Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Publisher
Association for the Development of Serbian Studies, Novi Sad
Editorial Address
Stevana Hristića 19, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia
tel.: +381 65 641 3628; fax: +381 21 6396 488
email: serbian_studies@hotmail.com
Editorial Board
f , University of Novi Sad (Serbia)
Boris Bulatović (editor-in-chief)
Tomislav Longinović, University of Wisconsin, Madison (USA)
Goran Maksimović, University of Niš (Serbia)
Ljiljana Bogoeva Sedlar, University of Arts in Belgrade (Serbia)
Slobodan Vladušić, University of Novi Sad (Serbia)
Persida Lazarević Di Giacomo, Gabriele d’Anunzio University of Chieti-Pescara (Italy)
Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover, Monash University, Melbourne (Australia)
Alla Tatarenko, Ivan Franko National University of L'viv (Ukraine)
Tatjana Tapavički Duronjić, University of Banja Luka (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Motoki Nomachi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo ( Japan)
Cover Design
Nenad Svilar
Print
NS MALA KNJIGA PLUS, Novi Sad
Journal Description
Serbian Studies Research provides scholarly articles in the fields of Serbian linguistics and literature,
international relations, cultural studies, history, sociology, political science, economics, geography,
demography, social anthropology, administration, law, and natural sciences, as they relate to the hu-
man condition.
Annual Membership
Institutional: 45 usd (including subscription)
Individual: 15 usd (including subscription)
Издавач
Научно удружење за развој српских студија (НУРСС), Нови Сад
Адреса
Стевана Христића 19, 21000 Нови Сад
тел.: +381 65 641 3628; факс: +381 21 6396 488
email: serbian_studies@hotmail.com
Уредништво
Борис Булатовић (главни уредник), Универзитет у Новом Саду (Србија)
Томислав Лонгиновић, Универзитет у Висконсину, Медисон (САД)
Горан Максимовић, Универзитет у Нишу (Србија)
Љиљана Богоева Седлар, Универзитет уметности у Београду (Србија)
Слободан Владушић, Универзитет у Новом Саду (Србија)
Персида Лазаревић Ди Ђакомо, Универзитет „Габријеле д'Анунцио ” у Пескари (Италија)
Слободанка Владив-Гловер, Монаш универзитет, Мелбурн (Аустралија)
Ала Татаренко, Национални универзитет „Иван Франко” у Лавову (Украјина)
Татјана Тапавички Дуроњић, Универзитет у Бањој Луци (Босна и Херцеговина)
Мотоки Номаћи, Хокаидо Универзитет, Сапоро ( Јапан)
Лектура и коректура
Уредништво
Корице
Ненад Свилар
Штампа
НС МАЛА КЊИГА ПЛУС, Нови Сад
УДК
008/009+3+8
Тираж
300 примерака
ARTICLES
НАУЧНИ ЧЛАНЦИ
UDC 821.111(73).09-992(043.3)
UDC 821.111.09-992(043.3)
Оригинални научни рад
1
sanjalazarevic7@gmail.com (Sanja Lazarević Radak, Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of
Arts and Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia)
2
Ово не значи да велики ратови који су уследили у двадесетом веку нису условили, или пак били
повод за исписивање нове карте, мењање граница и прекрајање света, већ да је мапа света са свим
пратећим значењима који укључују стереотипе и дефинишу однос центра и периферије настала у
доба колонијалног успона. Више о овоме у: Jo Sharp, Postcolonial Geographies. London, Sage, 2009,
p. 20.
12 | Сања Лазаревић Радак
Оријентализовани Словени
Према Едварду Саиду (Edvard Said) „оријентализам је стил мишљења, за-
снован на онтолошкој и епистемолошкој дистинкцији која се повлачи између
’Оријента и (најчешће) Окцидента (Said: 2008, 11). Песници, романсијери, фи-
лозофи, империјални администратори и политички теоретичари су прихватив-
ши основну разлику између Истока и Запада, конструисали скуп значења који
кроз јавни дискурс у облику академских формулација, стереотипа, менталних
пречица; кроз естетске форме или у колоквијалном говору, препознајемо као
Оријент (Said: 2008, 12). Као скуп идеја и корпус знања, Оријент је ослоњен на
генерализације и општа места – оријентални деспотизам, менталитет, оријентал-
ни сјај, суровост, нехигијена, заосталост или пад са одређене „цивилизацијске
лествице“. Оријентализација такозване Источне Европе подразумева гео-сим-
боличко уситњавање и функционише по принципу сличном оријентализаци-
ји. Наиме, Лери Вулф (Larry Wolf) сматра да је Исток Европе замишљен, кон-
струисан услед несвесне потребе за господарењем, доминацијом, представом о
властитој цивилизацијској супериорности, колико услед манифестне тежње за
експлоатацијом. Творци овог стила мишљења су просветитељи - Волтер, Русо,
Дидро. Њихови први контакти са „Истоком Европе“ доносе извештаје о људи-
ма ропског менталитета, уочљиво заосталима за Западном Европом (Todorov:
2010, 270). По Вулфу је просветитељство одговорно за бинарну поделу Европе
јер следећи ову мисаону нит, европско питање остаје смештено у оквире Запад-
не Европе, док се државе које је чине, везују за интелектуално наслеђе „очева
просветитељства“ (Wolf:f 2013:XIII). Оријентализација Источне Европе дели не-
ке поступке стереотипизације карактеристичне за „класични Оријент.“ У скла-
ду са њом, народи који насељавају овај део Европе „не познају благодети циви-
лизације“, а уз ова општа места неретко се манипулише њиховим непознавањем
основа хигијене и неписменошћу. Бројна запажања о „инфериорности“ Слове-
на, нису тек производ деветнаестог века који на врхунцу колонијалног успона
потичу од просветитеља – „изумитеља“ Источне Европе јер се и у вековима ко-
ји претходе овом интелектуалном контексту, непознати делови континента пре-
познају као унутрашњи Оријент или унутрашња опозиција Окциденту. Стога
се смештају изван граница европског континента будећи асоцијације на „дивље
народе“ који не познају „цивилизовани“ начин живота.
Како примећује Милица Бакић-Хејден (Bakić-Heiden), реторика балкани-
зма није издвојена од оријенталистичке реторике и феноменологије, већ се са
њом прожима и преклапа (Bakić-Hejden:2006, 20). Оријентализација народа
Балкана, које путници из овог периода називају – „малим хришћанским наро-
14 | Сања Лазаревић Радак
дима“, или „хришћанима на Истоку Европе“, најпре пролази кроз трочлани фил-
тер стеротипизације. На врху ове пирамиде налази се Оријент – некада моћни,
богати, славни гео-симболички и физички део света који је у историјској декли-
нацији изгубио некадашњих сјај и богатство. Декаденција је кључна реч којом
се у британским путописима описује Оријент. У средини ове пирамиде налазе
се Словени – народ који насељава Исток Запада, или део Европе у који је Ори-
јент ушао, проширивши њиме своје вредности. На дну пирамиде препознају
се народи Балкана – Словени, или својеврсни амалгам народа који се нашао на
„раскршћу цивилизација“. Оријентализацију Словена је у овом периоду тешко
одвојити од негативног опажања Балкана. Ове слике се међусобно преплићу,
подржавају и обликују представу о становништву које је стицајем историјских
околности и својеврсног географског усуда постало „жртва“ културе владара.
Стога је оријентализација балканских народа неодвојива од оријентализаци-
је Турака и представља се као последица њихове вишевековне владавине. Ми-
шљење о урођеној инфериорности народа ипак није у основи представе о ори-
јентализованим Словенима. Две путнице из деветнаестог века, госпође Ирби
и Мекензи (Irby, Mackenzie) које су седамдесетих година, путовале Турском у
Европи истичу да географска позиција балканских народа игра пресудну улогу
у њиховом политичком животу:
У две важне ствари Београд је оријенталан као да је смештен на Тигру или Ба-
ради– осветљењу и непоплочаности улица. Немогуће је да по кишовитом вре-
мену, после неколико посета, дођете кући, а при томе пропустите да до коле-
на упаднете у блато; ноћу је кретање немогуће уколико немате фењер (Paton:
1845, 54)
Кревет је био намештен на поду а ла турquе што је било тврдо; ипак посте-
љина је била снежно бела, па сам се сматрао правим срећником. Морам при-
знати да ме је чистоћа изненатила јер сам претходно закључио да је чишће-
ње навика која је страна словенској популацији (Paton:1845,85).
Можда смо сведоци краја – апсорпције мале Србије у велику Русију. Ова фарса
одиста може бити окончана када вук, уморан од своје улоге чувара убиje своје
јагње (Anonymous: 1884, 4-5).
Они носе стару турску ношњу; прслуке и широке панталоне, тешке, бројне ма-
раме везују око појаса обликујући достојанствену појаву. Марама прекрива чи-
20 | Сања Лазаревић Радак
Закључак
Сматрати Балкан конструктом, не значи порицати његову „реалну“ димен-
зију. На сличан начин, указивати на „словенско“ и „османско“ као конструкте,
не значи доводити у питање идентитете људи који живе на Балкану или у Тур-
ској. Конструкт је у овом раду схваћен као скуп репрезентација које се сажимају
крећући се двовековним током и формирајући јединствену и стабилну предста-
ву о људима који насељавају један део света или придавати непроменљиво значе-
ње скупу физичких географија. Дискурси о „османској владавини“, „османском
наслеђу“, „словенском карактеру“, „оријенталном духу“ насељавају менталне ма-
пе и реализују се кроз говор, постајући сажета, поједностављена стварност. Пој-
мови „османски“, „словенски“, полазе од претпоставке да је постојао један по-
литички, административни и социјални систем. Но, увид у друштвена уређења
на Балкану у протеклих неколико векова сведочи о одсуству некаквог централи-
зованог царства или хомогеног система културе. „Османско“ и „балканско“ за-
право су хибридне и умногоме имагинарне творевине које данас служе да означе
читав варијетет различитих конфесионалних, етничких група, разноликост ма-
24 | Сања Лазаревић Радак
ЛИТЕРАТУРА:
Anonymous. Servia: Her Aim and Story, London: Unwin Brothers, 1884.
Bakić-Hejden, Milica. Varijacije na temu Balkan, Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i
društvenu teoriju, Filip Višnjić, 2006.
Bilefeld, Ulrih. Stranci: prijatelji ili neprijatelji, Beograd: XX vek, 1998.
Charles, Boileau. Travels in the Three Great Empires of Austria, Russia and Turkey,
Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1839.
Denton, William. Servia and the Servians, London: Bill and Daldy, 1862.
Forester, Thomas. The Danube and Black Sea, London: Edward Stanford, 1857.
26 | Сања Лазаревић Радак
Summary: Adjectives “Ottoman” / “Turkish and” Slovene” have broad and uncritic ap-
plication in language. A discourse analysis reveal that they are mere constructs: inside - in the
countries we refer to as the “Balkan” and in the Occident, they have a complex and dynamic
meaning. Their use of the nineteenth century to the present days, reveals variability and strat-
ification of the content. At first, Turkish and Slovenian were nearly equal to their attributed as
„oriental“. As the growing involvement of the so-called liberal fraction, first embodied in the
political activities of William Gladstone, the Slavs were refered to, as “small Christian nations
on the edge of the European continent“. When this perception dominated the liberal stream,
one could notice the number of articles that were critical on the expanse of the culture and the
political practice of the Slavs. At the same time, the Liberals introduced significantly more be-
nevolent attitude towards the remains of the Ottoman Empire. Some of them point out specif-
ic character of Slovenian nation linked with separatism and destructivness and regret the col-
lapse of the great empire. South Slavs were associated with the Russians - the representation
under which survives rivalry since the 17th century. Finally, an insight into the history of this
representations demonstrates the variability of attitude towards the South Slavs and Turks in
favor of the current policy of Great Britain. A political interest defined “Ottoman” and “Slo-
venian” while their representations were settle the historical discourse.
Keywords: Ottoman, Turkish, Slavic, discourse, The Great Game, colonialism
Dr Vladimir Bosković1
Department of Modern Greek Studies
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Greece
1
vladimir.d.boskovic@gmail.com
2
My warmest thanks for this article go to Professor Matthew Kaiser of Harvard University, for his en-
thusiastic reading and his helpful comments. I also owe thanks to esteemed colleagues Saskia Dirkse
and Roderick Saxey for correcting my English translations of the songs; all mistakes and omissions are,
of course, exclusively mine.
30 | Vladimir Bosković
3
The second term ((poskočice) means ‘jig’ but also a ‘short cheerful song.’ The term is obviously used to
denote the carnivalesque character of the content, as there are no genre divisions in the book.
4
Still, Vuk never stopped collecting them. He included the ‘obscene words’ (together with some rather
scandalous, for the time, phrasal usages) in his 1842 Dictionary of the Serbian language, and that caused
heated debate among the intellectuals of the age.
5
Mala prostonarodnja slaveno-serbska pjesnarica [A little Slavo-Serbian book of songs of the common
people], Vienna 1814.
It Could Happen to a Bishop: Three ‘Special’ Songs by Lukijan Mušicki | 31
uinely popular [izvorno narodne] are published in the supplements of the volumes’
(Mladenović, 1973, p. CCLXXII, reference in Damjanov, 1988, p. 142). This defi-
nition, as obscure as it may be, is additionally contradicted by the fact that some of
the songs that show clear traces of an expert hand are included in the first part of the
volume and not in this ‘Supplement.’
Vuk’s informants consisted of local literati and enthusiasts who would send him
songs they had heard and written down. Forty five of the ‘special’ songs were sent to
Vuk by Lukijan Mušicki (1777-1837), abbot of the monastery of Šišatovac in Vojvo-
dina and, from 1828, the Orthodox bishop of the Eparchy of Karlstadt (Gornji Kar-
lovac, in what is today Croatia). Damjanov (1997) noted that these forty five songs
themselves ‘comprise an integral short collection of erotic poetry’ (p. 142; all trans-
lations are mine). Three of those songs – ‘Rada the Turkish Slave,’ ‘Golden Fleece,’
and ‘Nice Company’ – are found in the ‘Supplement’ under Mušicki’s name.6
Lukijan Mušicki is an odd figure in the history of Serbian literature. In his youth,
he used to compose love poems, and some of them became quite popular (Karanović,
1990, passim). At some point around 1800, he turned to Classicism and became its
most prominent representative among Serbs. He was interchangeably praised and
reproached, disparaged and rehabilitated, given the title of archipoeta or ‘that odifi-
er’ (odadžija). Lukijan’s high-style odes dedicated to high ideals and persons were
written in a high-register language and were so sublime that few people ever really
understood them. His letters portray him as an intelligent, lively, contradictory per-
sonality, a polymath and polyglot who was always in debt and not rarely suffered
from paranoia (many of his odes in seipsum address his innumerable invented ene-
mies). It is clear, nevertheless, that he was a prominent intellectual of his time, his ac-
tivities ranging from founding seminaries to writing a grammar to proposing a draft
of the letter ђ that is still part of the Serbian alphabet. He is also internally known as
‘the gay bishop’ of the Serbian Orthodox Church.7
Živomir Mladenović (1973), one of the editors of these songs, remarked: ‘It
is surprising how many special songs Mušicki wrote down, and some of them al-
so composed, for Vuk’ (p. XIII). He also suggested: ‘For some of Vuk’s collectors,
such as Lukijan Mušicki [...], it is not always easy to discern what they have written
down from the others, and what they have composed themselves’ (p. CCLXXV).
Following these scholarly testimonies, Damjanov (1987) concluded that the ‘Gold-
6
Other forty two songs sent by Mušicki were included in the collection thematically (No. 40, 41, 97,
99-101, 160-162, 164, 166, 169, 176, 211, 303-310, 313, 315-323, 326-328, 330, 332-337).
7
There is an oral tradition in the Serbian Orthodox Church that Mušicki was a ‘big, big homosexual’.
See an intriguing presentation at the internet portal of the Serbian gay community (in Serbian): [Anon-
ymous]. Lukijan Mušicki. http://www.gay-serbia.com/queer/musicki-lukijan/index.jsp.
32 | Vladimir Bosković
en Fleece,’ and most probably ‘Rada the Turkish Slave,’ were composed, or at least
finalized, after some unknown model, by Mušicki himself,f probably in his youth (p.
149-50). There is neither need nor space to enter here the theoretical speculations
on authorship in the spirit of Foucault or Barthes or to discuss Damjanov’s argu-
ments in detail; it is enough to note the striking features of diction and language of
these two songs that correspond not only to the love songs of Mušicki’s youth, but
also to the solemn odes of his maturity.
The motives that led Mušicki to collect – or compose – these songs remain
open to speculation. Several possible answers can be proposed, but the one that in-
terests me the most is the idea that the songs consciously resist emerging discours-
es of sexuality, even as they gesture inescapably toward them. Is Mušicki a dissident
of sexuality? Is he nostalgic for premodern experiences of sex, for proto-sexuality?
Is he trying to forge some sort of discursive alliance against sexuality between a ple-
beian customary consciousness and church intellectuals? In a way, his obscenity is
aligned with traditionalism and conservatism, and its target is the metropolitan and
middle-class confessing impulse that Foucault (1988) associates with modern sub-
jectivity. Perhaps Mušicki’s raucous “singing” genitals are a political antidote to Fou-
cault’s more earnest “talking” genitals.
In this case, the ‘popular’ or ‘folk’ tradition may have been conveniently used as
a shield that protects the social position of the reputable abbot. The social morals in
early nineteenth century Austrian Empire were indeed very strict and it would not
be surprising that Mušicki legitimized his writings by ascribing them to the people
– a strategy apt for a Romantic, analogous to the ‘nature’ or ‘natural reason’ of the
Enlightenment authors.
The first two poems are composed in eight-syllable trochaic quatrains rhymed
abab, while the ‘Nice Company’ is comprised of fourteen-syllable (8+6) trochaic vers-
es with an occasional rhyme. Traditionally, folk poetry either employs no rhyme or
rhymed couplets (aabb) but never four-line stanzas rhymed abab. The fourteen-syl-
lable verse is also not present in folk poetry, but it is well represented in the learned
poetry of the age.
These songs received only limited attention of the critics and scholars. It is our
intention primarily to presentt them and to try to show that, if approached from an ad-
equately critical perspective, these songs can offer exciting material for literary study.
male sexual slavery.8 The military organization of the Empire, its power and discipline
were turned into a gay fetish still as early as the sixteenth century, in the memoirs of
Bartolomej Georgijević (1553), who was himself a slave in Turkish hands. Fulfilling
both propagandistic and voyeuristic desires of the ‘Christian Europe,’ he described in
great detail the sexual abuse of young European boys. By the early nineteenth centu-
ry the ‘Turkish vice’ became well established in the European public, and travel lit-
erature – that monologue of sexual desire and frustration par excellence – abound-
ed with all kinds of made up, and ‘spiced up,’ stories of sexual slaves.
If we are to believe some of the travelers, the training of young male sexual slaves
was exceptionally cruel, as they were taught to become effeminate and passive in ev-
ery sense of the word. An 1836 account of a boy sold to a Constantinople noble (who
‘employed him […] in his exercises of pleasure’) describes that ‘when the boy re-
sisted or complained, he was beaten with 20 to 50 blows to the feet, hanging head
downwards from a rope. This was done so many days in succession that he could
hardly walk. […] He was also often left in a room without food or water for several
days, to make him compliant’ (Drake, 1992, p. 30).9
Rada is portrayed as pre-sexual; he knows not of sexual pathology, emotional
trauma or psychological torture. His restraint is physical: if he tries to escape, he will
be punished. His experience is articulated through physical sensations only, and the
pain is balanced through his own little quest for genital pleasure. There is no confes-
sion and no moral introspection; Rada simply replies when asked about his life. He
is the perfect subject. His master loves him: the tone of the commands denotes for-
mal authority in the presence of the council, but also familiarity when the two are
alone. The phrase var gött (‘Is there some ass?’) in Turkish indicates the willingness
to participate in something. The root rad that Rada’s name is derived from can in-
deed refer either to work or (with a short a) to willingness. Rada is willing, but he is
also a worker and is paid for his work; sometimes he sings when he works, and this
is his joyful song.
To draw a parallel at this point, we should note that the main difference between
the ‘Greek love’ and the ‘Turkish vice’ was the manipulation of domestic power.
8
It is interesting, if we are to follow the hard line of the Orientalist tradition, that the ancient Persians were
notorious among the ancient Greeks only for being ‘slaves.’ In both cases (ancient ‘slavery’ and modern
‘[homo]sexual slavery’) the fact that practically the same set of social relations existed, or might have
been equally imagined, in the dominant culture of the writer, remained conveniently unmentioned.
9
The Sultan’s dancing boys dressed in girls’ clothes, another institution used often in the West as a flagrant
example of Oriental perverseness (as late as 2003, in Khaled Hosseini’s Kite Runner), survived to this
day as a custom in Asia Minor where young lads called köçekk entertain the guests at wedding banquets
dancing in women’s clothes. See Murray, 1997, p. 24ff;f the medieval illustration on p. 25 shows the type
of skirt that is still used.
34 | Vladimir Bosković
The Greeks, apart from talking their boys into a relationship, had no real power over
them. The desire of the Greek pederasts was by definition laden with frustration: a
boy or his family could at every instant say no, the pressure of sophrosyne (temper-
ance) was incessantly holding in check the lover’s ‘two horses of the soul,’ and even
if everything went as hoped for, a comme-il-faut pederast would never penetrate his
boy’s body. An Ottoman pederast was, on the contrary, a full master and literal pos-
sessorr of his pleasure: he could become one with the object of his desire at any given
point. His will was the only governing force of the harem that simultaneously guar-
anteed the safety and the well-being of his human possessions (see Murray, 1997, p.
14ff). Male sexual slavery was, in other words, the social personification of the di-
lemma of totalitarianism.
If in the figure of Rada’s master we are to see the Foucauldian ‘web of power’
(1988, pp. 92ff), then we can observe the complex nature of the main character’s
loyalties. In the last strophe, the second voice of the song is heard, coming from what
appears to be an ‘objective’ source. It is a persona outside the realm of the Ottomans,
someone speaking from the enlightened (today we would probably say democratic)
world. It plainly identifies Rada with the Nation through an important assonance –
he is addressed as Rade, rode or ‘O Rada, [my] kin,’ like the Greek genos or the Ital-
ian gente. This refers to the kinship of an ‘imagined community,’ but also to its gro-
tesque potential for [re]birth, bearing fruit, and becoming (roditi, Greek gignomai).
Rada is the personification of an enslaved Nation that accepts its humiliating place,
but he is also a representation of a nonexistent, emerging, still-to-be-born Nation
and this state of ‘not-being’ is the remedy for Rada’s humiliation.
Rada belongs to Mehemet, but he belongs to his nation too; and if he does not
act upon the demand for national liberation (and also of European imperialism), he
will be laughed at, finger-pointed, and humiliated in a jest poem for all eternity. In
fact, he cannot belong to two masters, and his position is therefore liminal, he is found
outside his body, his logic is random and useless, and good only to be laughed at.
That is the tragic dimension of Rada’s fate and perhaps the deeper cause of his timor
mortis. The humorous key of the poem is the relief to this anxiety.
The Enlightenment, advertized as the maturity of the human kind and its break
with childhood, poses a threat to the vital interests of a sexual slave: if he becomes
an adult, his master will lose interest in him; he will no longer be protected and
cherished but, instead, will be plunged into uncertainty and danger. By humorous-
ly transforming the Turks from ‘blood-thirsty’ to ‘enlightened,’ this second voice re-
establishes the old order of things (kosmos): Rada can now leave his liminal chaos
the song threw him into and relax in the embrace of his kâhya and his haremlık, en-
joy some nice deserts and fine Turkish dishes; he does not need to grow up, to fight
his non-enlightened oppressors because they are, you see, already enlightened. He
It Could Happen to a Bishop: Three ‘Special’ Songs by Lukijan Mušicki | 35
is allowed to continue his passive acceptance of his slavery; as a member of the ‘en-
lightened’ or ‘civilized’ (the song says ‘Turks are enlightened too’), his masochistic
pleasure of being overly civilized may remain intact.
The last stanza can be seen as a Derridean pharmakon for erasing the past and
rebuilding the present, for bringing in abortion and fertility, both a cure for Rada’s
fear and the magic potion of the fighters for national liberation, a serum that will
make the Turks ‘lenient’ i.e. weak (see Derrida, 1981, p. 95ff). The song is the elixir
of Rada’s eternal youth that will keep the status quo and prevent the Enlightenment
from ruining his happy little world, but also the deadly sting of humor that will re-
main in Rada’s body forever, as well as the sweet drink of Letha that will help the
Nation forget its past in servitude by laughing at it.
10
Doba is used both in the sense of individual age and historical epoch.
36 | Vladimir Bosković
The pussy is the mother and the queen of all mankind. Her power and absolute
domination are a substitution, supplément for the phallocentric order of the world.
She is an energetic, authoritative motor of action; she refuses her role of the object of
male desire. The term translated as ‘humbles’ (upokori, literally ‘subjugates’), how-
ever, leads us back to Foucault’s concept of pouvoirr and reveals the circular nature of
the strategies employed in subverting the dominant discourse: the ‘proud’ [male] is
subjugated, but that still makes him the subjectt of the ode, and the poem is turned in-
to a joyful game of a bishop for his male friends, a discursive titillation for men who,
as always, leave the vagina out of the real business (Foucault, ibid.).
Is this poem really a parody? Damjanov (1988) noticed this ambivalence and
made no effort to further explore it (p. 149). There is really nothing in the poem
that subverts the genre of an ode as such. The language, the tone, the repertoire of
images and rhetorical devices, everything fits into the pattern of an ode. The ode on
‘the valley where the people were born in’ appears as a written, Classicistic Origine
du monde, only some thirty years earlier. The key to this question is, again, the pa-
ratext: the original title – ‘Pussy’ – is marked, it is a diminutive (pica
( , derived from
pička). This hypocoristic is the screw that causes the entire Classicistic construc-
tion to collapse. The Mother of Mankind can be a vagina, but never a pussy. On
the Courbet’s canvas, the realistic treatment of the object aspired to the represen-
tation of the raw Truth; a sublime/-ing Classicistic poem could not withstand even
its smallest amount.
ting married? The clear statement in the second verse – that the company consists
of young lads and girls – excludes this explanation. The overlapping of the names al-
so confuses the reader. Is the Great Cunt, the wife of the best man Crooked Dick,
the same as the one sitting with the twat and the two little pussies? And what about
the gender confusion in the penultimate verse – how can a pussy (is it one of those
two above?) be a brides-man?
The inconsistencies and contradictions in the song reflect the transitional phase
of the discourse on sexuality in a wider European context. It partially conforms to
the genre characteristics of the carnivalesque jest song performed at weddings, but
at the same time it brings on a discourse of clear and distinct genitalia that will have
a bright future in the literature of Europe. The genitals are not yet employed in the
game of numbers; they are not a means for procreation and enlarging of the pro-
ductive population. Instead, they seize the opportunity to take a break and engage
in a relaxed genital chitchat whose topic is not even related to us, and rightly so, be-
cause it is really irrelevant. The gender confusion, on the other hand, by subverting
the traditional role distribution, contributes to the egalitarian gender representa-
tion: the female is not a negation or lack of the male (a tradition that begins in an-
tiquity and finds its modern expression in Freud), it is not standing at the door and
serving the gentlemen; as an equal companion at the table, it is rather proudly sit-
ting among its comrades.
Damjanov (1987) suggested that the ‘fundamental vision of the [Serbian] erot-
ic compositions of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century might be iden-
tified as a grotesque vision of the body’ (p. 12, author’s italic). The bodies indeed are
incomplete, their proportions changed, they stress the lower bodily stratum. There
is, however, no constant death and rebirth, and, most importantly, there is no obses-
sion with primary bodily needs. Unlike the bodies in most of the poems from Vuk’s
collection, these ones do not fornicate, urinate, defecate, swallow and get swallowed;
they just sit and talk. There is also no political agenda at the table: the company gath-
ers to have some fun (see Bakhtin, 1984, esp. pp. 303-367). The only subtly paro-
dying element of the poem is the expression for ‘having fun’ itself (pak( provode šalu)
that bears a strong reminiscence to the formulas of epic poetry – but we already re-
alize that the fixed epic and patriarchal order is subverted. The carnivalesque spirit
the poem depicts does not abolish but expresses and reconfirms the order of power.
As I mentioned above, sex-as-songg appears to stand on the opposite of sex-as-
discourse. In this sense, Mušicki’s songs can be used to advance a counterintuitive
theory of obscenity: one that complicates Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque as
well as Foucault’s notion of sex-as-discourse. Despite all his external conservativ-
ism, Mušicki occupies a place far ahead of his more secular and politically progres-
sive contemporaries, as a forerunner of subversive metanarratives on sexuality that
38 | Vladimir Bosković
would reemerge on the intellectual stage of Europe only in the mid-twentieth century.
His genius was that he, indeed, realized how important it is to be in a nice company.
Already at the first light of dawn Još pri zore prvom svjetu
I light the fire and make it blaze, Staknem oganj i razžarim,
So that I can make mocha coffee Da ćeaji Mehemetu
For Mehemet the kâhya.11 Baš iz Moke kavu varim.
“Ver göt,13 Rada!” when he says, ’Var đot, Rade!’ kad mi rekne,
Instantly I bend over for him, Odma mu se ja navernem,
I genuflect, and he kneels down behind me, Kleknem, za mnom i on klekne,
He holds on to me so I don’t stumble. Ščepa me da ne posrnem.
11
Ottoman officer, local administrator.
12
Ottoman titles, members of kâhya’s cabinet.
13
‘Give ass!’ (Turkish in the original, var đot).
It Could Happen to a Bishop: Three ‘Special’ Songs by Lukijan Mušicki | 39
If some other of the women calls for me, Zazove l’ me druga bula,
An odalisque16 or a kadın, Odaliska ili kade,
I’d be a bastard and a scoundrel Bio b’ kurvin sin i hula
Not to accept what is being offered. Da ne primim čto mi s’ dade.
‘Oh, don’t worry, Rada, my kin, „O, ne boj se, Rade, rode,
Turks are enlightened too, I Turci su prosvješteni,
For they fornicate with slaves, S robljem jer se oni svode,
And they are lenient to their wives.’ A kroz prste glede ženi!
14
Ottoman coins, mints.
15
Wife.
16
Concubine.
40 | Vladimir Bosković
She sweetens all our worries and sorrows, Sve nam brige, tuge sladi,
She is a whirlpool and a vessel of joy; Radosti je vertlog, čaša;
Old and young like her, Miluju nju stari, mladi,
And all our brothers. Sva i proča braća naša.
Pussy dwells wherever she pleases, Pica, gdi god hoće, bavi,
And wherever she wants, she brings fortune; A gdi hoće, oskrobljava;
She is the reason for the greatest glory, Najvećoj je povod slavi,
She governs the potentates. Velmožami upravljava
Jason suffered many things for her – Jason tušta zbog nje podneo —
Having sailed over the briny sea More sinje prebrodivši,
Because of her he achieved his victory Pobjedu je rad nje odneo
Having cheated both the daughter and the Kćer i cara prevarivši.
emperor.
Blagorodni, svi gledajte
Gentlemen, take a look, all of you Brucavu i rujnu picu,
At a shaggy and rosy pussy, Pak ju sebi predstavljajte
And present her to yourself Ljudskog roda k’o rodicu.
As the great mother of all mankind.
Car, vojnici, poglavari,
Emperor, soldiers and rulers, Pa po zemlji svi čto hodu,
All those who walk the earth, Veličaju toj u stvari
Rejoice in this very thing Dol iz kog se ljudi rodu.
The valley where humans were born from.
REFERENCES:
Bakhtin, M. (1984). Rabelais and his World. (H. Iswolsky, Trans.). Bloomington:
Indiana University Press. (Original work published 1965).
Bovan, V. (1991). Yugoslav Oral Lyric, Primarily in Serbo-Croatian. Oral Tradition,
6 (2-3), pp. 148-173. Retrieved from http://journal.oraltradition.org/files/
articles/6ii-iii/5_bovan.pdf.f
Damjanov, S. (Ed.). (1987). Graždanski erotikon. Erotske pesme i poskočice u srpskoj
književnosti XVIII i početka XIX veka [Bourgeois Eroticon. Erotic Songs in the
Serbian Literature of the 18th Century]. Niš: Gradina.
———. (1988). Tri erotske pesme Lukijana Mušickog u Vukovoj zaostavštini [Three
Erotic Poems by Lukijan Mušicki in Vuk’s Archives]. In Tomislav Bjekić et al.
(Eds.). Srpsko građansko pesništvo: ogledi i studije (pp. 141-152). Novi Sad: Matica
srpska.
Derrida, J. (1981). Dissemination. (B. Johnson, Trans.). Chicago: University Press.
(Original work published in 1972).
Drake, J. (1992). ‘Le Vice’ in Turkey. In Dynes, W. R. & Donaldson, S. (Eds.) Asian
Homosexuality (pp. 27-43). New York & London: Garland.
Foucault, M. (1988). History of Sexuality. (Vol. 1). An Introduction. (R. Hurley,
Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published in 1976).
Georgijević, B. (1553). De Turcarum moribus epitome. Lyon: Jean de Tournes.
Available at http://nrs. harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.EEBON_
batch:ocm12046653e.
Karanović, Z. (1988). Pesme Lukijana Mušickog u rukopisnim pesmaricama XIX
veka [The Songs of L. M. in the Manuscript Songbooks of the 19th Century]. In
T. Bjekić et al. (Eds.). Srpsko građansko pesništvo: ogledi i studije (pp. 124-140).
Novi Sad: Matica srpska.
Mladenović, Ž., & Nedić, V. (Eds.). (1974). Srpske narodne pesme iz neobjavljenih
rukopisa Vuka Stefanovića Karadžića [Folk Songs from the Unpublished
Manuscripts of V. S. K.], (Vol. 1). Osobite pjesme i poskočice. Beograd: SANU.
Mladenović, Ž. (1973). Rukopisi narodnih pesama Vukove zbirkе i njihovo izdavanje
[The Manuscripts of the Folk Songs from Vuk’s Collection and Their Publishing].
Beograd: SANU.
Murray, S. O. (1997). The Will Not to Know. In S. O. Murray & W. Roscoe (Eds.).
Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature (pp. 14-54). New York:
New York University Press.
Zumthor, P. (1990). Oral Poetry: An Introduction. (K. Murphy-Judy, Trans.).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published in 1983).
It Could Happen to a Bishop: Three ‘Special’ Songs by Lukijan Mušicki | 43
Владимир Бошковић
Сажетак: У збирци опсцених српских народних песама објављених под именом Ву-
ка Стефановића Караџића 1974. године и насловљеној Особите пјесме и поскочице, упа-
дљив је допринос Лукијана Мушицког, уваженог песника учених ода и владике Српске
православне цркве. Мушицки је Вуку послао најмање 45 ласцивних усмених народних
песама. У овом раду бавим се трима песмама забележеним под именом Мушицког – ко-
је је он сам можда и саставио – и истражујем њихов историјски садржај користећи се те-
оретским оквирима теорије усмености, Фукоовим дискурсом сексуалности, и Бахтино-
вом дискусијом о карневалескном. Моја је теза да ове песме, осим што испитују сам појам
ауторства, такође доводе у питање неке од утврђених појмова у вези са појавом дискур-
са сексуалности у модерно доба.
Кључне речи: Лукијан Мушицки, Вук Стефановић Караџић, народна књижевност,
сексуалност, карневалескно, ласцивне песме, хомосексуалност, оријентализам, српска
књижевност
UDC 930.85(497.1:430)
Оригинални научни рад
Др Габријела Шуберт1
Универзитет „Фридрих Шилер” у Јени
Институт за славистику
Немачка
1
g schubert@uni-jena.de (Gabriella Schubert, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Institute of Slavic
g.
Studies, Germany)
46 | Габријела Шуберт
2
Gesemann, Gerhard: Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 1. Die russische Literatur, 2. Südslavische
Volksdichtung. Neuried 1981: 397. Њемачки цитати су у овом прилогу преведени од стране ауторке.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 47
Геземан у Београду
Геземанова одлука да након доктората студира славистику у Србији, није на-
ишла на одобрење његових професора; савјетовали су му да то не ради пошто ће
имати велике проблеме са Србима. Али Геземан се није поколебао у својој одлу-
ци и 1914. долази у Србију да би студирајући радио и као наставник њемачког
језика у Првој мушкој београдској гимназији.
„Духовни трагови Хердера, Грима, Гетеа и Ранкеа“, тако почиње Геземанов
син Волфганг свој коментар о боравку свог оца у Србији, „одвели су мог оца на
3
Gesemann, Gerhard: Helden, Hirten und Hajduken: montenegrinische Volksgeschichten. München
1935: 135.
4
Brown Mason, John (1936): „[Рецензија] Der montenegrinische Mensch“. American Sociological
Review vol. 1, No. 4/1936: 690–691, овдје 691.
48 | Габријела Шуберт
„Нисам умео још ниједно реченицу да саставим правилно српски. Знао сам
промене именица и глагола и осим тога неколико стотина српских десете-
раца напамет, али са ‚Мили боже, чуда великога! Вино пије Краљивићу Мар-
ко, рано пије у свету недјељу...‘ нисам се могао појавити пред ученицима.“6
Бјежанија
Своје мучне ратне доживљаје описује у својој књизи „Die Flucht. Aus einem
serbischen Tagebuch 1915 und 1916“ која је изашла 1935. године у Минхену и
1984. године у Бегораду у пријеводу Радослава Меденице под насловом „Са срп-
ском војском кроз Албанију 1915-1916.“.7 Књига је посвијећена Јовану Цвијићу,
човеку, коме – као Геземан пише
5
Gesemann, Gerhard: Germanoslavica: Geschichten aus dem Hinterhalt: 5 balkanische und eine Prager
Novelle aus dem Nachlaß; Kommentar, Lebensabriß und Schriftenverzeichnis erstellt von Wolfgang
Gesemann. Frankfurt a.M. [u.a.] 1979: 111.
6
Геземан, Герхард: Са српском војском кроз Албанију 1915-1916. Београд 1984: 39. Напомена: Ци-
тати из ове књиге преузети у оригиналу, у екавици.
7
Геземан, Герхард: Са српском војском кроз Албанију 1915-1916. Београд 1984: 39. Напомена: Ци-
тати из ове књиге преузети у оригиналу, у екавици.
8
Исто: 108.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 49
„Према Подгорици воде од Пећи два пута. Један иде долином северно од
Проклетија преко варошица Плава и Гусиња. Али Арбанаси из Пећи упо-
зоравају нас на опасност од њихове тамошње сабраће. Кажу да су опаки ра-
збојници и велико непријатељи Срба. Остаје нам, дакле, само пут преко
планине и кроз Руговску клисуру према варошици Андријевици. Пут је ве-
ома тежак али води преко чисто црногорске територије, тако да смо сигур-
ни од препада.“10
9
Исто: 78.
10
Исто: 101-102.
50 | Габријела Шуберт
стављену тему као што је политичка ситуација у Србији или у Њемачкој. Неке
потресне пјесме су Геземана дирнуле до суза. Пише:
Код Црногораца
Када су у повлачењу стигли иза моста код Ћаковице их су примили црно-
горски полицајци који су избјеглицама набављали смјештај и распоређали их на
различите породице и јавне зграде. Њихова организација, „ред и дисциплина“, с
обзиром на непрекинуту ријеку избеглица, задивљује Геземана; пише:
„Сада се осећам збринут, сада сам код куће, сад сам ја у Пруској.“13
11
Gesemann, Gerhard: Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 1. Die russische Literatur, 2. Südslavische
Volksdichtung. Neuried 1981: 230.
12
Геземан, Герхард: Са српском војском ...: 93.
13
Исто: 89.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 51
„да ће нас поучити наша судбина и да ћемо бити стрпљиви у нашим патња-
ма и сачувати нашу наду, и да нас непријатељи, ако стигну овамо, неће пре-
дати Арнаутима за освету, него да нас оставе на нашим огњиштима, …“14
У Андријевици
Успињање Геземана и његовог сапутника пријеко планине, затим кроз Ру-
говску клисуру према варошици Андријевици почело је 26. новембра 1915.
године. Пут је био веома тежак али у исто вријеме и интересантан јер се овђе
налазе гробови старосрпских угодника: Арсенија I, Саве II, Никодима, Јоани-
кија II, Јефрема, Спиридона, Саве IV, а поред њих у другој цркви Саве III, ха-
гиографа Данила па и Јевстатија и патријарха Макарија, брата везира Мехме-
да Соколовића.
Тада су Геземан и Ђерић преноћили у једној кућици црногорског резерв-
ног офизира. Сједећи у једном ћошку, Геземан пише:
„Ни пун сат ме хладноћа није пустила да спавам. Напољу је снег падао це-
лу ноћ.“
14
Исто: 92-93.
15
Исто.
52 | Габријела Шуберт
„умор ме свлада; тако је необично слатко лежати уморан у снегу, кад свест
почиње да се губи као каква далека музика. Бели покривач се приљуби уз
читаво тело, на прагу између јаве и сна јављају се пријатне слике: јелове шу-
ме и зелене ливаде, неколико мрких крава на потоку ...“.16
На крају стижу у село Велику. Одатле иду даље у Андрејевицу. Тамо су Ге-
земана упутили у једну гостионицу гђе
„влада једна висока строга жена тамне пути, око четрдесет јој је година. Но-
си прикладну црногорску женски ношњу; корача достојанствено као каква
краљица, главу држи као да носи свети путир на црним тешким витицама
сплетеним у венац и умотаним око црвене капице. “17
„Није довољно да је некој жени срце пуно јада да би свој доживљени бол мо-
гла непосредно и да уобличи у ову потресну ритмику, не, и јадиковање се
мора учити, учити као и певање јуначких песама. ... и то је заиста страшна,
спартанска помисао: да се и у јадиковању мора имати искуства.“19
16
Исто: 106.
17
Исто: 107.
18
Исто: 108.
19
Исто: 108-109.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 53
„Ђаба вам тај ваш свети Петар из Рима! Наш свети Петар је и моћнији не-
го онај римски. Римски се три пута одрекао Господа а наш свети Петар ни-
једном. Зато је три пута светији од њега. А моћнији? Сигурно је и моћнији.
Јесте ли читали или у цркви слушали да је римски Петар могао да проклиње!
Не. Ето вам! Наш свети Петар је могао да прокуне и његове клетве се још и
данас испуњавају на унуцима и потомцима.“21
Геземан који је само знао за Римског Светог Петра био је зачуђен и замо-
лио је присутне да му све објашњавају у вези са Светим Петром односно вла-
диком Петром I. Опширно пише о заслугама тог светог црногорског владара
за измирење црногорских племена и о вјеровању људи у његове чаробне, магиј-
ске способности које су имали више дјејства него судско кажњавање. Примећу-
је међутим и скептицизам младих према овом вјеровању. Цитира једног младог
Црногорца који каже:
20
Исто.
21
Исто: 112.
54 | Габријела Шуберт
„„Ја мислим да су Марко Краљевић и Милош Обилић више свеци него ка-
кви Захарији и Макарији, нарочито Милош, који је умро као мученик, као и
кнез Лазар. У сваком случају они су ми милији него Свети Петар у Риму.“22
У Подгорици
Фијакерима Геземана и његовог друга су возили из Лијеве Реке у Подгори-
цу. Тамо су се најпрво смјестили у хотелу „Европа“. Да преодоле своју доколи-
цу, посjетили стари римски град Дукљу, град који је назван према цару Дукли-
јану односно Диоклецијану. Овђе се налазе рушевине палате цара Дуклијана
који се ту родио и према ријечима једне старе жене која је међу рушевинама чу-
вала своје овце,
„после смрти открио шта је заправо био: демон који је за свога људског жи-
вота наступао у обличју цара.“23
Ђерић додаје на то да Дуклијан није био било какав демон него сâм сатана,
господар мрака, непријатељ бога свијетлости. И пита Геземана: „Па ваљда се се-
ћате шта о њему стоји у Вуковом Рјечнику?“24 Геземан каже шта је прочитао код
Вука а Ђерић му на то узвраћа:
„Да, свога Вука носите у глави, али још не погађате краткоузлазни акценат
на имену Дуклијан. Мораћемо још да увежбавамо српске акценте.“25
22
Исто.
23
Исто: 119.
24
Исто.
25
Исто: 120.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 55
ље, сједи на камену испред једне црквице у византијском стилу, држи свјеску
на кољену и пише. Ситуација избјеглица је постала све драматичнија: Битољ и
Призрен су пали, њемачки генерал-фелдмаршал Макензен је телеграфисао да
је поход против Србије завршен. Бугари се налазе у Дечанима, а Аустријанци
северно од Андријевице. Њихови напади на Ловћен су још узалудни али цр-
ногорска влада је већ спремна за одлазак. Избјеглице морају да још даље оста-
ну у Подгорици пошто су стигле ужасне вести о мукама и невољама оних ко-
ји су са војском ишли кроз Албанију: причају о препадима Албанаца из засједе
на војнике и избјеглице, ноћно пљачкање мртвих тјелеса, отимање жена, дево-
јака и дјеце.
О Краљу Николи
У слиједећем одломку Геземан извештава о његовом сусрету са Краљем Ни-
колом који га је дубоко импресионирао и у исто вријеме разочарао; пише:
Описује га као
„А ви, моји Црногорци, народе мојих црних брда, знајте: ако можда и бу-
дем приморан а своју столицу премештам из старог завичаја, са једног брда
26
Исто: 124.
27
Исто.
56 | Габријела Шуберт
на друго, остаћу међу вама и моје очи ће бдити над вама и вашим јуначким
борбама, моји сиви соколови...“28
Геземан његовом цитату додаје: „Не знам шта је још све причао. Сузе су
нам навирале у очи.“29
О Горском вијенцу
Да не би потпуно пропао под мучним условима збијега или, као што се де-
шавало другим избјеглицама, сишао с ума, Геземан у Подгорици купује Горски
вијенац Петра II. Петровића Његоша и забавља се са текстом на сунцу, испод
једног чемпреса. Ђерић му је на најљепшим мјестима чак исписао акценте. Чи-
тање Његошевих стихова му је било нека врста хране у једној граничној ситуа-
цији кад је већ осећао почетак логорске болести, надокнадило му је губитак сна-
га које су се сваким новим даном све више умањивали а биле су му потребне за
даљи пут. Пажљиво чита Горски вијенац; жели да у тим мудростима пронаеђе
снагу за пут, прије свега у оним стиховима који га у његовом тешком избјеглич-
ком стању посебно дотичу.
У његовом извештају цитира у њемачком пријеводу „неколико изрека из би-
блије хероизма, мало животворног пића из овог вијенца гора“ као на пример
28
Исто: 125
29
Исто.
30
Исто: 127.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 57
„као први готово већ световни владалац, ископао гроб самовољи и партику-
ларизму племена, али им и испевао погребну песму. И какву песму! У стиху
и стилу народне епске песме – али није еп; разговори и дијалози јунака, ту-
робна кола народа као трагични хорови – али није драма. Једноставно ре-
чено: класични, национални спев Срба као што је Вилхелм Тел Швајцараца;
као ни Тел, ни Горски вијенац није историја него предање, дакле, осмишља-
вање историје, и зато истинитији од сваке историје: Бартоломејска ноћ пре
две стотине година која је ова брда очистила од потурчењака. ...“31
„без муке се пјесна не испоја“ значи да без јуначке невоље не би било ни ју-
начке пјесме и нема потребе да се кује ваљана сабља ако човјека не прити-
скује јуначка нужда. Правилно објашњава исто тако стих „„Јунаштво је цар
зла свакојега“ који је у прошлости од многих погријешно тумачено у смислу
да је „јунаштво велико зло“33. Геземан правилно указује на то да јунаштво
31
Исто.
32
Исто.
33
Тако између осталих Стјепан Митров Љубиша, 1868. године и Јохан Кирсте, 1886. године као
и Милан Решетар 1890. године. Послије појаве Кирстеовог пријевода је Светислав Вуловић први
кориговао ову интерпретацију. Указао је на то да је значење тог стиха заправо супротно односно
да је јунаштво је та висока врлина која упркос свим незгодама побијеђује. Уп. Његош, Петар Пе-
тровић: Горски вијенац/Луча Микрокозман. Белешке и објашњења, написао Видо Латковић. Бео-
град 1975: 223. (Целокупна дела Петра II. Петровића Његоша IV. изд., књ. трећа).
58 | Габријела Шуберт
34
Слично је велики римски пјесник Хорације мислио о свом пјесништву кад је у његовој оди III
30,1 писао: на своје пјесничко дијело кад је писао „Подигао сам споменик трајнији од бронзе (лат.
Exegi monumentum aere perennius) и тиме ће послије његове смрти ипак нешто преживјети, неће
сав умријети (лат. Non omnis moriar)”.
35
Геземан, Герхард: Са српском војском ...: 130.
36
Исто.
У бијегу преко Црне Горе: Герхард Геземан о Црној Гори,
Светом Петру Цетињском, краљу Николи и Горском вијенцу | 59
Геземан закључује: „сав овај живот, сва ова природа остају несхватљиви. Сун-
це час гаји живот на земљи, час спржи оно што је јуче гајило:..“38
Филозофско промишљање и навођење стихова провлачи се кроз цео Гезе-
манов опис збега. Дубоко осећа њихов срж и спаја их са сопственом патњом и
патњом српске војске. Објашњавајући речи Игумана Стефана, описује и своју
ситуацију; пише:
„Како год било, човек има само две дужности: да брани своју физичку и сво-
ју моралну егзистенцију. ... Једино што човек има у овом туробном животу
јесте: часно име. Ако то стекне, имао се рашта родити.“39
„Славно мрите, кад мријет морате! / Ваш ће примјер учити пјевача / Како
треба с бесмртношћу зборит“
са задивљујућим исказом:
ЛИТЕРАТУРА:
37
Исто: 131.
38
Исто: 132.
39
Исто.
40
Исто.
60 | Габријела Шуберт
Gabriella Schubert
Др Марина В. Йорданова1
Университет „Проф. д-р Асен Златаров” – Бургас
Катедра „Български език и литература”
България
1
m_vladeva@mail.bgg (Marina V. Yordanova, University “Prof.f Dr. Asen Zlatarov” – Burgas, Department
of Bulgarian language and literature, Bulgaria)
62 | Марина В. Йорданова
2
Изследвайки етнографските особености на Балканите, макар и воден от, до голяма степен, поли-
тически цели, Йован Цвиич също очертава различни балкански типове (динарски, централен, па-
нонски и източнобалкански със съответните подвидове), принудени да съжителстват на една сил-
Емилиян Станев и Иво Андрич: срещи в прочита | 65
вествува хрониката. Те, заедно с песните, продуцират памет, тъй като идват от
правремето на колектива, от пред-писмения период на неговото съществуване.
Именно песента на гусларя за славни битки в отминали времена тласка Радисав
към личен подвиг; в името на правото си на песен, момъкът Миле губи главата
си. И тъй като в текста-Андрич винаги присъстват различните гледни точки към
едно и също явление (на християни, мюсюлмани, а понякога на католици, пра-
вославни и евреи), легендите често съществуват в няколко различни варианта.
Фолклорното у Андрич присъства на различни равнища на текста – в начина на
организиране на художествения материал, като белег на времето и особености-
те на мисленето и т.н. От разказа за Стари Новак и Груица детенце, през песни-
те на гуслари, които провокират съпротивата и подстрекават към бунт или на-
помнят за проклятието на красотата (песента за Фата), през митологемите за
кръстната смърт и за мостовете като крила на ангели, фолклорно-митологич-
ният пласт е високо фреквентен в повествователната стратегия на Андрич. То-
зи пласт е по-малко релевантен в текста-Станев, но съществува. Разчитаме го в
личното време на Еньо-Теофил, ритуално организирано от религиозните праз-
ници; в начина, по който конструира своите любовни стихове, в митологеми-
те за Йов и Еремиевия плач, в приказката за ламята, в народопсихологията на
балканобългарския човек „що живееше със земята и добитъка, с юди, самови-
ли, орисници и змейове, а пазеше и Исус в сърцето си”.
Междутекстовите съотнасяния, касаещи „Антихрист” и „Мостът на Дри-
на”, могат да бъдат продължени и по линия на символите с изоморфен характер
– мрак и тишина, а също и чрез анализиране на общия мотив „заиграване с дя-
вола”. Босненската тишина, която оплита духа и сковава всеки човешки порив, в
„Антихрист” е семантично равна на смълчаното равнодушно небе, което не може
да бъде отговор. Балканите като топос на отрицанието, мрака и копнежно-стра-
дащата човешка природа предопределят амбивалентния характер на всичко съ-
ществуващо тук. Личността се стреми към свобода, а се бои от отговорността
към себе си, която идва с нея. Устремен напред, човек усеща онези непреодоле-
ни връзки с миналото, от които не може да се освободи („Дяволът понудва ду-
шата, пречи й да вдигне тъмното було на непребродни векове” – „Антихрист”;
„Всичко останало бе потискано в онова мрачно подсъзнание, гдето живеят и
прекипяват основните чувства и неунищожимите вярвания на различните ра-
си, религии и касти, и тук, привидно мъртви и погребани, се готвят за по-късни,
далечни времена на неочаквани промени и катастрофи” – „Мостът на Дрина”).
На Балканите едновременно съжителстват хора от различни епохи, които
говорят различни езици и превръщат всеки опит за построяването на новото об-
що битие в онтологичния хаос на следваща Вавилонска кула. „Търсещ разумен
бог и подигран от дявола”, Еньо осъзнава, че „няма мъдрост по-силна от съд-
70 | Марина В. Йорданова
допир”. Защото Джем не може да живее иначе, освен като султан. Сибин не мо-
же да бъде нищо по-малко от княз. А истината е непостижима и многоизмерна
като човешкия порив към справедливост.
Разсъждавайки за измеренията на свободата и за пътищата към нея, Станев
и Андрич създават сходни модели на репресивната власт (която е нейно отри-
цание) и я въплъщават в герои-концепти. Срещу света на идеите (Сибин, Джем,
Кямил) се изправя материално-зримият и физически свят на насилието, което
иска да подчини човека, да го обезличи и унифицира (Карагьоз, Тихик). Първото
оръжие от арсенала на властта е забраната за свободно говорене. Затова Сибин
няма да бъде изслушан от еретиците нито веднъж, а в прокълнатия двор ще се
възцарява мълчанието всеки път, когато ненадейно се появи надзирателят. Един-
ствено Хаим се осмелява да наруши тишината със свои хипотези за индивидуал-
ните съдби, но той е обречен на постоянно страдание именно от думите, които
не може да не изрече. Думите са неговото наказание. И османската власт, и та-
зи над еретиците тръгва от идеята, че всеки е по презумпция виновен/грешен
и заслужава строго наказание (Карагьоз: „Никой само да не ми казва за някого:
невинен е. Само това не.”; „Брат Тихик обявил, че всички земни човешки посе-
ления, в които има господари и слуги, и всички невярващи в учението са врагове
на бога и на истинските християни е позволено да ги изтребват”). Така битката
срещу престъплението/порока се превръща в битка срещу самия човек. В стре-
межа на властника (Карагьоз, Тихик) да познае, да открие на всяка цена поро-
ка и да го притисне в ъгъла на изкуплението, този порок всъщност се превръща
в собствен, защото никой не може да се спаси чрез взиране в греха. В демонич-
ната игра на Карагьоз и в ритуалното преобличане на Тихик се крие желанието
за бягство от собствената човешкост. Те се срещат в точката на недоверието в
човека, което издава и усъмняването в себе си, защото също са хора. Разпитът/
изповедта трябва да осигурят самоизобличението чрез признание и да успоко-
ят все още тлеещата съвест на човека, който се храни с чужди вини. Но у Кара-
гьоз не е умрял напълно споменът за собственото вчера, когато сам е извървял
пътя на падението, а у Тихик е твърде буден робът, приучен да изпълнява чужди-
те повели и така да се спасява от отговорностите на личния избор. Между света
на господаря (човека, облечен с власт) и този на роба (затворения, подчинения
на чуждата воля) не може да има споразумение и така у Андрич и Станев дейст-
вителността отново се раздвоява. Насилието се превръща в средство за спасе-
ние, а това компрометира самия смисъл на спасението.
И в двата текста словото задава перспективите на нови светове, оформяй-
ки надредна действителност, но често остава неразбрано и само. Това се случва
с новата догма на Силвестър, който също идва не навреме да прогласи освобож-
даването на човека от всички богове. Случва се и с опитът на Кямил да възкре-
74 | Марина В. Йорданова
гото злото влиза в света. Личната митология, която със заплаха и сила Тихик и
Омер изграждат около себе си, ще се пропуква от камшичните удари на пробу-
дените за мъст човешки съзнания. Ръката, издигната за удар или проклятие вър-
ху чуждото его и мисъл, ще се стовари със страшна сила върху самите тях, за да
ги заличи от светлите страници на националната и/или лична история. Омер –
„онзи, който немари нито за душата, нито за бога, нито за вярата” – рано или
късно ще изчезне, подобно на Тихик, в огъня на подклаждания от самия него
ненужен бунт. И Омер, и Тихик са своего рода предатели (към вярата, към кня-
за, към ортодокса), които правят първата крачка към отстъплението, предавай-
ки себе си. Ренегатът, който се прекръства, и еретикът, който с поглед към бога
убива себеподобни, се превръщат в обемни символи на изгнаници, абдикирали
от самите себе си. Бягайки от онова, което са, в опит да се приближат до онова,
което трябва да бъдат, те изгарят зад себе си всички мостове. И бившият роб,
и бившият християнин ще осъзнаят, че всяка власт носи в себе си кълновете на
моралния и духовен разврат, и че на всяко място и във всяко време „невидимата
болест” на миналите грехове ще ги отделя от перспективите на новото им днес.
В двете произведения писателите не разгръщат крупни епически картини,
а акцентират върху индивидуалната съдба, достигайки до обобщения, надхвър-
лящи конкретното историческо време – Средновековието или средата на ХІХ
век. Посредством своите герои-творци, принадлежащи на други духовни епохи,
те дебатират за мястото на изкуството в една свръх-материална действителност.
Търсейки корена на злото, Андрич и Станев достигат до дълбините на двойстве-
ната човешка същност, за да покажат, че страхът отдалечава покаянието. „Омер
паша Латас” и „Тихик и Назарий” са художествени трактати върху проблемите
за ренегатството, подменената, но непобедена самоличност, и гибелните после-
дици от издигането на всяка догма над човека, комуто трябва да служи. И в два-
та текста догмата е персонифицирана и, макар че е насочена към множеството,
тя е прицелена и в личността на твореца. Така в средата на 70-те, в условията на
тоталитарна култура, чрез фигурата на твореца Ем. Станев и И. Андрич отпра-
вят своето предупреждение, че узурпирането на изкуството взривява догмата
отвътре, дори когато се преструва, че й служи...
Притиснатият от историческите катаклизми човек, живеещ тук, на Балкани-
те, който трябва да премине през личната революция, за да осъществи общест-
вената и социалната такава, е герой в романите „Травнишка хроника” и „Иван
Кондарев”. Високият полемичен заряд, познат от Емилян-Станевия роман, е на-
личен, макар и в по-редуцирана форма, и в хрониката на Андрич. Диалогът, де-
батът, различните – понякога противоположни – гледни точки се изразяват от
Давил и Дефосе. Тезата за полифоничността на хрониката е развита от Биляна
Чирич, според която консулът и неговият помощник въплъщават два времеви
Емилиян Станев и Иво Андрич: срещи в прочита | 79
отрязъка и така „романът на Андрич може да бъде четен през призмата на но-
вия историзъм най-вече заради различните перспективи и противопоставящите
се едни на други гласове (субверсивни и репресивни), на които е предоставено
място и е създадена възможност да се изприкажат, без да се слеят в една моно-
литна тенденция”(Ћирић 2013: 265). С първоначалното си заглавие „Хроника
на един град” романът на Станев се доближава до жанровия класификатор, за-
ложен в произведението на Андрич. И въпреки, че наименованието „Иван Кон-
дарев” натежава по посока на моноромана, това е творба за много съдби, при-
надлежащи на вулканичното и нестабилно обществено-политическо време от
първите десетилетия на българския ХХ век. „Травнишка хроника” отпраща към
консулските времена в началото на ХІХ, но въпреки различните темпорални рам-
ки, и двата текста разказват за рикошета на големите исторически драми върху
личната трагедия на обикновения човек. В романите той е представен до голя-
ма степен като продукт на историческите обстоятелства, като жертва на соци-
алната и духовна среда, в която се оформя не само индивидуалната личност, но
и етноса. Свидетелство за това са думите на следователя към Кондарев: „Може
би главната беда е, че сте българин и живеете в такова градче като нашето. В Ев-
ропа – аз преди войната съм бил там – бихте намерили спокойствие на духа си”.
В „Травнишка хроника”, чрез думите на Дефосе, Андрич изразява сходна фило-
софия: „/.../ и злобата, и добрината на един народ са продукт на условията, при
които той живее и се развива”. Създавайки романи за „нещастието на един на-
род”, писателите всъщност разказват и за личното страдание на своите персона-
жи. Именно перманентната ситуация на война и на застрашеност, на неизбеж-
ни политически и социални сътресения, отделят с рязка граница две поколения,
така щото бащите и синовете взаимно не могат да се разберат (Давил – Дефосе,
Кольо Рачика и баща му, Кондарев – Георгиев).
Независимо дали живее в Травник или в град К., нито един персонаж не мо-
же да се скрие от пороя на историята, от конвулсивното кълбо на променливите
събития, които разрушават всяка относителна устойчивост. Разделената на че-
тири вери и етноси Босна и нажеженото от политически страсти българско об-
щество, в което властва разноезичието, са мишена на динамичния исторически
вихър. Двамата южнославянски белетристи разсъждават над причините за чо-
вешката разединеност и ги откриват в религиозните, социални, политически и
културни различия между хората. И в тези романи присъстват герои изостана-
ли от своето време (Давил, Костадин Джупунов) и такива, комуто то принад-
лежи (Кондарев, Дефосе, фон Паулич). Макар че в очите на травнишките бе-
йове Давил е носител на новото, на неизменния ход на историческия процес,
който ще промени статуквото, консулът всъщност е уморен човек, преситен от
катаклизмите, сполетели цяло едно поколение. Кралството, Революцията и Им-
80 | Марина В. Йорданова
ЛИТЕРАТУРА
Андрич, Иво. Мостът на Дрина. С., 1964 (Ivo Andrich. Mostyt na Drina., 1964).
Андрич, Иво. Прокълнатият двор. С., 1976 (Ivo Andrich. Prokylnatiyat dvor.,
1976).
Андрич, Иво. Травнишка хроника. С., 1977 (Ivo Andrich. Travnishka hronika.,
1977).
Андрич, Иво. Омер паша Латас. С., 1982 (Ivo Andrich. Omer pasha Latas., 1982).
Андрич, Иво. Безсъници. С., 1983 (Ivo Andrich. Bezsynici., 1983).
Игов, Светлозар. Иво Андрич. Творческо развитие и художествена структу-
ра. С., 1992 (Igov, Svetlozar. Ivo Andrich. Tvorchesko razvitie i hudozhestvena
struktura., 1992).
Ничев, Боян. Основи на сравнителното литературознание. С., 1988 (Nichev,
Boyan. Osnovi na sravnitelnoto literaturoznanie., 1988).
Сарандев, Иван. Емилиян Станев: Литературни анкети. С., 2007 (Sarandev,
Ivan. Emiliyan Stanev: Literaturni anketi., 2007).
Станев, Емилиян. Антихрист. С., изд. „Ведрина”, год. на издаване не е посоче-
на (Stanev, Emiliyan. Antihrist)
Станев, Емилиян. Събрани съчинения в шест тома. Т. ІV. Иван Кондарев. С.,
1982 (Stanev, Emiliyan. Sabrani sychineniya v shest toma. T. ІV. Ivan Kondarev.,
1982).
Станев, Емилиян. Събрани съчинения в шест тома. Т. V. Иван Кондарев. С.,
1982 (Stanev, Emiliyan. Sabrani sychineniya v shest toma. T. V. Ivan Kondarev.,
1982).
Станев, Емилиян. Събрани съчинения в шест тома. Т. VІ. Легенда за Сибин,
преславския княз. Тихик и Назарий. Антихрист. С., 1986 (Stanev, Emiliyan.
Sabrani sychineniya v shest toma. T. VI. Tihik i Nazary. Antihrist, 1986).
ЋириЋ,Билјана. Травничка хроника Иве Андрића као место сустрета садашњо-
сти и прошлости. – В: Време и пространство в културата на българи и сър-
би/Време и простор у култури бугара и срба. Варна, 2013 (Biljana Chirich.
Travnichka hronika Ive Andricha kao mesto susreta sadashnjosti i proshlosti. U:
Vreme i prostranstvo v kulturata na bylgari i syrbi. Vreme i prostor u kulturi bugara
i srba. 2013).
Фрай, Нортръп. Великият код. Библията и литературата. С., 1993 (Fray, Nortryp.
Velikiyat kod. Bibliyata I literaturata, 1993).
Емилиян Станев и Иво Андрич: срещи в прочита | 85
Marina V. Yordanova
Dr Maroš Melichárek1
Pavol Jozef Šafárik University (Košice)
Faculty of Arts
Department of History
Slovakia
Europe has been challenged with the waves of migrations recently, but such a
phenomenon is not a newborn aspect of European identity and history.2 However,
1
melicharekmaros@gmail.com
2
As a historian and expert on migration processes writes Klaus Bade: „Since exists Homo sapiens exists Ho-
mo migrant too, migration is such a natural part of human existence as birth, reproduction, illness or deathť.“
ť
BADE, Klaus: Migration in European History. Oxford 2008, s. IX.
88 | Maroš Melichárek
it was the Balkans - the region which due to Ottoman expansion and its revision suf-
fered numerous migrations (voluntary and involuntary) and relocations (frequently
forced) of its inhabitants. The results of such a policy was a constant need to revenge,
we mean Balkan nations wanted to revenge on Turks and vice versa. Such phenome-
non is clearly visible in the course of 19th century (Russo-Turkish wars, Berlin con-
gress, shaping of modern Balkan states), but it has roots in older periods. In June
1690, as a result of Great Turkish War, 30 to 40,000 Serbs gathered near Belgrade led
by the patriarch Arsenije III. Čarnojević to seek refuge in Hungary. This is called the
Great Migration or in Serbian Velika seoba Srba (Великa сеобa Срба), the main area
to settle for Serbs was current territory of Vojvodina, but they were moving also to
present day Hungary and Romania.3 The most important centres were Szentendre,
Buda, Mohács, Pécs, Szeged, Baja, Tokaj, Oradea, Debrecen, Kecskemet, Satmár.
During several stages of research was the topic presented at three conferences
- Turkologentag 2016. Second European Convention on Turkic, c Ottoman and Turkish
Studies, Universität Hamburg (September 14. – 17. 2016), 7th International Sympo-
sium on Balkan Studies, Masaryk university, Brno (November 28. - 29. 2016), BA-
SEES (British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies) Annual Conference,
Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge (March/April 31. - 2. 2017). The main aim of the
paper is to provide the scholars and public with a new unbiased view of The great
Serb migration from 1690. One of the quests to solve is the “war of numbers” such
typical for Balkans region (concerning Great Serb migration from 40 to 500 000...)
and how is the Serb migration perceived in modern European historiography - pri-
marily Czechoslovak, Serbian, Albanian and Anglo-American. The topic itself has
brought several limitations, questions and issues since the beginning of the research.
The problem of studying selected topic lies also in the fact that except for one ex-
ception mediated by English translation stated at work of Noel Malcolm (The Great
Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo [1690]: history, myth and ideology),4 we did not
analyse Albanian sources, but it is a challenge of the future - to expand the work and
on the basis of joint research with colleagues dealing with Albanian history,5 to pub-
3
BATAKOVIĆ, T. Dušan: Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Religions&Ideologies. In: Kosovo and Meto-
hija – Living in the Enclave. Ed. Dušan Bataković. Belehrad : SANU, 2007, p. 125.
4
MALCOLM, Noel: The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): history, myth and ideology. In:
Oliver Jens Schmitt – Eva Anne Frantz (eds.): Albanische Geschichte Stand und Perspektiven der For-
schung. München 2009, p. 225–251.
5
For example: Přemysl Vinš from Charles University in Prague. Author of several essays on Albanian
history in Czechoslovak area -VINŠ, Přemysl: Albánský lid se na cestu dějinami vydal se šavlí v ruce.
Analýza historického příběhu socialistické Albánie, In „Dějiny – Teorie – Kritika“ 1-2013, p. 56-90; Na
křižovatce mezi Moskvou a Pekingem aneb počátek albánsko-sovětské roztržky; In „Porta Balkanica“
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 89
lish a wider output that would also capture Albanian historiography. On the other
hand it is important to state that conclusions of Albanian historians are rather dis-
tracting, but they offer interesting points in terms of comparison. From the point of
view of the chosen methodology - comparison and analysis, not all the works are of
a unified character (lacking romantic, older and inter-war works, we have focused on
modern historiography), but was an intention, and it is important to note that their
diversity best prove problematic and controversial perceptions of the chosen topic.
The depiction and symbolism of Great Serbian migration is still very strong and
up-to-date. In 1994, the American publicist John Kifner described the picture of Pav-
le „Paja“ Jovanović, (1859 – 1957) from 1896 Seoba Srba6 along with other mythi-
cal scenes of Serbian history as a Balkan version of the picture by Emanuel Gottlieb
Leutze (1816 – 1868) from 1851 Washington Crossing the Delaware. This alignment
clearly declares the strong rooting in the national consciousness of the Serbs, which
the author compared with one of the most famous American paintings. Migration has
also found other comparisons, such as various views of the retreating Serbian army in
1915 (Albanska golgota) heading towards Corfu island 7, or a photo from 1995 that cap-
tured the Serbs fleeing from the Republika Srpska krajina during Operation Storm.8
It is not possible to create a precise and comprehensive definition of Serbian
identity (the concept of so-called “serbdom”), our aim is to point at the indispens-
able place of Great Migration in this diagram and the individual connections. Key
pillar of the Serbian national identity is according our knowledge Serbian orthodox
church (SPC, autocephalous in 1219 – 1463, 1557–1766, 1920–) and its founder
Saint Sava (1174 – 1236). Religious connotations are also reflected in the interpre-
tation of Great Migration - Arsenije III. was perceived in the eyes of one of the con-
temporaries as follows: “Be our Moshe who led the people of Israel from Egypt...“9 The
unification of the Orthodox Church and the Serbian nation was crucial for its surviv-
al (the Byzantine heritage). In the given context the “Velika seoba” is directly linked
to the pillar of the Serbian national identity the Kosovo myth.10 Migration has tak-
en place from Kosovo, leaving the cradle of Serbian history, which is another step in
losing Kosovo. The phenomenon of the loss of Kosovo and Great Migration is also
closely related to the transfer of the remains of St. Lazar to the Ravanica Monastery
in Vrdnik (1697) „...i tu položimo mošti svetog Lazara srpskog.“11 In the era of occu-
pation of Yugoslavia was the relics threatened by the creation of The Independent
State of Croatia NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) through Bešenovo was trans-
ferred to church of Saint Archangel Michael in Belgrade. Remains of St. Lazar were
symbolically returned to Ravanica in 1989, in the 600th anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo.12 Within the cult of Kosovo, we are recognizing St. Lazar as one of the oth-
er points of the Serbian national identity. Serbian national songs (Српске народне
пјесме), collected and popularized in Europe by Vuk Karadžić, represent another es-
sential component, as they reflect important Serbian historical moments and mile-
stones (including the battle on the Kosovo field).13 In the context of the perception
of the Great Migration plays Ottoman invasion a key role, as the military encounter
between Habsburg and Ottoman troops resulted in migration. Although the Otto-
man invasion is traditionally referred to as “national tragedy,” the Orthodox Church
had full religious freedom and cultural autonomy in the period of the existence of
the Patriarchate in Peć, for example proved by service to Saint Lazar.14 Gradually,
10
See: ŠTĚPÁNEK, Václav: Jugoslávie – Srbsko – Kosovo. Kosovská otázka ve 20. století.í Brno 2011, p.
265-266.; ČOLOVIĆ, Ivan: Smrt na Kosovu Polju : Istorija kosovskog mita. Belehrad 2016, p. 9. – 31.
11
For some time deposited in today’s Hungarian city Szentendre (Szentandreja). ZIROJEVIĆ, Olga: Sr-
bija pod turskomvlašću 1459–1804. Belehrad 2009, p. 171.; ŠESTÁK, Miroslav: Kosovská bitva roku 1389
a kosovský mýtus. In: Dějiny a současnost. Kulturně historická revue. 21, n. 3, (1999) p. 43-46.
12
WHITE, George W.: Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe.
New York, 2000, p. 214-215.; VUJAČIĆ, Veljko: Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia:
Antecedents of theDissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Cambridge 2015, p. 132.
13
During his lifetime, he met and worked with a number of personalities of his time, such as Dositej
Obradović, Jernejj Kopitar, Ľudovít Štúr (whom he was so impressed to called him “literary patriarch
of Serbia”), Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Josef Dobrovsky, Leopold von Ranke, Jakob Grimm, Franz Joseph I.,
Miloš Obrenović, Petar II. Njegoš or Ljudevit Gaj. MELICHÁREK, Maroš: Osobnosť Vuka Stefanovića
Karadžića (1787 – 1864) v kontexte jeho jazykovednej činnosti vytvorenie moderného srbského jazyka. In:
Dejiny : internetový časopis Inštitútu histórie FF PU v Prešove 5, 2010, n. 2, p. 84–100. available on the
Internet: http://dejiny.unipo.sk/ [cit. 2017-09-01].
14
After the restoration of the Serbian Patriarchate in Peć, 1557, in churches were sung the songs about
Serbian medieval kings, the liturgies were devoted them. St. Lazarus was celebrated in churches on June
28 each year
y - the Turks presented as godless people who serve Lazarus as fuel for his eternal fire. AN-
ZULOVIĆ, Branimir: Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide. New York 1999, p. 33–35.; Služba svetom
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 91
however, the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the SPC – Patriarch Pa-
jsije (1614–1647) discussed a possible union with the Roman Catholic Church al-
ready started by Patriarch Jovan, Patriarcha Gavrilo (1648 – 1659) travelled to Russia
in 1653 and was hanged by the Turks. Officially was the SPC for a long time loyal to
sultan – it identified itself as a protector of Serbian unity, history and nation. Signif-
icant deterioration in relations occurred after unsuccessful rebellion in Banat, when
Koca Sinan Paša ordered the transfer of the remains of St. Sava from the monastery
of Mileševo to Belgrade and then burned on the hill Vračar 27. 4. 1594.15 The Bal-
kan Wars (1912-1913) are an imaginative fulfilment of the Kosovo cult and they al-
so represent a connection to the past in the context of Great Migration.16
The first historian whose work we have focused on is Dušan Bataković (1957 -
2017). Until his unexpected death he was director of INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN
STUDIES, SASU (srb. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, SANU) and a diplo-
mat, a former ambassador to Greece, Canada and France. The main priorities of his
research were the issue of Serbian nationalism, Serbian-French relations and ethnic
problems in Kosovo. His most important works include, for example Kosovo i Meto-
hija u srpsko-arbanaškimodnosima, La Yougoslavie: nations, religions, idéologies, Koso-
vo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1850-1912, Nova istori-
ja srpskog naroda, The Serbs and Their National Interest, t Kosovo. Un Conflit sans
fin? and others.17 For this analysis we have selected three papers, namely: Koso-
vo and Metohija: Identity, Religions and Ideologies (2007), Nova istorija srbskog naroda
(2002) a Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima (2006, reprint from 1991).
In an excerpt from the first mentioned work the author writes: „The Christian Ortho-
dox Serbs joined the Habsburg troops in their military campaign in Serbia as a separate
Christian militia (Militia Rasciana, Razische Feld-Miliz, Irregulëre Trupen). With the
exception of the brave Kelmendi tribe of Christian, Roman Catholic faith, the majority of
velikomučeniku knez Lazaru, caru i samodršcusrpskezemlje. Novi Sad 1889, 40 p.; GRKOVIĆ, Milica:
Nepoznati Ravaničanin /SREDNJEVEKOVNI SRPSKI SPISI O KOSOVU. available on the Internet:
https://www.rastko.rs/istorija/spisi_o_kosovu.html#_Toc693.[cit. 2017-09-01].
15
LEUSTEAN, Lucian N: Orthodox Christianityy and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Eu-
rope. Oxford University Press 2014, p. 87., ZIROJEVIĆ, O. Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804, Beleh-
rad 2009, p. 140–143.
16
For further information see: RISTANOVIĆ, Petar: Administrativne promene na prostoru Stare Sr-
bije 1912-1941. In: Baština, 2012, n. 32, p. 171-194, PELIKÁN, Jan et al.: Dějiny Srbska. Praha 2013,
p.255-256.
17
Bibliography & List of Publication (1983 – 2008). In: Dušan Bataković official website, Copyright ©
1997 – 2009 Dusan T. Batakovic. Dostupné na internete: http://www.batakovic.com/bibliography.ht-
ml. [cit.2010-08-21].
92 | Maroš Melichárek
Albanians — as newly-converted Muslims — took the side of the Sultan’s’ army against
the military coalition of Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians.““18 It puts a clear em-
phasis on the religious aspect - the Christian, then the Orthodox Serbs, the Christian
militia, what does not match the German or Latin equivalents, and at the conclu-
sion Kelmendi Christian clan of the Roman Catholic faith. From this point of view,
it is clear that, in general, the Christian components of the anti-Ottoman resistance
are highlighted, on the other hand the Albanians as newly converted Muslims auto-
matically joined the sultan (apart from Kelmendi clan). At this point, his interpreta-
tion does not match the work of another historian Olga Zirojević,19 who writes that
a large part of Albanians left the Austrian ranks in battle at Kačanik in January 1690,
the Kelmendi clan gained territory around Peć and benefiting from the war chaos -
assisted the Turks (influence of Mahmud Pasha Hasanbegović of Albanian origin).20
In work Nova istorija srbskog naroda Bataković refers to the words of a local church
chronicler when explaining events around Great Migration:„… in the spring of 1690
the patriarch — Arsenije Crnojević of Peć — summoned a vast number of Serbs, 37000
families [10-30 members on average, 555000. … highlighted by M. M.] and they all
set off to join the Imperial [Habsburg] army. In the same war there was large-scale looting
and dislocation of Christians and plundering of all the Serbian lands. Monasteries, towns,
and villages were abandoned, d and some were burned down.“ Author adds:„ Some Serbs
in Kosovo fled to the mountains, survived the persecution, and after the sultan’s’ amnesty
they re-settled the undisturbed dwellings, especially in Kosovo itself.f “21 Author referred
to work by Ljubomir Stojanović Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi, without further explana-
tion. Such a text is misleading as it gives a figure of 37,000 families, which has been
proven from several points of view,22 that it is irrelevant and also points only to the
sufferings of the Serbian population. O. Zirojević refers to primary sources: Letter
of Arsenije III. from November 30, 1690 to the court office in Vienna mentioned
30 thousand people, later in the letter of Joseph I (1706), 40,000 confirmed Car-
18
BATAKOVIĆ, T. Dušan: Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Religions and Ideologies. In: Kosovo and Me-
tohija – Living in the Enclave. Belehrad 2007, p. 26.
19
Olga Zirojević (born in 1934) is a Serbian historian of the Orientalist and History of the Ottoman
Empire. Her most important works are – Crkve i manastiri na području Pećke patrijaršije do 1683. godine.
Belehrad, 1984, 307 p.; Turskovojnou ređenje u Srbiji 1459—1683. Belehrad 1974, 319 p.; Islamizacija
na južnoslovenskom prostoru. Belehrad 2003, 94 p.
20
ZIROJEVIĆ, Olga: Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804, Belehrad 2009, p. 59.
21
BATAKOVIĆ, Dušan T. at al.: Nova Istorija Srbskog Naroda. Belehrad 2002, p. 126.
22
Authors (from University in Novi Sad) of the latest publications on the history of Serbs in the terri-
tory of Vojvodina admit a maximum of 80,000 people. MIKAVICA, Dejan - VASIN, Goran. Srbi u Ha-
bzburškoj monarhiji 1-2. Novi Sad 2016, p. 124-126.
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 93
dinal Kolonić, Stefan Daskal Ravaničanin wrote about 37,000 families - the author
himself avoids the exact number.23 In his work Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim
odnosima Bataković writes: „...Catholic Albanians, despite the promise of help, left the
Austrian army on the eve of the Battle of Kačanik at the beginning of the year 1690. The
Serbian militia fighting the sultan hordes retreated to the west and north of the country.
The Turkish raids including killing and stealing lasted for three months. Fearing Ottoman
retaliation, the population of Kosovo and adjacent areas began to move north alongside
Arsenije III. Patrairch led a considerable part of the Church hierarchy, several hundred
thousand refugees into the Holy Roman Empire in the southern Hungarian territory. His
people were given special religious and privilege rights. The Great Migration of 1690 was
a significant turning point in the history of the Serbian nation. There were many cities and
villages in Kosovo left without a single inhabitant ... The worst effect of large-scale migra-
tion was the demographic collapse. Subsequently, the areas were inhabited by Albanian
tribes from mountain areas....”24 This text presents the traditional perception of the
phenomenon of Great Migration, reflected in the point of reference of migration as
a turning point of Serbian history, the Albanian treachery, and the subsequent set-
tlement of Kosovo and Metohija by the Albanians. Here, paradoxically, we do not
find explicit numbers of migrant citizens - only a few tens of thousands. There is no
doubt that demographic change has taken place, but it is difficult today (even with
regard to sources) to determine its full extent. At this point, obviously, to empha-
size the differentiation of views, we should mention work from the Albanian envi-
ronment. In a book by Kristaq Prifti et al. (eds.), Historia e popullitshqiptar, vol. 1.
Tirana 2000, the reader learns a diametrically different view of the sketched events:
„…The Albanians, Austrian Allies, participated in the struggles against the Hordes of the
Crimean Khan. Kosovo was re-acquired by the Ottomans and the Tatars, and the Austri-
an army moved north. Together with the Austrian army, many rebels Austrian allies, left
the territory of Kosovo and Serbia. Serbian historiography created on this basis the the-
ory of the so-called large expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and the subsequent settlement
of Kosovo by Albanians. It is true that among those who left Kosovo was patriarch of Peć
(Peja) Arsenije III. Crnojević,ć but the number of Serbs who left with him was not so large
to claim it as the great expulsion from Kosovo in 1690. Among the forces that supported
the Austrians 2 were decisive - Albanians and Serbs. From an approximate calculation,
the Albanians formed the majority and were twice as numerous as the Serbs. Of the to-
tal number of those who left Kosovo, 10,000 no more, were Albanians. The term Serb,
which appears in the documents, means the Orthodox Albanian, who was subject to the
23
ZIROJEVIĆ, O: Srbija pod turskomvlašću 1459–1804, Belehrad 2009. p. 159.
24
BATAKOVIĆ, Dušan: Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima. Belehrad 2006, p. 29-30.
94 | Maroš Melichárek
jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Peć (Peja). On this basis, it is necessary to accept that
the rebels from Kosovo who left their land together with the Austrians were in most Alba-
nians.““25 This section offers a number of stimuli for reflection and controversy. First
of all, in the introductory part, there is no definition of ethnicity or the religion of in-
surgents - “many insurgents”. Role of Arsenije III. is unclear and undefined, it is only
mentioning that he was there, but we do not learn anything specific. When calculat-
ing the forces which supported Austrians, the Albanians are because of logical rea-
sons (addressing the reader by their primary role) in the first place, then the Serbs.
The author estimates the maximum number of migrant people from Kosovo up to
10,000, which is an unambiguous attempt to reduce the Serbian estimates as much
as possible. The term “approximate calculation,” which states that the number of Al-
banians was twice as high, does not show extraordinary scientific knowledge ... The
most controversial is conclusion where we find the explanation that the Serbs were
essentially Orthodox Albanians, and therefore no Serbs from Kosovo could migrate
as none existed..26
Work, which to a certain extent avoids nationalistic narratives, is a book called
Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, by Miranda Vickers. The author also
wrote another work with a similar theme – The Albanians: A Modern History (2013),
but there is almost no mention of the 1690 migration issue. Vickers points to the
fact that the religious status is for the Albanians an unclear concept („Ku eshte shpa-
ta eshte feja –Where the sword is, there lies religion“).27 The circumstances surround-
ing the Great Migration are described by Vickers as follows: „During the Austro-Ot-
toman wars in the latter half of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century, events
occurred which drove a great part of the Slav population from Kosovo. In 1690 Austrian
troops advanced through Serbia and Kosovo and onwards as far east as Skopje where the
Ottomans eventually defeated them. Fearing harsh reprisals from the Porte, a massive so-
cial upheaval took place. Unable to fight the Ottomans, the greater part of the inland Ser-
bian population accepted from the Austrian Emperor Leopold I an offer of asylum in the
25
MALCOLM, Noel: The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): history, myth and ideology, p.
225–251.
26
M. Ekmečić wrote in a book Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja. Istorija Srba u Novom Veku 1492–
1992 „Albanian historians are trying to prove that,t 1690 Kosovo has lost its Serbian character...,“ concern-
ing numbers he estimates 37 to 40 000 families. EKMEČIĆ, Milorad: Dugo kretanje između klanja i oran-
ja. Istorija Srba u Novom Veku 1492–1992. Belehrad 2010, p. 50.
27
Claimed in Sami Frasheri work Shqipëria ç’ka qenë, ç’është dhe ç’do të bëhet? Albania - What it was,
what it is, and what will become of it” ELSIE, Robert: Albanian Literature: A Short History. I.B.Tauris,
2005, p. 78-79.
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 95
28
A proclamation from April 6, 1690 for the Serb under the rule of the Sultan, a personal letter to the
patriarch - to every nation that becomes a subjectj of the Holy Roman Empire - casts doubt on the char-
acter of the “Invitation letter”. TODOROVIĆ, Jelena: An Orthodox Festival Book in the Habsburg Em-
pire: Zaharija Orfelin’s’ Festive Greeting to Mojsej Putnik (1757), Aldershot 2006, p. 4–6.
29
VICKERS, M.: Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, Londýn 1998, p. 27.
30
KATSIARDI,Olga – STASSINOPOLOU, Maria A.: Across the Danube: Southeastern Europeans and
Their Travelling Identities (17th–19th C.) Leiden, 2016, p. 55-56.
31
RYCHLÍK, Jan et al.: Mezi Vídní a Cařihradem – 1. Utváření balkánských národů. Praha 2009., p. 79;
KIA, Mehrdad: Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire, Oxford 2011, p. 117.
32
Pozri bližšie: Sir Noel Malcolm, Senior Research Fellow since 2002, All Souls College Oxford.
available on the Internet: https://www.asc.ox.ac.uk/person/37 [cit.2010-08-21].
33
Milorad Ekmečić, a Serbian historian, academician of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, de-
scribed it as “Historiography by the garb” or “Classical Military Propaganda Literature, as it used to
96 | Maroš Melichárek
called in the past. It is written with a clear aim for the countries and political organizations that are pay-
ing for it. “According to M. Ekmečić, this title is typical of Croatian political emigration and the ideolo-
gy of the new Muslim nation in Bosnia (as evidenced by the personality that Malcolm thanks for his con-
tribution to work - Ahmed Zilić). Ekmečić is convinced that Malcolm’s views are to destroy the fact of
Kosovo as a cradle of Serbian history. EKMEČIĆ, Milorad: Historiography by the garb only. Response to
the book of Noel Malcolm Kosovo – A Short History. Beograd 2000. s. 1. available on the Internet: http://
www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/malkolm/mekmecic-garb.html [cit.2010-09-18].
34
MALCOLM, Noel: Kosovo. A Short History. Londýn 1998, p. 139–162.
35
MALCOLM, Noel: Kosovo. A Short History. Londýn 1998, p. 139–162.
36
ELSIE, Robert. Historical Dictionary of Kosovo. Lanham 2010, p. 118–119.
37
HRADEČNÝ, Pavel – HLADKÝ, Ladislav: Dějiny Albánie. Praha 2008, p.147.
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 97
mum. For example, in work A Short History of Yugoslavia (1968) author writes: „Ar-
senije organized a large Serbian emigration to the north ... 30 to 40,000 families passed
the Danube to settled in southern Hungary.““38 In book Southeastern Europe under Otto-
man rule, 1354–1804, writes Peter F. Sugar: „under the leadership of Arsenije [...] about
200,000 Serbs moved north along with the retreating Austrian army. Southern Hungary
gained a prominent Serb element,t while the empty areas of Kosovo were inhabited by Al-
banians.““39 Barbara Jelavich counts with 30 000 migrating Serbs, while according her:
„...with the departure of Serbs the massive immigration of the Albanians took place, the
region won the Albanian majority.““40 John Cox also mentioned 30 000 families (His-
tory of Serbia. Westport 2002, s. 36).41 Malcolm argues: „If we accept that 20-40,000
individuals arrived along with Arsenije to Hungary, the crucial question is what the pro-
portion of those who came from Kosovo was. As we have already indicated, d the only col-
lective path starting in Kosovo and ending in Buda never existed.““42
In our environment, the question of numbers has not been a research priori-
ty, we also find a number of conclusions 43: „Arsenije III. and his people came into a
very difficult situation. In fear of the Ottoman revenge, the patriarch decided to go north
together with the retreating Habsburg army. Together with the rebels also spiritual hier-
archy and ordinary peasants from Macedonia, Kosovo and southern Pomoravie left the
area. Historical sources report that during this exodus, which is commonly referred to as
38
CLISSOLD, Stephen (ed.): A Short History of Yugoslavia. Cambridge 1968, p. 109.
39
SUGAR, Peter F.: Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354–1804. Seattle 1977, p. 222.
40
JELAVICH, Barbara: History of the Balkans, vol. l. Cambridge, p. 92–93, cited according MALCOLM,
N.: The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690), p. 225–251.
41
New books counts with a maximum of 40-50 thousand migrants, but it is not possible to state the fact
completely universal. PEARSE, Meic: The Gods of War: Is Religion the Primary Cause of Violent Conflict?.
Downers Grove 2007, p. 89, or LAMPE, John R.: Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country. Cam-
bridge, 1996, p. 26.
42
MALCOLM, Noel: The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690), s. 225–251.
43
According to essay Srbsko v područí Osmanskej ríše do začiatku 19. storočia /Serbia under ottoman su-
premacy until the beginning of 19th century/.: „Kosovo’s return into the Turkish hands has prompted Serbs
to fear rebellion and terror against the Orthodox population. In June 1690, approximately 30 to 40 thou-
sand Serbs were gathered near Belgrade, who went to Hungary with the Patriarch (in Peć was elected new
Patriarch Kalinik I). This great migration is also called the Velika seoba Srba (Великa сеобa Срба), and
at the head of the Serbs was the patriarch of Arsenius III. However, it is important to emphasize that the
Serb migrants were not only in the territory of Vojvodina, but also in the territory of today’s Hungary
and Romania. The most important centers were Szentendre (in 1693 about 6 000 - 14 000 Serbs), Buda
Mohács, Pécs, Szeged, Baja, Tokaj, Debrecen, Kecskemét, Szatmar.““ MELICHÁREK, Maroš: Srbsko v
područí Osmanskej ríše do začiatku 19. storočia. In: Dejiny – internetový časopis Inštitútu histórie FF PU
v Prešove 9, 2014, n. 1, p. 126–142 [elektronický zdroj].
98 | Maroš Melichárek
“ great migration of the Serbs,” 40,000 families left their homes, or hundreds of thou-
“the
sands of people. In June 1690, a great assembly of Serbian church and secular represen-
tatives took place in Belgrade. Bishop Isaiah Đaković was given a mandate to a meet-
ing with the Habsburgs about protection.““44 Formulation in the text “ contemporary
sources refer” is somehow misleading as the author does not indicate where the in-
formation come from. There we may also observe „traditional“ number about 40
thousand families... In a book Dejiny Srbska, which is a key monograph in our envi-
ronment concerning the history of Serbia, the rhetoric is very mild, what symboliz-
es into the effort to provide the reader with the fact objectively: „ The event that af-
fected Serbian history no less fatefully than a Kosovo battle is the Serbian migration from
1690, referred to as “seoba
“ ”. We do not know exactly how many Serbs have moved from
the territory of the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburg monarchy, nor their exact composi-
tion according to their place of origin. Historians estimated that their number was about
60-70,000, what was a large number at that time. [...] In June 1690, 30-40,000 people
gathered under the forts of Belgrade. The deteriorating military situation forced the Patri-
arch to go to Hungary with these people. It is hard to imagine that the migration look sim-
ilar to that of Paja Jovanović’s’ famous paintingg. The Serbs more likely migrated gradual-
ly into more spontaneous and chaotic waves.““45 Important is that the author hishlights
that the migration wasnt somehow unified and fully organized process, but vice ver-
sa, not organized and chaotic escape.
The meaning of the great migration can be perceived on several levels. Primar-
ily in the spirit of the traditional national / nationalist narrative, whether Albanian
(presented by Kristaq Prifti and the collective), respectively Serbian. According to
Dušan Bataković’s, Nova istorija srbskog naroda, “the great migration of Christian
Orthodox Serbs in 1690 was a decisive milestone in Serbian history.““46 In both cases,
opinions may be extremely unambiguous – as the most prominent exponent is the
number, respectively denial of participation and roles of one or other interested par-
ty. The attitude towards the objective perception of events is held by the historian
of the older Serbian generation prof.f Dušan J. Popović (1894-1985): Great Serbi-
an migration caused the transfer of the center from the so-called Old Serbia to Vo-
jvodina, which was particularly evident during the period of enlightenment, when
Novi Sad together with the Sremski Karlovci became cultural centers of the national
movement. The new Turkish name of the territory of South Serbia - Sandžak is per-
ceived as negative according to author. The threat of Hungarianization, particular-
44
ŠESTÁK, Miroslav et al.: Dějiny jihoslovanských zemí.í Praha 2009, p.127-128.
45
PELIKÁN, Jan et al.: Dějiny Srbska. Praha 2013, p. 141–142.
46
BATAKOVIĆ, Dušan T. et al.: Nova istorija srbskog naroda, Belehrad 2002, s. 126.
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 99
ly in the cities, was a major problem for the newly settled Serbian population. The
Serbs were forced to adapt to a different way of life and geographic conditions.47 D.
Popović counted with a maximum of 70,000 people.48 Part of Western European his-
toriography preserves a neutral attitude - Stanford J. Shaw in his work History of the
Ottoman Empire writes: „ Many Serbs helped the Austrian advance, but many of them
were very disappointed with Austrian supremacy and then helped Osman. Fazal Musta-
fa showed an effort to get their loyalty instead of punishing them for their previous betray-
al. A large number of Serbs crossed the Danube with a retreating imperial army in fear of
retaliation and settled in southern Hungary, the remaining part returned home after the
fear of retribution was eliminated by the Ottoman administration (decree declared that no
local Muslims would threaten life nor the property of returning Serbs).““49 From the text,
the author unequivocally point to the Ottoman sources, as well as the Ottoman role
highlighted in events associated with great migration. However, we also encounter
links with events of the 20th century and attempts to use historical events with po-
litical goals.:„… from a religious point of view it is more important because of the paral-
lel with the biblical exodus, as Arsenije acts as Moses. Connecting Kosovo with the Soul
of the Martyrs’’ Nation. [...] When Slobodan Milosevic spoke about migration during his
speech in 1987,7 he touched the deepest flows of the Serbian national soul.““50 In this con-
text, it is necessary to divide the efforts to use the topic in politics within the Ser-
bian political elite and the commemoration of the given narrative in the present, as
the case of the cited text. Quite similar attitude can be observed in Only the Nails Re-
main: Scenes from the Balkan Wars, where the author within Serbian National Narra-
tive connected the Great Migration with the traditional Serbian nationalist formula
Samo sloga Srbi spašava: “... the Ottoman oppression was stronger in Serbia than in oth-
er provinces (the nobility was slain, the serfs worked until death), the unity between Or-
thodox Christianity meant escape (exodus in 1690 from Kosovo, when 30,000 Serbs set-
tled in Krajina),51 or belief in the resurrection of the Serbian state, which was supported
47
On the other hand, we may oppose Popović that this was an incorrect step of Arsenije III, as it lead to
a definitive loss of “Old Serbia”.
48
POPOVIĆ, Dušan J.: Srbi u Vojvodini 1. Od najstariji hvremena do Velike seobe. Novi Sad 2008; POPO-
VIĆ, Dušan J.: Velika seoba Srba 1690: Srbi seljaci i plemići.Belehrad 1954, 378 p.
49
MALCOLM, Noel: The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690), p. 225–251.
50
PEARSE, Meic. The Gods of War: Is Religion the Primary Cause of Violent Conflict? Downers Grove
2007, p. 89.; JUDAH, Tim: The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Heaven 2000,
p. 45-47.
51
Here the author made a major mistake, since the region of Krajina was not the primary one during the
mentioned migration.
100 | Maroš Melichárek
by the Kosovo cult.““52 In conclusion, even today, several centuries after the researched
event happened, it represents a great weapon in the hands of historians (and politi-
cians) that can be used to promote ideological, national, or other goals.
LITERATURE:
BADE, Klaus. Migration in European History. Oxford : John Wiley & Sons, 2008
BATAKOVIĆ, T. Dušan: Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Religions & Ideologies.
In: Kosovo and Metohija – Living in the Enclave. Belehrad : SANU, 2007
BATAKOVIĆ, T. Dušan a kol.: Nova Istorija Srbskog Naroda. Belehrad: Naš dom,
2002
BATAKOVIĆ, Dušan. Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima.Belehrad :
Čigoja, 2006
ČOLOVIĆ, Ivan: Smrt na Kosovu Polju : Istorija kosovskog mita. Belehrad : XX
vek, 2016
EKMEČIĆ, Milorad. Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja istorija Srba u Novom Veku
1492-1992. Belehrad : Evro-Giunti, 2010
ELSIE, Robert. Historical Dictionary of Kosovo. Lanham : Scarecrow Press, 2010,
HRADEČNÝ, Pavel – HLADKÝ, Ladislav: Dějiny Albánie. Praha : NLN, 2008
KIFNER, John. The World; Through the Serbian Mind’s Eye. In The New York
Times, April 10, 1994. [online]. [cit. 2017-09-01]. Dostupné na internete:
<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/ 04/10/weekinreview/the-world- through-
-the-serbian-mind-s- eye.html?pagewanted=all>.
LAMPE, R. John: Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country. Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1996
MALCOLM, Noel: Kosovo. A Short History. Londýn : MacMillan Publishing ,1998
MALCOLM, Noel. The Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): history,
myth and ideology. In Albanische Geschichte Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung.
Oliver Jens Schmitt und Eva Anne Frantz (eds.), Mníchov : Verlag, 2009
MELICHÁREK, Maroš. Srbsko v područí Osmanskej ríše do začiatku 19. storočia.
In Dejiny - internetový časopis Inštitútu histórie FF PU v Prešove [elektronický
zdroj]. Roč. 9, č. 1 (2014)
MERILL, Christopher. Only the Nails Remain: Scenes from the Balkan Wars. Rowman
& Littlefield, 2001
52
MERILL, Christopher: Only the Nails Remain: Scenes from the Balkan Wars. New York 2001, p. 161.
Great Migration of the Serbs (1690) and Its Reflections in Modern Historiography | 101
PEARSE, Meic. The Gods of War: Is Religion the Primary Cause of Violent Conflict?.
InterVarsity Press, 2007
PELIKÁN, Jan – HAVLÍKOVÁ, Lubomíra a kol. Dějiny Srbska. Praha : NLN, 2013
POPOVIĆ, J. Dušan: Srbi u Vojvodini 1. Od najstarijih vremena do Velike seobe. Novi
Sad : Prometej, 2008.
ŠESTÁK, Miroslav a kol.: Dějiny Jihoslovanských Zemí.í Praha : NLN, 2009
ŠTĚPÁNEK, Václav: Jugoslávie – Srbsko – Kosovo. Kosovská otázka ve 20. století.í Brno:
Masarykova univerzita, 2011
VICKERS, M. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998,
VUJAČIĆ, Veljko. Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents
of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Cambridge University Press,
2015
ZIROJEVIĆ, Olga. Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459-1804. Belehrad: Čigojaštampa,
2009
Марош Мелихарек
Dr Cathie Carmichael1
University of East Anglia (Norwich)
School of History
Great Britain
The failure of the Serbian Kingdom to agree to all the points of Emperor Franz
Joseph’s Ultimatum was the final step in what had been a lamentable breakdown in re-
lations between itself and the Habsburg Monarchyy2. The progress of this breakdown
can be seen during the response to the assassination of King Aleksandar Obrenović
1
cathie.carmichael@uea.ac.uk
104 | Cathie Carmichael
in 1903, the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908, the Balkan Wars from 1912-13 as
well as the reaction to assassination of Habsburg heir apparent Archduke Franz Fer-
dinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. At the end of July 1914, the Habsburg Monarchy
declared war on Serbia ending what has been termed the ‘‘July Crisis’. In the follow-
ing five months until the end of the year, Habsburg forces attempted two invasions
of Serbia. From the declaration of war on 28th July and the bombardment of Bel-
grade to the Battle at Cer Mountain between 16th and 19th August 1914 and the Bat-
tle of Kolubara from 16th November to 16th December, there were high casualty
rates on both sides. The region between the Drina basin and Belgrade was devas-
tated by atrocities resulting in the deaths several thousands of combatants and civil-
ians. Serbia won the first two decisive battles of the war but was subsequently en-
gulfed and occupied by Habsburg forces in 1915. In this article, I will look at the
war crimes with a particular focus on the Mačva region in the high summer of 1914,
including the town of in Lešnica, Loznica and Šabac. I have attempted to interpret
these crimes in a wider political, geographical and emotional context, relying heav-
ily on newspapers and diaries to try to capture the tensions in the months prior to
and during the summer of 1914.
Whatever doubts may have been in the mind of individuals, there is no doubt
that Habsburg policy from at least 1878 aimed at controlling more of the Balkans
than they had done hitherto. This meant a shaping of all aspects of life in the inter-
ests of the state and society, which echoed colonial projects elsewhere in the world.
This policy included civilising Bosnia and Hercegovina3 and included extensive
church building and the introduction of Catholic authority in areas previously under
the sway of the Franciscan Order. Other improvements included the reforestation
of the Karst, the construction of a modern tram system in Sarajevo4 and the intro-
duction of mechanisation into farming. The rapid modernisation of Bosnia was not-
ed by one traveller in Zenica in the 1880s: ’(t)he Austrian post comes from Travnik
by a good road, recently put in repair. One might almost think oneself in the West,
were it not for some Beys, who smoke their long pipes, immovable and grave at the
sight of novelties and foreigners. The transformation will be effected quickly, wher-
ever the railway comes’5. Habsburg territorial domination involved building the in-
frastructure, often in the most challenging circumstances. Schools, gymnasiums, hos-
pitals, agricultural colleges, roads6 as well as factories sprung up. Pilgrims returning
from Mecca to Sarajevo could not just return home but first had their luggage disin-
fected in Sarajevo (putatively) to protect against typhus, cholera and plague7. Rail-
ways lines constructed despite the challenges of high temperatures, the bura winds,
lack of fresh water for the workers as well as malaria 8. Products from newly acquired
lands were valuable and produced fine quality food for export and for the Central
European tables. Bosnia and Hercegovina proved an excellent place to grow apples,
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 105
chestnuts and grapes9 and modern kilns were introduced to dry plums and plum
brandy was exported10. In Livno, a new cheese was produced, modelled on the Al-
pine gruyère11. In the remote Lastva valley close to the Habsburg border with Mon-
tenegro, fine wines were cultivated by the establishment of an agricultural station
that were imported across Europe12. While there is no doubt that Habsburg power
lifted the general level of development, it also meant that the authorities exercised
what many regarded excessive control, which they deeply resented. In 1906 Rado-
van Perović-Tunguz defined Bosnia and Hercegovina as a ‘land of wailing’ where the
‘foreigner’ ruled everything … ‘the forests in the hills and the birds in the forests…
and the fish in the stream and the ox and the plough and the seed in the furrow and
the wheat in its ear and the shepherd with his flock and the flute in his mouth and
the wind in the caves…’13.
Austria-Hungary pursued an active interest in the regions of the Balkans that
they did not exert direct control over. The murder of the Aleksandar Obrenović in
June 1903 had cast the Serbian people in a violent light and encouraged very nega-
tive stereotypes of Serbs to develop in the press14. The Habsburg reading public fol-
lowed Balkan Wars correspondents who sent vivid first hand reports of the fighting
back home15. In particular, reports created a clear image of Balkan ‘cruelties’, often
specifically Serbian cruelties (Serbengreuel)16. Authors such as Carl Pauli, who wrote
a 1913 book entitled Military Atrocities (Kriegsgreuel) thought that the Balkan Wars
were indicatively violent. The book contained illustrations of hapless refugees, dev-
asted villages and komitadjis who followed a ‘Serbisches Räuberleben’ (robber’s life)17.
The so-called ‘Prochaska Affair’ of 1912 involved the disappearance of the Habsburg
Consul in Prizren. Wild rumours about his terrible fate circulated in the press, but he
re-emerged unscathed18. Vivid reports of atrocities against Albanians in Djakovica in-
cluding mass hangings were widely reported19. The disappearance and ‘martyrdom’
of the Franciscan priest Luigi Palić drew a lot of press attention20. Although Palić had
had his vestments ripped off and was thrown to the ground, he said to his Orthodox
persecutors: ‘No, I will not renounce my faith and will not break my vows’. He was
then beaten numerous times and bayoneted by a Montenegrin soldier, eventually
dying from a punctured lung21. Before the Balkan Wars, a series of lithographs pub-
lished by Gottfried Sieben under the name Balkangreuel (Balkan Cruelty) in Vienna
in 1909 (followed by pirate editions followed in English and Czech and reprinted
as a series of postcards) created an image of the natural affinity between the region
and extreme violence22.
A commission set up by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pub-
lished its findings on the Balkan Wars in May 1914 in French and in English in June
1914. The commission of seven men, one from Austria-Hungary, Germany and Great
Britain, Russia and the United States and two from France, who travelled in the re-
106 | Cathie Carmichael
gion in August and September 1913, returned to write an official report later that
year in Paris23, although the Austrian Joseph Redlich was not authorized by his gov-
ernment to travel beyond Belgrade. The Carnegie Endowment Enquiry published its
findings, which catalogued the atrocities of the conflict including the second phase
of fighting in which the Balkan powers, having routed the Ottomans then turned
upon each other24. Of particular concern was the role of paramilitaries or komitadjis
who were viewed as inclined to violent excess. One of the report’s authors, the noted
Russian historian and Constitutional Democrat Pavel Milyukov felt that ‘(if) a mil-
itary clash should occur between the more civilized countries of Europe, we would
not witness extremes like the ones we have studied’25. Therefore the Commission’s
research may have stimulated a view that the peoples of the region were different by
inclination and violent by nature.
When the Habsburg Monarchy took control of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878,
it greatly increased its Orthodox and Muslim populations. Furthermore, it increased
the number of its population who looked for inspiration towards the Serbian and
Montenegrin Kingdoms, also recognised internationally in 1878. The Habsburg
Monarchy took on the administration of Sandžakk26, which was returned to the Ot-
tomans in 1908 and then wrested from their control by Serbia and Montenegro
during the war of 1912. Bastian Matteo Scianna has argued that Serbian victories in
the Balkan Wars weakened Habsburg power: ‘the idea of a greater Serbia and an in-
dependent Serbian state blocked the way of the Habsburgs to Salonika and under-
mined its stand and influence in the Balkans. Furthermore, the Serbian appeal at-
tracted Slavs within the Habsburg Empire and thus a propaganda of hatred became
necessary to establish a basis for future harsh measures’27. Discontent was discernible
in the writing of radicals as well as in the establishment of activist cells such as Mla-
da Bosna (who eventually turned to direct action and violence). After the ascension
to throne by Petar Karadjordjević, the policy of good relations with the Habsburg
Monarchy which had been favoured by the Obrenović dynasty, was generally aban-
doned in favour of a more rhetorically aggressive anti-Habsburg stance and more
overt pro-Russian sentiments in Serbia itself.f Discussing the plans for a new railway
in the Sandžak in March 1908 the Belgrade newspaper Večernje Novosti stated ‘(if)
Austria-Hungary should begin construction of the railroad, Serbia would have no
other alternative but to declare war on this conglomeration of nations. If construc-
tion of the fateful Sandžak railroad is begun, then Montenegro must immediately in-
vade the Sandžak and Serbia must immediately invade Bosnia’28. The already tense
relations between the Viennese and Belgrade monarchies changed irrevocably on Vi-
dovdan ( June 28th) 1914 when the Habsburg heir Franz Ferdinand was shot on a
Sarajevo street by a Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip. The young assassin had spent the
early months of the year in training in Serbia and had passed over the border to Bos-
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 107
nia with a group of co-conspirators. These young men who were committed to kill-
ing the Habsburg heir had not been apprehended or handed over to the authorities.
The weeks following the fatal shooting resulted in a loss of control and fearful lev-
els of anger, both real and incited within Austria-Hungary. In retrospect, this rise of
hatred was probably the irrational moment that fatally weakened the Monarchy and
jeopardised its trajectory towards modernisation and optimisation of its resources.
Patriotic feeling led to public demonstrations across the Habsburg Monarchy,
with crowds singing the Prince Eugen (and in the Tyrol the Andreas Hofer) song,
waving the black and yellow flag of the Monarchyy29. Leon Trotsky recalled the an-
ti-Serb sentiment in Vienna at the outbreak of the war. ‘(T)he inscription “Alle Ser-
ben müssen sterben” (‘all Serbs must die’) appeared on the hoardings and the words
became the cry of the street boys’30 which also appeared as ‘Serbien muss sterb(i)en’
(‘Serbia must die’). In propaganda posters and cards, Serbs were compared to para-
sites, reflecting the contemporary preoccupation with infection, delousing and med-
ical controls31. One read ‘I have put a nice louse in a fur coat (worn by Tsar Nicho-
las)’ (‘Da habe ich mir ja eine nette Laus in den Pelz gesetzt!’)32. Another read: ‘Serbian
Cuisine. Better a louse in the cooking pot than no meat at all’ (‘Serbische Kueche. Bess-
’ Laus im Topf als gar kein Fleisch’)33. On 16th July 1914, Viennese journal Die
er’ne
Muskete carried a vivid colour cartoon on its front page of Serbian King Petar Kar-
adjordjević, Montenegrin King Nikola Petrović and Russian Tsar Nicholas washing
their hands in blood34. An article published on the front page of the Wienerwald-Bo-
te newspaper described Serbs collectively as ‘beast in human form found on the edge
of European civilisation’35. In the newspaper Slovenec 27th July 1914 Serbia was de-
scribed as a ‘scab on the body of Europe’36. A poem entitled ‘thunder of battle’ also
published in Slovenec in July threatened to ‘make a cold home for the Serbs on the
willows’ (‘Dom hladen vam postavimo ob vrbi)37. The liberal politician Ivan Hribar,
who was imprisoned between 1914 and 1917 for his opposition to the war, remem-
bered the ‘shameful’ slogan ‘Srbe na vrbe’ (‘Hang Serbs on the willows’)38. Vladimir
Ravniharfelt that this sentiment came from the poem’s author Marko Natlačen and
not from ‘popular’ feeling per se39. The British Ambassador Maurice de Bunsen de-
scribed the ‘extreme …anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna’ in a telegram to Sir
Edward Grey on 30th Julyy40. During the July Crisis there were widespread atrocities
against Serbs within the Monarchy (especially Hercegovina). The Hotel Europa in
Sarajevo, which was owned by prominent local Serb Gligorije Jeftanović was gutted by an-
gry rioters41. One contemporary source compared the vandalism to a pogrom42. A postcard
was issued in which a grinning Habsburg soldier clutched a ‘Todesanzeige’ (Death
Notice) which announced the death of Serbia, its ‘komitadjis’ and ‘bands of murder-
ers’. According to the Belgrade-based newspaper Politika, a dead Croat soldier was
found in August 1914 with a satirical poem that called for Serbia to be ‘levelled to
108 | Cathie Carmichael
the ground’43. Capturing the mood of the summer of 1914, Manfried Rauchenstein-
er had written that ‘it was precisely the intellectual impulse for war that allowed the
tremendous enthusiasm for the conflict to emerge that would become a phenome-
non of the 20th century’44.
In 1914, the frontier between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia was hundreds
of miles long and very easily traversed in places via the river Drina, which was quite
shallow. Elsewhere the proximity between the countries, both cultural, geographi-
cal and linguistic was evident. In 1840 scholar Ami Boué flagged the problems of de-
fending the region : ´le point le plus vulnérable de la frontière occidentale serbe est
formé par la plaine de la Matschva, depuis Losnitza… au confluent de la Drina et de
la Save’45. Paradoxically, the years before 1914 saw a growth in South Slav mutual ap-
preciation. Ivan Meštrović, trained as a stonemason in Split, was heavily influenced
by Viennese Secessionist styles and art nouveau. He felt strong affinities for the pre-
dicament of the Serbs after 1389 and produced a number of sculptures on the theme
of the Kosovo struggle, which he considered symbolic of the medieval defeats in bat-
tle of all the South Slavs46. Nature was celebrated by artists across Europe in the de-
cades before the war in an attempt to express an organic unity in the world. Among
art nouveau artists, the weeping willow, streams, flowers and the seasons were favou-
rite motifs. Prague-based artist Emil Orlik took his inspiration from Japanese paint-
ings and frequently presented willows as did the German impressionist Max Lieber-
mann. In 1905, Slovene impressionist Ivan Grohar captured an image of the tree in
his painting Vrbe ob vodi. Zagreb-based artist Ferdo (Ferdinand) Kovačević painted
a series of brilliant canvases capturing the trees in different seasons on the banks of
the river Sava, which were also issued as inexpensive postcards. The willow tree (vr-
ba) and the Sava region would have been inextricably linked in the mind of any who
had seen Kovačević´s beautiful paintings. As such, the image of Serbs hanging from
the cold willow trees on their own land (as demanded in Slovenec on July 27th 1914)
was an assault on the beauty, fertility of the Mačva region and its people as well as an
implicit attack on those wanted to live together with or alongside the Serbs. During
the assault on the Mačva region in 1914, trees and orchards which had taken gener-
ations to establish, were wilfully destroyed47.
The parts of Serbia close to the Habsburg border, particularly the fertile Mač-
va region, had undergone rapid modernisation in the nineteenth century. In some
respects, the modernisation of this region was similar to the nearby Habsburg lands
and therefore of constant interest to its Central European neighbour. Most pre-1914
sources stress its productive potential. In the press in Austria-Hungary, the region
was frequently presented as ripe for investment and infrastructural development48.
In his 1866 Allgemeine und militär-Geographie, Georg Schaller recorded that the
Mačva region was Serbia’s most fruitful and filled with orchards and pigs49. Some
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 109
years earlier Cyprian Robert had remarked on the fertility of the land composed of
the ‘Sava’s mud’50. Fearing the growth of the Serbian economy and its own lack of
control over the matter the Habsburg Monarchy imposed a ban on imports of live
animals from landlocked Serbia for two years between the spring of 1906 and 1908
(hitherto it had been the largest importer of Serbian meat and especially pork). By
1914, Šabac was a prosperous town which benefitted from proximity to the Sava
and good transport connections51. By 1909, the Kingdom of Serbia had about 600
kilometres of railwayy52. The construction of a narrow gauge railway in the Mačva
and its implications for Serbian defence were noted by the Habsburg press53. Fre-
quently used as a place to cross into the neighbouring monarchy, its border guards
were judged to be assiduous54. A decade before the Great War, Herbert Vivian re-
called that ‘(t)he journey along the Save was pleasing, but uneventful. Very white
cattle lounged along the edge of the marshy Hungarian plain, which was studded
from time to time with patches of black pigs. The banks are a mere yard of perpen-
dicular mud, relieved on the Servian side by long low islets, pale willows and warm
hills reflected in the placid stream. Shabats quays seemed entirely given over to the
plum trade, great baskets of fresh fruit and heavy sacks of prunes stretched away as
far as the eye could reach...’55.
While not wanting to overstate an argument that the Habsburgs aimed to annex
Šabac and the Mačva even before the crisis of 1914, its status certainly cropped up
in policy discussions. Leopold Berchtold, the Empire’s Foreign Minister considered
war against Serbia to contain its policy against Albania. On 29th September 1913,
Berchtold had suggested an occupation (presumably temporary) of Šabac to force
the matter56. Prime Minister István Tisza also favoured annexation of Serbian ter-
ritory or as he put it ‘minor strategic modifications to the Austro-Serb frontier’. Al-
exander von Krobatin, the War Minister, pressed for ‘the permanent occupation of
a bridgehead on the Serbian side of the Sava, possibly around Šabac’57. Conrad von
Hötzendorf,f Chief of Staff of the Habsburg Military also pressed for annexing Ser-
bian territory: ‘Belgrade and Šabac and their environs for the erection of extensive
fortifications, the costs of which Serbia also would have to bear’58. By December In-
terior Minister Konrad zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst saw the need for ‘border cor-
rections including Šabac’59. Many Habsburg subjects believed that they were bear-
ers of civilization and that incorporation of lands in need of development was their
right. The years before 1914 were also one of great uncertainty and change. In the
space of just two years, the Balkan states had grown at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire, which had lost most of its European territory. In mid-June 1914, some two
weeks before the Sarajevo assassination, the Serbian government had let its Greek
allies know that it was in no state to fight another war, thus signally its vulnerabili-
tyy60. In a telegram sent on 29th July by the British Chargé d’Affaires in Constantino-
110 | Cathie Carmichael
ple Sir Henry Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey wrote that ‘the designs of Austria may
extend considerably beyond the sanjakk and a punitive occupation of Servian ter-
ritory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here…’61.
The Ultimatum issued by the Habsburg Government to the Serbian demanded
that frontier officials from the towns of Šabac and Loznica, who had putatively aid-
ed and abetted the Sarajevo assassins, were dismissed and severely punished62. Two
individuals Rade Popovitsch from Šabac and Budivoj Grbitsch from Loznica were
singled out. Every Habsburg subject therefore knew where these towns were and
what they signified. A proclamation entitled ‘To the People of Serbia and Montene-
gro’ was issued ensuring that, ‘the invasion was framed as a massive punishment for
a criminal act’63. As a result, the civilian populations bore the brunt of soldiers’ frus-
trations and the expectations whipped up by slogans in newspaper. Although the
Serbian Government had blown up bridges at the declaration of war, this did not
prevent the shelling of Belgrade in the first days of the war. Fearing the worst, much
of the population of Šabac actually left the town before the arrival of the Habsburg
troops. Habsburg Commander and Governor of Bosnia and Hercegovina who led
the assault on Serbia, Oscar Potiorek, had survived the Sarajevo assassin (although
he was himself a prime target for assassin Gavrilo Princip)64. Potiorek was the mas-
termind behind the first and second offensives against Serbia in 1914 and eventu-
ally had to retire in ignominy because of the crushing Serbian victories. During the
Drina Campaign, he issued stern advise to his troops: ‘the best method against the
komitadjis is to kill them all…., kill the whole band down to the last man, then wipe
out the village that harbored them and publicize the event widely’65. Other senior
Habsburg officials also encouraged violence. Before entering Serbia on 14th August,
the General of IX Army Corps Lothar Edler von Hortstein opined that ‘(w)ar brings
us into one hostile country inhabited by people fanatically hostile towards us; a coun-
try where perfidious murder, as the catastrophe in Sarajevo demonstrates, ... has
been celebrated as heroism. Any human and merciful approach towards such peo-
ple is not welcomed; on the contrary, it could be harmful... for security of our own
troops’66. One soldier also involved in the campaign at Šabac recalled ‘(w)e received
the order, which was read out aloud, to kill everyone and to burn down everything
that crossed our path … and to destroy all that was Serb’67. On August 17th, civilians
were shot en masse beside the church68. The order to shoot these civilians was given
by Kasimir von Lütgendorf and the troops subsequently buried the locals in a mass
grave. In 1920, Lütgendorf was tried for the extra-judicial murder of three drunk sol-
diers in Šabac, but not for the massacre of Serbs69. August 1914 was exceptionally
hot and the fighting on Cer Mountain was punctuated by summer storms70. Fierce
fighting took place in the dark and many Habsburg troops retreated in panic. Šabac
was retaken by the Serbian army on 24th August.
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 111
Anton Holzer has observed that the propaganda battle against the Serbs pre-
dated 191471 and as such, may have had deeper roots in popular culture. Many con-
temporaries were shocked by the violence of the summer of 1914 outside direct the-
aters of war. There is evidence for Catholic complicity in Anti-Serb propaganda. In
Sarajevo, posters were put up, possible scripted by Catholic Bishop Josip Štadler
and his assistant Ivan Šarić which informed the people that there were ‘subversive
elements’ ((prevratih elemenata) amongst them who should be ‘exterminated from
their midst’ (iz svoje sredine istrijebe)72. Mass hangings took place in the Mačva re-
gion often in settings such as orchards. Several hangings from trees in the town of
Lešnica were recorded by the Swiss humanitarian Rudolphe Archibald Reiss. He al-
so included photographs of the victims in his report73. At the time of the outbreak of
war, hanging was the standard form of execution in Austria-Hungary, but the death
penalty was only permissible if the culprit was over 20 years old. As was the case
elsewhere in Europe, this form of capital punishment could be inflicted upon both
women and men. It also had a strong association with suicide and only a close ex-
amination of a corpse could determine whether the act was self-inflicted or not. By
1914, public executions had become less frequent in the Habsburg Monarchy and
had disappeared entirely in some parts of Europe. It is therefore unlikely that most
of the perpetrators of war crimes in Lešnica had seen an actual hanging before. Giv-
en the contrast between the previously peaceful lives of the Habsburg troops and
the atrocities committed in August 1914, it does appear as if the propaganda against
the Serbs had begun to have some purchase. Furthermore, there were a number of
traditions and religious rituals that could have served as a kind of rehearsal for gro-
tesque violence and scapegoating. Fires were lit on the Eastern Saturday across Eu-
rope in the pre-1914 period, often involving immolating a suspended papier-mâché
Judas Iscariot74. Amongst the Czechs, the burning of a model of Judas took place on
bíla sobota, the Saturday before Easter Day75. Similar rehearsals for punishing be-
trayal through mock hangings took place in the Tyrol and the Mediterranean within
Catholic and Orthodox communities76. The relationship between religious practice
and popular violence was frequently recorded elsewhere. In Kishinev in 1903, Jews
were attacked by drunk mobs who had been incited by church services and newspa-
per propaganda just after Easter77. These violent acts were also constructed in terms
of ‘revenge’ (in that case for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ).
Contemporaries were shocked by the treatment of the remaining civilians in
Šabac and news about the extent of the atrocities quickly spread. Writing in her di-
ary in Belgrade on August 7th, Natalija Matić Zrnić recorded that ‘(p)eople are say-
ing the Germans have done terrible things in Šabac. It is very hot and a lot of blood
is being shed’78. Slovene writer Fran Milčinski quoted a ‘letter from a soldier’ that re-
ported that his regiment had arrived in Šabac after fierce fighting and that the town
112 | Cathie Carmichael
was ‘totally destroyed’79. In Niš, Swiss writer Catharina Sturzenegger noted in her
diary on 20th August 1914 that Šabac had been ‘cleansed’ (‘gesäubert’) of its Serbi-
an inhabitants80. An American traveller also in Serbia heard ‘rumours ... great... at-
tacks’ on Šabac81. In the Mačva region as a whole, there were numerous atrocities
against non-combatants. Soldier Antonije Djurić wept when recalling the slaughter
of an unborn child and the young mother whose stomach had been ripped open82.
In his diary, Slovak soldier Michal Baláž described an unburied dead soldier be-
ing eaten by a dog and general desolation of this region of Serbia in the Autumn of
191483. Czech soldier Josef Šrámek also depicted a devastated Serbian landscape of
mud, burnt out farmsteads and untended crops in October 191484. Atrocities con-
tinued throughout the war years and during the subsequent Habsburg occupation
of Serbia and Montenegro. Elsewhere witnesses described how Serb prisoners were
starved to death in prison camps.85 Visiting Serbia in 1915, the American journalist
John Reed described his horror at atrocities by Habsburg troops. In Šabac, he de-
scribed how he had found ‘endless row of smashed and gutted and empty houses’86.
Summarising these terrible events, the ‘Serbian Relief Fund’ recorded in the Spec-
tatorr magazine that ‘the fertile district of Shabatz (sic) has been brutally ravaged by
the invaders in the opening weeks of the war, and the suffering among non-combat-
ants in the North of Serbia is therefore infinitely more acute even than in Belgium
and Northern France’87.
The conflation between ‘self-defence’ and ‘aggression’ seems to have sealed the
fate of the Mačva region. Jonathan Gumz has argued in his book on ‘Habsburg Ser-
bia’ that the collective effort of the Serbs to fight against the invasion was a novel
phenomenon88. Many contemporary accounts emphasized the fact that Serb com-
batants were not just men of fighting age, but adolescents, women and the elder-
ly who all rose up to defend themselves after the invasion89. Egon Erwin Kisch wit-
nessed the execution of five Serb civilians, the youngest of whom he thought was
only fifteen years old90. Alluding to chaos and civilian casualties in the Drina region,
one Viennese newspaper complained that women and children had used guns and
thrown bombs at Habsburg troops91. The confidence of the Habsburg troops seems
to have evaporated rapidly during the summer. Although the Serbian army was very
short of provisions and many men just had a hat rather than a uniform, as combat-
ants they were more experienced and probably had a higher morale92. Nevertheless,
soldiers were encouraged to accept the idea that the Serbs were not only better armed
than them93, but also that they were bandits (or komitadjis) even in their own coun-
try. This term that stems from the reports of the Balkan Wars but was used through
the war years by Habsburg combatants94.
In 1914, Serbian civilians attempted to defend themselves against an invad-
er and were depicted as komitadjis, drawing on stereotypes that had developed in
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 113
the years before. This would lead me to conclude that notions of violence and vio-
lent behaviour are intrinsically linked to territory and the crucial question of who
controls that territory. Prior to the early summer of 1914, the Serb Orthodox pop-
ulation in the Balkans had been contained by the Habsburg authorities. They were
constructed as an antithesis to Habsburg civilisation and by 1914 they were even
constructed as unworthy to live in their own country. In the summer of 1914, the
idea that all Serbs were combatants justified a campaign of annihilation. Contempt
for Serbs also descended into a fatal belief in one´s own propaganda. Lack of due
respect for the adversary or what was termed ´fâcheuses
´ habitudes de l’’armée autrichi-
’
enne’ was a crucial element in their defeat at Cer Mountain, according to Lieutenant
Colonel Desmazes and Commandant Naoumovitch95. Use of violence is frequently
presented by the perpetrator as just, redemptive, for a higher social good and above
all, necessary. There is little doubt that the Habsburg authorities thought they were
well within their rights to control, take, annex, shape and destroy if necessary. The
lethal combination of anger, crude propaganda and confused tactics left the Serb
population across Serbia (as well as those Orthodox people living in Hercegovina
and Montenegro) highly vulnerable to wild acts of violence in the hot, stormy sum-
114 | Cathie Carmichael
mer of 1914. Alexander Watson has remarked that ‘(t) the Austro-Hungarian pop-
ulation...underwent a remarkable, but rarely recounted emotional journey during
the summer (of 1914)..., culminating in acceptance and even belief in the necessi-
ty of conflict’96. In the course of the war, it is estimated that one quarter of the Serb
population, or about 800,000 people97 perished from starvation, disease and war in-
juries. Habsburg military casualties were probably just under a million men killed,
while a similar number of people died from disease during the conflict and influen-
za at the end of the war.
1
Thanks to Boris Bulatović, Charlea Metcalf,f Mark Hobbs, Richard Mills, Mark Thompson, Gilad Halp-
ern and Chris Jones as well as the participants at the colloquium ‘Nationalism in the History of the Ho-
locaust, Genocide, and Mass Violence. Imploding Societies across the Twentieth Century’ hosted by the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Van Leer Institute in July 2017 for their comments and thoughts.
2
So much so that Habsburg subjects were warned about travelling in Serbia. See for example ‘Die Kriegs-
gefahr mit Serbien’ Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung, 19. March 1909, pp. 2-3
3
Robin Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg ‘Civilizing Mission’’ in Bosnia 1878-1914 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
4
´Die Elektrische Strassenbahn in Sarajevo´, Zeitschrift des Österreichischen Ingenieur- und Architek-
ten-Vereines, vol. 47 1895, p. 344
5
Emile de Laveleye, The Balkan Peninsula (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1887), p. 88.
6
János Asbóth, Bosnien und die Herzegowina: Reisebilder und Studien, (Wien: A. Hölder, 1888) pp. 346-51
7
Mary Sparks, The Development of Austro-Hungarian Sarajevo, 1878-1918: An Urban History (London:
Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 106
8
Helga Berdan, ‘Die Machtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns und der Eisenbahnbau in Bosnien Herzegowi-
na‘, Mag. Phil, Universität Wien, 2008, p. 68
9
Moritz Hoernes, Dinarsiche Wanderungen: Cultur- und Landschaftsbilder aus Bosnien und der Hercegov-
ina, (Wien: C. Graeser, 1894), p. 71
10
Peter F. Sugar, Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1963), p. 164
11
Ludwig Dimitz, Die forstlichen Verhältnisse und Einrichtungen Bosniens und Hercegovina (Wien;
W. Frick) 1905, p. 70
12
Percy Herderson, A British Officer in the Balkans: The Account of a Journey Through Dalmatia, Monte-
negro, Turkey in Austria, Magyarland, d Bosnia and Hercegovina (London: Seeley, 1909), p. 40
13
Edin Hajdarpašić, Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840–1914
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp. 85-6
14
‘Die Staatsumwälzung in Serbien. Die Thronfolgefrage’, Prager Abendblatt, 15th June 1903, pp. 1-2.
15
Veteran Balkan expert Albin Kutschbach originally from Germany published his account as, Die Ser-
ben im Balkankrieg 1912–1913 und im Kriege gegen die Bulgaren (Stuttgart: Franck 1913).
16
See for example, ‘Serbengreuel’, Vorarlberger Volksfreund, 19. März 1913, p. 5; ‘Der Balkan under der
Krieg. Die Serbengreuel in Makedonien’ Pester Lloyd, 5. April 1915 p. 2
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 115
17
Carl Pauli, Kriegsgreuel: Erlebnisseimtürkisch-bulgarischen Kriege 1912; nach den Berichten von Mitkämp-
fern und Augenzeugen (Minden in Westfalen: Wilhelm Köhler Verlag, 1913), p. 49
18
‘Weltkrieg für Prochaska und das cuvajsierte Sebenico-Spalato’, Arbeiter Zeitung, 18th November 1912,
p. 2. This article expresses scepticism about Serbian cruelties.
19
‘Die Lage in Albanien’, Fremden-Blatt, 23rd September 1913 (evening edition), p. 1
20
‘Der Konflikt in Montenegro’, Grazer Volksblatt, 26. März 1913, pp. 1-2; ‘Die Affäre Palic’, Frem-
den-Blatt, 16th December 1913, p. 5
21
‘Die Ermordungeines Franziskaners bei Djakovo’, Volksblatt für Stadt und Land, 30th March 1913, p.
3. This version of events was reported verbatim in numerous Habsburg Monarchy newspapers.
22
Irvin Çemıl Schick, ‘Christian Maidens, Turkish Ravishers: the Sexualization of National Conflict in
the late Ottoman period’ in Amila Buturović and Irvin Çemıl Schick (eds.), Women in the Ottoman Bal-
kans: Gender,r Culture, and History (London: I. B. Tauris 2007), pp. 273-306
23
Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-13. Prelude to the First World War, (London: Routledge, 2000)
p. 138
24
George Kennan, The Other Balkan Wars: a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospectt (Washing-
ton D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), pp. 310-311
25
Pavel Milyukov, quoted in Frances Trix, ‘Peace-mongering in 1913: the Carnegie international com-
mission of inquiry and its report on the Balkan Wars’, First World War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2. 2014, p. 147
26
Tamara Scheer, ““Minimale Kosten, absolut kein Blut!”: Österreich-Ungarns Präsenz im Sandžak von
Novipazar (1879-1908) (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2013).
27
Bastian Matteo Scianna, ‘Reporting Atrocities: Archibald Reiss in Serbia, 1914—1918’, The Journal
of Slavic Military Studies 25:4, 2012, pp. 605-6
28
Jan G. Beaver, Collision Course: Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf,f Serbia and the Politics of Preventive War
(Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press, 2009), p. 120
29
‘Die patriotischen Kundgebungen in der Monarchie und im Deutschen Reiche’, in Neue Freie Presse,
29th July 1914, p. 7.
30
Leon Trotsky, My Life. An Attempt at an Autobiography, ((Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 240
31
Hugh Raffles, ‘Jews
‘ , Lice, and History’, Public Culture vol. 19, no. 3, 2007, pp. 521–66
32
Reproduced at http://www.dw.com/de/propagandakrieg-gegen-serbien/a-17747070
33
Reproduced at http://www.ww1-propaganda-cards.com/s006slide.html
34
‘Sarajewo’ Die Muskete, 16th July 1914, p. 1
35
‘Der Thronfolgermord in Sarajewo ‘, Wienerwald-Bote, 11th July 1914, p. 1
36
Pavlina Bobič, War and Faith: The Catholic Church in Slovenia, 1914-1918 (Leiden: Brill 2012), p. 35
37
‘Bojni grom’, Slovenec, 27th July 1914, p. 1
38
Ivan Hribar, Moji Spomini, vol. 2 (Ljubljana: Merkur, 1928), p. 69
39
Vladimir Ravnihar, Mojega življenja pot: spomini dr. Vladimirja Ravniharja (Ljubljana: Oddelek za
Zgodovino, 1997), p. 99
40
Telegram from Sir Maurice de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, 30th July 1914, in T.G. Otte, July Crisis:
The World’s’ Descent into Warr, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 373
41
‘Grosse serbenfeindliche Demonstration in Sarajevo’, Sarajewoer Tagblatt, June 29th 1914, p. 1. Note
the two spellings of the Bosnian capital.
42
Rory Yeomans, ‘Of “Yugoslav Barbarians” and Croatian Gentlemen Scholars: Nationalist Ideology
and Racial Anthropology in Interwar Yugoslavia, in Marius Turda and Paul Weindling (eds.), ‘Blood and
116 | Cathie Carmichael
Homeland’: Eugenics And Racial Nationalism in Central And Southeast Europe, 1900-1940 (Budapest: Cen-
tral European University Press, 2006), p. 105
43
James Lyon, Serbia and the Balkan Front,t 1914. The Outbreak of the Great War (London: Bloomsbury,
2015), p. 147
44
Manfried Rauchensteiner, The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914-1918 (Vi-
enna: Böhlau 2014), p. 138
45
Ami Boué La Turquie d’Europe ’ : Observations sur la géographie, la géologie, l’histoire naturelle, la statis-
’
tique, les mœurs, les coutumes, l’archéologie , l’agriculture
’ , l’industrie, le commerce, les gouvernements divers,
le clergé,
é l’histoire et l’état de cet empire (Paris: Arthus Bertrand 1840), vol. 4, p. 12
46
Ljubinka Trgovčević , ´South Slav Intellectuals and the Creation of Yugoslavia´in Dejan Djokić (ed.)
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (London: Hurst 2003), p. 232
47
Rudolphe A. Reiss, Report upon the Atrocities committed by the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First
Invasion of Serbia (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co 1916)
48
‘Deutsches Kapitel in Serbien’, Montagsblatt aus Böhmen, 29th June, 1903, p. 2
49
George Schaller, Allgemeine und militär-Geographie ((Wein: Seidel 1866), p. 307.On the fertility of the
region, see also P.A F.K Possart, Das Fürstenthum Serbien, seine Bewohner, r deren Sitten und Gebraüche,
(Darmstadt,t C.W. Leske: 1837-8), Part 1, p. 219
50
Cyprian Robert, Die Slawen oder Tuerkei, oder die Montenegriner, r Serbier,
r Bosniaken, vol.20 (Dresden
& Leipzig, 1844), p. 26
51
‘Sabac, besides its importance as a busy river-port, is a great road-junction’, Lionel W. Lyde, A Mili-
tary Geography of the Balkan Peninsula (London: A. and C. Black, 1905), p. 95
52
Viktor Jonics, ‘Serbien und die Serben’, Grazer Volksblatt, 28. März 1909, p. 1
53
‘Bilder aus Serbien’ Prager Abendblatt, 24. March 1909, p. 7
54
Mary Edith Durham, Through the lands of the Serb (London: Arnold, 1904), pp. 159-160.
55
Herbert Vivian, The Servian Tragedy, with some impressions of Macedonia
(London: G. Richards, 1904) p. 202. On the plum trade see, ‘Pflaumen und Pflaumenmus’, Pester Lloyd,
5th February 1914, p. 18
56
David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 277
57
Otte, July Crisis, pp. 190-191
58
Otte, op. cit, p. 434
59
Marvin Benjamin Fried, Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 121
60
Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008), p. 50. On Serbia’s lack of readiness, see Mile Bjele-
jac, ‘Serbien im Ersten Weltkrieg’ in Gordana Ilić Marković (ed.), Veliki Rat – Der Große Krieg. g Der Er-
ste Weltkrieg im Spiegel der serbischen Literatur und Presse (Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2015), p. 56.
61
James Wycliffe Headlam, The History of Twelve Days: July 24th to August 4th 1914
(London: Fisher Unwin, 1915 ), p. 171
62
The original text is: ‘jene Organe des Grenzdienstes von Schabatz und Losnitza, die den Urhebern
des Verbrechens von Sarajevo bei dem Übertritt über die Grenzebehilflichwaren, aus dem Dienstezu-
entlassen und strenge zubestrafen’, in Winfried Baumgart(ed.), Die Julikrise und der Ausbruch des Er-
sten Weltkrieges 1914 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), p. 115. It was printed
verbatim in most of the Habsburg Monarchy daily newspapers.
Sealing the Fate of Šabac: Habsburg Policy and Mačva Region of Serbia 1903-1914 | 117
63
Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914-1918 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 46.
64
For an excellent account of his career, see Rudolf Jeřábek, Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo
(Graz: Verlag Styria, 1991).
65
Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, p. 142. Other accounts of the first battles of the war include John R. Schin-
dler, ‘Disaster on the Drina: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Serbia, 1914’, War in History, Vol 9, No.
2, 2002 pp. 159–195; Günther Rothenberg, ‘The Austro-Hungarian Campaign Against Serbia in 1914’
The Journal of Military History vol. 53. No. 2, 1989, pp. 127–146
66
Arhiv Srbije, MID-PO, F-XVI/1914, 16, Dos. IV quoted in Mile Bjelajac ‘The Impact of the WWI
on the Officers’ Mind-set in the Balkan Affairs: Interwar, WW II and After (Humanitarian Aspect)’,
ТОКОВИ ИСТОРИЈЕ Часопис Института за новију историју Србије no. 1 2016 p. 17
67
Anton Holzer, Das Lächeln der Henker. Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914–1918
(Darmstadt: Primus 2. Aufl, 2014), p. 118
68
Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse, pp. 57-58
69
‘Der Prozess gegen General Lütgendorf’f , Reichspost,t 5th June 1920, pp. 5-6.
70
Joseph Schön, Šabac!: der Kampf der Deutschböhmischen 29. Inf.f -Div., des Prager VIII.und des Budapes-
ter IV Korps im August 1914 in Nordwest-Serbien (Reichenberg: Heimatsöhne im Weltkrieg), 1928.
71
Anton Holzer, ‘Schüsse in Sabac, Die Massaker an der Zivilbevölkerung 1914’ in Gordana Ilić Mar-
ković (ed.), Veliki Rat – Der Große Krieg. g Der Erste Weltkrieg im Spiegel der serbischen Literatur und Pres-
se ((Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2015), p. 83
72
Andrej Mitrović, Srbija u prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), p. 31
73
Rudophe A. Reiss, Report upon the Atrocities committed by the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First
Invasion of Serbia (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co 1916)
74
According to the Gospel of Matthew, the historic Judas is supposed to have hanged himself.f
75
‘Velkonočni’ in Slovan - časopis věnovaný politickým a vůbec veřejným záležitostem slovanským, zvláště
českým, 30th March, 1872, p. 191.
76
James Fraser, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998),
pp. 715-6
77
Edward H. Judge, Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom (New York: New York University Press,
1992) pp. 54-55
78
Carol Lilly and Jill Irvine (eds.), Natalija: Life in the Balkan Powder Keg,
g 1880-1956
(Budapest: New York: Central European University Press, 2008), p.194
79
Fran Milčinski, Dnevnik 1914-1920 (Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 2000), p. 26
‘Sedaj smo že po vseh vročih bojih v Šabcu. Mesto je popolnoma razrušeno’.
80
Catharina Sturzenegger, Serbien im europäischen Kriege 1914 / 1915: nach Briefen, Dokumenten und ei-
genen Erlebnissen (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1915), p. 35.
81
Jan Gordon, The luck of thirteen; wanderings and flight through Montenegro and Serbia (New York: E.P.
Dutton: 1916), p. 228
82
‘Soldatentagebuch: Sommer in Mačva’ in Marković (ed.), Veliki Rat – Der Große Kriegg pp. 131-2.
83
Michal Baláž, Z bojov v Bosne, online at Europeana.com.
84
Josef Šrámek, Denik zajatce v I. světovéválce (Prague: Palmknihy, 2012) pp. 8-12
85
Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), p. 67
86
John Reed, War in Eastern Europe. Travels through the Balkans in 1915, (London: Orion 1999)
118 | Cathie Carmichael
87
‘Serbian Relief Fund’, The Spectator, 26th September 1914, p. 17
88
Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse, pp. 55-56.
89
The young age of the combatants struck a young Slavonian soldier Ivan Fürst in his Ratni dnevnik,
Državni arhiv, Osijek, online at Europeana.com.
90
Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse, pp. 53-4
91
’Der Vormarsch der Unseren in Serbien’, Neuigkeits Welt Blatt, 19th August 1914, pp. 6-7. This storyy
was repeated verbatim in other press accounts e.g. ‘Die Einnahme von Sabac’, Deutsches Volksblatt, 19th
August 1914, p. 2
92
On the Serbian army, see James M.B Lyon, ‘”A peasant mob”: The Serbian Army on the eve of the
Great War’, The Journal of Military History vol. 61. No. 3, 1997, pp. 481-502
93
Milčinski, Dnevnik, p. 26
94
Ludwig Schwenk, Als Kriegsgefangener durch Serbien 1918-1919: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, (Klagen-
furt: Hermagoras, 2017)
95
Lieutenant-Colonel Desmazes & Commandant Naoumovitch, ‘Les victoires Serbes en 1914’, Revue
militarise française, no. 10, 1927, p. 150
96
Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I: The People’s’ Warr (Lon-
don: Penguin, 2014) p. 59
97
Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), vol II, p. 323. See
also Slobodan Markovich, ‘Serbia’s War Losses during the Great War Reconsidered’ in Dragoljub Živo-
jinović (ed.), The Serbs and the First World War 1914-1918 (Belgrade: SANU, 2015), pp. 369-81
Кати Кармајкл
UDC 355.45(497.1)
Оригинални научни рад
Dr Christian Costamagna1
EastJournal.net (Torino)
Scientific Committee
Italy
Introduction
In the last decade the scholarship and research about Yugoslavia as a state have
been partially abandoned in favor of different topics and perspectives. Sociological
or other issues gained more popularity among the academic community, exploring
1
christian.costamagna@gmail.com
122 | Christian Costamagna
new fields and enriching our knowledge about life in a socialist system.2 Indeed, in
the period between the 1990s and the last decade the books and the scientific arti-
cles about the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, the crisis, not to mention the war,
for quite obvious reasons, filled the bookshelves. Notwithstanding the absence of ar-
chive funds, thanks to a comprehensive use of newspapers articles, interviews, mem-
oirs, internal documents of various institutions, there were enough sources in order
to establish an initial body of knowledge.
It should be noted, however, that the studies about the so called Titoist regime,
dropped almost suddenly.3 The self-management, the non-alignment, and virtual-
ly all the pillars of the Yugoslav socialist regime eclipsed from the research interests
of most of the scholars. Instead, nationalism, nations, war and peace studies, crisis
management, peacekeeping, migrations and many others, replaced all the previous
standard topics.4 Possibly, the only regime left and worth to study, along the 1990s
and in the following years, was that of Milošević in Serbia.5
This turn, if we can use this term, in the research perspectives, left a certain
amount of free hand for a new wave of historical investigations about the socialist re-
gime. To be sure, a few studies are flourishing recently about the past regime.6 Some
of these efforts were facilitated by the access to previously unavailable archival sourc-
es scattered among the various former Yugoslav states.7
2
For a recent overview, see the Part I of the following book: Florian Bieber, Armina Galijaš, and Rory
Archer, eds., Debating the End of Yugoslavia (Farnham – Burlington: Ashgate, 2014). For some themat-
ic example, see: Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor, eds., Yugoslavia’s’ Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in
Socialism 1950s-1980s (Budapest – New York: Central European University Press, 2010); Patrick Hy-
der Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-
nell University Press, 2011); Breda Luthar and Marusa Pusnik, eds., Remembering Utopia: The Culture
of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2010).
3
Of course, there were remarkable exceptions, such as: Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: a History of its Demise
(London: Routledge, 1999 [1995]), and also Dejan Jović, Jugoslavija: Država koja je Odumrla (Zagreb:
Prometej, and Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2003).
4
For a wide overview, see: Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debate about the Yu-
goslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
5
One of the most interesting analysis is: Slobodan Antonić, Zarobljena zemlja: Srbija za Vlade Slobodana
Miloševića (Beograd: Otkrovenje, 2002).
6
See: Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s’ antibureaucratic revolution: Milošević,
ć the fall of Communism and na-
tionalist mobilization (Basingstoke - New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Hilde Katrine Haug, Creat-
ing a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question (London and New York:
’
I. B. Tauris, 2012); Zoran Petrović Piroćanac, La Serbie et l’Ascension de Slobodan Milošević : 1982-1992.
’ Auto-degradation (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011).
Anatomie d’une
7
See the Part II – New Directions in Research, in the following book: Bieber, Galijaš and Archer, eds., De-
bating the End; Stefano Lusa, La Dissoluzione del Potere: il Partito Comunista Sloveno ed il Processo di De-
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 123
The so called titoist regime was an authoritarian and illiberal regime. While it
appeared as open and soft handed compared to the Eastern bloc, it was, nonethe-
8
Anyway, any aprioristic dismission of the Special war theory should be avoided. Also in the present
time, even in the largest democracy, there are several investigations ongoing about the Russian interfer-
ence in the 2016 US Presidential elections. See, for example, “Assessing Russian Activities and Inten-
tions in Recent US Election,” National Intelligence, January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/docu-
ments/ICA_2017_01.pdf.f Moreover, also in today’s Western Balkans, there are other forms of influence.
See, for example: Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2017).
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 125
less, a form of dictatorship that limited the individual freedoms. Of course, certain
social rights were granted, but not always, and not for all the society. Differences in
social strata and social stratification were part of the structure of the Yugoslav pop-
ulation. There was only one party, while divided in eight federal entities (the six re-
publics and two provinces). All the other alternative ideas and their supporters were
considered as enemies, or, at least, with suspicion. Many non-conformist thinkers
and activists were under police surveillance, others were arrested and imprisoned,
and a minority were killed by operatives of the Yugoslav security services (especial-
ly among the Croatian émigré nationalist groups).9
Considering the destabilizing effects of the so called Croatian Spring in 1971,
and the Maspok movement, it should not be surprising that the regime endorsed the
Special war doctrine. The introduction of market elements, consumerism, freedom
to work abroad, political devolution from the center to the republics, created high
expectations of further freedoms in certain segments of the society. Because of the
unexpected effects of partial openness towards the rest of the World and the West,
the Tito’s authoritarian regime needed to control the internal dissent, and the po-
tential and real adversaries in the country, and abroad.
In a wider context, the Yugoslavs, because of the non-alignment, followed close-
ly how the superpowers, and in particular the USA, interfered with certain govern-
ments considered too close to the socialist ideology in the Third world. Those strate-
gies alarmed the Yugoslav communists, who tried to learn lessons and develop some
self-defense strategy.
The Army
By the mid-1980s, the stability of the Yugoslav regime became more uncertain,
because of several factors, among which a social crisis due to low productivity, not
competitive products, high foreign debt, unemployment, high inflation, fall of the liv-
ing standards in the recently urbanized peasants, rising tensions in Kosovo, distrusts
in the politicians, and lack of leadership at Yugoslav level.10 That is why the analysis
9
For a short overview of the recent Croatian (and not only) literature about the Yugoslav security services
and the Croatian émigré circles, see: Kristian Benić, “UDBA i Bivše Tajne Službe: kako do Zaokružene
Sinteze ili barem Domaćeg Roberta Ludluma?”, Gradska Knjižnica Rijeka, last modified January 1st, 2017,
https://gkr.hr/Magazin/Teme/UDBA-i-bivse-tajne-sluzbe-kako-do-zaokruzene-sinteze-ili-barem-do-
maceg-Roberta-Ludluma. The following book offers an interesting example (in form of published sourc-
es) about police surveillance of a political dissident under the Yugoslav socialist regime: Vojislav Šešelj,
Policijski Dosije: Prvi Deo (Beograd: Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2010).
10
For a lucid contemporary analysis of the economy in Yugoslavia, see: Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Cri-
sis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
126 | Christian Costamagna
and the forecasts realized by the security sector, and in particular the military, who
acted as a kind of mega-corporation with ramified and high involvement in the lo-
cal economy, and in the revenue of arms exports towards developing countries, con-
trolled by highly ideologized dogmatic communist officials, tended to be quite pes-
simistic.11 Indeed, the military establishment was essentially the last bastion to think
and act in a pan-Yugoslav environment, and they had their own services (from the
health care to the security services), so it could handle first hand reliable informa-
tion all across the country. What made the Yugoslav People Army different from the
leaders of the various Yugoslav republics and provinces, was the simple fact that the
regional political elites had their consensus base just at republican (and provincial)
level, not at the federal one. So, from this point of view, the most interested organiza-
tion to keep safe the country, considering its formal political role in Yugoslavia, was
indeed the military establishment, since its chain of command was not affected by
the disintegrating effect of self-management and decentralization, notwithstanding
the presence of the Territorial defense system, which had a republican dimension.
In the crisis that was unfolding along the second half of the 1980s, under the con-
ceptual umbrella of the Special war, there were almost every kind of activities that
could undermine the stability of Yugoslavia, encompassing virtually every aspect of
social, cultural, and economic life.12 The culture of suspect, was not always taken in se-
rious consideration.13 It was denied by Slovenian political leaders, and it was mocked
by students’ magazines in Serbia. But paradoxically, the very same skepticism was it-
11
See Dragan Vukšić, JNA i Raspad SFR Jugoslavije: od Čuvara do Grobara svoje Države (Stara Pazova: Te-
komgraf,f 2006); Miroslav Hadžić, Jugoslovenska Narodna Agonija (Beograd: Dan Graf i Centar za Civil-
no-vojne Odnose, 2004 [2002]).
12
For a detailed list of the threats against Yugoslavia, see Arhiv Republike Slovenije, Fond AS 1589, Cen-
tralni Komite Zveze Komunistov Slovenije, podfond IV 1968-1990. Tehnična enota [File box] 1330,
Predsedništvo Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Ocene i stavovi o osnovnim karakteris-
tikama političko-bezbednosne situacije u društvu, sa posebnim osvrtom na aktivnost građanske desnice
i drugih antisocijalističkih snaga, Beograd, 2 novembar 1986 godine.
13
Milan Kučan, leader of the Slovenian communists, said, in March 1988, during a meeting of the Pres-
idency of the League of Communists that it was not “good or intelligent” to accuse Western European
countries of waging a “special war” together with the Yugoslav “internal enemies” against Yugoslavia.
The topic of the discussion was the situation in Slovenia. See ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e. 1349,
Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 72. Sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza ko-
munista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 29.03.1988, 10/1 SS. The culture of suspect was captured also in the field
of the arts, as in the movie: Balkanski Špijun, directed by Dušan Kovačević, and Božidar Nikolić (1984;
Yugoslavia). Mocking articles about the culture of suspect appeared in Yugoslav youth magazine, such
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 127
self considered an evidence of the danger of the Special war. The latter, as a Yugoslav
general defined it in 1982, was “an indirect aggression against the Socialist federal
republic of Yugoslavia [that] is conducted by reactionary forces, imperialists and by
the hostile emigration together and in complicity with the forces of the internal en-
emy”.14 Even after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in 1994, in the middle of the war, a
YPA General, Pavle Jakšić, stated that the military leadership had not been able to re-
ally understand the importance and the nature of the Special war in the context of the
Cold War. Jakšić added that the public opinion, was not informed about such threats.15
The enemies of Yugoslavia embraced a very large spectrum, encompassing Su-
perpowers, like the USA and the Soviet Union, the right-wing émigré groups scat-
tered among the First world, various nationalist enemies in Yugoslavia itself,f and
fifth columinsts (traitors) inside the state apparatus. Essentially, their guilt, was to
conspire against the Yugoslav socialist regime, trying to reintroduce capitalism, the
bourgeoise parliamentarism, to destroy the federation, or to put, once again, Bel-
grade under the umbrella of the Soviet Union. The means to achieve those goals var-
ied vastly. One supposed method was the concession of generous loans to Yugosla-
via from Western banks. This was interpreted as a strategical way to interfere in the
internal affairs and policies, altering the socialist nature of the policies implement-
ed by Belgrade.16 While without mentioning the term “Special war” explicitly, still
at the beginning of 1989, Stipe Šuvar, one of the most influential Yugoslav political
as Studentt (Serbia). See: Svetlana Vasović, “Povodom Dana Bezbednosti Ćelije su Otvorene za Drugači-
ja Mišljenja,” Student,t List beogradskih studenata, May 14, 1987, 5.
14
The original quote of the General Nikezić is here: Ilija Nikezić, “Il Significato di «Difesa Nazionale
Globale» e di «Autotutela Sociale,»” Questioni attuali del socialismo, no. (December, 1982): 42, as cited
in: Stefano Piziali, Jugoslavia tra Nazionalismo e Autodeterminazione (Montepulciano: Editori del Grifo,
1991), 41. For Yugoslav books about the Special war, contemporary to the events, see: Dušan Vilić and
Milan Ateljević, Specijalni Rat: Odbrana i Zaštita (Beograd: Poslovna politika, 1983); Vojislav Mićović,
Specijlani Rat i Jugoslavija (Beograd: Rad, 1986). I did not consult the latter two books here mentioned
(I read some of their contemporary reviews). The same authors, still in the 1990s, continued to publish
books where the Special war was still considered important. See Dušan Vilić and Boško Todorović, Ra-
zbijanje Jugoslavije 1990-1992 (Beograd: DIK Knjizevne novine, 1995), 71-164; Vojislav Mićović, The
Aggression Against Yugoslavia: the ““Angel of Mercy” of the New World Order (Belgrade: TANJUG, 2000),
111-30.
15
Vilić and Todorović, Razbijanje Jugoslavije, 96. See: Pavle Jakšić, Pohod na Jugoslaviju (Beograd: DIK
Knjizevne novine – Enciklopedija, 1994). I did not consult the latter.
16
In the set of documents consulted in Ljubljana, I have read about a meeting between the Yugoslav au-
thorities and Nicolae Ceaușescu. The Romanian political leader warmly suggested to the Yugoslavs to
follow his example, and repay all the foreign debt, otherwise the West would have used it as a weapon
against the socialist regimes. ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS [I have lost the reference file box and the orig-
inal text of this quotation about Ceaușescu].
128 | Christian Costamagna
leaders of the time, pointed out that a “fight for power” with the goal to “change or
destroy the constitutional order” was already in motion. According to him, the ille-
gitimate attempts to introduce the multiparty system in Yugoslavia, would have pro-
duced new political parties that, in turn, would have denied the values of socialism,
and promoted secessionism. Šuvar however did not ignore the very same responsi-
bilities of the League of communists in such a trend.17
17
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1360, Stipe Šuvar, Uvodna riječ na 20. Sjednici CKSKJ, [without date
but probably February 1989], 8.
18
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice Pred-
sedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 24.11.1987; Savezni sekretariat
za narodnu odbranu, Kabinet saveznog sekretara, Odraz unutrašnje situacije na bezbednost SFRJ, Beo-
grad, 5.11.1987 godine [no page number].
19
Mamula reported similar information also in his book. See: Branko Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija (Beo-
grad: CID, 2000), 146-48.
20
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 1.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 129
Clearly, the Yugoslavs paid a special attention about their image in the eyes of the
other countries. The document is structured in five parts. The first part is devoted
to the West and NATO countries. The second to the Warsaw pact countries. The
third to some non-aligned countries and to the Yugoslavs citizens working abroad.
The fourth part was about the impact of foreign evaluations about the Yugoslav inter-
nal conditions on their military activities. Finally, the fifth part was devoted to some
characteristics of the Yugoslav internal security issues. The Yugoslavs relied over a
network of informers inside foreign countries, organizations, military and diplomat-
ic circles, so we can assume that the information in the document should be reliable.
The first part of the document could be considered one of the most interest-
ing and dense in significative details. Mamula stressed that the West was paying lip
service to Yugoslavia, including their “traditional friends”. In the West, latterly, their
forecasts about Yugoslavia assumed more and more negative outlooks. The West
expected that the situation in Yugoslavia may have turned out like Lebanon or Po-
land at the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, to the disappointment of Mamula,
the West started to support strongly the internal opponents in Yugoslavia and the
far-right émigré elements.21
In the NATO military circles, thought that the worst problems in Yugoslavia
had to do with the “economic difficulties” and the “situation in Kosovo”. While of-
ficially the West supported the neutral position of Yugoslavia, and believed that the
Yugoslav defense system was able to accomplish its duties, more recently NATO
countries started to make speculations. Indeed, it seemed possible that the internal
conditions would have become so tense, that the situation of crisis may have gone
out of control, and creating the conditions for an internationalization of the inter-
nal problems of Yugoslavia.22 Kosovo and its never ending critical issues were under
the lens of the West. According to a footnote in the document, NATO thought that
the crisis in Yugoslavia “may explode at any time, transforming in a sort of lebaniza-
tion or superbalkanization”23 Not only, but NATO then, instead of being caught in
the dilemma about the future orientation of Yugoslavia, with the West, or with the
East, jumped directly to another level: “will Yugoslavia survive at all?” Considering
that those analysis were made in the second half of 1987, they have a certain histor-
21
Ibid., 2.
22
Already one year before, in November 1986, a YPA General, Miloslav Đorđević, raised the problem.
See: Christian Costamagna, “Security in Serbia by the end of 1986: From Kosovo crisis to the Third
World War,” in Vek srpske Golgote: 1915-2015, edited by Uroš Šuvaković (Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozof-
ski Fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini, 2016).
23
The quote is in the original. Mamula quoted a sentence from some NATO sources.
130 | Christian Costamagna
ical value and impact on our knowledge. Moreover, the archival source mentioned
here, confirms (terminology included) what Raif Dizdarević, at the time holding
the office of Federal secretary of the foreign affairs of Yugoslavia, mentioned in his
memoir, about the same issues.24
Going further, Mamula discussed specifically how the USA viewed Yugoslavia.
Already in January 1987, an American source told that the American administration
put Yugoslavia closely under scrutiny, they took the crisis very seriously, intensify-
ing the research activities and forecasts. Because of its geostrategic and political con-
ditions, according to Mamula, his country was in the spotlight.
The Americans, Mamula wrote, were particularly interested about Kosovo and
Serbia. From Washington, Kosovo was in all but the name already a republic, and
they expected that soon Albanian nationalists would have claimed an “ethnic Alba-
nia” which would have included “the Popular Republic of Albania, Kosovo, West-
ern Macedonia and part of Montenegro.”25 In the US thought that it was unreal the
existence of “two Albanias with different social systems”, so it was hard to imagine
what would happen to Yugoslavia and Albania proper.
Mamula, talking about America, made an interesting statement:
Serious interlocutors [not specified who] assure us that the USA did not change
their position toward Yugoslavia and that, like until now, they will support its in-
dependence. However, more and more they [the USA] are considering the [pos-
sible] destabilization of the country [Yugoslavia]. They [the interlocutors] claim
that the USA will support Yugoslavia as far as they consider it strong and united,
but, when they will consider that [Yugoslavia] it is not anymore [strong], [for
the US, it]“would not be difficult to support the creation of Greater Albania”.26
24
The only difference between the report made by Admiral Mamula, mentioned above, and the Security
report cited by Raif Dizdarević in his memoir, is that the latter is eight months older (March 1987). Raif
Dizdarević, La Morte di Tito: la Morte della Jugoslavia (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2001 [1999]), 189-91.
Reading Dizdarevic’s book, it is quite evident that he used abudantly the original documents and tran-
scripts. Of course, being a book of memoirs, he did not quote them like I did in this article. From Dizdare-
vić to Mamula (see his book in the bibliography of the present article), and many other local politicians
- Slobodan Milošević included, in his book Godine Raspleta (Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički za-
vod, 1989), from protagonists to political scientists and historians, the transcripts of the sessions of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (and the other republican branches), they constitute a privileged
historical source.
25
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 3.
26
Ibid., 4. The square brackets are mine. The quotation marks are in the original text. Probably Admi-
ral Mamula was quoting a confidential source.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 131
Without explicitly citing the USA, Mamula made a similar statement two month
before. In case of deterioration of the Kosovo crisis, with the escalation of an armed
conflict, internationalization and foreign intervention should have been expected,
and “It would be difficult to assume in such a case that the Yugoslav option would be
more real than of the Albanian one [,] of a more or less ethnically clean Kosovo”.27
He also thought that Yugoslavia may have lost the support of the big powers, in fa-
vor of its neighbors.
The Secretary of defense stated that the far-right Albanian émigré groups, were
more and more included in the military plans of the defense system of the USA, in
particular under the “Special operation forces”. Mamula believed that those émigré
groups from Kosovo, would have been exploited by the Americans under certain cir-
cumstances. In the meantime, the Albanian far-right from Kosovo constituted, for
the US, a strategical “backup”.28 This information could maybe raise some questions
about the debated relations between the US and the UÇK ten years later. However,
just a further deep research may clarify that issue. We should not forget that in the
military document here taken in consideration, there are other starting points that
suggest hints about what happened few years later, during the war in the 1990s. For
example, the report reminds that the Croatian far-right émigré groups abroad, start-
ed military training for some of their members, in an organized form, sending them
also in the French Foreign Legion (can this information shed new light on protago-
nists of the war in Croatia, such as the Croatian General Ante Gotovina?).
The Yugoslav Secretary of defense, quoting a Western source, from March of
that year, the long -term goal of the USA was to change the “socio-political system”
in the country, and make Yugoslavia join the Western positions. Nevertheless, in
the short term there was no rush to put under pressure the socialist regime, it was
enough to pressure for change in the economic system, stabilize it, and push Yugo-
slavia in the direction of the Western democracies. Indeed, already in March 1984,
the US administration, under President Ronald Reagan, approved a National Secu-
rity Decision Directive toward Yugoslavia, stating that: “We will also continue to en-
courage Yugoslavia’s long-term internal liberalization”.29
27
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, [I lost the number of the box file], Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške
sa 48. Sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 08.09.1987,
16/1 TDJ.
28
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 19.
29
“U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia: NSDD 133,” The White House, March 19, 1984, http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-133.htm.
132 | Christian Costamagna
To achieve their targets, the Americans used the following methods against Yu-
goslavia, according to Mamula: further indebtedness toward the US and the West,
because of economic and political pressures; supporting consumerism; reinforcing
the Western way of life in the Yugoslav citizens living abroad and through media pro-
paganda toward those in Yugoslavia; supporting opposition in Yugoslavia and oth-
er dissidents, reinforcing nationalism; weakening the Yugoslav defense capabilities
(e.g. influencing the families and friends of YPA officers who attended military acad-
emies in the US.
From Mamula’s point of view, the pressures of the US against Yugoslavia assumed
various forms and dimensions. For example, also the CIA’s chief of the counterter-
rorism, Claridge, said that he would have reconsidered the position of his agency
toward Yugoslavia, unless Belgrade stopped to tolerate Near East terroristic groups
(and not only them). The US would have stopped, or at least slowed down, the mil-
itary-economic relations with Yugoslavia, and menaced that “in the Pentagon there
are strong currents against the cooperation with Yugoslavia, because of its active and
passive support of terrorism”.30
A sub-committee for the Human rights and International Organizations of the
House of Representatives of the US Congress, the previous year, accused Yugoslavia
not only of support of terrorism but also of mistreatment of the Albanian minority
in Kosovo. They wanted to suppress the status of Yugoslavia as a privileged nation
in the field of commerce. About 160 congressmen were ready to sign such act. We
should recall that such a move of the US Congress was in countertendency with the
policies advanced by Slobodan Milošević from 1987 onward.31 Moreover, from the
point of view of the Yugoslavs, the campaign in the name of the human rights, and
other form of freedoms, were attacks against the constitutional order and legitimacy,
orchestrated by far-right groups, nationalists, in conjunction with foreign powers.32
Of course, also Tirana had a role in advancing its pretensions toward Kosovo, but
Mamula thought that Albania, while supporting separatists in Kosovo, would not go
too further, because of fear of a boomerang effect. Tirana believed that an unpredict-
30
The quoting marks are in the original text.
31
It was no accident that Milošević, later, refused to receive, with lasting consequences, the last Amer-
ican ambassador in Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman. The American campaign for the protection of the
human rights of Albanians in Kosovo was totally contrary to Milošević’s political agenda that gave him
so much popularity and consensus in 1987-1989.
32
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, Predsednikova Dejavnost, t.e.2649/9, Savezni savet za zaštitu ustav-
nog poretka: Oceni i stavovi o povećanoj ugroženosti ustavnog poretka i bezbednosti zemlje, Beograd,
21.03.1988 godine, 6.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 133
able crisis in Kosovo, would have pushed the Soviet Union in the Balkans, and Mos-
cow, under certain circumstances, may have taken again under control also Albania.33
As far as Italy was concerned (Italy in the document came straight after the USA,
and before UK and France), there was a gap between its official diplomatic policy,
and the real internal debate. Italy thought that the crisis in Kosovo could have esca-
lated beyond control, and could have created the conditions for a direct intervention
from abroad. Since Italy had a great interest in the geopolitical space of the Balkans,
because of security reasons to protect Italy from USSR, the Italians, in case of disso-
lution of Yugoslavia, started to consider a possible direct military intervention.34 In
another part of the same document, Mamula said that Italy formed forces for “emer-
gency intervention”, with the following duties: to reinforce the defense of Southern
Italy; for intervention in the Mediterranean; and “for the protection of Italian mi-
norities abroad”.35 That meant, if confirmed, a possible intervention to protect the
Italian minority in Istria.
Moreover, Mamula stated that, if Kosovo would have become “ethnically clean”
(with Albanians only), the Italian government would have supported the formal sta-
tus of republic for the Serbian Autonomous Province, leading to the creation of a
“Greater Albania”.36 If the plans described by Mamula are true, that means that Italy,
at the end of the 20th century, would have followed the footprints of the Italian Fas-
cist regime. The Secretary of defense added that, despite the official position of Ita-
ly, in the Italian military circles, there were pressures to follow a certain political and
economic line, such as to open the Yugoslav market to foreign capital, to give more
space to the free initiative in the market, and to introduce the Western form of gov-
ernment, with a multiparty system and a parliamentary democracy. The Secretary
felt uncomfortable with the negative narrative about the Yugoslav crisis prevailing
33
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 19.
34
Mamula described the same concept two months earlier, supposing a possible Italian direct military
intervention, in case of a serious Yugoslav internal destabilization. See ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, [I
lost the number of the box file], Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 48. Sednice, 16/5 TDJ. Eight
years later, at the end of 1995, Italy sent a first contingent of soldiers in Bosnia under the umbrella of the
UN (UNPROFOR). Since then, the Italian armed forces are in the region, Kosovo included (KFOR).
The interest of the Italian Army toward former Yugoslavia assumed different forms. General Kadijević
wrote that the Italian Army wanted to publish his book Moje Viđenje Raspada: Vojska bez države (Beo-
grad: Politika, 1993) in Italian, but he renounced because did not want to modify the structure of the
text. See: Veljko Kadijević, Protiv Udar: Moje Viđenje Raspada Jugoslavije (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 2010),
255.
35
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 15.
36
Ibid., 6.
134 | Christian Costamagna
in the Italian media, noting that even the Italian communist party, a friend of Yugo-
slav communists, shared those pessimistic view.37
Furthermore, the links between Italy and Yugoslavia, in the field of security and
foreign policy, at that time, could be exemplified by other interesting details, although
coming from different sources. In the 1980s, the Italian Military Intelligence and Se-
curity Service (Servizio per le informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare – SISMI) recruited
Nurif Rizvanović, a former officer of the Yugoslav Army. Rizvanović worked also for
the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienstt – BND) and the
Slovenian State Security Service (Uprava drzavne varnosti)38. The latter, being under
the Slovenian republican control, reflected the political tensions and acted in compe-
tition (and not in cooperation) with the Federal bodies, such as the Yugoslav Army.
Since the Italians had compromising material (as drug dealer) against Rizvanović, he
passed (also) to the Italians classified information taken from the Yugoslav People Ar-
my. His activities were discovered, and he was condemned by a military court in 1987
to a long sentence.39 The interest of Rome toward Yugoslavia appeared also in other
forms. Interestingly, in 1988, the Italian Minister of foreign affairs, Giulio Andreot-
ti, warned the Yugoslavs that Austria, to expand its economy, was trying to establish
“some [sort of] union” with Slovenia.40 From this point of view, the Italians felt in com-
petition with Austria, so passed the information to the Yugoslav central government.
It would be beyond the scope of this article to enumerate and detail every single
aspect, but still, it is worth to mention that, according to the Yugoslavs, the UK held
37
It is worth to note that the Italian Communist Party received financial help, occasionally, from the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the latter got the money they needed from the Yugoslav govern-
ment). By the end of 1978 the Italians asked 200,000 US dollars to the Yugoslavs, to cover part of their
losses. The Yugoslav ideologue, Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, was in favor, saying that it was in the inter-
est of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia to give money to the Italian communists. Stane Dolanc, himself
a Slovene, former heir apparent of Tito, was bothered by the request, because he did not trust the Ital-
ians, since they already took the money, on a regular basis, from “the Russians”. He was of the opinion
that half of that sum was already a great amount of money. See Pero Simić and Zvonimir Despot, Tito:
Strogo Poverljivo, Arhiviski dokumenti (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, second edition, 2011), 506-08. Simić
and Despot published excerpts of transcripts like those used in this article.
38
In Serbo-croatian: Uprava državne bezbednosti, better known as UDBA, its previous acronym.
39
Vilić and Todorović, Razbijanje Jugoslavije, 252. Also, the former Chief of the Yugoslav military coun-
terespionage, General Aleksandar Vasiljević, mentioned the Rizvanović case (but explicitly avoided to
mention SISMI and BND), during a TV interview. See: Radio Televizija Republike Srpske, interview
with General Aleksandar Vasiljević, last modified October 10, 2014, video, 05:10, https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=jkVVNG6Atw4&t=514s While there is no certain date of the interview, it was re-
corded between 2012 and 2014. The General Vasiljević was the reviewer of Vilić and Todorović’s book
quoted above in this note. See Vilić and Todorović, Razbijanje Jugoslavije,481-83.
40
Mamula, Slučaj, 146.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 135
toward Belgrade a position similar to the USA.41 France, instead, was openly con-
trary to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, being in favor of Yugoslav unity and the found-
ing values of the Second world war. The end of Yugoslavia, for the French, would
have “disrupted the present European stability”. The Federal republic of Germany,
while supporting Yugoslavia, thought that in the next 5-10 years the situation would
have worsened, to the point that it was possible a direct intervention of USSR. On
the other hand, the European Economic Community believed that Yugoslavia was
“facing collapse”, while there were three reasons that would have contribute to Yu-
goslav stability: its geostrategic position; the armed forces and its foreign policy.42
The Soviet Union’s evaluation of the internal problems of Yugoslavia followed
essentially the same patterns of the other countries. According to the document, the
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev postponed his visit to Yugoslavia because of its inter-
nal situation, waiting for further developments. Moreover, the leader of the Sovi-
et Union thought that self-management was in crisis, the authority of Yugoslavia in
the non-aligned movement was dropping, and added that while Yugoslavia was fac-
ing serious debt problems, the West was exploiting that situation to achieve its own
goals.43 That meant to bind politically Yugoslavia to the West.
In the eyes of the USSR, the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis would have opened
“a hotspot which would be hard to keep under control”. In Yugoslavia it was undergo-
ing a “fight for power”. Specular to what was believed about their competitors – the
West, in Soviet Union it was believed that the Yugoslav difficulties could be fruitfully
exploited, pushing Belgrade (and Tirana) in the socialist community led by Moscow.
The rest of the report for the Yugoslav political leadership contained other valu-
able remarks. Among them, we should mention the fact that apparently, both blocs
were convinced that in case of conflict, they would have Yugoslavia on their side.
A possible future conflict that, at the time, was imagined, by a wide range of actors
(from the NATO to Warsaw Pact military exercises, and from the Swiss Army to the
simulation games at Harvard University), would have erupted in Yugoslavia.44
Moreover, the Yugoslavs felt that the Special war waged against the YPA was
carefully planned. That form of Special war, according Mamula, consisted in putting
the society against YPA, advancing claims of civil service instead of military service,
under the guise of pacifist movements and because of religious reasons. According
41
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1346, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 58. Sednice, 7.
42
Ibid., 9.
43
Ibid., 10.
44
Ibid., 16.
136 | Christian Costamagna
to the Admiral, the main power of the YPA consisted in the conscripts, to say, in the
(already weakened) human factor. Yugoslavia could not afford neither a profession-
alized army (also because it was against the political and military doctrine of social-
ism), nor to buy abroad expensive military technology.45 In other words, the strength
of YPA (the human factor), was also its Achilles heel. This consideration opens also
the opportunity for a further reflection about the well-known myth of the strength
of the YPA, that will be not considered here.
In the end, Mamula concluded his report that the superpowers, at that stage,
were not any more interested in confronting each other in an open conflict because
of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, they tried to push Yugoslavia toward their own bloc by
the means of Special war, of indirect external and internal pressures, exploiting its
weaknesses. Propaganda and intelligence operations, since then were the most prac-
ticed strategies, until the “possible dissolution of the federation”.46 Both blocs were
preparing for the worst scenario, defining “preventive measures”, not excluding mil-
itary interventions, “with the goal to forestall the other side, or to protect its own se-
curity”. The Yugoslavs did not even exclude a secret settlement between the USA and
the Soviet Union, in case of deep crisis in the federation, in order to solve the “prob-
lem of Yugoslavia”, and to “avoid disorders in this part of Europe”. Mamula explicitly
mentioned that this strategy of exploiting the internal problems of Third world coun-
tries, the external pressures, the growing risk of civil war and foreign military inter-
ventions, should alert Yugoslavia. Without solving the internal issues, the economy
and the unity in the country, the federation was seriously in peril.47
45
Ibid., 18.
46
Ibid., 25.
47
Ibid., 26.
48
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1351, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 70. Sednice Pred-
sedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 8.03.1988 godine, p. 29/1 SG.
49
Mamula wrote that at the time, when Kadijević was going to replace the Admiral as Minister of de-
fense, they had a common position. Mamula added that he prepared for Kadijević (in March 1988), a
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 137
tion in the Socialist republic of Slovenia, and the attacks against the Yugoslav People’s
Army. The Army felt under constant attack by certain media in Slovenia, particular-
ly Mladina.50 Kadijević suspected that there was much more than a bunch of young
Slovenes behind those attack against the Armyy51. Moreover, at political federal level,
there was not a clear consensus about what to do in Slovenia, and how to manage the
situation. In the meantime, to add more tensions, there were increasing rumors about
the possible removal, supported by the Army, of the Slovenian political leadership.
The Yugoslav chief of the General Staff thought that the campaign against the
Army was, in the end, part of an undeclared war with the political goal to overthrow
the socialist regime in the federation. According to Kadijević, the claims to democ-
ratization in the society, were nothing less than elements of destruction of socialism
and its integrity, through the methods of the Special war.52 The General remarked
that the international situation had an influence over the events unfolding in Yugo-
slavia.53 Kadijević said that USSR still wanted to gain, through ground military op-
erations, access to the Adriatic sea, while the Yugoslav territory, in the last decade,
lost partly its significance among the superpowers. That goal was part of Moscow’s
“centuries-old aspiration”.54
Kadijević declared that the Yugoslav territory, under certain circumstances, could
still have become “object of an agreement between the two blocs”. That meant a sort
of agreed splitting up of Yugoslavia between the NATO pact and the Warsaw pact.
Nevertheless, Kadijević was optimistic about the “rating” (he himself used this En-
glish word) of Yugoslavia in the international evaluations. Indeed, since the super-
sketch for a meeting of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Indeed, while referring to different meetings, the
points listed by Mamula in his book, are similar to the content of the archival material here considered.
See: Mamula, Slučaj, 149-50.
50
While an official magazine of the Youth Section of the League of communists of Slovenia, during the
1980s, it promoted democratic values criticizing the most conservative segments of the socialist regime.
51
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1351, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 70. Sednice, 30/3
TDJ. Kadijević is referring to a discussion made during a meeting of the state Presidency of Yugoslavia,
five days before.
52
Ibid., 29/2 SG. Basically, the same statements were repeated by Kadijević at the end of the month,
during another meeting. See ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e. 1349, Neautorizovane magnetofonske
beleške sa 72. Sednice, 16/2 MV - 16/3 MV.
53
A remarkable contemporary comprehensive analysis of the Yugoslav security issues, in the context of
the international relations and the Cold War, is offered here: Marko Milivojevic, John B. Allcock, and
Pierre Maurer, eds.,Yugoslavia’s’ Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy
(Oxford, UK and New York, USA: Berg Publishers Limited, 1988).
54
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1351, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 70. Sednice, 29/3
SG.
138 | Christian Costamagna
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., 29/3 TDJ.
57
Ibid., 25/3 BR – 25/4 BR. Speech of Lazar Mojsov, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia.
58
Ibid., 31/1 MM.
59
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1352, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 76. Sednice Pred-
sedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 5.05.1988 godine, 10/3 MD. Ac-
cording to Lazar Mojsov, the debt amounted to 555 billion of Yugoslav dinars. See also Ibid., 9/1 VM,
where V. Kadijević states the same.
60
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1352, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 76. Sednice, 9/1 VM.
Kadijević admitted that the Army had a debt of 332 billion of Yugoslav dinars toward the Soviet Union.
Moscow, in retaliation, stopped to pay the Yugoslav companies who exported in the Soviet Union, until
the Yugoslav Army did not pay back its debt. In the meantime, the Soviet Union had a debt toward the
Yugoslav federation of two billion US dollars.
61
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1351, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 70. Sednice, 30/1
TDJ.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 139
While the Army felt strong destabilizing pressures coming from abroad, exploit-
ing the weakness of the Yugoslav economic system, and considered itself beyond any
doubt one of the primary targets in order to subvert the then legitimate self-man-
aged democratic system, there were also other issues and targets as well. Accord-
ing to Kadijević, for example, both Eastern and Western intelligence services were
very active toward the Yugoslav Army, in particular in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Belgrade,
Slovenia and the Adriatic coast. The Italian intelligence service became very active
lately, and it supposed that Yugoslavia, because of its deepening internal crisis could
have closed its borders. That implied that Italy was, most probably, worried about
the Italian minority in Yugoslavia.
Kadijević illustrated what he defined the “classical scheme” of the Special war,
which was taught in the military schools and “was not a secret”. He added that the
same scheme was adopted both in the East and the West, just with slight differenc-
es. The General said that there are four stages of the Special war, and the stage then
active in Slovenia (because of the attacks to the Army) was the penultimate, the
phase of “subversion”. It preceded the phase of “violence”, the last one. The “sub-
version” stage had two steps: the first one was to “harass the citizens” and to “de-
stroy the unity”. The second one foresaw “threats, defamation and concealed sab-
otage”.62 Kadijević added that in Slovenia, it would not have been good to conceal,
behind the appearance of democratization of the society, the Special war. But in the
end, he admitted, “we still have not exactly identified with whom we are fighting”.63
Interestingly, while the military leaders at the time pointed the finger against some
foreign enemy, and described in detail the stages of the Special war against Yugosla-
via, they were apparently not able to identify him (or them).
Two weeks later, during another session of the Presidency of the party, discuss-
ing about the situation in Slovenia, Kadijević added some details. According to him,
the CIA chief for Yugoslavia, on March 13, estimated that the role of the Slovenian
magazine Mladina had nothing to do with its editorial staff,f rather it was compara-
ble with “a serious movement similar to Solidarity in Poland”. Moreover, what was
happening in Slovenia, according to Kadijević’s interpretation of the CIA chief,f was
much more than criticism toward the Yugoslav people army, actually it pointed at
changing the Constitution, and it was the beginning of the destruction of the “com-
munist system in SFRJ”.64
62
Ibid., 31/4 MM.
63
Ibid.
64
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e. 1349, Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 72. Sednice, 17/2
SS - 17/3 SS. Kadijević did not mention the name of the CIA chief for Yugoslavia, and how he did ob-
140 | Christian Costamagna
tain those information about the CIA report. Apparently, on the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room
there is not such a report. See: “FOIA Electronic Reading Room,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed
November 25, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/home.
65
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.[I have lost the exact number of the box file. It should be one of the
following: 1337; 1338; 1349], Stenografske beleške sa razgovora tete a tete Predsenika predsedništva
SFRJ Lazara Mojsova i Predsednika predsedništva CK SKJ Boška Krunića sa Generalnim sekretarom
CK KPSS Mihailom Sergejevičem Gorbačovim, održanih 14. marta 1988. godine u 19,35 časova u Pala-
ti federacije - Beograd, [No page number].
66
Ibid., 2.
67
He used that term.
68
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.[I have lost the exact number of the box file. It should be one of the
following: 1337, 2.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 141
that the targets were the inter-ethnical relations69, the “Muslim factor”, the “anti-So-
viet factor”, the “Baltic factor”, and the processes of democratization that were under-
going. Gorbachev thought that the Prime minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret
Thatcher, was the “initiator” of this anti-Perestroika and Glasnost process. Thatch-
er, the Soviet secretary said, was worried by his growing popularity.70
Among the plans of the West against the socialist countries, Gorbachev said
that also the nuclear disarmament had a double end. According to Gorbachev, the
West did not want actually save money (diminishing the nuclear armament) for the
“economic development”. The real goal was to develop “new technologies” for the
“conventional armament”, and through its “modernization” reach the military “su-
periority” in comparison with the USSR.71
The Yugoslavs, Krunić and Mojsov, recognized promptly the scheme of the Spe-
cial war in what the Soviet secretary was saying them. Mojsov, in particular, tried,
without denying the crisis in his country, to downplay the dimension of the prob-
lems, and reassured that in Yugoslavia the experience of the Second world war was
still strong, the “brotherhood and unity” was safe, and it was not possible the for-
mation of new political parties there.72
Considering the nature of the bilateral cooperation between a small neutral Eu-
ropean country, Yugoslavia, and a world super-power, USSR, it should not be sur-
prising the reassurances that the Yugoslavs gave to Gorbachev. They still thought,
in 1988, that the Soviets were trying to bring Yugoslavia back in their political or-
bit. In this sense, what Mojsov said, talking about the economic ties and exchange
between the two countries, may assume an interesting dimension. Indeed, Mojsov
said, the economic cooperation should have been developed and improved, not on-
ly to pure exchange of goods, rather with “new forms of coordination, specializa-
tions, and joint ventures”. Mojsov said that Yugoslavia just needed “a bit of econom-
ic growth”, to escape from the “world hegemony” of the American “imperialists” and
their allies.73 While it is difficult to guess, from a practical point of view, how the So-
viet Union may have helped the suffering Yugoslav economy with more “coordina-
tion”, it should be clear enough that it could have been a political rapprochement
with Moscow, with significant implications.
69
To be sure, he referred to the relations between different nations in the same state.
70
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.[I have lost the exact number of the box file. It should be one of the
following: 1337, 3.
71
Ibid., 5.
72
Ibid., 6.
73
Ibid., 6-7.
142 | Christian Costamagna
The day after, Gorbachev met again with Krunić and other members of the Pres-
idency of the League of the Yugoslav communists. The content and the tones were
partly similar to the previous day, but the dialogue was much longer, with more top-
ics, such as the relations between the two communist parties, the internal situation of
their respective countries, socialism in the world, and the workers’ movement. There
was a certain dose of self-criticism among the participants. Indeed, Gorbachev said
that in his Party, just recently was opened a Department devoted to the Economy,
while without bearing that word in its official title. The problem was that the appa-
ratchiks that worked there, had a “low intellectual level”, because they were used at
dealing with everyday problems and practical things.74
On the other hand, the Yugoslavs went beyond the agenda. For example, while
thanking the Soviets for having obtained about ninety thousand archival documents,
they insisted about access to more of them, especially about “important figures” of
the Party, including some victims of the Great purge in Stalin era.75
As Mojsov the day before, also Krunić reassured Gorbachev that, notwithstand-
ing the gravity of the social tensions in Yugoslavia, there were no reasons to “ring the
alarm”. Moreover, Krunić added indirectly, with all likelihood, that it should not be
expected, despite the mounting crisis in Yugoslavia and the difficulty of taking po-
litical decisions, a military coup d’etat.76
Let aside the above-mentioned examples, Krunić pointed out that the Yugoslav
big foreign debt, together with other unfavorable circumstances, made very difficult
for Belgrade to reproduce the capital for investments. The Yugoslavs were scared
by “a stagnation in the technological development”. They considered themselves
“enough dependent” in the field of technological development. Since both the cred-
itors and the suppliers of high technology were in the West, the Yugoslav preferred
avoiding a default, because they feared worsening conditions, in spite of the “usuri-
ous conditions”.77 They feared also that a default would affect the supply of interme-
diate goods and raw materials.
Gorbachev replied to his Yugoslav counterpart, that he had analyzed the be-
havior of the West towards Poland. In general terms, it echoed some critical issues
outlined by Krunić. The West was keeping for itself the most vital parts of the pro-
74
ARS, AS 1589/IV, CK ZKS, t.e.1349, Državna Tajna; nije autorizovano, nije redigovano. Stenograf-
ske beleške sa razgovora Boška Krunića, predsednika Predsedništva CKSKJ i Mihaila Gorbačova, sek-
retara CK KPSS, održanih u Beogradu, 15. Marta 1988. Godine, sa početkom u 11,20 časova, 9.
75
Ibid., 12.
76
Ibid., 13.
77
Ibid., 19.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 143
duction process, so it was able to paralyze the Polish economy just not delivering
those essential elements for the final products. The Soviet leader was sure that the
West would have never given to the socialist countries the state-of-the-art technol-
ogy, not even in joint venture.78 Gorbachev reinforced his final statement offering
also another example about Romania. He mentioned a joint venture in that social-
ist country, together with the USA. The Soviet secretary said that since Romanian
workers have a “little pay”, the main benefits go to the American capital. Indeed,
selling those products at global stage, the capitalists “earn more”.79 As Gorbachev
already stated earlier, also in the Romanian case, the technology licensed to the so-
cialist countries was always not updated, “second class technology”, and the social-
ist countries were treated as “second class states”. Only the West benefitted from
these unfair conditions.80
Gorbachev, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, pointed out his strategy,
to escape from the “plague of the imports”. It was essential to revitalize the mechan-
ical engineering in the Soviet Union. In 1987, 49% of their technological products,
according to him, were at the state-of- the-art world level. To the contrary, USSR was
weak in the “electronics”, and the “scientific-technological solutions”.81 The solution
to the Soviet problems was to increment the research in electronics, and to create
new scientific centers, alone or together with other countries. The freedom from de-
pendence (from imports, from second class technology) was the main way to follow.
Boško Krunić answered to Gorbachev saying that it was necessary “the access
to the third markets because there are great opportunities there, even in the mili-
tary industry. Our soldiers will not access third markets. However, if we do not sell
[weapons], someone else will do it”.82 Gorbachev reassured him, “let’s consider it”,
“there is no problem, we’ll talk about it”. Clearly, apart from what was said, the com-
petition between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in selling weapons to the Third
world countries, was already creating disagreements between them.
Besides, it is worth noting that even in the ideological field, there were some
fissures. Boško Krunić, the leader of the Yugoslav communists, said to Gorbachev
that “[…] we do not throw the State out, we do not have illusions about its liquida-
tion, that’s ridiculous […]”. The State, according to Krunić, should have been used
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid., 20.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid., 21.
144 | Christian Costamagna
to “protect the system” and the “stability of the development”.83 Later, talking about
the mistakes of socialism, Yugoslavia included, he said that socialism became too
much identified with the state, at the expense of the production and the workers.84
Krunić told Gorbachev that “The ambitions were almost everywhere, in all the so-
cialist countries, unrealistic for a long time”.
The many contradictions of the socialist countries came to the fore with all their
seriousness just one year later, until their implosion. From the Yugoslav point of view,
what Krunić said about the state, that it was “ridiculous” to think about its “liquida-
tion”, was totally in contrast with the official ideology and the theory of the Yugoslav
socialist self-management, as it was defined by the ideologue Edvard Kardelj.85 Ac-
cording to that Marxist theory, developed by Friedrich Engels, “the state should with-
er away”, once socialism was realized. The top Yugoslav party leader, in that specific
circumstances and historical moment, practically denied, in front of the leader of the
Soviet Union, the very same Marxist ideology that he was presumed to defend and
apply in his own country, and in the name of which a single party ruled for decades.
Also in this case, this set of historical documents, give us valuable hints and in-
formation about socialism and socialist countries. They were technologically and fi-
nancially dependent from the West, and apparently under a constant siege mental-
ity. They could not compete with the research capacity of the so called Free world.
The latter exploited the weaknesses and the internal divisions in Eastern Europe,
trying to destabilize the socialist regimes. The Western capital took advantage of
the underpaid workforce in certain socialist countries. The weapons market in the
developing countries was profitable both for Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The
Marxist ideology was oscillating even in the top communist party functionaries. Ev-
ery single thread above mentioned, would deserve a further investigation, because
they would not only enrich, but even change the perception and interpretation of
some parts of our recent history.
83
Ibid., 24.
84
Ibid., 27.
85
For an exhaustive treatment, see: Jović, Jugoslavija.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 145
86
Mamula, Slučaj, 126.
87
Mamula, Slučaj, 128. Mamula quotes Vilić and Todorović, Razbijanje Jugoslavije, 247-48, where they
talk about Slovenia, the BND, and their destructive role against YPA and Yugoslavia. The essential prob-
lem is that out of three pages (246-248), Vilić and Todorović have just one footnote, quoting as source
an interview of General Aleksandar Vasiljević, given to the Slovenian magazine Mladina in January 1995.
When Vilić and Todorović write that the BND had a main role, unfortunately they do not state how they
know that, which and where are the evidences. Mamula did not question this, and he took it for grant-
ed.
88
If true, it would be rather anomalous.
89
See, for example, Vilić and Todorović, Razbijanje Jugoslavije; Mićović, The Aggression. While these two
books are full of harsh criticism toward almost every Yugoslav and foreign actor in the Yugoslav drama,
it is barely impossible to find even the smaller criticism toward the political line of Serbia in the 1980s
and 1990s.
146 | Christian Costamagna
gate Belgrade, fragment the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thanks to internal ene-
mies of the state. This view was basically a constant of Milošević’s political thought,
both in private conversations90, and in public speeches.91 This interpretation was ad-
opted even later, when he was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.92 It should be considered why the conspiracy narrative survived
in Serbia. Aside this, it should be recalled that even today, in Serbia, but also Re-
publika Srpska, Macedonia93 and others, the conspiracies against the legitimate gov-
ernment, especially in tabloids level media, are still current. Is there a sort of cultur-
al heritage that was transmitted from the socialist to the national states? If so, why?
Is there a cultural connection between the theory of Special war and the later nar-
ratives about the so-called putsch/revolution against Milošević in October 2000?94
(and, in general terms, maybe about the narratives of the so called coloured revolu-
tions in Eastern Europe).
Thirdly, the kind of information about security and threats against socialist Yugo-
slavia give us some hints about the Cold war history. For example, in the transcripts of
a meeting between Gorbachev and the Leader of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1988,
there are some – at least at the time – sensitive information about the role of the West
toward the socialist countries, the importance of the technological gap between the two
superpowers, and the strategic asset of the international commerce of weapons as an
important revenue stream for Belgrade. Not only, but some piece of information extrap-
90
Slobodan Milošević, Tajni Transkripti 1995-1998 (Beograd: Profil knjiga, 2009), 87-88 and 245. The
original text of the book is taken from Dušan Viro, Slobodan Milošević:
ć Anatomija Zločina (Zagreb: Pro-
fil, 2007). I did not consult this last book.
91
Slobodan Milošević, [No original title], Speech to the nation in occasion of the second round of the Yu-
goslav presidential elections, October 2, 2000, audio, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kx_Yhofed-
ag&t=27s.
92
Slobodan Milošević, The Defense Speaks for History and the Future. Opening Defense Statement at The
Hague by President of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević (New York: International Action Center, 2006).
93
See, for example, a recent public statement on the official web site of the Serbian Minister of defense
(and President of the political party called “Movements of Socialists”), Aleksandar Vulin, “Pažnja: u Toku
je SPECIJALNI RAT Protiv Srpskog Ministarstva Odbrane!” Last modified September 30, 2017, http://
www.vulin.rs/lat/reagovanja/paznja-u-toku-je-specijalni-rat-protiv-srpskog-ministarstva-odbrane.html.
Last year, also the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Đorge Ivanov, talked about a “Special war”
in his country. See Libertas, “Vo Makedonija se vodi «specijalna vojna», so abolicijata sprečiv destabili-
zacija,” June 22, 2016, http://www.libertas.mk/ivanov-vo-makedonija-se-vodi-spetsijalna-vojna-so-ab-
olitsijata-sprechiv-destabilizatsija/.
94
Radmila Nakarada tries, in her book, to put under scrutiny the conspiracy theories as a concept, and
offers a critical analysis of those theories as applied to Yugoslavia and Serbia. See: Radmila Nakarada,
Raspad Jugoslavije: Problemi Tumačenja, Suočavanja i Tranzicije (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2008), 85-
104.
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 147
olated from the military establishment in Yugoslavia about Italy, could help to define
a more complex bilateral relationship, such as the plans of the Italian Army in case of
a destabilization of Yugoslavia, to protect the Italian minority in the neighbor country.
Among the most interesting data collected in the documents of the Presidency
of the League of Communists, as far as I had the opportunity to observe, it must be
mentioned the value of Kosovo in the eyes of the Pentagon, according to the Yugoslav
Ministry of Defense. Indeed, in 1987, some information leaked, stating that in case
of deep crisis and instability in Yugoslavia (because of tensions in Kosovo), the Pen-
tagon could have supported, to grant stability to the Balkans, the creation of a Great
Albania, supporting the union of Kosovo and Albania. Of course it would be wise not
to take this data at face value. Moreover, it would be methodologically wrong to attri-
bute to this historical evidence, some ex post significance having in mind what hap-
pened ten years later in the region. Nevertheless, it must be said, that to the least this
information could help the historians to put more in context the events that rapidly
developed in Yugoslavia in the next few years. Assuming that the information leaked
to the Yugoslavs was correct, how did the Pentagon was supposed to support a Great
Albania, and give up its long-standing support of Yugoslavia? Was there any biparti-
san geopolitical strategic objective in the Balkans, in the eyes of the USA? If so, which
one? The Americans, in 1991, showed a gradual abandonment of the idea of the Yu-
goslav unity. In Spring 1991, before the war, they already posed more emphasis on
a democratic Yugoslavia, rather than united.95 Considering the fast escalation of the
Yugoslav internal crisis96, is it possible to assume that Washington decided to give up
with the idea of a united federal Yugoslavia, when the latter was not anymore able to
guarantee security and stability in the region? If so, is there a parallel between a pos-
sible American abandonment of the Yugoslav integrity in case of sustained instabil-
ity (due to Kosovo) in 1987, and the actual abandonment in 1991-1992 (due to the
dissolution and the wars)? Did the US pay lip service to a united Yugoslav state, as
far as it was stable and produced security, but actually they considered it expend-
able? Why before 1989-1991 democracy in Yugoslavia was not a primary goal? Why
Titoist authoritarian regime was tolerated until then? Most probably, by the end of
95
See the memoirs of the Secretary of State James A. Baker, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of
Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 482. In the
memoirs of General Kadijević it is possible to find some of his conversations with the American Am-
bassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, about the same topic: see Kadijević, Protiv Udar, 176 and
following.
96
The crisis was, in a context of growing social tensions, mainly an exploitation of sensitive issues by lo-
cal political elites. A Serbian hegemonistic policy in Yugoslavia, ignited by Albanian pretensions in Koso-
vo, was fought back by more than assertive nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia, at the expense of the
Yugoslav population. Those dynamics were not primarily the product of foreign direct involvement.
148 | Christian Costamagna
the 1980s, considering the evolution in Eastern Europe and the crisis in the Soviet
Union, due also to its internal instability, Yugoslavia lost his appeal in the eyes of the
USA. Tito’s country, from the point of view of Reagan administration, in 1984, was
perceived in the following way:
[…] an independent, economically viable, stable and militarily capable Yugo-
slavia serves Western and U.S. interests. Yugoslavia is an important obstacle to Sovi-
et expansionism and hegemony in southern Europe. Yugoslavia also serves as a use-
ful reminder to countries in Eastern Europe of the advantages of independence from
Moscow and of the benefits of friendly relations with the West.97
For the West, at that time, the promotion of democracy and human rights in
Yugoslavia was not a top priority.
From a cultural point of view, we can recollect and develop, from the docu-
ments, how the Yugoslav military elites imagined the West and the East. As far as
those above-mentioned documents are concerned, it is usually a quite negative im-
age, especially the West. Espionage, a long-term objective to subvert the political
system, the reintroduction of capitalism, the support of far-right secessionist move-
ments among the Yugoslav diaspora, contributed substantially to imagine and per-
ceive an insidious West, ready to exploit the weaknesses of Yugoslavia. Is this nega-
tive perception still at work in former Yugoslavia? If so, why?
Finally, those documents give us some useful details about how the military
leadership imagined the end of the Yugoslav state. To be sure, that task was already
started in the military circles of the West at least since the 1970s, when Tito was al-
ready old, and imagining a post-Tito Yugoslavia was a frequent practice among the
analysts.98 Considering the high amount of studies about the dissolution of Yugosla-
via, developed since the 1990s, it would be of interest to integrate and compare those
theories, and evaluate if they could contribute to our knowledge. For example, in at
least one case, it appears that the Yugoslavs were aware that the superpowers, if they
wanted, could have agreed and split Yugoslavia in a few days.
Last, but not least, it should be kept in mind that the theoretical paradigm of the
Special war, as conceptualized by the same Yugoslav socialist institution of the time,
does not mean that it would be the only way to exploit the new data available to enrich
and ameliorate the historical knowledge and interpretation of those events. The main
limits, after all, are in the intuition of the historians and researchers. We should not be
97
“U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia: NSDD 133,” The White House, March 19, 1984, http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-133.htm.
98
For example, see Carl Gustaf Strohm, Senza Tito Può la Jugoslavia Sopravvivere? (Trieste: Lint, 1977
[1976]).
Yugoslavia and the Special War in Late Socialism: New Research Perspectives | 149
confined by the ideological frame of the contemporaries, but we cannot produce his-
toriography without using critically the concept and the mind structures of the time.
REFERENCES:
Archives
Arhiv Republike Slovenije, Fond AS 1589, Centralni Komite Zveze Komunistov Slo-
venije, podfond IV 1968-1990.
Books
Antonić, Slobodan. Zarobljena Zemlja: Srbija za Vlade Slobodana Miloševića. Beo-
grad: Otkrovenje, 2002.
Baker, James A., with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution,
War & Peace, 1989-1992. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.
Bieber, Florian, A. Galijaš, and R. Archer, eds. Debating the End of Yugoslavia. Farn-
ham – Burlington: Ashgate, 2014.
Bechev, Dimitar. Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2017.
Breda, Luthar, and Marusa Pusnik, eds. Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday
Life in Socialist Yugoslavia. Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010.
Dizdarević, Raif.f La Morte di Tito: la Morte della Jugoslavia. Ravenna: Longo Edi-
tore, 2001 [1999].
Grandits, Hannes, and Karin Taylor, eds. Yugoslavia’s’ Sunny Side: A History of Tour-
ism in Socialism 1950s-1980s. Budapest – New York: Central European Univer-
sity Press, 2010.
Hadžić, Miroslav. Jugoslovenska Narodna Agonija. Beograd: Dan Graf i Centar za
Civilno-vojne Odnose, 2004 [2002].
Haug, Hilde Katrine. Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and
the National Question. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012.
Jakšić, Pavle. Pohod na Jugoslaviju. Beograd: DIK Knjizevne novine – Enciklopedi-
ja, 1994.
Jović, Dejan. Jugoslavija: Država koja je Odumrla. Zagreb: Prometej, and Beograd:
Samizdat B92, 2003.
Kadijević, Veljko. Moje Viđenje Raspada: Vojska bez države. Beograd: Politika, 1993.
Kadijević, Veljko. Protiv Udar: Moje Viđenje Raspada Jugoslavije. Beograd: Filip Višn-
jić, 2010.
Lusa, Stefano. La Dissoluzione del Potere: il Partito Comunista Sloveno ed il Processo di
Democratizzazione della Repubblica. Udine: Kappa Vu, 2007.
Mamula, Branko. Slučaj Jugoslavija. Beograd: CID, 2000.
150 | Christian Costamagna
Vukšić, Dragan. JNA i Raspad SFR Jugoslavije: od Čuvara do Grobara svoje Države.
Stara Pazova: Tekomgraf,f 2006.
Chapters
Costamagna, Christian. “Security in Serbia by the end of 1986: From Kosovo crisis to
the Third World War.” In Vek srpske Golgote: 1915-2015, edited by Uroš Šuvakov-
ić, 489-509. Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozofski Fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini, 2016.
Journal articles
Nikezić, Ilija. “Il Significato di «Difesa Nazionale Globale» e di «Autotutela Sociale.»”
Questioni attuali del socialismo, no. 12 (December 1982).
Movies
Kovačević, Dušan, and B. Nikolić, dir. Balkanski Špijun. 1984; Yugoslavia.
Interviews
Radio Televizija Republike Srpske. [No original title]. Interview with General Alek-
sandar Vasiljević. Last modified October 10, 2014. Video. https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=jkVVNG6Atw4&t=514s.
Website content
Central Intelligence Agency. “FOIA Electronic Reading Room.”Accessed Novem-
ber 25, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/home.
Benić, Kristian. “UDBA i Bivše Tajne Službe: kako do Zaokružene Sinteze ili barem
Domaćeg Roberta Ludluma?” Gradska Knjižnica Rijeka. Last modified Janu-
ary 1st, 2017. https://gkr.hr/Magazin/Teme/UDBA-i-bivse-tajne-sluzbe-ka-
ko-do-zaokruzene-sinteze-ili-barem-domaceg-Roberta-Ludluma.
National Intelligence. “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elec-
tions.” January 6. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.f
152 | Christian Costamagna
The White House. “U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia: NSDD 133.” March 19, 1984.
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-133.htm.
Vulin, Aleksandar. “Pažnja: u Toku je SPECIJALNI RAT Protiv Srpskog Ministarstva
Odbrane!” Last modified September 30, 2017. http://www.vulin.rs/lat/reagov-
anja/paznja-u-toku-je-specijalni-rat-protiv-srpskog-ministarstva-odbrane.html.
Кристијан Костамања
Апстракт: Овај рад нуди нове правце истраживања у области политичке историје
касног периода егзистенције социјалистичке Југославије, у контексту Хладног рата. Кри-
тичка анализа доктрине специјалног рата, као део идеологије југословенског социјализма,
уз стављање на увид раније недоступних архивских докумената Савеза комуниста Југо-
славије, могли би да доведу до значајних иисториографских преиспитивања. Према овој
специјалној ратној доктрини, Југославија и њен политички систем били су стално изло-
жени индиректним нападима од стране обе светске суперсиле и њихових савезника, чи-
ји крајњи циљ је било рушење самоуправног политичког система у Југославији. У раду су
узети у обзир неки необјављени архивски извори с краја 1987. и почетка 1988. године.
Они су подељени на две области: ону која се бави југословенским безбедоносним пита-
њима и ону која се тиче односа између Југославије и Совјетског Савеза. У првом случају,
анализирајући поједине извештаје југословенског војног руководства, дознајемо да би
ескалација кризе довела до интернационализације сукоба. Према овим извештајима, САД
би, у случају заоштравања југословенске кризе, дале предност стварању Велике Албани-
је уместо очувању државног интегритета. Друго, у обзир су узета и два састанка између
совјетског генералног секретара Горбачова и чланова југословенског политичког руко-
водства, који су били забринути због југословенских слабости које је Запад непрестано
користио. Југославија и друге социјалистичке државе су у области технолошког развоја
биле зависне. Поменути прелиминарни резултати заслужују даље истраживање, будући
да би се на тај начин бацило светло на неке битне сегменте европске и светске историје.
Кључне речи: Југославија, специјални рат, социјалнизам, Југословенска народна
армија, Хладни рат
UDC 323(497.1)”1991/1995”
Оригинални научни рад
Dr Vladislav B. Sotirović1
Mykolas Romeris University
Institute of Political Sciences (Vilnius)
Lithuania
1
globalpol@global-politics.eu
2
T. Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & The Destruction of Yugoslavia, New Haven−London: Yale University
Press, 1997.
3
S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1995.
4
B. J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast Europe, London:
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2006. For the matter of clarification, Slobodan Miloshevic was a
Montenegrin, probably even born in Montenegro in the village of Ljeva Rijeka according to some claims.
At the wartime of the 1990s, as today as well, Serbia’s political scene was and is completely occupied by
the persons who are either not the Serbs, not born in Serbia or by those whose origin is out of Serbia
living in Serbia as the first generation of the immigrants. Many of them even did not learn properly to
speak Serbia’s dialect of the Serb language that is of the Ekavian speech. On the sociolinguistic aspect
of the destruction of ex-Yugoslavia and the Serb national question, see [В. Б. Сотировић, Социолингви-
154 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
article is contribution to more accurate lightening of the reasons and causers of Yugoslavia’s
death in 1991−1995 dealing with the phenomena of the authoritarian and dictatorial neo-Na-
zi (Ustashi) regime in Croatia established by Franjo Tudjman in 1990.5
Keywords: Croatia, Croats, HDZ, Franjo Tudjman, Ustashi, Yugoslavia, Serbs
стички аспект распада Југославије и српско национално питање, Нови Сад−Србиње: Добрица књи-
га, 2007].
5
This article is critical contribution to the book: L. Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of
Yugoslavia, Durham−London: Duke University Press, 2003.
6
The HDZ was officially established on June 17th, 1989. Its founder and leader, Dr. Franjo Tudjman,
strongly supported by all kinds of the Croat nationalists and neo-Ustashi groups, stated that the party
was founded as a consequence of the new political conditions in the world and Yugoslavia and as a
counterbalance to the “neo-expansionistic” policy of the regime of Slobodan Miloshevic in Serbia [ J.
Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 1, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 114].
However, the basic authentic party’s principles were: 1. A creation of the independent Croatia within
her historical borders; 2. Croatia has to be a state only of the Croat people; and 3. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
according to the ethnic, territorial and economic criteria, has to be a part of Croatia [ J. Guskova, Istorija
jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 2, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 419].
7
J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 2, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003,
418.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 155
8
On the holocaust of Serbs (Magnum Crimen) in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941−1945, see [V.
Dedijer, The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican, Prometheus Books, 1992; B. M. Lituchy (ed.), Jasenovac
and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia: Analyses and Survivor Testimonies, New York: Jasenovac Research Institute,
2006; V. Novak, Magnum Crimen: Half a Century of Clericalism in Croatia, I−II, Jagodina: Gambit, 2011;
E. Paris, L. Perkins, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941−1945: A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions
and Massacres, Literary Licencing, LLC, 2011].
9
On the WWII Nazi Croatia, see [S. Trifkovic, Ustaša: Croatian Fascism and European Politics, 1929−1945,
The Lord Byron Foundation, 2011; R. McCormick, Croatia under Ante Pavelic: America, The Ustaše and
Croatian Genocide, London−New York, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2014].
10
See the USA documentary movie [Truth is the Victim in Bosnia, 1992 at https://youtu.be/
fNqHfIugmaU].
156 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
11
The countries of the European Community recognized independent Croatia (under ( the German
pressure) on January 15th, 1992. Croatia became a member of the U.N. on May 22nd, 1992 [ J. Guskova,
Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 2, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 414].
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 157
12
D. Pavličević, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i prošireno izdanje, Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić,
2000, 245.
158 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
Ante Starchevic urged the creation of a Greater Croatia and not recognizing the
existence of any other South Slavs except the Croats and Bulgarians.14 His ideology
and the HSP party’s program and narrative were markedly colored by anti-Serb tone.
Consequently, both of them became the main ideological framework for the exter-
mination of the Serbs on the territory of the NDH, 1941−1945 and for the ethnic
cleansing of the Serbs by Tudjman’s regime in 1995 (the “Flash” and “Storm” mil-
itary-police operations in May and August). In 1895 it was established even more
radical and nationalistic the Pure Party of Rights (the ČSP) headed by Josip Frank
(of the Jewish origin) whose members and ideological followers took active partici-
pations in the pogroms against the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during
the WWI.15
The post-Yugoslav HSP, as the largest and most influential extreme Croat
neo-Nazi Ustashi party, was re-established in February 1990 by domestic and émi-
gré Croat neo-Nazi Ustashi fellows. The party became soon relatively popular that
had a membership of approximately 100.000 by 1992 when the party received 7 per-
cent of the vote for the national Parliament. However, the HSP became a “favorable
opposition party” of the HDZ in the 1990s and as such, in fact, unofficial spokes-
man of the ruling HDZ. A coalition between these two ultraright nationalistic par-
ties is visible at least from the very fact that the HDZ violated the Croatian elector-
al law in 1995 in order to permit the HSP to cross the famous 5 percent threshold
13
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see [В. Ђ. Крестић, Геноцидом до Велике Хрватске. Дру-
го допуњено издање, Јагодина: Гамбит, 2002].
144
On Croatian national identity, see [A. J. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A
Centuries-Old Dream, Manchester−New York: Manchester University Press, 2003].
15
On the ideology of the Croatian Party of Rights, see [M. Gross, Povijest pravaške ideologije, Zagreb:
Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1973; M. S. Spalatin, “The Croatian Nationalism of Ante Starčević,
1845−1871”, Journal of Croatian Studies, 15, 1975, 19−146; G. G. Gilbert, “Pravaštvo and the Croatian
National Issue”, East European Quarterly, 1, 1978, 57−68; M. Gross. A. Szabo, Prema hrvatskome
građanskom društvu: Društveni razvoj u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina 19.
stoljeća, Zagreb: Globus nakladni zavod, 1992, 257−265]. On historical account of the political parties’
ideologies in Croatia, see [ Ј. Хорват, Странке код Хрвата и њихова идеологија, Београд: Политика,
1939]. On pogroms of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Great War, see [В. Ћоровић, Цр-
на књига: Патње Срба Босне и Херцеговине за време Светског Рата 1914−1918, Удружење ратних
добровољаца, 1996]. On nationalistic ideologies and violence, see [S. Malešević, Nation-States and
Nationalisms, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013].
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 159
(5.1). After 1993 when the party leadership was changed, the HSP obviously be-
came a tool of the ruling HDZ on political scene of Croatia. In February 1996 the
HSP became cleansed from all party leadership who opposed informal HDZ-HSP
coalition and cooperation.
Different factional struggles within the pravashi bloc led to the creation of sev-
eral new ultraright political parties in Croatia like the HSP-1861, the Croatian Pure
Party of Rights, the National Democratic League or the Independent Party of Rights.
All of them, including and those unofficial groups and movements of the Croat ex-
tremists, have been trying to propagate their nationalistic messages through almost
totally controlled mass-media by the governmental HDZ. In these media efforts on-
ly those groups who had been “approved” by the HDZ (firstly the HSP) succeeded
to send their messages to the audience.
One of the most important features of Croatia’s political scene in the early 1990s
was the fact that the HDZ itself was gradually passing to the hands of a “Herzegov-
inian lobby” (like Vladimir Sheks, Vice Vukojevic, Gojko Shushak) within the par-
ty leadership what meant that the WWII Ustashi ideology and practice ultimately
won against all other options in both the Central Board of the HDZ and the Gov-
ernment of Croatia.16 However, the crucial point of such HDZ’s course was that in
fact the party and state leadership became crucially depended on and even governed
by the Croat (Ustashi) émigré groups with whom the HDZ’s “Herzegovinian lob-
by” had extremely close relations especially Gojko Shushak, a Minister of Defense,
who was a manager and owner of several firms in Canada before returning to Croa-
tia in 1990 to become a member of the Central Board of the HDZ. Franjo Tudjman
favored Gojko Shushak exactly for the reason that he was a key figure in maintain-
ing contacts with a Croat diaspora which was giving substantial financial support
for the HDZ’s policy.
This “Herzegovinian lobby” succeeded to strengthen its own position within
the HDZ primarily by using regional identity as a basis for establishing necessary
networks of power, influence, and favors (for instance, a Herzegovinian extremist
Ivic Pashalic). The HDZ’s “Herzegovinians” are usually seen as the cardinal factor
which firmed Tudjman as a dictatorial strongman in the party and the state. Tud-
jman’s sympathy and support to the “Herzegovinian” extremists is for sure unques-
tionable, especially when it comes to authoritarianism on the domestic front and
dealing with Croatia’s Serbs. He became firstly convinced of his own personal and
his party’s “historic mission” to bring state independence for (a Greater) Croatia and
16
The Herzegovinians are traditionally considered as the most belligerent and confrontational mental
group within the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. On mental and cultural characteristics of the Yugoslavs, see
[В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, Београд: Просвета, 2000].
160 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
finally to solve the “Serb Question” within her borders and in parts of a “Croat” Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. He shared the same standpoint of the traditional Croat national-
ists that all aspects of the transition from state socialism to (quasi)liberal democracy
and market economy have to be subordinated to the state-building process. None-
theless, Tudjman was enough smart to project a positive “democratic” image abroad,
and this has prevented many of foreign observers and politicians from getting a right
picture of his ultraright views and politics especially in dealing with Croatia’s Serbs.
For all Croat ultranationalists a crucial political reference in regard with the
state-building process is the 1941−1945 NDH. They finally succeeded with a great
support by Tudjman and his HDZ to rehabilitate the NDH and even to recognize
its historical contribution to the Croat state-building efforts. It was done chiefly by
a brutal falsification of historical facts and self-interpretation of historical events and
the role and deeds of the Croat Ustashi personalities. For the HDZ’s Croatia there
were at least four reasons for praising the Ustashi WWII state:
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 161
17
P. R. Vitezović, Croatia rediviva: Regnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare, Zagreb, 1700.
18
On Pavelic’s biography, see [B. J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers
of Southeast Europe, London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2006, 228−271].
19
For instance, see, interview with Paraga, Danas, Zagreb, 1991-03-5.
162 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
1941−1945 was provoked by the Serbs themselves, i.e. by the Partisan uprising in Ju-
ly 1941 against the legitimate and internationally recognized NDH,20 neglecting the
fact that the Ustashi genocide against the Serbs started three months before the out-
break of the Serb-(Partisan and non-Partisan) revolt in the NDH. A HSP’s political
cynicism was going up to absurd claims that many of these massacred Serb civilians
in fact have been killed by the Serb-Chetniks or Partisans dressed in the Ustashi uni-
forms. Nevertheless, a common issue among all Croat extremists regarding the “Serb
Question” is the WWII practice of creation of an Autocephalous Croatian Orthodox
Church as a bridge toward the final Catholization and Croatization of Croatia’s Serbs.
The excuse of the Ustashi regime violence in the NDH usually is followed by
the claim that the Nazi-Fascist feature and iconography of the NDH were forced
upon the Ustashi authorities by Germany and Italy, that the Ustashi Government
did as much as possible to protect the Jews within the NDH, and finally, and what
is of the crucial importance, that the real number of murdered NDH’s Serbs is very
much overestimated by the pro-Serb Yugoslav authorities after the WWII. For in-
stance, instead of 700.000 killed people in the death camp of Jasenovac (“Yugoslav
Auschwitz”, of whom 500.000 were the Serbs) today official Croatia recognizes on-
ly 86.000. In the other words, Jasenovac is a great Serbian falsification and political
propaganda: a myth projected by the supporters of an idea of a Greater Serbia.21 For
the Croat extremists, among the victims of Jasenovac the largest number have been
the ethnic Croats but not the ethnic Serbs.22 The Croat rightists as apologists for the
Ustashi movement and their Nazi racist regime claim that the NDH is falsely rep-
resented for pure political reasons and therefore the picture of the NDH has to be
repainted. However, such repainting or rewriting of the NDH’s history is in a pure
odd to historical sources and scientific account of non-partisan historiography. Fi-
nally, Dr. Franjo Tudjman himself,f as a professional historian, in his most important
book (Wastelands of Historical Reality) sought to minimize the crimes of the Ustashi
regime in the WWII against both the Serbs and the Jews.23
20
The NDH was recognized by Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, g Romania, Japan,
p Spain, National
China, Finland, Denmark and Manchuria. It existed from April 10th, 1941 to May 15th, 1945 [S. Srkulj, J.
Lučić, Hrvatska Povijest u dvadeset pet karata. Prošireno i dopunjeno izdanje, Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni
centar, 1996, 105].
21
On Tudjman’s Croatia’s dealing with the population losses in the NDH and the rest of Yugoslavia,
see [V. Žerjavić, Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941−1945, Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1997].
Compare with [С. Аврамов, Геноцид у Југославији у светлости међународног права, Београд, 1992].
22
See, for instance, Election Declaration of the Croatian Party of Rights in 1992 [Izborna deklaracija
Hrvatske stranke prava, Zagreb, 1992, 3].
23
F. Tudjman, Bespuća povijesne zbiljosti, Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1989.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 163
A rehabilitation of the legacy of the NDH and Ustashi ideology with the NDH’s
iconography was, however, only a formal problem for Franjo Tudjman and his HDZ
who have been officially ambivalent toward it. Tudjman knew very well that any close
association with the NDH and Ustashi ideology and iconography will cause many
problems for Croatia’s image abroad especially among the Jewish communities and
their political lobbies. However, on the other hand, for Tudjman the NDH was giving
the state-building example as Croatia for the centuries did not have any experience of
a real and internationally recognized statehood. For that reason, for the HDZ’s ideol-
ogists the NDH became a crucial element for completing the main party’s task – to
unify within the umbrella of the HDZ all Croats. In addition, the NDH was giving a
link to Vatican as the main supporter of both the Ustashi and the HDZ regimes and
ideology.24 Subsequently, the HDZ’s authorities did not and do not openly endorse
the Ustashi movement and the NDH, as it is the case with of “Croat rightists”, but on
the other hand both Tudjman and his HDZ had avoided any clear denunciation of
the NDH’ Nazi, totalitarian, genocidal and above all Serbocidal aspects. Moreover,
the HDZ’s Croatia adopted all important symbolic and iconographic aspects of the
WWII NDH (like kuna currency, state insignias, etc.) and dedicated streets, squares
and monuments in Croatia to the Ustashi WWII officials. Tudjman himself as a Pres-
ident of Croatia nominated, for instance, two ex-WWII Ustashi officials to high state
posts: Ivo Rojnic – Ustashi commander in Dubrovnik who became Croatia’s ambas-
sador in Argentina and Vinko Nikolic – an official in the Ministry of Education of the
NDH who got a seat in the Parliament. Alongside with the rehabilitation of the Nazi
NDH, in Tudjman’s Croatia it was rehabilitated and the WWII Croatian Roman Cath-
olic Church with its head Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac who directly collaborated with
the Ustashi regime and headed the practice of Catholization of the Orthodox Serbs.25
A linguistic nationalism or purification of the official standardized Croat lan-
guage in the public usage but mainly from the Serb language based lexemes was on
the very agenda of the Croatization of Croatia by Tudjman’s regime.26 However, a
24
On direct links between the NDH and Vatican, see [Tajni dokumenti o odnosima između Vatikana i
ustaške NDH, Zagreb, 1948; V. Dedijer, Vatikan i Jasenovac. Dokumenti, Beograd, 1987; D. Živojinović,
D. Lučić, Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo. Prilozi za Magnum Crimen, Beograd, 1988; M. Bulajić, Misija Vatikana
u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj, I−II, Beograd, 1992; М. А. Ривели, Бог је с нама: Црква Пија XII сауче-
сника нацифашизма, Никшић: Јасен, 2003; Д. Р. Живојиновић, Ватикан, Католичка црква и југо-
словенска власт 1941−1958, Београд: Просвета−Терсит, 1994, 11−127].
25
On Stepinac’s case, see [A. Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac hrvatski kardinal, Rim, 1974; S. Alexander, The
Triple Myth: A Life of Archbishop Stepinac, New York, 1987; М. А. Ривели, Надбискуп геноцида: Монси-
њор Степинац, Ватикан и усташка диктатура у Хрватској 1941−1945, Никшић−Јасен, 1999].
26
A linguistic nationalism was a common issue in all former East European countries after 1990 as
the language was and still is understood as the main identifier of the (ethno)nation. On the linguistic
164 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
lexical purification of the Croatian language in Tudjman’s Croatia was done basi-
cally according to the NDH’s pattern. One of the first steps in the process of Cro-
atization and purification of the Croat language by the new HDZ’s authorities was
to make a clear difference between the Croat and Serb languages from lexical, or-
thographic and grammar points of view. It was done by a set of scientific editions
by the linguists and philologists who have been at the same time trying to present
and a “proper” history of the Croat language with the cardinal political goal to show
that the Croat and the Serb always have been two different ethno-national languag-
es and what is of the most importance that the Shtokavian dialect was all the time
and the Croat national language but not only the Serb.27 As a final ethno-political
consequence of the HDZ’s policy of linguistic nationalism was that the Serb ethnic
name was expelled from the official name of the standardized language and its or-
thography in Croatia likewise everything what was in connection with the Serbs in
regard to the Croat language.28
As the best mean to hide its de facto support for the Nazi Ustashi ideology and
the WWII NDH’s legacy, Tudjman’s regime officially and rhetorically supported the
“anti-fascist” Josip Broz Tito’s Partisans from the WWII29 with the manifestation of
nationalism in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s, see [S. Barbour, C. Carmichael (eds.), Language and Nationalism
in Europe, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 221−239].
27
On this issue, as examples, see [V. Brodnjak, Razlikovni rječnik srpskog i hrvatskog jezika, Zagreb,
1991; M. Moguš, Povijest hrvatskoga književnoga jezika, Zagreb: Globus nakladni zavod, 1993; M. Kačić,
Hrvatski i srpski: Zablude i krivotvorine; Zagreb: Zavod za lingvistiku Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta
u Zagrebu, 1995; M. Lončarić, Hrvatski jezik, Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski–Instytut Filologii Polskiej,
1998]. Compare with [П. Милосављевић, Срби и њихов језик. Хрестоматија, Приштина: Народна
и универзитетска библиотека, 1997].
28
M. Okuka, „O osamostaljivanju hrvatskog književnog jezika“, А. Кюннапа, В. Лефельдта, С. Н. Ку-
знецова (ред.), Микроязыки, языки, интерязыки. Сборник в честь ординарного профессора Алексан-
дра Дмитриевича Дуличенко, Тарту, 2006, 231. On the Serbian point on the Croat, Serb and Bosnian
languages, see [B. Tošović, A. Wonisch, (eds.), Die serbische Sichtweise des Verhältnisses zwischen dem
Serbischen, Kroatischen und Bosniakischen, I/4, Novi Sad: Institut für Slawistik der Karl-Franzens-
-Universität Graz−Beogradska knjiga, 2012].
29
For the matter of historical accuracy, the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito (half Slovene and half Croat) during
the WWII have not be fighting against the Germans, Italians and Ustashi forces if they are not attacked by
them. Moreover, during the whole war the Partisans collaborated primarily with the NDH regime and its
armed forces but with the Germans as well. Therefore, the “anti-fascist” aspect of Tito’s Partisans and the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the KPJ) is falls and invented by the Yugoslav Communists themselves.
On this issue, see [М. Самарџић, Сарадња партизана са Немцима, усташама и Албанцима, Крагује-
вац: Погледи, 2006; В. Б. Сотировић, Кривотворине о Јосипу Брозу Титу, Брозовим партизанима и
Равногорском покрету, 1941. г.−1945. г., Виљнус: Југославологија – Независни истраживачки цен-
тар за југословенске студије, 2014]. About Josip Broz Tito, see [В. Адамовић, Три диктатора: Ста-
љин, Хитлер, Тито. Психопатолошка паралела, Београд: Informatika, 2008, 445−610; П. Симић, З.
Деспот, Тито: Строго поверљиво. Архивски документи, Београд−Службени гласник, 2010; П. Си-
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 165
political option that the post-Yugoslav Croatia is building her own statehood on the
“anti-fascist” People’s/Socialist Republic of Croatia legitimacy after 1945. Howev-
er, at the same time, the HDZ created a clear atmosphere in Croatia in which the
victims of the Ustashi terror (primarily the Serbs) are regarded as the national en-
emies. For the matter of illustration, up to January 1996 around 3.000 “Partisan”
monuments were destroyed or removed in Croatia.30 Tudjman launched an initia-
tive to transform a death camp of Jasenovac’s memorial center (on the left bank of
Sava River that is on Croatia’s side) from the “victims of fascism” to the “victims of
the civil war” – an initiative that was in fact just camouflaged association with the
NDH which pleased all Croat extremists. The Croat security forces even before the
beginning of the civil war in Croatia in 1991 heavily structurally damaged the muse-
um building of Jasenovac when a bigger part of documentation and torture evidence
simply disappeared but the monument itself was not destroyed or damaged for the
very reason as the monument is in fact composed by four Ustashi “U” letter-symbols.
Franjo Tudjman, a Ph.D. in history, ran in conflict with the Yugoslav Communist
authorities in the mid-1960s when he started to refute the official number of mur-
dered ethnic Serbs in Jasenovac as too high, accusing at the same time the Yugoslav
Communists for deliberately falsifying the truth on Jasenovac. It cost him dismiss-
al from the post of a head of the Institute for the History of the Workers Movement
in Croatia (in Zagreb) but this action marked the beginning of the process of Tud-
jman’s transformation from a Partisan General to the Croat nationalist and extremist.
Nonetheless, his cosmetic political moves like removing a prominent Ustashi extrem-
ist Tomislav Merchep from the HDZ’s Executive Committee at the Third General
Convention of the HDZ in October 1995 could not hide the HDZ’s infatuation with
the Ustashi iconography, ideology, legacy and ethno-political goals.
Tudjman’s and HDZ’s preoccupation with Croatia’s state-building and solving
the “Serb Question” rather than establishing liberal-democratic political system and
institutions meant that the NDH’s legacy continued to play very important role in
the HDZ’s strategy and policy of creation of the new normative order and values. In
the other words, the political-ideological mainstream of the HDZ’s Croatia was and
is grounded on appropriation of the NDH’s legacy.
Today, as a result of the HDZ’s policy of extreme ethno-confessional national-
ism, Croatia is, since mid-1995, “more ethnically homogeneous than ever was in the
мић, Тито: Феномен 20. Века. Треће допуњено издање, Београд: Службени гласник, 2011; J. Pirjevec,
Tito in tovariši, Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2011; V. Dinić, Tito (ni)je Tito. Konačna istina, Beograd:
Novmark doo, 2013].
30
Vreme, Beograd, 1996-01-15.
166 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
historic past”.31 The Serb population on the present-day territory of Croatia fell from
24 percent in 1940 to 12 percent in 1990 and 4 percent in 1996 with the practice of
its everyday assimilation (Croatization) and emigration from Croatia.
The Croat ultranationalists (i.e., the followers of the Ustashi movement) called
in the 1990s for the full scale of Croatia’s militarization in order to achieve their chau-
vinistic and racist political goals of the Croat-based ethnically pure independent (a
Greater) Croatia. In their opinion, a full or complete political independence of the
ethnically pure Croatia within the borders of the Socialist Republic of (a Greater)
Croatia could be reached only by the open war against Croatia’s Serbs and the Yugo-
slav authorities, but not negotiating with them. In this respect, a leader of the most
ultranationalistic political party in Croatia – the HSP, Ante Djapic, was clear in his
statements to abandon the political activity if a single part of the territory of Croatia
is going to be lost by the negotiations with the Serbs.32 The WWII Ustashi movement
followers openly advocated in the 1990s a full scale of the war against “the Serb ag-
gressors” for the sake to gain Croatia’s independence and to clean Croatia from the
ethnic Serbs. That was done at least for two crucial reasons:
1. They believe that a struggling for the Croat nation’s ethno-political goals was a
legitimate framework of both a beating the Serb nationalism and fulfilling the
Croat historical task of creation of a Greater Roman Catholic Croatia without
the Orthodox infidels.
2. They sponsored the attitude that the Serbs cannot be trusted as a nation to ne-
gotiate with them about the peaceful agreement on the disputed issues with
the Croatia’s Government and therefore the war was the only way to pacify the
Serbs from Croatia according to the pattern of the pacification (i.e., the ethnic
cleansing) of the Palestinians in Israel.33
31
S. Barbour, C. Carmichael (eds.), Language and Nationalism in Europe, Oxford−New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000, 228.
32
Interview with Ante Djapic ( July 13th, 1994), J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideology and State-
-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”, Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1997, pp. 36, 42; Glas
Slavonije, Osijek, 1995-08-18.
33
Interview with Ante Djapic ( July 13th, 1994), J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideology and State-
-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”, Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1997, pp. 36, 42. On
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine by the Israeli Jewish authorities, see: I. Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of
Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld, 2011.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 167
34
For instance, in the case of the village of Ahmici in the Lashva Valley (the Vitez municipality) on April
16th, 1993 when around 120 Bosniaks were massacred by the forces of the Croat Defense Council (Ch. R.
Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992−1994, College Station,
Tex., 2003, 92−95).
35
On the Latin American dictatorships, see: S. Mainwaring, A. Pérez-Liñán, Democracies and Dictatorships
in Latin America: Emergence, Survival,l and Fall, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013; J. Dávila,
Dictatorship in South America, Chichester: Wiley−Blackwell, 2013; J. A. Galván, Latin American Dictators
of the 20th century: The Lives and Regimes of 15 Rulers, Jefferson, NC−London: McFarland & Company,
Inc., Publishers, 2013.
36
On democracy, see: B. Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford−New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002; Ch. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press,
168 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
2007; J. B. Pilet, W. P. Cross (eds.), The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary
Democracies: A Comparative Study, New York: Routledge, 2014.
37
It is known that Tudjman did not oppose often practice of the Nazi salutation to him as it was, for
instance, in 1995 on the football stadium in Split (Poljud) [ J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize
(1990−2000), 2, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 418].
38
According to Tanjug, 1995-05-21.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 169
tion against the regime differently to Serbia under Miloshevic’s strong hands. The
latter finally and lost power exactly after the mass-protests in Belgrade on October
5th, 2000 (the first „Colored Revolution“ in Europe).
Tudjman’s authoritarian dictatorship was especially hostile towards the opposi-
tion press that was considered as a fifth colomn in Croatia. The opposition journal-
ists were accused for irresponsible (miss)usage of their freedom of expression. As a
metter of fighting against the opposision press, it was introduced a special (illlegal)
taxation of independent weekles but primarily of the most anti-regime’s newspaper
– the Feral tribune from Split.39 During the election campaignes, the opposition par-
ties were denied equal and full access to the state-controlled press and TV, likewise
in Serbia, and therefore violating one of the fundamental elements and conditions
of the parliamentary democracy. Hence, the electoral results theoretically were not
fair what does not mean that a majority of the ethnic Croats from Croatia would not
vote for the HDZ in the case of fair electoral campaign. Similarly to all totalitarian
regimes, the HDZ’s controlled Parliament passed a special law (in the spring 1996)
for „defamation“ against the state officials. However, such or similar law did not ex-
ist in Miloshevic’s Serbia. Tudjman’s personal efforts to make stronger his own po-
litical (authoritarian) position in Croatia at any cost of liberal democratic institu-
tions are obvious and very similar to his counterpart in Serbia in the 1990s with one
difference: Tudjman was more successful in destroying liberal democracy in Croa-
tia in comparison to Miloshevic’s efforts to do the same in Serbia.
For the HDZ’s political leadership, „without Franjo Tudjman there would be no
HDZ and without the HDZ there would be no Croatia“.40 It is clear that Tudjman’s
party attempted to equating itself with the creation and survival of the post-Yugo-
slav Croatia while Tudjman himself attempted to personalize the institution of the
presidency. Any opposition to himself or his political party were seen as the opposi-
tion to Croatia as the stare and the Croats as the nation that is probably mostly visi-
ble from the fact that Tudjman as a President of Croatia refused to ratify electoral re-
39
The Feral tribune was the most important Croatia’s newspaper that was writing about the terrible
war crimes committed by the regular Croatian police forces against the Serb civilians during the bloody
destruction of Yugoslavia. For instance, it was published an interview with Miro Bajramovic, who was a
member of the First Zagreb police detachment for the special tasks (the „Autumn Rains“ detachment)
in the autumn 1991. Bajramovic recognized that he personally killed at that time 72 persons including
9 women in the region around the town of Pakrac in Slavonia [Feral tribjun, Split, 1997-09-01]. About
the Croat crimes against the Serbs was writing as well Croatia’s newspaper Arkzin which, for instance,
publish in July 1994 a list of 75 killed Serbs from the town of Gospic in the Krajina region [S. Kovačević,
P. Dajić, Hronologija jugoslovenske krize 1994, Beograd: Institut za evropske studije, 1995, 127].
40
Novi list, 1995-10-15.
170 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
sults for the Zagreb municipality’s mayor in 1995 as the opposition leader won under
the excuse that Croatia’s capital cannot be in the hands of the enemies of Croatia.41
The fact was that all ultranationalistic parties and organizations in the 1990s
struggled for creation of a Greater Croatia according to the principle of the ethno-
graphic, historical and even natural rights. In all of those concepts, Bosnia-Herze-
govina was seen as an integral part of the united Croatia. There were, in principle,
two concepts of the united Croatia:
The cardinal point of the question of Croatia’s state borders involves Bosnia-Her-
zegovina as indivisible part of any kind of the “natural Croatia”. All existed differenc-
es between the Croats and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims were considered as
artificial and created by the Yugoslav authorities. The Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina were declared as the “purest Croats” according to the WWII Ustashi ideological
pattern. In general, for the Croat politicians, academicians and public workers, the
41
Р. Арсенић, „Остварени сви циљеви“, Политика, Београд, 1995-12, 7.
42
The Banovina Hrvatska had a territory of 65.456 square km. with 4.024.601 inhabitants according to
the 1931 census. It was composed by 70.1 percent of the Croats, 19.1 percent of the Serbs, 3.6 percent
of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims (today the Bosniaks) and 7.2 percent of the others (mainly the
Germans and the Hungarians). It consisted the territories of Croatia proper, Slavonia, the West Srem,
Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, the West Herzegovina, the parts of the Central Bosnia and the parts of the North
Bosnia [S. Srkulj, J. Lučić, Hrvatska Povijest u dvadeset pet karata. Prošireno i dopunjeno izdanje, Zagreb:
Hrvatski informativni centar, 1996, 101−103]. The Banovina Hrvatska was created under the British
diplomatic pressure to solve the “Croat Question” in Yugoslavia before the German aggression. The final
political agreement on the creation of Banovina Hrvatska and her borders was reached by two Yugoslav
politicians – one Croat (Vlatko Machek, a leader of the Croat opposition) and one Gypsy/Roma (Dragiša
Cvetković, a Yugoslav Prime Minister). The ethnic Serb politicians did not participate in the negotiations
on the agreement and strongly opposed it.
43
In the eyes of some Croat ultranationalists, even the Bay of Kotor in Montenegro as well Bachka and
Sanjak from Serbia were seen as the parts of the ethnohistorical Croatia.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 171
Drina River was a demarcation line between the civilization and the barbarism, or
between Europe and the Orient. The Serbs were considered as the proponents of
the Byzantine-Ottoman Oriental anti-European culture, while the Croats and Slo-
venes were saw as the last bulwark of the European civilization in front of the Ori-
ental primitivism. For all Croat nationalists, the Drina River was and is the border
that the Serbs must not be allowed to cross as well the border of the “natural Croa-
tia”. In some conceptions of the ultraterritorial enlargement of Croatia, the territory
of Serbia had to be restricted to the area around Belgrade only.44 Nevertheless, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and Croatia were considered as the same land, people and blood of
the same nation. Therefore, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be united into
a single national state of the ethnic Croats. Croatia’s unification with Bosnia-Herze-
govina was explained by ethnic, historical economic and even civilizational reasons
as the historic mission of the Croat nation was seen to defend Europe from the Ori-
ental despotism, i.e. from Serbia and the Serbs.
It is known and proved that Tudjman had a set of secret negotiations with Milo-
shevic to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. Hence, the Day-
ton Accords on November 21st, 1995 on the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina
according to the mathematical formula of 51/49 percent can be seen as a practical
implementation of their secret agreement sponsored by the U.S. administration of
Bill Clinton.45 A creation of an ethnically pure Croat portion of Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na was a part of this Tudjman-Miloshevic’s deal and in order to achieve this goal the
Croats practiced in 1993−1994 the policy of ethnic cleansing of the West Herze-
govina and a part of the Central Bosnia within the territory of the Croat-proclaimed
Herzeg-Bosnia with the capital in Mostar on the Neretva River.46 The Croat-Mus-
lim civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was halted in the spring of 1994 just due to the
U.S. ultimatum to Zagreb: in order to liquidate the Republic of Serb Krajina and to
reintegrate it into Croatia the Croats had to unite their military forces in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina against the Serbs. Therefore, it was agreed in March 1994 a creation of the
Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was advocated by Washington
44
Profil, 1992-08-03.
45
On the Dayton Accords, see: D. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft,
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
46
The “Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” (the HZHB) was proclaimed on July 3rd, 1992 that is three
months after the outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Herzeg-Bosnia became in fact a
“South Croatia” and just formally part of Bosnia-Herzegovina [ J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize
(1990−2000), 1, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 368−369]. However, the HZHB was on
August 28th, 1993 proclaimed as the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (the HRBH) with political aim
to be united with the Republic of Croatia.
172 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
(the Washington Framework Agreement). In practice, even today, the Croat con-
trolled part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not under a virtual administration by the cen-
tral authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo similar to the case of the Repub-
lic of Srpska. Nevertheless, Tudjman’s policy of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina
with the Serbs was opposed by all kinds of the Ustashi groups either in Croatia or
Bosnia-Herzegovina as for them a whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was indi-
visible part of a Greater Croatia as a national state of all and only ethnic Croats in-
cluding and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims who were ideologically consid-
ered as the ethnohistorical Croats as well. The Ustashi organizations and parties
advocated a common Croat-Muslim combat against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina but only after the creation of ethnically pure Croat Herzeg-Bosnia. In principle,
they opposed the Dayton Accords as this agreement gave to Serbia a real possibili-
ty to cross the Drina River.
47
The same ethnopolitical role of national coherence played anti-Semitism in the ideology of the Nazi
Germany. In the Croat case, the anti-Semitism was not important factor in the ultranationalist ideology,
at least up to the WWII.
48
For instance, see: J. Jareb, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike: Povodom Mačekove autobiografije, Zagreb:
Institut za suvremenu povijest, 1995, V−X.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 173
49
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe, 1995-08-10.
50
Temeljna načela i statut, Hrvatska stranka prava, 1991-02-24.
51
Interview with Ante Djapic, Glas Slavonije, 1995-08-19.
174 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
ished and instead of it the Orthodox Church of Croatia should be established (like
in the WWII NDH). Since the Croat military-police operation “Oluja” (Storm) of
ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs in August 1995, all Croat nationalistic parties,
including above all the ruling HDZ, did everything in order to prevent the return
of the Serb refugees (about 250,000)52 to their homes. In order to achieve this goal,
usually three methods were used: 1. Demolition of the Serb houses; 2. Public an-
nouncing the Serb names as wanted war criminals; and 3. Physical attacking, or even
killing, the Serb refugees.
Nevertheless, either the HDZ or other right-wing Croat parties never recog-
nized the mass exodus of Krajina Serbs from Croatia in August 1995 as the ethnic
cleansing as for them it was rather a free choice of homeland as it was officially stat-
ed by the President Franjo Tudjman. The official Croatia as well never recognized
the existence of the concentration camps for the Serbs in the 1990s on the territory
of Croatia like it was in the Pakrac poljana, around Gospic, and in Sisak.53 According
to the Croat nationalists, the problem of depopulated parts of Croatia (once inhab-
ited by the Serbs) after August 1995, should be solved by housing the ethnic Croat
diaspora and the Croat refugees. That was exactly the best option of the final solu-
tion of the “Serb Question” in Croatia which mostly satisfied Franjo Tudjman who
when he took his “freedom train” on August 26th, 1995 from Zagreb to Split via de-
populated Krajina region said that the Serbs: “had disappeared ignominiously, as if
they had never populated this land. We urged them to stay, but they didn’t listen to
us and, well bon voyage”.54 Regardless that the HSP urged the Government to intro-
duce a special legislation on restricting the return of the Serb refugees, it was, nev-
ertheless, activated a law according to which the refugees had right to reclaim their
property during the three-month period. That was a legal mechanism used in order
not to create real conditions for the Serb refugees to return back. Therefore, the “Serb
Question” in Tudjman’s Croatia was solved on the way that today there are only 4
percent of the Serbs out of total Croatia’s population in comparison to 12 percent
52
В. Ђ. Мишина (уредник), Република Српска Крајина: Десет година послије, Београд: Добра воља,
2005, 48.
53
J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 1, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003,
223.
54
J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideology and State-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”, Problems of Post-
-Communism, July/August 1997, 40. It is clear from the transcripts of the meeting between Croatia’s
Government and military officials at Brioni just before the operation “Storm” started that Tudjman’s
requirement was that the Serbs have to disappear from Croatia [http://www.nspm.rs/dokumenti/
tudjmanovi-brionski-transkripti-udariti-srbe-da-nestanu.html].
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 175
according to the 1991 census.55 The task from 1991, when Croatia’s governmental
forces started the war against their own citizens of the Serb origin,56 was finally real-
ized in August 1995: the Serbs who remained in Croatia became politically not dan-
gerous and under complete governmental control and served as a proof to the inter-
national community that Croatia is formally multiethnic society.
The Croat ultranational parties and other organizations expressed a visible form
of anomaly in their ideological and programmatic concepts as on the one hand pro-
moted an idea of protection of the West European culture and civilization but at the
same time, on the other hand, expressed a great extent of suspicion and even hos-
tility towards the western liberalism.57 The western liberalism, in their opinion, was
speaking in the favor of an individual, his/her freedom, rights and prosperity but not
in the favor of a nation and national interest. As for all ultranationalists, a nation was
über alles and therefore any ideology that was not speaking primarily in the favor of
a nation was not acceptable and even seen as destructive since only the particular-
ity of the nation is giving a real meaning to the life of the individual. A destructive
nature of the western liberalism was primarily seen in regard to the liberal approach
toward the family question as the ultranationalists reject the liberal emphasis on in-
dividual freedom of choice and rights and on personal benefits from such choice.
What they support instead of liberal ideology of personal free choice is an ideolo-
gy which is advocating the promotion of welfare of the nation and realization of the
national state policy. As for the Croat ultranationalists the main problem and ob-
stacle for prosperity of Croatia and Croats were the Serbs, their requirement for de-
mographic renewal of the Croat nation was politically pointed against the Serbs. Ba-
sically they adopted a demographic (boom) policy of Kosovo Albanians after the
WWII in their fight against the local Serbs. For the Croat ultraright parties, a family
structure has to be framed within the conservative-patriarchal order as the best way
to biologically increase the population of the ethnic Croats as, for instance, Franjo
55
On the present-day territory of Croatia there were 24 percent of the Serbs before the WWII.
56
That Croatia’s Government launched the war against the Serbs in 1991 in order to provoke them is
confirmed by Tudjman’s first minister of police, Josip Boljkovac in his interview in 2014 [http://www.
jugoslavologija.eu/2014/12/24/tudmanov-ministar-priznao-prvi-smo-napali-srbe-da-bi-poceo-rat/].
57
On the western liberalism, see [L. Mises, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition, San Francisco, California:
Cobden Press, 1985; E. Fawcett, Liberalism: The Life of an Idea, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2014; M. Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015].
176 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
58
F. Tudjman, S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku, Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1995, 79−90.
59
On the concept of citizenship, see: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of
Minority Rights, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; R. Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short
Introduction, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; É. Balibar, Citizenship, Cambridge, UK−
Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2015. The same citizenship concept, for example, is accepted by all three
Baltic States after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 177
In general, the Croat ultranationalists were against the basic values of the west-
ern liberalism but also and against many segments of the western culture especial-
ly of the U.S. as they perceived such culture as an attempt to destroy the authentic
values of the Croat nation. The West became accused and for the attempts to un-
dermine the independence of Croatia and even to recreate some form of the Yugo-
slav (or Balkan) confederation with the Serbs and Serbia. Therefore, the U.N.’s UN-
PROFOR’ R s detachments, deployed on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina
(as the U.N.’ protection zone) were called to be removed from the territory of Cro-
atia as the main obstacle for her territorial reunification. Nevertheless, Croatia be-
came finally reunited within the borders of a Greater Croatia of Josip Broz Tito after
the WWII when Croatia’s military and police reoccupied the territory of Krajina in
August 1995 under the blessing of both the U.S.’s administration and the UNPRO-
FOR’R s command. Therefore, for the Croat ultranationalists the suspicions of possi-
ble Western designs to recreate a form of Yugoslavia disappeared after the operation
“Storm” but their suspicions to the Western political liberalism and cultural and so-
cial values of the liberal ideology are present up today.
Conclusion
The internal and external destruction of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s
was celebrating in 2015 its 20th years of anniversary. However, this historical event
still needs a satisfactory research approach in regard to the true geopolitical reasons
and political-military course of the destruction of this South Slavic and Balkan state.
During the last quarter of century, the (western) global mainstream media and ac-
ademia unanimously accused Serbia and the Serbs for the national chauvinism as
the main cause of the bloody wars on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s.60
However, the role and direct impact of the other Yugoslav republics and nations in
the process of killing the common state was not taken (purposely) into the consid-
eration; especially of the Croats and Croatia as the biggest nation and republic af-
ter the Serbs and Serbia. This article is an attempt to contribute to the full-scale of
understanding of the process of destruction of the former Yugoslavia taking into ac-
count a role of the Croats and Croatia.
Franjo Tudjman’s authoritarian regime in Croatia and the territorial expansion-
ist policy of his HDZ’s ruling party during the bloody destruction of the former Yu-
goslavia in the 1990s were not noticed at all by the western politicians, academicians
60
For instance [L. Silber, A. Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, London: Penguin Books, 1997; L. Sell,
Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Durham−London: Duke University Press, 2003].
178 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
BIBLIOGRAPHY
П. Симић, Тито: Феномен 20. века. Треће допуњено издање, Београд: Службени
гласник, 2011 (P. Simić, Tito: Fenomen 20. veka. Treće dopunjeno izdanje, Beo-
grad: Službeni glasnik, 2011).
П. Симић, З. Деспот, Тито: Строго поверљиво. Архивски документи, Београд−
Службени гласник, 2010 (P. Simić, Z. Despot, Tito: Strogo poverljivo. Arhivs-
ki dokumenti, Beograd−Službeni glasnik, 2010).
П. Милосављевић, Срби и њихов језик. Хрестоматија, Приштина: Народна и
универзитетска библиотека, 1997 (P. Milosavljević, Srbi i njihov jezik. Hres-
tomatija, Priština: Narodna i univerzitetska biblioteka, 1997).
М. Самарџић, Сарадња партизана са Немцима, усташама и Албанцима,
Крагујевац: Погледи, 2006 (M. Samardžić, Saradnja partizana sa Nemcima,
ustašama i Albancima, Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2006).
М. А. Ривели, Надбискуп геноцида: Монсињор Степинац, Ватикан и усташка
диктатура у Хрватској 1941−1945, Никшић−Јасен, 1999 (M. A. Riveli,
Nadbiskup genocida: Monsinjor Stepinac, c Vatikan i ustaška diktatura u Hrvatskoj
1941−1945, Nikšić−Jasen, 1999).
М. А. Ривели, Бог је с нама: Црква Пија XII саучесника нацифашизма, Никшић:
Јасен, 2003 (M. A. Riveli, Bog je s nama: Crkva Pija XII saučesnika nacifašizma,
Nikšić: Jasen, 2003).
Ј. Хорват, Странке код Хрвата и њихова идеологија, Београд: Политика, 1939
( J. Horvat, Stranke kod Hrvata i njihova ideologija, Beograd: Politika, 1939).
Д. Р. Живојиновић, Ватикан, Католичка црква и југословенска власт 1941−1958,
Београд: Просвета−Терсит, 1994 (D. R. Živojinović, Vatikan, Katolička crkva
i jugoslovenska vlast 1941−1958, Beograd: Prosveta−Tersit, 1994).
В. Ћоровић, Црна књига: Патње Срба Босне и Херцеговине за време Светског
Рата 1914−1918, Удружење ратних добровољаца, 1996 (V. Ćorović, Crna
knjiga: Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme Svetskog Rata 1914−1918,
Udruženje ratnih dobrovoljaca, 1996).
В. Ђ. Крестић, Геноцидом до Велике Хрватске. Друго допуњено издање, Јагодина:
Гамбит, 2002 (V. Đ. Krestić, Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske. Drugo dopunjeno
izdanje, Jagodina: Gambit, 2002).
В. Ђ. Мишина (уредник), Република Српска Крајина: Десет година послије,
Београд: Добра воља, 2005 (V. Đ. Mišina [ur.], Republika Srpska Krajina: De-
set godina poslije, Beograd: Dobra volja, 2005).
В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, Београд: Просвета, 2000 (V.
Dvorniković, Karakterologija Jugoslovena, Beograd: Prosveta, 2000).
В. Б. Сотировић, Социолингвистички аспект распада Југославије и српско
национално питање, Нови Сад−Србиње: Добрица књига, 2007 (V. B. So-
180 | Vladislav B. Sotirović
J. Jareb, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike: Povodom Mačekove autobiografije, Zagreb: In-
stitut za suvremenu povijest, 1995.
J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 1, Beograd: Izdavački grafič-
ki atelje “M”, 2003.
J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 2, Beograd: Izdavački grafič-
ki atelje “M”, 2003.
J. Dávila, Dictatorship in South America, Chichester: Wiley−Blackwell, 2013.
J. B. Pilet, W. P. Cross (eds.), The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary
Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Study, New York: Routledge, 2014.
J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideology and State-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”,
Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1997, 30−43.
J. A. Galván, Latin American Dictators of the 20th century: The Lives and Regimes of 15
Rulers, Jefferson, NC−London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2013.
Izborna deklaracija Hrvatske stranke prava, Zagreb, 1992.
Interview with Dobroslav Paraga, Danas, Zagreb, 1991-03-5.
Interview with Ante Djapic, Glas Slavonije, 1995-08-19.
Interview with Ante Djapic ( July 13th, 1994), J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideol-
ogy and State-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”, Problems of Post-Communism,
July/August 1997, pp. 36, 42.
I. Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld, 2011.
Glas Slavonije, Osijek, 1995-08-18.
G. G. Gilbert, “Pravaštvo and the Croatian National Issue”, East European Quarter-
ly, 1, 1978, 57−68.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe, 1995-08-10.
Feral tribjun, Split, 1997-09-01.
F. Tudjman, S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku, Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1995.
F. Tudjman, Bespuća povijesne zbiljosti, Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1989.
E. Paris, L. Perkins, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941−1945: A Record of Racial and
Religious Persecutions and Massacres, Literary Licencing, LLC, 2011.
E. Fawcett, Liberalism: The Life of an Idea, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2014.
É. Balibar, Citizenship, Cambridge, UK−Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2015.
D. Živojinović, D. Lučić, Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo. Prilozi za Magnum Crimen, Beo-
grad, 1988.
D. Pavličević, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i prošireno izdanje, Zagreb: Nak-
lada P.I.P. Pavičić, 2000.
D. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft, New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
Ch. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
An Alternative View on the Destruction of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s | 183
Ch. R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History,
1992−1994, College Station, Tex., 2003.
B. Tošović, A. Wonisch, (eds.), Die serbische Sichtweise des Verhältnisses zwischen dem
Serbischen, Kroatischen und Bosniakischen, I/4, Novi Sad: Institut für Slawistik
der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz−Beogradska knjiga, 2012.
B. M. Lituchy (ed.), Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia: Analyses and Survivor
Testimonies, New York: Jasenovac Research Institute, 2006.
B. J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast
Europe, London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2006.
B. Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford−New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002.
A. J. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-Old Dream,
Manchester−New York: Manchester University Press, 2003.
A. Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac hrvatski kardinal, Rim, 1974.
„Brionski transkripti“, Nova srpska politička misao [http://www.nspm.rs/dokumen-
ti/tudjmanovi-brionski-transkripti-udariti-srbe-da-nestanu.html].
Владислав Б. Сотировић
UDC 398.4(495.2)”21”
Оригинални научни рад
Dr Dimitris Petalas1
Hellenic Folklore Society (Athens)
Greece
Nicht wenige Volksglauben slawischer Herkunft haben sich bis heute -wenn
auch vom Verschwinden bedroht- im Süden des griechischen Festlands erhalten.
1
dpetalas@otenet.gr
186 | Dimitris Petalas
Zwei davon wurden schon vor einiger Zeit untersucht (in Arkadien die mora2 und
das σμέρδι, σμερδάκι oder σμιρδάκι3), andere sind wohlbekannt (z.B. das Eulenge-
schrei als Vorbote des Todes oder die Feen, die in Form eines Wirbelwinds tanzen
und einem, wenn man nicht aufpasst, die Sprache rauben können).
In dieser kleinen Studie möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit auf zwei Volksglau-
ben lenken, die noch lebendig sind, aber bisher, soweit mir bekannt, unbeachtet ge-
blieben sind.
2
Serbokroatisch mora=Albtraum, Nachtmahr. Mehr dazu s. Laograhia, Bd. XX, S. 330. Das auch in an-
deren slawischen Sprachen anzutreffende Wort (bulg. morá, ukr. móra, russ. kikimora) ist etymologisch
eng mit dem dt. Nachtmahr verbunden, dem e. nightmare und dem frz. cauchemar. Es ist unverändert ins
Deutsche gedrungen, und zwar in Legenden der ehemals deutschen und heute polnischen Gegend um
Posen (Poznan). Das zeigt die Erzählung „Die Mora“ in der Sammlung von Leander Petzoldt Deutsche
Volkssagen, Marix Verlag, Wiesbaden 2007, S. 71
3
<Slaw. sьmrdь=hässlich, schrecklich, stinkend. Spukgeist in Gestalt eines Hundes oder einer Wildkat-
ze, die auf verschiedene Arten den Herden Schaden zufügt (erwürgt Schafe, stiehlt ihre Milch…). In
Abwandlungen des Volksglaubens handelt es sich um die Seele eines ungetauften Kindes, das seinen Na-
men erfahren will und an der Mutterbrust saugt (s. Φαίδων Μαλιγκούδης, Η Θεσσαλονίκη και ο κόσμος
των Σλάβων, Βάνιας, Θεσσαλονίκη 1997, S. 155-157).
4
Светлана М. Толстој - Љубинко Раденковић, Словенска Митологија. Ензиклопедијски Речник, Zep-
ter Book World, Beograd 2001.
5
Das dem “mit dem bösen Blick behexen” entsprechende serbische Verb урећи (<реч=Wort), also et-
was Ähnliches wie das griechische γλωσσοτρώω (=mit der Sprache Unheil bringen), da man glaubt, die
Wirkung des bösen Blicks könne auch von einem völlig gutgemeinten Ausdruck der Bewunderung her-
rühren, es genüge, wenn der Sprechende den bösen Blick habe. Aber auch das Wort урок ist etymolo-
Zu zwei Volksglauben auf der heutigen Peloponnes | 187
deren Worten: Der Behexende entreißt und nimmt [seinem Opfer] ein „Zählmaß“.
Daher erscheint bei den Serben als Synonym des Verbs урећи [=mit dem bösen Blick
behexen, s. Anm. 2] auch промерити [=zählen, vermessen] und Frauen, die behe-
xen, werden промернице [wörtlich=Zählerinnen] genannt. Daher wurde der Na-
me des Kindes geheim gehalten, weil es als sein „Zählmaß“ angesehen wurde; aber
auch die Zahl der Schafe, weil auch die deren Maßeinheit war. Somit wird die magi-
sche Handlung verständlich, bei der ein gerade geborenes Kind auf eine Waage ge-
legt wird, wobei niemand sehen darf,f wie viel es wiegt; das wurde als eine Art Vor-
sichtsmaßnahme für das Baby benutzt, weil so sein Zählmaß geheim blieb und der
Behexer es nicht wegnehmen konnte. Mit der Einsperrung seiner Gestalt ins ausge-
sprochene Wort wird das Lebewesen (Mensch, Tier oder Pflanze) zur Zerstörung
seiner Unversehrtheit gebracht, da es so „gefangen genommen wird“ und auf diese
Weise sogar bis zur Vernichtung getrieben werden kann. Daher auch das russische
Wort für den bösen Blick -порча = [serb.] кварење [=Zerstörung]. Im kroatischen
Zagorje benutzt man statt des Verbs урећи auch обрати [=pflücken, sammeln] mit
der Bedeutung von „die Gestalt wegnehmen, trennen“. Daher glaubt man in Mon-
tenegro (in der Gegend von Куча / Kuča), dass der böse Blick einwirkt, wenn ge-
wisse Einzelpersonen „aus ihrem großen Verlangen heraus sehnsüchtig und lüstern
ein schönes Tier, aber auch Menschen ansehen“; aus dem gleichen Grund zeigt man
-ebenfalls in Montenegro (ehemaliger Bezirk Ријечка / Riječka)- ein gut entwickel-
tes Kind nicht der Öffentlichkeit, weil man fürchtet, „die bösen Mäuler könnten ihm
Unheil bringen und die Augen mit dem bösen Blick es zerreißen“. Man fasste also
die Behexung mit dem bösen Blick als eine Trennung des Inhalts von der Gestalt auf,f
die Gestalt als Träger der Beschaffenheit [d.h. des Wesens der Person, die den bö-
sen Blick erleidet]: das Wort „fällt“ auf die Kreatur, „steht“ auf ihr, entreißt ihr die-
se Beschaffenheit und fliegt zurück zu seinem Urheber. Trennt der Behexer die Ge-
stalt vom Inhalt, gelingt ihm die Zerstörung der Unversehrtheit (d.h. des Opfers);
und genau in diese so zerborstene Unversehrtheit dringen mythische Wesen, die
уроци [wörtlich=Böse Zungen, also Behexer] heißen und sogar den Tod des Men-
schen herbeiführen können“6.
gisch mit реч verbunden. Parallel dazu gibt es allerdings auch das Substantiv злоочник (wörtlich=der
ein böses Auge hat, neidisch ist).
6
Der serbische Text lautet so: Урицање се може дефинисати као магијски поступак “одвајања и за-
тварања” лика човека (стоке, воћке) у реч и његовог присвајања <..>. Другим речима, то је хватање
и одношење нечије “мере”. Зато се, као синоним глагола урећи, код Срба јавља и ознака промери-
ти, а жене које уричу називају се и промернице. Из тих разлога крило се име детета, јер се оно сма-
трало за његову “меру”, крио се и број оваца, јер је и то њихова мера. Стога је разумљива магијска
пракса стављања детета после рођења на кантар, али без гледања колико је оно тешко, која је кори-
шћена као облик његове заштите (јер је на тај начин његова мера остала сакривена и злоочник је не
188 | Dimitris Petalas
Aber auch beim Lemma број (=Zahl) des gleichen Lexikons bemerkt Светлана
М. Толстој: “Die Zählung wird oft als gefährliche Handlung verstanden, mit deren
Hilfe man das Objekt der Zählung beherrschen und seinem Willen unterwerfen
kann. Verboten ist z.B. das Zählen der Schafe einer Herde (man glaubt, das könne
etwas Schlimmes auslösen), sowie der in einem Schwarm fliegenden Vögel (diese
könnten ihren Kurs verfehlen), verboten ist das Messen der Länge eines gewebten
Leintuchs u.a.7
Wie mir kürzlich ein bulgarischer Freund aus der Gegend von Смолян / Smol-
jan sagte, weigern sich auch dort die Hirten, die genaue Zahl der Tiere in ihrer Her-
de zu nennen; sie antworten mit Ausflüchten wie „Ich habe sie nicht gezählt“, „Gott
allein weiß es“ o.Ä.
Zum Schluss möchte ich noch kurz bei der Bemerkung von Раденковић bezüg-
lich der Zerstörung -so der Volksglaube- der Unversehrtheit des Opfers der Behe-
xung stehenbleiben, d.h. der Trennung seiner Gestalt von seiner Beschaffenheit und
die Gefangennahme letzterer durch die frevelhafte, da dämonische- Macht des Be-
hexers; ich möchte hier die enge und nicht nur etymologische Beziehung vieler in-
doeuropäischer Sprachen zwischen der Unversehrtheit (die auch als Stärke, Gesund-
heit verstanden wird) und dem Heiligen betonen: Bei Homer z.B. bedeutet ἱερὸς auch
stark („Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον“); ähnlich im Deutschen: die Adjektive heil (=gesund,
unversehrt) und heilig haben die gleiche Wurzel. So auch im Englischen die Wörter
whole (=ganz), hale (=gesund, kräftig), to hail (=grüßen in der Bedeutung: ich ent-
biete den Gruß „Sei gesund!“), to heal (=heilen) und holy (=heilig)8. Im Altkirchen-
може однети). “Хватањем лика у реч” долази до нарушавања целокупности бића или растиња, ко-
ји на тај начин бивају “заробљени” а тиме и до њиховог кварења. Отуда и руска ознака за урицање -
порча (“кварење”). У хрватском Загорју, уместо урећи, каже се још и обрати, што би значило “ски-
нути, одвојити лик”. Зато у Црној Гори (Кучи) верују да урок настаје када поједине особе “са своје
лакомости жудно и одвећ лакомо погледају добру животињу, тако и чељад”; из тог разлога, такође
у Црној Гори (некадашња Ријечка нахија) напредно дете нису износили у свет да га гледају, јер су
се бојали да га “зла уста не урекну, или зле очи не разнесу”. Значи, урицање се схватало као раздва-
јање садржаја и форме, а форма је схватана као носилац квалитета: реч “падне” на биће, “стоји” на
њему, узме му квалитет и “одлети” своме власнику. <...> Када злоочник раздвоји садржај и форму,
долази до нарушавања целине, и управо у тако отворену целину улазе митолошка бића која се на-
зивају уроци и која могу да изазову и човекову смрт.
7
Der serbische Text lautet so: Бројање се често схвата као опасна радња, помоћу које је могуће овла-
дати предметом бројања, потчинити га својој вољи. Нпр. забрањује се бројање оваца у стаду (веру-
је се да им се тиме може нанети штета), птица које лете у јату (помрсиће им се пут), забрањује се
мерење дужине изатканог платна и сл.
8
Chambers’s’ Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, W. & R. Chambers, Limited, London, Ed-
inburgh, 1915.
Zu zwei Volksglauben auf der heutigen Peloponnes | 189
slawischen kommt vom Adjektiv cĕlŭ (=gesund, ganz, unversehrt) -etymologisch ver-
wandt mit heil- das Verb cĕlovati (=ich begrüße, küsse die Reliquie eines Heiligen)9.
(Anm.: In der deutschen Übersetzung des serbischen Texts stammen die Erklä-
rungen in eckigen Klammern vom Verfasser).
B) Die Eselsechse
Die oft bis zu 40 cm lange, in Griechenland lebende Smaragdeidechse sieht be-
sonders abstoßend aus; auf der Peloponnes wird sie, soweit ich weiß, „γαϊδουρογ(κ)
ουστέρα“ [gaidurogustéra] („Eselsechse“) genannt, in Thessalien heißt sie
„πρασινογκοστέρα“ [prasinogostéra] („Grünechse“). Abgesehen vom slawischen
Wort für „Eidechse“ im Allgemeinen, das sich in der Sprache des Volkes auf dem ge-
samten griechischen Festland erhalten hat (serb./bulg. гуштер/gušter), ist die oben
erwähnte peloponnesische Benennung von besonderem Interesse, weil sie ein Zeug-
nis für das Überleben (geringfügig abgewandelt) eines alten slawischen Volksglau-
bens darstellt. Die „Eselsechse“ wird nicht wegen ihrer Größe so genannt, sondern
weil sie nach dem Volksglauben den, der von ihr gebissen wird, nicht eher loslässt,
bis ein Eselsgeschrei zu hören ist.
Im Enzyklopädischen Lexikon der Slawischen Mythologie wird unter dem Stichwort
гуштер angeführt, nach dem Volksglauben der Südslawen könne man nur vom Biss
der Eidechse (im Allgemeinen) geheilt werden, wenn man ein Eselsgeschrei verneh-
me. («по веровањима Јужних Словена, човек се неће излечити од уједа гуштера
све док не чује њакање магарца»).
Wie wir sehen, haben sich die Spuren der Slawen, die sich vor ungefähr 1500
Jahren auf der Peloponnes niederließen, bis heute erhalten.
9
Friedrich Kluge, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York,
1989, Lemma heil.
190 | Dimitris Petalas
Dimitris Petalas
Abstract: The present paper examines two popular Slavic beliefs which have survived in
contemporary Peloponnese and may also be found in former Yugoslavia and (the first of them)
in Bulgaria. Firstly, the relation that counting or calculating something (such as the number
of sheep or the weight of a new-born child, respectively) has to putting someone under a spell
by casting the evil eye on them; and secondly, being bitten by a lizard and being unable to find
relief or cure unless a donkey’s braying is heard.
Keywords: casting a spell, counting, donkey, evil eye, (green) lizard, Peloponnese, pop-
ular belief,f Serbia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
UDC 7.038.53(497.1)
Оригинални научни рад
Dr Tanja Zimmermann1
University of Leipzig
Institute of Art History
Germany
1
tanja.zimmermann@uni-leipzig.
g de
192 | Tanja Zimmermann
if not in reality, then in fiction.2 Through literary styles of fragmented narration, os-
cillating between different identities, chronotopes and languages, they found a new,
imaginary homeland for their way of an “art of living”. Exile translated a plurality of
cultural identities into labyrinths and phantasmagorias of the world seen through a
multitude of mirrors.3 As Edward Said observes, exile is not only praised as a sublime
state of dissidence and as a literary topos, but it has been raised even to an aesthetic
norm of “nomadic” and “deterritorialized” postmodern writing.4 Elisabeth Bronfen
asserts that exile is not a place without a fatherland, but a “third place” between the
home and the host lands, between the real and an imaginative world.5 If literature
and visual arts describe the wounds of the exile, they do so implicitly by promoting
art as a medicine capable of healing these wounds by means of narration. The expe-
rience of exile is thus transformed into a form of quintessentially aesthetic experi-
ence, compared to the expulsion of the first humans from paradise. Exile becomes
a sort of an unending longing for the vanished Arcadia, which surveyed only in lit-
erature and art.6 Like the concept of mythical Arcadia – a product of fictional liter-
ature and art that offered a counter-image for political reality –, exile offers literary
and visual meta-experience beyond the real experience. Being the epitome of nos-
talgia and suffering, exile has become a land of pleasures of a higher sort: By means
of heroic self-stylization and self-celebration, it is the realm where a man as an au-
thor can realize the aspiration of his narcissism. However it is a masochistic sort of
narcissism that draws its satisfaction from the very experience of abandonment. Ac-
2
Ugrešić, Dubravka (1999). The Writer in Exile. [Online] Available: http://www.kitch.si/
livingonaborder/files/Dubravka%20Ugresic%20-%20The%20Writer%20in%20Exile.pdf (May 30,
2016).
3
Pels, Dick (1999). Privileged Nomads: On the Strangeness of Intellectuals and Intellectuality of
Strangers, Theory, Culture, Society, 16, 63-86; Trepte, Hans Christian (2000). Polnische Exilliteratur
– Sprache und Identität. In: Łukasz Gałecki & Basil Kerski (ed.), Die polnische Emigration und Europa
1945-1990. Eine Bilanz des politischen Denkens und der Literatur Polens im Exil. Osnabrück: Fibre,
247-264; Behring, Eva (2004). Paradigmenwechsel in der Schreibstrategie. Elemente einer Ästhetik
des Exils? In: Eva Behring & Alfrun Kliems & Hans-Christian Trepte (ed.), Grundbegriffe und Autoren
ostmitteleuropäischer Exilliteraturen 1945-1989. Ein Beitrag zur Systematisierung und Typologisierung.
Stuttgart: Steiner, 441-515.
4
Said, Edward E. (2000). Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
173-186.
5
Bronfen, Elisabeth (1993). Exil in der Literatur. Zwischen Metapher und Realität. Arcadia, 28, 167-
183.
6
Iser, Wolfgang (1984). Spencer’s Arcadia. The Interrelation of Fiction and History. In: Mihai Spariosu
(ed.), Mimesis in Contemporary Theory 1. The Literary and Philosophical Debate. Amsterdam,
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 109-141.
Between Nomadism and Sedentariness: Figuration of Space in Literary
and Visual Culture of Migrant Workers from Yugoslavia | 193
7
Ugrešić 1999; Hoffmann, Eva (1998). The New Nomads. The Yale Review, 86, 43-58.
8
For the song see also: Ondrěj, Daniel (2007): Gastarabajteri. Rethinking Yugoslav Economic Migration
towards the European North-West through Transnationalism and Popular Culture. In: Steven. G. Ellis
& Lud’a Klusáková (ed.), Imagining Frontiers, Contesting Identities, Pisa: Pisa University, 287.
9
Trumbetaš, Drago (1995): Gastarbeiter-Gedichte 1969-1980 (Gastarbajterske pesme). Velika Gorica:
Glasnik Turopolja.
194 | Tanja Zimmermann
10
Riblja čorba, Gastarbajterska pesma (1996). [Online] Available: http://www.songtexte.com/songtext/
riblja-orba/gastarbajterska-pesma-5b971320.html (May 30, 2016).
Between Nomadism and Sedentariness: Figuration of Space in Literary
and Visual Culture of Migrant Workers from Yugoslavia | 195
In contrast to exile culture, Riblja čorba and Trumbetaš describe migrant cul-
ture as characterized by material, consumerist values and split between two worlds
– the ascetic word during the working days and excessive festivities during the week-
ends. Thus, migrant culture is at the same time greedy and wasteful. Its paradox,
ecliptic character is close to the grotesque folkloristic culture of carnival, described
by Mikhail Bakhtin as an extreme form of liberation from the rules of the systems
of power and from the discipline of everyday life.11 Carnival culture does not liber-
ate through sublimation and rejection of the material world, but through excessive
de-sublimation in the midst of the world – in its lower regions, in its entrails. Unlike
exiled dissidents, migrant workers do not populate “third worlds”, transforming the
dark side of life into sublime forms of life-art, but are people inhabiting “non-places”
(non lieux) within the material world. According to Marc Augé, non lieux are transi-
tional places which are not marked by tradition and history, unable to convey iden-
tity.12 Although crowds of people in searching to commercialize their labour meet at
places of transition – travel facilities (waiting rooms, airports, train stations), con-
sumption facilieties (shopping malls, tourist resorts) or provisory dwellings (refugee
camps) – they do not really belong together and remain unlinked by any permanent,
collective identity. Even if they are grouped together, they still feel lonely. Even if
they have to spend a long time in one and the same place, they do not perceive it as
an ambience marked both by tradition and transformation, but as a space stuck in a
11
Bachtin, Michail (1969): Literatur und Karneval. Zur Romantheorie und Lachkultur. München: Hanser;
Bachtin, Michail (1995): Rabelais und seine Welt. Volkskultur als Gegenkultur. ed. Renate Lachmann.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
12
Augé, Marc (2011). Nicht-Orte. München: Beck, 42, 51, 81-114.
196 | Tanja Zimmermann
permanent presence and lived as an ahistorical space. The sites of economic migra-
tion, respectively Gastarbeit, defined as the setting of temporary work abroad, can
thus be added to Augé’s non places. Socialized within a particular, occasional com-
munity, migrant workers in literature and visual arts regularly do not inhabit home-
lands, which are linked to a genuine lieu with its history, tradition and identity. Thus,
their homes in their host lands generally remain provisional dwellings such as small,
low-rent apartments, reminding of camping places, barracks and containers. Differ-
ent realms of life such as a kitchen, a sleeping or a sitting room, a bathroom and a
laundry place, are located in the same small space, transforming it into a polyfunc-
tional heterotopia typically seen in Trumbetaš’s drawings.13
13
Foucault, Michael (1990). Andere Räume. In: Karlheinz Barck & Peter Gente, (ed.), Aisthesis.
Wahrnehmung heute oder Perspektiven einer anderen Ästhetik. Leipzig: Reclam, 34-46.
14
Knortz, Heike (2008): Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte. „Gastarbeiter“ in der westdeutschen Diplomatie
und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973. Köln: Böhlau, 22.
15
Novišćak, Karolina (2007): Der jugoslawische ‘Gastarbeiter-Export‘ auf dem Sonderweg zwischen
Sozialismus und Kapitalismus. In: Silke Flegl & Anne Hartmann & Frank Hoffmann (ed.): Wahl und
Wagnis Migration. Beiträge des Promotionskollegs Ost-West. Berlin, p. 141-161; Brunnbauer, Ulf (2007):
Jugoslawische Geschichte als Migrationsgeschichte (19. und 20. Jahrhundert). In: Ulf Brunnbauer &
Andreas Helmedach & Stefan Troebst (ed.): Schnittstellen. Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung
in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag. München: Oldenbourg, 111-
132; Brunnbauer, Ulf (2009): Labor Emigration from the Yugoslav Region from the late 19th Century
until the End of Socialism: Continuities and Changes. In: Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.): Transnational Societies,
Between Nomadism and Sedentariness: Figuration of Space in Literary
and Visual Culture of Migrant Workers from Yugoslavia | 197
Veljko Bulajić’s film A train without a timetable (Vlak bez voznog reda, 1959)
gives insight into the split perception of migrant workers in Yugoslav of economic
migration policy. The film tells a story about the organized migration of peasants
in socialist Yugoslavia from the beautiful but poor shores of the Dalmatian Adriat-
ic to the rich plain area of Baranja, Vojvodina and Srijem. The old generation does
not want to leave their stony village, where their fathers’ fathers had lived and where
their ancestors are buried. In their local Ikavian dialect, they argue against migration
with an older generation of people who had struggled with the poor conditions of
life in their village – defying hunger and plagues, regardless of the fate of individu-
als or of only one generation. Unwilling to become “gypsies” – their metaphor for
migration – and to go “to the end of the world” – their metonymy for leaving their
birth village, some of them even are reminded of how they had to flee from the Fas-
cists during the Second World War.In the film, Dalmatian peasants are presented as
patriotic, sedentary people, faithful only to their place of birth, untied to the broad
land of multinational socialist Yugoslavia. After having listened to a partisan, a com-
munist leader who had encouraged them to leave, a larger group – mostly young
people, families and widows with children – decided indeed to leave their home-
land. Even some elderly people, for example the grandmother of a family, decide to
join them: in her luggage she has the cross she once had installed on the grave of her
husband. The travel by train is not only a geographic move within space, but also
the mental transfer from the old, paternalistic society into a new, modern and high-
ly mobile world. At the end – and after enduring painful experiences accompanied
by false decisions –, most of the young people find the right partner. Enjoying new
possibilities of emancipation, they free themselves from their past, and from the pa-
triarchal bonds that had marked their adolescence. The birth of a child in the very
moment of their arrival marks the symbolic change from the old into the new world.
At this very moment, the old grandmother carrying the cross from the grave of her
deceased husband dies.
In the film only one person, an orphan who lost his family during the war, de-
cides to travel further on to Paris or even to the United States, far beyond the bor-
ders even of Yugoslav emigration. This young, immature man called Nikolica shows
symptoms of a trauma contracted during the war. He drinks too much, and during
the journey, he tries to bond with several women, unable however to stay faithful to
one of them even for a moment. Ever since his first appearance in the film, he is pre-
sented as not caring about true love or faith. Searching for spectacle and consump-
Transnational Politics. Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslav Region, 19th-21st century. Munich: de Gruyter,
17-49.
198 | Tanja Zimmermann
functions for Yugoslav patriotism.16 Paintings, like Josip Generalić Wedding tartt (Svat-
bena torta, 1970) with a peasant couple in the middle of idyllic nature, Milena Rašić’s
Sunday (Nedelja, 1969) or Mara Puškarić-Petra’s Sweemer on the river Petrička (Kupači
na Petričkoj, 1977) show their homeland as a paradise for the classless and suprana-
tional “brotherhood and unity”, where the primordial bonds between people are as
intact as the fruits of their work.
All these paintings reveal idyllic, neo-primitive projections of a socialist society
based on its Yugoslav soil. The homeland is presented as a collective idyll, within
which people are united as one big family. Following this pattern, several Yugoslav
migrant novels17 and films, beginning with Krsto Papić’s Special trains (Specialni vla-
kovi, 1972) and Goran Paskaljević’s Beach guard in wintertime (Čuvar plaže u zimnom
periodu, 1976), present Gastarbeiter as excluded from the socialist idyll and living
in-between and always feeling the pain of an incurable wound of belonging neither
to one nor to the other society. Forced to leave their homeland due to bad econom-
ic conditions, they remain split between two worlds and longing for the place they
do not inhabit.18 This pattern has also been adopted in East and West European mi-
grant films in the post-communist period, such as Michael Klier’s The grass is green-
er everywhere else (Überall ist besser,
r wo wir nicht sind, 1989), Paweł Pawlikowski’s Re-
sortt (2001), Lucas Moodysson’s Lilya 4-Everr (2002) and Nariman Tubaraev’s Ticket
to Germany (fr. Les petites gens, russ. Malen’kie ljudi, 2003), which emphasize irratio-
nal, phantasmatic desires for the West, which lures people with false expectations
of richness, self-fulfillment and hapiness.19 Their messag is to stay in the homeland,
where one can find at least modest hapinness.
3. Architecture of nostalgia
In their homeland, on the contrary, migrant workers build luxury houses, which
are destined to represent the emigrant’s economic status as well as to embody the
nostalgia for their homeland and their broader family into architecture. Huge hous-
16
For “naïve” painting in Yugoslavia see: Zimmermann, Tanja (2014). Der Balkan zwischen Ost und
West. Mediale Bilder und Kulturpolitische Prägungen. Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 247-256.
17
Examples are novels by the Slovenian writer Anton Ingolič, Where are you, the Lamuts?? (Kje ste,
Lamutovi?, 1958), Heaven over the family house A Chronicle of an emigrant family (Nebo nad domačijo.
Kronika izseljenske družine, 1967) and Swallow over the ocean (Lastovka čez ocean, 1974).
18
Brunnbauer, Ulf (2009). Editorial. In: Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.): Transnational Societies, Transnational
Politics. Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslav Region, 19th-21st century. Munich: de Gruyter, 7-15.
19
Clarke, David (2005): Going West: Migration and the Post-Communist World in Recent European
Film, Cultural Politics, 1, 279-294.
200 | Tanja Zimmermann
es often remain empty or unfinished, expecting the imaginary return of their own-
ers after a long Odyssey of migrant lives. Their style is not marked by local tradition,
but by the styles of holyday and wellness architecture or of nouveau riche-building,
combining several styles in an eclectic way. Usually these buildings have at least two
flats, which are decorated with arcades and balustrades, their gates being ornated
with imperial symbols of power such as eagles, lions and other heraldic animals.20
In 2008, the American-Serbian artists Erin Obradović and Marija Đorđević
launched a project about Gastarbeiter houses in which they collected photographs
of prominent homes in the Požarevac area as well as in the region northwestwards
from it (Braničevo, Veliko Gradište, Majilovac, Kurjace, Durakovo, Topolnik, etc.).
They presented the photographs at the exhibition The Return of the Gastarbeit-
ers (Povratak gastarbajtera), which was open for the public from July 22nd to August
10th 2008 in the Art Club in Kučevo.21 Evidently, Obradović and Đorđević were in-
spired by artistic documentations of housings Dan Graham had documented in his
conceptual project Homes for America in 1966-67.22 Graham took pictures of typi-
cal family houses in American suburbs, arranged in minimalist series in rows. Obra-
dović’s and Đorđević’s conceptual work reveals the commercial and somehow cheap-
ish baroque character of Gastarbeiter homes.
In 2011, the Serbian parodist online newspaper News in the Mirrorr (Njuz.net:
Vesti u ogledalu) which entertains its public with fake news, published an article on a
new type of Gastarbeiter house constructed without providing any flats and destined
to destroy the whole architectural canon of Gastarbeiter homes. The entire region of
Negotin, according to the Njuz reporter, was shocked by this decision:
20
Rosner, Thomas (2012): Serbien: Die Paläste der Gastarbeiter, Die Presse. 8 September. http://
diepresse.com/home/panorama/welt/1288073/Serbien_Die-Palaeste-der-Gastarbeiter (May 30, 2016);
Anonymus (2012), Gastarbajterska arhitektura – spratovi, lavovi i nešto roze. [Online] Available: http://
www.tarzanija.com/gastarbajterska-arhitektura-spratovi-lavovi-i-nesto-roze/ (May 30, 2016).
21
Obradovich, Erin & Djordjevic, Marija (2008). Dva sprata, tri sprata. [Online] Available: In: http://
palata.wordpress.com/; http://palata.wordpress.com/return-of-the-gastarbeiters/. (May 30, 2016).
22
Graham, Dan (1967). Homes for America, Arts magazine. December & January, 20-21.
Between Nomadism and Sedentariness: Figuration of Space in Literary
and Visual Culture of Migrant Workers from Yugoslavia | 201
Petrašin Simić, koji kaže da je pokušao da spase čast gastarbajtera ali u tome ni-
je uspeo. – Pokušali smo da sa Gagićem nađemo zajednički jezik i ubedimo ga
da izgradi makar dva sprata i da na ogradu stavi minimalno tri figure životinja ili
makar egipatske ćupove, ali on nije hteo ni da čuje. Čuli smo i da se u Nemačkoj
bavi nekim sumnjivim poslovima, nekakvim dizajnom i hortikulturom, i pret-
postavljamo da je to razlog za ovakvo čudno ponašanje – rekao je Simić. 23
The inhabitants of Jabukovac are amazed by the move of their neighbor and point
out that they began to be suspicious of his good intentions from the very mo-
ment they saw what a modest gate he had built. Immediately, one could see that
this was no clean business. When you arrive at the gate, you aren’t welcomed by
a lion, a swan, by nothing at all. There are only two poor pillars and an ordinary
entrance gate with its metal bars in-between. ‘Devil’s work’, says Lazar Perić,
Milorad’s closest neighbor. […] Also by the president of the commune of Ja-
bukovac, Petrašin Simić, came to meet Milorada Gagić. The mayor says that he
tried to save the honor of the Gastarbeiter, but hasn’t succeeded. ‘We tried to
find a common language with Gagić and to persuade him to build at least two
floors or to put at least three animal figures or even Egyptian amphoras on the
wall, but he didn’t want even to hear about it. We heard that in Germany he al-
so runs suspicious businesses dealing with some kind of design and horticul-
ture, and we assume that this is the reason for his strange behavior’, said Simić.
The richly ornate and spacious architecture of Gastarbeiter houses should not
be perceived only as a lack of taste. At the same time, it expresses nostalgia – the gap
between the home and the host land, inscribed into the buildings. Svetlana Boym,
who distinguishes between two forms of nostalgia – a reflective and restorative one
– , describes the feeling of nostalgia not only as a “sentiment of loss and displace-
ment”, but also as “a romance with one’s own phantasy”, a “mechanism of seduc-
tion and manipulation”, requiring a long-distance relationship in order to survive.24
Whereas the reflective nostalgia operates with fragmentary, individual longing and
temporal dimensions aimed at maintaining a bittersweet longing itself even beyond
any location, restorative nostalgia affects collectives and tries to rebuild what has
been lost. Thus, the second one is more topographical, oriented towards regaining
23
Milosavljević, Nenad (2011). Gastarbajter napravio kuću bez spratova. [Online] Available: Njuz.net.
http://www.vesti.rs/Zabava/Gastarbajter-napravio-kucu-bez-spratova.html (May 30, 2016).
24
Boym, Svetlana (2001). Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic, 49-54; Boym, Svetlna (2007). Nostalgia
and Its Discontents. The Hedgehog Review, 9, 7-18. [Online] Available: http://www.iasc-culture.org/
eNews/2007_10/9.2CBoym.pdf (May 30, 2016).
202 | Tanja Zimmermann
the lost paradise. In general, what has to be regained is the nation, understood as
hosting a primordial family clan. It needs symbols and rituals (festivities), where the
local collectivity can be assembled, thereby representing the larger unity of the na-
tion. Following Boyms criteria for differentiating both types of nostalgia, Gastarbeit-
er architecture – although realized in homes for individuals – symbolizes a collective
phenomenon of longing for the national homeland than individual nostalgia. Its rep-
resentative (several floors, balustrades, gates with heraldic animals) and open struc-
ture (arcades, balconies, terraces) is not destined to host a nuclear family, but rather
a broader family clan, synecdoche for the whole nation. As cultural anthropologists
claim, houses do not represent only material goods and shelters. Instead, they are at
the same time externalized expressions of dreams, thoughts and feelings.25 Gastar-
beiter houses, thus, are neither defined by personal utility, nor by individual nostal-
gia, but by a vision of belonging to the imagined community their builders have lost.
25
Bachelard, Gaston (1975): Poetik des Raumes. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer; van Baak, Joost (2009):
The House in Russian Literature: A Mythopoetic Exploration. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi; Eickhoff,f
Hajo (1975): Haus. In: Christian Wulff (ed.): Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie.
Weinheim / Basel: Beltz, 221-230.
26
Deleuze, Gilles & Guatari, Félix (1992). Tausend Plateaus. Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie. Berlin:
Merve, 12-42.
Between Nomadism and Sedentariness: Figuration of Space in Literary
and Visual Culture of Migrant Workers from Yugoslavia | 203
such an open horizon. Instead, they move between two fixed points – the home and
the host land. The heroes of Štaka’s film are women of three generations from for-
mer Yugoslavia who also represent three different attitudes to their host and home
lands. The first one, Fräulein Ruža from Serbia, tries to adjust to the host land in an
exaggerated way. Trying to incorporate the working mentality expected from her in
a Swiss canteen, she over-identifies with the Swiss working class. She works asceti-
cally from early morning till evening. In her life, there is no place for a husband, for
friends and for private life. Transformed by her working ethos into a senseless ma-
chine, she wears gray clothes and fixes her hair in a strict style with a hair slide. She
binds her watch, a metaphor and metonymy of her economically organized life, so
straightly around her wrist that it leaves traces in her skin. Thus, working time that
rules her life inscribes itself even into her body. Assuming an air of superiority, she
only speaks German with her compatriots. At the same time she shows some ata-
vistic features in her way of dealing with money by collecting it in a cookie box and
not saving it in a bank account. Money represents a kind of fetishized substitute for
the life she has lost and for the wishes she did not fulfill.
The older one of the three women, Mira, speaks only Croatian and has friends
exclusively from the Croatian diaspora. She wants to return home, but she and her
husband have to postpone their return from one year to the next, until they final-
ly decide to stay in their small apartment in Switzerland for the rest of their lives.
In Dalmatia, they build a big Gastarbeiter house with many flats in which they ulti-
mately will never live.
The third woman is a young girl from Bosnia and refugee who lost her family.
She operates as a perfect nomadic figure, incorporating an alternative to the “seden-
tary nomads” – Gastarbeiter. She suffers from leukemia and therefore has no plans
for the future – neither in her homeland nor in her host land. She only looks for plac-
es where she can stay for a few nights. Under her nomadic influence, Fräulein Ruža
starts to enjoy her life at least a little bit by finding a lover, while Mira accepts that
she will never return home.
The literary and visual culture of Gastarbeiter is thus not only a product of in-
ternational job markets and migration, but also of an imaginary geography locating
them in the midst of the gap between their home and host lands, excluding them
from both. While the dialogical architecture of bridges transcends nations and cul-
tural differences,27 Gastarbeiter houses remain nostalgic extensions, which try to
bridge the distance between a place of departure and an imagined return that nev-
27
Zimmermann, Tanja (2013). Bosnische Brücken als Naht der Kulturen. In: Renata Makarska &
Katharina Schwitin & Alexander Kratochwil & Annette Werberger (ed.): Kulturgrenzen in postimperialen
Räumen. Bosnien und Westukraine als transkulturelle Regionen. Bielefeld: Transcript, 301-334.
204 | Tanja Zimmermann
er takes place. These houses are no homes, and they remain foreign to any local
architectonical landscape. Contrary to the nomadic movement of exile that never
comes to an end (settlement) and persists in geographic suspensions of both the
home and foreign land, Gastarbeit is characterized by pendulous movement be-
tween two fixed places – between a “beginning” (at home) and a prolonged, but
provisory arrival at “end of the world” (in the foreign country). Gastarbeiter do not
live an Odyssey, they are suspended in the static motion of going forth and back,
in an eternal compulsion to repeat, never arriving anywhere. The experience of an
ever ambiguous non-place, always envisaged from the other one, is inscribed in-
to their art, poetry, architecture and stereotypes – as a nostalgic gesture in perma-
nent suspension.
LITERATURE:
Clarke, David (2005): Going West: Migration and the Post-Communist World in
Recent European Film, Cultural Politics, 1, 279-294.
Deleuze, Gilles & Guatari, Félix (1992). Tausend Plateaus. Kapitalismus und Schizo-
phrenie. Berlin: Merve, 12-42.
Foucault, Michael (1990). Andere Räume. In: Karlheinz Barck & Peter Gente,
(ed.), Aisthesis. Wahrnehmung heute oder Perspektiven einer anderen Ästhe-
tik. Leipzig: Reclam, 34-46.
Hoffmann, Eva (1998). The New Nomads. The Yale Review, 86, 43-58.
Iser, Wolfgang (1984). Spencer’s Arcadia. The Interrelation of Fiction and Histo-
ry. In: Mihai Spariosu (ed.), Mimesis in Contemporary Theory 1. The Liter-
ary and Philosophical Debate. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub-
lishing Company, 109-141.
Knortz, Heike (2008): Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte. „Gastarbeiter“ in der west-
deutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973. Köln: Böhlau.
Novišćak, Karolina (2007): Der jugoslawische ‘Gastarbeiter-Export‘ auf dem Son-
derweg zwischen Sozialismus und Kapitalismus. In: Silke Flegl & Anne Hart-
mann & Frank Hoffmann (ed.): Wahl und Wagnis Migration. Beiträge des Pro-
motionskollegs Ost-West. Berlin, p. 141-161.
Ondrěj, Daniel (2007): Gastarabajteri. Rethinking Yugoslav Economic Migration
towards the European North-West through Transnationalism and Popular Cul-
ture. In: Steven. G. Ellis & Lud’a Klusáková (ed.), Imagining Frontiers, Con-
testing Identities, Pisa: Pisa University
Pels, Dick (1999). Privileged Nomads: On the Strangeness of Intellectuals and In-
tellectuality of Strangers, Theory, Culture, Society, 16, 63-86.
Trepte, Hans Christian (2000). Polnische Exilliteratur – Sprache und Identität. In:
Łukasz Gałecki & Basil Kerski (ed.), Die polnische Emigration und Europa
1945-1990. Eine Bilanz des politischen Denkens und der Literatur Polens im
Exil. Osnabrück: Fibre, 247-264.
Trumbetaš, Drago (1995): Gastarbeiter-Gedichte 1969-1980 (Gastarbajterske
pesme). Velika Gorica: Glasnik Turopolja.
Said, Edward E. (2000). Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 173-186.
Zimmermann, Tanja (2014). Der Balkan zwischen Ost und West. Mediale Bilder
und Kulturpolitische Prägungen. Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 247-256.
206 | Tanja Zimmermann
Тања Цимерман
Апстракт: Eгзил се, с једне стране, везује за високу културу и узвишени, нематери-
јални свет, док је мигрантски миље повезан са ниском културом и материјалним, теле-
сним светом, којим влада новац, апсорбујући и дехуманизујући људске животе. Радници
мигранти не насељавају неке имагинарне ‘треће светове’, већ материјална, транзициона
места на рубу друштва без традиције и идентитета. Иако стално ‘осцилирају’ између две
државе, њихова култура се не перципира као динамична, покретачка, већ као седентарна.
Док интелектуалне елите припадају истовремено и култури из које потичу и оној у којој
су придошлице, радници мигранти су искључени из обе, остајући некомпатибилни чак и
са патриотским концепцијама матичне земље. У чланку су приказане главне карактери-
стике и начини репрезентације културе миграната на неким примерима визуелне култу-
ре, сликарства и филма из бивше Југославије.
Кључне речи: радници мигранти, номадизам, седентарност, простор, визуелна кул-
тура, Југославија
UDC 94(540)”1857”
Оригинални научни рад
The expansion of British colonialism in India was made possible due to the sup-
port and services of the native recruits to the army raised by the British East India
Company. They were sepoys, and were also addressed as telengis, or purbias during
the revolt. Of the 139,000 sepoys of the Bengal Amy –the largest modern army in
Asia –all but 7,796 turned against their British masters.2 The uprising was the first
major challenge to the mighty British Empire. British loyalist, reformist and vision-
ary Syed Ahmed Khan Bahadur, analysing the causes of the revolt in the 19th cen-
tury said, ‘The Government is twice as strong in these as it was in the early years of
1
azimakhtar@gmail.com
2
William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, Penguin Books, Delhi, 2007, p.10
208 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
the country; while the native princes, the subahdars and the nobles do not retain one
tenth of the power they then had.3
There were many theories about the conspiracy and plans for the Revolt. They
range from exchange of bread with coded messages to mendicants acting as spies and
information agents. However, all such theories were denied by Syed Ahmed Khan,
who writes, ‘A conspiracy or concerted league never existed in the army. It is well
known that after the mutiny had broken out no sepoy ever mentioned such a thing’.4
It may be mentioned that Syed Ahmed Khan was posted in Bijnor as East Indian
Company official and saved many lives of Europeans and British. He assured Mrs.
Shakespeare, the wife of Bijnor Collector and Magistrate, ‘As long as I am alive, you
should not be anxious and fear for life. When you find my dead body laying in front
of your bungalow, there is no harm in being concerned and anxious’.5 Given the na-
ture of the revolt, it has been described differently by historians and leaders alike.
Historian R C Majumdar writes, ‘I have selected the title ‘the sepoy mutiny
and the revolt of 1857’ as in my opinion it correctly describes the essential nature
of the movement., whatever view we might take of it.6 Syed Ahmed Khan titled
his book ‘Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind’, which is translated as ‘causes of the Revolt’.
British Historians always looked down upon the uprising with disgust and termed
it as ‘mutiny’. Many consider the event as the ‘War of Independence’, given the
fact that large number of soldiers turned against their officers, masters and also
inspired the commons to rise against the colonial oppression. The event also in-
spired future leaders of the National Movement and Freedom movement in Indi-
an Subcontinent. Hindutva ideologue V D Savarkar titled his book, ‘The Indian
War of Independence’. In the Introduction of the book, he writes, ‘The spirits of
the dead seemed hallowed by martyrdom, and out of the heap of ashes appeared
forth sparks of a fiery inspiration.’7
Delhi, Meerut, Kanpur / Cawnpoor, Lucknow, Jhansi, Shahabad, Patna, Bareil-
ly, Avadh were some of the popular and most documented centres of the Revolt. As
Dalrymple writes, ‘Most narratives of 1857 cut back and forth between Delhi, Luc-
3
Syed Ahmed Khan Bahadur, Causes of the Indian Revolt, English Translation, Medical Hall Press,
Benares, 1873, p.6
4
Ibid., p. 10
5
Altaf Hussain Hali, Hayat Javed ( Biography of Syed Ahmed Khan), National Council for Promotion
of Urdu Language, Delhi, 1990, P.78
6
R C Majumdar, the sepoy mutiny and the revolt of 1857, Firma , S Chaudhari, Calcutta
7
V D Savarkar, The Indian War Of Independence, Introduction, xxiii, 1909
The 1857 Revolt in India: Mayhem, Murders and Murmurings of Martyrs | 209
know, Jhansi, and Kanpur in a way that suggests far more contact and flow of infor-
mation than there actually was between the different centres of the Uprising.8
Obviously this information and sources as found in Mutiny papers in the Na-
tional Archives of India, Delhi and legends have weaved stories around selected few
who are remembered. Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar’s tomb in Myanmar,
where he was packed off after the revolt is tourist centre for visitors and locals alike.
This horrific incident was one of the biggest charges against Abu Zafar Sirajuddin
Mohammed Bahadur Shah during his trial for rebellion, treason and murder. The tri-
al held the former king of Delhi had been found guilty of every charge against him.9
The old Emperor, weakened, striped of all power and confined to the fort, was
warned of the future for taking plunge in the uncertain Revolt. Someone said to him
(an accomplished poet), Dumdama mein dam nahi khair mango janki-Ai Zafar than-
di hui Shamsher Hindustan ki (There is no power left in the fort, save your life; Oh
Zafar, the sword of India has been silenced for all time to come). The emperor re-
plied with twinkle in his eyes, Ghazion mein Bu rahe gi jab talak iman ki-Takht Lon-
don tak chale gi Tegh Hindustan ki (As long as the martyrs of the faith have trust in
their faith; The sword and trumpet of India will be heard in the corridors of British
crown). Though these lines are still quoted by people during the celebrations of the
event and to commemorate the Independence Day in India, the fate of the sepoys
and millions of others were sealed when the British Empire sent reinforcement to
take the rebels head on and crush it with all force at its disposal. Correspondence be-
tween two British officers during the course of the Revolt testify the cruelty meted
out to the rebels. When John Lawrence (military officer, who earned military fame
during 1857) wrote to Nicholson asking for a ‘return of court-martials, held upon
insurgent natives, with a list of various punishment inflicted’, the latter sent back the
dispatch, writing on the back, ‘THE PUNISHMENT FOR MUTINY IS DEATH’.10
Even after 170 years of the Revolt, memorials are raised, prayer services are held,
motion pictures are made, tales are spun, and poetry recited in memory. But the hon-
our and memorial are reserved for few heroes and heroines like Mangal Pandey, Ba-
hadur Shah Zafar, Tantia Tope, Azimullah Khan, General Bakht Khan, Nana Saheb,
Kunwar Singh & his brother from Ara (Shahabad), Moulvi Ahmedullah (Faizabad),
Peer Ali (Patna), Jhansi Queen, Begum Zeenat (Lucknow) and some others. Such
names are also mentioned by V D Savarkar in his book: Kunwar Singh, Amar Singh,
8
William Darlymple, op. cit,. p.11
9
https://scroll.in/article/835316/may-16-1857-how-a-massacre-by-rebel-sepoys-at-the-red-fort-felled-
bahadur-shah-zafar / 5 12 2017
10
William Darlymple, op.cit., p.201
210 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
Moulvi Ahmed Shah, Nana Saheb, Azimullah Khan, Tantia Tope, Ranee Lakshmi
Bai, Mangal Pandey Mahal11. But the heroes of the Revolt were lesser known, un-
known lowly ranked soldiers who were made to suffer for their rebellious act of ris-
ing against the British Empire. As Historian Bipan Chandra writes, ‘The greatest
heroes of the revolt were, however, the sepoys, many of whom displayed great cour-
age in the field of battle and thousands of whom unselfishly laid down their lives.12
These sepoys and rebels were put to sword and publicly executed without any tri-
al at various places affected by the uprisings. This takes us to rebels and sepoys who
were prosecuted and publicly executed to instil fear and scare among the natives.
On June 19, 1857, the Governor General reported: ‘ In the district of Rohini,
the headquarters of 5th Irregular cavalry, four men attacked on June 12 the officers
of the regiment at the Commanding Officials bungalow…three of the sowars of the
regiment, were apprehended, tried and hung on the 15th.13
Major MacDonald wrote to the Headquarters, Rohnee on June 16, 1857: ‘When
we were attacked I felt convinced that our men did the deed…’14 He was referring to
the sepoys of his battalion turning rebel and raising the banner of the revolt.
Kootubuddin, Najeeb executed on 23 June. He exclaimed ‘Burra Zulum’ and
‘Kuch Insaaf na paya’ while being hanged. Kuloo & Payambar Baksh were execut-
ed on July 13, 1857.
Sheikh Salamat Ali- He was from Cawnpore and a Jamadar in the 53rd Regiment
Native Infantry. He was tried by the Sessions Judge, Patna under Act XVII of 1857
on June 30, 1857. He was convicted of desertion under aggravated circumstances,
sentenced to death and executed forthwith.
Mohit Singh- He was a Havaldar in the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry. He was
tried by the Sessions Judge, Patna under Act XVII of 1857 on June 30, 1857. He was
convicted of desertion under aggravated circumstances, sentenced to death and ex-
ecuted forthwith.
Narain Dichit- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He was ar-
rested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sentenced to
imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons under Act
XVII of 1857.
11
V D Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence, 1909
12
Bipan Chandra, Modern India, NCERT, Delhi, 1990, P.115
13
Parliamentary Papers, 1857, Sess II, I:
14
Parliamentary Papers, 1857-58, Vol. II, Appendix- B, 2, 3, 4, United Kingdom
The 1857 Revolt in India: Mayhem, Murders and Murmurings of Martyrs | 211
Nurput Singh- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He was ar-
rested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sentenced to
imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons under Act
XVII of 1857.
Mohabeer Singh- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He was
arrested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sentenced
to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons under
Act XVII of 1857.
Bhikaghur Goushy- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He
was arrested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons
under Act XVII of 1857.
Mohabeen Tewary- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He
was arrested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons
under Act XVII of 1857.
Bhogirat Parrey- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He was
arrested and tried in Nuddea, Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sentenced
to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons under
Act XVII of 1857.
Maun Singh- He was a sepoy in the Regiment 43rd Native Infantry. He was ar-
rested and tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour in irons
under Act XVII of 1857.
Azim Khan- He was a Jamadar in 37th Regiment Native Infantry at Benares. He
deserted his regiment and was arrested in Barh, while on the run. He was charged of
being a deserter under Section XVII of 1857 and was convicted of being a deserter.
He was sentenced to death in Patna.
Mohubbat Ali ‘alias’ Muhubur ‘alias’ Mohib Ali- He was a sepoy in 37th Reg-
iment Native Infantry. He was tried under Act XI of 1857 and was declared a reb-
el against the state. He was convicted of rebellion and sentenced to death in Patna.
Ali Buksh ‘alias’ Ameer Khan- He was a young sepoy of around 20-22 years,
in the 37th Regiment Native Infantry. He was arrested in Monghyr and tried there.
He was tried under Act XVII of 1857 and was declared a rebel against the state. He
was convicted of rebellion and sentenced to death in Patna. His death sentence was
commuted into transportation for life on August 7, 1857 by the Governor Gener-
al of India in Council.
Ellahie Bux- He was from Punjab and was the son He was a young sepoy in 37th
Regiment Native Infantry. He was arrested in Moorshedabad, Bengal. He was tried
212 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
under Act XVII of 1857 and was declared a rebel against the state. He was convict-
ed of rebellion and sentenced to death.
Ram Singh- He was a Jamadar of Najeebs. He was charged of conspiring against
the government and put on trial in Jessore, Bengal in July, 1857. He was convicted
and executed on July 20, 1857 morning,, in daylight , opposite Kotwali Thana, in
the presence of large number of people , in Jessore.
Gunesh Tewary- He was a Najeeb. He was charged conspiring against the Gov-
ernment and put on trial in Jessore, Bengal in July 1857. He was sentenced to trans-
portation for life in July 1857. He was found dead in his cell on the morning of Au-
gust 2, 1857 in Hooghly.
Preg Dutt Dhobe- He was considered a ring leader and put on trial before the
Hoogly Sessions Judge. He was charged of conspiring against the government and
sentenced to transportation for life on July 20, 1857. Later, his death sentence was
commuted in life sentence, when he confessed to his role during the Revolt. He was
found dead inside jail in his cell on the morning of August 2, 1857 and it was labelled
by the English ‘suicide by hanging’. It was reported on August 5, 1857.
Ameer Khan- He was tried by William Taylor, Patna Commissioner. He was
charged under Act XIV of 1857 and convicted. He was hanged on the morning of
July 23, 1857 at Patna. Going to the gallows, he predicted the fall of the British Em-
pire and complained of gross injustice. He was in touch with Ali Kareem, another
prominent rebel of Patna, and a conspirator.
Dabeedeen Pandey- He was a rebel belonging to the 37th Native Infantry Reg-
iment. He was son of Ajaeb Pandey, resident of Bishoopoora, Pergunnah Bal. He
was a Naik in the Regiment, and was allegedly fleeing to Nepal, when he was caught
by the local police in Monghyr. He was executed in Champaran after a summary
trial. Every policeman was awarded Rs. 50, who apprehended any suspected reb-
el during the Revolt.
Lochun Gowalla- He was a sepoy of the Grenadier Company of the 17th Regi-
ment Native Infantry. He was convicted of mutiny and desertion and sentenced to
death at 7 AM on July 28, 1857.
Tibroo Sontal ‘alias’ Copa Thakooram- son of Lokbon, Age 23-25. A resident
of village Kopha, Pergunnah Chota Kunjedla, Damun Zilla, Bhagalpur. He was
convicted of rebellion, attended with plunder, and the forcible capture and deten-
tion with evil intent of peacable objects. He was convicted and sentenced on June
12, 1857 to transportation for life by the Chotanagpur Commissioner and put in
Alipore Jail.
Runga Khan- He belonged to 4th troop 12th irregular cavalry, posted at Muzaf-
farpur. He crossed the Ganduk river and fled to Champaran. He was arrested by the
police at the Sutter ghaut in Champaran. He was charged of mutiny and plunder and
The 1857 Revolt in India: Mayhem, Murders and Murmurings of Martyrs | 213
attended with violence and was given death sentence. He was also accused of plun-
dering Mahajans in Muzaffarpur. He was hanged in Champaran by the Joint Magis-
trate on August 4, 1857.
Alli Buksh ‘alias’ Ameer Khan- He was a sepoy in the 37th Regiment Native In-
fantry. He was arrested in Monghyr.
Narain Dichit- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and tried
in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to impris-
onment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act XVII
of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Nurfut Singh- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and tried
in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to impris-
onment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act XVII
of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Mohabeer Nissar- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and
tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to im-
prisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act
XVII of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Bhikagur Gossaen- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and
tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to im-
prisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act
XVII of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Mohabeer Tewaree- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and
tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to im-
prisonment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act
XVII of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Bhogirut Parey- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and tried
in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to impris-
onment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act XVII
of 1857, on July 24 1857.
Mauning- He was a sepoy in 43rd Native Infantry. He was arrested and tried in
Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced to imprison-
ment for life in transportation beyond sea with labour and irons under Act XVII of
1857, on July 24 1857.
Alluck Tewarry- He belonged to the 43rd Regiment Native Infantry. He was ar-
rested and tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea on July 9, 1857.
Davy Misser- He belonged to the 43rd Regiment Native Infantry. He was arrest-
ed and tried in Nuddea (Nadia), Bengal. He was charged of desertion and sentenced
to imprisonment for life in transportation beyond sea on July 9, 1857.
214 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
Murtaza Khan. He was peshkar of Phulpur. He was charged of sedition and con-
spiracy to plunder Government treasury during the Revolt. He was convicted and
punished under Act XIV of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced
to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Kareemoolla- He was Sheikh Chaprassi of Phulpur. He was charged of sedition
and conspiracy to plunder Government treasury during the Revolt. He was convict-
ed and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sen-
tenced to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Buldee Jamadar- He was employee with Railways. He was charged of plunder
of railway bungalow and arson during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished
under Act XI and XIV of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to
death. He was executed on July 13, 1857.
Mudar Bux- He was charged of plunder of rebellion with robbery during the Re-
volt. He was convicted and punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Com-
mission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Golami- He was charged of plunder of rebellion with robbery during the Revolt.
He was convicted and punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commis-
sion. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Cheetoo- He was charged of plunder of rebellion with robbery during the Re-
volt. He was convicted and punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Com-
mission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Ginnon- He was charged of plunder of rebellion with robbery during the Revolt.
He was convicted and punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commis-
sion. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 18, 1857.
Bhudoo Shaikhanee- He was charged of aiding in the rebellion and inciting in
the death of several Christians during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished
under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death
by hanging. He was executed on July 16, 1857.
Ruggobhur Ramrutton- He was charged of firing on the police while in the exe-
cution of their duty and rescuing prisoners during the Revolt. He was convicted and
punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced
to death. He was executed on July 17, 1857.
Madara- He was charged of rebellion, attacking officer and cutting boats during
the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad
Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 17, 1857.
Salamat Ali- He was Moonsif of Allahabad. He was charged of aiding and abet-
ting in rebellion, during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI
and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was
executed on June 22, 1857.
The 1857 Revolt in India: Mayhem, Murders and Murmurings of Martyrs | 219
Seetaram Looneah- He was from Chail and charged of having in his possession
a thane of American drill, and Rs. 55 during the Revolt. He was convicted and pun-
ished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sen-
tenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Ganesh Looneah- He was from Chail and charged of having in his possession
Rs. 34 of which he was not able to account for during the Revolt. He was convict-
ed and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He
was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Jhao Looneah- He was from Chail and charged of having in his possession a
thane of American new drill, and Rs. 49 cash during the Revolt. He was convicted
and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was
sentenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Madaree- He was a butcher. He was charged of sedition, plunder and riot during
the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Al-
lahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Shakir Md.- He was a butcher. He was charged of sedition, plunder and riot during
the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Al-
lahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Oodeet Sing(h)- He was a Zamindar. He was charged of plundering boats and
rebellion during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI
of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was execut-
ed on July 2, 1857.
Mullo Sing(h)- He was a Zamindar. He was charged of plundering boats and
rebellion during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI
of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was execut-
ed on July 2, 1857.
Lalloo Sing(h)- He was a Zamindar. He was charged of plundering boats and
rebellion during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI
of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was execut-
ed on July 2, 1857.
Balbund Sing(h)- He was a Zamindar. He was charged of plundering boats and
rebellion during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI
of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was execut-
ed on July 2, 1857.
Isree Buneah- He was charged of plundering salt during the Revolt. He was con-
victed and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission.
He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 2, 1857.
Boolooah Passi- He was charged of robbing government chaprassi of perwanah
and money, during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and
222 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was ex-
ecuted on July 3, 1857.
Punchumah Passi- He was charged of robbing government chaprassi of perwa-
nah and money, during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI
and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was
executed on July 3, 1857.
Nunkooah Passie- He was charged of robbing government chaprassi of perwa-
nah and money, during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI
and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was
executed on July 3, 1857.
Peeroo- He was charged of attacking the tehseel and taking share in the plunder
during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the
Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on July 4, 1857.
Kaloo- He was charged of attacking the tehseel and taking share in the plunder
during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857
by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death. He was executed on Ju-
ly 4, 1857.
Rutnah- He was charged of stealing cattle during the Revolt. He was convicted
and punished under Act XI and XVI of 1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was
sentenced to death. He was executed on July 4, 1857.
Zoolfikar Khan- He was charged of rebellion and attacking police peon on du-
ty during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by the
Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed
on June 24, 1857.
Shamsher Khan- He was charged of rebellion, theft and felon during the Re-
volt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by the Allahabad Com-
mission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed on June 27, 1857.
Sheikh Elahie- He was charged of aiding in the escape of Supher Khan, a reb-
el during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by the
Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed
on July 2, 1857.
Khoda Bux- He was charged of robbing a captain of the 6th Regiment Native In-
fantry during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by
the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was execut-
ed on June 24, 1857.
Subrathee- He was charged of robbing a captain of the 6th Regiment Native In-
fantry during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by
the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was execut-
ed on June 24, 1857.
The 1857 Revolt in India: Mayhem, Murders and Murmurings of Martyrs | 223
Munoo and Jhunoo- He was charged of rebellion and attempt to escape with
ammunition during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of
1857 by the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was
executed on June 26, 1857.
Surujdeen- He was charged of robbery, conspiracy and being notorious bad-
mash during the Revolt. He was convicted and punished under Act XIV of 1857 by
the Allahabad Commission. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He was execut-
ed on June 26, 1857.
The persons mentioned above were considered guilty and executed by the East
India Company for raising the banner of revolt against colonial rule. The history of
British rule in India repeats the lesson which history has taught us that it is impossi-
ble to govern a country in the interest of the people without bestowing on that peo-
ple some degree of self government and representation.
Concluding Remarks
Did the Company have such rights and privileges to give death penalty and pros-
ecute citizens of the land, where it acquired legitimacy and legal status from series
of Moghal Farmans? Was the company master or a vassal? Obviously, the Company
had no legal status to indulge in mass murder and create mayhem in order to scare
Indians and force them into submission. The brutal suppression led to the awaken-
ing of Indian soul and created sense of unity and infused patriotic fervour. As Savark-
ar writes, ‘The Revolution of 1857 was a test to see how far India had come towards
unity, independence, and popular power’.15 The suppression of the Revolt led to se-
ries of changes introduced and ended the rule of the Company. The Administration
of Indian territory was now directly placed in the hands of the British Crown, which
promised to make no distinction among Indians as far as rights and freedom were
concerned. For Indians, the great sacrifice of the rebels became the source of inspi-
ration for awakening nationalist feeling. Many movements such as Ghadar Party and
leaders were born due to the landmark selfless sacrifice of the martyrs in 1857 Revolt.
The institutional reforms were also enacted in army, services, judiciary, governance
and the advice of Indians could no more be ignored for future changes in spheres of
legislature and government. Their sacrifice, tale of valour and bravery against all odds
are still a source of inspiration in a nation devoid of icons and role models.
15
- V D Savarkar, ibid, p. 544,
224 | Abdul Azim Akhtar
Glossary: sepoy= low rank in East Indian army, telengis= from Telengana state
of India, purbias= one who hails from Purvanchal ( eastern Uttar Pradesh or Bihar
state), Najeeb=noble and rank in army, Subedar=rank in army, Naik=rank in army,
Kiladar=noble having a fort, Havaldar=rank in army, Munsif= f lower judicial official,
Jamadar=junior rank officer, Burkudaz=armed police constable, Kidmatgar=one who
offers service, Chowkidar=guard or nightwatchman, Chaprasee=peon, bhishtee=wa-
ter carrier, tehseeldar=District revenue collector, seeahnavis=writer, Mohtamim=care-
taker, peshkar=clerk in court, Zamindar=landlord, perwanah=order from high offi-
cer,tehseel=revenue area, badmash=ruffian, sawar=cavalry.
што није имала само једног лидера, што је касније утабало пут за развој ‘национализма’ и
‘патриотизма’ на индијском субконтиненту. Овај рад представља покушај да се открију и
представе примери неких од устаника који су усмћени током бруталног гушења Побуне.
Кључне речи: Индијска побуна из 1857. године, сепоји, Британска Индија, Дел-
хи, Канпур
3. Формат: фонт: Times New Roman; величина фонта: 12; размак између ре-
дова: Before: 0; After: 0; Line spacing: Single.
8. Језик рада и писмо: Језик рада може бити српски, руски, енглески, не-
мачки, француски или неки други европски, светски или словенски језик, раши-
рене употребе у међународној филолошкој комуникацији. Писмa на којима се
штампају радови на српском језику јесу ћирилица и латиница, уз равноправну
употребу екавског и ијекавског наречја.
228 | Упутство ауторима за припрему рукописа за штампу
11. Кључне речи: Број кључних речи не може бити већи од 10. Кључне речи да-
ју се на оном језику на којем је написан апстракт. У чланку се дају непосредно након
апстракта. [Техничке пропозиције за уређење: формат – фонт: Times New Roman,
Normal; величина фонта: 10; први ред – увучен аутоматски (Col 1).]
12. Претходне верзије рада: Ако је чланак био изложен на скупу у виду
усменог саопштења (под истим или сличним насловом), податак о томе треба
да буде наведен у посебној напомени, при дну прве стране чланка. Не може се
објавити рад који је већ објављен у неком часопису: ни под сличним насловом
нити у измењеном облику.
14. Напомене (фусноте): Напомене се дају при дну стране у којој се нала-
зи коментарисани део текста. Могу садржати мање важне детаље, допунска об-
јашњења, назнаке о коришћеним изворима итд., али не могу бити замена за ци-
тирану литературу. [Техничке пропозиције за уређење: формат – Footnote Text;
први ред – увучен аутоматски (Col 1); величина фонта – 10; нумерација – арап-
ске цифре.]
17. Резиме: Резиме рада јесте у ствари апстракт на другом језику на којем
није рад. Ако је језик рада српски, онда је резиме обавезно на енглеском језику.
Резиме се даје на крају чланка, након одељка Литература. Превод кључних речи
на језик резимеа долази после резимеа. [Техничке пропозиције за уређење: фор-
мат – фонт: Times New Roman, Normal; величина фонта: 11; размак између редо-
ва – Before: 0; After: 0; Line spacing: Single; први ред – увучен аутоматски (Col 1).]
Уредништво
Serbian Studies Research
| 231
There is no standard length for articles, but 48,000 characters is a useful target
(excluding footnotes and references). The cover page should provide full affiliation,
the mail and e-mail addresses, and telephone number(s) of the corresponding au-
thor. The title page should include the paper title and the names and affiliations of
all authors. The article should begin with an abstract of 100-250 words describing
the main arguments and conclusion of the article.
Ordinarily, we are able to report back to authors about their submissions with-
in three months.
The opinions expressed in the articles published in Serbian Studies Research are
those of the authors and not necessarily of the editors of the journal.
Serbian Studies Research accepts advertising that is of the interest to the mem-
bership of the scholarly Association for the Development of Serbian Studies.
CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Библиотека Матице српске, Нови Сад
811.163.41
821.163.41
ISSN 2217-5210
COBISS.SR-ID 262351623