAINING VIDEO
SPARROWS DESIGN BOOK FOR FROG CAPSULE STRENGTH VERIFICATION
MIRA REPORT ON SPINAL INJURY RISK FOR FROG CAPSULE
EC MACHINERY DIRCTIVE 98/37/EC - ANNEX I ESSENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
BS EN 1050 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT
BS EN 292 PARTS 1 & 2 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – BASIC CONCEPTS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGN
LIMITS OF MACHINERY
MECHANICAL HAZARDS 1
Passenger/ Deck Crew Fingers getting trapped between
1 PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - CRUSHING 1.1 2 2 4
buoyancy blocks
2 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - ENTANGLEMENT 1.4 Personnel Entanglement With Sling 3 3 9
4 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Overload Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
5 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Corrosion Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
6 CRANE OPERATOR , DECK CREW DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - HANDLING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Crush Injury Deck Crew Handling Unit 4 2 8
7 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Side Impact – Injury Of Passenger 3 2 6
8 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Vertical Impact - Heavy Landing 2 3 6
9 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Water Impact - FROG Immersion Into Sea 2 1 2
10 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Crane Boom Failure 5 1 5
11 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Capsule Toppling Over Due To Vessel Movement 3 2 6
13 CRANE OPERATOR , PASSENGER PASSENGER OPERATION TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Impact on passengers body parts outside frog 3 2 6
14 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Poor friction on deck surface i.e. ice leading to sliding 3 2 6
37 PASSENGER DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER FALLING OR EJECTED OBJECTS OR FLUIDS 17 Luggage items falling from carrier 3 2 6
40 PASSENGER PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING SLIP, TRIP, FALL (RELATED TO THE MACHINERY) 19 Passenger trip on entry and exit of Frog 2 2 4
54 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL HAZARDS - LACK OF STABILITY 27.1.1 Passenger exiting in dangerous direction 3 2 6
55 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - INCIDENT MECHANICAL HAZARDS - OVERLOADING 27.1.2 passengers getting struck by wave 0
MECHANCAL HAZARDS - UNEXPECTED Maintenance checking lifing points requires ladder - Undue
56 INSPECTOR INSPECTOR PERIODIC INSPECTION 27.1.4 2 1 2
MOVEMENTS OF LOADS care taken
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INADEQUATE HOLDING
57 27.1.5 N/A 0
DEVICES/ ACCESSORIES
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INSUFFICIENT
58 27.4 see 4 0
MECHANICAL STRENGTH OF PARTS
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INADEQUATE
59 SELECTION OF LIFTING ACCESSORIES AND 27.6 see 4 0
INTEGRATION WITH MACHINE
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - FROM ABNORMAL
60 CONDITIONS OF ASSEMBLY/ TEST/ USE / 27.8 See 72-75 0
MAINTENANCE
70 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER FALLING OF PERSON FROM PERSON CARRIER 35 Falling Passenger from Carrier 4 1 4
RISK I.D.
CAUSE/ FAILURE MODE RISK REDUCTION METHOD SEVERITY PROBABILITY RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL PERSON RESPONSIBLE STATUS
NO.
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions
1 Passenger/ Deck Crew Fingers getting trapped between buoyancy blocks 2 1 2 SUPERVISOR, PASSENGER
Instruction - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
2 Personnel Entanglement With Sling 3 1 3
Instruction - Training Video CREW
Passengers/ Deck Crew trapped between FROG and fixed object. Includes Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
3 3 1 3
the use of Taglines. Instruction - Manual - 3.7 - Tag Lines CREW
Instructions - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling
4 Overload Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations
5 Corrosion Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling Design - Manual - 2.1 - General Description 5 1 5
SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
6 Crush Injury Deck Crew Handling Unit Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction 4 1 4
CREW
7 Side Impact – Injury Of Passenger Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations 3 1 3
8 Vertical Impact - Heavy Landing Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations 2 1 2
9 Water Impact - FROG Immersion Into Sea Design - Manual - 6.7 - Wave Pool Test 2 1 2
10 Crane Boom Failure Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope 5 1 5
Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope
11 Capsule Toppling Over Due To Vessel Movement Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction 3 1 3 SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR
Instruction - Manual - 3.6 - Crane Operator Guidance
12 Stability - Capsule turning over due to horizontal speed at touch down Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope 3 1 3
13 Impact on passengers body parts outside frog Instruction - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling 3 1 3 PASSENGER
Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
14 Poor friction on deck surface i.e. ice leading to sliding 3 1 3
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction CREW
15 N/A 0
16 N/A 0
17 N/A 0
18 N/A 0
19 N/A 0
20 N/A 0
21 N/A 0
22 N/A 0
23 N/A 0
24 0
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instructions
25 Hazard from Falling objects/ Immersion in water 3 1 3
Instruction - Manual -3.8 Luggage Storage
26 Hazard from Vertigo Sufferers - 1 2 2
27 N/A 0
28 N/A 0
29 N/A 0
30 N/A 0
31 N/A 0
32 N/A 0
33 N/A 0
RISK I.D.
CAUSE/ FAILURE MODE RISK REDUCTION METHOD SEVERITY PROBABILITY RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL PERSON RESPONSIBLE STATUS
NO.
Instruction - Manual - 3.3 - Pre-transfer Planning
73 Insufficient Pre-transfer Inspection Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, INSPECTOR
Instruction - Training Video
74 Passenger Error, Seat Harness Incorrectly fitted Instruction - Training Video 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, PASSENGER
75 Passeneger Error,/ Deck Crew Error signalling 'All Clear' Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, DECK CREW, PASSENGER
Severity
1 Negligible - Negligible injury, no absence from work Minor damage No significant impact on environment
2 Slight - Minor injury requiring first aid treatment Moderate damage Minor impact on the environment
3 Moderate - Injury leading to lost time accident Significant damage Moderate pollution
4 High - Single fatality or multiple serious injury Limited structural damage Severe but localised pollution
5 Very high - Multiple fatality Major structural damage Major pollution
Likelihood
1 Very unlikely A freak combination of factors would be required for an incident to occur
2 Unlikely A rare combination of factors would be required for an incident to occur
3 Possible Could happen when additional factors are present but otherwise unlikely to occur
4 Likely Not certain to happen, but an additional factor may result in an accident
5 Very likely Almost inevitable that an accident would result
Introduction
New lifting regulations (LOLER 98) were introduced in the UK on 5th December 98.
These laws have specific impact on ‘marine transfer operations’, affecting:
The comments below pertain to the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment
Regulations 1998 (LOLER 98), as well as the Approved Code of Practice and
Guidance issues by the HSE1. Bold italic sections are quoted from the regulations.
The section in standard italics are quoted either from the Approved Codes of Practice
(ACOP) or the HSE guidance notes.
LOLER 98 - Regulation 5
(1) Every employer shall ensure that lifting equipment for lifting persons –
As part of the risk assessment carried out to satisfy your duties under the
Management Regulations, you should assess the risks arising from other work
equipment, structures or objects which the person being lifting may strike.
Fully enclosed carriers and falling objects protection on carriers can reduce
the risks in such circumstances. They should be used wherever there is a need
provided that it is reasonably practical to do so, taking into account the nature
of the work involved.
Comments - The use of traditional personnel basket transfers does not appear
to comply with this guideline.
(1) Every employer shall ensure that work equipment is so constructed or adapted
as to be suitable for the purpose for which it is to be used or provided.
(2) In selecting work equipment, every employer shall have regard to the working
conditions and the risks to health and safety of persons which exist in the
premises or undertaking in which that work equipment is to be used and any
additional risks posed by the use of that work equipment.
ACOP 3 – Article 68
(1) Every employer shall ensure that every lifting operation involving
lifting equipment is –
b) appropriately supervised;
Comments
ii. The duty of the employer to provide suitably designed equipment for use in
the workplace (refer to Article 214). Provision of traditional personnel basket is
unlikely to meet this requirement.
iii. The requirement to properly plan lifting operations (refer to Article 217,
particularly parts e) and f), also Article 221).
v. The requirement to take full account of the proximity of other hazards and
environment in which the operation are to take place, including variable factors
such as meteorological conditions (Article 253 and 265).
The newer style of personnel transfer capsule (i.e the Frog) now on the market
does appear to comply with Regulation 5.
Given this scenario it is considered that the most effective way to ensure safe
operations and to demonstrate compliance with the law is to formerly plan
each lift (or sequence of lifts). It is recommended that employers utilise a
‘transfer log’ similar to that attached, as an aid to planning and to provide a
record demonstrating the adequate planning of operations.
Reference 1. Safe use of lifting equipment, Health & Safety Commission, L113,
HSE Books, 1998
Attached is a copy of the Bureau Veritas design review certificate, covering FA-01
and FS-01 type units.
Background
Crash impact experts from Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA) were
contracted to study the biomechanical effects of passengers associated with the impact
scenarios identified in the Risk Assessment. Their findings demonstrated a high level
of protection offered by the Frog (which would greatly exceed the protection offered
by a traditional rope transfer basket). Risks to passengers associated with impacts
within the maximum operating envelope for the unit were generally shown to be low.
The following MIRA reports are included in the GTM for reference. In summary the
finding were as follows:
Vertical Impact Assessment
A vertical impact assessment was carried out for lumbar spine injury and cervical
spine injury under the most extreme operating conditions defined for the Frog. Injury
criteria were derived from 'Biomechanical Data' sourced by MIRA. The main
assumptions relating to the work case scenario were as follows:
# Maximum relative impact velocity 4.0 m/s
# Single passenger (increased spring deceleration)
# Extreme weather limit - Significant wave height 2 m. (Platform to Vessel
transfer)
# Maximum crane hook velocity 2.2 m/s
# 5th percentile female passenger (group with highest injury risk)
# 1kg Headgear representing heaviest offshore Hardhat type.
The assumptions (in particular the Crane Hook Velocity) are all pessimistic, and the
risk of this extreme impact scenario is very low.
Conclusion
The assessment indicates that, given the parameters above, the risk of lumbar spine
injury is less than 0.2%.
Forces in the cervical spine caused by the same acceleration indicate that a seated
occupant may experience 30% of the Injury Assessment Reference Value (IARV) for
continuous loading (>27ms) and 8% IARV for brief loading (0ms). Therefore
passengers do not suffer a significant risk of neck injury.
Attached is a copy of the Det Norske Veritas operational risk assessment report.
____________________________ ____________________________
Prepared for
Revision 1
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July 2005
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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July 2005
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
CONTENTS
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July 2005 i
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Austal Ships have developed a design for a High Speed Crew and Supply Vessel. One method of
transferring personnel from the vessel to an offshore installation is by personnel transfer capsule.
Reflex Marine of Aberdeen manufacture such a transfer capsule, commonly referred to as The Frog.
The Frog was designed to replace the traditional transfer basket and a number of units are already in
use around the world.
This report commissioned by Austal Ships and Reflex Marine details an independent comparative
risk assessment of transferring personnel to/from offshore installations using the transfer capsule
compared to traditional helicopter transfer. The scope of the study has been limited to the actual
transfer of personnel to/from the installation and does not include the transit phase to/from the
shore.
The Frog personnel transfer capsule is specifically designed for the transfer of personnel from
offshore support vessels to and from offshore installations. The Frog's design features address the
following hazards associated with such transfers:
x falling out of the capsule
x heavy landings
x landing and swinging impacts; and
x immersion.
The major residual accident event is the dropping of the capsule during the transfer so that it
impacts the vessel, installation or the sea at velocities greater than the design impact velocity of
4m/s. The risks associated with this low probability event have been assessed relative to the risks
associated with helicopter transfer.
A summary of the comparative risks is presented in the following table. The results are based on
transferring a total of 18 personnel.
The probability of an accident per lift of a personnel transfer capsule is similar to that per helicopter
take-off and landing (of the order of 10-6 per operation). However, because to transfer a given
number of personnel (18 in this example) multiple lifts of the transfer capsule would be required,
the total probability of an accident is greater for transfer by personnel capsule than by helicopter.
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
On the same basis a helicopter accident is likely to involve more people (higher capacity) than an
accident involving a personnel transfer capsule. Consequently the risk to an individual per transfer
(injury or fatality risk) is similar, whether transferred by helicopter or personnel transfer capsule.
The statistics for helicopter accidents world-wide do show an approximate three-fold increase for
fatalities in the Rest of the World compared to the North Sea and Australia. The reasons for this are
not analysed but could include factors such as type and specification of helicopters used (e.g. single
or twin engine), provision of emergency response services, and maintenance. Consequently the
risks of transfer by personnel transfer capsule are less than the risks of helicopter transfer in the
Rest of the World.
The results for transfer by personnel capsule are subject to a relatively high degree of uncertainty.
This is primarily due to the lack of data with respect to transfer by personnel capsule. However,
given that the Frog has a number of design features to mitigate the identified hazards, and that when
lifting fellow workers following documented procedures the likelihood of an incident is likely to be
considerably lower than for normal crane operations, the risks associated with transfer by personnel
capsule may be overestimated. Therefore, although a firm conclusion as to which method is safer
cannot be drawn, it is considered likely that transfer by personnel capsule is safer than by
helicopter.
Other factors such as availability, ease of operation and cost are also likely to be key in the decision
making process.
The scope of this study was limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the installation and
does not include the transit phase to/from the shore. The results should be considered accordingly.
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
1. INTRODUCTION
Austal Ships have developed a design for a High Speed Crew and Supply Vessel (see
Appendix IV for details). One method of transferring personnel from the vessel to an
offshore installation is by personnel transfer capsule. Reflex Marine of Aberdeen
manufacture such a transfer capsule, commonly referred to as The Frog. The Frog was
designed to replace the traditional transfer basket and a number of units are already in use
around the world.
Austal Ships and Reflex Marine have commissioned DNV to undertake an independent
comparative risk assessment of transferring personnel to/from offshore installations using
the transfer capsule compared to traditional helicopter transfer. The scope of the study has
been limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the installation and does not include
the transit phase to/from the shore.
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
A desk top hazard identification exercise has been undertaken to identify and qualitatively
review hazards associated with helicopter and personnel capsule transfer to/from the
installation.
The risk associated with each hazard has been qualitatively assessed using a 5x5 matrix as
presented in Appendix I. The risk categories are defined as follows:
x Low - The risk is broadly acceptable and no further risk treatment would be required
x Medium - The risk is tolerable if As Low As Reasonably Practicable
x High - The risk is unacceptable and further risk reduction measures are required
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July 2005 4
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Helicopter Transfer
Helicopter ditching Causes of helicopter accidents and typical risk Freq - V. Remote
control measures are well documented. It is Conseq - Moderate
not the intent of this study to identify or
Risk - Low
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July 2005 5
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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July 2005 6
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Reportable accident frequency during take-off and 1.6 per million flight stages (1)
landing
Probability of accident per transfer offshore (2) 2.4 per million transfers
Probability of a reportable accident being fatal 0.18
Probability of a fatal accident per transfer offshore (2) 0.43 per million transfers
Probability of death in a fatal accident during take-off or 0.46
landing
Probability of an individual being a fatality per transfer 0.2 per million transfers
offshore (2)
Note 1. A flight stage includes one take-off and one landing. This may be considered
equivalent to one transfer.
Note 2. A take-off or landing on an offshore platform inevitably involves more hazards than
one at an onshore heliport. A breakdown of take-off/landing accidents according to
location shows that a majority of take-off/landing accidents occur offshore. An
internal analysis by DNV indicates that the accident frequency offshore is
approximately 1.5 times the average, and onshore approximately 0.5 times the
average. This analysis was based on a limited dataset but appears reasonable and is
therefore used in this study.
In addition to the risks posed to helicopter occupants, accidents involving helicopters can
cause damage to the platform itself. Such damage could be caused by a helicopter crashing
during take-off or landing, or by an accident while the helicopter is on the helideck such as a
fire or being blown off by the wind. However the only known cases of damage to the
platform have been during take-off/landing. Most of the reported events involved little or
no damage to the platform.
The only fatalities from accidents on the ground or helideck have been ground crew struck
by rotor blades. In the UK North Sea there were 2 such fatalities between 1980 and 1995,
during which time there were 4,160,000 flight stages. Therefore the probability of a a
ground crew fatality per transfer is given by:
2 / 4,160,000 = 5 x 10-7 fatalities per transfer
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July 2005 8
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
this period, of the 379 recorded fatalities none were associated with personnel transfer by
basket, capsule or similar device.
Although a number of incidents involving transfer by personnel basket have been reported,
no fatalities have been recorded in the data reviewed. No data on the number of lifts/
transfers has been sourced, hence an injury/fatality rate cannot be explicitly calculated.
However, a review of dropped object incident data can be used to determine an appropriate
estimate of injury/fatality rates per transfer operation.
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July 2005 10
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Given the relatively light weight of a personnel transfer capsule (870 kg), the dedicated
rigging, documented operating guidelines and the additional care likely to be shown when
lifting fellow workers, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of dropping a transfer
capsule is an order of magnitude less than the average for normal crane lifts. Therefore
based on the above incident data, the frequency of dropping the personnel transfer capsule is
taken to be 5 x 10-6 per transfer.
The probability of impacting the installation or vessel, or falling into the sea, based on the
incident data for main cranes is as follows:
Impact on installation - 48%
Impact on vessel - 25%
Fall into sea - 27%
This probably overestimates the likelihood of impacting on the installation as the incident
data includes transferring loads around an installation as well as loading/unloading supply
vessels. A more realistic split for vessel to installation transfers is considered to be:
Impact on installation - 33%
Impact on vessel - 33%
Fall into sea - 33%
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July 2005 11
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Environmental North Sea Gulf of Mexico Far East Middle East Australia India
Parameter
Average Sea 6 – 14 qC 20 – 31 qC 24 – 31 qC 20 – 31 qC 26 – 31 qC 24 – 28 qC
Temperatures (qC)
Current Speed Average : 0.3 Average : 1-2 Average : 0.4 Average : 0.1 Average : 0.5 Average : 0.3
(Knots) knots knots knots knots knots knots
Max : 1.2 knots Max : 3 knots Max : 2.8 knots Max : 1.2 knots Max : 1.4 knots Max : 1.7 knots
Probability of 0.26 0.43 0.86 0.62 0.49 0.34
Calm Wind
d Beaufort 3
Probability of 0.64 0.57 0.14 0.38 0.51 0.66
Moderate Wind
Beaufort 4 to 7
Probability of 0.11 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.0 < 0.01 < 0.01
Severe Wind (Up to 10% during
t Beaufort 8 the height of the
monsoon)
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Likelihood of an Likelihood of an
Frequency of droped individual becoming a individual sustaining
transfer capsule Location of impact fatality an injury
1.67E-08
0.33 0.01 8.25E-07
Installsation 0.5
8.25E-07
1.67E-08
5.00E-06 0.33 0.01 8.25E-07
(per lift) Vessel 0.5
8.25E-07
1.67E-07
0.33 0.1 1.20E-06
Sea 0.8
3.00E-07
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
The probability of an accident per lift of a personnel transfer capsule is similar to that per
helicopter take-off and landing (of the order of 10-6 per operation). However, because to
transfer a given number of personnel (18 in this example) multiple lifts of the transfer
capsule would be required, the total probability of an accident is greater for personnel
transfer capsule than helicopters.
On the same basis a helicopter accident is likely to involve more people (higher capacity)
than an accident involving a personnel transfer capsule. Consequently the risk to an
individual per transfer (injury or fatality risk) is similar, whether transferred by helicopter or
personnel transfer capsule.
The statistics for helicopter accidents world-wide do show an approximate three-fold
increase for fatalities in the Rest of the World compared to the North Sea and Australia. The
reasons for this are not analysed but could include factors such as type and specification of
helicopters used (e.g. single or twin engine), provision of emergency response services, and
maintenance. Consequently the risks of transfer by personnel transfer capsule are less than
the risks of helicopter transfer in the Rest of the World.
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Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Frog personnel transfer capsule is specifically designed for the transfer of personnel
from offshore support vessels to and from offshore installations. The Frog's design features
address the following hazards associated with such transfers:
x falling out of the capsule
x heavy landings
x landing and swinging impacts; and
x immersion.
The major residual accident event is the dropping of the capsule during the transfer so that it
impacts the vessel, installation or the sea at velocities greater than the design impact velocity
of 4m/s. The risks associated with this low probability event have been assessed relative to
the risks associated with helicopter transfer.
In the North Sea and offshore Australia risks to individuals have been shown to be similar
whether transferred by helicopter or personnel capsule. However helicopter risks are on
average three times higher in the rest of the world and hence in these areas it may be safer to
transfer by personnel capsule.
The results for transfer by personnel capsule are subject to a relatively high degree of
uncertainty. This is primarily due to the lack of data with respect to transfer by personnel
capsule. However, given that the Frog has a number of design features to mitigate the
identified hazards, and that when lifting fellow workers following documented procedures
the likelihood of an incident is likely to be considerably lower than for normal crane
operations, the risks associated with transfer by personnel capsule may be overestimated.
Therefore, although a firm conclusion as to which method is safer cannot be drawn, it is
considered likely that transfer by personnel capsule is safer than by helicopter.
Other factors such as availability, ease of operation and cost are also likely to be key in the
decision making process.
The scope of this study was limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the
installation and does not include the transit phase to/from the shore. The results should be
considered accordingly.
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Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
8. REFERENCES
1. Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, "Civil Aircraft Accidents, Activities and Rates"
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services Website, December
1999.
2. UK CAA, "UK Offshore Helicopter Operations Statistical Report for 1998", Safety Data
Department, July 1999.
3. E&P Forum, "1998 E&P Forum World-Wide Oil Industry Helicopter operations and
Safety Review", May 1999.
4. E&P Forum, "Safety Performance of the Global E&P Industry 1998", Report No.
6.80/295 July 1999.
5. DNV ARF C1 Rev 1 - "Guide to QRA of Offshore Installations", Confidential internal
document, 1998.
6. US Minerals Management Service, "Report of the Crane Accident Workgroup", October
1998.
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July 2005
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
APPENDIX I
QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING MATRIX
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Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Likelihood/Frequency/Probability
Consequence Very Remote Remote Occasional Probable Frequent
Minor Low Low Low Low Medium
Moderate Low Low Medium Medium Medium
Serious Low Medium Medium Medium High
Major Medium Medium High High High
Critical Medium High High High High
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July 2005
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
APPENDIX II
CAUSES OF HELICOPTER INCIDENTS
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
APPENDIX III
PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE INFORMATION
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Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
APPENDIX IV
CREW BOAT INFORMATION
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