STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1284448

The Terror Speaks: Inside Pakistans Terrorism Discourse

and National Action Plan
Pamir H. Sahill
Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies, University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article, employing a poststructuralist Critical Discourse Analysis, Received 15 October 2016
reveals cracks, discrepancies, and inconsistencies in Pakistans discourse Accepted 16 January 2017
on terrorism and practice. I argue that Pakistan continuously constructs a
monstrous enemy and magnies it in a way that conceals alternative
representations of reality that could show that the state, by presenting
itself as a victim of terrorism, is using phenomena of political violence to
serve its political objectives inside and outside the boundaries of the
state. The article argues that after a militant attack on a school in
northwest Pakistan, critical, liberal, and dissenting narratives mingled
with the dominant state discourse in a fashion that strengthen illiberal
practices in the country, thus undermining the ideals of democracy.

In mid-June 2014, Pakistan launched the much-awaited1 offensive against militants in the
North Waziristan district of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).2 The military
said that the ofcially called Zarb-e-Azb3 operation was against foreign and local terrorists
hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan.4 Although secular political forces in Pakistan
supported Zarb-e-Azb, some right-wing and religious political partiesmost importantly,
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)were opposed to it, insisting that negotiations were the
only way to bring peace in Pakistan. On 16 December 2014, a group of militants attacked
the Army Public School (APS) in the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing more than 140
students and school staff. The attack was dubbed as the 9/11 of Pakistan,5 soon after which
the government, almost all prominent political parties, and the military approved a 20-point
National Action Plan (NAP; for details see Appendix) to ght extremism and terrorism. In a
way, it was similar to the post-9/11 period in the United States where both the government
and the opposition passed the PATRIOT Act and vowed to ght terror globally. The APS
attack was signicant as it brought all the political parties together against terrorism. That
way, for the rst time since 2001, all dissenting and critical voices regarding state policies
and terrorism either amalgamated with the dominant discourse or if any were left, they were
suppressed by contrasting the innocence of the schoolchildren with the evilness of the
Taliban and threats the group was posing to the very existence of Pakistan. In January 2015,
the parliament, the government and the military announced full implementation of the

CONTACT Pamir H. Sahill halp00@vse.cz Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies, University of
Economics, W. Churchill Sq. 1938/4, 130 67 Prague, Czech Republic.
2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 P. H. SAHILL

NAP, exemplifying a situation where the anti-Taliban secular and liberal as well as those
who were accused to be pro-Taliban in the past6 were standing together against terror.
Throughout the year, both the Pakistani government and the military issued statements
reiterating that they had succeeded in their ght against terrorism. By the end of 2015, a sui-
cide attack on a government building in northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwas Mardan district
killed more than 20 people7 and then on 20 January 2016, a group of militants attacked the
Bacha Khan University8 in the northwest town of Charsadda, which was followed by a sui-
cide bombing on a gathering of Christian families celebrating Easter at a park in the eastern
Lahore city,9 contradicting and disproving Pakistans ofcial claims of triumph in the War
on Terror.10 Pakistani senate, thinkers, analysts, some politicians, and international media
raised questions regarding ofcial claims criticizing both the government and the military
for failing to implement NAP,11 arguing if after launching a massive military campaign in
FATA and as a result of formulating the NAP, the terrorists were defeated, how could
they still be able to launch attacks that were similar to that of the APS? They noted that the
NAP has failed to end terrorist attacks in Pakistan.12 Internationally, U.S. president Barack
Obama maintained that NAP was the right policy but urged Pakistan to take actions to
show it is serious about delegitimizing, disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks.13
Such analyses of the terror problem in Pakistan are not new and debates have continued
for many years pinpointing shortcomings in Islamabads strategies aimed at solving the
problem.
This article, however, does not aspire to extend those debates or discussions in the same
way, that is to say, it does not offer any problem-solving approach regarding terrorism in
Pakistan. Rather, it questions Pakistans discourse and practice vis-!a-vis terrorism. Put dif-
ferently, this article asks three equally important questions:
1. How the APS attack served as a precedent to formulate a unied discourse on terror-
ism in the form of NAP?
2. How the post-NAP Pakistani discourse on terrorism can be interpreted in an alterna-
tive and critical context? and,
3. What are the consequences of such discourse (and practice)?
I argue that Pakistans antiterror discourse not only offers an amplication of the repre-
sentations of realities but also serves as a legitimacy-cover for its national and international
political objectives. That is to say, by presenting the state as a terrorism victim, showing the
monstrous face of terrorism playing havoc with the lives of innocent schoolchildren, the
dominant discourse and practice in Pakistan conceal and veil alternative understandings of
the political violence that the state unleashes either through coercive technologies of power
or through disciplinary power mechanisms and tools like the NAP. By employing poststruc-
turalist Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article unpacks the dominant discourse on
terrorism and reveals its cracks, inconsistencies, and limitations and offers an alternative
approach to how the state, using the logic of (in)security, has shrunk the liberal space and
how the policies and laws the state has adopted carry a form of inherent political violence
akin to the violence perpetrated by the militant groupsaspects that were not efciently
analyzed before.
In this article, rst, I provide a sketch of the theoretical and methodological framework
and delineate the method of delimiting texts and data collection in a specied timeframe.
Second, since discourses are historical, that is to say, they ought to be understood in context,
I present a summary of post-NAP discourse (and practice) in Pakistan. Third, in the main
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 3

analytical section, I rst unpack terrorism discourse in Pakistan in a broad, alternative con-
text, arguing that after the APS attack the state constructed and magnied its monstrous
enemy. After that, the article shows how discourse on terrorism in Pakistan carries a para-
dox within itself as the acts of violence in the country are not victimizing the state as a whole
but are discriminatory. Through poststructuralist theoretical analysis aided by data or
empirical evidence, one of the core arguments of the article is constructed: how, by present-
ing the monstrous face of terror, an inherent discursive and practical terror of state
speaks. Finally, I argue, the state is using the terrorism discourse to achieve its political
goals by attaching a cause/effect equation to them.

The Holy Trinity: Poststructuralism, CDA, and Method

Poststructuralist CDA is chosen to look inside Pakistans terrorism discourse because the
governments problem-solving strategy envisioned through NAP and its endorsement and
support by the international community, particularly the United States, is problematic as it
has cause and effect connotations and moves the debate away from what is at the heart of
the discourse on terrorism.

Poststructuralist CDA: Theoretical and Methodological Frame

A major problem with liberalor broadly speaking, the rationalistframeworks is that they
adopt a reductionist approach while analyzing a phenomenon and do not pay attention to
details as these approaches in International Relations (IR) adhere to foundationalist and
essentialist traditions. Cox had rightly pointed out that problem-solving theory takes the
world as it nds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions
into which they are organized as the given framework for action14; however, a critical or
alternative approach questions the world and phenomena, and tries to understand and
explain social and political power relations, the institutions, and their behavior.
Poststructuralism follows an anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist episte-
mology and in contrast to positivists who assume the existence of social reality, poststructur-
alism denies the possible existence of a valid and given truth about the world.15 Rejection
of given truth about the social and political world, however, does not equate with negation
of materiality of the world because in that case it will be an idealistnot a poststructural-
istassumption. To illustrate, Laclau and Mouffes famous and widley quoted example suits
well here:
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs
here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specicity as objects is constructed in
terms of natural phenomena or expressions of the wrath of God, depends upon the structur-
ing of a discursive eld. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but
the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discur-
sive condition of emergence.16

Anti-essentialist ontology rejects the notion that things and the social or political world
have true or real essences within. It rather suggests that the whatness of any given entity is
socially constructed17 thus objects, subjects, states, institutions, and entities are given mean-
ing and are also endowed with a particular identity through language.18 Furthermore, by
4 P. H. SAHILL

employing anti-foundationalist epistemology, poststructuralists problematize and question

the possibility of building knowledge on, or around, apparently permanent categories or
essences that leads to the subversion of essence and meaning. That is how and when:

Political analysis becomes a question of examining the unevenness, and the relative perma-
nence, of certain ensembles of meaning. According to an anti-foundationalism perspective,
there are no foundations to rely upon for an understanding of the world. Thus socio-political
phenomena have to be understood by looking at the way in which actors, objects, and politics
are constructed within a discourse.19

In poststructuralist analysis of the discursively constructed social and political world, the
interplay of power relations becomes vivid thereby opening up new horizons to identify
cracks and contradictions within states, political institutions, identities, and discourses.20
That said, instead of reduction or superciality, poststructuralism aspires to evolve a limit-
lessly broad, and at the same time a micro-level careful study and understanding of interna-
tional politics. Since it is discourse through which the political world is constituted,
therefore, I nd CDA a suitable methodological tool to look into the problem of terror-
ism in Pakistan. Although a bulk of literature is available on it as a methodological and
even a theoretical framework,21 CDA, informed by poststructuralism, is not a widely used
methodological tool in the discipline of IR; therefore, it is important to provide a brief intro-
duction to it, along with arguments for its utilization for this article.
Precisely, CDA is a critical way of doing scholarship where structural relationships of
dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested through language are ana-
lyzed.22 van Dijk has a similar argument, adding that CDA is discourse analysis with an
attitude that focuses on social problems, especially on the role of discourse in the produc-
tion and reproduction of power abuse or domination23 and it plays an advocatory role for
groups who suffer from social discrimination,24 which is to say, it is not only emancipatory
but in a poststructuralist sense, serves as a methodological toolkit to understand and explain
domination of a discourse and its power effects.25
Poststructuralist CDA, as compared to other discourse analysis strategieslike content
analysisis better because the former is a text-reducing26 strategy while in the latter long
texts are needed and quoted for analysis27which is not suitable for journal articles, where
sometimes word-limit can be a barrier, thus leaving little room for theory-driven analysis.
Other methods of discourse analysis, for example, Foucaults archaeology28 involves archival
discourse analysis that is suitable for a study of a period that involves extended timeframes
or a huge bulk of literature. The same is the case with genealogy,29 which is necessarily an
extension of archaeology involving power relations.30 That said, in order to critically assess
Pakistans discourse on terrorism, CDA therefore, is an appropriate methodological
approach that equips this article to efciently provide answers for research questions. The
prerequisite for conducting such an analysis is what Neumann calls cultural competence;
however, he argues against naturalizing (i.e., not to become part of the universe studied)
because that is when the researcher becomes home blind and does not pay attention to the
detail.31 Keeping in view that precondition, it is argued that I have what Neumann terms
competitive advantage because I have lived and worked in both Afghanistan and Pakistan
and understand and speak many of the languages of both countries. In order to conduct a
poststructuralist CDA, it is important to incorporate a specic pathway or method to con-
nect the empirical with the theoretical eld.32
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 5

Method: Timeframe, Text Selection, and Delimitation

To begin with CDA, it was necessary to choose a timeframe and delimit texts suiting the
scope of this article. Although the Pakistani government started implementing the NAP in
January 2015, the timeframe selected here begins from mid-June 2014 because that is what
marked the initial shift in Pakistans ofcial discourse on terrorism when after repeated
calls by the U.S. administration and the collapse of talks with the domestic Taliban mili-
tantsthe Pakistani army launched an offensive in the North Waziristan tribal district
that was known as the stronghold of Al Qaedalinked militants, Pakistani Taliban, and the
Haqqani Network. The Haqqani Network is blamed for carrying out multiple coordinated
attacks inside Afghanistan.33 In addition, the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in Waziristan
has a link with NAP because the latter provides legitimacy to the former. Therefore, the
timeframe chosen for this article begins mid-June 2014 and continues through June 2016.
The criterion for selection of texts for this article is Hansens Model 2 of discourse
analysis. She explains three34 intertextuality models concerning discourse analysis, among
which Model 2in addition to ofcial or government discourseincludes texts, statements,
and narratives of opposition, media, and institutions.35 This means that texts selected
according to this model enable this article to show how ofcial, opposition, and liberal
political discourses vis-!a-vis terrorism in Pakistan unied after the APS attack and as a con-
sequence how the power of the newly shaped, unied, dominant discourse helps Pakistan
achieve its political objectives and in what way liberal democratic ideals are undermined.
A variety of texts were selected to not only comply with the requirement for Hansens Model
2 but also to delineate the complex nature of dominant ofcial discourse in Pakistan, to
reveal its cracks and to show paradox in the narratives of some liberal political parties and
experts. Nevertheless, in Pakistan the source of ofcial discourse on terrorism is not the
federal government alone. Due to its complex historical context,36 it is sometimes difcult to
locate the main source of ofcial discourse, especially when it comes to national security
and/or foreign policy.
Constitutionally, Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy, which means that the executive
headed by the prime minister is answerable to the legislature. The bicameral parliament not
only makes new laws but amends existing laws and the constitution. It is responsible to over-
see government policies and to question the executive whether it is implementing laws or
not. Precisely, the constitution of Pakistan makes the parliament supreme organ of the
state.37 In this case, for an analysis of the ofcial discourse, one should select and delimit
texts from two sources (i.e., the parliament and the executive). However, when it comes to
Pakistan, parliamentary supremacy and an elected executive running affairs of the state is
true only in theory. In practice, the state of affairs in Pakistan is very complex as it is the mil-
itary that plays a major role in making (and implementing) national security and foreign
policies. Fairbased on textual and contextual analysis of defense journals and literature
provides a detailed account of militarys decision-making role in Pakistan arguing that it is
the driving force behind shaping ideas and thoughts of the population.38 In other words, the
military in Pakistan is an important institution in shaping and reshaping dominant state dis-
course. In addition, for drawing plausible conclusions, it is important to understand what the
dominant discourse in a society is and how ofcial and dominant discourse circulates widely
through society because a discourse is considered dominant, only if it is presented as truth
to the population by propagating it throughout the society exactly in the same way as blood
6 P. H. SAHILL

ows and circulates via arteries and veins in the entire body.39 In other words, truth is cen-
tered on the form of scientic discourse and the institutions which produce it and it is sub-
ject to constant economic and political incitement, which means that there is always
demand for truth, exactly in the same way as economic production. The truth produced
through the discourse of various state institutions, circulates throughout the social body via
educational system(s) and media. Furthermore, the state-sanctioned truth is always pro-
duced and transmitted under control.40 That said, for grasping a whole picture of discourse
on terrorism in Pakistan, it was necessary to choose an array of texts as primary and second-
ary sources to rst understand the complex dominancy of discourse on terrorism and then
to delineate its consequences.
In doing so, a thorough reading and examination of more than 400 texts, within the time-
frame between June 2014 and June 2016, was conducted. The texts comprise of, rst, all the
press statements and press briengs of the Pakistani militarys Inter Services Public Relations
(ISPR)41; second, the transcripts of six consecutive National Assembly (NA)42 post-APS
attack debate sessions that included legislations and the twenty-rst constitutional amend-
ment43; third, press releases, policy statements, and transcripts of the speeches issued by the
Prime Ministers Ofce44 (PMO); fourth, ofcial press releases and statements of various
opposition political partiesall serving as primary sources; and nally, media reports, televi-
sion (TV), and radio debates and opinion articles by Pakistani and international journalists,
experts, and politicians were selected as secondary sources, thus fullling Hansens criterion
for Model 2 of discourse analysis.
I physically read, selected, and delimited the texts from the aforementioned sources. Since
in Pakistan Internet penetration is low, and most people watch TV, listen to radio, and read
Urdu newspapers, therefore to address research problem(s), all texts selected from the pri-
mary sources were reviewed, delimited, and crosschecked to ascertain if they were given
proper coverage in the news transmission of three major TV channels (i.e., Geo News,
Dunya News, and Express News),45 two main international radio stations (Radio Mashaal
and Deewa Radio),46 and three Urdu newspapers (Daily Jang, Daily Mashriq, and Daily
Express).47 For this purpose, texts concerning with NAP or terrorism were taken from, for
example, PMO, ISPR, or NA websites and then media sources were checked to determine if
those texts appeared there or otherwise. I did this in three ways and steps. First, I selected
two prime-time news hours (6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time) from the Geo News and
Dunya News TV channels and observed if a selected text was included in the bulletin as
short news, long news, a news report, or if main points from the selected text were presented
as news tickers48 or not. The same text was then checked in Express News TVs news hour
to observe the extent of coverage. Second, I looked for texts in the e-paper editions of cited
Urdu newspapers. Finally, since most of the political violence in Pakistan took place in the
Pashtun-dominated northwest part of the and the military operations were conned to
FATA, it was therefore important to establish whether the texts analyzed in this article were
broadcast through the two international radio stations for Pashtun areas. Any text whether
from the government, military, or oppositionthat did not fulll the illustrated mechanism
or criterion was omitted. Furthermore, for the view of opposition leaders and analysts, some
of the TV and radio debates and newspaper articles were used, which were directly related to
the scope of this article. Some of the English media sources were only used, rst, to assess
and analyze the views and narratives of liberal and opposition politicians and analysts; sec-
ond, to save time in translating all Urdu or Pashto material; and nally, because most of the
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 7

texts available on ofcial Web portals are in English and are directly cited and quoted in the
English newspapers stories. Having said that, the websites cited in this article as primary
sources like PMO, ISPR, transcripts of NA sessions, and political parties statements as well
as secondary sources like international media sources, experts opinion articles and TV and
radio debates serve as repositories of information and for replicability purposes. During the
nal phase of validating ndings and making the analysis credible and academically strong,
I used two online data sets on political violence in Pakistan and South Asia, as secondary
sources.

The Terror Speaks49: Post-NAP Discourse, Dichotomy, and Consequences

The APS attack changed the stance of various religious and nonreligious political parties
regarding terrorism in Pakistan. The parties include Jamaat e Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam (JUI-F), and PTI. All of them previously sought reconciliation with the TTP50 and
were reluctant to condemn its acts but after a school attack, they agreed to take rm meas-
ures against it. Other prominent political parties like Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Awami
National Party (ANP), and Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), who had for years
remained critical of the state policies regarding extremism and militancy, joined hands with
the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N)-led federal government by showing their full
support to combat terrorism.51
In analyzing texts, I found out that despite attacks similar to that of the APS, the govern-
ment, military, and opposition political parties as well as a majority of the Pakistani security
experts still believe that NAP is a comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem of terror-
ism. In this regard, the Pakistani government, the political forces in the opposition, and
many of the journalists and experts argue that in order to succeed in its ght against extrem-
ism and terrorism, Islamabad has to fully implement NAP.52 Pakistani Members of the Par-
liament (MPs) representing various political parties also think that the military should be
allowed to use all necessary means to root out terrorism in all its forms and manifesta-
tions, which is why NA approved and adopted the Pakistan Army Act (2015) and the 21st
Constitutional Amendment with consensus.53 Moreover, during the post-APS attack NA
debate sessions, a majority of the politicians acknowledged that since the 1980s, Pakistan
had supported various Afghan militant groups in their ght against the former Soviet Union
in Afghanistan and the same policy continues to this day. The government and an over-
whelming majority of Pakistani MPs believe that peace in Pakistan is only possible when
Afghanistan is stable, which is in the best interest of Pakistan.54 In 2015, the Pakistani
prime minister, president, army chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two Pashtun nation-
alist political partiesANP and PMAPkept reiterating this statement. While both ANP
and PMAP still accuse Islamabad of meddling in Afghanistans affairs by supporting the
good Taliban,55 they also stress that if Afghanistan is unstable, Pakistan too cannot get rid
of militancy. They argue that political violence and instability in Pakistan are a consequence
of Islamabads Afghan policy. The government, opposition, and experts in Pakistan as well
as media reports suggest that that the Taliban and other militant groups funded, trained,
and supported by the Pakistani governments, military, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency, have turned into a Frankensteins Monster that is now after its master.56 After
adopting NAP and acknowledging the mistakes of the past, both the federal government
and the military restated that they were not distinguishing between good and bad Taliban
8 P. H. SAHILL

and that they were facilitating Kabuls reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban; state-
ments that enriched Pakistani discourse on terrorism. To show that it was serious in taking
measures against militant groups, throughout 2015, Pakistan army continued issuing press
releases claiming killing of terrorists and sentencing militants to death after trials in the
military courts. In December 2015, the army claimed to have killed 3,400 militants in the
ongoing offensive57 in North Waziristan and Khyber districts of FATA. The military boasted
to have achieved phenomenal successes in breaking the backbone of the terrorists.58
Despite being the rst-ever unanimously approved broad antiterror strategy, I argue that
the discourse on terrorism in Pakistan is awed, perplexed, and inundated with discrepan-
cies. The post-APS discourse on terrorism is dominant in a way that not only veils dissenting
voices but also undermines aspirations for liberal democratic apparatus of the state. Like all
previous antiterror policies, the NAP has also not proved to be effective yet in bringing about
desired results. In fact, after every attack, critics show their discontent with the measures
taken by the state and in response the state vows to deal with the terrorists with full determi-
nation and boasts of successes until another attack happens and this continues. Critics and
the politicians of the left-wing and nationalist political parties fail to question the states
behavior and its dominant discourse vis-!a-vis terrorism. The power of dominant discourse
and has also concealed the consequences and many political objectives that the state wants
to achieve under the guise of tackling terrorism. To elucidate this point, it is important to
look into Pakistans discourse and practice regarding terrorism through an alternative, con-
textual, and conceptual prism of analysis.
Foucault argues that discourses are historical and create knowledge that is intertwined
with power. In other words, discourses are historical and they transmit power.59 Power
and knowledge are entwined and connected to a degree that there is no point in dreaming
of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power60 and vice versa. The power/
knowledge nexus operates in a way that determines dominant categories of truth and
normality through an exclusion of other voices and perspectives. The contemporary dis-
course on terrorism functions in a similar way prohibiting any dissenting voices from
emerging61 and even if voices emerge, they mostly deviate from the core theme of under-
standing extremist and terrorist phenomena and/or adhere to an attitude that boasts of
itself as being normative, humanitarianly problem solving, trying to show the evil of ter-
rorism that leaves people in a dire predicament and so on. Such voices or analyses take ter-
rorism as it is, they accept terrorism as an evil reality that implies in advance its own
moral condemnation62 without questioning or critically examining it and seeing the
cracks, limitations, and the phenomena that are concealed through the dominant dis-
course. In the same way, the APS attack led the Pakistani state and society to raise a united
voice against terrorism and diminish all micro, opposing, or dissenting narratives that
questioned the state and its inability to defeat terrorism for more than a decade despite
repeated claims to the contrary. The state, beneting from this antiterror sentiment,
approved and adopted NAP, pledging to implement itwhich, however, is a form of vio-
lence itself that is, as Newman argues, similar to the violence exhibited through acts of ter-
rorism and that is difcult to separate from the violence codied in laws, institutions
and the sovereign power of the state. He argues, if terrorism is to be dened by a form
of violence designed to inspire fear, then one can of course speak equally about state ter-
rorism as one can about non-state terrorism.63 Thus, NAP represents legalization of the
coercive power that the state uses against its enemies. To further illustrate, Newman
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 9

employs Leforts analysis of post-Revolution France,64 which is suitable in the case of Paki-
stan as well to assign broad meaning to its discourse and practice under NAP.
Lefort says, in the early 1790s, Robespierre and Saint Justtwo prominent gures of the
Public Safety Committeeaddressed the Convention in an effort to justify their use of state
terrorism to save the Republic that was being constituted on the principles of total destruc-
tion of anyone and everything that stood against it. Saint-Just and the committee he repre-
sented, instilled fear in peoplethus becoming terrorists and calling themselves terrorists.
He claimed that they are moderates and better than previous regimes and that the kings
were crueler than them. Thus, in order to make the Republic stand rm on its foundations
and eliminate its opponents, the use of terror was justied and it was merely a counter-ter-
ror which is temporary and, ultimately, quite moderate; however, despite that the Conven-
tion was skeptical of it and needed to be convinced. That is why when Saint-Just delivered
his speech, his discourse on terrorism served terror as it must be shown and it also implied
that such terror was well founded. Such debate on terror in the Convention, Lefort argues,
created a new political space, and [gave] substance to what was no more than an attribute
of arbitrary power and this is the time when terror speaks, it is sanctioned, and is set
free after which it becomes impossible to assign it a master.65
The legally unleashed terror, Newman argues, nds and constructs enemies of the
Republic and more insidious plots against the Revolution to put off the traumatic realiza-
tion of the ambiguity of its own foundations.66 In the same fashion, after the APS attack,
Pakistan discursively constructed an evil enemy and dehumanized it. The NA debates
show what APS attack represented was a wicked, inhuman, monstrous, and evil act
that took lives of innocent schoolchildren. TTP, which took responsibility for the attack,
was presented as an enemy that grew large as a result of the state policies in the past and
was now threatening the base, the very foundation of the state.67 Pakistan had previously
also presented TTP as an anti-state militant organization, but at the same time differentiated
it from groups launching attacks in Afghanistan.
In its new antiterror discourse however, Islamabad termed the enemies of Afghanistan as
the enemies of Pakistan (i.e., there is no distinction between good and bad militants),
which is signicant because, it not only spatio-temporally magnies the enemy but also is
indicative of two important discursive constructions. First, it shows that the state is acknowl-
edging the narrative of Frankensteins Monster, which is exploiting Afghanistans instabil-
ity by having bases there to launch attacks in Pakistan thus making it a victim of terrorism.
Second, it reinforces the causality that Afghan peace is a prerequisite for stability in Pakistan.
In fact, both arguments are constructed in a way that they hide some very important phe-
nomena. For example, if it is accepted that the militant groups have taken the form of a
Monster that is now targeting its own Master, then it is equally important to look into
how the Master is being targeted and what is the Monsters course of action vis-!a-vis Paki-
stan and Afghanistan.
The study of discourse on terrorism in Pakistan reveals a completely different representa-
tion of the realities than what the political and military elite offer. Since 2001, an overwhelm-
ing majority of the attacks have taken place in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. If I only
take suicide bombings into account, more than 460 attacks have taken place in Pakistan
since 2001. Among them, 344 attacks were launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and in
Baluchistan.68 The majority of the attacks in Sindh were carried out in Pashtun-dominated
areas of Karachi and in the areas of Baluchistan where ethnic Pashtuns or Shia Hazaras
10 P. H. SAHILL

live.69 Data shows, even if militants have targeted areas in Punjab province, most of the vic-
tims were Pashtuns, religious minorities, and people belonging to the lower-middle class.70
If I look at the statistics from another angle, that is, if the number of victims in all attacks in
Pakistan is seen, it shows that more than 20,000 civilians have been killed from 2003 to
2016, majority of them Pashtuns or religious minorities. In the same period, more than
6,000 security personnelpredominantly police and Pashtun paramilitary soldierswere
killed in attacks and clashes.71 On the other hand, in more than a decade, militants have
without any exceptionattacked the Afghan government and security ofcials, the interna-
tional troops, and civilians in the entire country.72 The data reveal that the discursively con-
structed Pakistani Monster is not targeting its Master (i.e., the state, largely represented by
the military, the government, or the ISI); but it does act indiscriminately in Afghanistan. It
means that on the level of discourse the Monster/Master is a dichotomous binary but in
practice, it is not as the Monster knows who to target and how to do that. It is a fact that the
Monster has previously attacked the military General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, the Naval
Base in Karachi and has massacred schoolchildren in Peshawar, but such attacks, I argue,
also help the state achieve political objectives other than defeating terrorism. First, such
attacks serve as a means to reconstruct enemies of the state to provide foundations and
meaning whenever the terror discourse blurs. Second, when an enemy is constructed, the
state masks its failures and inner contradictions by violently exercising its power, portraying
that it is taking revenge and that it is serious in eliminating terrorism. Such power, in Fou-
cauldian terms, can be either coercive (e.g., military offensives) or disciplinary like formulat-
ing new laws or policies. Third, the state employs narratives of fear, insecurity, and
threatened sovereignty and justies its own violence and atrocities of the past, present, and
future through new legal frameworksthat is what Pakistan did in the form of NAP after
the APS attack. Fourth, by depicting itself as a victim of terrorism and by presenting big
numbers of lost lives and property, the state attracts international sympathy and nances
and at the same time by locating the source of threat beyond its borders; strengthen narra-
tives like the instability of Afghanistan have drastic consequences for Pakistan. Finally, the
state discourse becomes powerful enough, so that it not only gains support of the society but
also veils some very important phenomena. For example, since state discourse legitimizes
the use of coercive power against the enemy, society in general ignores the mass displace-
ment of people in areas where the military carries out strikes and launches offensives. This
way, after endowing the government and the military with power and authority, people fail
to see that increasing security practice is in fact shrinking the space for individual freedom
something they continuously struggle for. Even liberal scholars and politicians who adhere
to discourses on human rights, justice, law, and humanitarianism cannot see the dire predic-
ament of the people in war-torn areas. Instead, as mentioned before, they argue that the mil-
itary should keep acting forcefully until it eliminates terrorism.
The dilemma of liberal, secular, and some nationalist politicians and analysts in Pakistan is
their paradoxical discourse. For example, they have been arguing for more than a decade that as
a result of faulty policies of interference in Afghanistan, terrorists are playing havoc with the lives
of Pakistanis. Despite that, they still expect the same state organs will implement NAP and ght
against militants in FATA. Liberals and nationalists demand freedom, democracy, rule of law,
justice, and human rights envisaged in the constitution of Pakistan, but act against those ideals.
Post-APS NA debates and 20-point NAP are good examples to show how leftist, liberal, and
nationalist political parties unanimously agreed on establishing military courts, thus
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 11

undermining existing justice apparatus. They agreed on avenging the death of schoolchildren by
continuing military and intelligence operations in Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan without
questioning the behavior and success stories of the security apparatus and the nature of state vio-
lence itself. In order to establish the writ of the state in areas where it was suspended, they gave
authority and released funds to the military, thus legally enabling them to violate human rights
and provide immunity for such acts of the past.73 In a broad context, the parliament delegated
its authority to the military and government in a way that challenged the notion of liberal
democracy as a whole. Similarly, liberals and nationalists in Pakistan argue that Islamabad con-
tinuously destabilized Afghanistan, but at the same time they reject their own narrative by imply-
ing the causality that Afghan peace is foremost and key to peace in Pakistan.
In fact, after more than a year of restructuring discourse and adopting NAP with the promise
of not distinguishing among terrorist groups, Pakistan continues to use nonstate groups both
within its geographical borders and in Afghan and Indian territories to achieve its political goals
and to give meaning to its own terror. An example is the 2 January 2016 attack on Pathankot
Airbase in Indian Punjab, which New Delhi, after initial investigations, said was carried out by
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)74 and asked Pakistan to bring its leader Maulana Masood Azhar to
justice. Islamabad, however, maintained that it did not nd any evidence against Azhar. Simi-
larly, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), headed by Haz Saeed, openly operates in Pakistan despite it
being blacklisted by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization.75 India accuses
Saeedwho also founded Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)of masterminding the Mumbai attacks of
2008 and Pakistan rejects the claim. However, Saeed praises the militants who launch attacks in
India and called for more Pathankot-style attacks.76 Despite being wanted by the United States,
Saeed is free to move and hold anti-India rallies in Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.
Inside Pakistan as well, civil society and some experts have accused Pakistans security establish-
ment for supporting the good militant groups and using them against Afghanistan and India
and targeting only those whom it demonizes as enemies of the state.77

Conclusion
This article critically analyzed Pakistans discourse on terrorism and the one year of NAP
revealing its limitations and paradoxes. The article, employing a poststructuralist theoretical
framework, showed how Pakistan reconstructed its post-APS discourse. In the wake of the
APS attack, the state succeeded to not only magnify the enemy but to also win the sympa-
thy and support of the international community by presenting itself as a victim of terrorism.
Pakistan uses the discourse of terrorism to legitimize the exercise of coercive power to sup-
press any dissenting voices as well as to nd a base for the ambiguous foundations of the
republic exactly the same way post-Revolution France did in the 1790s.
It is argued that the TTPs behavior is not similar to Frankensteins Monster because it is
choosing its targets in Pakistan selectively and does not ght the Master (i.e., the state). Also,
the argument that the state is not making distinctions between good and bad militants does
not possess substance as the state is supportive of the other Monsters, which are indiscrim-
inately launching their attacks in Afghanistan and India. In addition, there is no causeeffect
equation in place as regards the Pakistani formulation that Afghan peace is key to Pakistans
stability as it is using nonstate groups to destabilize Afghanistan despite publicly rejecting
that it is not, to keep the monstrous evil alive because it is politically and nancially
beneting from it at the international level.
12 P. H. SAHILL

The article showed that as a result of dominant discourse, those political and social forces
that were critical of the role of the state in the past, seem to ignore that the tightening secu-
rity apparatus within the country is limiting the freedom and undermining the ideals of
democracy. Also, liberal and nationalist political discourses in Pakistan are self-contradictory
because liberals and nationalists are supporting state terrorism by seeing NAP as a problem-
solving, comprehensive strategy without questioning its increasingly illiberalizing inherent
power and without problematizing the notion of Pakistani terrorism itself.
The article concludes that Pakistan has continued the use of nonstate militant groups to
achieve political goals both nationally and internationally. First, such groups will selectively
target Pakistan, thus suppressing any dissenting voices and at the same time giving the state
an opportunity to depict itself as a victim of terrorism. Second, since direct aggression is not
a normal behavior in the contemporary partially globalized world, therefore, the use of non-
state groups is a betterno matter how Machiavelliantool for states to achieve political
objectives internationally. Finally, the security establishment of Pakistan that constructs and
reconstructs the political discourse and makes it dominant through media and a large num-
ber of intelligentsia, governs the power/knowledge nexus, which ultimately benets it to
hold a larger share of power and authority. It is, thus, by large, the militarynot elected
civilian governments or political partieswhich is the most popular and trusted state insti-
tution. Only a handful of intellectuals or political parties are critical of the security establish-
ment, but the dominant discourse is so compelling and inuential that those who criticize
the military or the intelligence agencies for their support of the militant groups are also con-
demned as anti-state. As a result, the security establishment retains full control over foreign
and security policies and endows the civilian governments with their share. This kind of rela-
tionship must remain symbiotic, because whenever the government tries to take control of
the affairs, the military either steps in and takes the reins of power in its hands through a
coup d"etat or weakens the government to a level that it complies with all rules of the game.
Nevertheless, for the security establishment to remain in control, it must keep giving sub-
stance to its foundations. That is why it sets the scene by implying that India, the United
States, certain forces in Afghanistan, and within the country, are conspiring against the state
through terrorist attacks.

Notes
1. Both the United States and Afghanistan were pressuring Islamabad for years to take action
against various militant groups (e.g., Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU], and
Haqqani Network), who are blamed for many deadly attacks in Afghanistan.
2. FATA are, constitutionally, territories of Pakistan. FATA is governed by the president who may dele-
gate his authority and/or direct the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to perform certain
duties and/or to govern FATA districts through administrators called political agents and assistant
political agents. Constitutionally, FATA are composed of seven districts (called agencies) plus six
regions (called Frontier Regions [FRs]). An FR means a district that is located between or connects a
settled district or area of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and FATA. The seven agencies/districts
of FATA are Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, North Waziristan, Orakzai, and South Waziristan.
The six FRs are named after districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa adjoining a Tribal agency. They are FR
Bannu (connecting Bannu district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with North Waziristan), FR Dera Ismail
Khan, FR Kohat, FR Lakki Marwat, FR Peshawar, and FR Tank. Two articles in Pakistans constitution
(article 246 and 247) are concerned with administration and governing of FATA. Two points in those
articles are signicant. One, the laws passed by Pakistani parliament, cannot be extended to FATA
unless the president orders so. Two, the Supreme Court or any High Court in Pakistan have no
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 13

jurisdiction over FATA; it means that orders, verdicts or rulings by the higher courts or district courts
cannot be extended to FATA and the people of FATA also cannot appeal to the High Courts or
Supreme Courts in case of any dispute or issue with agency administration. There is a regulation, how-
ever, called Frontier Crimes Regulation, which was imposed on FATA by the British Rulers of India in
1901 that is still in force, albeit with some amendments. See: National Assembly of Pakistan, The Con-
stitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (6th ed.) (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan,
2012), pp. 143147.
3. In Arabic, zarb means to strike and azb means cutting or sharp. Zarb e Azb thus means a sharp
and cutting strike. Also, Azb was the name of one of the swords that Islams Prophet Muhammad
owned.
4. Ismail Khan, All-Out Military Operation Launched in North Waziristan, Dawn 16 June, 2014.
Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1112949 (accessed 29 April 2016).
5. Dawn, School massacre Pakistans 9/11: Sartaj, Dawn 20 December 2014. Available at http://
www.dawn.com/news/1152041 (accessed 29 February 2016).
6. Ever since 2001, when the government decided to be part of the U.S.-led War on Terror, a polem-
ical debate has existed in Pakistan. The nationalists, secular and liberal politicians, writers, ana-
lysts, and intellectuals accused religious political parties and forces to be pro-Taliban. The
religious politicians and analysts, who had remained close to the military establishment, in turn
labelled their opponents as pro-United States, slaves, and against the ideological foundations of
Pakistan. It was only after the APS attack that religious political parties condemned terrorism
and distanced themselves from the Taliban discourse and worldview.
7. Dawn, 26 Killed in Suicide Attack Near Nadra Ofce in Mardan, Dawn 29 December, 2015.
Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1229406 (accessed 21 January 2016).
8. At the time of attack, a poetry recital, revolving around the theme of peace, was about to begin
to commemorate the twenty-eighth death anniversary of Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, widely
known as Bacha Khana prominent Pashtun gure who, along with Mohandas Karamchand
Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), led a nonviolent political struggle against British colonialist rulers of
the Indian subcontinent in the twentieth century. See: Jon Boone, and Jason Burke, Pakistan
Attacks: At Least 30 Dead in Terror Raid at Bacha Khan University, The Guardian 20 January
2016. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/20/bacha-khan-university-explo
sions-heard-as-gunmen-attack-pakistan (accessed 21 January 2016).
9. BBC News, Pakistan Explosion Leaves Many Dead at Lahore Park, BBC News 27 March 2016.
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35908512 (accessed 16 June 2016).
10. Even after those attacks, the military spokesman General Asim Bajwa claimed that the terrorists
were defeated, which is why they were after soft targets like educational institutions, which are
a sign of progressive Pakistan. See: Talk Shows Central, DG ISPR Major General Asim Bajwa
Press Brieng j Bacha Khan University Attack, YouTube. 20 January 2016. Available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?vDjhz3KRwR4QE (accessed 22 January 2016). The press conference
was in Urdu language that I translated into English.
11. Afrasiab Khattak, Return of the Terror, The Nation 23 January 2016. Available at http://nation.
com.pk/columns/23-Jan-2016/return-of-the-terror. Also see, Gul Bukhari, Which Part, Dear
Establishment? The Nation 24 January 2016. Available at http://nation.com.pk/columns/24-Jan-
2016/which-part-dear-establishment. Also, Mohammed Hanif, Pakistans Unnecessary Mar-
tyrs, The New York Times 22 January 2016. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/
opinion/pakistans-unnecessary-martyrs.html?_rD0. See, Declan Walsh, Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud,
and Ismail Khan, Taliban Attack at Bacha Khan University in Pakistan Renews Fears, The New
York Times 20 January 2016. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/bacha-
khan-university-attack-charsadda.html?_rD0. And Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistans Tryst with
Counter-Terrorism, The Express Tribune 24 January 2016. All, accessed 15 May 2016. The Sen-
ate of Pakistan questioned the NAPs implementation, saying, if the government had followed
the anti-terror plan in letter and spirit the Bacha Khan University attack could have been pre-
vented. For details, see: Mateen Haider, Senate Questions NAP Implementation after Varsity
Attack, Dawn 20 January 2016. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1234226/senate-ques
tions-nap-implementation-after-varsity-attack (accessed 30 May 2016).
14 P. H. SAHILL

12. Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Bacha Khan University Attack Failure of NAP: Farooq Sat-
tar, Muttahida Quami Movement 21 January 2016. Available at http://www.mqm.org/englishnews/
35004/bacha-khan-university-attack-failure-of-nap-farooq-sattar. Also, Kiran Nazish, Pakistan Uni-
versity Attack: Before the Recital, After the Bullets, The Diplomat 26 January 2016. Available at
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/pakistan-university-attack-before-the-recital-after-the-bullets/. Both
accessed 3 June 2016. Some analysts argued that the NAP is the right strategy; however, it has lost its
teeth because the government neglected its execution. Please see: Sana Ali, Charsadda and the
Neglected National Action Plan, South Asian Voices 3 February 2016. Available at http://southasian
voices.org/charsadda-and-the-neglected-national-action-plan/ (accessed 5 June 2016). Some others
claimed that the counterterrorism policy in Pakistan has remained faulty and paradoxical for years.
See: Farah Jan, School Attacks Expose Widening Cracks in Pakistani Counterterrorism, IPI Global
Observatory 3 February 2016. Available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/pakistan-counter
terrorism-bacha-khan-taliban/ (accessed 7 June 2016).
13. Lalit K Jha, Pakistan Can and Must Dismantle All Terror Networks: Obama, Press Trust of
India. 24 January 2016. Available at http://www.ptinews.com/news/7013841_Pakistan-can-and-
must-dismantle-all-terror-networks-Obama.html (accessed 24 January 2016).
14. Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations The-
ory, MillenniuJournal of International Studies 10(2) (1981), pp. 126155.
15. Judith Renner, The Local Roots of the Global Politics of Reconciliation: The Articulation of Rec-
onciliation as an Empty Universal in the South African Transition to Democracy, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies 42(2) (2014), pp. 263285.
16. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Demo-
cratic Politics (2nd ed.) (London: Verso, 2001), p. 108.
17. Bobby Sayyid and Lilian Zac, Political Analysis in a World without Foundations, in Elinor Scar-
brough and Eric Tanenbaum, eds., Research Strategies in the Social Sciences: A Guide to New
Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, [1998], 2007), pp. 249267.
18. Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War (Abingdon: Routledge,
2006), p. 16.
19. Sayyid and Zac, Political Analysis in a World without Foundations, p. 250.
20. Saul Newman, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New Theories of the Political
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 67.
21. Please see: Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012); Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scien-
tic Research, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis
(London: SAGE, 2001), pp. 121138 and Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1992).
22. Ruth Wodak, What CDA is AboutA Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its
Developments, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis
(London: SAGE, 2001), pp. 113.
23. Teun A. van Dijk, Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity, in Ruth Wodak and Michael
Meyer, eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 96 (emphasis
added); pp. 95120.
24. Michael Meyer, Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,
in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: SAGE,
2001), p. 15.
25. Lesley Treleaven, A Knowledge-Sharing Approach to Organizational Change: A Critical Dis-
course Analysis, in Haridimos Tsoukas and Nikolaos Mylonopoulos, eds., Organizations as
Knowledge Systems: Knowledge, Learning and Dynamic, Capabilities (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2004), pp. 154180; also see: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991) and Norman Fairclough, Discourse
and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
26. Meyer, Between Theory, Method, and Politics, p. 16.
27. For a good example of a poststructuralist content analysis, please refer to: Anastassia Tsoukala,
Dening the Terrorist Threat in the Post-September 11 Era, in Didier Bigo and Anastassia
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 15

Tsoukala, eds., Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 4999.
28. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Oxon, UK: Routledge, [1972] 2002).
29. For details, see: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish and Michel Foucault, The History of Sexu-
ality: An Introduction. Vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
30. Ondrej Ditrych. Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy and State. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change.
31. Iver B. Neumann, Discourse Analysis, in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, eds., Qualitative
Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.
6365.
32. Meyer, Between Theory, Method, and Politics, p. 14.
33. BBC News, Haqqanis: Growth of a Militant Network, BBC News 14 September 2011. Available
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14912957 (accessed 19 November 2015).
34. Model 1 deals with the analysis of the ofcial discourse while Model 3, that is subdivided into 3A
and 3B, covers what Hansen calls marginal discourses.
35. Hansen, Security as Practice, pp. 5357.
36. In Pakistan, the civil/military imbalance in decision making and controlling affairs is evident
since its emergence as a state in 1947. On three different occasions1958, 1977, and 1999the
army ousted elected governments and has ruled the country for more than three decades in sum.
During other times, the army has stayed in power indirectly by taking control of the security and
foreign policy.
37. National Assembly of Pakistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, pp. 4151.
38. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Armys Way of War (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2014); for the Pakistani militarys role in FATA and its support for local and foreign
militant groups see Farhat Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban (Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub-
lishing, 2011).
39. Foucault suggests that once discourses are established, they disperse in society in the same way
like blood circulates in the body in a cycle, which means the discourse in the society, like blood in
the body, is continuously, enriched, fed, reinforced, reshaped, and reconstructed according to
arising needs. See Carol Grbich, New Approaches in Social Research (London: SAGE Publications,
2004), p. 40.
40. Alketa Peci, Marcelo Vieira, and Stewart Clegg, Power, Discursive Practices and the Construc-
tion of the Real, Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management 7(3) (2009), pp. 377386.
41. ISPR, Press Releases: Archive, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). From June 2014 to January 2016.
Available at https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?oDt-pr_archive&monD12&yrD2014&styrD
2014 (accessed 21 January 2016).
42. The lower house of the Pakistani bicameral parliament.
43. National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly
Debates-1 (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015a), pp. 157; National Assembly of
Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly Debates-2 (Islamabad:
National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015b), pp. 172; National Assembly of Pakistan, National
Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly Debates-3 (Islamabad: National Assembly of
Pakistan, 2015c), pp. 16; National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan:
Assembly Debates, Assembly Debates-4 (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015d), pp.
182; National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates,
Assembly Debates-5 (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015e), pp. 138 and National
Assembly of Pakistan, Twenty-rst Amendment Act, 2015, Assembly Debates-6 (Islamabad:
National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015f), pp. 12. The transcripts of the NA debates were in Urdu,
which I translated, except two bills that were in English.
44. Prime Ministers Ofce, Prime Ministers Speeches, Prime Ministers Ofce, Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. From December 2014 to December 2015. Available at http://www.
pmo.gov.pk/pm_speeches.php (accessed 11 January 2016).
45. Geo News is the most popular TV channel in the country. See: Geo News (available at https://live.
geo.tv/); Dunya News (available at http://dunyanews.tv/newsite/live_stream/new1_live_tv.php);
16 P. H. SAHILL

and Express News (available at http://live.express.pk/). The recorded version of news and analysis
programs was accessed from Zem TV (available at: http://www.zemtv.com/) and Awaz TV (avail-
able at http://www.awaztoday.pk/), all accessed 1 December 2016. The language of all TV chan-
nels and portals is Urdu.
46. Both Radio Mashaal and VOA Deewa are U.S. Congressfunded, Pashto-language services target-
ing FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pashtun-dominated areas of Balochistan, and across the
Durand Line. Radio Mashaal is a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL) and Deewa Radio is
Voice of America (VOA) entities. Due to poor infrastructure, shortage (and in some cases lack
of) electricity and Internet, the rst source of information for people living in FATA and other
Pashtun-dominated areas is Radio. See: Radio Mashaal (available at http://www.mashaalradio.
com/) and Deewa Radio (available at http://www.voadeewaradio.com/), both accessed 1 Decem-
ber 2016. News broadcasts and articles are all in the Pashto language.
47. Daily Jang has the highest publishing rate in Pakistan, simultaneously published from various
large cities (available at https://jang.com.pk/); Daily Mashriq is published from Peshawar, north-
west Pakistan and is widely read in Pashtun-dominated urban areas (available at http://mashriq.
epaper.pk/); also see Daily Express (available at http://express.com.pk/epaper/) all accessed 1
December 2016. All newspapers are published in Urdu.
48. In TV and radio short news is presented by an anchor with or without still pictures and has a
maximum time of 40 seconds. It appears in a single column of the newspaper. A long news story
often includes sound-bites or sound on tape (SOT) in TV or radio and takes a space of more than
one column in the newspaper. A news report includes more than one sound-bite/SOT, often
includes a comment or analysis, and is two to three minutes long and often appears as one of the
top/lead stories in newspapers. News tickers, however, are short-text news or main points of
important or fresh news, running on the bottom or top of the TV screen.
49. This phrase is taken from Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory. Translated by David
Macey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 69.
50. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan means the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. It is abbreviated as TTP.
51. Prime Ministers Ofce, APC Unanimously Resolves Speedy Implementation of 20-Point
National Action Plan, Prime Ministers Ofce, Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2
January 2015. Available at http://www.pmo.gov.pk/news_details.php?news_idD300 (accessed 18
November 2015).
52. Awami National Party, ANP PRNs-2015: Dec-2015, Awami National Party (ANP) 16 Decem-
ber 2015. Available at http://awaminationalparty.org/main/?page_idD10259 (accessed 29 Decem-
ber 2015). The press releases were in Urdu. Also see, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistans Tryst with
Counter-Terrorism, The Express Tribune 24 January 2016. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/
story/1033423/pakistans-tryst-with-counter-terrorism/ (accessed 24 January 2016) and Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf, Imran Khan Expressed Shock at the Silence of Nawaz Sharif over the Hate-
Filled Speech of Altaf Hussain, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 1 May 2015. Available at http://
www.insaf.pk/news/national-news/item/1789846-imran-khan-expressed-shock-at-the-silence-of-
nawaz-sharif-over-the-hate-lled-speech-of-altaf-hussain (accessed 21 November 2015).
53. National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly
Debates-3, pp. 16; Also see, National Assembly of Pakistan, Twenty-rst Amendment Act,
2015, Assembly Debates-6, pp. 12.
54. The Express Tribune, Hand in Hand: Regional Peace is a must for Pakistan, Afghanistan, Says
Asfandyar, The Express Tribune 8 November 2015. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/
987060/hand-in-hand-regional-peace-is-a-must-for-pakistan-afghanistan-says-asfandyar/. Also
see: The News, Achakzai Links Peace to Stability in Afghanistan, Amicable Ties with India, The
News 19 January 2016. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/92165-Achakzai-links-
peace-to-stability-in-Afghanistan-amicable-ties-with-India and Dawn, Pakistan Ready to Help
Afghanistan in Its Quest for Peace, Says Nawaz, Dawn 23 November 2015. Available at http://
www.dawn.com/news/1221726. All accessed 21 January 2016.
55. The good Taliban means militant groups that are targeting Afghanistan and not threatening
Pakistan while the bad Taliban are those who launch attacks in Pakistan. For example, Quetta
Shura or Haqqani Network are good Taliban because they are ghting against the Afghan
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 17

government and international forces based in Afghanistan. While Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP) is considered a group of bad militants who are active in Pakistan.
56. Dexter Filkins, Pakistans Monster, The New Yorker 22 January 2016. Available at http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/pakistans-monster (accessed 23 January 2016. The notion of
Frakensteins Monster was rst posited in 2009. For details, see, Declan Walsh, Pakistan: Fran-
kenstein Military at War with Its Own MonsterThe Taliban, The Guardian 12 October 2009.
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/12/pakistan-chaos-after-taliban-mili
tancy (accessed 21 January 2016).
57. The Express Tribune, 3,400 militants killed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR, The Express Tribune
23 December 2015. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1008791/3400-militants-killed-in-opera
tion-zarb-e-azb-ispr/ (accessed 21 January 2016. Also see ISPR, Press Releases: Archive.
58. ISPR, Press Release: No. PR380/2015-ISPR, ISPR: Inter Services Public Relations 12 December
2015. Available at https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?oDt-press_release&idD3127 (accessed
21 January 2016).
59. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 19721977. Edited by
Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
60. Ibid., pp. 5152.
61. Newman, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought, p. 101.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., pp. 103108.
64. Lefort, Demcracy and Political Theory.
65. Ibid., pp. 5972.
66. Newman, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought, p. 102.
67. National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly
Debates-1; and 2015b.
68. Pakistan Body Count, Statistics for Suicide Bombing, Pakistan Body Count 20 January 2016.
Available at http://www.pakistanbodycount.org/suicide_bombing.php (accessed 30 January 2016).
69. South Asia Terrorism Portal, Suicide Attacks in Pakistan: 20022016, Satp: South Asia Terror-
ism Portal 20 January 2016. Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/data
base/Fidayeenattack.htm (accessed 30 January 2016).
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid. But the link is available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casual
ties.htm (accessed 23 January 2016).
72. First Post, Timeline: Tracing the Deadliest Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan since 2001, First
Post 24 November 2014. Available at http://www.rstpost.com/world/timeline-tracing-the-deadli
est-insurgent-attacks-in-afghanistan-since-2001-1818985.html (accessed 30 January 2016).
73. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2015/2016: The State of the Worlds Human
Rights. Annual Report (London: Amnesty International, 2016), pp. 280284. Also see: Amnesty
International, Pakistan: Human Rights Abuses in the Search for al-Qaida and Taleban in the
Tribal Areas. Investigative Report (London: Amnesty International, 2004); and Human Rights
Watch, Pakistan: Upsurge in Killings in Balochistan (Hold Military, Paramilitary Troops
Accountable for Abuses), Human Rights Watch 13 July 2011. Available at https://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/07/13/pakistan-upsurge-killings-balochistan (accessed 29 May 2016).
74. Tiwary, Deeptiman, Pathankot Attack: NIA Asks Pakistan for Details of JeM Terrorists, The
Indian Express 3 March 2016. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/
pathankot-attack-nia-seeks-details-of-4-jem-terrorists-from-pakistan/ (accessed 30 April 2016).
75. Mehreen Zahra-Malik and Mubasher Bukhari, Pakistan Court Orders Ruling on Muslim NGOs
Illegal Sharia Courts, Reuters 27 April 2016. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-paki
stan-charity-idUKKCN0XO170 (accessed 30 April 2016).
76. The Times of India, Haz Saeed Calls for More Attacks on India, The Times of India 4 February
2016. Available at http://timesondia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Haz-Saeed-calls-for-
more-attacks-on-India/articleshow/50846657.cms? (accessed 30 April 2016).
77. Farhat Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban. Also see: Cyril Almeida, Blood and Balochistan, Dawn 26
April 2015. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1178214/blood-and-balochistan. And, Aasim
18 P. H. SAHILL

Saleem, Why Pakistani Armys Anti-Terror Campaign Falls Short, Deutsche Welle (DW) 28 January
2016. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/why-pakistani-armys-anti-terror-campaign-falls-short/a-
19009968. Please refer to Aqil Shahs views in this article. All accessed 30 April 2016.
78. Mateen Haider, Gen Raheel Visits Kabul, Seeks Handover of Mullah Fazlullah, Dawn 17
December 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1151412 (accessed 20 November 2015).
79. Natalya Zamarayeva, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Geopolitical Dimensions, NEO: New
Eastern Outlook 28 May 2015. Available at http://m.journal-neo.org/2015/05/28/pakistan-afghani
stan-relations-geopolitical-dimensions/ (accessed 20 November 2015).
80. Prime Ministers Ofce, Prime Ministers Address to the Nation, Text of Prime Ministers
Address to the Nation (Islamabad: Prime Ministers Ofce, Government of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan, 25 December 2014). Available at http://www.pmo.gov.pk/pm_speeches.php (accessed
19 November 2015). The address was in Urdu that I translated.
81. Dawn, MPC Ends with National Consensus on NAP, Dawn 3 January 2015. Available at http://
www.dawn.com/news/1154662 (accessed 19 November 2015).
82. Prime Ministers Ofce, Prime Ministers Address to the Nation. See also: Abdul Manan, Fight
against Terrorism: Dening Moment, The Express Tribune 25 December 2014. Available at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/ght-against-terrorism-dening-moment/ (accessed 19
November 2015).
83. National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan: Assembly Debates, Assembly
Debates-1 (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015), pp. 157; Also: 2015b. 172; 2015c.
16; 2015d.
84. Ibid. 2015f, 12.

Funding
I gratefully acknowledge nancial support by the Internal Grant Agency of the University of Econom-
ics Prague, research project no. F2/9/2016, titled: Crises in MENA and Southwest Asia: Democratisa-
tion, Militancy and Security.

Appendix: NAP: The United Voice of Pakistan

The attack on the APS in the north-western city of Peshawar prompted the Pakistani Army
Chief General Raheel Sharif to visit Kabul and seek the cooperation of the Afghan government
to handover the TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah78 who, Islamabad believes, is hiding in the
north-eastern Nuristan and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan. During his visit, Gen. Sharif
assured Afghan President Ashraf Ghani that the enemy of Afghanistan is the enemy of Paki-
stan79 and that both countries should join hands in ghting terrorism. At home, the Pakistani
government called an All Parties Conference on 24 December that year, after which Pakistani
PM Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation pledging to eradicate extremism and terrorism from
Pakistan through NAP.80 On 2 January, a Multi-Party Conference in Islamabad, chaired by
the PM, concluded with consensus on the 20-point NAP,81 summarized below:
1. The moratorium on death sentences was lifted saying that the execution of convicted
terrorists will continue.
2. Special Trial Courts under the supervision of the Pakistani military, in other words,
Military Courts, were announced to be established for two years to put militants and
criminals on trial.
3. No armed militias will be allowed to operate in the country.
4. Strengthening the National Counter-Terrorism Authority.
5. Government will take actions against publications promoting hate speech, extrem-
ism, intolerance and sectarianism.
6. Eradicating channels nancing terrorism or terrorist groups.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 19

7. Banned groups will not be allowed to re-emerge under different identity.

8. A Special Anti-Terrorism Force will be established.
9. Prevention of extremism and protecting minorities from persecution.
10. Registration and regulation of madrassas (i.e., religious seminaries or schools).
11. Ban on glorication of terrorists or terrorist organizations in media.
12. Reforms will be brought in the administrative structure of FATA and the return of
Internally Displaced Persons will be prioritized.
13. Dismantling communication networks of terrorist organizations.
14. Steps will be taken to prevent abuse of Internet and social media for terrorism.
15. There will be no space for extremism in Punjab province.
16. Military operation in southern Karachi city will continue.
17. Authorizing and empowering the provincial government of Baluchistan for reconcilia-
tion with the separatist groups.
18. Decisive measures will be taken against elements fomenting sectarianism.
19. A comprehensive policy will be formulated regarding the Afghan refugees based in
Pakistan.
20. The criminal justice system will be reformed. In order to implement the NAP, the gov-
ernment and the parliament will propose and approve new legislations and amend-
ments in the constitution.82
The study of transcripts of NA sessions debating NAP and its execution show unanimity
of views suggesting that when the state is threatened, every counter action becomes legiti-
mate. A majority of the MPs representing both the government and the opposition gave
examples of the United States and the United Kingdom suggesting that if those countries
adopted harsh antiterrorism laws or approved military tribunals after terror attacks, Pakistan
should do the same even if such actions seem to threaten human rights.83 Endorsing the
NAP, the parliament approved a constitutional amendment giving the military sweeping
powers to establish military courts84 and the government released funds to the army to
promptly respond to security threats and to speed up already continuing offensives in the
FATA.