FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 1

DEATH PENALTY It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the
pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated
for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we
G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]
have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court
of Appeals:[1]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the
first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be
RESOLUTION
disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court."
PER CURIAM:
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming
against the accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-
xxx, the defense attempted to prove that:
year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction
as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
of the alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
penetrated the alleged victim's private part; and
of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the
said motion that can disturb our verdict.
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel,
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic
Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty
review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines
(FLAG).
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could
The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death
not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
sentence:
c) the defense of alibi.
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the
pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the
complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal
of our judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time,
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of
by way of a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following
the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-
matters:
appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable
bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
doubt.
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant
offense in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from
was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the
adequately defending himself;
sentence of death against him on this basis.
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
the Death Penalty Law;
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the
effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the
trial court during the trial of the rape case.
incompetence of counsel.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional
reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to
per se:
the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec.
matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal.[2]
19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation
against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission
of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit
of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3)
withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do
main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial
the same sexual assaults to other women."[3] Thus, this is one occasion
proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant.
I.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 2
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also
cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at
the trial and accepted by the judge."[5]
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses
mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive
identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution.
Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to
disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial
court's jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes
of his counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross
incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and
prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-
appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had
amply exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable
decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his client's defense.
As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time
he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings
thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-
Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25,
1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his line of defense.
There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted
from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his
client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case
against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the
previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have
overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as
punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an
ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge
themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to
compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing
sensitization throughout the later generations against past barbarity and
the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today every
man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human rights
recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve
the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure
society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on
the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal
punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable
and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on
January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death
penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment
had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a
modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a
constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We unchangingly
answered this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director
of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v.
Puda[11] and People v. Marcos,[12] In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said
that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.'"[13]
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are
not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and
well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of
Limacothat:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is
the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of
their private opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v.
Veneracion.[15]
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of
treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or
with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list of
capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the
emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616
added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk
rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death
penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital
offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking
Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During
martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing
with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an
unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos
regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a
Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments
thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of
a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped
themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights
Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the
proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article
III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as
Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already
imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a
consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the
death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death
penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be
done -- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or by
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 3
the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition
should be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored
by the legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that
capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are
traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no
evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life
should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous
for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been
there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it.
Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to
serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which
were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty".[16]
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not
survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama
first pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher
incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the last
decade".[17] Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to
absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave
society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar
emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested,
"although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should
afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation,"[18] and his
concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner
Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B.
Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A.
Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla
put it succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Teodoro
C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital
punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the
right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital
punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point
of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under
certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do
what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake
is whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the
common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that
delegation is forever under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to
determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether
the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for the
common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori, and as
was remarked within a few days or even a month, determine a positive
provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature to
prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most
grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating
circumstances."[19]
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered
provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death
penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de
los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations
even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter
in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature.
Arguments pro and con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we
should leave this to the discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will,
in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after
repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have
repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it
again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If we
will leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us leave
it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this
half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal
Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these
pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time
say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I
think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes
depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this
completely to the legislature composed of representatives elected by the
people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact
that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this
to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let
us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent."[20]
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three
(23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12)
voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording
of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death
penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special
criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were
tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what
used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder
isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"[22]
thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the
penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum
and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay,[23] People v.
Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into three new periods, to
wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme
under the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we
reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we
concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not reflect the
intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article
III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did,
then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the
old one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But
if no total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the
death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the
institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total inexistence
of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 4
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder
to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These
should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-
grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that
Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty and has not, by reducing it toreclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is
still plain enough".[27]
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the
initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution,
to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the
Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not;
and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the
death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments
for and against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on
the policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection,
the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue
of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would
vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes
would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in
the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote
of No would be a vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the
scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first
decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed,
and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the
compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body
decides in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the committee
would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be imposed. It
affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a vote in
favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements
on how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion of
the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a
senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no'
on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic
policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the
scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that
if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill
No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as
agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever
course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body
later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as
a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the
Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides
in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address two
issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be
imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so,
is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The
death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the
crime is heinous."[28]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and
no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-
incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in
the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently
created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate
of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate
in the committee would be the determination of the crimes to be
considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech.
He began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-
imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and
other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or
punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death
penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death
penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the
work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for
future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the
death penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the
death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons
reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the
Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the
Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal Code,
would be considered as having been repealed -- all provisions on the
death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by the
Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose
such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article
but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected
by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional
provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal
Code itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why,
in the proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring,
the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either
reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the
Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they had to be
reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them
had to be amended because the Committee thought that amendments
were proper."[29]
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to
whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 5
special law which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for
heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind
that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was
amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the
Constitution provides that where the death penalty has already been
imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we thought
that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be
considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole
trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the
special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define
the crime for which the death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want
to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which is punished
in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same -- merely reproduce.
Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping
the definition of the crime as the same and merely adding some
aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these
offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code."[30]
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for
discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated
on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept
prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each
and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought.
Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that
the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of [heinous]
crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the
case of each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a
significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the
death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was
ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification.[31]Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the
abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the
alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying
the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there
were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator
Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was
that "the State has done everything in its command so that it can be
justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty".[32] The
problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists
admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice
system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse
to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last
resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As
an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino
explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers
to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added
that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in incidence
as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death
penalty is enough compelling reason.[33]
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle
lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition
of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second,
the statement of compelling reasons for each and every capital crime.
His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his objections to
the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.
President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are
described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished
by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in
the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but
that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the
offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at
the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to society
in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government
have made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The
compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses
of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as
indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for
the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President,
does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would
call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately,
distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to
one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see
the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty
therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered
by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid
stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that is included
in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble, general
statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And that, we
believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient
notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the Congress,
in providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would
suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme
Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble
would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable
in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons
for each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation,
especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which
says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the
compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it
becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished
as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive
law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will
more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself which
is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition and
penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that
the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and
these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death
penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does
the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state
clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty
for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the crimes
heinous included in the bill?
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 6
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I
believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we
state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the
question is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill
that will be controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient
compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is
heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of
constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will go
into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death
penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process." [34]
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty
bill violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide
abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second
Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in
the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary session.
He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration
would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this respect, the
Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and
protocol considering that these agreements have reached only the
committee level.[35]
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate
Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four
(4) negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was
approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August
16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The
House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third reading
House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for certain
heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when
the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from
the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth
Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by
twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives on October
27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187,
411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632
authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal
ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-
impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous
crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the
exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it . .
.'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an
amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the
death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution.
Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the
discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm.
Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some
future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through
initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is
entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the
viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity,
show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public
peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the
Castanoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We
ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a
few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent
manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its
inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law,
public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years
as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized
society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young
business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self
of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old
high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model
someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that
it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom
Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the
Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still
makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken
by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the
overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista
of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve,
there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and
lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and exact
vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House
Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to
listen to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and
pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and
without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or
butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on
for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will
deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 7
interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow
upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that
we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."[36]
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and
in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were
not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed
less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special
law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what
crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves
the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely
eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative
Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not
only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but
also for other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide; murder;
kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or
without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A.
7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as
defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is
killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson resulting in the
death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to
the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of
its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity,
is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and
morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance
to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S.
v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity
and obedience which individuals owe to the government under which
they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which they
receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against
his or her own will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of
scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear
through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is
being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of
the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he
commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a
homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are
perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other
personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the
parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the
stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the
victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention
the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of police
interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the
universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are
passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that,
in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the
rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the
crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in
making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation
or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the
passengers to terrorism." [37]
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to
February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House
of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on
second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the
House of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it
was up for consideration on third reading. [38] The results were 123
votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23,
1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral
Conference Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act
to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special
Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the
present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law,
and one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said
law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old
daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on automatic
review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death
sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's
affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue
of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the
death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in
the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death
penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against punishment of such
nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-
appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without
complying with the twin requirements of compelling reasons and
heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No.
7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide
the context for the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in
Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing
of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death
penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by
heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven
in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find
the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 8
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v.
Alicando, [40] traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the
Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable,
which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so
hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion
of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately
undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place,
time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences
and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing
authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the
appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a
mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina
and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived
as a mere enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the
elements that make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that
there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were
crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there
were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the
attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than
three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or
edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or
airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public
utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government
museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located
in an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is
perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape
is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or
more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed
with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs
(id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts
(id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
(Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec.
16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous
drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate
vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform
penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand
for a specification of the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes
because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in
these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the
death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered
before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner
by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on
his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance
to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society,
which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious,
or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or
perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death
is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense
which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he
shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 9
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any
of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of
victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case
where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who
is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim
dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of
a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall
be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in
every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to
a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1),
6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A
(1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall
be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are
government officials, employees or officers including members of police
agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the
mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials,
employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found
guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8,
9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate
vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of
heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken
or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life,
and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her
individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual,
psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death,
and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim
in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds
itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 10
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that
so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche of the
populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness
is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting
the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659
punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less
abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time
to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on
automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659,
with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally
alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating
circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies
circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be
punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals
the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal Code,
death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the
commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the
Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty;
and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which
indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A.
No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand
the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize
circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as
heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend
the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the
evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee
and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It
is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the
determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the
ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not
heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and
substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the
mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional
requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to the
death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the
abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion
are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because
the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the
most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects,
repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-
political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes
must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be
no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub
elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its
demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be
pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in
case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only
compelling reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing
else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to that could
check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the
compelling reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a
dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural milieu after the
suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however,
interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the
conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The
imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of
criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is
an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a
requirement that the death penalty first proves itself to be a truly
deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher
incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed
a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that
the constitution in the first place did not require that the death penalty be
first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that
congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-
impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty
be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have
failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that
R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such
crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick
to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress,
in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for
attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death
penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death
penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black
accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given
the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the
death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist
movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by
American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial
discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our
task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these
death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 11
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no
permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the
penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused
if he is poor and despised x x x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.
They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient
not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit
in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary
death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which
these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards
intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of
personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the
trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-
enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks
that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the
constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg
v. Georgia,[42] Jurek v. Texas,[43] and Profitt v. Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because
the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support
of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is
not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for
crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is
imposed. It is also established that imposing capital punishment, at least
for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the
Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmities which led the
Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in
Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death
penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of
severe punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the
crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the
death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the
statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically
different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate,
none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape
chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which
rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes -- Georgia, North
Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was
mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina,
respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment
laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none
of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four
States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized
the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman
with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for which
death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also
authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the
victim was a child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has
since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x x
x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States
at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape
victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital
punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not
wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty
for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly
confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for
the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the
latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are
to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.'
It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat
of force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the
victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to
the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage.
Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public
injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does
not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to
another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does
not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life
may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first,
that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a
proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by
the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes
in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a
dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking
of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on
the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the
gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such
a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice
of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already
demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the
forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining
essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and
cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 12

masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies

based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so
caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the
safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no
doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have
held in the case of People v. Cristobal: [46]

"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person.

It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a
right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity
that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."

We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed
here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful,
sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without thinking,
would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with the
fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with
even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is,
in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what
the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.

"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is

substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which
invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve
the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character
and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may rule
comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a x x x
necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and
ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the
luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity
of social survival." [47]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for

Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED [48] for LACK OF MERIT.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 13
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN
MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE
MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.
Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.
Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and
thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their
conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think
so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee
would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and
instant punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a
private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town
mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had
complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found
their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in
cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the
mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror.
The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice,
also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was
only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he
too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims
were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were
pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate
informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other
seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano
Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is
now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other
convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who
all ask for a reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora,
Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men
went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his
son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the
house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his
horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under
his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length
with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell.
At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by
Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any
move to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his
sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked
him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others
looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took
the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro
Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them
and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows
with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down
and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice
in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with
their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed.
Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy
made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and
missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then
vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as
the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz
ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head
and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and
fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the
two grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8
Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and
Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro
Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita
de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora
as the other accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino
before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially
noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively
identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of the
others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muñoz. 13 Melecia
earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but
changed her mind later on cross-examination and named Millora as the
actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had
earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00
promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money.
14 For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death
unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She
narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how
Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muñoz,
while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated
by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing
because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully
escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the
killings that it occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and
suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly
pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally
deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that
befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did
not allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio officials they
knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent
and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these
witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these
are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their
accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said
witnesses are emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries
sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip
left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the
back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically
lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically
opened with the brain tissue outside.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 14
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the
upper right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at
the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left
clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court
correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos
were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group
and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and
their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba,
Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano
Muñoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep
coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00
to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando
de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the
Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed
with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared
hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression
that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to
report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention
that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with
them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they
had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were
already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz was
described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred
of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler,
let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were
discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro,
who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house,
as testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of
the killings, having gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He
claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after
drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only
between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30, 1972. 27 The
lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than
Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora
as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him
instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by
these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or
mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily
wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically
declared that Millora was with the group that she took to the field where
her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both
claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of
policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole
night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of
June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them breakfast. 30
Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was
located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31 Moreover, the trial
court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated
them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's
witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent
when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at
9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the
suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for
the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons
who were with Muñoz and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos
were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. As we
said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
assess their credibility. The written record will not show that nuance of
tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and
the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm
the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could be
considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations
before him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their seven
other companions, participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the
manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses
of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as
undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling
evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation
assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the three
offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found
guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other two herein appellants only
as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muñoz was
found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices.
34 In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no
evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally
liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when
the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there
was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the
Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom
they were looking for. They knew where to look for them. They sought
each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro
Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed
themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the
appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody
moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from the
house and the rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while
helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with them and then
forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by
with their weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one
interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question
that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously
agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such,
each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the
three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of
murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the
trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by
alevosia. There was treachery because every one of the three victims
was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the
accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by
surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down when
he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the
head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified
by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the
death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the
above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 15
lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before, where the
offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the
minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable
in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty,
including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period
was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that
"in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without
categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R.
Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three
new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L.
Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal
maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein
does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III,
Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to
be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which
was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The
majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original
interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the
constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder
to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These
should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-
grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that
Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is
still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the
language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of
much assistance either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it
was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still
not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that
there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by
dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary
consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited
by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not
decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those
statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it
has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to
death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the
range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I
suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if
there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of
the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for
the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it
is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until
such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about." Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected
the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the
intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also
the other periods of the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable
from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially
so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we
are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty"
(Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were not
saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish
the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the
intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a
result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all
expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated
therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have
been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and
plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for
such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion
makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance
where the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely,
considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was
then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the Court
today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which
we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the
composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing
its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new
perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are
not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown
rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all
life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not
prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing
a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our)
tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by
the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold
that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar
as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to
reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties
remains unchanged.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 16
The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that
would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death
penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance
of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the
same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than
the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some
relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was
paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked
longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount.
When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the
householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not
agree with me for a penny?'
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined
exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this
prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably
to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion
perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants
for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with
the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the
victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to
P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers
would have remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain
responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting officer,
who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and
conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons
against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law
and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful
patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the
accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal
Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer
three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs
of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the
deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is
concerned.
Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our
view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed by
Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion
thereof provides:
... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.
xxx xxx xxx
The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the
death penalty but only provided for its non-imposition. Our reading,
however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall
not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed
non-existent in our penal statutes.
It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority)
of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting
interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that
resort must be had to judicial construction.
It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute
that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects
(Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60).
A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where
legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent
must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself.
However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does
not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more
than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as
the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order
to clearly ascertain that intent.
The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no
doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus,
Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in
his speech sponsoring the provision:
My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not
on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case
it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And
the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out.
There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might
be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an
institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended
precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the
reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676).
(Emphasis supplied)
Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait
for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission
went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive
capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty
was approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal
voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17"
(Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).
Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a
member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty,
arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive
safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be
carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence
still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although
the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death
penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also
mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death
sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him,
this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through
all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error
(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 17
In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be
observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show
the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death
penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional
prohibition. To quote him:
FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are
put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize
whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have
made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total
abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything
for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process
of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by
them or not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746)
(Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding
the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the
total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty.
This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.
The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds
further light:
MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption
that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to
the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because
those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly?
But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are
punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these
amendments?
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but
the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp.
748-749) (Emphasis supplied)
It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to
provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes.
Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the law-
making body which can legislate back into existence something that has
been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while
abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore
it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress
enacts the necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent
in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this
point:
FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of
this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death
penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and
there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.
MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President?
Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses
punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty?
FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I,
p. 749). (Emphasis supplied)
The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was
deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide
for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the
understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be
when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for
certain heinous crimes:
MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not
pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes?
MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty.
MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment?
MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-
748) (Emphasis supplied)
To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do
not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for
its non-imposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction
that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The
literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent,
purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative
enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the
Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed
421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object,
being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal
interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to
harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of
the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).
Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the
Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30,
1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721,
December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934,
September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder
in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with
the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now
becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium
period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the
lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course,
reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death
penalty.
The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period
scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating
circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the
minimum period; and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
medium period.
The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the
requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in
the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of
such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a
document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as
indicated by the discussions on the floor.
Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on
the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder,
specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following
interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those
statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it
has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to
death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the
range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I
suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 18
there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of
the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for
the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it
is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until
such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750)
The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all
discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases
that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for
Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also
shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the
Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to
the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the
majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more,"
wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for
the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to
be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority
concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.
If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the
penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying
circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the
crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no
longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on
the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The
distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic
aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same
penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in
creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various
modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to
penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating
circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying
circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in
banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also
intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing
three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in
different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that
this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly
left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks."
In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty
for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua,
must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new
penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must
be provided for so that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder
in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant
circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the
Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those
cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly
legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital
punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal
Code.
Narvasa, Paras, Sarmineto, Cortes and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is
concerned.
Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our
view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed by
Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion
thereof provides:
... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.
xxx xxx xxx
The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the
death penalty but only provided for its non- imposition. Our reading,
however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall
not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed
non-existent in our penal statutes.
It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority)
of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting
interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that
resort must be had to judicial construction.
It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute
that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects
(Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60).
A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where
legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent
must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself.
However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does
not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more
than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as
the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order
to clearly ascertain that intent.
The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no
doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus,
Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in
his speech sponsoring the provision:
My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not
on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case
it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And
the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out.
There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might
be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an
institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended
precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the
reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676).
(Emphasis supplied)
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 19
Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait
for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission
went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive
capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty
was approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal
voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17"
(Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).
Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a
member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty,
arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive
safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be
carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence
still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although
the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death
penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also
mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death
sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him,
this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through
all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error
(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be
observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show
the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death
penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional
prohibition. To quote him:
FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are
put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize
whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have
made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total
abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything
for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process
of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by
them or not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746)
(Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding
the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the
total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty.
This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.
The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds
further light:
MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption
that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to
the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because
those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly?
But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are
punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these
amendments?
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but
the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp.
748-749) (Emphasis supplied)
It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to
provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes.
Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the law-
making body which can legislate back into existence something that has
been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while
abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore
it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress
enacts the necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent
in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this
point:
FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of
this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death
penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and
there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.
MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President?
Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses
punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty?
FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I,
p. 749). (Emphasis supplied)
The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was
deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide
for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the
understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be
when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for
certain heinous crimes:
MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not
pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes?
MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty.
MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment?
MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-
748) (Emphasis supplied)
To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do
not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for
its non-imposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction
that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The
literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent,
purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative
enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the
Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed
421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object,
being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal
interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to
harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of
the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).
Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the
Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30,
1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721,
December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934,
September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder
in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with
the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now
becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium
period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the
lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course,
reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death
penalty.
The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period
scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating
circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the
minimum period; and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
medium period.
The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the
requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in
the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of
such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a
document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as
indicated by the discussions on the floor.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 20
Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on
the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder,
specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following
interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those
statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it
has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to
death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the
range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I
suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if
there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of
the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for
the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it
is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until
such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750)
The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all
discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases
that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for
Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also
shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the
Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to
the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the
majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more,"
wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for
the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to
be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority
concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.
If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the
penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying
circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the
crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no
longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on
the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The
distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic
aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same
penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in
creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various
modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to
penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating
circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying
circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in
banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also
intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing
three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in
different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that
this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly
left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks."
In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty
for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua,
must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new
penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must
be provided for so that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder
in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant
circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the
Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those
cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly
legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital
punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal
Code.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is
concerned.
Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our
view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed by
Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion
thereof provides:
... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.
xxx xxx xxx
The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the
death penalty but only provided for its non- imposition. Our reading,
however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall
not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed
non-existent in our penal statutes.
It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority)
of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting
interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that
resort must be had to judicial construction.
It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute
that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects
(Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60).
A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where
legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent
must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself.
However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does
not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more
than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as
the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order
to clearly ascertain that intent.
The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no
doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus,
Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in
his speech sponsoring the provision:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 21
My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not
on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case
it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And
the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out.
There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might
be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an
institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended
precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the
reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676).
(Emphasis supplied)
Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait
for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission
went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive
capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty
was approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal
voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17"
(Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).
Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a
member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty,
arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive
safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be
carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence
still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although
the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death
penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also
mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death
sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him,
this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through
all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error
(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be
observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show
the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death
penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional
prohibition. To quote him:
FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are
put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize
whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have
made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total
abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything
for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process
of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by
them or not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746)
(Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding
the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the
total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty.
This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.
The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds
further light:
MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption
that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to
the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because
those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly?
But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are
punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these
amendments?
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but
the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp.
748-749) (Emphasis supplied)
It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to
provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes.
Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the law-
making body which can legislate back into existence something that has
been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while
abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore
it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress
enacts the necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent
in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this
point:
FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of
this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death
penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and
there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.
MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President?
Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses
punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty?
FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I,
p. 749). (Emphasis supplied)
The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was
deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide
for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the
understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be
when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for
certain heinous crimes:
MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not
pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes?
MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty.
MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment?
MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-
748) (Emphasis supplied)
To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do
not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for
its non-imposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction
that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The
literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent,
purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative
enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the
Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed
421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object,
being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal
interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to
harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of
the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).
Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the
Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30,
1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721,
December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934,
September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder
in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with
the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now
becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium
period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the
lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 22

day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course,

reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death
penalty.
The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period
scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating
circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the
minimum period; and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
medium period.
The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the
requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in
the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of
such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a
document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as
indicated by the discussions on the floor.
Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on
the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder,
specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following
interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue:
If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the
penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying
circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the
crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no
longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on
the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The
distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic
aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same
penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in
creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various
modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to
penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating
circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying
circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in
banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also
intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing
three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in
different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that
this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly
left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks."

FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those
statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it
has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to
death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the
range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty
for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua,
must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new
penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must
be provided for so that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder
in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant
circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the
Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those
cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly
legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital
punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal
Code.

FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I
suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if
there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).

xxx xxx xxx

FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.

MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of

the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for
the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it
is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until
such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?

FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750)

The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all
discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases
that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for
Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also
shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the
Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to
the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the
majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more,"
wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for
the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to
be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority
concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 23
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the
Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant)
for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims
being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a consequence
though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader
in both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to
acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the
1987 Constitution,1 we now find it necessary to determine whether the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction
of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum
term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the
Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence
was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the
Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his
penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should
be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should
be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000
to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca,
Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA3 and
BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was accused of
raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-
G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G,
6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.5 All these cases were consolidated for
trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several
instances over a span of six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both
identified him as the man who had raped them. During trial, their
respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the
doctor who physically examined them were entered as documentary
evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first
molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her
grandmother.6 She recounted that the incident took place when she and
appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and
vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should
she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in
the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997,
that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by
appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by
appellant for the third time, again at the house of her grandmother.8 The
following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth
time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing9 after
having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at
the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried
to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly
stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother,
CCC,11 the brutish acts appellant had done to her.12 Her mother thus
filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open
court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to
prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in
1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant
shared with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked
a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina.
Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was
holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of
appellant's threat that he would kill her.14 BBB further testified that in
1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions,
the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of
the time of day.15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.16
On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of
her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed
him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA
towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make
any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes
and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed
himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up
and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her
sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was
appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since
then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again.17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to
her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual
abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the
same, her mother brought her to the police station and her statement
was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined.
Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to
her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she
was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family.18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified
that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June
2000. Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that
BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was packing more
than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the
matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house.
Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was
only five months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that
she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to
the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After
examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually
molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their
daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant.
It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to
her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry at
CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the
prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca
District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB and
AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child. These
medical certificates were presented in court.21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination,
there were no external sign of physical injury found on her body.
However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was
slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without
resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and
"eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her
examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual
penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there
were no external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 24
majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact.
On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the
hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person
having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-
examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign
body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA.23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his
defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the
house of his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away
from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15
January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister,
two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape
occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning
of the following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB
and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further
asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he
had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case
was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of
his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would
call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members.25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.26 The RTC
pronounced appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing,
citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak
defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the
clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and
the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's
relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the
records of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for review.
However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People
v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of
the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on
appellant.28 The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at
least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly
on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full
faith and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial
court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was
established with certitude that the accused on several occasions
sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its
authorship were proved by the victims' candid and unwavering
testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate
in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more
evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over
what their uncle had done to her and her sister.29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos.
6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged
that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000,
respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find evidence
beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had
accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him
liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral
certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum,
quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA
was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her
vagina and she answered in the negative.30 Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape
from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted
rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court, assails the
findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the
testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000.
Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to
her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been
sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July
2002, this time she stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA
were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at her
grandmother's), the accused passed through a window, entered their
room and raped her again.32 Appellant also latches on the
inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her
rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that
appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002
hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was
raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the
Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was
testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez33 on the
appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims
who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial,
minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted.[34] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's
Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and
merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct
examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are
to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open
court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such
circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than letter-
perfect.[35] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-
known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of
testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why
BBB was confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly
in the Memorandum for the People38 filed with the RTC, the public
prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first
testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15,
2000, as regards the place of commission—house of her parents or
house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top – 3
minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration
that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina,
and he was moving while on her top then she felt something came out
from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a
knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand on
June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and
many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused
about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. After she testified
on November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998
and 1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January
15, 2000, which happened in her own house. These noted discrepancies
as to the exact place of commission – accused's house or victim's house
– is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both houses are
situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered
defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the
weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in
a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house
barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January
2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 25
of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sister's house in the
middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house
without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an
accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.41 The defenses
of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution
has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the
perpetrator.42 In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of
appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower
courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the
15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the
accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of
rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about the
allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the
evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted
because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is
outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to
the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating their
harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law
as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years before
the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly
wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she
could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape
victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against a
member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed.43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself
to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-
victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman,
more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.44 The weight
of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the
contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed
the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, these
testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their
relationship with appellant were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the
Informations the ages of the victims when they were raped but the
prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court
as documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when
appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that
he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' father,
and thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of
consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to
BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant
repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose
the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in
revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces
a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the
accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she would report the
incident.46
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts
of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of
attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender
commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform
all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.47 In
Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no
penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia
of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the
hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you
when you were eleven years old?
A – Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q – What was that?
A – He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he
inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A – No, Mam. [sic]
Q – Why?
A – It was painful, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A – Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case
No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual
abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A – June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q – What year?
A – June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A – He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q – And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
A – He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your
vagina?
A – Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q – And what did you do when you feel painful?
A – I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q – When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A – He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 26
Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A – No, Mam.49 [sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the
penalty, the CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape.
Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be
convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-
settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not
necessary to convict for consummated rape since the slightest
penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v.
Campuhan, the term "slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that
there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed
touching at the very least the labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal
contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina
(the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ
or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the slightest
penetration, more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis,
before rape could be deemed consummated. We, therefore, take
exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was
trying to insert his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved painful to
[AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act.
From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered
cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of
doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the pudendum
of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule that the
introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby
touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the case of
rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there
is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape,
penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced
the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however slight, is not completed.51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it
has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty
of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However,
in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes
should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on
appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed
by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer
uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of
Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such
reduction in recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua52 and People
v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2)
counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but
interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape
of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted rape. There is no
doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to
the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an
attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in
an attempt to commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law"
for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353,
prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly
proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been
raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating
the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or
accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article
71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special
attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision
reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating
such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 27
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees
lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a
minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose
of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the
same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be
eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate
Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-
imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum
periods.59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty
for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the
Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication.
However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem
concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a
maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two
degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty,
does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty
with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant
would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for
attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several classes of
convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds
it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was
imposable under two different frames of reference. This was especially
made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code
through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for
in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to
death," and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as
the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery
"if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present;"60
kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person;"61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several
circumstances enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was
imposable on several crimes, including murder,63 qualified piracy,64
and treason.65 The imposition of the death penalty for crimes
punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the
appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally
outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to
those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death,
as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on
the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were
punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on
accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not
relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of
attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried
prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not
"reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned
from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the
exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the
penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision
mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape
in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion
temporal."67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused, who
had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old
stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that
"reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the Court, through then
Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty
for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death,
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, since [RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the
common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph thereof
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is
the penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum
shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised
Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties.
Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty
prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties … the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale."
Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies
which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if
consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if
the penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty
of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659,
Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty
prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower
in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in
the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the
proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did
not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent
readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty
imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetua to
death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the
Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to
consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 28
indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that
some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and
kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible penalty
of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes,
such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our
ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and
accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to
death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the
penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the
penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning
from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce
such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in
Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on
frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death
by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed
or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were
deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such
amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause,
which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress
as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express
repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive
orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not
merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its
utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death
penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this
provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be
claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape
of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death
penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution
through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the
statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted
rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep.
Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty
for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not
its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be
argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After
all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a
minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory,
but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is
enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of
Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the
option of employing either a liberal or a conservative construction, there
is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the
reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in
People v. Muñoz,72 a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the
course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the
"imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have
been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read
instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would
have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling
for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The
inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a
fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually
intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions
only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the
legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the
law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending
any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative
intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only
to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results
is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death.
Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal
for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an
accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim,
even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had
no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final
judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is
sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice
should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal.
Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the
new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the
death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No.
9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was
to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes
previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has
the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet
given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and
accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal
law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to
enact such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly
stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No.
9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention
to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at
all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem
strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized
in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example
of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple
kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by
death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the
penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have
been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than
kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was
merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition
on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal
Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would
be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 29
accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping,
the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there
is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification
other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation
to frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if
consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by
death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time,
the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing
premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or
also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same
penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be
mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously
punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated
stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to
death,"73 such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by
death are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is
"a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed
reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the
maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would
have warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted that Rep.
Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies,
then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be
sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would
now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that
would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one
degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be
disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and
established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature
has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime
that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different
attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only
irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that
physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such
discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from
oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the
penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In
contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346
instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even
as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the
operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in
Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated
penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in
Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws.
Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in
kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion
temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would
bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended,
to remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the
accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an anomalous
notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same
standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the
crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple
kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed
as having eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run
across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would
receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now
Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even
mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The
maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi
embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system—a uniform system of jurisprudence.75 "Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x
This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different
legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No.
9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed
as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of
the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear
and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for
frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal
laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused.77 If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will
lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute
were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.78 The law is
tender in favor of the rights of an individual.79 It is this philosophy of
caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that
animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights,
that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would
not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that
the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the
corresponding modification of penalties other than death, dependent as
these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of
Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act
No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier
pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would
have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and
inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not speak well of
a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own
prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a
reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices
that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy
the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our
penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muñoz,80
decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional
bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding
modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no
expression of "such a requirement… in Article III, Section 19(1) of the
Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made
the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987
Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty."82
It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in light of Rep.
Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muñoz as precedent deter the
Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded
penalties other than death?
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 30
It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found guilty of murder,
which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein
were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus penalized
in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muñoz held that
the proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of
reclusion temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum,
divided into two halves for that purpose. Muñoz rejected this formulation,
holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards
this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to
the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's effects
on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as
recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish
a view urging the reexamination of Muñoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly settling the
question now befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muñoz are
different from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muñoz inquired into
the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while
herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muñoz may have
pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but
that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now
being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act
No. 9346. Otherwise framed, Muñoz does not preclude the Court from
concluding that with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death
penalty Congress has unequivocally banned the same.
Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article
III, which provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have interpreted that provision
as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to
enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and
applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be
understood and appreciated that at the time Muñoz was decided, it
would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement
that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very
provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless
subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes," as Congress very well did just four (4) years after
Muñoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the
legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws
prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit
Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express stipulation in the
Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory
expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative
of intent similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on the
imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding
modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which
calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding modifications
of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and
not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep.
Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided
for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muñoz did not
engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the
Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general
graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder.
Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a
context within which the concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal
effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep.
Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws
insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word "imposition"
in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might
try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means
employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied in
Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as
a means of retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have been a most
curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain
degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet
constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when
infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due
process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a
standard characterized as "nothing but blather in search of meaning."84
In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, the
demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and
"application," for both terms embody the operation in law of the death
penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the
graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of
Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means
of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since
Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death
penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions
requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily
extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article
71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to
retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the
other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such
conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints
appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress
empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death
penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within
the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed
itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression
of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than
at any time in our political history as a nation.
Following Muñoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution,
might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead
placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the
characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between
the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in a
state of hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened — then it died;
because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the
death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that
day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect,
whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death
penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muñoz lacked legal justification
when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act
No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on
convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong. Muñoz properly stood as
the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality
prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on
its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in
the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as
"heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification
under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other
than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in
imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.86 The
categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does
official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has
also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities
awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination
persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty
of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through
Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes
previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act
No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to
the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 31

crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still,
what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their
abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction
of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be
imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.

Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil
through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate
discuss the effects of these rulings. of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.89

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the
application is immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the
graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not
from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be
reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was
punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep.
Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua
to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal
laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty,
hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof.
However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and
death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous
rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to
death" is prision mayor.
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence90 in awarding to
BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of
consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court
sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of
consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699,
6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and
6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the
crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No.
6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor
as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is
ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted
rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended SO ORDERED.
to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of
crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would
have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to
extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[87] x x
x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that
we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such
crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons
defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly
recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects,
referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently
serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their
reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not
make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be
other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are
remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such
prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and
non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees
possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such
prisoners who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason

of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to
the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the
downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to
two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we
downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility
for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 32
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with
modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the
penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing
the award of civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and awarding ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against
AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s father filed
a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant
on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.6 The
Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and
unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her
minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health
Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-
appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes
imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal
Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision9 finding the
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty
mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice
of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while
the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in
which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in
"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for
appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005,
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the
judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo
of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused,
Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and
to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for
review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which
took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further
review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-
appellant filed his Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having failed
to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to
have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS
MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the
Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin
and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo
near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the
backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-
down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her
private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her
stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from
them, witnessed appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s cousin]
instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA’s] mother, her aunt Emily, and
told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother answered that they
(referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered
[AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however,
was gone. [AAA’s cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 33
appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did
not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her
because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her
mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part.
Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA’s cousin] came to their
house and told [AAA’s] mother again that appellant had earlier made an
up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA’s mother], however did
not say anything. At that time, [AAA’s] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay.
She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who
conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared
and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of [AAA]’s
examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural
health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can
interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5)
[AAA]’s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar
laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal
mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in layman’s
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there
is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have
been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense
as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña
Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for
his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father
retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an
agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an
agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring
seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were
residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred
residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag
while his mother is from barangay Doña Tomasa both of Guinobatan,
Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land.
Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old
in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994
he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at
Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually
play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa
about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother.
Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised when he
was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latter’s
place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed
Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on
May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under
Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile
cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted
and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the case for
Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was
incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months
later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed
in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on
a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited
him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge
because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can
go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape her.
Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case
was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s] mother, is also related
to his father, [AAA mother’s] father, being a second cousin of his father.
Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to the
AAA’s family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against him
but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078
filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in
relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape case
but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked
exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as
the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin
and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and
her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was
confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3)
there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only
reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a
conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said Salvacion
Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May
7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier
helped AAA’s father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant
also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force,
threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant
harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso
and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital
bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of
any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies
between AAA’s and her cousin’s testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin
testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA
testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited her
to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that
when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while
on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA’s
testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started the
up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to
AAA after telling the latter’s mother what accused-appellant had done to
AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on
her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin
testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but
AAA testified that there were only four of them who were playing at that
time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses,
which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the
veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The
alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn
the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually
abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of
how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve
full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only
five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were
barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to
rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses
can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court
proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is
especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord
them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to recall the exact date
when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date
of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even
discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and
immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a
witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 34
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element
of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge
of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases
need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that
where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not
committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to
sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint,
provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the
period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of
the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense
was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense
was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled
that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15,
1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime
in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took place on
December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date
December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was
subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA’s] sworn
statement mention the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of
the case against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster
accused-appellant’s claim that the only reason why this case was filed
against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same
accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for
the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is
common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and
the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year delay in
reporting the long history of rape by the victim’s father as
understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a
13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that
show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat
the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this
case was sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father in the latter’s
testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry
when your wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back in
1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June
to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which
reason that during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the
case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we
filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape
because there is no proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation
in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old,
as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge"
took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since
none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive
presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below
the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the
conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor
scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no showing of
any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the presence
of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to prove the
crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical
report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important
is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient
to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and
time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.
Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over the appellants’ defense of denial and alibi.29 The shallow
hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces
this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following
conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the instant
case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s] parents finally
decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize
after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA
and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually
ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed
often enough that the testimony of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of
complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of
sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless,
cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors
and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an
honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished
accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on
him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant
committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death
shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years
of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the
time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven
during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her
date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by
the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-
appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When
accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 35
24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As
found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any
month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able
to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not
certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18
years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases,
this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a
minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for
the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages
provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically,
Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to
be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether
the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at
the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the
convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil liability
prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for
consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured
party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason
of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of ₱50,000.00
to the offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have
heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity
authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside
from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral
damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape
continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction.
Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the
victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than ₱75,000.00. This
is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise
compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis
Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as
compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis
Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature
of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the
offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at
the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity
and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly
considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the
rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual
age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty
of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public
penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified
rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took
in People v. Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did
not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted
to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 for moral damages,
even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one
degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling
in People v. Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness,
not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome
explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages as
follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of
Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano
which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of
the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the
death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall ₱75,000.00 … Also,
in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need proof other
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court’s
award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to
₱75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is
still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following
prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts;
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified
by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty;
₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to
have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People
v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. The Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 36
only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the
heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and
only after the claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the
compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the
exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and
moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate
that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the
amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award
of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages is increased to ₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is likewise increased to ₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid
Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed
down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age
at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.47
Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was
previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13,
2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence.
– Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the
time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act
to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years
at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still
under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18
years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No.
603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court
(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344
does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned
from the Senate deliberations50 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion
of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office
of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;
but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be
a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age
of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment
of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 37
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not
affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced
in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00
as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the
case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition
in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO.
3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 29 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with
the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
"1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice
or more times of any crime; and
"2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they
have failed to surrender voluntarily.
"If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in
writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
"Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.1âwphi1
"Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same
is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes
of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if
the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial,
the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided,
finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced
is lestierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment."
Section 2. Article 94 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is
extinguished partially:
"1. By conditional pardon;
"2. By commutation of the sentence; and
"3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence."
Section 3. Article 97 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any
offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to
Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
"1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
"2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
"3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
"4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good
behavior during detention; and
"5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed
another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four
hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time
rendered.
"An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the
above allowances for good conduct."
Section 4. Article 98 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth
of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code,
gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance
of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the
period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to
stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
"This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving sentence."
Section 5. Article 99 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read
as follows:"
"ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully justified,
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such
allowances once granted shall not be revoked."
Section 6. Penal Clause. – Faithful compliance with the provisions of this
Act is hereby mandated. As such, the penalty of one (1) year
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 38

imprisonment, a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)

and perpetual disqualification to hold office shall be imposed against any
public officer or employee who violates the provisions of this Act.
Section 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall within sixty (60) days from
the approval of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations on the
classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be
necessary, to implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees or
issuances, executive orders, letters of instruction, administrative orders
or rules and regulations which may be inconsistent with this Act shall be
deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.

Section 8. Separability Clause. – If any part hereof is held invalid or

unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions not otherwise affected
shall remain valid and subsisting.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance,

executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or
regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is
hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

Section 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) new
papers of general circulation.

SUBSIDIARY PENALTY

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10159 April 10, 2012

AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 39 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Article 39 of Act No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further

amended to read as follows:

"Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. – If the convict has no property with which
to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article,
he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day
for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing
in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction
by the trial court, subject to the following rules:

"1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and

fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the
preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it
continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall
be counted against the prisoner.

"2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a fight felony.

"3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision

correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
culprit.

"4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement

in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict,
during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall
continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal
penalty consists.

"5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered
by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve." (As amended by Republic Act
No. 5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969.)

Section 2. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held

invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not
otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 39
APPLICATION
COMPLEX CRIMES AND SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIMES
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty
of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in
the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura
Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial
and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that
the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding
that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he
was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio
Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical
experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done,
and, according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided
over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio
Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading
"Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission.
There was not a single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he
was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The
veracity of this motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That
the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the
test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex
that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of
insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always
able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the
crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner
or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and
conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations
that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once
arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as
in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his
commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the present
instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar
Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to
abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One
time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked
to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a
fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of
his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness
of censorship especially in relation to rationalization about the
consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C.
Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality defect which
in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked
by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that
Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses
he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by
counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the
filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may
be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although
not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas,
the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the
Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in
President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill
the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign;
and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him,
President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of
assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the
night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal
Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and
surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in
government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose
and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his
thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines,
should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the
same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his
purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he
thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American
soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing
President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following his intended
victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now
Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having
encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the
pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10,
1947.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 40
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez
whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in
accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on
the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its
materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the
contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its
original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I
planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days
and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my
God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I
expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice
it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of
their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their
deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be
blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had astounded them
with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of
risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he
should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as
compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I
not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am
willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not if others
will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only
displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the
request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit
B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at
Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand
grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He
buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close
to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of
about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the
latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by
Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing,
grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from
the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the
general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,
covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that
everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded
in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was
found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon
Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of
mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and
F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two
hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was
one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing
next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran
away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de
Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that
exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding
him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives,
mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion,
placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and
some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the
affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person
with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten
years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to
the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen
was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724
Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and
identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the
platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when
he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his
responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action in
throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors
the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently
signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he
had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the
presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his
answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the
Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E).
From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies
exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand
during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several
errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first,
"in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela";
second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder
and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article
49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public
authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements
made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to
put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President
Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand
grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to
explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main
and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil
purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded
by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He
stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill
the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because
the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to
killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal
to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the
latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the
persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them
also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 41
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the
latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to
the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard
to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and
that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the
different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed
three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing
him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another
act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the
words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it
is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should
intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the
felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention
of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's
Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.)
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People
vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B
a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira
a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un
cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle,
quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no
intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la
muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La
Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y
condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a
un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la
muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de
homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la
muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado,
no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas
por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la
pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto
en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues,
claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del
Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo
del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en
S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p.
42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49
that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first
clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly
explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the
victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the
injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra,
this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that
neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against
the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into
the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was
different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President
Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him,
thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did
not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we
qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as
merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant
proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the
offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were
directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating
President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign
promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief
Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the
appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said
offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder
committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade
at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating
circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most
serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the
extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but
to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised
Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working
day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record
shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 42
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR
ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND
ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE
PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and
HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence,
People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a
marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public
attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are
now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in
Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile
was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon
City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of
the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed
by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted,
hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the
existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set
the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor
General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case
and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but
separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary
means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article
48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the
first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6,
1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety
bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the
Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without
prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional
liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the
legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted
against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail
to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and
litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following
options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed
in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General
in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion,
but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also
constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should
be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good
law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to
warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not
too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential
Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the
occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of
Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed
upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect
of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition,
absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 43
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory
that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and
that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus
was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the
real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited
clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48
of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were
not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could
not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of
favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than
that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were
punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace
referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later
75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de
que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas
grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de
las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran
los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver
offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the
sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with
separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not,
to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one
act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses
put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had
no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate
of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for
this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct
acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the
other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling
of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating
to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission
or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the
trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a
take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety
of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging
simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients
of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as
means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;
that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that
does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the
Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a
mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by
the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was
filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on
the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted
by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in
filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from
what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for
petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant
and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15
This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty
of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that
he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner
claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the
voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because
said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume
that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light
of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information
against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple
rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 44
as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from
which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial
and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with
said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only
after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without
first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez
ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense,
would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or
omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge
in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there
instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these
questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent
Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than
fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court,
except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify
by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the
reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant
of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be
precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if
it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes
no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest
fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived
as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on
the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim
the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or
weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to
this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their
cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking
recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such
pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have
hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the
present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already
gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition
interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that
should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the
relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by
the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that
clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution
of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of
the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses
have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against
them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the
afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained
without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of
their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion
has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and
have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even
the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of
seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against
innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,
or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not
even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need
to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or
to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the
umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the
law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly
seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any
of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall
become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No.
92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has
been with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus,
should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that,
ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of
Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that
Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books.
The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 45
recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to
Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy
relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the
pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus
may still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be
availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is
under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this
case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of
jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus
is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a
process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked
though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or
tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority
to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such
a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty
(Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the
present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which
petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-
existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder,
nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions
brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw
notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to
reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of
Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of
this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to
charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses
notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity
of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense
(now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation.
But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942,
were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987.
EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others
enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force
and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been
so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence,
under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown
in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the
case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of
Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that
under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the
Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor
prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for
Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues
arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations
filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily
not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special
circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other
recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in
connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and
that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property
constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one
crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated
in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are
aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have
been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers,
issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are
imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She
thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made
it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The
prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect,
questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree,
a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human
rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post
facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our
legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with
murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is
to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme
Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case
by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed
"on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of
rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature
of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on
PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion
because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood,
the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder
because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a
rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not
a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb
cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the
dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine
gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction
of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate
penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in
total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian
economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of
passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those
engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the
intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 46
to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in
lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel
attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the
rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I
cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which
categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The
petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested
without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an
established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant
which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial
system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court should
never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its
erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out.
Or, at the very least and where possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme
Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a
Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his
reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However,
any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes
he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no
jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this
particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this
Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a
warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General
provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking
to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It
could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This
Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that.
There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the
significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an
executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is
committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than
that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it
has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly,
through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should
be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower
ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid,
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]
was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further
emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word
on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29,
1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226
[1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968]
and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577
[1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon,
et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable
cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with
murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of
the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members
of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the
hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of
probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer
was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant
business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any
restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent
if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in
rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings,
fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend
masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo
them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-
conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio
case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the
Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their
waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga
was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent
civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier,
appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the
United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of
conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a case of
conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense
and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn
v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a
statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional
due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order
to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of
the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge
as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that
the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
(id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia
which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This case
did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but
its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly
read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a
deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this
Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to
be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime
which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense
should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 47
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra)
has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using
more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels
that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties
like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent
court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that,
as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or clarification.
I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate
relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in
our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134
(entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose
which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion.
Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts
comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent
or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government
or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers
or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for
Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular
measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or
insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the Government,
destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which
they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion
generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [
], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or
employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates
to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or
ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and,
on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the
political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more
even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-
examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine
are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or
discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted
separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far
as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity
principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in
relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do
not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the
specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms.
Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted
with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses
become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
[1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute
becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous
existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not
where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975];
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the
non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial
decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the
United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act
criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US
188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of
Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle
does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez
doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised
Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the
first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is,
however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be
so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez
could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez
doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause
and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil.
90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears
to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary
intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez
doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in
slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new
doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been
derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average
competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez
and subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these terms would
almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the
conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the
Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the
Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the
occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed
absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a
rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous
challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable
with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and
jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-
embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on
the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are
absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of
the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was
appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion
of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since
then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 48
powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in Articles
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on
the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe
that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs
clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe
that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that
distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the
commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses
that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of
rebellion, on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting,
albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense
perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an
element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be
considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the
operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised
Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in
the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely
necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that
common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the
course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the
latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied
to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of
another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is
not an element of the latter, and if and when actually committed, brings
the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision
(Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common
crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course
of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion
and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof,
but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the
course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may
be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may,
therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion.
To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes
between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion,
and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and
installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian
to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the
furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of
rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable.
In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the
powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks
or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial
notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code.
Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a
class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and
magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached
by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the
Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat
may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the
commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping,
robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing
of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat,
the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is
indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be
painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of
herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the
Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad
application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive
portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent
judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by
the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent
judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the
indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is
bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available
to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion,
a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the
respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In
view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval
thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded
to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of
right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an
offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section
3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus
praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the
offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is
incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule
102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail,
to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable.
Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the
bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section
14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by
petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated
March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for
his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the
respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further
proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the
trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three
decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of
our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the
forces of the government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3
whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be
complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a
contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder,
among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple
rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have
been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a
complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of
rebellion is left fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a
clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the
matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution
of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the
filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we
gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail
means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 49
court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied
that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People
vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the
information in question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging
simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in
at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was
confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted
by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson
and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme
Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez
doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has
been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even
pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-
breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with
murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine
(as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C.
Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal
proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and
multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon
lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in
hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information
is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be
allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it
has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto
are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And,
since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court
in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is
fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more
than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best,
fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from
what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new
and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious
consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants
of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941,
RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released
and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has
been with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus,
should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that,
ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of
Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that
Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books.
The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was
recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to
Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy
relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the
pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus
may still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be
availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is
under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this
case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of
jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus
is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a
process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked
though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or
tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority
to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such
a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty
(Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the
present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which
petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-
existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder,
nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions
brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw
notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to
reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of
Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of
this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to
charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses
notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity
of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense
(now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation.
But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942,
were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987.
EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others
enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 50
and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been
so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence,
under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown
in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the
case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of
Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that
under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the
Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor
prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for
Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues
arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations
filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily
not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special
circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other
recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in
connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and
that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property
constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one
crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated
in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are
aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have
been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers,
issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are
imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She
thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made
it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The
prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect,
questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree,
a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human
rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post
facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our
legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with
murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is
to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme
Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case
by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed
"on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of
rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature
of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on
PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion
because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood,
the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder
because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a
rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not
a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb
cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the
dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine
gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction
of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate
penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in
total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian
economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of
passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those
engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the
intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected
to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in
lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel
attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the
rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I
cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which
categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The
petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested
without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an
established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant
which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial
system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court should
never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its
erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out.
Or, at the very least and where possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme
Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a
Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his
reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However,
any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes
he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no
jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this
particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this
Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a
warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General
provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking
to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It
could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This
Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that.
There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the
significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an
executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is
committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than
that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it
has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly,
through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should
be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower
ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid,
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]
was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further
emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word
on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29,
1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226
[1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 51
and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577
[1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon,
et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable
cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with
murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of
the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members
of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the
hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of
probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer
was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant
business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any
restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent
if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in
rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings,
fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend
masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo
them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-
conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio
case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the
Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their
waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga
was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent
civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier,
appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the
United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of
conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a case of
conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense
and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn
v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a
statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional
due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order
to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of
the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge
as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that
the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
(id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia
which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This case
did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but
its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly
read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a
deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this
Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to
be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime
which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense
should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra)
has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using
more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels
that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties
like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent
court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that,
as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or clarification.
I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate
relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in
our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134
(entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose
which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion.
Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts
comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent
or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government
or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers
or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for
Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular
measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or
insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the Government,
destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which
they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion
generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [
], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or
employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates
to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or
ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and,
on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the
political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more
even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-
examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine
are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or
discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted
separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far
as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity
principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in
relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 52
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do
not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the
specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms.
Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted
with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses
become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
[1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute
becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous
existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not
where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975];
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the
non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial
decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the
United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act
criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US
188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of
Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle
does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez
doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised
Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the
first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is,
however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be
so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez
could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez
doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause
and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil.
90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears
to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary
intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez
doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in
slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new
doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been
derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average
competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez
and subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these terms would
almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the
conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the
Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the
Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the
occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed
absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a
rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous
challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable
with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and
jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-
embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on
the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are
absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of
the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was
appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion
of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since
then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the
powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in Articles
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on
the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe
that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs
clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe
that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that
distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the
commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses
that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of
rebellion, on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting,
albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense
perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an
element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be
considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the
operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised
Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in
the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely
necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that
common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the
course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the
latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied
to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of
another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is
not an element of the latter, and if and when actually committed, brings
the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision
(Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common
crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course
of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion
and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof,
but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the
course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may
be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may,
therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion.
To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes
between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion,
and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and
installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian
to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the
furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of
rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable.
In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the
powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks
or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial
notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code.
Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a
class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and
magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached
by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the
Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat
may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the
commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping,
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 53
robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing
of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat,
the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is
indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be
painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of
herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the
Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad
application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive
portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent
judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by
the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent
judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the
indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is
bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available
to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion,
a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the
respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In
view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval
thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded
to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of
right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an
offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section
3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus
praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the
offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is
incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule
102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail,
to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable.
Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the
bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section
14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by
petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated
March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for
his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the
respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further
proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the
trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three
decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of
our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the
forces of the government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3
whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be
complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a
contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder,
among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple
rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have
been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a
complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of
rebellion is left fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a
clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the
matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution
of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the
filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we
gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail
means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial
court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied
that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People
vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the
information in question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging
simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in
at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was
confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted
by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson
and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme
Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez
doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has
been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even
pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-
breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with
murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine
(as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C.
Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal
proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and
multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon
lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in
hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information
is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be
allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it
has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto
are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And,
since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court
in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is
fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more
than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best,
fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from
what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new
and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious
consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants
of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941,
RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released
and their bails cancelled
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 54
G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario
Satimbre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band
and sentences Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer
imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six
(6) years, prision correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the
offended party, Ignacio Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of
the principal penalty and the accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario
Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day,
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the
spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and all three to pay the
proportionate part of the costs.
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision
of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs.
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the
owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after
answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby
indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on
instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after getting his
flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to take a look.
As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having
been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding and
pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired
his revolver but missed. Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow
on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was
hogtied by the men. The fact, however, was that he did not lose
consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the house. One of the
robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor for money saying that they are
people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the
danger, took from under the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash
and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber.
Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they
tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons.
After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets
and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the
robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario,
a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery was
reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary.
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon
receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner Ignacio
Peñaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was
ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the robbers bore
a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through
it to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they
removed the adobe stone and that is the place where they passed
through" (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning, policeman Melquiades
Samaniego reported seeing suspicious characters passing through a
nearby field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able
to locate a greasegun with 5 bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24,
I, testimony of Chief of Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for
robbery in band was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in the complaint, as
subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben
de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio
Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario
Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having
waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they
are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
where the corresponding information was filed. As subsequently
amended, by the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia
alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel
alias Pepe, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is
alleged in said information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in
the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio
Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori,
Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe,
Alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo
Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with the intent to gain and armed with a Grease
Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2) revolvers, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the
spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by
boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and
once inside, attack, assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the handle of
the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him
unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same
accused approached Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point
and demanded money; that the same accused while inside the said
house searched and ransacked the place and take and carry away the
following cash money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio
Peñaflor and Casimira L. Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine
Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at P350.00, One (1) licensed
Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight,
valued at P7.00, to the damage and prejudice of said spouses in the
total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN
PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and
Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of
the offended parties, Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman
Peñaflor , Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro
Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of
Police of Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the
Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants
Napolis, Satimbre and Malana, respectively, admitting their participation
in the commission of the crime charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the
charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under
which the affidavit Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by
appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramento dwelt on the
investigations conducted by them and the circumstances under which
said defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk of
Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained
how Exhibits B and C were subscribed and sworn to before them by
defendants Satimbre and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his
own defense, he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he was
in his house in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from
him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of
his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the
crime charged and said that, although reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he
eventually signed thereon, upon the advice of his wife Engracia
Mendoza — who sought to corroborate him — and Mayor Guillermo
Arcenas of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery
that took place in Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to
his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 55
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan
dismissed the case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and
De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana
and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed
to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis
and Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision
of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has
erred — .
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the
crime charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-
judicial confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the
evidence on record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of
law and jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not
been sufficiently identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime
charged. In support of this contention, it is argued that the identification
made by Mrs. Peñaflor was due to a picture of appellant taken by Lt.
Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then
shown to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then brought
to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor
identified him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from the
picture she had seen before he was taken to her for said purpose. The
defense further alleges that she could not have recognized appellant
herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the same was dark,
and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record
shows that the authorities were notified immediately after the
occurrence; that, soon after, peace officers — Police Chief Lapid and
PC Lt. Sacramento — repaired to the house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor
and investigated them; that based upon the description given by Mrs.
Peñaflor , one individual was apprehended and then presented to Mrs.
Peñaflor , who said that he was not one of the thieves; that another
person subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly,
exonerated by her; that in the course of the investigation conducted by
the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor
to the offices of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures
of police characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she
noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the
culprits; and that appellant was, therefore, arrested and brought to Mrs.
Peñaflor , who positively identified him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peñaflor , through
the aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the thieves.
It was she who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of
the thieves. Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the
first two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant
herein would not have been identified by her if she were not reasonably
certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein
because it was he who demanded money from her and to whom she
delivered P2,000 in cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he
who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it was he who tied her
hands and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in her
presence, consumed sufficient time — from 10 to 20 minutes — to allow
her eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and, hence, to
recognize some of the robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two
flashlights switched on, namely, that of her husband, and the one used
by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focused downward, it
had to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly when the
money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he
opened and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her
testimony was confirmed by other circumstances presently to be
mentioned, in connection with the consideration of the other alleged
errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise — that
appellant's conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession and
that the same had been made under duress.
Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered
by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in concluding
that the evidence for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the
witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth. Besides, appellant's
confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the Court of
Appeals had the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's
identification, we have the extra-judicial confession of appellant Nicanor
Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said accused on
October 26, 1956, 25 days after the occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal
Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946,
was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His testimony
shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in the
Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he understood it to which appellant
Napolis answered "yes"; inquired whether he was coerced to which he
replied "No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which
he did (tsn. 14-15, I). Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the
confession in his (Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon
further testified that he saw no signs of physical violence on the person
of the appellant who appeared normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In
this confession, Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it was co-accused
Antonio Bededia (still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband
Ignacio Peñaflor and who hit him (Peñaflor ) on the head and that it was
co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested
Peñaflor 's revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis admitted that it was
he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he who got the
money bag. The loot, according to him, was split from which he received
a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he
mentioned appellant Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun
and the one who got Peñaflor 's revolver from the hands of co-accused
Ben de la Cruz. ... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision
of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are
final, except — .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing
exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the
evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of
credence. Counsel for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio
Peñaflor said that the thieves had entered his house by forcing its door
open, Mrs. Peñaflor testified that their entry was effected through an
excavation by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that
the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to
get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The house
of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one of which was a
store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a
door leading thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that
the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a
wall thereof, and this was corroborated by the chief of police, although
he added that the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of wood from
said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to
a door, inside the store, leading to the dwelling proper, as distinguished
from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact
made by the Court of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 56

trial Judge, who had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be sentenced to an
trial, it is clear to Us that the first three (3) assignments of error are indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of
untenable. prision mayor to nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days of reclusion temporal.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime
committed and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against herein appellant,
Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.
armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made
by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in
accordance with said legal provision.

In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also,

used violence against Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his
wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions
falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article
299, although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that
covered by the latter provision. This Court had previously ruled — .

... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is

characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling
qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299
of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because
where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is
greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the
individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.)
And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty
to be applied under article 294 is lighter than that which would result
from the application of article 299. ... . 3

Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the

foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a
deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable
effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is
punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal.4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous
decision,5 if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon
any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the
injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same
Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be
much lighter.6 To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that
has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a

person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to
justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with
"violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this
reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the
cases above cited — reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing
to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more
serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294
applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of
person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the

elements of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in
the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty
should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime. In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De
los Santos7 and applied in U.S. v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People
v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 57
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO,
defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador
L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple
murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering
them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2)
Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5)
Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in
the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal
Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the
following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio
Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from
Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own
lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older
than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has
a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman
since September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had
stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora
telling him that she would give him money. To have money for his
expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty
pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He
was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the
twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a
launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay
on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving
at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the
morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to
Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter,
had given them, they were able to locate an employment agency where
they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's
daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee
of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora
gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him
thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his
pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins
returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense.
From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that
same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at
about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that
evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the
dining car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another
row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An
aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on
the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose
was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-
year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who
was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more
than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers
were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an
old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the
seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the
seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman,
who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her
left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and
Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of
Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at
Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which they put
aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was around
eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up
and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in
front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman
who was seated opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby,
attempted to leave her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed
her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child
(Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the
palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers
scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed
everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant
Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty.
He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going
to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there
was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach
8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance
of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating
coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index
finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the
man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority
and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of
three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching
it between his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and,
in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank
to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had
fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He
retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with
a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was
stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in
the dining car when he received the information that there were killings
in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at the rear of
the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio
stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who
was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was
not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach
and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him
with the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another person,
Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with
the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and
stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him.
Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 58
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary
soldiers escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the
custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names.
The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were
picked up along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba.
Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid
treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria
Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11).
A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G
to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in
the train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan,
Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San
Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay
City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P
to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they
jumped from the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin,
Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon
and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D
Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2,
M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda
Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon
Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later
(43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her
right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba
Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the
Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined
for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was not
able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby
losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for
safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred
pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was
lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators
took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet,
Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that
date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North
General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was
stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. He
retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody
"who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the
train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of
them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he
stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to
die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he
was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was taking his money.
He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he
stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who
were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the
stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other"
(Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket
and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio
allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and
told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling
brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint
for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the
accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The
case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the
Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an
information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder
(six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after
jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio
pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the
judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers
appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-defense
and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for
two homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from
appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at
the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965,
Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To
pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his
pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two
brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were
allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making
signs. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions
towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They
were facing the twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on
a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window
being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four
men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them,
sat on the seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves
behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was
already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up,
approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the
other man who was sitting near the window and who was holding also a
balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him
with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that
he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not
hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 59
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his
hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from
the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him
to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was
picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed
as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and
L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While
Antonio was stabbing the second man, another person from behind
allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose
consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his
forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He
regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His
money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors
the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen.
Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that
assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had
stabbed because he was already weak. He fell down and became
unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and
Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered
consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the
North General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of
January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on
Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each,
mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of
3rd ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral
level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10).
The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about
one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were
discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins'
rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several
innocent persons, made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run
amuck? It appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea
spending their hard earned money and suffering privations, even to the
extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with
respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30
from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from
any of his three children whom he could not locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact
which could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and
wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who easily
get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the
persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as having evil
intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the
accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the
part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their
self-control and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle
of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach,
their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a
novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins
must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about them in
whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble
persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion
or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their
ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little
money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-
up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that
the trial court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for
the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins,
according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on
the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato
Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of
identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that
they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn
September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable
guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one
day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates
(Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who
was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with
the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court
assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose
was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with
a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which
Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the
train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose
old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom
Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the
platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio
(not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate,
Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest.
And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had
stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was
Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January
9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and
vice-versa does not detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is
that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they
stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the
evidence found in the trial court's decision. He argues that the
testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does
not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main
point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing
himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's
testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and
prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of
Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that
Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies
do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that
Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare
notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the
coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and
Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-
23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea
and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not
observe the same events and their powers of perception and recollection
are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends
that no one corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a
man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat
occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 60
confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who
admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than
the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to
the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their
own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the
testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were
the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since
they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother
to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is
probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning
to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order
to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the
passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins
consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible.
In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that
two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily
perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have made an
outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which
they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides,
because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando,
and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling
stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are
with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two
yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming
into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are
convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants'
responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified,
according to the trial court, because they died due to stab wounds,
should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and
P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to
inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely,
Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and
Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting
of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body
and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid
being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths.
The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be
indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the
accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for
lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the
necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the
proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct
of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their
deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate
sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep.
[N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal
assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death
or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water,
impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible
for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs.
Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train
of the four victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal
responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other
victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries
suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida
Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack
of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not
testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate
crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia)
(Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults
perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were
unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have had
weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and
community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means
of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a
complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers
to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de
delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o
mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea
medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there
is "acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los
resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con
la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos"
(Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382,
403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder.
(See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who
ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted
of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted
murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre
case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate
murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired
successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U.
S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso,
85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil.
305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam,
61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94
Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61
Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil.
437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were held
to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single
criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in
this case, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period
or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The
death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the
appellants. No modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the
attempted murder case.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 61

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the

death sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling
are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one
attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion
perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one
(1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay
solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven
victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of
the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000,
and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the
penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article
70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the
appellants.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 62
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127663. March 11, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO
VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of
conviction promulgated by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of the
First Judicial Region stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on October 24,
1996 sentencing him to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder
with double Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him
to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No.
1866).
The information against accused-appellant, Bernard Castro, and one
John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995, at
Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian, municipality of Manaoag, province
of Pangasinan, and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, simultaneously
attacked and fired their caliber .30 carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean
Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta, Sandra Montano, William Montano and
Randy Tibule while they were on board a tricycle, on their way to a dance
party, hitting them in the different parts of their bodies which caused the
instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy
Acosta and Sandra Montano, to the damage and prejudice of their
respective heirs, and inflicting fatal injuries to William Montano and
Randy Tibule, in the different parts of their bodies, having thus
performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder
with respect to both but which did not by reason of causes independent
of the will of the accused, namely, the able and timely medical
assistance given the said victims William Montano and Randy Tibule,
which prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6 of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
pertinently averred:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995 at
Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality of Manaoag,
province of Pangasinan and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control, a firearm, to
wit: Caliber .30 carbine without first having secured the proper license
thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing the offense
of multiple murder and double frustrated murder.
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are
succinctly summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano
(16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie Garcia, Willie
Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr., were at the house of
Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were discussing how to
go to the wedding party of Jean Maries cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN
June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going
to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated
inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano (TSN June 11,
1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18,1996, pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio
Cabaoangan, they met appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions
who were armed with guns. The tricycles headlight flashed on their
faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montanos
group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan, mapan tayon
(They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and companions left (TSN
June 11,1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra
Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 14-16). They
sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
- gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the nipple right
through and through trajecting the middle lobe of the lungs, rt ventricle
of the heart, middle lobe of the lung, left with point of exit 1 inch in
diameter 1 inch lateral of the nipple, left.
(Exhibit B)
Ramon Garcia:
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. diameter point of entrance ear canal thru and
thru trajecting the skull brain substance with point of exit temporal area
right.
- Another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance anterior
axilliary line left at the lable nipple trajecting the lung (left) heart ventricle
and lung (right) with point of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral the
nipple right.
(Exhibit C)
Sandra Montano:
- gunshot wound .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the temporal
area left, penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain substance (right)
(tempral regis) where the slug lodge.
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of entrance
trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru trajecting the upper
third of the stomach of thoracic vein with the point of exit 1 cm. in
diameter at the level of the 7th thorasic vertebrae.
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the
attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have caused
their death were it not for the timely medical attention given them (TSN
July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained several gunshot wounds on the
left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the left shoulder and
middle right finger (TSN June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule sustained two
gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant (stomach) and the other
at the left periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered a
judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding and disposing:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747: --
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Republic Act No.
7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having
been a complex crime the penalty of which is in the maximum, and with
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 63

the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, hereby sentences him the ultimum
supplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177
known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased
RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and
SANDRA MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows:
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RECANTATIONS
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO
VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;

1). To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, jr.: IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MOTIVE
ON THE PART OF BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE
a) P 50,000 as indemnity ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED
TRICYCLE;
b) P 52,116.00 as actual damages
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS DELIBERATE FAILURE TO
PRESENT THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED
2). To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED
SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED
b) P 26,358.00 as actual damages ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT IN HIS MEMORANDUM.

3) To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA: (pp. 106-107, Rollo)

a) P 50,000 as indemnity After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate consideration
of the arguments of accused-appellant, the Court does not find enough
b) P 500,000.00 as moral damages basis to reverse.

4) To the heirs of the deceased Sandra Montano: Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider
what he says are material, substantial, important and significant
a) P 50,000 as indemnity discrepancies between the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and their
testimonies in court. Accused-appellant points to the Statement of
b) P 48,269.80 as actual damages William Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20, 1995
(Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement taken on September 24,
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City
where William Montano specifically named Bernard Castro as the
5) To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO: person who flagged down the motorized tricycle he and the other victims
were riding. This, he claims, is inconsistent with his testimony during the
a) P 39,133.92 as actual damages trial where he stated:

b) P 100,000.00 as moral damages ATTY. RANCHEZ:

6) To the victim RANDY TIBULE: Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsiam, Manaoag,
Pangasinan?
a) P 36,233.65 as actual damages
A. No, sir.
b) P 100,000.00 as moral damages
Q. Why?
and to pay the costs.
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749: -- to fifteen meters, somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.

the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your
reasonable doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM tricycle?
AND AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our motorcycle,
to pay the costs. sir.

Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as: The law is harsh, but Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
that is the law!
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was
SO ORDERED. immediately recognized by me, sir.

(pp. 180-181, Rollo.) Q Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately
recognized?
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for
reversal on the following assigned errors: A. That one, sir.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ACTG. INTERPRETER:

MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT,
DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the bench
WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IN COURT; for the accused, and when asked his name, he gave his name as
Rolando Valdez.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 64
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and September
24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to Bernard Castro as the
person who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden by the victims.
On November 8, 1995, William and his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule
executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda where
they disclaimed having seen Bernard Castro at the scene of the crime.
They declared that after a more thorough consideration of what
transpired, they have realized that the filing of the complaint against
Bernard Castro was a mistake and the result of misunderstanding or
misapprehension of what actually happened. In his testimony in court,
William, however, identified accused-appellant as the person illuminated
by the headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily
recognized him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent between his
declarations during the investigation and his testimony in court. The lack
of precision with which he distinguished between the person who
flagged down the tricycle and the other person who he recognized
because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as
inconsistency at all. The same holds true with claimed discrepancies
between the statements of Randy Tibule during the investigation and his
testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the withdrawal or
retraction of the accusation of several witnesses against Bernard
Castro, these same witnesses accusation against accused-appellant
becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of his brief to
the sworn declarations of prosecution witnesses made during the
investigation of the case, Bernard Castro may have indeed been
identified and named as one of the gunmen. It may readily be noted in
these very same references, however, that all these prosecution
witnesses referred to two other companions, then unidentified, of
Bernard Castro. Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) referred to in page
11 of the brief, the police investigators categorically referred to Bernard
Castro y Nazareno, alias Toti as one of the suspects or assailants
involved in the shooting incident (p. 112, Rollo). The logical conclusion
that may be drawn therefrom is that there is at least one other assailant
in addition to Bernard Castro, and as it developed, accused-appellant
was subsequently and positively named as such. Withal, we cannot
subscribe to accused-appellants ratiocination that if the witnesses
pointed to Bernard Castro as one of the perpetrators of the crime, then
it follows that accused-appellant cannot be one other and additional
perpetrator anymore. Accused-appellants reasoning on this point is
absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious withdrawal
of the victims charges against Bernard Castro. He insinuates that such
recantation should not have been given any consideration. But, this is
water under the bridge. Anyway, even in the remotest possibility that the
retraction of the accusation against Bernard Castro may be reversed, it
does not get accused-appellant off the hook. Considering that accused-
appellant had himself been positively identified, together with Bernard
Castro, as one of the other perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may
still stand independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is
indicted or remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro who had
the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the motorized tricycle,
mistaking one of the occupants thereof for Isidro Capistrano, Castros
former classmate and with whom he earlier had an altercation. It is very
clear in his brief, however, that accused-appellant predicates this
argument on the mistaken premise that he was not positively identified
in the case at bar although he admits that it is established that he was
at the scene of the crime (p. 114, Rollo). This argument will not hold
simply because it is settled that accused-appellant had been positively
identified by eyewitnesses and victims William Montano and Randy
Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary
for conviction only when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused,
not when accused has been positively identified as in the present case
(People vs. Caggaunan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it
is also to be noted that lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious offense for no
reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecutions deliberate and
intentional failure to present the investigating police officers and their
Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) constitutes culpable suppression of evidence
which, if duly taken into account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself was able to
present the police officers, and exhibit 7 (p. 116, Rollo). It is to be further
noted that as earlier pointed out, the declaration of SPO1 Suratos and
SPO1 Carbonel did not categorically rule out the possibility of convicting
other persons as co-principals of Castro. On the contrary, it is clear from
such affidavit that there was more than just one perpetrator of the crime.
It even confirms and corroborates the eyewitness accounts of William
Montano and Randy Tibule pointing to accused-appellant as one of the
other companions of Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and every piece of
evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to depart from the trial
courts accord of credence to the eyewitness accounts of William
Montano and Randy Tibule who positively identified accused-appellant
as one of the persons who shot and fired at them and their companions
that fateful night. We agree with the trial court that the evidence points
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was one of those
principally responsible for the deaths of the four victims in this case and
the wounding of two others. There is also sufficient evidence that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the killings, thus,
qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make
(People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and
unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or depend himself
against such attack. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack,
without slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People vs.
Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise present. After
reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any showing of evident
premeditation on the part of accused-appellant. While there may be
testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation between Bernard Castro
and a certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently prove the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. It is not enough that
evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must
be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to
commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the
offense, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be
evident premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following have
to be prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and the execution to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences
of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime does not
constitute sufficient ground to consider the existence of evident
premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the offenders
determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their act of arming
themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their
supposed victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second element).
More important that these two elements is the proof that a sufficient
period of time had lapsed between the outward act evidencing intent and
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 65
actual commission of the offense (the third element). There must have
been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This element
is indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation to aggravate
the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court
reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only when
there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence
in the accomplishment of the criminal act. There must be an opportunity
to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the
consequences of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough
for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and
scheme.
(p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had
stressed the importance of sufficient time between the criminal act and
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, affording such opportunity
for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment. Obviously,
this element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the supposed
heated argument between Bernard Castro and Capistrano, Castro and
company went home to get the firearms and not long thereafter mounted
the assault. There was no chance for the anger to subside. The culprits
in the case at bar had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection to
arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that
of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the very basic and
elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery (People vs. Mobe,
81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we
were to uphold the trial courts premises on the complex nature of the
crime committed, the death sentence, being the maximum penalty for
murder, would still have been the imposable penalty under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Court however, finds compelling reasons
to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for the complex crime
of multiple murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion
perpetua (for the complex crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions) to four counts of reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and
two indeterminate sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for
the 2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples brief that
accused-appellant should instead be convicted of four counts of murder
and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the
erroneous Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple murder and double
frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may be
noted that in his Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating
municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a prima facie
case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101- 102, Ibid.) Too, the
same investigating judge in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found
a prima facie case for two counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.).
It was upon reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated
November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As
amended by Act No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined
above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear from
the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted
not from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For
one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman
involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It
cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single
firearm. There were also several empty bullet shells recovered from the
scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired.
Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their
victims, some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the
others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely
impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single
bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute
distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime
of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty,
not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder
for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner,
accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated
murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission
of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty or
reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty
of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four
sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two
counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an
indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor to a maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
It was recently held in the case entitled People vs. Molina (G.R.No.
115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R.
No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which
in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its
publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar
were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of any penal
law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have
prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be
advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive
application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare
accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for the
crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be
given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal
Possession of Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for
illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as meaning
that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no
other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved
(murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No.
U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review
herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 66

murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as

this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to
accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law
will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the
character of an ex-post facto law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to

Criminal Case No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of murder and
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of reclusion
perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences,
each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The appealed judgment relating to the civil liabilities of
accused-appellant towards the six victims is AFFIRMED.

Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is

hereby dismissed.

No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 67
[G.R. No. 146099. April 30, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JIMMEL SANIDAD,
PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG, JOHN DOE (at large) and PETER
DOE (at large), accused.
JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG,
appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
CONDEMNED TO DEATH by the trial court on 26 July 2000[1] for the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, accused-
appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG
now seek the reversal of their conviction as we review automatically the
judgment pursuant to Sec. 22, Rep. Act No. 7659, amending Art. 47 of
The Revised Penal Code.
On 16 January 1999 at around five oclock in the afternoon Marlon
Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito
Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez
and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra, on board a passenger
jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Langangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined
the residents in a drinking spree that lasted up to the wee hours the
following morning. In the course of their conviviality, accused-appellants
Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong and several other
residents of Lagangilang joined them in drinking.[2] Marlon Tugadi and
accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and members of the
CAFGU before then.[3]
On 17 January 1999 at about four oclock in the morning Jimmel Sanidad
and his companions finished drinking and left.[4] Shortly after, the group
of Marlon Tugadi also stopped drinking and headed home for Budac,
Tagum, Abra, boarding the same jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo.
Seated next to Delfin in front were Ricardo Tadeo and Rolando Tugadi,
while on the left rear seat were Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay and
Raymund Fontanilla. Seated on the right rear seat were Bobby
Velasquez, Dennis Balueg, Edwin Tumalip and Pepito Tugadi.[5]
With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney cruised the rough and
gravelly dirt road of Abra-Cervantes with its passengers completely
unaware that danger lurked ahead in the dark and dreary stretch of the
road. The jeepneys headlights sharply ablaze and glaring illuminated the
path and radiated towards the lush vegetation of the surrounding
landscape. As the jeepney approached a plantation, its headlights
beamed at accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel and two
(2) other unidentified companions who were positioned next to a mango
tree at the left side of the road approximately fifteen (15) meters away.
Accused-appellants were armed with an armalite, a .45 caliber pistol and
shotguns with buckshots.
As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a classic case of
ambuscade suddenly and without warning unleashed a volley of shots
at the jeepney.[6] Delfin stepped on the gas in a vain effort to elude their
assailants, but they continued firing at the hapless victims. Bullets
plowed the side of the vehicle and all the passengers sitting at the back
instinctively ducked on the floor to avoid being hit. The accused pursued
the vehicle on foot and fired at it incessantly until it finally stalled a few
meters away.[7]
The jeepney was left in shambles. Its tires, headlights and taillights were
shattered; its windshield broken to pieces, and the front and left sides of
the vehicle riddled with bullets.[8] Miraculously, almost all of its
passengers, with the exception of Rolando Tugadi, survived the ambush
and suffered only minor injuries. Marlon Tugadi tried to pull his brother
Rolando Tugadi from the vehicle to safety only to realize that he was not
only too heavy, he was already dead. As the pursuing gunmen drew
near, Marlon decided to abandon Rolando and scampered away with
the other victims until they reached a bushy area about fifteen (15)
meters away from the vehicle.[9]
Meanwhile, the accused caught up with the crippled jeepney. Moments
later, fire engulfed it. The radiant flames of the burning vehicle
illuminated the malefactors who stood nearby and watched the blaze. It
could not be determined whether the accused purposely set the vehicle
on fire or the fuel tank was hit during the shooting that ignited the fire.
Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi later heard one of the unidentified
companions of accused-appellant Sanidad say to him: My gosh, we
were not able to kill all of them.[10] Thereafter, the accused left the
scene, firing their guns indiscriminately into the air as they walked
away.[11]
Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid
in a culvert on the side of the road and did not come out until the police
arrived at the scene. The police doused the burning vehicle with water
and found the charred remains of Rolando Tugadi.[12] Likewise
retrieved at the crime scene were eighty-five (85) empty shells from an
armalite rifle, two (2) empty shells from a .45 caliber pistol, and a slug
from another .45 caliber Pistol.[13]
Dr. Maria L. Dickenson, Medico-Legal Officer of Lagangilang, Abra,
conducted an autopsy on Rolando Tugadi immediately after the incident.
Her postmortem findings were: (a) carbonization of the body, (b) long
bones of lower extremities still burning, (c) presence of lower half portion
of charred skull, (d) presence of left charred thigh, (e) presence of right
charred thigh, and (e) presence of upper third of charred right leg. Cause
of death: burns, generalized, 6th degree.[14]
An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious
mischief was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias
Pambong, John Doe and Peter Doe. The defense of the accused rested
on bare denial and alibi. They disclaimed liability for the ambush insisting
that at about 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning of 17 January 1999 they were
already at home sleeping when they heard the clatter of gunfire and an
explosion nearby. But the trial court disregarded the defense interposed
by the accused and forthwith convicted them of the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murder, and sentenced them to death.
In this mandatory review, the legal questions raised essentially centered
on: first, the credibility of witnesses; and, second, the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence.
We affirm the conviction. We find that the prosecution succeeded
overwhelmingly in meeting the quantum of proof required to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The trial court properly
convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the credible and
uncontroverted testimonies of the victims and other prosecution
witnesses.
It is axiomatic that the assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a
function best discharged by the trial court which is in a better position to
determine conflicting testimonies after having heard the witnesses, and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. This Court will not
interfere with the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses
unless those findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight
and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by
the judge which, if considered, would have affected the outcome of the
case.[15] None of the exceptions have been shown to exist in the instant
case.
Accused-appellants pointed out supposed inconsistencies and
inaccuracies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marlon Tugadi,
Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla, thus -
x x x x ordinary human conduct is very predictable. When confronted
with danger, the first reaction is to avoid it. But not Jun Quipay, Marion
Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla. While all claimed they
have jumped out of the jeep, they did not run away. Instead they still
lingered at about 7-50 meters away from the jeep. So that they saw the
attackers when the jeep exploded. How remarkable is their depiction of
the accused as unafraid of an exploding jeep! The testimonies of Jun
Quipay and Marlon Tugadi cancel each other out. Marlon said he saw
the ambushers come out with guns blazing. Jun said Marlon was lying
down with eyes closed when that moment happened. Again, back to
human nature, Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi saw with the morning
light that their brother Rolando Tugadi is (sic) no more. A carbonized
cadaver he became. And yet they did not tell the police who did the
dastardly acts! How unnatural. And yet they claimed in court that they
positively identified the accused at the time of the ambush.[16]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 68
After a cursory reading of the transcripts, however, we find that the
supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do
not affect the veracity of the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay,
Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla. Indeed, inconsistencies and
inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and
candor, and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[17]
At any rate, the ineludible fact remains that Marion Tugadi, Jun Quipay,
Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were all at the scene of the crime
and almost got killed during the ambush. They were eyewitnesses to the
gruesome death of a family member in the hands of accused-appellants.
What is important is that they conveyed to the trial court what they
actually perceived, including those seeming improbabilities, on that
fateful day; and they categorically supplied all the facts necessary for
accused-appellants conviction. Verily, victims of crimes cannot be
expected to recall with exact precision the minutiae of the incident.
Human memory is not as unerring as a photograph.[18] Different
persons having different reflexes produce varying reactions,
impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and
emotional conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of
the incident.
Significantly, the victims positively identified accused-appellants Jimmel
Sanidad and Ponce Manuel in open court as among those who
ambushed them in the early morning of 17 January 1999 at the Abra-
Cervantes Road, which led to the death of Rolando Tugadi. Quoted
hereunder is an excerpt from Marlon Tugadis testimony -
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know one by the name of Jimmel Sanidad?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Will you please focus your eyes around and point to that person
Jimmel Sanidad?
A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when
asked of his name he answered Jimmel Sanidad.)
Q: Why do you know this accused Jimmel Sanidad Mr. Witness?
A: We were in the same batch in the CAFGU sir.
Q: Aside from being a CAFGU batch member, what else do you know
of this accused Jimmel Sanidad?
A: We sometimes drink together when I go to their place, sir.
Q: How about the other accused Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, again I
ask you to focus your eyes around and point at him and identify him?
A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when
asked of his name he answered Ponce Manuel).[19]
Victims Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were
likewise asked during the trial to identify the malefactors who staged the
ambush, and they all pointed to Jimmel Sanidad and Ponce Manuel.
It must be stressed that the incidents prior to, during and after the attack
provided the victims with more than sufficient opportunity to identify
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly acts. The
victims had a drinking session with their assailants that lasted for many
hours. During the ambush itself, the headlights of the victims vehicle
illuminated the assailants. Again, when the vehicle burst into flames after
the ambush, the surroundings were bathed in light including the
assailants who were standing nearby, thus enabling the victims to have
a good look at their faces. These circumstances, coupled with the
victims familiarity with accused-appellants, rendered a mistaken
identification very unlikely.
The general denial and alibi of the defense are too lame to be legally
accepted as true, especially when measured up against the positive
identification of accused-appellants. The doctrine is well-settled that
denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses as they are easy to
concoct and fabricate but difficult to disprove. Denial and alibi should be
rejected when the identities of accused-appellants are sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.
For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at
another place at the time of the commission of the offense but must also
demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at that time. In the case at bar, accused-appellants
claimed that they were in their respective houses at the time of the
ambush. But the record shows that the house of accused-appellant
Jimmel Sanidads sister where he was staying in Sitio Bio, San Isidro,
Lagangilang, Abra, is but a mere six (6) to seven (7)-minute walk, or
about 700 meters, from the crime scene.[20] While accused-appellant
Ponce Manuel lived in the same place, (in) the same community.[21]
Equally untenable is accused-appellants assertion that the delay of the
victims in identifying their ambushers for more than four (4) weeks points
to the conclusion that all the survivors of the ambush were really and
timely clueless as to who the perpetrators of the ambush (were).[22]
Delay in reporting a crime to the authorities is not an uncommon
phenomenon. The rule is, delay by a witness in divulging what he or she
knows about a crime is not by itself a setback to the evidentiary value of
such witness testimony, where the delay is sufficiently justified by any
acceptable explanation. Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal or the
individual manner by which individuals react when confronted by a
gruesome event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime,
is a valid excuse for the temporary silence of witnesses. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General in the present case -
x x x the victims in the instant case were survivors of an extremely violent
incident which inflicts severe concomitant psychological stress on them.
Considering also that the survivors were being investigated by the police
from another municipality where the perpetrators not only reside but one
of them was even a member of the CAFGU, it is a natural reaction for
the victims not to reveal that they know the identities of the perpetrators
and induce them to take action to prevent the victims from testifying x x
x x Furthermore, Marlon Tugadi insisted to the police during the
investigation that he knew who ambushed them but that he would talk
only after his brothers interment. This hardly qualifies as an unusual
behavior.[23]
Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial court found, attended the
commission of the crime. For collective responsibility to be established,
it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior
agreement to commit the crime. Only rarely would such an agreement
be demonstrable because criminal undertakings, in the nature of things,
are rarely documented by written agreements. The concerted actions of
accused-appellants, however, clearly evinced conspiracy. Their
simultaneous acts of peppering the victims jeepney with bullets, and
thereafter chasing the vehicle to prevent its escape, were undoubtedly
in pursuance of a common felonious design. All these sufficiently prove
beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to consummate the killing
of the victim.[24]
On treachery, the deadly successive shots of accused-appellants did not
allow the victims any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The victims
were like a flock of sheep waylaid and ferociously attacked by a pack of
ravening wolves. While the victims might have realized a possible
danger to their persons when they saw accused-appellants, all armed
and positioned in a mango tree ahead of them, the attack was executed
in such a vicious manner as to make the defense, not to say a counter-
attack, virtually impossible.
Under the circumstances, it is plain to us that accused-appellants had
murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. They must
consequently be held liable for their acts. Insofar as victims Marlon
Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo,
Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg
are concerned, although they barely escaped the ambush with
superficial injuries does not alter the nature of accused-appellants
participation in the crime of murder except that not one of them having
suffered fatal injuries which could have resulted in their death, accused-
appellants should only be held guilty of attempted murder. Accused-
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 69

appellants had commenced their criminal scheme to liquidate all the

victims directly by overt acts, but were unable to perform all the acts of
execution that would have brought about their death by reason of some
cause other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the victims
successfully dodged the hail of gunfire and escaped.

We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within
the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of
complex crimes, provides that when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period. In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in
the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.[25]

Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in

firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi.
Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire
at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each
other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadis group as a whole.[26] Thus, one of
accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: My gosh,
we were not able to kill all of them.[27] Where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.[28]

The penalty for the most serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The
Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion
perpetua to death. It therefore becomes our painful duty in the instant
case to apply the maximum penalty in accordance with law, and
sentence accused-appellants to death.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 26 July 2000 finding

accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias
PAMBONG guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of DEATH is
AFFIRMED.

Accused-appellants are likewise ordered jointly and severally to: (a)

INDEMNIFY the heirs of the deceased victim Rolando Tugadi in the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity as well as P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and, (b) PAY victim Delfin Tadeo the sum of P50,000.00 for
the loss of his jeepney.

In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to Her Excellency the
President for the possible exercise of her pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 70
GR Nos. L-7618-20, Jun 30, 1955
PEOPLE v. CRISPIN LAWAS
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
In G.R. No. L-7618 (Crim, Case No. 180, Court of First Instance of
Lanao), Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it,
Generoso Osorio and Agapito Gumisad have appealed from a judgment
of the Court of First Instance finding each of them guilty of the crime of
robbery, and sentencing each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years,
eight months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the offended party Manaronsong Lomangcolob, in the
following manner; Crispin Lawas and Agapito Gumisad, P50.00 each;
Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, P266.00 each; and
Agustin Osorio, P500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. The appeal of Agapito
Gumisad has, however, been dismissed for failure on his part to file a
brief. This appeal in this Court, therefore, only refers to the others.
In G.R. No. L-7613 (Crim. Case No. 444, Court of First Instance of
Lanao), Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio hava
appealed from a judgment of tha Court of First Instance of Lanao, finding
them guilty of multiple murder and sentencing each of them to suffer tha
indeterminate penalty of from ten years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen years four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
each of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
In G.R. No. L-7620 (Crim. Case No. 373, Court of First Instance of
Lanao), Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad,
Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos were also found guilty of tha crime
of multiple murder and sentenced to the same penalty imposed upon
Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio in Criminal Case
No. 444. They have also appealed from the decision. But the appeals of
Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon have been dismissed for
failure on their part to file briefs. The case now proceeds on appeal only
as to Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patrocinio Pinos.
The evidence shows that on July 3, 1042 various Moros (Maranaos)
from Barrio Baris, Municipality of Kolambugan, province of Lanao,
raided the barrio of Malingao, killing 11 Christian residents including men
and women, wounding two of them, and, thereafter, robbing them of their
belongings. This incident was reported to the home guards, an
organization composed of ex-Philippine Constabulary soldiers and
civilians whose duty it was to preserve peace and order among the
inhabit ants, protect them, and prevent the infiltration of the Japanese in
their communities. The report was made to appellant Crispin Lawas,
head of the home guards in Balimbing and to Sgt. Benaojan, also head
of home guards in Salong. Upon learning of the incident, Lawas and
Benaojan and some home guards proceeded to the barrio of Malingao
to check up the report. There they found the asad bodies of the Christian
Filipinos killed by the Maranaos and learned that the Maranaos who had
committed the act came from the barrio of Baris. So they proceeded to
the barrio of Baris in the afternoon of July 10. Upon reaching Baris, they
divided themselves into two groups, one headed by Sgt. Benaojan and
the other by Crispin Lawas. That headed by Sgt. Benaojan gathered the
Maranaos around the place of ex-Mayor Gunti, while that headed by
Crispin Lawas, those that live around the house of Datu Lomangcolob.
Some seventy of them, including Manaronsong Lomangcolob. school
teacher, Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, his wife and children, Gunti
Ampaso, his wife and children, Pasintao, his wife and four children,
Laito, his wife and four children, Pacpac, his wife, niece and nephew,
Mainanding Lomangcolob and two children, Dibton and children,
Garagabos and wife, Rutum, his wife and children, Aboli and a child,
Adki's children, and others were brought by the home guards to the
barrio of Salong, where they arrived in the evening of July 10th, between
seven and eight o'clock. When the home guards were in the barrio of
Baris, they or some of them took away three carabaos, two horses, and
many personal belongings, especially of Datu Lomangcolob. This is the
basis of the charge of robbery.
The Maranaos were confined during the night of July 10 under guard in
the house of one Restituto Requino. The next morning, Crispin Lawas
and Agustin Osorio began investigating the principal Moros. Some 15 of
them were brought down in groups of five before Lawas and Osorio. A
table was set up near the rice mill of Pedro Lacson and there Lawas and
Osorio questioned them. In the course of the investigation, and for
reasons which are disputed, the home guards then on duty and present
at the investigation fired at the Moros and most of them were killed. In
the course of the melee that followed, some of the home guards and
others who could not be identified, went up the house of Restituto
Requino and fired at the woman and children who were on the second
floor of the house. Some of the women and children were stabbed. No
less than 35 women and children were killed and no less than 16 of the
Moros down below were also killed. Among the killed were Datu
Lomangcolob Sumala, Gunti Ampaso, Pasintao, Laito, Pacpac and
Rutum. For this killing, two charges of multiple murder were filed, one
against Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio, and
another against Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad,
Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos.
Insofar as the crime of robbery is concerned, principal witness
Manaronsong Lomangcolob, son of. Datu Lomangcolob. Sumala,
declared that the Home guards who gathered them in . the barrio of Baris
and later brought them to the barrio . of. Salong took from them (the
Maranaos) 3 carabaos worth P800, 2 horses worth P100, and jewelry
and other personal belongings worth P500. The animals were taken
away by the following home guards: Lawas, 1 horse; Agapito Gumisad,
1 horse; and Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, one
carabao each. Of the accused, the following were seen coming down
from the houses of the Maranaos, bringing with them malongs, bracelets
and other personal belongings: Generoso Osorio, Felipe Si-it,
Hermenegildo Tabacon, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio and Agapito
Gumisad.
Of the above-named accused, only Lawas testified, but he made no
denial of the taking by him of one of the horses. None of the briefs or
memoranda filed on behalf of the appellant claims or mentions grounds
why appellants should not be held guilty of robbery, although certain
discrepancies appear in Lomangcolob's testimony as to the manner in
which the said horses and carabaos ware taken. Admitting that there are
discrepancies in tho said testimony as to the details of the taking, the
evidence conclusively shows that the accused designated above took
the animals and properties in question. No denial of this fact was ever
made. There is insinuation that some of the animals may have been
some of those taken at the raid of Malingao, but no satisfactory evidence
exists on which a finding to that effect can be predicated. The evidence
also shows that the accused were armed at the time of the taking of the
animals and other personal properties. The finding of the trial court that
the accused are guilty of robbery as above-indicated is fully supported
by the evidence. There is no evidence, however, of the existence of any
conspiracy among the accused in the commission of tha acts of robbery
and each one must respond for his own individual act.
As to the charge of multiple murder, tha death of about fifty of the
Maranaos, including fifteen men, twenty five women and ten children is
not questioned; but the circumstances under which their death took
place are the object of conflicting evidence. The three witnesses for the
prosecution claim that the Moros were fired at when Datu Lomangcolob
refused to be tied at the hands, while the defense claims that they were
fired at because they attempted to grab the arms of the home guards.
The evidence submitted by both sides on this issue may be summarized
as follows:
Manaronsong Lomangcolob testified that while he and four of his
companions namely, Gunti Ampaso, lacpac and Datu Lomangcolob
ware in front of the table before which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio
were making the investigation, Lawas first asked them to sign blank
papers, and that they, the Maranaos, refused; but they were beaten with
rifles and boxed, so Datu Lomangcolob enjoined him and his
companions to sign the blank papers as demanded by the investigators;
that afterwards Crispin Lawas informed the Maranaos that they would
be brought to Captain Morgan at Balimbing and for this purpose their
hands were to be tied; that for the purpose of tying their hands,
Hermenegildo Tabacon, one of the home guards, brought some pieces
of split rattan; that as Datu Lomangcolob was approached to have his
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 71
hands tied, he refused and, thereupon, Crispin Lawas fired his revolver
at him and ordered the guards to fire; that following instructions, the
home guards fired at the Moros and many of them fell down dead; that
those Moros who tried to escape were also fired at; and that after a short
time Crispin Lawas ordered his men to "cease fire", and the firing
stopped.;
Pedro Lacson, a resident of Barrio Salong, corroborated tha principal
parts of the above testimony of Manaronsong Lomangcolob, declaring
that he (Lacson) was under the eaves of his house observing the
investigation that Lawas and Osorio were conducting; that he noticed
Lawas ordering the men to be brought down from the house of Restituto
Requino; that in the course of the investigation, Lawas said that the
Moros would be brought to Balimbing where Captain Morgan was and
that the Moros were to have their hands tied; that Datu Lomangoolob
expressed willingness to go to Captain Morgan, but that he was not
willing to have his hands tied; and that then a commotion ensued and
then Crispin Lawas gave his men the order to fire. In connection with the
massacre of the women in the second floor of the house of Restituto
Requino, it is very clear that in the course of the shooting two persons,
not companions of Lawas, went up the house of Requino and, perhaps,
helped in boloing the 15 women and children in said house.
A third witness corroborated the most important details of the above
testimonies. Manking Aguam, claiming to be 11 years old when the
incident took place, testified as follows: That he was with the women and
children in the upper floor of the house of Restituto Requino before the
investigation began; that he saw some of the accused as they brought
down the male Maranaos for the purpose of investigation; that the firing
was caused by the refusal of the Maranaos to accede to have their
hands tied as ordered by Crispin Lawas: that in the course of the
shooting, Agapito Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Tito Requino
and Patricio Pinos shot at the women and children and stabbed them
with boloes; and that Gumisad was trying to stab him and what he did
was to jump down and run away.
Only two of the accused took the witness stand, namely, Crispin Lawas
and Agustin Osorio. Other witnesses testified for them, but their
testimonies are of no material value insofar as the main issue is
concerned. Crispin Lawas testified that upon the receipt of the report of
the raid on the Christian Filipinos by the Maranaos on July 9, he met
with Captain Morgan, the head of the home guards and tha PC; that
thereupon Captain Morgan instructed him to accompany Sgt, Benaojan
and proceed to Barrio Malingao to investigate the incident; that in
pursuance of said order, he and Sgt. Banaojan went to Barrio Malingao
and saw the dead persons there; that he found out after investigation
that some of the Moros who made the raid came from Barrio Baris, so
he and Sgt, Benaojan and their men proceeded to Baris; that the people
of that place were gathered together in the afternoon of July 10 and that
they took them along to Barrio Salong; that when they reached that
place, Sgt. Benaojan ordered the Moros to stay in the house of Restituto
Requino and that this was done; that at dawn the following day, Lawas
went to Captain Morgan to make a report, and that Captain Morgan
ordered him to investigate the leaders of the Moros and, afterwards,
send the result of his investigation to him; that he returned to the barrio
of Salong the following morning; that at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning
of the following day (July 11), he ordered a table to be placed on the
ground and that the investigation of the Moros be conducted; that the
investigation took place in the following order: first Mayor Gunti, Datu
Lomangcolob, Datu Pacpac and Manaronsong Lomangcolob together;
that as said investigation proceeded, the Moros suddenly rushed at the
home guards to grab their guns and so a commotion arose; that he and
Agustin Osorio did not know what had happened and upon hearing gun
fire he stood astounded; that because of the presence of the women and
children, he ordered his guards to cease fire, which was done; that
throughout the time of the firing, he could not do anything but stand up;
that his companion Agustin Osorio in the meanwhile lied flat on the
ground; and that afterwards he went to the middle of the place where
the gathering was and found out that many Moros were dead.
For his part, accused Agustin Osorio testified that on July 10, he was
ordered by Sgt. Benaojan to go to Camp 5 with 4 soldiers to investigate
the maltreatment of a Christian Filipino; that on their way back from the
investigation, they heard shots coming from Barrio Malingao and so they
went to that barrio and upon arriving there they found 11 Christian
Filipinos dead and 2 wounded; that he received information about the
incident from one, Piano Taborada, who said that the ones who made
the raid were from Barrio Baris; that when he returned to Barrio Salong,
he reported the incident to Sgt. Benaojan; that he accompanied Sgt.
Benaojan and Crispin Lawas on July 10 to Barrio Malingao where they
saw 11 Christians dead and 2 wounded; that after the investigation
conducted in Barrio Malingao, they went to Barrio Baris where they
arrived at five o'clock in the afternoon; that upon reaching Barrio Baris,
Mayor Gunti sounded the "agong" and the people of the barrio swarmed
around them; that they brought some of the men to the barrio of Salong
and there they were ordered to sleep in the house of Restituto Requino;
that after breakfast the following morning, July 11, an investigation was
to be made and after the male Moros were brought down he and Lawas
began investigating them; that after investigating 6 of the Moros, and
while investigating the 7th, he immediately noticed a commotion among
the Moros and the soldiers because of the fact that the former were
grabbing the firearms of the latter; that in the course of the struggle the
guns of the soldiers were exploded; that because of the noise Lawas
could not give any order so he and Lawas laid themselves down flat on
the ground and after one minute in this position, Lawas ordered that the
guards cease firing and the firing stopped; that he could not tell where
the firing started because at the time when it began Lawas was dictating
to him and he was writing down what Lawas dictated; and that after the
firing had ceased, ha looked around and found many teoros. dead, while
the soldiers (home guards) had run away.
There is no question that before Lawas fired at Datu Lomangcolob and
the home guards also fired at the other Monos, there was a sort of
commotion, evidently produced by the announcement made by Lawas
that the Moros were to be brought to Captain Morgan at Balimbing and
that their hands were to be tied. The existence of this commotion is
admitted by Pedro Lacson, eye witness to the incident, who said "But
then the Moros refused that they will go there with the Christian and
immediately a commotion started and because of that, Crispin Lawas
ordered them to be fired at." The issue lies on the cause or origin of said
commotion, for while the prosecution contends that this was produced
by the refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, the defense
claims that the commotion was produced by the Moros suddenly rushing
at the soldiers to grab their firearms, arid so they were fired at. The
theory of the defense is not warranted by the facts and circumstances
proved and admitted. Had the Moros actually rushed at the soldiers to
grapple with these for the possession of the firearms, they would have
mixed up with the soldiers in body struggles and it would have been
impossible for the soldiers to fire at them without hitting their own
companions. Had there been a free for all struggle for the arms of the
soldiers, the latter could not have fired at and hit the Moros without
hitting others or their own companions. But only one of the home guards
was wounded by a stray bullet; no others received any injury in the
course of the commotion. Besides, a volley of shots appeared to have
been fired immediately when the commotion started, as a result of which
many Moros fell down dead. This would not have been the case had real
grappling for the possession of the guns taken place as claimed by the
defense. If a struggle for the possession df the firearms had taken place,
the shots would have come intermittently. If there were shots made after
the first volley had been fired they were aimed at the escaping Moros.
All the above circumstances belie the claim of the defense that the
Moros tried to grab the firearms of the solders, and that the latter fired
at them as a consequence of the said attempt.
On the other hand, neither can the theory of the prosecution that upon
refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, Lawas gave the
order to fire at the Moros, be admitted on its face value. Witness Pedro
Lacson, who appears to be the most impartial of the witnesses, admits
that there was a commotion, although he did not specify the nature and
character thereof. If any commotion ever existed at all, it must have bean
caused by the announcement that the Moros were to be tied. This
announcement must have angered the Morors, who must have
protested the act; theretofore, they had submitted themselves to the
arrest without protest or resistance. The most reasonable inference is
that upon hearing that their hands were to be tied and as the leader was
going to have his hands tied and he refused or resisted, the Maranaos
must have angrily protested, showing an attitude of hostility or
resistance; and this attitude must have been interpretted by Lawas and
the soldiers as a determination to resist and even to fight, Perhaps, this
belief also must have produced the impression upon the mind of Lawas
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 72
that the Moros were bent on something like the use of force, such as the
grabbing of the firearms of the soldiers, and perhaps it may have been
in an attempt to forestall such a frantic and unexpected attack that
Lawas gave the order to fire and that he himself fired at Datu
Lomangcolob. We think that this must have happened; that Lawas
believed that the Moros were about to resist and even attempt to fight
for the arms, so he gave the order to fire.
There can not, therefore, be any circumstance that would qualify the
killing of the Maranaos as murder; there was no evident premeditation;
neither was there treachery because the Moros were face to face with
the soldiers; and neither could there be abuse of superior strength
because the soldiers did not expressly take advantage of their arms to
commit the offense.
On the other hand, there is no circumstance present in the killing which
may sufficiently serve to mitigate the offense that has been committed.
It is possible that an attitude of hostility accompanied the refusal of Datu
Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, which attitude must have been
shared by his companions; and it is also possible that the fear of well-
known Moro ferociousness could have made Lawas and his
companions believe that the Moros were bent on refusing to be tied. But
there is no evidence that they went beyond showing their refusal or
hostility, or an apparent act on their part such as would induce a
reasonable belief that the Maranaos were about to begin an aggression
against their captors. Their peaceful conduct at the time of their arrest
and before the investigation showed that they were submissive and
obedient. No circumstance, therefore, can sufficiently justify a finding
that the offense was committed with any mitigating circumstance. The
offense committed is plain, simple homicide, with respect to Crispin
Lawas and Agustin Osorio, as it is also with respect to thos3 soldiers
who fired at the Moros at the time the commotion arose.
But with respect to the killing of the women and children in the upper
story of the house of Restituto Requino, the killing is plainly attended by
the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The women and children
were defenseless; there is no evidence that they showed any act of
defiance or hostility, and while the soldiers were given an order to fire at
the Moros then on the ground, said order could not imply or include an
order to go up the house and massacre the innocent and defenseless
women and children therein. Persons who participated in the killing of
the women should be made to suffer the penalty commensurate with the
degree of perversity which attended this act. While evident
premeditation may not be assumed, because the massacre of the
women and children was part of the impulse that resulted in the killing
of the Moros on the ground, yet the women and children were
defenseless and could offer no resistance at all. Their defenseless
condition should be considered as included in the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not as an independent
circumstance of treachery. We find, therefore, that only one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime, or the killing of the
women and children, and that is tha abuse of superior strength, which
aggravating circumstance raises the offense to that of murder.
The question which still has to be considered is tha determination from
among the appellants of those who may be convicted of the murder of
the women and children.in the house of Restituto Requino. Witness
Pedro Lacson declared that he saw two men armed with bolos going up
the house as the shooting of the Moros on the ground was in progress,
but he asserted that these did not belong to the group of home guards
led by Crispin Lawas. But Manking Aguam identified Agapito Gumisad,
Felipa Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Pedro Benaojan, Tito Requino and
Patricio Pinos as among those who went up and shot or stabbed the
women and children in the house. The identification is not contradicted
nor denied by the defense, but except as to Gumisad, who was well
known to the witness before the incident, the identification is not as
positive and certain as to amount to proof of their identities beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus witness identified Tito Requino as one of the
assailants; but Requino was never known before that time by the
witness. He also identified another as Benaojan, but the other evidence
submitted by the State itself shows that Benaojan was not present at the
time of the incident. In another part of his testimony, the witness said
that Tabacon, Pinos and Generoso Osorio were among those who
brought down the Moros; while in tha same testimony, he asserts it was
one old man, Mauricio Macasarte, who also went up. There was no
corroboration offered by any more competent and disinterested witness.
This vacillating and doubtful identification, coupled with tha fact that the
witness was only eleven years of age at tha time of the incident and
made tho identification seven years later, and that he had an interest in
the conviction of the accused, can not serve as legal basis for a finding
that the persons pointed out at tha trial were in fact the very persons
who committed the murder of the women and children, With the
exeeption of Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon, whose
appeals have been dismissed, the other appellants Felipe Si-it,
Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos can not, therefore, be found guilty
of murder.
As to whether Crispin Lawas and .Agustin Osorio can be held
responsible therefor, it is true that the authors of the murder were home
guards under their immediata command. But the evidence submitted
fails to disclose any previous common design to massacre all the Moros
under detention, including the women and children. The evidence is to
the effect that the women and the children were not arrested or taken
into custody, but that they only accompanied their husbands and
relatives who were brought for investigation. There was no evidence of
a previous conspiracy by reason of which Crispin Lawas and Agustin
Osorio, as leaders, may be held for the murder of the women and
children.
May they be held guilty of murder by induction on the basis of the order
given by Lawas to fire at the Moros as the commotion started? It is true
that Lawas was the leader of the home guards in Balimbing among
whom were Agapito Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon and
Patricio Pinos. But the order given was to fire at the Moros (on the
ground), and nothing else; the order was to fire at the Moros who
showed resistance or protest against his order that they be tied. The
order could not have been interpreted to mean that the women and
children in the house, who did not appear to have shown any resistance
or hostility at all, should also be fired at. Lawas clearly did not intend that
the women and children inside the house should also be fired at. He can
not be held guilty of the crime committed, as it has been held that in
order to make the inducer responsible for the crime committed, it is
necessary that the inducement is material land precedes the
commission of the act, and that such inducement was the determining
cause thereof.
"xxx, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the
inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such
a way that it become the determining cause of the crime, and such
inducement was offered with the intention of producing that result, then
the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the
person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on
the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.
"The verb 'induce' is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover
cases where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive
resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the
crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very
strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely
the result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them,
inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word
spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical
phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a
resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason
predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed
the act having any expectation, that his suggestion would be followed or
any real intention that it produces a result. In such case, while the
expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he
would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the
principles laid down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only
that the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the
determining cause of the crime." (U. S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, 218)
Neither Crisipin Lawas nor Agustin Osorio may, therefore, be held
responsible for the crime of murder in connection with the massacre of
the women and children by inducement, and they must be acquitted of
the charge of murder.
One last question involves the determination of the number or crimes for
which each of the appellants may be found guilty, whether each one
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 73

should be considered as having committed as many crimes as there

were persons who were killed, or only for one complex crime of multiple
homicide. The information is for multiple murder, and no inference can
be made therefrom, that the accused are being charged of as many
offenses as there were victims. Then the evidence positively shows that
the killing was the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the
order of the leader to fire, and continued with the intention to comply
therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to
that effect. There was no intent on the part of the apellants either to fire
at each and everyone of the victims as separately and distinctly from
each other. It has been held that if the act or acts complained of resulted
from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense (Article 43
of the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it
has been held that the act of taking two roosters belonging to two
different persons in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 237,
citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 2, 1898 and
October 4, 1905). And in the case of People vs. Guillem, 47 0.G. No. 7,
3433, a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at
President Roxas, resulting in the death of one victim and in physical
injuries on others was considered as a single act, also falling under the
first part of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It may be added that
there is absolutely no evidence as to the number of persons killed by
each and every one of the appellants, so even if we were induced to
hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by
him, it is imposible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to
ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone. We are,
therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of only one offense, that of
multiple homicide for which the penalty to be imposed should be in the
maximum period.

Wherefore, in G.R. No. 7618, for robbery, the judgment of conviction

appealed from is hereby affirmed, but the maximum of the penalty
imposed is hereby raised to 6 years 10 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength in the commission of the offense. The individual
liabilities of each of the persons sentenced for said crime are hereby
also affirmed. In G.R. Nos. 7619 and 7620, the appellants Crispin
Lawas, Clemente Osorio, Agustin Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio
and Patricio Pinos are each found guilty of the crime of multiple homicide
and each sentenced to suffer the penalty of not less than 15 years 6
months and 21 days nor more than 18 years 2 months and 21 days, both
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased,
jointly and severally, in the amount of P3,000.00, and to pay the costs
proportionately.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 74
CONTINUED CRIME AND CONTINUING
CRIME
G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora
entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street,
Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force
upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in
the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego
Magat, and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10,
belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two
crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of
Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was
sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three
years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen
roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases.
The accused appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance,
and, upon being arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not
guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by agreement of the parties
approved by the court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty of one
crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two roosters constituted but
one crime, and taking into consideration the circumstance that the
accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to
the penalty of three years, six moths and one day presidio correccional
and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs in case
No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to indemnify, as the roosters
were returned to their respective owners. The accused appealed to this
court and his counsel alleges that the trial court erred: (a) In holding that
the guilt of the accused was proven by his own admission; (b) in not
giving him the benefit of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead
of acquitting the accused, with the costs de oficio.
We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support the
contention of the appellant. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
guilt of the accused in the present case is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The case falls under the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 518
of the Penal Code, amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244, in connection
with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code. The penalty provided
in the law is that of presidio correcional in its full extent, and there having
been present the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the penalty
must be imposed upon the accused in its maximum degree, or four
years, two moths and one day presidio correcional. The accused being
an habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an additional penalty must
be imposed upon him consisting of half the penalty provided or the crime
committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio correcional. (People vs.
Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 1).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a question in
his brief which we believe it is necessary for us to resolve now, due to
the fact that it is not only important to our jurisprudence, but also to the
due prosecution of violators of the law. The Attorney-General urges that
the penalty for two crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each
of the stolen roosters. The question, then, to determine is whether or not
the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same occasion and
in the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat
and the other to Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code contains three
paragraphs enumerating the acts which constitute the crime of theft. The
first defines theft in general; the second declares a particular act to be
theft which is not included in the description in the first paragraph, and
the third also considers theft a series of acts with similar characteristics
to the general type, with the exceptions therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft: 1awph!l.net
1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of
violence or intimidation against any person or the use of force upon
anything, shall take anything which is the personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
2. Any person who, having found anything which has been lost,
shall with knowledge of its ownership appropriate the same with of gain.
3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove or
make use of the things damaged, subject to the exceptions established
by paragraphs one two, and three of article five hundred and ninety-two
paragraph one of article five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one
of article five hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and
ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and six hundred and three.
As may be seen, the act taking another's property without violence or
intimidation against persons, not force upon things, with intent to gain
and without the consent of its owner, is what constitutes the crime of
theft, as described in the first paragraph of article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and what is
punished is the alarm caused in the community by the perpetration of
the act which is violative of the individual rights guaranteed by the law,
as well as the damage that said act may occasion to the members of the
community. Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters,
in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one
occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental
circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons.
There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the
roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise
to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because
there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894, said:
The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two calves on one
night, belonging to four owners, which livestock was found in various
adjacent and open meadows, constitutes only one crime of theft,
because the fact that the persons injured by the taking of the cattle by
the accused were several, said accused knowing that the meadows in
which this livestock was found were open and adjacent, it being easy to
pass from one to the other, does not authorize the legal conception that
the said accused committed four thefts on said night, but only one as
found by the lower court, which did not commit an error of law by holding
that the acts were committed on a single occasion.
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know the owner
of the thing stolen, the crime being consummated provided that being
stolen belongs to another and the same is taken with intent to gain.
(Decision of the supreme Court of Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither
is it necessary for the existence of the crime of theft that it should appear
in a specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen, because the
law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal liability, but only the
restitution or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil
nature. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.)
What constitutes the crime of theft is the taking of another's property with
intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after the unlawful
act of taking another's property is proven, it is evident that all the
elements mentioned in the first paragraph of article 517 of the Penal
Code exist. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention
to take a thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same
place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 75

that the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a
multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the doctrine laid
down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), according to which,
where the accused made no objection to the information on the ground
that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly
submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the offenses
charged; and the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction
of each and all of these offenses which were established by the
introduction of competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore,
have imposed the prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses
of which the accused was convicted in accordance with the provisions
of article 87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable
to the present case as two separate complaints have been filed herein
against the accused, but the trial court convicted the accused in the two
cases, considering the facts alleged in the said complaints as
constituting but one crime.

In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in Spanish

decisions in regard to the question which is here debated:

In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the taking of
articles belonging to two different owners at the same time and place:
"In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that if two or more articles
belonging to different are stolen at the same time and place, the theft of
the property of each owner is a separate crime and may be prosecuted
as such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch C. C.,
412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.],
498.) In other jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be prosecuted,
at the pleasure of the State, either as one offense or as several distinct
offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass., 507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104
Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St.,
688; State vs. Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if
several articles, stored in the same place, are taken by a single
larcenous act, the mere fact that some of them belonged to one person
and some to another does not dissolve the act into separate crimes.
(Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; Am. St., 17; D. C.-
Chanock vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Holies vs. U. S., 10 D.
C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean vs.
State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71 South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III.,
284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-Furnace vs. State, 153 Ind.-93; 54 North
East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335; Iowa-State vs. Sampson, 157
Iowa, 257; 138 North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.], 967; State vs.
Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80 North West, 227; State vs. Larson, 85 Iowa,
659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-State
vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo.
vs. Johnson, 81 Mich., 573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs.
Quintini, 51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124
Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90 Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs.
Morphin, 37 Mo., 373; Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179;
Mont.-State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.-State vs.
Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac.,
679; Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-
State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep., 253; State vs. Smith,
10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23 Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46
Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101; Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent,
15 Pa. Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95 North West,
289; Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson vs.
State, 9 Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep., 732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A.,
Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23 Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs. Blay, 77
Vt., 56; 58 Atl. Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432;
54 Am. St., 878; State vs. Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs. Com.,
90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533;
112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs.
Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189; Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo.,
504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K., 765; 61 Eng. C.
L., 765.)

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby,
modified and the accused Vicente de Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six years and three months presidio mayor, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 76
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO
T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE
TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-
INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA,
petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA,
COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga
for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for
petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court,
which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised,
praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the
respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named
therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further
delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners
as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests
were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was
first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and
void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their
respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not
been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right
to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not
warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint
is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest
may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when
the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale
behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the
case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for
the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose
behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended,
so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in
court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight
(8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 77
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was
listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing
of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat,
or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime
of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority."
The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no
bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed
with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato
Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February
1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February
1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva
posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and
they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar
as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and
is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in
favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his
arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant
is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court
in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they
were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in
fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of
the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose
of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution
of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence
of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of
a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of
the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and
detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be
less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was
tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August
1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the
charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of
U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the
fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of
the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance
was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in
which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no
error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally
before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas
corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who
arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such
irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque
and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When
apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an
NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and
other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand,
was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of
finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the
house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of
ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit
or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one
Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered
to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as
"Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation
Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an
NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato
Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the
National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service,
National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security
Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were
found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 &
2605778;
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 78
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or
authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a
written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of
the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988),
Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military
agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to
the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino,
and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also
admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay
San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co."
dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)"
dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated
August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a
written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of
Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City.
Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the
military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988).
They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After
identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission
to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a
search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay
captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the
NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit
books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well
as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live
ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle,
and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other
occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to
the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and
that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a
result, the said other occupants of the house were released from
custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with violation
of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another
information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City,
which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715.
Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this
Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the
hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire
to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot
and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra
are officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission
(NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said
petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers
and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was
justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The
arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at
the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license
to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under
the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the
NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they
had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms
and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in
the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights,
Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The
military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked,
the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were
asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and
ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought
to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were
the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of
same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and
Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had
previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig,
Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos.
74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court
on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the
said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant
and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having
been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30
August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the
respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 79
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully
arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without
merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when
they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against
them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing
of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by
the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the
prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no
preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not
made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there
is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot
now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to
due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of
Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case
shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19,
Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to
be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of
the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal.
pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya
and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her
with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447.
Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court
on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that
Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to
a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti
delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a
warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court,
as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and
Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they
were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support
their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the
part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers
in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be
seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence
submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the
result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no
less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure
conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or
fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth
military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members
of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced
positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence
of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms
and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino
that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably
conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some members of the
raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours
after the raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at
Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and
searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters.
They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not
only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino
and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at
Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to
believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those
expected to visit Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's
information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it
unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military
agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this
Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi
Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities
to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra
who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that
Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 80
phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's
telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from
Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not
offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted
reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in
question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest,
incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and
circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat they were
up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive
conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of
the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an
Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General
Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators
Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and
protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria
Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his
jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put
under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed
by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-
type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed
to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at
Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at
about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the
respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General
Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District
under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained,
restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is
justified in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85,
charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in
fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of
the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November
23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order
to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen
at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and
symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali
sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory
ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and
pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo
na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988.
He was invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after
which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that
the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we
find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and
we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no
merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally
arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that
at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and
Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the
suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police
on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo
Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up
Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for
questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno,
Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,
even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel
Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said
court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution
denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not
disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the
police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court
after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the
killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs.
Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment
thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 81
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of
an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds
exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated
therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is,
that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite
explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with a
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and,
thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ
of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed
against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been
filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed
down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said
regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the
people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the
arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence
against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus
is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal
information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective
mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an
obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless
and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine.
It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the
exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are
not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or
reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine
is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to
limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether
or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of
commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take
cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales,
Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire
into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment
petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact
been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions
at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of
habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual
liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate
scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without
warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a
dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing the
most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his
supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing
the "continuing" offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when
that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that
even now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my
colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of
the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less
if we are really to reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the
true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every
support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be
waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe
that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which
are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more
important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated
Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some
reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in G.R.
No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The
majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472
[1983]). The majority there made the same equally broad statement but
without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of
such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the
specific offenses which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses" (121 SCRA
at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has in effect included the
offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious
blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of
determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that
"inciting to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
in terms of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do
distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press and speech which may
constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities
might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn
out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I
would submit that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense"
narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in
G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering
that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 82
court below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense
charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando
Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had
already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the
arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does
not appear strictly necessary, considering that the petitioner had already
been charged in a valid information filed with the competent court, which
court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and
considering further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the
doctrine of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as
subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some
future case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
Cortes, J., concurs.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all
eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. 1
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested." 3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault
upon Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the
offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest
— subversion was the logical crime with which he should have been
charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on
account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out,
"he was not arrested while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came
a day after the said shooting incident." 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible
in case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify
the authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means
"knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with,
becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversion association as
defined in sections two and three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military
could not have known that Dural, at the time he was taken, was a
member of the New People's Army because he was not performing any
over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification"6
before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the underground
army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was
committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was
guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural,
at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the
overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that
the peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is
guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act.
Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential
information." I do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred
to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By
its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and
when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have
here is purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid
that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due
respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick
up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason
that subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to
be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's
military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be
presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic
because Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise
take exception. It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final." 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due
process is its historic office. 12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had
"manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which
habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not
convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot
and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure
that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally,
I find it indeed strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-
free.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with
a public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a
petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the
motion, I do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even
insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who think and
believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to
the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 83
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked
contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in
my view, does not justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by
relying on the bare word of the military, this very Court has, to all intents
and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal
possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon
Casiple to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17
and unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like
Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear
that by the majority's strong language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are
admitted NUCF officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners
guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we
should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would
have set to naught the presumption of innocence accused persons
enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined
towards the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say
that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I
have observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the
existence of a crime being actually committed or having been
committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful
fishing expedition conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am
quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed
democracy.
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed
under arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be
picked upon in one's own home and held moments later without a
warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech
delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November
21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988.
Under these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a
warrant could be justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)
of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the
court, Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is
whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody.
Under the Rules, an information means "an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with
the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal
shooting of Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988.
It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a
suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his
accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno, under these
circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a
warrant or the existence of the circumstance described under either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had long been
committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view
as doctrines that have lost their luster:
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that
subversion is a continuing offense;
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the
authorities' handling of the petitioners' cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present
Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due
process of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which require the determination
by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable." 21 Under the 1987 Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial
law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves
the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the
existence of a state of emergency], the President takes absolute
command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which,
incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the
President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God.
For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the
people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the
Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent,
the exercise of emergency powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the
soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand
scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case
that in my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very
esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for
the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper
complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of
justice within the time prescribed by law. . .
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason
would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as
amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on
a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process
issued by a competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims
of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo,
and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines —
and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the
outlawed organization. The question that has not been answered is
whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for
purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of
any showing that they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am
perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we
held in one case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of
jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion,
Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers,
were held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information
against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
against them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation (examination)
having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a
warrant).i•t•c-aüsl As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 84
arrest. The fact that an information exists does not mean that a warrant
will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
(examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33
I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905)
decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been
served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question
that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the
accused's charges that the judge who issued it did not examine the
complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic, because
the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial
stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued.
I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way
of the writ of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing
pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a
judicial decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it,
although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and
all the evils his regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties and
trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored
its honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests
on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this Court's
ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so
painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years
of struggle against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic
outlook of Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on
liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they
may seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my
part — forged by years of experience and sharpened by a painful and
lonely struggle for freedom and justice — toward men and women who
challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for
now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to posterity and an appeal
for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions
we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without
warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a
dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing the
most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his
supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing
the "continuing" offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when
that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that
even now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my
colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of
the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less
if we are really to reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the
true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every
support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be
waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe
that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which
are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more
important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated
Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some
reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in G.R.
No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The
majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472
[1983]). The majority there made the same equally broad statement but
without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of
such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the
specific offenses which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses" (121 SCRA
at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has in effect included the
offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious
blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of
determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that
"inciting to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
in terms of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do
distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press and speech which may
constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities
might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn
out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I
would submit that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense"
narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in
G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering
that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the
court below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense
charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando
Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had
already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the
arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does
not appear strictly necessary, considering that the petitioner had already
been charged in a valid information filed with the competent court, which
court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and
considering further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the
doctrine of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as
subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some
future case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
Cortes, J., concurs.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all
eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 85
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. 1
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested." 3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault
upon Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the
offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest
— subversion was the logical crime with which he should have been
charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on
account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out,
"he was not arrested while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came
a day after the said shooting incident." 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible
in case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify
the authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means
"knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with,
becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversion association as
defined in sections two and three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military
could not have known that Dural, at the time he was taken, was a
member of the New People's Army because he was not performing any
over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification"6
before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the underground
army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was
committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was
guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural,
at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the
overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that
the peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is
guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act.
Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential
information." I do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred
to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By
its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and
when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have
here is purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid
that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due
respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick
up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason
that subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to
be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's
military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be
presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic
because Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise
take exception. It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final." 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due
process is its historic office. 12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had
"manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which
habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not
convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot
and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure
that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally,
I find it indeed strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-
free.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with
a public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a
petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the
motion, I do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even
insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who think and
believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to
the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked
contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in
my view, does not justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by
relying on the bare word of the military, this very Court has, to all intents
and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal
possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon
Casiple to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17
and unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like
Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear
that by the majority's strong language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are
admitted NUCF officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners
guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we
should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would
have set to naught the presumption of innocence accused persons
enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined
towards the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say
that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I
have observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the
existence of a crime being actually committed or having been
committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful
fishing expedition conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am
quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed
democracy.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 86
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed
under arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be
picked upon in one's own home and held moments later without a
warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech
delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November
21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988.
Under these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a
warrant could be justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)
of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the
court, Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is
whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody.
Under the Rules, an information means "an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with
the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal
shooting of Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988.
It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a
suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his
accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno, under these
circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a
warrant or the existence of the circumstance described under either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had long been
committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view
as doctrines that have lost their luster:
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that
subversion is a continuing offense;
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the
authorities' handling of the petitioners' cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present
Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due
process of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which require the determination
by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable." 21 Under the 1987 Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial
law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves
the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the
existence of a state of emergency], the President takes absolute
command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which,
incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the
President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God.
For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the
people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the
Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent,
the exercise of emergency powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the
soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand
scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case
that in my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very
esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for
the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper
complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of
justice within the time prescribed by law. . .
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason
would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as
amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on
a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process
issued by a competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims
of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo,
and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines —
and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the
outlawed organization. The question that has not been answered is
whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for
purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of
any showing that they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am
perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we
held in one case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of
jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion,
Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers,
were held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information
against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
against them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation (examination)
having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a
warrant).i•t•c-aüsl As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of
arrest. The fact that an information exists does not mean that a warrant
will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
(examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33
I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905)
decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been
served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question
that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the
accused's charges that the judge who issued it did not examine the
complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic, because
the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial
stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued.
I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way
of the writ of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing
pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a
judicial decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it,
although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and
all the evils his regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties and
trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored
its honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests
on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this Court's
ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so
painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years
of struggle against tyranny.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 87

It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic

outlook of Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on
liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they
may seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my
part — forged by years of experience and sharpened by a painful and
lonely struggle for freedom and justice — toward men and women who
challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for
now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to posterity and an appeal
for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions
we loathe.

I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 88
[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES
EBDANE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely,
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B.
GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE,
petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON
DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004]
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO
L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B.
MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU
R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered
ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into
the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of
July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).[1]
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the
day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a
state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the
instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders,
have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly
declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly
constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government
certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which
constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service
and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution,
whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an
actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of
rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance
with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress
and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the
instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders,
have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly
declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly
constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government
certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which
constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service
and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution,
whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-
Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003,
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended.
After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks.
The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state
of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO
EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a
state of rebellion was declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which
was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003,
and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were
directed to suppress and quell the rebellion;
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 89
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby
declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging
the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),[2]
party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM),
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.[3] They
further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation
by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.[4]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice
Society (SJS), Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar
reviewers.[5] Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of
rebellion.[6] They contend that the declaration is a constitutional
anomaly that confuses, confounds and misleads because [o]verzealous
public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order,
are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.[7]
Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the
report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law.[8] Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.[9]
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo
and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens
and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers
and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of
rebellion.[10] Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to
call out the Armed Forces.[11] They argue, however, that the declaration
of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers.[12] Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution.[13]
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator
assails the subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and
abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the
Constitution.[14] In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion.[15]
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions
have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.[16] In addition,
the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring
suit.[17]
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased
to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate
moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual
controversies.[18] Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise
moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[19] The case at bar
is one such case.
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion
and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through
Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an
angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and
attempted to break into Malacaang.[20] Petitions were filed before this
Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after
such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness
of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21]
precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the
declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity
to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in
the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the
petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, [22] this Court
recognized that:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes
a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned
by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress
can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of
rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress
emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers legislative powers.
Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid
congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law
powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal
standing or locus standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus standi has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[23]
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in
their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect,
uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people,
especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine
society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights,
including political and civil rights, of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and
mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section
4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate
their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion
to support the same.[24] [Emphasis in the original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v.
Perez:
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify
the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under
imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[]s right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a
state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary
to the Constitution.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 90
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords
little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first
instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution
limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[25]
Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status
would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity
of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v.
Morato: [26]
The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of
independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that their
right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII,
15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real
parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may
invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the
judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts
from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and
bars the bringing of suits by just any party.[27]
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does
not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.[28] No such illegal disbursement is
alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional
question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[29] Again,
no such injury is alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the
issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must
fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the
Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a
state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period
to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated power[s].[30] From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion,
and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.[31] However,
as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[32]
[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out
power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note
that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-
Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The
executive power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition,
Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the
Constitution of the United States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S.
President executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in
their original simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776,
Article II of which states in part:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America . . . .
....
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States. . . .
....
Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article
II Executive Power]
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the
above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding
action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the
prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers, which
are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief
provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the President serves
as Chief of State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief
of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.[33]
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as
the protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to
office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only
kept faith with the people by driving the patricians from power. Old
Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the
indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas nullification
effort.[34]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 91
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not
pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature ordered
an election for a convention, whose members quickly passed an
Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts
unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them
after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal
Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then
implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who
sought to pay or collect customs duties.[35]
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy.
Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the
Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would not
occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to see to it
that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these
laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no enforcement
machinery against violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask
Congress for a force bill.[36]
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He
wrote: . . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional
law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance of the people
composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce them to obedience.
Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called
upon South Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable
interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them, disunion by
armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? [37]
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope
walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of
agreement, and the President announced that the national voice from
Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared nullification
and accession confined to contempt and infamy.[38]
No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable,
and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as
Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress
explicit and restricted, and sought some source of executive power not
failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the Presidents
designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to
the executive power provision and joined them as the war power which
authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of
Congress.[39]
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent
power and duty under his oath directly to represent and protect the
people. In his Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the
Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the
government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or
surrender the existence of the Government . . . . This concept began as
a transition device, to be validated by Congress when it assembled. In
less than two-years, it grew into an independent power under which he
felt authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied
States.[40]
Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their
first service, according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts,
places and property, taking care to avoid any devastation, any
destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of
peaceful citizens.[41]
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns
report to use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The
decision was handed in the celebrated Prize Cases[42] which involved
suits attacking the Presidents right to legally institute a blockade.
Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by Congress, the
claimants contended that under international law, a blockade could be
instituted only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the
State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively
empowered to declare war, it is only that body that could impose a
blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative declaration were
illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincolns right to act
as he had.[43]
In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior
legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came
to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the
expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine
Bill of 1902.[44] The use of the power was put to judicial test and this
Court held that the case raised a political question and said that it is
beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the power.[45] Later,
the grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.[46]
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to
mean that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim
that Public office is a public trust, which he practiced during his
incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking
railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all
picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and
violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union president, was
convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the
principal issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had
the President to send troops without the request of the Governor of the
State.[47]
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,[48] the Supreme Court upheld the
contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the governments province to
mix in merely individual present controversies. Still, so it went on,
whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large,
and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to
the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty
to all citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere
fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking
measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.[49] Thus,
Clevelands course had the Courts attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt
launched what political scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling
himself the steward of the people, he felt that the executive power was
limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional
powers.[50]
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever
undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias
coal mines under his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he
found means other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he
had made detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to
wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal production
would begin again.[51]
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the
operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the
Philippines, this led to the incorporation of Section 6,[52] Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with modifications in
Section 7,[53] Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in
Section 18,[54] Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become
more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and
the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the
presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies
or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the
integrity of the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme.
Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was
vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the
U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the unitary and highly
centralized nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, There
is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which have
reserved powers under the United States constitution. Elaborating on
the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 92
. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments
of the government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested
in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided by law.
These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual
division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in
Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant of all
the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of
all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If
this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers
with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if
not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in
one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is
a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of
government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He is the
executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate
and direct than the United States president because he is given by
express provision of the constitution control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.[55]
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the
1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general
opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines.[56] Since then,
reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has
restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same,
however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis
into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the
Presidents power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under
the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under
the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.[57] [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.]
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in
the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time,
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the
Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a
declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power),
Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring
a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed
forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.[58] At
most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that
the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.[59] Perhaps
the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived
enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate
is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This
Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance.
For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the
dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights.[60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus,[61] then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
conditions.[62] At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call
for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In
Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that [i]n quelling or
suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,[63] if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a state of rebellion.[64] In other words, a person may be
subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or
not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the
requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.[65]
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a
declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military
tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is
no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative
powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted
to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an
indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a
grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The fundamental issue in the petitions is the legality of Proclamation No.
427 issued by the President on July 27, 2003 declaring a state of
rebellion.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 93
The majority affirmed the declaration is legal because the President was
only exercising a wedding of the Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. U.S. jurisprudence and commentators are cited
discussing the awesome powers exercised by the U.S. President during
moments of crisis[1] and that these powers are also available to the
Philippine President.[2] Although the limits cannot be precisely defined,
the majority concluded that there are enough residual powers to serve
as the basis to support the Presidential declaration of a state of
rebellion.[3] The majority, however, emphasized that the declaration
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.[4] They
affirmed the legality of warrantless arrests of persons who participated
in the rebellion, if circumstances so warrant[5] with this clarification: [i]n
other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrests for the
crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
present.[6]
If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still be present for an
arrest to be made, then the declaration is a superfluity. I therefore
shudder when a blanket affirmation is given to the President to issue
declarations of a state of rebellion which in fact may not be the truth or
which may be in affect even after the rebellion has ended.
Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 27, 2003, at the
height of the occupation of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala
Center, Makati City, by 323 junior officers and enlisted men (Oakwood
Incident),[7] which began in the early morning of July 27, 2003.[8]
Shortly after, the President issued General Order No. 4, ordering the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
use reasonable force, and pay due regard to constitutional rights, in
putting down the rebellion.[9] The Oakwood incident ended peacefully
that same evening when the militant soldiers surrendered after
negotiations.
From July 27 to August 1, 2003, search and recovery operations were
conducted. Throughout the Oakwood Incident, searches were
conducted in the non-occupied areas,[10] and, with the recovery of
evidence, staging points for the Oakwood Incident were found in Cavite,
Makati and Mandaluyong.[11] After the soldiers left at around 11:00 in
the evening of July 27, a search was conducted around the Oakwood
premises.[12] These searches expanded in scope on the basis of
recovered evidence.[13]
Ramon Cardenas, Assistant Executive Secretary in the previous
administration, was arrested, presented to the media in handcuffs and
brought for inquest proceedings before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
in the morning of July 28.[14] He was initially detained at the Office of
the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG), and brought to the DOJ in the afternoon of July
28.[15] Cardenas was later charged with the crime of rebellion,[16] but
as of this writing has been allowed bail.
On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group had surrendered
peacefully, an official spokesperson from the DOJ declared that the
Presidents indefinite imposition of the state of rebellion would make
warrantless arrests a valid exercise of executive power.
The Court can take judicial notice that the police authorities were
releasing to media evidence found purporting to link personalities in the
political opposition, the most prominent of whom was Senator Gringo
Honasan. Even Senator Loi Ejercito and Mayor JV Ejercitos names were
being linked to the attempted uprising.
On August 1, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police had effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion,
and, accordingly, that the state of rebellion had ceased on that date.
The majority discussed only the abstract nature of the powers exercised
by the Chief Executive, without considering if there was sufficient factual
basis for the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion and when it
ended. In taking this position, the majority is returning, if not expanding,
the doctrine enunciated in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,[17] which overturned
the landmark doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia.[18] In Lansang, the
Supreme Court upheld its authority to inquire into the factual bases for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and held
that this inquiry raises a judicial rather than a political question. In
Garcia-Padilla, on the other hand, the ponencia held that Lansang was
no longer authoritative, and that the Presidents decision to suspend the
privilege is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons.
These two cases were decided prior to the 1987 Constitution, which
requires this Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government.[19] This provision in the 1987 Constitution was precisely
meant to check abuses of executive power. Martial Law was still fresh
in the minds of the delegates in 1987!
The majority ignored the fact that the state of rebellion declared by the
President was in effect five days after the peaceful surrender of the
militant group.
The Presidents proclamation cites Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution as the basis for the declaration of the state of rebellion..
Section 18 authorizes the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to call out
the Armed Forces, in order to suppress one of three conditions: (1)
lawless violence, (2) rebellion or (3) invasion.[20] In the latter two cases,
i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety
requires, also (1) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
(2) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The majority made it clear that exercise of the Presidents Commander-
in-Chief powers does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion
or a declaration of a state of lawless violence or a state of invasion.
When any of these conditions exist, the President may call out the armed
forces to suppress the danger.
Thus, the declaration of a state of rebellion does not have any legal
meaning or consequence. This declaration does not give the President
any extra powers. It does not have any good purpose.
If the declaration is used to justify warrantless arrests even after the
rebellion has ended, as in the case of Cardenas, such declaration or, at
the least, the warrantless arrests, must be struck down.
Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, to wit:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How committed. The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking up
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the legislature, wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
On the other hand, a coup d etat is defined as follows:
ART. 134-A. Coup d etat. How committed. The crime of coup d etat is a
swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic
of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications
networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out
anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the
military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or
without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power.
Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed only by rising publicly or taking up arms against the
Government. A coup d etat, on the other hand, takes place only when
there is a swift attack accompanied by violence. Once the act of rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government ceases, the
commission of the crime of rebellion ceases. Similarly, when the swift
attack ceases, the crime of coup d etat is no longer being committed.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 94

Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,[21] and the authorities after the Oakwood incident ended in the evening of July 27, 2003, e.g.,
may resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as warrantless arrests, should also be declared null and void.
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.[22] However,
this doctrine should be applied to its proper context i.e., relating to
subversive armed organizations, such as the New Peoples Army, the
avowed purpose of which is the armed overthrow of the organized and
established government. Only in such instance should rebellion be
considered a continuing crime.

When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the evening of July 27, the
rebellion or the coup d etat ended. The President, however, did not lift
the declaration of the state of rebellion until 5 days later, on August 1,
2003.

After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of having conspired

with the soldiers or participated in the Oakwood incident could be
arrested without a warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which governs arrest without warrant, provides as
follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxxxxxxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.

Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court are
exceptions to the due process clause in the Constitution. Section 5, par.
(a) relates to a situation where a crime is committed or attempted in the
presence of the arresting officer.

Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the requirement of

personal knowledge, on the part of the arresting officer, of facts
indicating that an offense had just been committed, and that the person
to be arrested had committed that offense.

After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July 27, 2003, there was
no crime that was being attempted, being committed, or had just been
committed. There should, therefore, be no occasion to effect a valid
warrantless arrest in connection with the Oakwood Incident.

The purpose of the declaration and its duration as far as the overeager
authorities were concerned was only to give legal cover to effect
warrantless arrests even if the state of rebellion or the instances stated
in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules are absent or no longer exist.

Our history had shown the dangers when too much power is
concentrated in the hands of one person. Unless specifically defined, it
is risky to concede and acknowledge the residual powers to justify the
validity of the presidential issuances. This can serve as a blank check
for other issuances and open the door to abuses. The majority cite the
exercise of strong executive powers by U.S. President Andrew Jackson.
Was it not President Jackson who is said to have cynically defied the
U.S. Supreme Courts ruling (under Chief Justice Marshall) against the
forcible removal of the American Indians from the tribal lands by saying:
The Chief Justice has issued his Decision, now let him try to enforce it?
Others quote Madison as having gone further with: With what army will
the Chief Justice enforce his Decision?

WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4, issued on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All other
orders issued and action taken based on those issuances, especially
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 95

THREE-FOLD RULE the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement
to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their
claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment
of damages.
ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,
vs.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said
"Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as
per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the
CORTES, J.:
value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as
per assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of
Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value
the Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal
exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per
Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only
3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out,
Corrupt Practices Act.
however, that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for
the claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons,
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the
thus showing that they were all falsified.
petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. The eight
informations substantially allege the same set of circumstances
A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the
constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case No. 002 reads as
claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial
follows:
capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally
assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October
by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.
1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks,
named accused, being employed in the Office of the Highway District
accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where
Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and
they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of
confederating together with two (2) other John Does whose true
P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left,
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with evident bad
explaining to them that there were many who would share in said
faith, and for personal gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they
feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate the approval of one
were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.
Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the removal and
reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints
government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-
with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in
Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the
their supporting sworn statements what they later testified to in court.
accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or
administrative functions and after said claim was approved and the
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the
corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed
Sandiganbayan:
in the amount of P7,200.00 given only P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de
Leon), appropriating, applying and converting to themselves the amount
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense
of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon
penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
and the government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and
convincingly proven by the prosecution;
Contrary to law.
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent
Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the
jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;
aggrieved private party, the PNB Check number, the amount involved
and the number or John Does, the seven other informations are verbatim
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is
repetitions of the above.
excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code;
The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a
charged in the information and the offense proved;
temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16,
1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the
Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to December 31,
Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is
1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with
correct is a question of law which this Honorable Court is authorized to
property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for
pass upon.
the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said
owners.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against
him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the
allege the essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense
widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD
penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos,
Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano
The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:
Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog,
Binangonan, Rizal.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their
hereby declared to be unlawful.
claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements
affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada
xxx xxx xxx
required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 96
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a
violation of Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioner contends
that inasmuch as he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses,
permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer contemplated by
Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt
practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any
public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the
acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor
General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear
the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government
corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may
not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to
read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be
a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the
Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis
of a document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which
petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the
government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having
inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the
report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional
Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became
the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is
belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to
negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway
constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in
their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving
payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred.
They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference was done through manifest, partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged
injury or damage to the complainants and the government must have
been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage
was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his
official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense
charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the
fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-
agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to
demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations
of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith
on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims
and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which
relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation
of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution
is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to
the petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense
charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was
able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to
the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner
divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part
of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the
claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for
payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the
widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the
Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this case. He argues that before the
Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial body, at least two (2)
divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly constituted and
appointed.
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People
(G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the
petitioner De Guzman questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
hear and decide his case on the same ground that herein petitioner
assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the
Sandiganbayan saying that:
Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and
eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function
without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides
that the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices
each" while Section 5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three
justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each
and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a
division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose
pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the
First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the
pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606
supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed
by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days
of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold
rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not
exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into
account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the
service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty
and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the
prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe
of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing
eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-
petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta, (No. L-
19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):
... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still
impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding
penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the
State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to
impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 97

In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty
imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v.
People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 790, 792).

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of

the foregoing discussion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 98

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally,
what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was
confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40",
instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the
vs.
marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the
results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the
person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to
the latter's complaint of
REGALADO, J.:
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara
discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on
to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the
November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for
Act
the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988,
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant
at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of
facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in
watching television with the members of his family in their house when
consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to
three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying
laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.1
on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him
at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989,
that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were
after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher
Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty.
so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead.
He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial
When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some
on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine
times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
I
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge
of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later
peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he
identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp
vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a
Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but
certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco
claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment
Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in
to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the
the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura
house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching
Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing
and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan
marked money from Bustamante, the team, together with their
District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for
informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the
three days.9
police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the
place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant
consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana.
was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing
Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea
abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that
bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed
appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's
to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money
arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of
amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten
for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that
to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon,
the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see
Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his
latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit
body.11
at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial
investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.4
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked
thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana
money from appellant.5
dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government.12
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of
the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment
members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his
of the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter
companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired between
erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring
Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after
Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in
the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial
evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs
investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
Act.13
remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally
waived his right to counsel.6
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and
evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely
Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein
confiscated subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in
the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 99
any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold
and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof,
the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of
selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not
include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other
two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
clearly and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether
for money or any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be
established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the
poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by
both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The
prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant,
on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took
place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As
between the straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of
Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the
former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to
credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the
utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment,
extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial
apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's
entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be
attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim
of appellant of having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere
shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited
chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service
of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP)
at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein,23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the
marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that
he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it
as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated
the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the
offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is
that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant.
Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on
who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or
discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs
the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects
on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere
imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not
take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant,
but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the
investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills
allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing
purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28
This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz
in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in
conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic)
on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the
persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations
because we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item
can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime
Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make
a request for that powder because they, themselves, are using that in
their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the
money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of
rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the
Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other
species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking
of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant
in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under
the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report
prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was
arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves
and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In
the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore
mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the
confiscation of the marked bills from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents
are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being
nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34
Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in
the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or
confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not
allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and
hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal
participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven.
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 100
case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell
marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again
reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small
scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to human
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for what
matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale
could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of
how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say
that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental
torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp
Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to
support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents
earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for
evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support
for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence
of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions
on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his
abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering
even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that fact,
saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas,
he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother
who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention
there.49 Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the
authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors
despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the legal services of counsel
being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion
that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations
that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents
were determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not,
appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his
isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he
was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective
December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience necessarily affects the
original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law
which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the
adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the
sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams
and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea
bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable
provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser
penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to
194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force
of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof
applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws.54 The execution in said article would not apply to those
convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to
convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659
could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case,
a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage,
can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty
to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in
the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code,
declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to
persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts
of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of
whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced
penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final
and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then
practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief
under a writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of
the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial
reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any
person who shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away,
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 101
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be
applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon
the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on
the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that
is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750
grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana
involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with
respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said
Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give
effect to the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed
where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated
in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is
only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties
under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law
provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending
upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form
a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the
medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex
penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second
paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above
quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the
drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component
penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the
context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are
compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs
enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the
bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three
aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the
marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500
to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the
case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated
but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be
resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to
6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as
provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76
of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty
to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or
other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into
account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied
in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because
the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the
offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from
or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the
penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide
for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently
be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances
whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the
provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could
not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the
penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the
scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory
effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined
in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is
actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in
this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical
sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is
prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof
pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under
special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in
the United States but differently from the penalties provided in our
Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific
penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as
imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division
into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate
Sentence Law61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would
direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised
Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for
instance, Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of
salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as
required by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a
fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by
means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three
hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as
therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined
therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named
and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged
from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the
penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential
Decree
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 102
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion
temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4
months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or
force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special
law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the
rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant
statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies
under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is
clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example,
Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration
of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under
the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping.
Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code.
The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply
to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as
other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the
former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612
and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for
offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code
lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on
penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to
said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription
in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an
indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties
under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been
the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article
64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said
special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law
entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the
nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and
duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is
not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent
seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the
Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle
(Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof
such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the
same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on
penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this
case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent
pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court
held that where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion
in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for
the application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of
the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided
by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and
centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws."
(Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous
Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined
in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the
Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on
the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances
apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications
of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on
Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will
now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is
involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we
have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances
should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the
degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with
the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in
Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree.
Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided
in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or
even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the
aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425,
to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by
the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith.
Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in
degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since
the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor.
There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only
the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation
of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in
the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any
event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue
to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be
forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern
of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since
drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act
which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to
be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 103

course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the
indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate
sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that
this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under
a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the
preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is
punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary
because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws
which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in
Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of
penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and
would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore,
considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is
but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea
expositio.69
not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely
be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his
confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since
thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under
set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's
eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole
may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served
the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant
should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional
which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law,
the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor,
instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference,
which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the
creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of
conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin
Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he
should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act

No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised
Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to
arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the
same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a
special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first
part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
(Emphasis ours.)

A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but

also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret
in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its
construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its
provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is
considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise
embraced therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is

that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation,
which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of
historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and
related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation,
considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it
follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall
be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we
shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No.
4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best
mode of interpretation.71

The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of

compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 104
[G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000]
ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City.[2] Both
courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22[3] and imposing on her two one-year imprisonment
for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay two fines, each
amounting to two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial
court also ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the
jewelry received or its value with interest, to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees and costs.[4]
We state the relevant facts.[5]
On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan by phone.
Petitioner thereafter went to Seguan's store. She bought various kinds
of jewelry -- Singaporean necklaces, bracelets and rings worth
P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated August 25, 1990, payable to
"cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000.00[6] and gave
the check to Seguan.
On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan's store and
purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another
check payable to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in
the amount of P241,668.00[7] and sent the check to Seguan through a
certain Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were
returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner's account in the bank from
which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the
two dishonored checks. She never did.
On June 5, 1991,[8] an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two informations against
petitioner. Both informations were similarly worded. The difference is
that in Criminal Case No. 22128, the bouncing checks is Metro Bank
Check No. CLN 094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of
P241,668.00. The informations read:[9]
Criminal Case No. 22127-
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM
for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did
then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check NO. 1 CLN
094244391 dated August 25, 1990 in the amount of P300,000.00
payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was issued in payment
of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented
with the bank the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed"
and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said
check, said accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria
Antonia Seguan in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. 22128-
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM
for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22, COMMITTED AS
FOLLOWS:
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in this City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing
damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check No.
CLN-094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00
payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was issued in payment
of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented
with the bank, the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed"
and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said
check, said accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria
Antonia Seguan in the amount of P241,668.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991."[10]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" in both cases.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision
in the two cases convicting petitioner, to wit:[11]
"WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
accused, Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case No. CBU-
22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
PESOS and in Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of
imprisonment for ONE YEAR and fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) is likewise imposed.
"The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria
Antonia Seguan, the sum of P541,668.00 which is the value of the
jewelries bought by the accused from the latter with interest based on
the legal rate to be counted from June 5, 1991, the date of the filing of
the informations, or return the subject jewelries; and further to pay
private complainant:
"(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in compensation for the
latter's worries with the freezing of her business capital involved in these
litigated transactions;
"(b) The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.[13]
On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
dismissing the appeal in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
"SO ORDERED."[14]
Hence, this appeal.[15]
In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much
more, had any "transaction" with her. According to petitioner, she issued
the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She
gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of
jewelry, as a "security arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would
return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.[16]
The appeal has no merit.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:[17]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 105

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that in determining the penalty

"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value;
"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the
checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing
transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere
guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry
she was to sell on consignment basis.[18] These defenses cannot save
the day for her. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element
was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know
that her funds in the bank account were insufficient. She did not prove
this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of
the offense are present.[19] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a
conviction.[20]
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or
make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from
notice of dishonor.[21] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare.[22] Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.[23] Why
and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining
culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the
checks are also irrelevant.[24]
to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem
valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence
imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the
amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. No.
22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison
term."[30] We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the
ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner.
The two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to
P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient.
The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney's fees are
deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court
of Appeals.[31] We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET
ASIDE the sentence of imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to
pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months.[32] We
DELETE the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The rest of
the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall
stand. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Unlike in estafa,[25] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the
check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage.
The damage done is to the banking system.[26]

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the

only inquiry is, "has the law been violated?" When dealing with acts mala
prohibita[27]--

" it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal
intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention
of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is
necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would
be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many
cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious
effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is
produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention
of the person performing the act is good or bad."

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. Petitioner issued

two checks. They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due
to the fact that the account was closed. Petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption that she knew her funds were insufficient at the time of
issue of the checks. And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or
make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc
quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be
exceedingly hard but so the law is written.

However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B.P.

No. 22 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days
but not more than one year or a fine of not less than, but not more than
double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two
hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court."[28]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 106

[G.R. Nos. 118950-54. February 6, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LUCRECIA GABRES, also known as MONA GABRES, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses Perlito (Lito) and
Lucrecia (Mona) Gabres and, except for the names of the private
complainants and the amounts involved, the text in each of the
corresponding informations is substantially the same in all; viz:[1]
"The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and LUCRECIA GABRES
also known as MONA GABRES of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
anticipation, Nisperos, accompanied by her son, Ramil, and her
neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay,[4] went to the residence of the
Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After the group was introduced by
Nisperos' cousin, Rosario Zapanta, the spouses confirmed their being
engaged in the recruitment of factory workers for Korea. A "package
deal" was reached. Each applicant was to be charged a placement fee
of P45,000.00. The parties agreed to meet again on 12 April 1992 at the
Dr. Yares Clinic in Baguio City. On the appointed date and time, Mona
Gabres alone showed up to meet with the applicants. The latter were
joined, in this meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo
Mirabueno, who all promised to also come up with the required
"placement fees."
At the respective dates stated below, the accused spouses received the
following amounts from each of the applicants; thus:
"DATE OF PAYMENT

"That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and

sometime subsequent thereto, at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province NAME OF PAYOR
of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud and by means
of deceit through false representations and pretenses made by them
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and AMOUNT
there willfully unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOEL PANIDA, by then
and there representing themselves as a duly authorized or licensed 1. April 26, 1992
recruiters for overseas employment, when in truth and in fact they were
not, thereby inducing the said person to give to them the sum of FORTY- -
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad, which amount they misappropriated for their own use Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos)
and benefit and then either fail or refuse and continue to fail or refuse to
return the same despite repeated demands, all to the damage and Joel Panida
prejudice of said person in the total sum aforesaid and other
consequential damages. Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.

"Contrary to Law."[2] -

In addition, the spouses were charged with having engaged in large -

scale illegal recruitment; thus:
-
"The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia Gabres also known
as Mona Gabres of Illegal Recruitment, defined under par. 1, Art. 38 of P5,000.00(No receipt)
P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the
Philippines, and penalized under Art. 39(b) of the same Code, as P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR No. 1800)
amended by P.D. 2018, committed as follows:
P5,000.00 (Exh. 'A' - CR No. 1803)
"That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and
sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Tublay, Province of 2. May 1, 1992
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually -
aiding each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
recruit ORETA NISPEROS, TARCISO DACSIG, JULIUS AOAY, JOEL Julius Aoay
PANIDA and RONALD MIRABUENO for overseas employment, by then
and there misrepresenting themselves as a duly authorized or licensed -
recruiters when in truth and in fact they were not and by reason of said
misrepresentations, they were able to obtain from the said complainants P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR No. 1802)
the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all to the damage and 3. May 5, 1992
prejudice of the above-named complainants in the total sum aforesaid
sum and other consequential damages. -

"That such illegal recruitment having been committed by in large scale, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.
it constitutes economic sabotage.
Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos)
"Contrary to Law."[3]
-
The six cases were tried, preceded by the arraignment of the accused,
jointly. -

The following version of the case is culled from the evidence given by P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1803)
the prosecution.
P5,000.00 (No receipt)
Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard that the accused
couple were recruiting factory workers for abroad. With great 4. June 7, 1992
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 107

- -

Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos) P25,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR No. 1803)

Joel Panida

Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.
Julius Aoay
-
-
- departure for abroad. The promise was not fulfilled. Then, in order to
- of the Korean employer, Mr. Kim, that was being awaited so as to firm
P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)
P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)
P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)
P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)
-
Julius Aoay
-
P30,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No. 1802)"[5]
On 03 July 1992, the accused spouses assured Ramil Nisperos, Joan
Nisperos, Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Julius Aoay, Jonard Dulay
and Ronaldo Mirabueno that they could expect within a few days their
appease the applicants, the spouses explained that it was only the call
up the flight schedule. The call never came. After a series of follow-ups,
the applicants were directed by the spouses to confer with the latter's
supposed associate in Manila, one Rebecca (Vicky) Naval, who was
said to be managing the Bachs and Cochs Travel Agency. Naval initially
denied any association with the Gabreses; she later, however, told the
group that she had been engaged by the spouses to process the travel
documents, plane tickets and flight bookings of the applicants, and that
the required visas were already being applied for.

5. June 10, 1992 After several more months of waiting and still getting nowhere, the
applicants finally demanded the return of their money from the spouses.
- Each applicant was issued four checks, each for P10,000.00, but which,
when presented for payment, all bounced.[6]
Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos)
The would-be overseas workers sought the assistance of the Philippine
- Overseas Employment Administration-Cordillera Administrative Region
("POEA-CAR") which certified, through Atty. Justinian O. Lichnachan,
P30,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1801) that the accused spouses were "not licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment within the City of Baguio or any part
6. June 17, 1992 of the region."

- Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial proceeded only
against his wife. Mona Gabres pleaded "not guilty" to each of the
Oreta Nisperos (for Joan Nisperos) accusations. She denied any involvement in her husband's activities.

- The defense sought to establish that Mona was a mere fish vendor in
Bauang, La Union, and that this work demanded her full attention. Her
P5,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No. 1801) husband used to be an overseas contract worker himself and, thereafter,
a liaison officer for Caro Fran Recruitment Agency, whose job included
7. June 18, 1992 the processing and following-up of travel papers with the Department of
Foreign Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband introduced her to Vicky Naval
- who requested Mona to safekeep the collection of placement fees from
the applicants. She admitted having joined her husband, but only once,
Oreta Nisperos (for Jonard Dulay) in collecting the payments made by private complainants on 03 July
1992 at Acop, Tublay, Benguet, which was duly remitted to Naval.
-
In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo A. Brawner[9]
P5,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR No. 1801) (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) rendered judgment that
concluded:
8. July 3, 1992
"WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
- as follows:

Joel Panida "1. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds accused Lucrecia
`Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt to suffer an
- indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of five (5) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM to nine (9) years
P35,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No. 1800) and ten (10) months of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;

"3. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, this Court finds accused Lucrecia
`Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
- charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 108

prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as

MAXIMUM; "Q Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?

"4. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, this Court finds accused Lucrecia "A It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.
`Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence "Q On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able to meet each other?
of imprisonment of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
Prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as "A Yes, ma'am.
MAXIMUM;
"Q Who were your companions?
"5. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1804, this Court finds accused Lucrecia
`Mona' Gabres NOT GUILTY of the offense charged due to insufficiency "A My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida and my son Ramil
of evidence and hereby acquits her with proportionate costs de oficio; Nisperos.

"6. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1805, this Court finds accused Lucrecia "Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you on April 12, 1992.
`Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and "A Mrs. Mona Gabres, ma'am.
to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
"Q How about the other accused, Lito Gabres.
"On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres is hereby ordered to pay to Joel Panida, Oreta Nisperos, Julius "A He was not there, ma'am.
Aoay and Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. the amounts of P45,000.00, P55,000.00,
P40,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively, as actual damages. "Q Now, what transpired on April 12, 1992?

"Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres. "A They told us that if we are interested we will pay an advance payment
of P5,000.00 each.
"In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be credited to the full
term of her preventive imprisonment as provided for by Article 29 of the "Q For each applicant?
Revised Penal Code, provided the conditions set forth therein for the
enjoyment of the same have been met. "A Yes, ma'am.

"With respect to accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres, let these cases be sent "Q What else did you talk about?
to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as he shall have
been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court. "A They told us that if we have money we will see each other on April
26.
"In order that he may not escape the clutches of the law, let Warrants of
Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Station Commander, Bauang, La "Q Where will you see each other on April 26?
Union and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila. Further,
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered "A I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay because they knew where
to include the name of accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres in its Hold Departure we are.
List.
"Q What particular place in Acop?
"SO ORDERED."[10]
"A At our residence, sir.
Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court. Appellant, in main,
would wish to sway the Court into thinking that the real culprit was Lito "ATTY. PAOAD:
Gabres and that the complaining witnesses gave stress over her
participation only because her husband could not be apprehended. "Now, how much all in all are the two accused asking you to pay in
consideration of the same in Korea?
The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction.
"A They were asking P45,000.00.
The testimony given by each of the private complainants unquestionably
would point to both the spouses to be the culprits in an elaborate scheme "Q Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other again on April 26,
to defraud the hopeful applicants for overseas work. The Court quotes 1992, what happened on that date?
from the transcript of the proceedings.
"A They came at our residence, both of them.
Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:
"Q The two accused?
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"A Yes, ma'am.
"Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that it was the later part of
March, 1992 that you and your cousin went to see the two accused in "Q Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April 26, what
Bauang, what transpired then? happened?

"A They told us that they were recruiting factory workers for Korea. "A My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.

"Q What else happened? "Q Who particularly paid for your son?

"A They told us that if my children are interested we will see each other
in Baguio City on April 12.
"Q What was your agreement as to where shall you meet each other
and the date.
"A I paid for my son, ma'am.
"Q Aside from you and your son who else were present?
"A Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.

"A I suggested that we will see each other at the clinic of Dr. Yares. "Q How about Julius Aoay?
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 109

in Criminal Case 1803 and as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this
"A He was also present, ma'am. the receipt issued to you?

"Q You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you paid "A Yes, it is.
P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying that you paid
P5,000.00 on that day? "Q Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?

"A They issued us a receipt, ma'am. "A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.

"Q Who received the payment? "Q How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?

"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am. "A He was the one counting the money."[13]

"Q Who issued the receipt? In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only accused-
appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the applicants for
"A It was Lito Gabres who was making the receipt, ma'am. overseas work. Joel Panida testified:

"x x x x x x x x x. "Q On April 12, 1992 were you present in that meeting?

"Q Now, after April 26, 1992 what happened? "A Yes, I was also there, ma'am.

"A They told us that they will go back at our residence on May 1 and if "Q Who else were present on that day, April 12, 1992?
the other applicants will have their money at that time they will process
their papers. "A Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.

"Q Who paid on May 1, 1992? "Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you?

"A Julius Aoay, ma'am. "A It was Mona Gabres only, ma'am.

"ATTY. PAOAD: "Q How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?

"Who received the payment? "A He was not there, ma'am.

"A Both the two accused, ma'am. One will receive the amount and the "Q On April 12, 1992 what transpired in that meeting?
other will issue the receipt."[11]
"A She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to Korea. She
Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.: also asked us that if we are interested then we will give P5,000.00 each
as down payment." [14]
"Q Now, to whom did you give this P5,000.00?
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private complainants
"A I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it to Mona Gabres, Ma'am. have prevaricated the evidence to implicate Mona Gabres only because
the authorities have yet to succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of
"Q Now, who issued you a receipt? course, unfortunate that the husband, at least momentarily, is able to
ward off the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end, still
"A Mona Gabres. catch up with him.

"Q What about her husband Lito Gabres? Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of deceit
punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[15] The
"A Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to Mona Gabres who counted the trial court's brief ratiocination is well taken; viz:
money, after counting the money Lito Gabres gave it to Mona Gabres.
"There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by the
"x x x x x x x x x. complainants. They parted with their money in consideration of
deployment for work in a foreign country, but which unfortunately
"Q I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992 previously remains unrestituted despite the failure in that regard of the person or
marked as Exhibit `B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1803 and Exhibit `I- persons who promised that they will be sent off to work abroad."[16]
1' in Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1805, is this the receipt you are referring to?
Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale,
"A Yes, Ma'am. an offense under Article 38(b), in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code
which provides:
"Q Now, who issued you this receipt?
"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including
"A Lito Gabres, Ma'am. the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
"Q Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The
participation of Mona Gabres? Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
"A I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and then
handed it to Mona Gabres, Ma'am."[12] "(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall
Testimony of Julius Aoay: be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.rny

"Q I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which has been "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
previously marked as Exhibit `A' in Criminal Case 1801, as Exhibit `B' in a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit `C' with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 110
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group."
"x x x x x x x x x.
"ART. 39. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein."
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal recruitment), namely:
(1) that the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2)
that the offender undertakes any of the recruitment activities defined
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same code. (PEOPLE vs.
CORAL, G.R. Nos. 97849-54, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without
any doubt, this Court finds the two elements of the crime present in the
case at bar. That the accused are non-licensees or non-holders of
authority to lawfully recruit is evident in the certification issued by Atty.
Justinian Lichnachan of the POEA-CAR Regional Extension Office of
Baguio City (Exhibit `D,' 93-CR-1800). Article 13(b) of the Labor Code
defines recruitment and placement as `any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.' The act of the accused in holding out a
placement fee of P45,000.00 per applicant in exchange for an
employment abroad; the several collections made by them; and their
promise to send off the applicants for work in Korea were just some of
the circumstances that would qualify the acts of the accused under the
definition of recruitment and placement."[17]
The Court, however, would have to reduce the award of actual damages
to Oreta Nisperos from P55,000.00 to P50,000.00. Oreta concededly
could not present any receipt for the supposed payments she allegedly
made on 26 April 1992 and on 05 May 1992, for P5,000.00 each, on
behalf of Ramil Nisperos. Joel Panida, in his testimony, attested to the
payment made on 26 April 1992[18] but no similar evidence was
presented to prove the payment made on 05 May 1992.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such
amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense.[19] The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of
the crime.[20] The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to
the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range
of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
it might be subdivided.[21] The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.[22]
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum
term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the
accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and
one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus
an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to modify in part the
penalties imposed by the trial court; viz:
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount involved is P45,000.00.
Hence, the minimum penalty should be reduced to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, which is the maximum of the
allowable minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence. The
maximum penalty imposed by the court a quo is within lawful range.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount involved, as so modified
by this Court, is P50,000.00. The minimum penalty should then be
reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional (the
maximum of the minimum of the indeterminate sentence). The maximum
penalty should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
plus a period of two (2) years (one [1] year for each additional
P10,000.00) for a total maximum period of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No. 93-CR-1803, the amounts
involved in each total P40,000.00. The minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence imposed by the court a quo of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional is within lawful
range. The maximum penalty, however, should at least be six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a total
maximum period of seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
modification only insofar as the penalties therein imposed are
concerned; thus -
(1) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-appellant is sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years
and ten (10) months of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, accused-appellant is sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM, the actual damages
being reduced to P50,000.00.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, accused-appellant is sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM,
to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of from two (2) years, eight (8) months and
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 111

one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from
are AFFIRMED.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 112
[G.R. No. 138876. November 24, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EGMEDIO
LAMPAZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite for the successful
prosecution of rape. Even without a medical report, a court may convict
an accused based on the offended party's credible testimony. The
"sweetheart" defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or tokens. Love
is not a license to rape.
The Case
Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994 Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique (Branch 10)[2] in
Criminal Case No. 3692, finding him guilty of rape.
In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and "at the instance of the
offended party," Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan C. Mission Jr. charged
appellant as follows:[3]
"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the Municipality of
Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design, through intimidation, violence and force and
with the use of a deadly weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Teodora Wacay without and
against the consent of the offended party."
With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant entered a plea
of not guilty when arraigned on June 9, 1988.[4] Trial proceeded in due
course. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated its assailed Decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:[5]
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and jurisprudence,
after the prosecution has presented thorough and convincing evidence,
the Court finds accused EGMEDIO LAMPAZA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the period of Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day to
Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months as minimum to Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years
as maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay [in] the amount of
P30,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C. Tajanlangit, filed
a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).[6] After the defense
and the prosecution filed their respective Briefs, the appellate court[7]
rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of appellant, but modifying
the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:[8]
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant EGMEDIO LAMPAZA is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
complainant Teodora Wacay the amount of P50,000.00 for moral
damages.
In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,[9] the CA
"recalled" the entry of the above judgment, certified the case to this
Court and elevated the records.[10]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[11] the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the following
facts as summarized by the trial court:[12]
"The first witness presented was a college student who is the nephew of
the private offended party, who went to the house of the latter on March
20, 1988, without finding her there. Witness looked for Teodora,
proceeding to the place where farm animals are grazed, which was two
hills away. (pp. 2-4 TSN, September 27, 1989)
"Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the nipa huts in the farm.
When [his] aunt reached him, she was sobbing and very pale. She
immediately asked him to accompany her back to her house. His aunt
explained to him that she ha[d] to leave that place immediately because
she was afraid of somebody and therefore could not stay in Sitio
Namontonan, Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. (pp. 5-7,
TSN, Ibid.)
"During cross examination, defense counsel verified the details
regarding the testimony under direct-examination of this witness, as to
the reason witness was in that sitio (p. 8, TSN, id.), the distance between
the house and the grazing area of the farm animals, the location of the
nipa hut and other details. (p. 9, TSN, id.)
Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was very afraid when he
met her running out of the nipa hut although she did not tell him yet what
happened. That [his] aunt was trembling, very pale and looking very
weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)
The private offended party herself testified, and positively identified
accused in open court. (p. 18, TSN, id.) That in the morning of March
20, 1988 she was in her farm lot in Sitio Namontonan, Barangay
Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. When she was about to graze
their animals, all of a sudden accused came from behind her and twisted
both her arms. Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut
which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free, to no avail
despite kicking, shouting and struggling to be free from the hold of the
accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut; pinned both her
legs including her right hand with [his] knees [and took] off his pants.
The accused ha[d] his bolo beside him with which he threatened the
victim. Victim testified that accused raped her then, explaining in detail
the commission of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about the rape that
evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach the
testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that accused and
victim were close neighbors; that during the incident private offended
party passed by accused who was cutting bamboo poles, on her way to
the grazing area of the farm lot. (pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989). She
described again the force and intimidation emanating from the accused
in committing the act complained of. Private offended party informed the
Court of the great fear she felt that she was trembling and almost
speechless when the incident happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified on cross[-
]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual intercourse she
stated that it lasted only three minutes, although the acts of force,
intimidation and the struggle lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-
23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution presented another
witness in the person of the husband of the offended party (p. 32), who
testified that the latter informed him about her being raped by the
accused; that [he] wanted to kill the accused but he was prevailed upon
by his wife and decided to file a case in Court, hence the criminal
complaint (p. 34). Witness was in another town during the incident: that
he returned to his house in the afternoon of the following day, when his
wife informed him of the incident. (p. 32-34)
"They went to the police authorities the following day and filed their
formal complaint, contained in a sworn statement. (pp. 34-38, TSN, id.)
Version of the Defense
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 113
Insisting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts, the defense
presents the following version of the facts:[13]
"The defense's version of the case is as follows: Accused Egmedio
Lampaza and complainant Teodora Wacay are neighbors. They have
known each other since childhood. Accused courted complainant who
later became his girlfriend. However, they married different persons, but
that notwithstanding, they have had intimate relations.
"In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a signal from
complainant. The latter informed him that her husband was in another
town, and when he asked her "what now because your husband is not
there," complainant just laughed. Complainant told accused that she
was going to fetch her carabao, so he followed her. When he reached
the place where she was, he put his arms around her, but she brushed
them aside, apprehensive that they might be seen. Complainant went
up the nipa hut, the same place where they had had sexual intercourse,
and made love again, with complainant taking off her clothes first,
followed by accused taking off his pants and shirt. They made love
consensually. He did not threaten complainant; neither did he use force
[or] violence in consummating the sexual act because the same was
with the consent of complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991.)
"Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused, testified
that complainant is the mistress of her husband, the accused. Because
of her husband's extra-marital relationship, they were always quarreling.
To avoid further trouble she went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for
Judge Amelia K. Del Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The
latter testified that Filomena had worked for her family as a housemaid,
and during the course of her employment she had confided to her
employer that her (Filomena's) husband was maltreating her and ha[d]
a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992)."
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was consensual, the
trial court held that appellant used force against the victim by twisting
her arm and bodily lifting her from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also
threatened and intimidated her by placing a bolo beside her during the
actual rape. The trial court ruled:[14]
"Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show that there
was force committed on the victim when her arms were twisted and she
was bodily lifted from the farm lot to the nipa hut. She was intimidated or
there was a threat to intimidate her, when the bolo was placed beside
her during the rape.
"This court finds that the incident complained of which occurred on
March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the consent [or] approval of the
victim.
"We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay related the incident to
her husband the following evening, if indeed the rape was not committed
because the husband was out of town then. Much more, that she went
to court. In People vs. Estolano, 193 SCRA 383, the Supreme Court held
that complainant would not have made the offense subject and endured
the ordeal of testifying to all its gory detail if she had not in fact been
raped."
Affirming appellants conviction, the Court of Appeals modified the
penalty to reclusion perpetua and increased the moral damages to
P50,000.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant contends that the trial court committed the following errors:[15]
I
x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force and intimidation on
complainant in order to consummate the sexual act
II
x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein complained of was
done without the consent [or] approval of the victim
III
x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape based on the inconsistencies, contradictions, and incredibilities
palpably apparent in complainants testimony and in [the testimonies] of
her witnesses
In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the three grounds
raised by appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Force and Intimidation
Appellant contends that rape was not proven because force and
intimidation were not established beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically,
he argues that the testimony of the victim on this point should be
rejected, because it conflicted with her Sworn Statement given during
the preliminary investigation. First, in her statement she averred that he
pressed [her] forward towards the nipa hut; but she testified that he lifted
her. Second, she declared in her statement that he forcibly made [her]
lie down, but she testified that he dump[ed] [her] on the floor. Third, she
also stated that appellants bolo was tucked to his side, but she testified
that it was placed beside her.[16]
We are not convinced. The "conflicts" cited by appellant are largely
semantical, not factual, in character. Whether appellant forcibly made
her lie down on the floor or whether he dumped her makes no substantial
difference in appreciating the fact of the crime: that she was down on
the floor against her will. Likewise, appellant makes too much ado about
the discrepancy between her being pressed forward and her being lifted;
the allegedly conflicting statements equally mean that he forced her to
go to the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is that inconsistencies
between an affidavit and a testimony do not necessarily discredit the
witness, for affidavits are generally incomplete[17] and are not
considered final repositories of truth.[18]
In any event, we agree with the trial court that appellant used force and
intimidation in ravaging complainant. Although its factual findings are not
absolutely binding on this Court because it was not the ponente who
heard the prosecution witnesses,[19] we believe and so hold that the
totality of the evidence presented indubitably demonstrates that
appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will. He
twisted the arms of the terrified victim, forced her to go inside the
uninhabited nipa hut, placed the bolo beside her, and threatened to kill
her in order to sate his lust. The victim testified as follows:[20]
Q. Now, while you were untying the rope of your carabao, do you recall
of any unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What was that incident?
A. All of a sudden, a person came from behind me and twisted both my
hands. (Witness demonstrated with her right hand twisted towards the
left side of her body while the left hand was also twisted towards the
right side of her body, both hands in front).
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted your arms, what
else happened?
A. He lifted me.
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you were
lifted by Egmedio Lampaza?
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 114
A. (With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the victim and the witness in
place of the accused, the accused stands behind the victim and place[s]
both arms around the victim while the arms of the victim are twisted with
the right arms towards the left and the left arms towards the right side of
her body and from that position the accused lifts the victim upward,
raising the victim about three inches from the ground.)
Q. Now, Madam Witness, while you were being lifted by the accused in
the position you have just mentioned, what else did he do?
A. Egmedio Lampaza told me, Come, lets have sexual intercourse.
Q. While saying that and while lifting you, what else did Egmedio
Lampaza do, if any?
A. He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir.
Q. How far is that nipa hut from where you were at that time?
A. About five arms stretch away, Sir.
Q. Was that hut inhabited?
A. No one lives there.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried to the
nipa hut, what did you do if you did anything?
A. I struggled to set myself free.
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
struggled?
A. (At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the accused while
the witness takes the place of the victim and from the position previously
described, with the xxx arms [of the accused] around the victim, the
victim struggle[s] to set herself free by moving her body towards the left
and right and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms of
the accused [who is] embracing her. The witness further states that
since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to set herself free).
Q. Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the clutches of
the accused, what else did you do if any?
A. I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as if she
were pedalling an unseen bicycle).
Q. Did you make any statement while you were trying to struggle from
the hold of the accused?
A. I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q. Why did you not say anything?
xxxxxxxxx
A. Because I was afraid, Sir.
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q. Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused do, if
any?
A He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut, what
happened to you?
A The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand, Sir, with
both of his knees.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did the
accused do?
A The accused took off his pants.
Q While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying anything?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he say?
A If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I am going
to kill you.
Q Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the accused with
him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was he carrying?
A He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
Q Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
A It was beside me, Sir.
Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by the victim],
it was couched in general terms.[21] The argument is bereft of merit. We
must stress that the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden
of proving resistance.[22] Indeed, physical resistance need not be
established when the culprit employed intimidation,[23] which, insofar as
it was directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the light of
the latter's perception and judgment at the time.[24] In the present case,
the victim was terrified because the threat of the appellant to kill her was
substantiated by the bolo he placed beside her. Furthermore, she could
not have successfully resisted because, according to her, he was husky
and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant did not
undergo medical examination to show signs of physical struggle or
assault.[25] The fact that the victim had no visible signs of injury did not
by itself disprove rape.[26] We reiterate that she was too intimidated to
offer serious resistance to the advances of appellant.
More important, no law requires a medical examination for the
successful prosecution of rape.[27] Even without a medical report, the
rape victims credible testimony, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for
conviction.[28] In the present case, we find no reason to disbelieve her
testimony. Time and time again, the Court has held that no woman in
her right mind would declare to the whole world that she was raped and
subject herself to the concomitant strain and stigma, unless she is telling
the truth.[29] For his part, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to
show that the victim's testimony was false.
Second Issue: Sweetheart Theory
Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant
that fateful day, but argues that they were lovers and the act was
consensual.[30] He adds that their respective marriages to different
persons had not prevented them from engaging in sexual dalliances with
each other.
We are not persuaded. Other than his bare assertions, appellant
adduced no independent proof that he was the sweetheart of the victim.
His defense was neither corroborated by any other witness nor
substantiated by any memento, love note, picture or token.[31]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 115

Furthermore, even assuming that the two were lovers, their relationship
did not give him a license to sexually assault her.[32] Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, in line with existing jurisprudence.[45] We agree
Appellants defense is further negated by the behavior of the victim who, with the Court of Appeals that he should also be ordered to pay P50,000
according to Rogelio Sumbilon, was running out of the crime scene as moral damages. The Court has held that the fact that complainant
sobbing and very pale[33] immediately after the commission of the has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings
crime. Elaborating during cross-examination, he said that the victim was which constitute the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still
in a hurry, as if she was afraid of something and as if somebody was require the victims recital thereof at the trial x x x.[46]
running after her.[34] When they reached her house, she told him that
she was afraid and that they should hurry to her mothers house about WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
three or four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly belied appellants AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the appellant shall pay the
claim that the sexual act was consensual. victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto in addition to the P50,000
awarded as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
Third Issue: Alleged Inconsistencies and Incredibilities
SO ORDERED.
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not be
accorded credence because their testimonies were replete with
inconsistencies and incredibilities. In addition to the instances alluded to
earlier, appellant cites the following: the victim testified that she shouted,
although she said in her Sworn Statement that she had not done so; she
allegedly told her husband of the rape on the evening of the fateful day,
but her husband testified that he did not return home until the afternoon
of the following day.[35]

We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are minor in

character and, as such, do not impugn the credibility of the complainant.
Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, the slight contradictions even
serve to strengthen her credibility.[36] Indeed, the Court cannot expect
a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual assault.[37]

Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical impossibility of the victims

narration that he was allegedly pinning her down with both his hands
while taking off his shirt at the same time.[38] The alleged impossibility
does not imply the falsity of her testimony; it only means that it was
impossible for her to remember the minutiae of appellants act.

Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the following assertions of

the victim: (a) she made no mention of the rape to her nephew when she
saw him right after the incident;[39] (b) she did not immediately tell her
husband that she had been raped;[40] (c) she did not report the outrage
to the police or to the barangay officials.[41]

These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was not

weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the incident to her
nephew or to her husband. There is no code of conduct prescribing the
correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual assault. When placed
under a great deal of emotional stress, the workings of the human mind
are unpredictable.[42] Some may immediately relay the incident to
authorities and close relatives, but others need time to compose
themselves before deciding on a course of action.[43] Although she did
not immediately inform her nephew about the incident, she told her
husband about it after he arrived from another town, when they were
about to sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to report
the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account is far from
incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay in reporting the
incident to the police, this fact is not necessarily an indication of
fabrication.[44]

Crime and Punishment

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed
when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained under any of the
following circumstances: (1) force or intimidation is used (2) the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. Herein appellant does not
deny that he had carnal knowledge of the victim. Moreover, the totality
of the evidence presented shows that he employed force and
intimidation against her. Clearly, his conviction of rape should be
affirmed.

Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the penalty for
simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a lower indeterminate
penalty, the trial court erred, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law
does not apply when the offense involved is punishable with reclusion
perpetua.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 116
[G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO
OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him
to an indeterminate penalty[2] of six (6) months one day (1) to six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to
eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,[3] and to pay P50,000.00
civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and to
reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his
wife, Tita T. Oyanib.[4]
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate informations
charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder and
parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long
and with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon
him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident premeditation.[5]
Criminal Case No. 6018
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of
said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities[7] and was immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail.[8]
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib
y Mendoza by reading the informations against him and translating them
into the Visayan dialect.[9] He pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court
conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T.
Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3, 1979[10] and had
two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan,
Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with
Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at
the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo),
not far from the place where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and
his family were watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of
their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a
commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The commotion
and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo
went upstairs to check.[11]
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on
the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus)
while sitting on the latters stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long
black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused
told Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the
neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the
hospital.[12]
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office,
Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that
at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on duty,
he received an information regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas
residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.[13]
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face
up with several stab wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus was
clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a
knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was
informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of
Jesus and Tita.[14] The incident was recorded in the police blotter as
Entry No. 137138.[15]
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer,
Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.[16] Jesus sustained
multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left chests and
stomach were fatal.[17] The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple stab
wound chest and abdomen.[18]
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds
inflicted in the left chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of
death was cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple stab
wound.[19]
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito
and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their
two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her
friend Merlyns house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to
the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and
rented the second floor.[20] The rented space consisted mainly of a sala
with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that if one enters
the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the
sala, directly to the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all
efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita
was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito.[21] In fact, she was very
open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of
Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus,
in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan,
Iligan City.[22] Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He
censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just
ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.[23]
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor
handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The
letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited
his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00
in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.[24]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 117
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of romance (kissing)
coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting
knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse.
Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito
immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59 in height and
weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose
his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity
and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing
Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting kill him Jake, kill
him Jake.[25]
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen.
Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita
stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This
angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her
three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the
owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to
interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco,
Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friends neighbor. He
threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At
around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague
Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in
Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to
surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.[26]
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wifes
place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the
incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that
they would kill him so they could live together.[27]
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision
finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements and having carefully observed the demeanor of
witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y
Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
(Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and
appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or
obfuscation and voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1)
DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to
EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to
indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the
costs.
It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the
forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge[28]
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an
appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court.[29]
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under
the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, which boiled down to the basic issue of whether accused is
entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.[30] He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts
and the evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces
of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the
photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the
photograph graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any
underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and
her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed
the victims under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in
denying him the exempting privilege under the Article.[31]
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He
invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an
exempting cause. An absolutory cause is present where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there
is no penalty imposed.[32]
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the
exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be
relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.[33]
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. The death caused must be
the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing
by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.[34]
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar.
The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that
he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the
testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act
of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused
chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus
in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage,
accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He
vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him,
but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several
times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police
when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the
offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised
Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:[35]
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a
man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 118

purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful

spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only
during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-
6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro.[36] He shall
not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred
(100) kilometers from Iligan City.[37]

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 119
[G.R. No. 38332. December 14, 1933.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
VALERIANO DUCOSIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Alejandra F. Antonio for Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.
DECISION
BUTTE, J.:
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated murder was referred
by the first division to the court in banc for the proper interpretation and
application of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature approved on
December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate Sentence
Law." As this is the first case which has come before us involving the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be convenient to set out here some
of its provisions.
Section 1 of Act no. 4103 is as follows:
"Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal
Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum
term, which shall not be less than the minimum term of imprisonment
provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the court shall
sentenced the accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending
circumstances, be properly imposed under the present rules of the said
Code, and to a minimum which shall not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense. Except as provided in section two hereof, any
person who shall have been so convicted and sentenced and shall have
served the minimum sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on
parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 2 is as follows:
"This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted to
misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those who maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year; nor to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in
section five hereof."
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate Sentence"
to be composed of the Secretary of Justice as chairman and four
members to be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and
consent of the Philippine Senate. This section describes the
qualifications of the members. Section 4 gives the board authority to
adopt rules of procedure and provides for the compensation of the
members.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the physical, mental
and moral record of the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and
authorizes the board to determine the proper time for the release of such
prisoners. After a prisoner has served the "minimum penalty" imposed
upon on him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by his
training for release and that there is a reasonable probability that he will
not violate the law again and that his release "will not be incompatible
with the welfare of society", the board may in its discretion authorize the
release of such prisoner on parole. The board may also recommend the
release on parole of other prisoners may also recommend the release
on parole of other prisoners previously convicted of any offense other
than those named in section 2.
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole
for a period "equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum
sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence." Section 7 provides that a certified
copy of the board’s order of conditional or final release shall be filed with
the court and with the Chief of Constabulary.
Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions
of his parole, who violates any of the conditions of his parole, who
violates any law during the period of surveillance for which he has been
convicted, shall be subject to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve
the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he
was originally committed to prison" unless the board grants a new
parole.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
shall not be construed to impair the powers given to the Governor-
General under section 64 of the Administrative Code or the Organic Act
of the Philippine Islands.
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval, that is to say,
on December 5, 1933.
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30,
1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon the following information:
"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, treacherously attack,
assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then and there suddenly and
without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting
upon him several wounds in different parts of the body, some of which
are necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a consequence,
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely intervention
of medical assistance.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten
years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law and to pay the costs. The penalty for the crime of
murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under article 50, the penalty
for a frustrated felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed
for the consummated felony, which in the present case is prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from
ten years and one day to seventeen years and four months. The
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating circumstance, in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes the penalty within the
minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and one day to twelve
years, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be served
within said range, i. e., not less than ten years and one day nor more
than twelve years. The penalty imposed by the trial judge being within
this range is correct and therefore is the penalty prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after
this appeal was lodged in this court, we are now required to revise the
sentence imposed upon the appellant and to bring the same into
conformity with Act No. 4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in
the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum." The
prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole
under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between
the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he
may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving
said period in whole or in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to
imprisonment for a period which is not more than the "maximum" nor
less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate
Sentence law.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 120
This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and
the "minimum" penalty be determined?
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by
the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of
said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
had never been passed. We think it is clear from a reading of Act No.
4103 that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act
indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or amend
any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative history
of the Act further shows that attention was called to the necessity for
taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with
the provisions of our penal laws, especially with those treating with
penalties." (Committee Report, House of Representatives H-3321, Ninth
Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised
Penal Code:
"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public funds in
the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
are present. Under this law the court may impose on him a maximum
sentence not exceeding ten years and eight months but not less than
nine years, four months and one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal
Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four years, two
months and one day (the minimum imprisonment period of prision
correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its minimum. See article
61, Revised Penal Code). The court, therefore, may sentence the
accused to be imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten
years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten years and eight
months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. In the example given reference is made to article 217, paragraph
3, of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period.
The penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to say, anywhere
between nine years, four months and one day and ten years and eight
months in the discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here the
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty under the
Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that is to say, between
ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the court.
This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial
court, in conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised
Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven
years. We wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103 does not require this
court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the longest time of
imprisonment within the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment conforms
to the provisions and rules of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore
fixed and established as the maximum of the sentence which shall be
imposed upon the Appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred
to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum
which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We
are here upon new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty
that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the
widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the
"minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less
mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and
circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower
to that determined by the court in the case before it as the maximum
(that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see
our discussion above). In the example which the legislature had before
it in the Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of the
sentence was correctly stated to be the medium degree of prision mayor
in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next lower is prision
correccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum
degree (article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say,
anywhere from four years, two months and one day to eight years. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides that the
"minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of
the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the
discretion of the court to fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere
between four years, two months and one day and eight years. In the
example given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the
minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the
maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is to say,
from four years, two months and one day to ten years. As stated, it is in
the discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said
range without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum
degree, medium degree and minimum degree, and in this particular the
courts are vested as stated with a wider discretion than they ever had
before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum
penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in
fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment.
Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
"to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official
Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider
the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society.
This opens up an almost limitless filed of investigation and study which
it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized
but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the
imperative necessity of protecting the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should
be considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme
youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his
mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his
previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and
aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial
and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and
circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the
offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes
— this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first,
toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with
him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State
are important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative
necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts
of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law
to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing
principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the
beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act
No. 4103 in the case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this
defendant was convicted before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as
we know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered
it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record
before us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of
murder and only the timely intervention of medical assistance prevented
the death of his victim and the prosecution of the appellant for murder.
He was given the full benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 121

maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have received from the
record in this case, we have concluded that a reasonable and proper
minimum period of imprisonment should be seven years, which is within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the maximum, that is to
say, within the range from four years, two months and one day to ten
years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period. We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the
court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of
the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the
defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten
years and one day of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and to a
minimum imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus modified, the
judgment appeared from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 122
[G.R. No. L-3246. November 29, 1950.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, Defendant-Appellant.
Luis Contreras, for Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar,
for Appellee.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not
disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones
was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot,
Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From
there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of
Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month’s stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia
Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused,
without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo
from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the
blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling
down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband
Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this
position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts
for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written
statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed his wife. The
motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his
statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he
often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected
that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his
wife had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the
peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At
the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered
a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the
testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was
confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that
he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his
clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that
at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that
he would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the
prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his
fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that
once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from
inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his
liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an
imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and
we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very
witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it
was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness
and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt
from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from
and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain.
Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting
and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote
Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 46 that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the
imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because
mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
49
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot
be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without
positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts
penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper
to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him
from liability, on the basis of his mental. condition, unless his insanity
and absence of will are proved."
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement,
assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the
case of United States v. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following
syllabus:
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than
to indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst
of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in
confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is
not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the
defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse."
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant
is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of
about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and
supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he
made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take
violent measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating
his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his
suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification
and was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a
disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the
following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his
written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went
to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter
was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However,
after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only
frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may
have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at
least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one
of those unfortunate beings, simple and even feebleminded, whose
faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 123

of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs,
laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling
of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she had
betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities,
still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down
and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed
his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and
expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to
find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent
on proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in
the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of
First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and
we therefore decline to find the existence of this aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is
feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense
or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would
diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the
mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of
jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the
possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua
to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the
application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a
single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each
one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles
76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty
applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On
the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of
indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two
indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore
clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Then, in the case of People v. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another
parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of
conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist,
inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely,
reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code
must be applied. The Court further observed:
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor
has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and
therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case
with a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an
appreciable amount of confinement."
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby
affirm the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the
appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment
he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court
in the two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled
to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that
next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., I concur in the result.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission

of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of
United States v. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide,
in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised
Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:

"And even though this court should take into consideration the presence
of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not
afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to
a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not
contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now
Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code). (Decision of September 30,
1879.)

"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of

which is inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this
court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of
article 2 of the Penal Code; and.

"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and

hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of
the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the
exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may
reduce the penalty to that of the next lower."
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 124
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent
qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law
expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his
appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.
Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview
of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of
ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit.
Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo .
. . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of
his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning
them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation
in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos.
105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term
of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of
the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie
Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was however
acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended
party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his
innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed
his conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some
missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism
advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said
defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is
a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT
penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to
interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC became final.
The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as
a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be
arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC
denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July
1992 dismissed his petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991.
Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he
had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he
had failed to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact,
committed any error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for
reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a petition for
certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This failure is fatal to his cause.
It is a ground for dismissal of his petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola,
5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the
petitioner's application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time
....
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to
grant probation after conviction, upon an application by the defendant
within the period of appeal, upon terms and conditions and period
appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an
appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks
this Court's compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which
may militate against his petition as he now argues before us that he has
not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from
the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to
enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because
the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he
would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he
appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose
of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable
him to qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail
of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which
affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot
extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an
accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred
by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a
special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not
enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit
of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted
to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives,
rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the
law who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly
mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the
quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the
application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 125
accused from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the
penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet
prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for
the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be
given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke
"liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the
statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of that statute,
leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the
spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words
which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our
procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given
effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind,
however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect
are derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from
some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation"
rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which
too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the
meaning which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated
the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the
text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face.
The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no
need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to
engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects
the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the
statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he
finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco
v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will surely
follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much
more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words as
to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is
in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts,
cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until
lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning
of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our
people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply
contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation
Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v.
Salvador, 13 we said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the
use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish;
where the law does not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already
probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the
penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms
imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be
determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the
terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than
six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise
specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as
all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word
maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall
not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend
to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and
distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed
to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as
he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime committed
on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each
of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the
four (4) private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was
still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was
probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment
for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the
gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further
commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who
have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to
Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who
have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are
deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is
principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant
degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core
criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted
in a single decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation
(for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and
sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who
has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and
one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously,
the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of
probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the
MeTC Decision he could not have availed of the benefits of probation.
Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes him
from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however
erroneous it may be, that the penalties imposed against him should be
summed up, still he would not have qualified under the Decision
rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16)
times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8)
months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years
provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months
multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months
(in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his argument,
petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four
(4) times since there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing
petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite
difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 126
any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date
of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should
suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the
RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the
duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a
STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account
of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave
oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties
imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not
sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC
as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus
— former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases
and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the
said accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to
pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the
accused was acquitted or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under
each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of
conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents
was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12)
other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the
judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole
modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed
up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test,
petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as
he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed
thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the
verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the
Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the
penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing
more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC
not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible
for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision
— but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of
any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised
only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC
all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has
been established because of his positive identification by the witness for
the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of
corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases,"
18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an
error in relying on his positive identification considering that private
complainants could not have missed identifying him who was their
President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good
number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged
defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly
private complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of them was
presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court
could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative
testimony of private complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of
guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue
the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never
manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a
wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence,
upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence
therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By
perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply
to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who
although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing
so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction
by the RTC to the Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his
appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he
was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which
could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become
final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his
allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in
accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20
should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed
against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may
now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can
be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged
in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period
allowed by law. This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and
crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation was
filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . .
. (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the
RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the instant petition.
We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of
now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano,
Jr., on the specific issue —
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The
law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation . . . .
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation
from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law,
the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is
a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of judgment
before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the
application for probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting
an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed, meaning
to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and
no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an
appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968,
in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The
petitioner did not file his application for probation before the finality of
the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was
filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application
for probation may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment
has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a warrant
of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the
MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had
become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial
court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does
not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and
probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from
his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 127
not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him,
and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation,
the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying probation is the fact that petitioner had appealed his
sentence before filing his application for probation. Reliance is placed
on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as
amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his
sentence or applying for probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply
for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit in the
choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation
under any of the cases mentioned in § 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall
not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national
security or the public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not
qualified for probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court
singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence
is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused
should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even
encouraged — speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the
accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and failed to obtain
an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No.
1990 by expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is
eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining
an acquittal if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event
his conviction is affirmed.2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in
limiting the accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision
of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is to deny him the
right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible
for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The
purpose of the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only
after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC
petitioner was principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While
acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him, what is clear is
that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given
to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had
originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of
prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority
opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer the prison term of 1 year
and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The
totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months)
thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by §
9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in
each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases
that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal
further although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some
space not covered by the present law on probation . . . where in its
original state, the petitioner was disqualified from applying for probation
under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under
the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the
letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow
probation in this case would be to go against the "clear and express
mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is
not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120
SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat
its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984),
per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate
himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government funds
that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while
incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v.
Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140
SCRA 391, 395 (1985) instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never
intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant
evidence he can avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a
reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on
the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of probation.
A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right of an
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal.
Proof of this is that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had
been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became qualified for
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 128
probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was
because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That
possibility, however, was also there when he appealed from the MeTC
to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he
would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed
his innocence and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence,
but no more so does an accused who, upon being arraigned, pleads,
"Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is
otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads
"not guilty'' in the beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows
contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who appeals a
sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the
penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new
sentence and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174
SCRA 566 (1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had
appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for probation.
For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could
have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the
original sentence meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation.
The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms imposed on
petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose
of § 9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence
originally imposed on petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in each crime
committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of
grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the
total prison term which he would have to serve was 26 years and 8
months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test,
the modified sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the
petitioner for probation because he has to suffer imprisonment of eight
months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the
said accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment." This means eight (8) months times four (4), since there
are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple
sentences imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For
example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of
not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137
SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa
in five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the
crimes had been committed on different dates he was found guilty of
each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was sentenced
to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days.
In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15)
days.
That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering
the totality of several penalties for different offenses committed is also
implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the accumulation
of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the
offense committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I
contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral defamation
for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of
a graver offense than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral
defamation and sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months.
The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one
offense of grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same
offense, say four or more times. The relevant comparison is not, as the
majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral defamation
four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying
probation in this case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only
after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its
decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the
circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await the remand of the
case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the
RTC had become final.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and
respondent judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for probation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in his dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not
qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on him by a court a
quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation
if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed
limit, I am unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for
purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with
Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the
eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for probation charged with,
and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed,
taken separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the
word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of
P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been
the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying probation is the fact that petitioner had appealed his
sentence before filing his application for probation. Reliance is placed
on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as
amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 129
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his
sentence or applying for probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply
for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit in the
choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation
under any of the cases mentioned in § 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall
not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national
security or the public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not
qualified for probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court
singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence
is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused
should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even
encouraged — speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the
accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and failed to obtain
an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No.
1990 by expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is
eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining
an acquittal if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event
his conviction is affirmed.2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in
limiting the accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision
of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is to deny him the
right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible
for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The
purpose of the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only
after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC
petitioner was principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While
acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him, what is clear is
that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given
to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had
originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of
prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority
opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer the prison term of 1 year
and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The
totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months)
thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by §
9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in
each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases
that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal
further although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some
space not covered by the present law on probation . . . where in its
original state, the petitioner was disqualified from applying for probation
under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under
the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the
letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow
probation in this case would be to go against the "clear and express
mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is
not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120
SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat
its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984),
per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate
himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government funds
that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while
incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v.
Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140
SCRA 391, 395 (1985) instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never
intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant
evidence he can avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a
reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on
the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of probation.
A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right of an
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal.
Proof of this is that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had
been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became qualified for
probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was
because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That
possibility, however, was also there when he appealed from the MeTC
to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he
would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed
his innocence and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence,
but no more so does an accused who, upon being arraigned, pleads,
"Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is
otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads
"not guilty'' in the beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows
contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who appeals a
sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the
penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new
sentence and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174
SCRA 566 (1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had
appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for probation.
For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could
have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction."
II.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 130

It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the
original sentence meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation.
The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms imposed on
petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose
of § 9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence
originally imposed on petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in each crime
committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of
grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the
total prison term which he would have to serve was 26 years and 8
months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test,
the modified sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the
petitioner for probation because he has to suffer imprisonment of eight
months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the
said accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment." This means eight (8) months times four (4), since there
are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in his dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not
qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on him by a court a
quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation
if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed
limit, I am unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for
purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with
Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the
eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for probation charged with,
and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed,
taken separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the
word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of
P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been
the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.

The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple
sentences imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For
example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of
not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137
SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa
in five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the
crimes had been committed on different dates he was found guilty of
each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was sentenced
to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days.
In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15)
days.

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering

the totality of several penalties for different offenses committed is also
implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the accumulation
of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)

It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the

offense committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I
contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral defamation
for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of
a graver offense than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral
defamation and sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months.
The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one
offense of grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same
offense, say four or more times. The relevant comparison is not, as the
majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral defamation
four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

III.

Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying

probation in this case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only
after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its
decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the
circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await the remand of the
case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the
RTC had become final.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and

respondent judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for probation.

VITUG, J., concurring:

FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 131
G.R. No. L-61958 April 28, 1983
PLUTARCO YUSI and DAISY YUSI, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE LETICIA P. MORALES, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
Antero B. Tomas for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw
their application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that their
appeal from the judgment of conviction be given due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in Criminal
Case No. 2260 in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20,
1982. The court sentenced the petitioners "... to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE
(1) YEAR and SIX (6) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, to
pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of the piano, and
to pay the costs of the suit."
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was
promulgated, the petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of
record. The respondent court appointed a certain Cesar Villar who
happened to be in court to act as petitioners' counsel de oficio during
the promulgation. On that occasion, the petitioners through their counsel
de oficio manifested that "... they are going to avail of the benefits of the
Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond."
(Annex "B", Reno p. 14) The court immediately granted the petitioners'
prayer "... with a condition that the accused will submit within this day a
certification from the bonding company that it is willing to accommodate
the accused under the same bond for a period of five (5) days beginning
today."
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an
application for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1257 (Annex "C", Rollo, P. 15).
Acting on the petitioners' application for probation, the respondent court
on the same day, June 23, 1982, issued an Order directing the probation
officer of Cabanatuan City to conduct an investigation on the application
for probation and to submit his report on the matter within sixty (60) days
from receipt in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 968 as amended. (Annex "A", Rollo, P. 18).
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of promulgation of
the decision and within the reglementary period to file an appeal, the
petitioners filed with the respondent court their Notice of Appeal (Annex
"E ", Rollo, p. 19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order denying the
notice of appeal on the ground that the petitioners waived their right to
appeal the decision when they filed their application for probation (Annex
" F ", Rollo, p. 20).
On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the court an appearance
as counsel in collaboration with the petitioners' counsel of record, and
on behalf of the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the July
6, 1982 order. On July 24, 1982, the petitioners filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration. (Annexes "G" and "H", Rollo, pp. 21-24).
On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying both
the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for
reconsideration (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 28).
Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above orders.
In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we considered the People of the
Philippines impleaded and required the Solicitor General to comment on
the petition.
Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's comments, which we treated
internally as an anwer, and dispensing with the filing of briefs or
memoranda, we resolved to declare the case submitted for decision.
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose application for
probation was granted after conviction of the crime of estafa may still
withdraw such application for probation and within the reglementary
period appeal the judgment of conviction.
In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal the
respondent court relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) as amended
which considers an application for probation of a convicted accused to
be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal.
And now, the question before us is whether or not such a waiver or
withdrawal is irrevocable.
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding application of the
"waiver rule" under the Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent
court in granting the application for probation and denying the prayer to
withdraw, failed to take into account the fact that the petitioners' counsel
of record was not present when the petitioners applied for probation.
True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by the
court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted with
their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible
appeal when he advised them about the effects of the application for
probation. More so when we consider the thin line that divides a criminal
case for estafa and a civil case for collection of a debt.
And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after the petitioner
discussed their case with a brother-in-law, Judge Eladio C. Sequi of the
Municipal Court of Carranglaan, Nueva Ecija, the petitioners filed their
notice of appeal upon the Judge's advice. It must be noted that the notice
of appeal was filed just seven (7) days after the promulgation of the
decision.
Considering that the application for probation is an admission of guilt on
the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and that the application for probation is considered a waiver
upon his part to file an appeal, it is in the best interests of justice that the
court should take the necessary steps to insure that the accused has
been fully apprised of the full import of his application before the court
acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation
and application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the
decision was promulgated and approved the formal application the
following day without taking steps to be informed that the petitioners
were aware of the full import of their application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the
Probation System was envisioned among other things, "to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence" (Section 2(b),
Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered
"penitent offenders." They appeared to have improvidently filed their
application for probation and should be allowed to withdraw it and to
appeal the decision.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he observes that:
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer which is the reason for
probation unless there is a willingness on his part to right the wrong he
has committed. Probation is envisioned for the accused. He may or may
not avail of its benefits. Although probation is founded on consent,
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 132

waiver and/or contract, public policy requires that interpretational

objectives set forth in Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 968 be given
full effect. Probation cannot therefore be forced or compelled on a
convict. To permit this would only serve to invite its violation. Instead, a
greater emphasis should be exerted in securing the probationer's
effective participation in society's major social institution.

Since 'probation is an island of technicalities surrounded by sea of

discretion' (Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Galsheen, 'See What Condition
Your Condition Are In,' Federal Probation, XXXV (June 1971)', it should,
therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the accused (herein
petitioners). Having opted to discontinue with the application for
probation in its initial stages and prior to the submission of a post
sentence investigation report and within the period interposed an appeal
from the adverse decision, petitioners should be allowed to withdraw
their application for probation and pursue their right to appeal therefrom.

The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality

towards the accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. Probation is a major step taken
by our Government towards the deterrence and minimizing of crime and
the humanization of criminal justice. In fine with the public policy behind
probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the
moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal
and probation spring from the same policy considerations of justice,
humanity, and compassion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby

GRANTED. The Orders dated June 23, 1982, July 6, 1982 and August
19, 1982 of the respondent court are nullified and set aside. The
respondent court is directed to give due course to the petitioners' notice
of appeal.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 133
G.R. No. 114343 December 28, 1995
ANGELO CAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FE ALBANO MADRID, et al. and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals1 dated November 11, 1993, denying petitioner's
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
restraining order, to challenge the orders of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 21) of Santiago, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 0822, entitled
"People vs. Angelo Cal".
The facts of the case are as follows: After an information for illegal
recruitment was filed with the aforementioned trial court on September
5, 1990, petitioner posted bail for his provisional liberty. On June 8,
1992, a decision was rendered in the aforesaid criminal case wherein
the petitioner herein was found guilty of violation of Article 36(a) of the
Labor Code as amended [illegal recruitment], and sentenced to, among
other things, suffer imprisonment of four years and pay a fine of
P20,000. The decision was promulgated on July 15, 1992, in the
presence of the petitioner, after which he was committed to jail by virtue
of an order of commitment issued the same day. The following day, July
16, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, filed with the court a quo an
application for probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an application
for release on recognizance. Also on the same day, the trial court issued
an order directing the petitioner to report to the Provincial Probation and
Parole Officer, and for the latter to conduct an investigation of the
applicant and submit his report and recommendation within sixty days.
Almost two weeks later, on July 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the trial
court a "Motion to Withdraw Application for Probation and Notice of
Appeal", alleging that he "hastily filed his application 'because of the
threats employed upon him by the authorities' and that 'he was not able
to intelligently consult with his lawyer and reflect on the legal
consequences and effects of his application for probation under the law'
so that he may not be considered to have waived his right to appeal the
decision" (decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 52). On account of the serious nature
of said allegations, the lower court conducted a full-blown hearing to
verify the petitioner's allegations. However, the court denied petitioner's
motion to withdraw application, etc. on November 20, 1992, when it was
determined that the accusations were baseless, and that petitioner's
counsel did in fact properly advise him as to the effects and
consequences of appeal and of probation, and that, notwithstanding
such advice, in the words of the trial court —
. . . (t)he accused chose the easy way out which was to apply for
probation in order that he will not be detained because he could not post
his bailbond. But later he went to talk to his employer Dindo Vales in
Manila. He was induced to appeal. Understandably so because in the
decision it was also found out that the recruitment activities of Dindo
Vales and his placement agency did not have any license to recruit.
It is unfortunate that the accused in attempting to withdraw his
application for probation, would impute negligence, misconduct, fraud
and worst threats upon his lawyer and a personnel of the Court whose
only fault was to help him and accommodate his lawyer's request. The
accused would feign ignorance and stupidity in not knowing what he was
doing when in fact his mind was working in a diabolical way by imputing
fraud and wrongdoing in others. What simply happened here was that
the accused decided to apply for probation because it was an easy way
to avoid being detained in jail, to avoid the trouble of putting up a
bailbond; to avoid further expenses of counsel and to end the case once
and for all without suffering incarceration. But after his employer induced
him to appeal, helped him to post his bail bond and perhaps even
provided him with another counsel, the accused changed his mind. He
was fully aware and he knew what he was doing. He was properly
advised by his lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for
probation, he would lost his right to appeal although of course he was
given contrary advice by his employer in Manila. It would be a dangerous
precedent to allow the accused to make a mockery of the Probation Law.
The case of Yusi vs. Morales2 cannot apply to him.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal is
DENIED. The convict Angelo Cal is directed to make manifest his desire
to pursue his application for probation by reporting to the Probation and
Parole Officer, Cauayan, Isabela, within 72 hours from receipt of this
order, otherwise he will be ordered to serve his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal from the
Order dated November 20, 1992", which was denied by the court a quo
on January 4, 1993, on the ground that petitioner had availed of the
benefits of the Probation Law and therefore cannot avail of the remedy
of appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the last-mentioned
order was likewise denied through an order dated June 1, 1993.
Then petitioner filed on July 9, 1993 a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for restraining order, with the respondent
Court of Appeals, which denied due course to and dismissed the same
in its Decision of November 11, 1993. A motion for reconsideration
thereof was also denied, for having been filed out of time by 23 days.
Hence this petition before us.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Court "gravely erred and abused its
discretion" (a) in affirming the trial court's order of July 15, 1992 for
petitioner's immediate confinement to jail after promulgation of judgment
but before same became final and executory, i.e., prior to the lapse of
the period for filing appeal, notwithstanding that petitioner had posted
bail, and (b) in affirming the trial court's order of November 20, 1992
which denied petitioner's motion to withdraw his application for probation
and which did not give due course to his notice of appeal (petition, pp.
7, 11).
After deliberating on the petition, the public respondent's comment
thereon filed by the Solicitor General, and petitioner's reply to comment,
this Court is convinced that the petition is unmeritorious.
With respect to the first issue, there is no dispute that, as a rule, and
unless the trial court directs otherwise, the bail bond posted by an
accused remains in force at all stages of the case until its final
determination. Now, in this case, since the trial court, immediately after
the promulgation of judgment (and without waiting for the finality
thereof), issued a commitment order despite petitioner's being out on
bail, petitioner should have challenged the legality of such commitment
order. However, instead of doing so, petitioner, after having been
properly advised by counsel on the effects and consequences of
probation, voluntarily — and with the assistance of counsel — filed an
application for probation, along with an affidavit of recognizance and an
application for release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioner's
actuations thus foreclosed his right to appeal.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation, was
amended by P.D. 1990 in order to make appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.3 Thus, Sec. 4 provides specifically that "(T)he filing
of the application (for probation) shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal".
The purpose of the amendment [of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 by P.D. 1990]
was, precisely, to prohibit an application for probation if the accused has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction [and vice versa].
xxx xxx xxx
P.D. No. 1990 [which took effect on January 15, 1986] was issued when
it was observed that even if a person's conviction was finally affirmed
after he had exhausted the appeal process (usually up to this Court), he
nevertheless could still apply for probation and thus in effect undo such
affirmance. To prevent loss of time, money, and effort on the part of the
State in this wasteful exercise, the law was amended to make appeal
and probation mutually exclusive remedies. (Bernardo vs. Balagot,
supra.)
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 134

And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal and
probation, respectively, are diametrically opposed. This is because an
accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment in fact, ". . . the application for probation is an admission of
guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment
of conviction and . . . the application for probation is considered a waiver
upon his part to file an appeal, . . .4

Thus, in this case, the petitioner's application for probation had the effect
of a final determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail bond.
Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals could not have done
otherwise than to affirm the trial court's order of July 15, 1992 for
petitioner's immediate confinement after promulgation of judgment, in
view of the subsequent application for probation which rendered the said
judgment final and immediately executory.

As for the second issue, although petitioner insists on faulting the courts
a quo for denying his motion to withdraw his application for probation
and rejecting his notice of appeal, his position is nonetheless untenable.
The respondent Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court's order
of November 20, 1992, denying the petitioner's motion to withdraw his
application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal, partook of
the nature of an order granting probation, which is not appealable.

Inasmuch as "(P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant rests upon the
discretion of the court . . . (and) the grant of probation is . . . not automatic
or ministerial"5, and considering further that "(a)n order granting or
denying probation shall not be appealable"6, therefore, the appellate
Court correctly affirmed the trial court's order of November 20, 1992, and
denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, etc.

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolves

to DENY the instant petition, petitioner having failed to show any
reversible error committed by the respondent appellate Court. No costs.

Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 135
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance
Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the
same corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated
check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of
P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner
alone, since jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had
thoughtfully fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision
correccional and to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner was also required to
reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of
suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him,
petitioner through counsel orally manifested that he was taking an
appeal. Having been so notified, the trial court on the same day ordered
the forwarding of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9
July 1987, petitioner through his counsel received from the Court of
Appeals a notice to file his Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time within which to
file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. 1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized
by his then counsel of record, sought advice from another counselor. On
30 November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel,
filed in the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not,
however, accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case had
already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and Petition
for Probation" dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition
for Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner asked
the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the
alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with
the records of the criminal case, for consideration and approval under
P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same time, petitioner prayed that the
running of the period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in
abeyance until after the Court of Appeals shall have acted on his Petition
for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the
Court of Appeals, petitioner formally withdrew his appeal conditioned,
however, on the approval of his Petition for Probation. 2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that it had no objection to
petitioner Llamado's application for probation. Private respondent-
complainant, upon the other hand, sought and obtained leave to file a
Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for probation, to which
Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his
"Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18
March 1988.
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr.
Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion
was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted
a concurring opinion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988, with another,
briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the
majority in the Court of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the
dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application
for probation which was filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with
the trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the
Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file
Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief
had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but before
actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated
on 24 July 1976. Section 4 of this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the execution
of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could
grant an application for probation "at any time" "after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the
application for probation was "deemed [to constitute] automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D.
No. 1257 so as to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
court may, senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the
filing of the application for probation and he may submit his comment on
such application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court,
with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after
the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be
acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate
court. (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals
that it had established a prolonged but definite period during which an
application for probation may be granted by the trial court. That period
was: 'After [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence." Clearly, the cut-
off time-commencement of service of sentence-takes place not only
after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even
after judgement has been rendered by the appellate court and after
judgment has become final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as
amended by P.D. No. 1257 provides that "the application [for probation]
shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the
appellate court"; for the appellate court might have increased or reduced
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 136
the original penalty imposed by the trial court. It would seem beyond
dispute then that had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the
statute as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner
Llamado's application for probation would have had to be granted. Mr.
Llamado's application for probation was filed well before the cut-off time
established by Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976
was once again amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so amended
and in its present form, Section 4 reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting
an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphasis supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its
present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after
[the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and —
within the period for perfecting an appeal — ." As if to provide emphasis,
a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It
is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the
phrase which said that the filing of an application for probation means
"the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The deletion is quite
logical since an application for probation can no longer be filed once an
appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that
would have to be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner
Llamado was convicted by the trial court), to the instant case, we must
then inquire whether petitioner Llamado had submitted his application
for probation "within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put a little
differently, the question is whether by the time petitioner Llamado's
application was filed, he had already "perfected an appeal" from the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation
of B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122
that such appeal is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal
with the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed
from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the Philippines.
As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally and in open
court his intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment
of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of
appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an
appeal" and the clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current form, should
not be interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court;
and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did
not specify a period of fifteen (15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is
also urged that "the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No.
1990) should not apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation
at the earliest opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice
Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have
recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal laws
[should] be liberally construed in favor of the accused," and to avoid "a
too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which
would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the [probation
law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of
petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to
persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the
trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as
indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest
opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses
invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period.
There was absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to
that period for the operative words of Section 4 already do refer, in our
view, to such fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of the operative language of
the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent
they articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new
enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but
clearly changed the substantive content of Section 4 existing before the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot
control the specific terms of the statute; in the instant case, the whereas
clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms
of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for
perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish
specification for the loose language "first opportunity" employed in the
fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a term of
art but it is a term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and
Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to judges and
lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the
meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the law-
making agency could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those
words in the context of procedural law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal
statutes, we note at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that
any statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal
case should be given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however, have no
authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law" where
the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe
that "the spirit of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words
which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our
procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given
effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind,
however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect
are to be derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and
not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of
and transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation
rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which
too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the
meaning which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated
the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the
text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face.
The Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no
need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to
engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects
the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 137

statute. The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds
it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. SO ORDERED.
Court of First Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in
application will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:

. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so

as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is
in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts,
cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until
lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning
of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction. 6

The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our

people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated.

There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read
a statute as the legislative authority wrote it, not as he would prefer it to
have been written. The words to be given meaning whether they be
found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the
authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If
judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of
the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will
effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their
authority and discretion. Once a judge goes beyond the clear and
ordinary import of the words of the legislative authority, he is essentially
on uncharted seas. In a polity like ours which enshrines the fundamental
notion of limiting power through the separation and distribution of
powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest they substitute their
conceptions or preferences of policy for that actually projected by the
legislative agency. Where a judge believes passionately that he knows
what the legislative agency should have said on the particular matter
dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the conclusion
that therefore that was what the law-making authority was really saying
or trying to say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:

Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are
confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its particular
exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the constraints
imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter
of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in
construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy
has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly
admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the
limitations A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making
might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read
out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7

Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as

amended has vested in the trial court the authority to grant the
application for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
entertain the same and should have (as he had prayed in the alternative)
remanded instead the records to the lower court. Once more, we are not
persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner
perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a
position to remand the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover,
having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not
at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to
him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have
reached, that is, that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost
when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678

is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 138
G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Morlando J. Gonzaga for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition to review by certiorari the order dated December 21,
1981 of respondent Pacito G. Mutia, 1 then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Court (now Municipal Trial Court) of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental, which imposed as a condition in granting probation to
petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon that she refrain from continuing with
her teaching profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral
Defamation by the then Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental,
then presided by respondent Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with
and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore,
principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) and the
appellate court, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her rank
and age and the fact that the crime was committed in the office of the
complainant in the public school building of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental
where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
during office hours, increased the penalty imposed by respondent judge
and sentenced petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On the same
date petitioner applied for probation with respondent judge who referred
the application to a Probation Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation
Report favorably recommended the granting of petitioner's probation for
a period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting
petitioner's probation, but modified the Probation Officer's
recommendation by increasing the period of probation to five (5) years
and by imposing the following conditions: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) To present herself to the jprobation officer designated to
undertake her supervision at such place as may be specified in the order
within seventy- two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place
designated by the Probation Officer at least once a month in person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer
and not change her residence without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and place of
work or an authorized Social Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of
the defendant and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible
with her freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession.
Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition was rejected by
respondent judge. Hence, the petition at bar alleging grave abuse of
discretion in the imposition of the said condition that petitioner should
"refrain from continuing her teaching profession." The petitioner submits
that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but
is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of
the probation law and prays that the said condition be deleted from the
order granting her probation. On petitioner's motion, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing
the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be
classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law,
require that the probationer should (a) present himself to the probation
officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be
specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b)
report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are
those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the
Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison.
The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are
liberal in character 2 and enable courts to designate practically any term
it chooses as long as the probationer's constitutional rights are not
jeopardized. 3 There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant
to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special
or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive
and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in
their application and each case should be judged on its own merits —
on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. 4
The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial
courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she knows
and as such she possesses special skills and qualifications. Thus, she
was designated as District Guidance Coordinator and always
designated as District-in-Charge whenever the District Supervisor is out
of town. She is usually selected to represent her district in seminars,
meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study
and Development. It also appears that she is an outstanding member of
the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council, having served as Physical
Education & Girl Scout Field Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District
Girl Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of the Distinct Federated Girl
Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource person in District
and Division Level Girl Scout encampments and re-elected Board
Member of the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the
petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the students and the
school in general the benefits that may be derived from her training and
expertise. While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 5 Equal regard to the
demands of justice and public interest must be observed. 6 In this case,
teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of
petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling
and occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in
teaching would practically prevent her from complying with the terms of
the probation.
Respondents contend that petitioner's final conviction carries with it the
accessory penalties in addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment;
and since petitioner was sentenced to arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, she must likewise
suffer the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner,
however, because she was granted probation. The imposition of her
sentence of imprisonment was thereby suspended and necessarily, the
imposition of the accessory penalties was likewise thereby suspended.
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is
rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. 7 It is not a
final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 139

conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision

of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. 8

In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the petition and hereby
orders that paragraph (h) of the questioned order granting probation
which requires that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession be deleted. The temporary restraining order is hereby made
permanent. No costs.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 140
G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990
MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer, Manila
Probation Office No. 4, respondents.
Coronet Law Office for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the
reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984 of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch XX.
1 The decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss
and/or strike out motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru
counsel, should be, as it is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the
picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her
United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3,
1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case
No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The
dispositive portion of the judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Manuel Bala y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of a public or official document defined and penalized under
article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE
(1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS,
SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional,
to pay a fine of Pl,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 for each day, and to pay the cost. He
shall be credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may
have undergone in accordance with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April
9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment, 2 the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the
respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was
then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the
terms and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his
supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence
from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Piñas specifically 33
Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's
request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on
August 10, 1983, 3 one year after the order granting the same was
issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the
respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the
conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines,
through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion
to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent
judge. 4
The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on
the ground that he was no longer under probation, 5 his probation period
having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As
such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the
petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January
6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time
attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. 6
The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation,"
dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not
pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was
submitting a supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation
of probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over
his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired.
Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the venue
of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC
of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality
of Las Piñas the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13,
P.D. No. 968, which provides
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the
jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the
Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such
a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other
pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter.
the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously
possessed by the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which
amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which
went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect
because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the
motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which
disposed of only the issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence. The
motion did not touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation.
The respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence, much
less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General submits that
the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before
the final discharge of the probationer by the court, contrary to the
petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and
upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation
officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically
terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 141
found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous
with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation
officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be
deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not
to exceed the period set in the law. This is so because the period of
probation, like the period of incarceration, is deemed the appropriate
period for the rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a
review of the records compels a revocation of the probation without the
need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only
be an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow
the petitioner to further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite
with responsible society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to
give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope — hope
for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun
the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not
reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the
probationer because he (probation officer) is in the best position to report
all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical condition
of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and
community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary.
Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the
supervision and reform of the probationer through a personalized,
individualized, and community-based rehabilitation program for a
specific period of time. On the basis of his final report, the court can
determine whether or not the probationer may be released from
probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had
neglected to submit his report and recommendation. For, as earlier
discussed, without this report, the trial court could not issue the order of
final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order of final discharge
which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the
absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist,
unless otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are
going to do. We are revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be
emancipated from the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging
to faithfully comply with the conditions of his probation, among which
are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of
society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and
rehabilitation that will be prescribed by the Probation Officer. 9
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This
non-compliance has defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to
wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by
providing him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed
the probation program. Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to
rehabilitate and reintegrate himself as a productive, law abiding, and
socially responsible member of society, he continued in his wayward
ways — falsifying public or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner,
along with two other persons, Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren
Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official
documents (U.S. Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171,
of the Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court
imposed upon each of them in all five (5) cases a prison term of "two (2)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years also of prison
correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory
penalties thereof, and to pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification by granting
restitution of the amounts they collected from the offended private
parties. The judgment has since become final. As a matter of fact, for
failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment despite
notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July 10, 1989.
A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this
warrant has not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These
facts are evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his
probation. Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling.
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation.
The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be
brought before the court for a hearing which may be informal and
summary, of the violation charged. ... If the violation is established, the
court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions
thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the
sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable. 11
(Emphasis supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer
be arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The
expiration of the probation period of one year is of no moment, there
being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither
can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the
penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-
one days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on
"probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the
imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final judgment but an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the
convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if
the conditions are violated." 13
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or
immunity conferred by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed
by others or by all; special enjoyment of a good or exemption from an
evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to some persons. 14
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
15 If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the
petitioner, the State is not barred from revoking such a privilege.
Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if probation is not
revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of
residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from
the Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. 16 Such being the
case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the
probation case. To uphold the petitioner's contention would mean a
depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first
place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused applied
for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas
as he is up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out
earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33
Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. 17 On the other hand, pursuing the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 142

petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would mean

that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the
Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a
resident of Las Piñas.

It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode

compels change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner,
to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the
apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las
Piñas is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital
Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say,
the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court,
forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. 19
Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati
or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-
equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the
case does not attach to the branch or judge. 20 Therefore, in this case,
RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost
control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner.

The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to

transfer residence from his probation officer.1âwphi1 This would not
suffice the law is very explicit in its requirement of a prior court approval
in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees that the
probationer must

xxx

(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his

residence without its prior written approval;

xxx

Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of

August 11, 1982 as one of the conditions of probation, to wit:

(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said

address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than
twenty-four (24) hours without first securing prior written approval of his
Probation Officer.

In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious
administration of justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for
violations of the conditions of his probation, instead of remanding the
case to the trial court and having the parties start all over again in
needless protracted proceedings. 22

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the

petitioner is hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner and for him to serve the
sentence originally imposed without any deduction. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 143
G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990
AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON.
ANTONIO SOLANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-
Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN, respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled, "Agustin
Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.," which affirmed the Order
dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18, 1987
directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability of
herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in
Criminal Case No. 0-33798 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin
Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 86).
After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO,
JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical
injuries, defined and penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor the following
mitigating circumstances:
1) voluntary surrender; and
2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence
(sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months
and twenty (20) days, with the accessories provided for by law, and to
indemnify the victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50
as actual or compensatory damages, and the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages for the incapacity of Francisco Lukban to pursue and engage
in his poultry business.
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with
the trial court. The application was granted in an Order dated April 15,
1987. The order contained, among others, the following condition:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly
installment of P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month
during the entire period of his probation. (p. 15, Rollo)
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October,
1987, petitioner complied with the above condition by paying in checks
the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly, through the City Probation Officer,
Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily
accepted the checks and subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of
the civil liability adjudged in his favor in the criminal case. The motion
was opposed by the petitioner.
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the
motion for issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioner but it was denied on December 22, 1987. After
the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly
with this Court a petition for review of the trial court's order granting the
motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
but respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated
August 3, 1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which was filed
on September 26, 1989 and raised the following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION
OF OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS
CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR
ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS
UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10, Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting private
respondent's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, respondent
Court of Appeals advanced three (3) reasons: 1) that the decision dated
October 16, 1986 had become final and executory and the judge who
rendered the decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear
that the probation law provides only for the suspension of sentence
imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no beating on his civil
liability and that none of the conditions listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law relates to civil liability; and 3) that private respondent is
not estopped because he had nothing to do with the filing and the
granting of the probation.
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal
Case No. Q-33798 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of serious physical injuries had become final and executory
because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is
deemed a waiver of his right to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968).
Likewise, the judgment finding petitioner liable to private respondent for
P126,633.50 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as consequential
damages had also become final because no appeal was taken
therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of the trial court to alter or
modify. In the case of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31,
1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422-423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was
held:
. . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it
cannot lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et al.,
G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29, 1956), especially, considering the fact that,
as in the instant case, the alteration or modification is material and
substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L-12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In the case
of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking et al., 11 Phil. 276, (cited by
respondents), it was held that "where a final judgment of an executory
character had been rendered in a suit the mission of the court is limited
to the execution and enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its
parts and in accordance with its express orders." The judgment in
question is clear, and with the amended writ of execution, the liability of
petitioner is greatly augmented, without the benefit of proper
proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 granting
the application for probation and imposing some conditions therein
altered or modified the decision dated October 16, 1986. The April 15,
1987 Order of the trial court granting the application for probation and
providing as one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify
private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did
not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but
merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil
liability during the period of probation.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 144
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v.
Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935. We already ruled
that "(T)he 'conviction and sentence' clause of the statutory definition
clearly signifies that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the
case."
The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the criminal
aspect of the case" should not be given a literal meaning. Interpreting
the phrase within the context of that case, it means that although the
execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of probation, it does
not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.
This can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok case where
the issue that was involved therein was whether a grant of probation
carries with it the extinction of the civil liability of the offender. The reason
for ruling that the grant of probation does not extinguish the civil liability
of the offender is clear, "(T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are
governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal Code
where under Article 113 thereof provides that: '. . . , the offender shall
continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other lights, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence, or any other reason.'" In the instant case, the
issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability of a probationer
but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation
the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the
offended party during the period of probation.
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation Law
enumerates thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of which relates
to the civil liability of the offender (p. 22, Rollo).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976)
provides:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best.
In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al., G.R.
No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that the conditions
listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law are not exclusive. Courts
are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation
being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused.
Courts may impose conditions with the end that these conditions would
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding individual. Thus,
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be
classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law,
require that probationer should a) present himself to the probation officer
designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be
specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and b)
report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are
those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the
Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison.
The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are
liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term
it chooses as long as the probationer's constitutional rights are not
jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant
to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special
or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive
and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in
their application, and each case should be judged on its own merits —
on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. . .
..
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation of the
probationer. That is why, under the law, a post sentence investigation,
which is mandatory, has to be conducted before a person can be
granted probation to help the court in determining whether the ends of
justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be
served by the granting of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig, Post
Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP Journal, Special
Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-387). In the case of People v.
Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458 (1933), among those which
has to be ascertained is the financial condition and capacity of the
offender to meet his obligations:
. . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there is at
least a willingness on his part to right the wrong committed, and the
effect of such an act upon the individual is of inestimable value, and to
a large extent, determines whether there has been any real reformation.
To be clearly consonant with such a purpose, the post sentence
investigation must include a financial examination of the offender's
capability in order to work out a system of payment which can effectively
accomplish reimbursement without interfering with the defendant's
family and other financial responsibilities, according to U.S. Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute. . . . (Sec. 301.1 Comments
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney
General's Survey of Release Procedures 38 (1939) cited in The Period
and Conditions of Probation by Sergio F. Go, IBP Journal Special Issue
on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420). (Emphasis ours)
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order
granting probation "as it may deem best." As already stated, it is not only
limited to those listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law. Thus,
under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and
Procedures, among the conditions which may be imposed in the order
granting probation is:
Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order may also
require the probationer in appropriate cases, to:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the victim
or his heirs . . . .
However, this is not to say that the manner by which the probationer
should satisfy the payment of his civil liability in a criminal case during
the probation period may be demanded at will by him. It is necessary
that the condition which provides for a program of payment of his civil
liability will address the offender's needs and capacity. Such need may
be ascertained from the findings and recommendations in the post-
sentence investigation report submitted by the Probation Officer after
investigation of the financial capacity of the offender and that such
condition is to the end that the interest of the state and the reformation
of the probationer is best served.
In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is
presumed that when the trial court issued the order of April 15, 1987, the
condition that the petitioner has to pay private respondent P2,000.00 a
month for the satisfaction of the civil liability adjudged against him was
recommended by the probation officer who prepared the post-sentence
investigation and that such condition is, in the judgment of the trial court,
"deemed best" under the circumstances.
Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting
probation which under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11,
P.D. 968), the probation period must have lapsed by now. Hence, the
order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in the amount of
P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation must have also lapsed.
If such were the case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for
the private respondent to enforce the execution of the balance of the
civil liability of the petitioner. However, the records are bereft of
allegations to this effect.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated March
16, 1989 of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the order of the trial
court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as well
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 145
as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the same court are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 968 July 24, 1976
ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, one of the major goals of the government is to establish a
more enlightened and humane correctional systems that will promote
the reformation of offenders and thereby reduce the incidence of
recidivism;
WHEREAS, the confinement of all offenders prisons and other
institutions with rehabilitation programs constitutes an onerous drain on
the financial resources of the country; and
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide a less costly alternative to the
imprisonment of offenders who are likely to respond to individualized,
community-based treatment programs;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order and decree the following:
Section 1. Title and Scope of the Decree. This Decree shall be known
as the Probation Law of 1976. It shall apply to all offenders except those
entitled to the benefits under the provisions of Presidential Decree
numbered Six Hundred and three and similar laws.
Section 2. Purpose. This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing
him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender
which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.
Section 3. Meaning of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall,
unless the context otherwise requires, be construed thus:
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction
and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court
and to the supervision of a probation officer.
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a
referral for probation or supervises a probationer or both.
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. No person shall be placed on
probation except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a
determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best interest
of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.
Section 6. Form of Investigation Report. The investigation report to be
submitted by the probation officer under Section 5 hereof shall be in the
form prescribed by the Probation Administrator and approved by the
Secretary of Justice.
Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. The probation
officer shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant
not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct
the investigation. The court shall resolve the petition for probation not
later than five days after receipt of said report.
Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the
petition, the defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his
bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was
filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow
the release of the defendant on recognize the custody of a responsible
member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance
whenever required by the court.
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In determining
whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall
consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents,
environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and
available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be
denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender
will commit another crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day
and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the
court shall contain conditions requiring that the probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within
seventy-two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer.
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) meet his family responsibilities;
(c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said
employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer;
(d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and
treatment and enter and remain in a specified institution, when required
for that purpose;
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 146
(e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
(f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or
residence of persons on probation;
(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;
(h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;
(i) permit to probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his
home and place or work;
(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence
without its prior written approval; or
(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the
defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with
his freedom of conscience.
Section 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take
effect upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender
of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply
with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission
of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense
under which he was placed on probation.
Section 12. Modification of Condition of Probation. During the period of
probation, the court may, upon application of either the probationer or
the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of
probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or the probation
officer of the filing such an application so as to give both parties an
opportunity to be heard thereon.
The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer
of any change in the period or conditions of probation.
Section 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. The probationer and
his probation program shall be under the control of the court who placed
him on probation subject to actual supervision and visitation by a
probation officer.
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the
jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of that place, and in such
a case, a copy of the probation order, the investigation report and other
pertinent records shall be furnished said Executive Judge. Thereafter,
the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously
possessed by the court which granted the probation.
Section 14. Period of Probation.
(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and
in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six years.
(b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to
serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of
probation shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total
number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate
established, in Article thirty-nine of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Section 15. Arrest of Probationer; Subsequent Disposition. At any time
during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a
probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought
before the court for a hearing, which may be informal and summary, of
the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending
such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail of
persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers
arrested under this provision. If the violation is established, the court
may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof.
If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying
the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.
Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and
upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation
officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a
copy of such order.
Section 17. Confidentiality of Records. The investigation report and the
supervision history of a probationer obtained under this Decree shall be
privileged and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other
than the Probation Administration or the court concerned, except that
the court, in its discretion, may permit the probationer of his attorney to
inspect the aforementioned documents or parts thereof whenever the
best interest of the probationer make such disclosure desirable or
helpful: Provided, Further, That, any government office or agency
engaged in the correction or rehabilitation of offenders may, if
necessary, obtain copies of said documents for its official use from the
proper court or the Administration.
Section 18. The Probation Administration. There is hereby created
under the Department of Justice an agency to be known as the
Probation Administration herein referred to as the Administration, which
shall exercise general supervision over all probationers.
The Administration shall have such staff, operating units and personnel
as may be necessary for the proper execution of its functions.
Section 19. Probation Administration. The Administration shall be
headed by the Probation Administrator, hereinafter referred to as the
Administrator, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. He shall hold office during good behavior and shall not be
removed except for cause.
The Administrator shall receive an annual salary of at least forty
thousand pesos. His powers and duties shall be to:
(a) act as the executive officer of the Administration;
(b) exercise supervision and control over all probation officers;
(c) make annual reports to the Secretary of Justice, in such form as the
latter may prescribe, concerning the operation, administration and
improvement of the probation system;
(d) promulgate, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, the
necessary rules relative to the methods and procedures of the probation
process;
(e) recommend to the Secretary of Justice the appointment of the
subordinate personnel of his Administration and other offices
established in this Decree; and
(f) generally, perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be
necessary or incidental to achieve the objectives of this Decree.
Section 20. Assistant Probation Administrator. There shall be an
Assistant Probation Administrator who shall assist the Administrator
perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the latter and as may
be provided by law. In the absence of the Administrator, he shall act as
head of the Administration.
He shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall
receive an annual salary of at least thirty-six thousand pesos.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 147
Section 21. Qualifications of the Administrator and Assistant Probation
Administrator. To be eligible for Appointment as Administrator or
Assistant Probation Administrator, a person must be at least thirty-five
years of age, holder of a master's degree or its equivalent in either
criminology, social work, corrections, penology, psychology, sociology,
public administration, law, police science, police administration, or
related fields, and should have at least five years of supervisory
experience, or be a member of the Philippine Bar with at least seven
years of supervisory experience.
Section 22. Regional Office; Regional Probation Officer. The
Administration shall have regional offices organized in accordance with
the field service area patterns established under the Integrated
Reorganization Plan.
Such regional offices shall be headed by a Regional Probation Officer
who shall be appointed by President of the Philippines in accordance
with the Integrated Reorganization Plan and upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice.
The Regional Probation Officer shall exercise supervision and control
over all probation officer within his jurisdiction and such duties as may
assigned to him by the Administrator. He shall have an annual salary of
at least twenty-four thousand pesos.
He shall, whenever necessary, be assisted by an Assistant Regional
Probation Officer who shall also be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, with an
annual salary of at least twenty thousand pesos.
Section 23. Provincial and City Probation Officers. There shall be at least
one probation officer in each province and city who shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Administrator
and in accordance with civil service law and rules.
The Provincial or City Probation Officer shall receive an annual salary of
at least eighteen thousand four hundred pesos.
His duties shall be to:
(a) investigate all persons referred to him for investigation by the proper
court or the Administrator;
(b) instruct all probationers under his supervision of that of the probation
aide on the terms and conditions of their probations;
(c) keep himself informed of the conduct and condition of probationers
under his charge and use all suitable methods to bring about an
improvement in their conduct and conditions;
(d) maintain a detailed record of his work and submit such written reports
as may be required by the Administration or the court having jurisdiction
over the probationer under his supervision;
(e) prepare a list of qualified residents of the province or city where he
is assigned who are willing to act as probation aides;
(f) supervise the training of probation aides and oversee the latter's
supervision of probationers;
(g) exercise supervision and control over all field assistants, probation
aides and other personnel; and
(h) perform such duties as may be assigned by the court or the
Administration.
Section 24. Miscellaneous Powers of Provincial and City Probation
Officers. Provincial or City Probation Officers shall have the authority
within their territorial jurisdiction to administer oaths and
acknowledgments and to take depositions in connection with their duties
and functions under this Decree. They shall also have, with respect to
probationers under their care, the powers of police officer.
Section 25. Qualifications of Regional, Assistant Regional, Provincial,
and City Probation Officers. No person shall be appointed Regional or
Assistant Regional or Provincial or City Probation Officer unless he
possesses at least a bachelor's degree with a major in social work,
sociology, psychology, criminology, penology, corrections, police
science, administration, or related fields and has at least three years of
experience in work requiring any of the abovementioned disciplines, or
is a member of the Philippine Bar with at least three years of supervisory
experience.
Whenever practicable, the Provincial or City Probation Officer shall be
appointed from among qualified residents of the province or city where
he will be assigned to work.
Section 26. Organization. Within twelve months from the approval of this
Decree, the Secretary of Justice shall organize the administrative
structure of the Administration and the other agencies created herein.
During said period, he shall also determine the staffing patterns of the
regional, provincial and city probation offices with the end in view of
achieving maximum efficiency and economy in the operations of the
probation system.
Section 27. Field Assistants, Subordinate Personnel, Provincial or City
Probation Officers shall be assisted by such field assistants and
subordinate personnel as may be necessary to enable them to carry out
their duties effectively.
Section 28. Probation Aides. To assist the Provincial or City Probation
Officers in the supervision of probationers, the Probation Administrator
may appoint citizens of good repute and probity to act as probation
aides.
Probation Aides shall not receive any regular compensation for services
except for reasonable travel allowance. They shall hold office for such
period as may be determined by the Probation Administrator. Their
qualifications and maximum case loads shall be provided in the rules
promulgated pursuant to this Decree.
Section 29. Violation of Confidential Nature of Probation Records. The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to six
years and a fine ranging from hundred to six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who violates Section 17 hereof.
Section 30. Appropriations. There is hereby authorized the appropriation
of the sum of Six Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos or so much as
may be necessary, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Decree.
Thereafter, the amount of at least Ten Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos or so much as may be necessary shall be included in the annual
appropriations of the national government.
Section 31. Repealing Clause. All provisions of existing laws, orders and
regulations contrary to or inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 32. Separability of Provisions. If any part, section or provision of
this Decree shall be held invalid or unconstitutional, no other parts,
sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby.
Section 33. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon its approval:
Provided, However, That, the application of its substantive provisions
concerning the grant of probation shall only take effect twelve months
after the certification by the Secretary of Justice to the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court that the administrative structure of the Probation
Administration and of the other agencies has been organized.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 148
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
TOTAL EXTINCTION
DEATH OF THE CONVICT
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary
to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May
20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death
of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view
of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal
and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled
in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus:
Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility
and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads,
in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The
law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import
of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished
from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article
132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia
firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon
puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the
words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad
legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de
ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be
any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there
is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p.
421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the
term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states
that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in
the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long
as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico
(November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp.
234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might
be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability."
I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 149
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that
criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action
and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case
where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as
was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by
the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio
Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and
People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view
of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in
view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing
People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by
this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to
the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil
liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished,
in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950
(Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the
revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the
Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case
wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the
accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis
to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had
swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of
the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including
fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of
the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to
his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court
relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the
defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court
of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery
of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be
included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos,
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the
correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the
criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In
doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum
of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action
(People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz,
107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 150
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of
Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of
the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned,
the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan
arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days
of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not
his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned
(Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability
solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination
of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution
of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed
irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability
ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be
that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This
is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on
appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent
of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by
ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as
one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been
filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting
such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal
action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which
does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One
would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex
delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably
signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a
crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal
liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding.
This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article
30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of
this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a
separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more
than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion
of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated
under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing
his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 151
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that
civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant
dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint
of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos
and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where
the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the
component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed
in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against
the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that
money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil
action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by
filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather,
it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the
civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on
other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same
shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict
or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real
or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor
or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that,
in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil
action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused
and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising
from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we
stressed, refers only topurely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 152

offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED

with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 153

G.R. No. 190610 When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes
charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-versus-
SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ,
Accused. The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden
JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, of proof in the cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
Accused-Appellant. drugs, in this case methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as
shabu. The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the
April 25, 2012 performance of duty of the police officials who conducted the buy-bust
x------------------------------------------------x operation. The dispositive portion reads:

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the] accused

Before the Court is an Appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jose
Brillantes y Lopez (Brillantes) assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal
Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558 convicting accused Brillantes and
Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz) for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 entitled An Act Instituting the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act Of 2002.[3]
In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 11556
Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in
Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu with a weight
of 0.0619 gram and is therefore sentenced to serve the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE
(1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay
a fine of P300,000.00.
Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for illegal sale of shabu
and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11558 for
illegal possession of shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.2351 gram
and is therefore further sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have in his possession, control and custody one (1) plastic sachet
containing shabu weighing more or less 0.1 gram including plastic
container without prescription or authority to possess the same in
violation of the aforecited law.[4]
On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 with illegal sale of shabu and illegal
possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The two separate Informations
follow:
The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the same
to be disposed of as the law prescribes. [7]
The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of the trial
court. It upheld that all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs
were present and the finding against Brillantes well established by the
prosecution. Further, it also found that all the elements constituting
illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs were established
beyond reasonable doubt to convict De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the
three charges, great weight was given to the testimonies of the members
of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3 Rovimanuel Balolong
and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer.

On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal[8] was filed by Brillantes through

Criminal Case No. 11557
counsel before the Supreme Court. His co-accused De la Cruz, did not
appeal his conviction.
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division Officer-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
in-Charge Romeo F. Fajardo[9] informed the Court that accused-
sell and deliver to a Public Officer, who acted as poseur buyer 0.1 gram
appellant Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections
including plastic container of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report[10] signed
popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, without any license or
by New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical Officer Benevito A. Fontanilla,
authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited law.[5]
III.

Criminal Case No. 11558

Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his conviction
of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his criminal and pecuniary
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of Laoag, liabilities.
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in
have in his possession, control and custody two (2) big plastic sachet
Article 89(1) that:
containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams including plastic
container without being authorized and permitted by law to possess the
same in violation of the aforecited law.[6] Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 154

It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary SO ORDERED.
penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his death pending
appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,[11] to wit:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes

his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

xxx

There is no civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.[12] No private offended party is involved
as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the decision of the trial
court.

The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal

liability does not have any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did
not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on Criminal Procedure on the
matter states:

RULE 122 - Appeal

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter; (emphasis ours)

xxx

The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary liabilities is

predicated on his death and not on his acquittal. Following the provision,
the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent extinguishment of his
liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz.

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal of

accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897 affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in
Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and
ACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having been
extinguished. No cost.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 155
[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA
JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django,"
"Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No.
2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias
'Ka Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting
him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose
Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al.,
charging them of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in
the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from
his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon,
and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot
ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which
directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for
the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672,
respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted
by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint
trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial
identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the
accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest
in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was
hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be
extinguished and Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was
awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding
a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several
minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct
his companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo
when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on
March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property
of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of
the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew
Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let
her son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only
seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending
to their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force
(CHDF) in their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that
her son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca,
she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was
informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they
saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and
complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days
of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative
of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's
death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was
issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to
identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the
burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the
waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla
who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol,
Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal
cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused
and imposing the following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose
Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo
and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory provided by law and to pay the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards
Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of
his period of detention.
"With cost de-oficio.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone
error allegedly committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN
PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled
"Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who
Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other
Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the
Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission
dated 22 October 1998.[2]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 156
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR.
JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of
Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the
Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the following
armed activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon,
Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay
Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang,
Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at
Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a
case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed against him before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the
community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 was filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his
misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986,
in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of
the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987,
in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at
Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in
which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed against him.
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the
applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were
done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20
May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October
1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty
Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for
rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let
a Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution
becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said
period.'"[3]
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National
Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the
attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to
JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor
of the province, the opportunity to take whatever action you may deem
appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall become
final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this
Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission
by any party within said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4]
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to
the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether
or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action,
if there was any, taken by the NAC.[5]
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among
other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by
any party.[6]
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation
No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons
who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes,
on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but
not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat;
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat;
disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or
insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition;
illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault;
resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such
person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of
means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals;
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed
in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion
and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence
without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or
sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided,
That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other
crimes for personal ends."
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason
or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 157

grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach,

the law of nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.[8]

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon and
amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act

which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised
Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective.
It serves to put an end to the appeal.[10]

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case
No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663

and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon,[12] are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose
N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon
is likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal
cause.

The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his
compliance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 158
[G.R. No. 116512. March 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIAM O.
CASIDO @ MARIO, and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @ ARMAN,
accused-appellants.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that the conditional pardons
granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during
the pendency of their instant appeal, and disposed of the incident as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants Urgent Motion To Withdraw
Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED
to effect, with the support and assistance of the Philippine National
Police, the re-arrest of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin who shall then, forthwith, be reconfined at the New Bilibid
Prisons in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, both within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof, and to submit a report thereon within the same period. In
the meantime, further action on the appeal is suspended until the re-
arrest of the accused-appellants.
The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE,
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, why they should not be held in
contempt of court for acting on and favorably recommending approval
of the applications for the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the
pendency of their appeal.
In a Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee for the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter Committee), dated 28
August 1996, two members of the Committees Secretariat, namely, Nilo
C. Mariano (Assistant Chief Prosecutor) and Nestor J. Ballacillo
(Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General), submitted the following
explanation in compliance with the above-mentioned resolution:
1. In line with the confidence building measures of government, the
President on August 11, 1992 constituted the Presidential Committee for
the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon with the Secretary of Justice as the
Chairman and Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government as members with the directive to
establish guidelines for the grant of bail, release or pardon of persons
detained or convicted of crimes against national security and public
order and violations of the Articles of War. Subsequently, membership
to the Committee was expanded to include the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and a member of the defunct National
Unification Commission who was later on replaced by the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process.
2. On 9 December 1992, the President issued an amendment to the
guidelines incorporating therein a provision which reads: Those
charged, detained or convicted of common crimes but who can establish
by sufficient evidence that they have actually committed any of the
crimes/offenses enumerated above may apply for possible grant of bail,
release or pardon under these guidelines.
3. Corollary to the constitution of the Committee, a Secretariat was also
constituted which was tasked to process and evaluate the applications
of those desiring to be granted pardon or recommended for release or
bail under the aforementioned guidelines and which will recommend to
the Committee those who qualify under the guidelines.
4. The members of the Secretariat are representatives of the Office of
the Chief State Prosecutor, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Office
of the Chief State Counsel, the Bureau of Corrections, the Philippine
National Police Legal Service, the Judge Advocates Office-Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the
Commission on Human Rights (Legal Services).
5. In the processing and evaluation of the applications for the grant of
pardon, release or bail, it was the agreement between the Secretariat
and counsels for the applicants who are usually the lawyers of non-
government organizations (NGOs), such as the Task Force Detainees
of the Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the
KAPATID, PAHRA, among others, that simultaneous with the
processing of the applications, motions for the withdrawal of the
applicants appeals must be filed by them with this Honorable Court.
6. With the arrangement, the processing and evaluation of the
applications for the grant of pardon, release or bail by the committee
resulted in the grant of conditional pardon to 123 applicants and absolute
pardon to eight (8) applicants as of June 27, 1994.
7. The applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed prisoners
were recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant of
Conditional Pardon (after the Secretariat had evaluated that the former
committed the crimes for which they had been charged in pursuit of their
political belief) per Memorandum dated May 25, 1995 and approved by
the President on December 29, 1995. The Conditional Pardon paper
was signed by the President on January 19, 1996 and the subject
prisoners (accused-appellants) were released by the Bureau of
Corrections on January 25, 1996.
8. Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal which was received by the Supreme Court on January
11, 1996. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first whether the
counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO
lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion to Withdraw their Appeal. It was
upon the honest belief of the Secretariat that the NGO lawyers would
perform their agreed undertaking, that the Secretariat indorsed the
applications for conditional pardon of subject prisoners for favorable
action by the Committee, and thereafter by the President.
9. There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the
Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the
Constitution, but that what happened was a clear misappreciation of fact.
10. The Secretariat/Committee was only prompted to act, as they did, in
their sincere and zealous effort to take part in the governments
confidence building measure geared towards achieving peace and
national reconciliation. To avoid repetition of grant of presidential
clemency under similar circumstances, the Secretariat/Committee will
require applicants for any executive relief to show proof that their appeal,
if any, has been withdrawn and the withdrawal thereof has been also
approved before acting on their applications as directed by President
Fidel V. Ramos in his handwritten instructions to the Presidential
Committee, thru the Executive Secretary, and upon recommendation of
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Rene Cayetano, for the Presidential
Committee to exercise better diligence. (See Annex 1, and its
attachments).
11. The undersigned most respectfully pray for the kind indulgence and
understanding of this Honorable Court on the matter.
On 18 September 1996, the Court required Hon. Nilo C. Mariano and
Hon. Nestor J. Ballacillo to submit to this Court a list of the members of
the Secretariat who participated in the deliberations on the accused-
appellants application for pardon and recommended the grant thereof,
together with a certified true copy of the agreement between the
Secretariat and the counsel for the applicants for pardon regarding the
filing with the appropriate courts of motions for the withdrawal of appeals
pending therein. Their Compliance, dated 23 October 1996, stated as
follows:
2. A review of the records of the Secretariat indicates that initially or as
of January, 1993, the members of the Secretariat were:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 159
Undersecretary Ramon S. Esquerra - DOJ
Assistant Chief State Nilo C. Mariano - DOJ
Executive Director Artemio C. Aspiras - DOJ
State Counsel Teresita L. de Castro - DOJ
Director Eriberto Misa, Jr. -Bureau of Pardon Corrections
Edgardo Dayao - JAGO
Pedro Abella - PNP
Samuel M. Soriano, Jr. - CHR
Imelda B. Devila - National Unification Commission
Nestor J. Ballacillo - OSG
3. On February 9-11, 1995, a Working Group was constituted to conduct
and expeditious review of the cases of prisoners in the New Bilibid
Prison who are alleged to have committed crime in pursuit of political
objectives (Resolution No. 1, of the Secretariat Working Group).
4. For this purpose, the Working Group consisting of State Prosecutor
Alberto Vizcocho of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Commissioner
Mercedes V. Contreras of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and
Andrei Bon C. Tagum of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (OPAPP) convened for three days or February 9-11,
1995 to review the cases of the political prisoners.
5. Among the cases reviewed by the Working Group were those of
appellants Franklin Alcorin y Alparo and William Casido y Balcasay.
6. After the review of the cases, the Working Group issued Resolution
No. 1, which states among others that the prisoners [including Alcorin
and Casido] be recommended to the Secretariat of the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Conditional Pardon in view of a determination
that they were charged or convicted of crimes that may have been
committed in pursuit of political objectives. (A copy of Resolution No. 1
is attached hereto as Annex 1).
7. The recommendations on the political prisoners listed in Resolution
No. 1 by the Working Group as well as the recommendations made by
the Secretariat were based on the undertaking of those representing the
political prisoners, particularly the Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs) such as, among others, the Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), KAPATID
and PAHRA who promised that the corresponding withdrawals of appeal
would be filed with this Honorable Court and other Courts concerned.
This undertaking of the NGOs was however verbal and not made in
writing.
8. In recommending the grant of conditional pardon to Alcorin and
Casido, the members of the Secretariat Working Group acted in good
faith and did not disregard the Resolutions of this Honorable Court in
People vs. Hino, Jr., G.R. No. 110035, January 31, 1995 and People vs.
Salle, (250 SCRA 582, December 4, 1995). At the time they made the
recommendations or the Working Group issued Resolution No. 1, the
members of the Secretariat and the Working Group were not aware of
the Hino and Salle rulings. Moreover, at the time the cases were being
reviewed, the members of the Secretariat, were pressed on by members
of the NGOs to act on certain applications for pardon or provisional
release with dispatch. In turn, they made it clear to those following up
the applications that the appropriate withdrawal of appeals should be
filed so that the applications could be acted upon.
9. Believing in good faith that the promise or undertaking of those who
followed up the applications for pardon of Alcorin and Casido would be
complied with as promised, the members of the Secretariat Working
Group did not secure the written commitment for the withdrawal of the
appeal by accused Alcorin and Casido before their applications for
pardon were reviewed.
Earlier, or on 1 October 1996, the Court received from Hon. Manuel C.
Herrera, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, a letter, dated
26 September 1996 addressed to Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
wherein the former informed the Court that the applications for amnesty
of accused-appellants Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido were
favorably acted upon by the National Amnesty Commission on 22
February 1996. The body of the letter reads:
We refer to a newspaper article found in the Philippine Daily Inquirers
August 1, 1996 issue. Please be informed that on February 22, 1996,
the National Amnesty Commission (hereinafter the NAC) favorably
acted on the applications for amnesty of Franklin A. Alcorin and William
O. Casido.
The NAC was created under Proclamation No. 347 by President Fidel
V. Ramos on March 25, 1994, to receive, process, and decide on
applications for amnesty. Under Proclamation No. 347 a grant of
amnesty shall carry with it the extinguishment of any criminal liability for
acts committed by the grantee in pursuit of his or her political beliefs. It
also carries with it the restoration of civil or political rights that may have
been suspended or lost by virtue of a criminal conviction.
In the course of our deliberations, the NAC found that the applicants are
indeed confirmed members of the CPP/NPA/NDF whose killing of
Victoriano Mapa was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs.
We enclose, for ready reference, copies of the following documents:
1. Notice of Resolution for Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido
2. Proclamation No. 347
3. Primer on Amnesty under Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348.
In its Comment to the aforesaid letter (submitted in compliance with our
Resolution of 7 October 1996), the Office of the Solicitor General alleged
that the accused-appellants in this case, in an effort to seek their release
at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well
as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC); then
contended that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after
conviction, as held in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez,[1] the amnesty then
granted accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
rendered moot and academic the question of the premature pardon
granted to them.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In Barrioquinto,[2] we
stated as follows:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or character of an
amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act
of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 160

conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36, Revised
Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been
extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section
19,Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily
applied under Proclamation No. 347,[3] was valid. This Proclamation
was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution
No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin

Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the pardon.

As to the pardon, we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the

Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the absurd that its members
were unaware of the resolutions of this Court in People v. Hinlo[4] and
People v. Salle.[5] As early as 1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada,[6]
cited in our Resolution of 30 July 1996 in this case, already stressed in
no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or
pardon could be extended. Even in their Comment of 28 August 1996,
the Members of the Secretariat implied that they were all the time aware
that a pardon could only be granted after conviction by final judgment;
hence, they required from the lawyers of the applicants the filing with
this Court of motions for the withdrawal of the applicants appeals. Thus,
they cannot plead ignorance of this condition sine qua non to the grant
of pardon. They should have demanded from the applicants the
submission of proof of their compliance of the requirement before
submitting to the President a favorable recommendation. That alone, at
the very least, could have been the basis of a finding of good faith. In
failing to observe due care in the performance of their duties, the
Members of the Committee caused the President serious
embarrassment and thus deserve an admonition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the

release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin
was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this
case is dismissed with costs de oficio.

The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,

Release or Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished to exercise
utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duty to save the
President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to grant
pardon or parole.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 161
G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO
OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission, respondents.
Roseller T. Lim for petitioners.
Antonio Belmonte for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against
the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with
the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case
proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period
for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became
aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which
grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy,
and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date
when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually
committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said
Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other
petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended,
did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission,
prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order
returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch
as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed
the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino
who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of
amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the
President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, reads in
part as follows:
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the
different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer
armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities operated as
guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in
opposition to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the
invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist
the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, committed acts
penalized under the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many
members of these resistance forces, for such acts;
WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the laws of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as
criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered
invaluable service to the nation; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these
persons be freed form the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are
now being subjected;
NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of
the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty inn favor
of al persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal
Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period
from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and
occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to
acts committed from purely personal motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who
among those against whom charges have been filed before the courts
of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the future,
come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions,
simultaneously to be established , shall examine the facts and
circumstance surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct
summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the
accused. These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon
finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the Commissions
shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to
the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an
amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act
of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised
Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6],
Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247;
In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA.,
285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170
Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267;
271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order
to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of
September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense;
it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation
against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 162

the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the
rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with respondents and the writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions
the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation should refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order,
is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and
thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the
the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having committed
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or could not have
such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that
is entitled to said benefits. a Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act
and decide whether the offense with which an accused was charged
comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence
having committed it would be to defeat the purpose for which the
presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense,
Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commission were
can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is
established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of a case
regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not
and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes
only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never
within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant
committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a
has plead not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions
patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts
can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed
of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has
the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the
committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being
benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or
guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person
confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of
considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having
justices in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not
rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act.
come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few
would take the risk of submitting their case to said Commission.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged
was against chastity and was committed in furtherance of the resistance
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that
against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that is
the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito ,
has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true
does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the
that though the motive as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective,
summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused,
it need not be testified to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or
directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No.
hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an
11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the victim, either
offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
as principals by cooperation, inducement or conspiration, or as
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission
accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to
of the offense, deeds or words hat may express it or from which his
the benefits of amnesty, because they were members of the same group
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement of
of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the
testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the
enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
case about said motive, can not generally be considered and relied on,
specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of
the reason o motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed
Because such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or to hear and decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto
colored by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez,
for which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the
unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.
committed the offense with which he is charged, and states that he did
it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not for purely
personal motive, it is impossible for the court of Commission to verify the
motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused
could explain of the offense, because only the accused could explain his
belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense.

There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the

commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty Commission may
investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact
that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which
he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof.
Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or
complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal
proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether
or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not
having committed the offense made by an accused simply means that
he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty
thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he
has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons a ding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political
motives.

According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating

the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the Philippines,
cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the province in which
the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases
already decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the
appellate courts, shall be passed upon and decided by the respective
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 163
ABSOLUTE PARDON
G.R. No. L-19745 January 31, 1964
ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE OXIMANA, ET AL., respondents.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for petitioners.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat and Associates for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Vicente Oximana is the president of the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union
(BBWU) having been elected to said position on June 20, 1960,
pursuant to the provisions of constitution and by-laws of said union.
Since 1948, when the union was organized, Oximana has been elected
continuously as such president and has performed the duties and
functions of said office without interruption in accordance with the
provisions of said constitution and by-laws.
In 1926, Oximana was convicted of the crime of abusos deshonestos for
which he was sentenced to 3 years 6 months and 25 days imprisonment
which he served until December 4, 1930. As a consequence, a
complaint was lodged against him before the Court of Industrial
Relations on February 2, 1961 by a prosecutor of said court seeking as
president of the union on the strength of the previous of Section 17(e) of
Republic Act 875. In this complaint, the union was made party
respondent because of complainant's desire to restrain Oximana from
performing the duties and functions of his office as president and to have
a new election held for the purpose of electing a new qualified president.
In answer to the complaint, respondents alleged that it fails to state
cause of action for it does not show that it bears the sanction of at least
10% of the entire membership of the union of which Oximana was
president, and that assuming that it does and Oximana was convicted
of the offense which involves moral turpitude, the same is not however
one of the offenses contemplated by Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875.
In any event, respondents contend that the aforesaid legal provision,
being penal in character, does not apply to Oximana for he has been an
official of good standing long before the effectivity of Republic Act 875.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties submitted a stipulation
of facts wherein, among other things, it was agreed that on April 1, 1961
the President of the Philippines granted Oximana full, absolute and
plenary pardon for the crime he had committed in 1926, thereby
restoring him to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights, one of
which is the holding of the position now disputed by complainants.
On November 29, 1961, Judge Amado C. Bugayong, who heard the
case, issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. He said
that were it not for the absolute pardon granted to Oximana he would
have been disqualified. But said pardon has erased all the ill effects of
his conviction and had restored to him all his rights and privileges as a
citizen as if he had not committed the crime at all. One of such rights is
to hold an office in any labor organization as the one now being held by
respondent Oximana.
This Order was affirmed by the court en banc. Hence, the present
petition for review.1äwphï1.ñët
Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875 provides as follows:
No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
shall be eligible for election to any office in a legitimate labor
organization or for appointment to any position involving the collection,
custody, management, control or disbursement of its funds, and any
such person shall be disqualified from continuing to hold any office or
such position in the organization.
If the case of respondent Oximana should be considered in the light of
what is provided for in the section abovequoted there would be no doubt
that he would be disqualified from holding the position of president which
is now being disputed by complainants for the crime for which he was
convicted in 1926 is one which involves moral turpitude because the
purpose of the law is indeed to disqualify one who, because of gross
misconduct, has rendered himself unfit to hold any office in a legitimate
labor organization. But here the situation of respondent Oximana has
changed since his conviction. It appears that since the time of his
conviction in 1926 up to the time the complaint for disqualification was
lodged against him in 1961, a long period of time has passed, and, in
the meantime, he may have reformed himself and become new and
repentant man. In fact, when he organized the Benguet-Balatoc
Workers' Union in 1948, he became its president and had been
reelected as such continuously up to the present time without any
indication that through his actuation as such official he has ever
committed any misconduct or act unbecoming his office that may
disqualify him to continue deserving the confidence of the union and its
members. It is perhaps for this reason that on April 1, 1961 the President
of the Philippines grant him full, absolute and plenary pardon which
restored to him the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights one of
which is the right to hold any office in any legitimate labor organization.
We believe that the effect of this pardon is as the President of the
Philippines has stated, the restoration in full of Oximana's civil and
political rights, the effect of which is to blot out any evil consequences of
the crime he has committed. Authorities abound supporting this view.
Thus, it has been held that "A full and complete pardon, granted after
conviction, removes all penalties and legal disabilities, and restores the
defendant to all his civil rights." Continuing, the court went on to say that
"pardon completely destroys the effect of the judgment ... (and)
'obliterates, in legal contemplation, the offense itself; and hence its effect
is to make the offender a new man'" (Stephens v. State of ex rel.
Goldsberry, 11 Okl. 262, 239 P. 450). In a similar vein, this Court, thru
Mr. Justice Laurel, stated that "an absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
the conviction;" (Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441). And in an earlier
case, this Court, thru the same Justice also stated:
... An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case,
the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no
basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon,
extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will
be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual
in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute
insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
(Cristobal v. Labrador, et al., 71 Phil. 34, 38).
We are, therefore, persuaded to affirm the view expressed by the court
a quo in its order of November 29, 1961.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 164

G.R. No. L-48100 June 20, 1941

FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.

Rodriguez & Aclaro for appellant.

Cecilio Maneja for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto

proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the
respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the
municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were
had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94
(a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged
that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment
in 1912 of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the
contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been
removed by plenary pardon.

The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election

and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office
of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was
granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and
it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of
ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of
the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and
restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the
effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction
under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon
having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law
for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of
inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of
mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G.
R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction, While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute
pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the
opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this
jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the
Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should
be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and
resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is
admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more
than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from
the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right
of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period
1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three
times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under
these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him
absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference
to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the
Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this
wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy
to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant, So ordered.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 165

G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015 (2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos
(₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, in the Jose Velarde account.
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
Mansion" located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
Respondents.

DECISION The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the
said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the
usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in orders issued against the said accused are hereby recalled and declared
relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia functus oficio.4
Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of the
writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 20131 and April
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way
Second Division and En bane, respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said pardon
entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada" for having
states:
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013 winning MALACAÑAN PALACE
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (former President Estrada)
MANILA
disqualification to run for and hold public office.

By the President of the Philippines

The Facts

PARDON
The salient facts of the case are as follows:

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
have reached the age of seventy (70),
Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the
crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al." The dispositive part of the WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six
graft court’s decision reads: and a half years,

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the
accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT
GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby
orders their ACQUITTAL.
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by
the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and
imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to
Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as long
as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the
forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred
Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with interest and
income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in
full, including all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in
pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this
pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in
the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received
and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his
handwritten notation thereon.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 166
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy
earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a
"Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed
by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028 (DC), a
petition for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C.
Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC), a "Petition to
Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as President due to
Constitutional Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice
of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In separate
Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second
Division, however, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the
uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection
applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former
President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former’s right
to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for
reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however,
former President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest
number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought
recourse to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v.
Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a
Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that
former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into
the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying
for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos
Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President
Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance
to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial
cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and
SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming
it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso,
[Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the
standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that
[former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President
Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no
longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in
wastage of government resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was
denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing
the present petition. She presented five issues for the Court’s resolution,
to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S
PARDON WAS NOT CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS
DISQUALIFIED TO RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN
CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE INVOLVES
THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY RESOLVED IN THE
CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND
IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH
M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S
PARDON NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR
REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM
SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU
PROPRIO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF
HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 167
DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO VOTE
RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada
was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day,
the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor
of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for
the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case. His
motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution15 dated June 25, 2013.
Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the
latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further,
given that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold
public office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray,
and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim)
should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position of
Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition
filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential question for
resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for
in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former
President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The "acceptance,"
she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with
the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the pardon,
i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office." She explains that the
aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President
Arroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it, the clemency
would not have been extended. And any breach thereof, that is,
whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of
the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a
candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon
which former President Estrada mustbe disqualified from running for and
holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in Section
40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues that the
crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by imprisonment of one
year or more and involving moral turpitude; such that former President
Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however,
Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make available to
former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of the
OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or plenary.
Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements
provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough
that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon carries with
it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and
41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without categorically
making mention what specific civil and political rights are restored "shall
not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage;
nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the
above constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a general or
implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro
R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to
endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the right to hold public
office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal
case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter
how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express, explicit, positive
and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal
reckons that "such express restoration is further demanded by the
existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the pardon
x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public office was not
restored to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public
respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or not the
pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run
for public office had already been passed upon by public respondent
COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-028
and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing
pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada] disqualified to
run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any
new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public
respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking judicial
cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and which can
be verified from its own records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court on the courts’ discretionary power to take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to them because
of their judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that
[former President Estrada’s] conviction for plunder disqualifies him from
running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the
subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively restored his
right to run for any public office."21 The restoration of his right to run for
any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of
the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the seeming
requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the
express restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the
pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of
Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much
the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking
into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon granted to
former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is not
an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot therefore serve
to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed Resolutions."24
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 168
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant
arguments to defend his stay in office: that "the factual findings of public
respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body mandated to administer
and enforce all laws relative to the conduct of the elections, [relative to
the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof, and the eligibility of
former President Estrada to seek public elective office] are binding [and
conclusive] on this Honorable Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an
absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral (sic)
position in the City of Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of
Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was
erroneously cited by both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective
claims, x x x reveal that there was no discussion whatsoever in the ratio
decidendi of the Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an
expressed restoration of the ‘right to hold public office in the pardon’ as
a legal prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special
disqualification;" that moreover, the "principal question raised in this
Monsanto case is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement
toher former position without need of a new appointment;" that his
"expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon
extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a
mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the
pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the
requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was
categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored to his
civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be
construed favorably in favor of the grantee;25 and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the
hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right
to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against
former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was
anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC,
that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of
one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President
Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office
notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a
statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is
disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post
despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former
President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide
for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,
particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote
and bevoted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and
accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which
political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo
did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section
5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of
executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were
decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting
pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with what
is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally
declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action."
The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29
thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon,
being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of
this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court,
except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s
power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation,
was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out
an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of
"offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and
defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. The following is
the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce
an amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt
practices laws may be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of
corrupt practices may include a very little offense like stealing ₱10;
second, which I think is more important, I get the impression, rightly or
wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the
premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and,
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 169
consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this Article
seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-President
Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no
corresponding power except to declare martial law. Therefore, I request
that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of
Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar to the provisions
on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of that
Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted because
violations of the election laws go into the very political life of the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is
also necessary to have that subjected to the same condition because
violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to
affect the very economic systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a
compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that will
provide for the classification as to which convictions will still require prior
recommendation; after all, the Congress could take into account
whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such
magnitude as to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the
millions or billions of dollars. But I assume the Congress in its collective
wisdom will exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not to require
any further stricture on the exercise of executive clemency because, of
course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a lowly clerk
committing malversation of government property or funds involving one
hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that the
corrupt practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have
virtually drained a substantial portion of the treasury, and then he goes
through all the judicial processes and later on, a President who may
have close connections with him or out of improvident compassion may
grant clemency under such conditions. That is why we left it to Congress
to provide and make a classification based on substantial distinctions
between a minor act of corruption or an act of substantial proportions.
SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE
before the word "violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction
because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it purely
as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially
an executive power, and that is precisely why it is called executive
clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete, an
exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm, is
allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits the
power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the President to
grant executive clemency by limiting the power of Congress to only
corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious than
these. Under this amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of
executive clemency in cases of drug addiction and drug pushing which
are very, very serious crimes that can endanger the State; also, rape
with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside from the fact that it is a
derogation of the power of the President to grant executive clemency, it
is also defective in that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are
far more serious crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that
the pardoning power is anexecutive power. But even in the provisions
on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is required that
there be a favorable recommendation by the Commission on Elections
for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that
and as a member of the Committee, has explained in the committee
meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this particular provision.
May we call on Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have
just approved the Article on Accountability of Public Officers. Under it, it
is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all government
officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with
patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept
that a public office is a public trust, the violation is itself a violation not
only of the economy but the moral fabric of public officials. And that is
the reason we now want that if there is any conviction for the violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation
of the public trust character of the public office, no pardon shall be
extended to the offender, unless some limitations are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the
convicting court, but the Committee left it entirely to the legislature to
formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between
grave and less grave or serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we have
strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to
accompany it with a mandate that the President’s right to grant executive
clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a
public office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by
deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and
arguing before this Constitutional Commission that we are emasculating
the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me is another clear
example of that. So, I speak against this provision. Even the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment
by deletion because I am in sympathy with the stand of Commissioner
Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should remember that
above all the elected or appointed officers of our Republic, the leader is
the President. I believe that the country will be as the President is, and
if we systematically emasculate the power of this presidency, the time
may come whenhe will be also handcuffed that he will no longer be able
to act like he should be acting.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 170
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the
approval of proposals, but now I find that the proposal of Commissioner
Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes
which cast a bigger blot on the moral character of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute
power of our Chief Executive in deciding whether to pardon, to reprieve
or to commute the sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and
after him will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The
Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is allowed
to stay, it would mean that the President’s power togrant pardon or
reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the Anti-Graft Court,
when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe Revised Penal
Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits
the consideration of the exercise of executive clemency, usually under
Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such
exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the amendment proposed
by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip
more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in
our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they have
already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer
mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by
the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be
prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers
in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and
punishment under the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit
this to the floor and also because of the objection of the main proponent,
Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners should vote
on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment
of Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of Section 17
appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand. (Several Members
raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised
their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment
is approved.30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon
persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said
Articles contain specific textual commands which must be strictly
followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the
disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed
by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly
restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non
est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure.31 It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential
pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the
requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal
that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of
suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former
President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 171
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or
diminish the President’s power to extend clemency. He opines that they
do not reduce the coverage of the President’s pardoning power.
Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They
only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with
areas where or the instances when the President may grant pardon; they
are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise such power so that
no other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full
effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to
include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold
public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36
and 41 only ask that the President state his or her intentions clearly,
directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the
President retains the power to make such restoration or remission,
subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state
it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress
may dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her power of
executive clemency. The form or manner by which the President, or
Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional
powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided
in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of
powers deeply ingrained in our system of government which "ordains
that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere."33 Moreso, this fundamental principle
must be observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by one
branch on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the
diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should
be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency
granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict
interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the
pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed
by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must
be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and
prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President
to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that
the pardon of the principal penalty does notcarry with it the remission of
the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to
pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the
pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposedin
accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and
its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence
refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada
who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty
pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached
to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by
law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
of which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers
in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said
right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as a
political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right
to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply there with in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court
reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 172
President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that,
upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained his FULL
civil and political rights – including the right to seek elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain
meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement
that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in derogation
of the constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise
of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has been
restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has
been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned
views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to
be respected, they do not form partof the controlling doctrine nor to be
considered part of the law of the land. On the contrary, a careful reading
of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement that denotes
adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced application of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require the President
to use a statutorily prescribed language in extending executive
clemency, even if the intent of the President can otherwise be deduced
from the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained
above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not contrary to, the
provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for
any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President
Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it
provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s
conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local
position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC.
However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President
Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. This
is made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted
plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates
running for local elective positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court acknowledged the
aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may be
availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the
date of proclamation.38 The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case is
quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos
is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false
material representation arises from a crime penalized by prision mayor,
a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40
of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and
the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed
to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office
have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas clauses do not form part
of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute.41 In this case, the whereas clause at issue is
not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not
by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its
effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of
COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padaca’s separate concurring
opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010
Resolution did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised
the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or
preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates the
ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular paragraph does not
have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon
extended by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling
is consistent with the traditional and customary usage of preambular
paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular paragraphs or
whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation
much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former
ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 173

decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on
former President Estrada’s decision torun for President in the May 2010
elections against, among others, the candidate of the political party of
former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the
pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to
suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the
President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available
to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe four
corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that
the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or
condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the
mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result ina revocation
or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a
statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive
clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy orto
delimit the scope of the pardon.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a
clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or
support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon
can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst
actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due process,
because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain.43

Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas
Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does
not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This
Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual
infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which civil or
political rights were restored if the Court were to take the road suggested
by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights" excludes the restoration of former President Estrada’s
rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe
executive clemency granted does not provide the Court with any guide
asto how and where to draw the line between the included and excluded
political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for
resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on the condition that
former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public office, but
it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon – whether the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have
restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in
question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that
former President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to former President
Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by
the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of,
among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He adds
that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights
of suffrage and to hold public office, she should have been more clear
on her intentions.
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and
gross.44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate
any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise
of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross" as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it
unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which
substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear – the pardon granted to
former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in
character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled meaning
in law and jurisprudence.

With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission
of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding the restoration
of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no
distinction as to the coverage of the term "full political rights" and the
term "political rights" used alone without any qualification. How to
ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is "partial" and not "full"
defies one’s understanding. More so, it will be extremely difficult to
identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the
text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon
cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word "full" when
the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada
without any exclusion or reservation.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 174

MARRIAGE OF AN OFFENDED WOMAN ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
G.R. No. 185843 March 3, 2010 seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. – x x x.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the
RONIE DE GUZMAN, Appellant.
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.
RESOLUTION

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages

NACHURA, J.:
This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and
reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant
Ronie de Guzman.
Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163,
Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned.
After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and
imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The
trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim ₱50,000.00 in each
case or a total amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision dated
March 27, 2008, appellant’s conviction, but modified it with an additional
award of ₱50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of
₱100,000.00, as moral damages.
contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of
rape,5 as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity,6 to totally extinguish
the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have
been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony. Parenthetically, we
would like to mention here that prior to the case at bar, the last case
bearing similar circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or
around 36 years ago.1avvphi1
Based on the documents, including copies of pictures7 taken after the
ceremony and attached to the motion, we find the marriage between
appellant and private complainant to have been contracted validly,
legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each
other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public
policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the
highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant
the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C
of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman

Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal.
is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant
Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for failure ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.
of appellant to sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged
decision as would warrant the exercise of the Court’s appellate
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of Corrections for
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision of the CA was
appropriate action. No costs.
affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant
contracted marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend
Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the
Amazing Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is the pertinent
Certificate of Marriage1 and a joint sworn statement ("Magkasamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay")2 executed by appellant and private
complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage
between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his
conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from
imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C3 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

In its Comment/Manifestation,4 appellee, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, interposed no objection to the motion, finding the
marriage to have been contracted in good faith, and the motion to be
legally in order.

The motion should be granted.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads
–

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability

is totally extinguished:

xxxx

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in

Article 344 of this Code.

Article 344 of the same Code also provides –

FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 175
[G.R. Nos. 136899-904. October 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO
DELA CERNA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Irene dela Cerna did not experience and enjoy the natural love and
affection of a father. Instead, at fifteen, she went through an ordeal,
characterized by suffering and torment perpetrated by the very person
who was supposed to protect and shield her from harm her own father.
Six separate complaints were filed on May 16, 1997 against accused-
appellant charging him with rape committed on January 15, 1989,
December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August 25, 1996, February 10,
1997 and March 5, 1997. The first complaint alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of March, 1997, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, who is her father, by means of force and intimidation upon
undersigned complainant, then only fifteen (15) years old to wit: by
carrying her to a room and forcibly lie down on bed and removed her
panty and short, placed himself on top of her, did then and there have
carnal knowledge with the undersigned against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The five other complaints were identically worded except for the dates
of the commission of the crime and the age of private complainant.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the
cases were jointly tried.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Irene recounted her harrowing
experience at the hands of her father, which began when she was only
seven years old. Her testimony was faithfully summarized by the
Solicitor General as follows:
Irene dela Cerna was born on August 26, 1982 at Negros Occidental,
San Carlos City (p. 2, TSN, March 25, 1998). She recalled that one
afternoon when she was only seven (7) years old, her father, appellant
herein, beckoned her to come inside the room. At the time, her mother
was not at home. When she went inside the room, appellant undressed
her and made her lie down. Appellant then played with her private parts
and touched her vagina with his penis which lasted for about fourteen
(14) minutes (p. 4, TSN, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant instructed her to put
on her clothes as her mother was due to arrive any time. Appellant did
the same act to Irene many times (p. 5, id.)
On January 15, 1989 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, appellant
called Irene from inside the room. Once Irene was inside the room,
appellant undressed her and made her lie down. Appellant played with
her vagina for about ten (10) minutes (p. 5, id.) and pushed his penis
into the lips of her vagina (p. 16, id.).
On December 26, 1993 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon while her
mother was out taking up dressmaking, appellant forced Irene to enter
the room. Appellant stripped her naked, forced his penis into her vagina
(pp. 14-15, id.) and performed the push and pull movement for about ten
(10) minutes. Irene did not shout for help because of fear. In one
occasion, Irene saw appellant with a gun. After the rape, appellant
cautioned Irene not to report to anybody what happened (p. 16, id.).
On March 3, 1996, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon while her
mother was out, appellant called Irene in the room and stripped her
naked. Appellant ordered Irene to lie down and mounted on top of her.
Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the push and
pull movement. Irene tried to shake appellant off but he was too heavy
for her. Irene did not shout for help because of fear that appellant might
harm her and her siblings. Irene had witnessed appellant punched her
mother on the stomach during a quarrel (pp. 12-13, id.). After the rape,
appellant warned her not to tell anybody of what transpired between
them (p. 13, id.).
On August 25, 1996, when Irene was fourteen (14) years old, appellant
called her from the room. Irene was already reluctant to go alone near
appellant as she knew what appellant would do to her. Irene was
constrained to go to appellant when her other sister told her to go to him
as beckoned. Inside the room, appellant undressed her (p. 7, id.). Irene
did not utter a word while she was being undressed because she was
afraid that appellant might get angry and she and her siblings will again
be subjected to physical abuse as they used to be (p. 8, id.). Irene tried
to resist appellant but he was too strong for her (p. 7, id.). Appellant
mounted on top of Irene, inserted his penis into her vagina, and
performed the sexual act of push and pull. After the sexual act, Irene
was ordered to leave the room. On the same day, her mother delivered
the dresses she had sewn to her customers. Irene did not report the
sexual abuse to the police authorities because she was afraid of
appellant and she pitied her mother who was suffering from tension (p.9,
id.).
On February 10, 1997 while her mother was out, appellant dragged
Irene up the stairs of their new house towards the room. Appellant
pushed her on the bed, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed
the push and pull movement. The sexual act lasted for just a short time
as her mother was expected to arrive any time. Irene hated appellant for
raping her. After the rape, appellant warned her not to tell anybody what
happened (pp. 18-19, id.).
On March 5, 1997, appellant forced Irene inside the room and stripped
her naked. Appellant made her lie down on the bed, inserted his penis
into her vagina and performed the push and pull movement for about ten
(10) minutes. Irene initially resisted appellant but she was no match for
him. After the rape, appellant warned her not to tell anybody what
happened. Irene cried thereafter (pp. 20-22, id.).
Irene described appellant as a mean person. She was afraid to tell
anyone about the rape as she believed appellant is capable of killing her
and her siblings (p. 24, id.).
Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two (2) best friends in school,
namely, Cheryl Quano and Bernadette Comita. Bernadette, in turn, told
her own mother what Irene divulged (p. 27, id.). Bernadettes mother
talked with Irene regarding the rape incidents after which the former
brought her to the office of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) at the City Hall where she was interviewed by a
social worker (pp. 28-28, id.).[2]
Emma Patalinghug, a social worker at the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) Center for Women and Children, declared
that private complainant, accompanied by her mother, was referred to
her office on March 21, 1997. She testified that the victim told her that
she had been sexually abused by her father since she was seven years
old.[3]
Dra. Aster Khusravibabadi of the Cebu City Medical Center examined
the victim on March 21, 1997 and found old healed hymenal lacerations
at 5:00 and 6:00 oclock positions, and the introitus admits two fingers
with ease.[4]
Accused-appellant opted not to testify invoking his constitutional right to
remain silent.
On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private complainant to
prove that she voluntarily executed an affidavit of desistance. Private
complainant explained that she decided to forgive her father for the sake
of her mother and her younger siblings who experienced pain and
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 176
difficulty in sustaining their daily needs as their whole family was
dependent upon their father for support.[5]
The affidavit of desistance, dated July 3, 1998, was made in the
vernacular and was offered in evidence for the defense. Pertinent
portions thereof stated that complainant was no longer interested in
pursuing the cases against her father; the complaints filed with the
Prosecutors Office and in Court were not her voluntary acts as she was
only influenced and forced by the people who came to support and
intercede in her action; the testimony she made in court on March 25,
1998 was not of her own free will as she was only forced to do so; there
were false statements she made during the hearing of the case; she had
truly forgiven her father; she wanted harmony and happiness; nobody
influenced her to execute the said affidavit of desistance to end the
cases she filed against her father x x x.[6]
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna guilty of six counts of rape, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, ERNESTO DELA CERNA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against complainant,
IRENE DELA CERNA, his minor daughter, in the aforequoted six (6)
charges and consequently, he is hereby imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in the aforesaid Third and Sixth Complaints in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code and the supreme penalty of
DEATH in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Complaints, conformably
with the provisions of the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and
ordered to pay the complainant Irene dela Cerna, the sums of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS in each of the six (6) cases as
damages, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
the costs.
The entire records of these cases must be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Accused-appellant assails said decision and contends that the trial court
erred in convicting him despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant mainly relies on the affidavit of desistance executed
by private complainant, claiming that said affidavit created a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a
complainant in a criminal or administrative case, that he or she is
discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her complaint for
whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our jurisprudence
reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character
of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a
victim, after going through the trouble of having the accused-appellant
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped
her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case.[8]
A careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance in this case reveals that
private complainant never retracted her allegation that she was raped
by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise
doubts about her rape. Plainly, all the affidavit really stated was that she
had decided to withdraw the complaints as she had already forgiven her
father and she wanted peace and happiness for her family. Rather than
contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainants testimony that accused-
appellant raped her on several occasions.
Likewise, when asked on the witness stand what prompted her to sign
the affidavit, Irene answered:
Q: What prompted you to write that letter?
A: I was already staying with the DSWD and my condition there was all
right but the problem was my mother, whenever she visited me, she told
me that they were really hard in their daily existence. They were just
staying in the house of a friend and they have no means to support
themselves. My brothers and sister at times cannot even go to school
because of lack of money and they cannot eat properly.[9]
But, in her earlier testimony for the prosecution, Irene demonstrated a
firm resolve to have accused-appellant punished for his crime, as can
be gleaned from the following:
Prosecutor Solima
Q: Are you aware that your father would be penalized the moment he
would be convicted for the crime of rape?
A: Yes, sir.
Court
Q: And you would want him to die?
A: Although I have forgiven him for what he did to me considering that
he is my father, but I will not also agree that he will not be penalized of
imprisonment for what he did to me.[10]
Also, during cross-examination, Irene testified:
Atty. Porio
Q: And you earlier testified that you pity your mother and that you have
forgiven your father for what he had done to you, do you know that if it
is proven that your father is guilty he would be sentenced to a death
penalty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you not bothered by your conscience if your father would be
sentenced to death?
A: Yes I would surely be bothered but that is his fault.[11]
A comparison of Irenes previous and subsequent testimonies leads to
the inference that the affidavit of desistance was executed merely as an
afterthought. As such, it has no persuasive effect.
Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irenes affidavit of desistance.
Such an affidavit, by and of itself, does not mean that what she
previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit itself are true. On
the contrary, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable. The reason is because affidavits of retraction
can all too easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually
through intimidation or monetary consideration. Thus, there is always
the probability that they will later be repudiated and there will never be
an end to criminal litigation.[12] It is also a dangerous rule for courts to
reject testimony solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because
the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for one reason or
another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and put the
investigation of crimes at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.[13]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 177
It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred prior to
the effectivity of RA 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 which took effect
on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of rape as a crime against
persons. Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and treat the
acts of rape herein committed as private crimes. Thus, their institution,
prosecution and extinction should still be governed by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC):
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness.- The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as
the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.
The aforequoted article provides for the extinction of criminal liability in
private crimes. For the crimes of adultery and concubinage, the pardon
extended by the offended spouse results in the extinction of the liability
of the offender. On the other hand, in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, two modes are recognized for extinguishing
criminal liability - pardon and marriage. In all cases, however, the pardon
must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case
has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish
criminal liability.[14]
It must be stressed that private complainant in this case filed her
complaint on May 16, 1997 and even testified against accused-appellant
on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she executed her affidavit of
desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the pardon extended by the
victim to her father was made after the institution of the criminal action.
Consequently, it cannot be a ground to dismiss the action in these
cases. The reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a
criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective
sense of morality, decency and justice has been outraged. In such a
case, the offended party becomes merely a complaining witness. The
complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute the guilty parties in the name of the People of the
Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage
in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.Hence,
once filed, control of the prosecution is removed from the offended
partys hands[15] and any change of heart by the victim will not affect the
states right to vindicate the atrocity committed against itself.
At any rate, there is hardly any doubt about the truthfulness and
reliability of Irenes initial testimony in the trial court which we find to be
positive, credible and convincing. To be sure, she would not have
accused her own father of a serious offense like rape had she really not
been aggrieved.[16] Likewise, a rape victims testimony against her
father is entitled to much credibility since respect for elders is deeply
ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law.[17]
Considering all these premises, we are impelled to affirm the trial courts
conviction of accused-appellant for the six counts of rape committed
upon Irene dela Cerna.
Certain facets of this case, however, need to be carefully threshed out
in order to fully administer justice to all parties concerned. Conformably,
it is a well-established procedure that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct an error in the appealed judgment, whether
this is assigned as an error or not.[18] In the case at bar, two of the six
instances of rape - on January 15, 1989 and December 26, 1993
occurred before the effectivity of RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) which
took effect only on December 31, 1993. As correctly held by the trial
court, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua for each of these two
crimes of rape.
However, with respect to the four other incidents of rape which were
committed after the effectivity of RA 7659 and in each of which the trial
court imposed the extreme penalty of death, an exhaustive discussion
is called for.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of RA
7659, was already the pertinent statutory provision prevailing at the time
of the latter four rape incidents. It categorized as a heinous offense
punishable by death the rape of a minor by her own father. Said
provision reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.-
xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxx xxx
In a number of cases, this Court ruled that both the age of the offended
party and her relationship with the accused must be alleged in the
information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Failure
to specifically state these attendant circumstances of minority and
relationship in the information will bar the imposition of the death
penalty.[19]
In the instant case, the trial court, pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659,
imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna
after taking into account the minority of Irene as well as the relationship
of father and daughter between them. Both circumstances of minority
and relationship were alleged in the informations. However,
jurisprudence requires that the victims minority must not only be
specifically alleged in the information but must likewise be established
beyond reasonable doubt during trial. The leading case on this point is
People vs. Javier,[20] where this Court unanimously held:
However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present
the birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victims age was not
contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly
necessary in this case considering that the victims age which was then
16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. x x x. In
a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme penalty
of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must
be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld
x x x. Verily, the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty
and clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure to sufficiently
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 178

establish the victims age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for SO ORDERED.
rape in its qualified form.

This doctrine has since been reiterated in a plethora of cases with the
Court consistently holding that proof of the victims age must be
indubitable in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

In People vs. Cula,[21] this Court lowered the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua in a case of rape committed on a 16-year-old victim
by her father on the ground that the prosecution did not present any
independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate, and the trial court
failed to render a categorical finding on the matter.

In People vs. Liban,[22] we held that the birth certificate of the victim, or
in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal
certificate or school record, that can help establish the age of the victim
beyond reasonable doubt should be presented. While the declaration
o4f a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay
proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the
question of the relative weight that may be accorded to it is an entirely
different matter. Corroborative evidence would be most desirable or
even essential when circumstances call for it.

The case of People vs. Pecayo, Sr.,[23] reiterated the pronouncement

in Liban that a duly certified certificate of live birth accurately showing
the complainants age, or some other authentic document such as a
baptismal certificate or school record, is competent evidence. Even the
lack of objection on the part of appellant does not excuse the
prosecution from proving such fact beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of

proving the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. No single
independent proof was offered in court to establish the fact that
complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the incidents. Irene
merely stated during her direct examination that she was born on August
26, 1982. We find Irenes casual testimony as to her age insufficient.

Once again, we need to emphasize that the penalty of death is an

extreme sanction as it carries with it the forfeiture of life. Which makes it
imperative for this Court to carefully weigh every piece of evidence
presented by all parties. We cannot presume that the victim is a minor
simply because she claims to be one.

In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of rape in the latter four instances but
must reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua on account of
the prosecutions failure to satisfactorily prove the qualifying
circumstance of minority of the victim.

Finally, the award of damages made by the trial court should likewise be
modified. In accordance with current case law, accused-appellant
should be ordered to pay complainant the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity for each of the six counts of rape.[24] In addition, the victim
should be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 for each
of the six counts of rape without need of pleading or proof. This Court
has held many times that a rape victims injury is inherently concomitant
to and results from the odiousness of the crime.[25] Lastly, accused-
appellant is also liable to pay the sum of P25,000 as exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.[26]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of simple rape and is
sentenced in each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the victim Irene dela Cerna the following: (1) P50,000 as
civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as moral damages and (3) P25,000 as
exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 179
PARTIAL EXTINCTION
CONDITIONAL PARDON
G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952
In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee, vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent-appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor
Meliton G. Soliman for appellant.
Amado B. Parreño for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental by Antonio Infante, and the petition having been
granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this Court.
It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to
17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, which he
recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939,
after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted a
conditional pardon and released from imprisonment, the condition being
that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines".
On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of
Bacolod City of driving a jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine
of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13,
1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the
President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the
Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested and re-committed to the
custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the
condition of the aforesaid pardon.
It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-
incarcerated, had been abrogated, and he was sustained by the court
below.
Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision
(Sales vs. Director of Prisons * 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these ruling
were laid down:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930,
contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals
among other acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the
Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On
the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is
subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly
preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the
President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who
violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the
enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection,
we observed that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article
159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of 3?3 Acts Nos.
1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable
to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence.
We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power
vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a
conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original
sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under one
provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. . . .
The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which
the petitioner had been recommitted to jail - one year and 11 days - had
prescribed. This contention was also sustained in the appealed decision.
Said the Court:
Segun el articulo 92 del Codigo Penal Revisado, la pena de un (1) año
y once (11) dias que corresponde a la pena de prision correccional,
prescribe a los diez (10) años.
Por manera que, habiendo transcurrido mas de diez (10) años la
responsabilidad criminal del solicitante proviniente de la infraccion de su
indulto bajo condicion, ha prescrito con exceso.
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.
It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an
essential element of prescription. There had been no such evasion in
this case. Even if there had been one and prescription were to be
applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved
sentence, and the computation could not have started earlier than the
date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.
We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner
was charged with having breached was no longer operative when he
committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations
upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that,
where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39
Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S,
Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions subsequent,
annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's
sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest
from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed.
In that case, the prisoner was discharged on habeas corpus because
the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court,
imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operated beyond
the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted,
does not state the time within which the conditions thereof were to be
performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of
strict construction, we take into account, besides the benevolent nature
of the pardon, the fact that the general run out prisoners are unlettered
or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal implications of
conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.
There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible
argument, that no conditions can be attached to a pardon that are to
extend after the expiration of the term for which the prisoner was
sentence, although this view is not shared by the weight of authority. (39
Am., Jur. 564, 567; 46 C.J. 1201.)
Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the
same, instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression
and injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for the remission of
a small fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the Executive's mind
to keep hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the
threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor
such as that which gave rise to the order under consideration.
There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in
the case at bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law,
prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his
sentence, more than ten years after he was pardoned, would be
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 180
repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of our penal
laws. If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble
and caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing
him is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there
is at least as much justification for extending this liberality through strict
construction of the pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived
and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.
Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the
prisoner's general conduct during his long confinement had been
"excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee or penal
colonist, and that his release before the complete extinguishment of his
sentence could have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary
behavior with little or no thought of exacting any return from him in the
form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were
independent and ample punishments. The judgment of the lower court
is affirmed, without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pablo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
PARAS, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
In so far, however, as the decision in the case of Sales vs. Director of
Prisons (48 Off. Gaz., 576) is relied upon I wish to make reference to my
dissent in said decision and to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Feria
in which I concurred. I may emphasize that section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
stand and be enforced together, as the limit of imprisonment under
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code and the penalty under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are not the same. Even if it be
assumed that the enforcement of the two legal provisions may bring
about the same result in some cases, the effect would be to penalize
twice a single offense, namely, the violation of a conditional pardon, and
this is repulsive to elementary rules of criminal law.
Feria, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur in the result.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioner herein was sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal for murder. On March 6,
1939 after serving fifteen (15) years, seven (7) months and eleven (11)
days of his sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon and released
from imprisonment. The period of the sentence remaining to be served
was one (1) year and eleven (11) days. The condition of his pardon was
that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On April 25, 1949, petitioner was convicted of a violation of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law for driving a jeep without a license and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P10, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On July 13, 1950, the Executive Secretary ordered the re-
arrest and recommitment of petitioner for violation of the conditions of
his pardon. He was arrested and he sued this writ of habeas corpus.
I fully concur in the majority opinion insofar as it reaffirms the doctrine
laid down in the case of Sales vs. Director of Prisons, (48 Off. Gaz.,
576), which holds that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
is still in force, and that for any violation of a conditional pardon, the
President is authorized to order the arrest and re-commitment of said
violator to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. I also agree, with
the majority that the penalty herein has not prescribed for the reason
that there has been no evasion of sentence upon which the principle of
prescription of penalty is based. However, I cannot agree with the
majority insofar as they hold that when petitioner committed a violation
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the condition of his pardon was no
longer operative. It is the theory and opinion of the majority that the
duration or life of the conditions imposed in the pardon is limited to the
period of the prisoner's sentence, specially when the pardon does not
designate the time for the observance of the condition. This is
diametrically opposed to the great weight of authority that the conditions
of a conditional pardon are to last and endure during the lifetime of the
pardonee. When no limit is mentioned in the pardon it is to be presumed
that it is indefinite and lasts until the prisoner pardoned dies.
Limitations as to Time of Performance. - A pardon may, as one of its
restrictions and limitations, designate the time for the observance of its
conditions, but if it does not, it is generally held that the time of
performance of conditions subsequent is limited only by the life of the
convict. (39 Am. Jur., Pardon, etc., Sec. 71, p. 564; emphasis mine.)
SEC. 74. Suspension of Running of Sentence. - A sentence of
imprisonment for a criminal act is satisfied only by the death or by some
legal authority; if, from any cause, the time elapses without the
imprisonment being endured, the sentence will still be a valid, subsisting,
unexecuted one. In accordance with this principles, it is well-settled that
where a prisoner is conditionally pardoned, upon breach of the condition
the time he was at liberty under the pardon is not to be considered as
time served on the original sentence, and he may be compelled to serve
out the term which remained unserved at the time the pardon was
granted and accepted. By breach or non-performance of the conditions
the pardon becomes void and the status of the prisoner is the same as
it was before the pardon was granted; or, as is sometimes said, the
position of the prisoner on a violation of the conditions of his pardon is
similar to that of an escaped convict. He cannot complain of the
interruption of the execution of the sentence during the time he enjoyed
his liberty, for it was secured by him by his acceptance of the conditional
pardon.
A condition in a pardon that the convict shall be required to serve out the
unserved portion of the term of his original sentence if he violates the
terms of the pardon does not terminate with the expiration of the original
term of sentence. Accordingly, the rule is laid down by many courts that
a convict who has violated the conditions of a pardon may be compelled
to serve out the unexpected term of his original sentence, even though
the breach occurred after the date upon which his sentence as fixed by
the court which sentenced him would have expired. (Ibid, pp. 566-567;
Emphasis mine).
The principle enunciated in the above quotations has been cited with
favor and followed by this court in the following cases:
In case of People vs. Sanares, 62 Phil. 825, the defendant therein,
convicted of theft and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment, began serving his sentence on July 9, 1924. He was
conditionally pardoned and released on March 1, 1927. The period of
the penalty remitted was three (3) years, seven (7) months and eight (8)
days. He committed estafa on February 5, 1935, that is to say, several
years after the expiration of the original sentence or the period of the
sentence not served by reason of the pardon. This court said that
prosecution under article 159 of the Revised Penal code was in order.
That means that he had violated the condition of the pardon despite the
expiration of the period of his sentence. In other words, the conditions
of the pardon were still in effect despite said expiration of the period.
The case of Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil., 154, is also
applicable. The petitioner therein was convicted of falsification of a
public document and sentenced to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days, which sentence was to expire on October 28,
1937. On November 14, 1935, he was paroled by the then Governor
General. One of the conditions imposed was that he will not commit any
other crime. The petitioner contended that the alleged act of adultery
imputed to him were committed and took place not before but after the
expiration of his original sentence and so he was no longer liable for
violation of his pardon. This court held that even if the adultery were
committed after said expiration, still he had violated his pardon, meaning
to say, that the conditions of his pardon were still in effect and were
operative even beyond and after the expiration of his original sentence.
The following are additional authorities:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 181
On forfeiture of a pardon by breach of the conditions, a convict becomes
liable to serve that part which he has already served of the term of
imprisonment for which he was sentenced, although the original term
has long since expired. (State vs. Barnes, 6 L.R.A., 743; 10 S.E., 611;
Emphasis mine.)
The expiration of the term for which a convict was sentenced does not
make inoperative a provision in a conditional pardon, that, if he is
subsequently convicted of crime, he shall serve the unexpired term in
addition to that imposed by the new sentence; but he may be compelled
to serve out such unexpired term, although his subsequent conviction
does not occur until after the expiration of the term of the original
sentence." (Re Kelly, 20 L.R.A. [N.S.] 337; 155 Cal., 39; 99 Pac., 368;
Emphasis mine.)
When a prisoner who has been at large on a conditional pardon is
recommitted to serve the remainder of his term, the time he has been so
at large is not to be treated as time served on his sentence. (Ex
parteMcKenna, 79 Vt. 34; 64 Atl. 77.) It follows that a defendant
sentenced to two years imprisonment and pardoned, may six years later
be recommended for the breach of the condition of his pardon. (State
vs. Barnes, 32 S.C., 14; 10; S.E., 611; 6 L.R.A. 743; Vol. I, Bishops
Criminal Law, Sec. 915 [5], p. 660; Emphasis mine.)
But there is really no need for all this authorities above-cited and quoted
because the majority opinion itself admits that its view is opposed to the
weight of authority. What is it then that impels the majority to brave and
go against the current of the great weight of authority, and maintain that
the conditions imposed in a conditional pardon that the pardonee will not
again violate any penal laws of the Philippines, dies with the expiration
of the period of the original sentence, or with the expiration of the period
of his sentence which remain unserved which in the present case, was
one year and eleven days? The only reason and the whole argument
brought forth to sustain the opinion is that if we are to hold otherwise,
the pardon "instead of an act of mercy, would then be an act of
oppression and injustice" because in exchange for the remission of a
small fraction of the prisoner's penalty, the Chief Executive would "keep
hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of
recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor such as
that which gave rise to the order under consideration." I emphatically
dissent from this view.
To me, the concern of the majority about the threat of recommitment
being used by the Chief Executive as the sword of Damocles hanging
over petitioner's head for the rest of his life, is without foundation. The
threat, if there be one, is not being utilized by a heartless and vindictive
Chief Executive to harass and annoy a pardonee and make his
existence miserable, but it is rather an alternative, undesirable and
unpleasant and to be avoided, which tends to keep the pardoned convict
on the straight and narrow path. The prospect of avoiding serving his
remitted sentence and his employment of continued liberty and freedom
from person is rather an incentive that serves to impel and lead a
pardonee to live within the law like his fellowmen. But even if we regard
recommitment to jail as a continuous threat hanging over the pardonee's
head, are we not all, for that matter living under the continuous threat of
prosecution for violation of law. To all of us from the age of criminal
responsibility (9 to 15 years depending on discernment) down to the
grave, the threat of punishment or suffering for violation of the penal laws
or the 3p3 law of Nature, is like the sword of Damocles, ever hanging
over our heads. Commit an offense whether deliberate or thru
negligence, and the sword of prosecution descends upon you; disobey
the laws of nature such as that of gravitation and you may have a fall,
bad or even fatal; defy the elements and you may perish in them. The
threat and prospect in every case is real and ever present, and yet we
never think of regarding that threat as oppressive or unjust. We take it
as a matter of course, and as an inevitable part or element of human
institutions and of the scheme of the universe.
When a convict accepts a pardon with conditions attached, he does so
with his eyes open and he knows the consequences. As a rule, the
benefits far outweigh the disadvantages. That is the reason conditional
pardons are almost invariably accepted. Afterwards when the pardonee
fails to live up to the conditions of the pardon, it ill becomes him to
whimper and complain and say that the conditions were unjust and
oppressive, just because the portion of his sentence remaining to be
served is relatively short, and the offense committed by him in violation
of his pardon is not serious.
I am afraid that the majority has allowed itself to be unduly impressed
and influenced by what I regard a misplaced sympathy for the herein
offender. But we should not interpret the law in accordance with the
status of the parties and the effect of the operation of the law on them.
Where the law makes no distinction we should not distinguish. I confess
that I see no justice, much less, oppression in construing the conditions
of a pardon that the pardonee will not again violate any penal laws of the
Philippines, as operative during his lifetime. If he commits such a
violation, he is not penalized and punished for it from the standpoint of
pardoning power. He is merely made to serve out the remaining period
of his sentence and nothing more. In other words, having shown that
contrary to his promise or undertaking, he could not be law-abiding
citizen, the law cancels and compels him to continue serving his
sentence. It is not a penalty but rather a withdrawal or cancellation of the
grant of freedom to him. In this connection, the majority has apparently
overlooked the contractual phase of a conditional pardon.
It has often been held that a conditional pardon, is a form and substance,
a contract between the executive power of the state and the person to
whom it is granted." (39 Am Jur. 559)
A conditional pardon delivered and accepted has been said to constitute
a contract between the sovereign power or the executive and the
criminal that the former will release the latter upon compliance with the
conditions. (46 C.J., 1202)
The convict is given the pardon and is released from confinement and
his sentence is suspended in return for a promise and an undertaking
that he would behave properly and not commit any violation of law. If to
him that condition is too burdensome, if he believes that because of
criminal tendencies and inclinations he cannot keep away from law
violations, he need not accept the offer of pardon. There is no power on
earth that can compel him to accept the pardon against his will. As Chief
Justice Marshall years ago said in the case of United States vs. George
Wilson 7 Peters, 150; 8 Law ed., 640, a "pardon may be rejected by the
person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered
no power in a court to force it to him."
The fact that a condition in a pardon may be burdensome or
objectionable does not vitiate the pardon. Speaking of the condition in a
pardon Chief Justice Marshall in the same case said that " a pardon may
be conditional, and the condition may be more objectionable than the
punishment inflicted by the judgment." But as already stated, if the
prospective pardonee feels that the condition is objectionable or
burdensome, he need not accept the pardon.
A condition that the pardonee will not violate any penal law of the
Philippines during his lifetime is legal.
Other conditions-. . . It is a valid condition that the grantee shall not be
convicted of a violation of any of the criminal laws of the state, . . . . (39
Am. Jur., 563.)
Again, a pardon may be granted upon the condition that the convict . .
.shall be and remain a law-abiding citizen. (46 C.J., 1201.)
And as to being burdensome or oppressive, personally, I firmly believe
that suvh a condition is not burdensome and, clearly, not oppressive. By
far, the great majority of citizens go through life without committing any
penal offense. Thousands upon thousands, even millions of our citizens,
especially in the provinces and in rural communities, have never entered
the portals of a court of justice to be arraigned and tried, much less have
been behind prison bars. For every citizen like petitioner herein who
commits a violation of law and is prosecuted therefor, there are
thousands of his fellow citizens who are law-abiding and do not commit
such violation.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 182
The only legal limitation to the condition that may be imposed in a
conditional pardon is that it should not be illegal, immoral or impossible
of performance. I do not beleive that there is any illegality, immorality or
impossibility of performance in the condition that the pardonee shall not
violate any penal laws of the Philippines.
Nature of condition.-The condition may be of any nature so long as it is
not illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance. (46 C.J., 1200.)
Time during which condition is to be performed.- . . .; and by the weight
of authority a pardon is not illegal or impossible of performance because
its conditions require observance for a period of time extendingbeyond
that in which the sentence should have been served. (Ibid., p. 1201;
Emphasis mine.)
A condition of a parddon that requires reimprisonment for the remainder
of the original sentence of imprisonment, after the expiration of the
particular period of time fixed by the court within which the sentence
imposed should be executed, is valid. It can not be said to be immoral,
or impossible of performance during the life of the petitioner; nor can it
be illegal, since the particular period of time within which the sentence
is to be suffered by the convict as specified in the sentence is not a part
of the legal sentence, except so far as it fixes the quantum of time that
he must suffer such penalty, and the condition imposed is not forbidden
and does not increase the punishment imposed by the court in its
sentence. (39 Am. Jur., 564; Emphasis mine.)
Furthermore, the Chief Executive in issuing a conditional pardon and in
imposing the conditions in it does so in the exercise of his constitutional
powers. The ChiefExecutive is vested with his authority not only by law
(Sec. 64 [i], Revised Administrative Code), but by the very Constitution
(Art. VII, Sec. 10 [6], granting him the power to attach such restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. In interpreting this
constitutional power of the Chief Executive we should not without good
ground or valid reason brush aside and hold invalid a condition imposed
by the Chief Executive on a conditional pardon on the ground that it is
oppressive and unjust, specially if to do so, we defy and ignore the
weight of legal jurisprudence.
It is argued in the majority opinion that although the penalty remitted has
not prescribed, his reimprisonment more than ten years after he was
pardoned would be repugnant to and against the spirit and genius of our
penal laws, and by a process which it terms "strict construction", it finally
accords to him the benefits of prescription. That, to me, is perplexing.
The maajority in a solemn holding and declaration says that prescription
of the penalty does not apply in the present case; then in the next breath
it declaares tha it should apply and so actually applies it. Where do we
or the majority stand? The law of prescription of penalties, either is
applicable or is not applicable. There is no middle ground. If it is not
appliocable, we may not apply it. If the law of prescription of penalties
should be amended so as to cover cases like the present under
consideration, such amendment falls within the exclusive domain of the
Legislature. We cannot and should not undetake to do it, otherwise we
would be treading on the controversial and dubious ground of judicial
legislation.
The reason given in the majority opinion for extending the benefits of
prescription of penalties to the petitioner although according to the same
majority prescription is inapplicable, is contained in the following
quotation of its opinion:
If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble and
caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing him
is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at
least as much justification for extending this liberality through strict
construction of the pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived
and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.
This point of view fails to appreciate the theory and the reason behind
the law of prescription of penalties. If a convict under confinement, at the
risk of being killed succeeds in breaking jail and also succeeds in
evading rearrest for a certain period of time which by no means is short,
despite the efforts of all the instrumentalities of the Government
including sometimes the setting of a prize or reward on his head, which
thereby enlists the aid of the citizenry, the law calls off the search for
him, and condones the penalty. But during that period of prescription the
escaped convict lives a life of a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the
mountains and forests in constant mortal fear of being caught. His life
far from being happy, comfortable and peaceful, is reduced to a mere
existence filled with fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery. As the
distinguished penal law commentator Viada said, the convict who
evades sentence is sometimes sufficiently punished by his voluntary
and self-imposed banishment, and at times voluntary exile is more
grievous than the sentence he was trying to avoid. (Viada y Villasca,
Codigo Penal, Vol. III, p. 41, 5th ed.) And all the time he has to utilize
every ingenuity and means to outwit the Government agencies bent on
recapturing him. For all this, the government extends to him a sort of
condonation or amnesty.
But the case of a pardonee is widely different, he never risked life or limb
to secure his freedom. He never escaped from prison. He was given his
freedom as it were on a silver platter, and thereafter like his fellow
citizens lives in peace and comfort. He rejoins his family and engage in
business and enjoys all that life has to offer. The only condition that the
Chief Executive requires of him, which condition he has voluntarily
accepted is that he conducts himself and behaves like his fellow citizens,
live in peace and abide by the law. To me, there is absolutely no parity
or comparison between him and an escaped convict. Naturally, the
reasons for extending the benefits of prescription of the penalty to an
escaped convict do not obtain in the case of petitioner.
Finally, to bolster the opinion of the majority it is claimed that while in
jail, petitioner had observed good conduct and was classified as trustee
or penal colonist, and that his release before extinguishing his sentence
could have been intended as a reward for his exemplary conduct. I
believe that it is hardly relevant to bring in a pardonee's good behavior
while in jail in order to mitigate, even to condone his violation of the
condition of his pardon. For good conduct while in prison, a prisoner is
duly and amply rewarded with time allowance for good conduct, resulting
in a substantial reduction of sentence, all according to law (Art. 97, Rev.
Penal Code.)
If the conditional pardon issued to the petitioner were intended and
meant only as a reward "with little or no thought of exacting any return
from him in the form of restraint from law violations," as claimed in the
majority opinion, then the pardon should have been made absolute and
unconditional. But the fact is that it imposed a condition, which the Chief
Executive expected to be complied with as shown by the action of the
Office of the Chief Executive in having him rearrested for violation of the
pardon. Incidentally, our very Penal Code (Art. 95) provides that "any
person who has been granted a conditional pardon shall incur the
obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed, otherwise
his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in
the revocation of the pardon . . . ." This idea of strict compliance with the
obligation assumed by a pardonee, embodied in Article 95 is wholly at
variance with the claim of the majority that a conditional pardon is a mere
reward with no thought on the part of the Government of exacting
fulfillment of the obligations imposed. For the foregoing reasons, I
dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the decision
appealed from.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 183

CIVIL LIABILITY prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao moved for reconsideration
but it was denied.

IN GENERAL Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-
94846,[7] entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of
Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito
[G.R. No. 150793. November 19, 2004]
dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19.
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LYDIA C. HAO, respondents.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the
RTC in an order reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive portion
DECISION reads:

QUISUMBING, J.: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is

ordered to allow the intervention of the private prosecutors in behalf of
petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim.
Petitioner assails the Decision,[1] dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively participate in the
5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The proceedings.
RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also challenged by herein petitioner
is the CA Resolution,[2] dated November 20, 2001, denying his Motion SO ORDERED.[8]
for Reconsideration.
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower court acted with grave
Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider material facts; (2) allowing
Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No.
falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172[3] in relation to 99-94846 although it was not a party to the criminal complaint in Criminal
Article 171[4] of the Revised Penal Code. The charge reads: Case No. 285721; and (3) effectively amending the information against
the accused in violation of his constitutional rights.
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification upon a public denying the petition, thus:
document, to wit: the said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
the Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public,
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as
Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his Notarial Registry as Doc No.
well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in
109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public
toto.
document, by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the
Annual Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present
and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as SO ORDERED.[9]
the said accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never
present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April 30, 1994
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had
and neither has participated in the proceedings thereof to the prejudice
no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since
of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth
there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
as therein proclaimed.

For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
the concept of a derivative suit. Respondent maintained that when the
directors or trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a demand
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as from stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
Criminal Case No. 285721[6] for falsification of public document, before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit,
Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
for it alleged that petitioner falsified documents pertaining to projects of
the corporation and made it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued and a director of the corporation. According to the appellate court, the
thereafter. corporation was a necessary party to the petition filed with the RTC and
even if private respondent filed the criminal case, her act should not
divest the Corporation of its right to be a party and present its own claim
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho
for damages.
and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and
presented Hao as their first witness.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution
dated November 20, 2001.
After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainants counsels
as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege
and prove any civil liability in the case. Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible errors:
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chuas motion and
ordered the complainants counsels to be excluded from actively
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 184
I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAOS FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO.
285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA
REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-94846]
III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNAS DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA
HAOS COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE
THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR
BEING A SHAM PLEADING.[10]
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal
complaint in the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty
Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should
private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when
(1) it sustained the lower court in giving due course to respondents
petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was
not the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when
it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was in the nature of a derivative
suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-
corporate proceedings and cannot be made part of a criminal action. He
cites the case of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,[11]
where the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case
cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case,
the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit,
considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the private
complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case,
we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal
on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with
the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document. Among
the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority
shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege
in his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative
cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders
similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with by the
petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the
instant petition which, in part, merely states that this is a petition for
review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the
RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 since the trial
courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil liability against the
private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all
deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be
treated as a derivative suit.[12]
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil
aspect cannot be treated as a derivative suit because the appeal lacked
the basic requirement that it must be alleged in the complaint that the
shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of
the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join.
Under Section 36[13] of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section
23,[14] where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged
with its board of directors or trustees.[15] An individual stockholder is
permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation
wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights,
whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones
to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the
suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation
as the real party in interest.[16]
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate
cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the
relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of
the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action
against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend
on behalf of the corporation.[17]
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.[18] When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[19]
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by
respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose
subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty Corporation.
Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena
Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil case for the
corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not
institute the action against petitioner. Private respondent was the one
who instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that she filed a
derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate.
Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a
derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder
suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint
that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the
corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish
to join him in the suit.[20] It is a condition sine qua non that the
corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation
an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be
served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the
corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit
and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the
same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as
party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because
judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.[21]
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated
that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation.
Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not
be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note that the case
was titled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena
Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela
Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner before us now claims that the corporation is not a private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and thus cannot be included
as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Devt. Corporation v. Court
of Appeals.[22] In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the standing of
Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the petition for certiorari,
even though it was not a party-in-interest in the civil case before the
lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by
her not only in her personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the
corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all remedies
available to her before she instituted the case, not only to claim damages
for herself but also to recover the damages caused to the company.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 185

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[23] when a trial court
commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action for
certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the
private offended party or complainant.[24]
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or
those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended
parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as
person(s) aggrieved to file special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari.[25]
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of
a corporation to join said petition for certiorari, despite the finality of the
trial courts denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent
Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[26] we held that if
aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari. In that
case, petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims
and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible
remedy since she could not intervene in the probate of her father-in-laws
estate.[27]
In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the
respondent Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was brought in
her own name and in behalf of the Corporation. Although, the
corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of
the falsification was the corporations project and the falsified documents
were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party
in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case
directly and adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower
court err in allowing private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial
of Criminal Case No. 285721?
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the
right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages
arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior
court did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by
her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds
that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the
participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed
to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is
without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence
should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine
who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising
from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve
the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.[32]
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation
made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It
follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to
establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the
private offended party has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June
14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October
5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private prosecutors are hereby allowed to
intervene in behalf of private respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution
of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,[28] holding that where
from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing
the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended
party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability

arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends
two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime.[29] The civil
action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages.[30]

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party
may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.[31] Rule
111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 186
PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's
motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the
vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez,
while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo
Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a
consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as
reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which
required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical
Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court
of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused
voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical
Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision handed
down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as
a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to
which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating
circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in
its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the
complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the
value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which
complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay
complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the
cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his
desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the
accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel
moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter
a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but
also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be
imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did
not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the
private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant
praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory
damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate
court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting
the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P
5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served
upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the
insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus,
complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was
denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the
appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo
Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and
not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order
was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the
matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered
its decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has
no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275,
which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is
fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said
operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than
to render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case
without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has
been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of
the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action
is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding
the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly
held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter
of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case
of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not
arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana";
(c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or
changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a
party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in
a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article
100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be
applied to the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-
contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a
declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be
distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-
delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.
Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand,
the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present
case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana.
This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be
regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the
employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that
the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3)
that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156).
The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites
present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.
Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 187

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been

deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one
wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code
but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent
upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law,
he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the
employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the
criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the
employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris,
supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of
the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded
as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings
in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of
execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable

because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and
in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such
subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a
separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary
liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision
against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's
decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA
709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the
absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party,
is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the
latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea
v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to
render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case
and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error
has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action
is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of
the heirs of the victim."

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant
the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend
its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be
sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once
all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such
being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case
where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of
amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a
motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has
been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for

subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is
directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary
liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs
against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 188
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[2] and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and
January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated
April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166,
denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal
Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the
subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck
driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with double homicide and double physical injuries.[4] The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in
charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered
in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules
and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution
to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate
said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner
as a result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped
and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with
plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage
in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate
no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the
amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018
driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no.
PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898
driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined
amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver
Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula
y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the
other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical
injuries which required medical attendance for a period of more than 30
days which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical
injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine
days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated
February 4, 1991, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death
of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo
Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and
compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees, plus the costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the
above judgment became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular
accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the
dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a
"Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that
the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside
insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for
the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of
merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on
September 25, 1991.Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution
of the subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied
due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period.[10] The other directed the issuance of a writ of
execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award
of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that
respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying
the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was
concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance
of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court,
petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process when he was found
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the
criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated
October 27, 1992, disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is
DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for
lack of persuasive force and effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November
24, 1992. This was denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994.
Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court
of Appeals erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT
THE PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED
OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 189

TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM. essence of due process.[21]

III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE
EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN
ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action
under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial court. To resolve it, we
must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final
and executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the
criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of
preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by
the trial court to prove the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between him and accused. Nor that, alternatively, the
accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time
of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them
due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the
same criminal proceeding where the award is made.[18] However,
before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the
discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.[19]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused
because it was his truck that was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it
was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that
provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their
contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings,
despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced
evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With the convicts
application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and
executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it
found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances
to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the
employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the
enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly
notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary liability,
he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he
did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the
latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time
of the incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and
duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively,
a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This
was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court
that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6,
1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27] that
belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the
execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued
the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability.
Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that
the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault
respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the
trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court
observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged employer is not
afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as
to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso

"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged
employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris
(supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability
of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained
therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as
still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in
the suit."[20]

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee

relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be
determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during
the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances,
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 190
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment
meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat
the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf
in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the
primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has
become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3]
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in
the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED
and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion
Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was
found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral
expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month,
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses,
her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the
sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30
years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital
expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon,
P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least
P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses,
P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical
expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses,
P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as
well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital
expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses,
P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills,
P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss
of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota
Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost
of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of
accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently,
for
the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth
mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes
the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused,
also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal
which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice
of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal
from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave
due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998,
[petitioner] filed its brief.On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the
OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground
that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases
on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May
31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the
instant motion to dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined
in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of
civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of
the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 191
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense
of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158
SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant
case.[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its
appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had
jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of
that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused
will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the prosecution
cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given
a more severe penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may
also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment
as is prejudicial to them.[11]
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate
court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its
pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8
of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal.[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment
and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the
promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since
he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by
analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.[15] While at
large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified
or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused
to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers
employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,
according to Article 103 which reads:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 192
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the
main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment
of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20]
33,[21]34[22]and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate,
distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same
act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need
not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than
once for the same act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil
liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but
not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto
civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party
may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,
which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the
criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case
to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party
to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman,
its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that
none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds
employer did not interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an
appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.[28] Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the
light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees
to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only
defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee
absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief[29] filed
with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that
the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent
evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the
accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.[33] Indeed,
appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the
judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the
accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a
penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial
court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his
right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could
become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though,
that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by
jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.[35]
Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is
deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now
final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by
the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 193
is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not,
as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When
the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such conduct
is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate
court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he
has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do
not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts
directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal
cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its
employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed
rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary
liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down
-- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-
employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of
the latters insolvency.[44] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who
is subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered
by a competent court.[48] By the same token, to allow them to appeal
the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters
consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating
the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must
be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged
in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil
action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in
a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer,
as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase
its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-
employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of
the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon
the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and
second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability
of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight,
then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon
the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency,
in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability,
but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process.[53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory
origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal
as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56]
Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[57] In these times
when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules
have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the
orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 194

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its
right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.[60] In fact, it can
be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against
the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may
the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee
has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear
from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its
regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner,
being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in
an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither does petitioner
dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 195
[G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005]
MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison
Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San
Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and
Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the
entrance of the drainage system.[2]
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent
Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by
concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about
a foot deep.[3] After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a
fish, came out of the drainage system and left[4] without saying a word.
Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent
Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area.[5] Shocked
at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.[6] For his part,
respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto,
Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto
rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having
been conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any
criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of
respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.[8] Respondent
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system
catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that
he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system
while riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic
Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and
submitted his autopsy report containing the following postmortem
findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with
white long sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in
a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy
particles with bloody path.
Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section
contains bloody froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries,
contributory.[9]
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents
Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which
found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory
portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda,
who testified on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the
victims head and the abrasion on the latters left forearm could have been
caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The
injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of
drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the
larynx and trachea (Nakahigop ng putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or
by force.[11] On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the
hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong
force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated
that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head
could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back
of Wilsons head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he
was thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor
declared that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons
face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the
trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of
strangulation.[12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents
had admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the
inside portions thereof,[13] the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court
granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated
January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the respondents
liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to
prove their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar
as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred
that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN
RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE
VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.[14]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on
December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 196
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but
rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the
criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled
jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment
of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts
imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE
EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON
QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities,
surmises and speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he
could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage system
since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a
snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to
hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness
due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that
the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill
motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering
that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilsons death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the
Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the
injuries sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well as the
locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents
after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering that
respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring
out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the
drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area
waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record
to show that either or both the respondents caused the death of her son
and, as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed
the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not
criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[17] The
civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.[18] When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.[19] With the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.[20]
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.[21] The sole purpose of the civil action
is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused.[22] While the prosecution must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it
is required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant
against the accused for damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that
the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not
exist.[23]
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.[24] Natural
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events,
while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act
of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed
must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is
that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor.[25]
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the
felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or
death of the victim. The cause and effect relationship is not altered or
changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del
lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion
del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la
constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de
medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the
felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.[26]
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury
when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed
and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.[27]
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as
to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their
felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The
offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.[28] A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.[29] This Court has
emphasized that:
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties
attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be
easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate
cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty
of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. [30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 197

The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied
case similar to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his
responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case, the physical head hit a hard object:
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the
COURT:
means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound
which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it The Court would ask questions.
is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide,
etc.[32]
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the
back of the head might be due to the victims falling on his back and his
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by head hitting a pavement?
dolo. In People v. Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is
strong enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus pavement, then it is possible.
delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendants agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the
corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the
head hit the pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases,
the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged
to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some A It is also possible.
other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural
cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or
was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious,
death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be it is possible that he might have taken in some mud or what?
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to A Yes, Sir.
kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still
or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of breathing?
a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[34] A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would
indicate that the victim was still alive when he was placed under
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or water.[37]
the private complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of
evidence or superior weight of evidence. Although the evidence The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims
adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, face could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain pavement:
his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants.[35]
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it
be caused by the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how
preponderance of evidence is determined:
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough
surface.
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or Q Rough surface?
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses A Yes, Your Honor.
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may signs that the victim was strangled?
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]
the greater number.[36]

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA,
the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the
facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective
testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the
deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his
head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused
when the victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion
hit a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling
down?

We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also
of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter possible.[39]
hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the
injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 198

The trial court took into account the following facts: Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?

Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution A He went with me, Sir.
that there were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The
stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante
pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with
Andres was with you?
water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round.
If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in
some amount of water and drown.[40] A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there
at the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just
followed, Sir.
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its
conclusion based on the said findings.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down,
Dante Andres also came or arrived?
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of
the evidence of the parties, and its conclusion anchored on such A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]
findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this
Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to
facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
prove a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts
outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to
alleged in the Information.
warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate
courts.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. No costs.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because
even Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he
himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and SO ORDERED.
Pacheco inside.[41] Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only
respondent Pacheco had one.

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have
caused the abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise,
failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the
victim were made ante mortem or post mortem.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that

either or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or
instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might
have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the
deceased.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed

serious crimes for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-
motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to
prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased.
In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the
part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter
was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that
respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son
before the latters death:

Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?

A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after
going from her mother who is gambling, Sir.

Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?

A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)[43]

When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was
respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the
petitioner of her sons death. Even after informing the petitioner of the
death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way
to the grassy area where the deceased was:
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 199
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
[ G.R. No. L-25913, February 28, 1969 ]
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. APOLONIO
BUSTOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga on October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing
of Ray¬mundo Castro, whose heirs are now the petitioners. The trial
court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two
mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary
surrend¬er, sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years,
4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners,
who were re¬presented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum
of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the
accused (respondent), is entitled from the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six (26)
years as a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962." Both
respondent and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals,
respondent asking that that appellate court acquit him and petitioners
praying, on the other hand, that respond¬ent be convicted of murder,
that the portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the
GSIS be de¬leted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the
aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate
and exemplary damages." For the pur¬poses of their appeal, petitioners
even filed unneces¬sarily a printed record on appeal. On October 18,
1965, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the trial
court in so far as it concerned (1) the amount of damages to be awarded
petitioners thus:
"x x x Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which
we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to
the heirs of the de¬ceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to com¬pensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at
the annual salary of P2,676.00 x x x."
and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated as
such by the trial court, which was changed to "vindication of a grave
offense", but affirm¬ing it in all other respects. Upon motion, however,
of respondent for the reconsideration of said decision, re¬iterating his
plea for acquittal, or, in the alternative, praying for the elimination of the
award of moral and compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 13, 1965, an amended decision, the
pertinent portions of which are:
"The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for reconsi-
deration to support the complete re¬versal of the judgment appealed
from, have been considered and passed upon in our decision, and we
see no reason to alter the same in so far as the appellant's guilt of the
crime is concerned. On the other hand, we agree with the appellant that
in the interest of justice and equity and in view of the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them,
the award of moral and compensatory damages should be eliminated.
"WHEREFORE, the decision pro¬mulgated October 18, 1965, is hereby
amended by eliminating therefrom the award of P6000.00 representing
moral damages, and of P13,380.00 representing the decedent's loss of
earnings."
From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. The
prayer in their petition for certiorari asks for nothing more than that the
amended deci¬sion of the Court of Appeals be revoked and reversed,
and its original decision be affirmed in toto in so far as the award of
indemnity and damages is concerned. Since We find the grounds of the
appeal meritorious, We grant fully the prayer in the petition.
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other,
to restate, in a more compre¬hensive way, the law regarding the items
of damages that are recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime,
whe¬ther the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceed¬ings itself
or in a separate civil action. In the in¬stant case, recovery of such
damages is being sought in the criminal proceedings, but even if it were
claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same, for
generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except
with respect to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be
awarded only when a separate civil action is instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil
Code) With the clarifications We are making herein, at least the writer of
this opinion expects that litiga-tions regarding the aspects of the law
herein passed upon may be minimized.
As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original
decision of the Court of Appeals, while correct in making
aparticularization in the award of indemnity and damages, nonetheless,
still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional requirement that all
decisions of courts of record must state both the facts and the law on
which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art, VIII, Constitution) In said original
decision, the Court of Appeals held:
"Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased: Aside
from the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we
uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the
heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the
annual salary of P2,676.00 (Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indi¬cated
in so far as it concerns the amount of indemnity and damages to be
awarded to the heirs of the de¬ceased, and the mitigating circumstance
of vindication of a grave offense which takes the place of the
circumstance of obfuscation appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against the appellant."
As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award
of indemnity and damages to petitioners; worse, the impression is given
that the said award is pure¬ly a matter of discretion on the part of the
court. Clear¬ly, this is not in accordance with the law. Indeed, it must
have been this failure to refer to the pertinent le¬gal provisions which
induced the appellate court, at the mere invocation by respondent of Art.
2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily eliminating in the
amended decision the items on moral damages and compensa¬tion for
loss of earning of the decedent which its original decision had correctly
contained. Having held that it had discretion in the premises, the court
easily yielded to the argument that simply because it had credited the
respondent with two mitigating circumstances, it was al¬ready justified
in eliminating the items of damages al¬ready adverted to, presumably
having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides, that:
"In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances."
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or
otherwise, the quoted provision does not warrant a complete deletion of
said items of damages. In any event, the court evidently failed to take
into account that several other provisions can come into play considering
the circumstances in this case.
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations
arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws, "x x x subject to the
provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book
(Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 200
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
(Art. 100, Revised Penal Code) This civil liability, in case the felony
involves death, includes indemnification for consequential dama¬ges
(Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "x x xthose
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art.
107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as above
indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said
provisions:
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
"In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all da-
mages which are the natural and pro¬bable consequences of the act or
omis¬sion complained of. It is not neces¬sary that such damages have
been fore¬seen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant." (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206
which provides thus:
"The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pe¬sos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addi¬tion:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earn¬ing capacity at the time of his
death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the pro-
visions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascend¬ants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been
increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil.
426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G. R. No.
L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that
this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be
adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the
moral damages being "left to the dis¬cretion of the court, according to
the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability
when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary
damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court
will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in con¬nection with the
indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases
wherein exemplary da¬mages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "x x x damages to
be adjudicated may be respectively increased or less¬ened according
to the aggravating or mitigating circum¬stances," (Art. 2204) but "the
party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages,
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art.
2211) As to attor¬neys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may
be re-covered only when exemplary damages have been granted(Art.
2208, par.1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate
civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense --- P12,000.00,
without the need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances attending the
commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased --- an
amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual in¬come at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a mat¬ter of duty, unless the deceased had no
earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not
caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support,
under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may de-mand
support from the accused for not more than five years, the exact duration
to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, --¬ an amount to be fixed by
the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the de¬ceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating cir¬cumstances, --- an amount to be fixed in the discretion
of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litiga¬tion, --- the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to reco¬ver civil liability
has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
capacity of the de¬ceased and for moral damages are recover¬able
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these
damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened
accord¬ing to the mitigating or aggravating cir¬cumstances, except
items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals erred in eliminating in its amended decision, the items of moral
damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in case of death,
this Court has already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R. Nos. L-13328-
29, September 29, 1961, that once the heirs of the deceased claim moral
damages and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it be-comes the
duty of the court to make the award. We held:
"Art. 2206 states further that 'In addition' to the amount of at least
P3,000.00 to be awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages as a consequence of the death of their
deceased kin, which simply means that once the above-mention¬ed
heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral damages and are
able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty
of the court to award moral damages to the claimant in an amount
commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by them."
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272,
June 26, 1967:
"In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only
P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory
da¬mages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art.
FINALS CRIMINAL LAW 1 I ACJUCO 201

2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of con-tract results in the reiterated. (Annex G, id.) Respondent did not file any answer to said
passenger's death. As has been the policy fol¬lowed by this Court, this motion despite the resolu¬tion requiring him to do so. (Par. 12, Petition
minimal award should be increased to P6,000 x x x Still, Arts. 2206 and for Certiorari) Neither has respondent filed any brief in the present
1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to instance, notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for extension to
the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental file the same, which, incident¬ally, were all granted. Under these
anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict technicalities of
becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. Plaintiff demands procedure in order to accomplish substantial justice more expeditiously.
P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the cir¬cumstances, We Anyway, as We said at the outset, peti¬tioners are asking Us, in the
consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages prayer of their petition for certiorari, for nothing more than to affirm "in
aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to toto" the original decision of the Court of Appeals, and in their lone
plaintiff-appellant." assignment of error in the present instance, their only claim is that "the
Court of Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating
the award of P6,000 moral damages and the award of P13,380.00 loss
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss of
of earnings of the deceased Raymundo Castro." In these
earning capacity of the deceased, We also held in the case of Daniel
cir¬cumstances, even if We should award the amounts of da¬mages
Bulante v. Chu Liante, G. R. Nos. L-21583 and L-21591-92, May 20,
just mentioned, inspite of the absence of the per¬tinent findings of fact
1968 that:
by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach beyond amounts
that are undis¬puted by the respondent.
"The next item objected to re¬fers to the damages awarded to the heirs
of the deceased passengers for loss of earning capacity, se¬parately
We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners'
from the indemnities by reason of death. The ground for the objection
brief and We hold that, on the basis of the facts not questioned by
is that loss of earn¬ing capacity was not specifically pleaded or claimed
respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as moral damages
in the complaint. This item, however, may be consi¬dered included in
and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning
the prayer for 'actual damages' and for other 'just and equitable reliefs,'
capacity of the deceased awarded in the original decision of the Court
especially if taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764,
of Appeals in addition, of course, to the indemnity for death fixed also by
of the Civil Code, which allows, in addi¬tion to an indemnity of at least
said court at P6,000.00. This amount of P6,00.00 We cannot increase
P3,000 by reason of death, recovery for loss of earning capacity on the
to P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the
part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs 'in every case x x
subsequent cases, (People v. Mongaya, G. R. No. L-23708, October 31,
x unless the deceased on account of permanent physical dis-ability not
1968, and People v. Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143, November 29, 1968)
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
because in the instant suit, neither party has appealed in relation thereto.
death.'"
This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as to
specific portions of the civil indemnity to be paid by the respondent. It
To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Mara¬nan v. Perez and would have been different if the whole criminal case were up for our
Bulante v. Chua Liante, from which We have quoted, were actions based review because then, even without any appeal on the part of the
on contracts of common carriers. But the above-mentioned doctrines offended party, We could have still increased the said liability of the
are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, after all, Art. accused, herein respondent. (See Mercado v. Lira, supra.)
2206 of the Civil Code which was applied in said cases is precisely the
provision pertinent to lia¬bility arising from crimes (and quasi-delicts).
At this juncture, for the guidance of parties simi¬larly situated as
No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the court in the
petitioners herein, and so that there may be no useless expenses in
above cases only because Art. 1764 of the Civil Code provides that said
appeals by offended parties in regard to the civil aspect of a criminal
"Art. 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the
case when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it should be
breach of contract of a common carrier." Accordingly, the interpretation
made clear that when there is no such separate civil action and the claim
given to said article in those cases are applicable to the case at bar. In
for civil indemnity is joined with the crimi¬nal case, no record on appeal,
other words, this must be so because under the Civil Code, the same
whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary, except
rules on damages are generally to be observed, whether death results
perhaps when formal pleadings raising complicated questions are filed
from a crime or a quasi¬-delict or a breach of the contract of common
in connection therewith, and still, this would be purely optional on the
carriage.
appellant because anyway the whole original record of the case is
elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already settled that appeals
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of earning relating to the civil as¬pects of a criminal case should follow the
capacity of the deceased in the pre¬sent case, the original decision of procedure for appeal required by the rules of criminal procedure.
the Court of Appeals awarding them, does not afford sufficient basis for (People v. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221; People v. Villanueva, G. R.
Us to increase the amounts fixed by said court, as prayed for by No. L-18769, May 27, 1966)
appellants. As has already been stated, the said decision failed to follow
the Constitution, not only in not stating the law on which it isbased but
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is
also in not making the necessary findings of fact on which it based its
modified as hereinabove indicated, in so far as the civil liability of
discret¬ion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and
respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this instance.
compensatory damages. Legally, therefore, We can, if We wish to,
return this case to that court for it to supply these constitutional
omissions. We opt, however, to save time and further difficulties for, and
damages to, the pe¬titioners. Extant in the records before Us is the fact
that the respondent has never disputed that petitioners are the widow
and seven children of the deceased, three of whom were still minors at
the time of his death, nor that the said deceased was a public school
teacher, 56 years old, and earning P2,276.00 a year. These facts
appear to have been repeatedly asserted in the briefs of petitioners in
the Court of Appeals and in this Court. No denial was ever made by the
respondent. When respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
original decision of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition for
Certiorari) he only argued that in view of the mitigating circumstances
cre¬dited to him by said court, petitioners were not entitled to moral
damages and to indemnity for loss of earning ca¬pacity of the deceased;
the amounts fixed therefor by said court - he never questioned. When
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the amended decision
of the Court of Appeals, these facts (relationship, earn¬ings, etc.) were