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arXiv:1506.

00431v1 [quant-ph] 1 Jun 2015

PRINCIPLES OF A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS

Mioara MUGUR-SCHCHTER
http://www.mugur-schachter.net

This is a concise English version of the


complete French text appearing at
arXiv:1310:1728v3 [quant-ph]
II

Abstract

This work is not a reinterpretation of modern Quantum Mechanics. It consists of a new representation of microstates,
fully reconstructed conceptually and formally, and freed of interpretational problems.
First a qualitative but formalized representation of microstates is developed rigorously and quite independently
of the quantum mechanical formalism under exclusively epistemological-operational-methodological constraints. This is
called Infra-Quantum Mechanics and is denoted IQM. The specific and definite aim of Infra-Quantum Mechanics is to
endow us with a reference-and-embedding-structure expressly organized outside modern Quantum Mechanics, in a way
such as to insure detailed and maximally efficient comparability with the current Hilbert-Dirac formulation.
This and only this can permit a clearly significant, exhaustive and coherent re-examination of nowadays funda-
mental Quantum Mechanics, of its inner structure as well as its global structure grasped from its outside.
By the use of Infra-Quantum Mechanics, a critical-constructive examination of the Hilbert-Dirac formalism is first
worked out, step by step. It thus appears that:
(a) Nowadays Quantum Mechanics is devoid of any explicit mathematical representation of individual, physical,
actual microstates, even though the statistical-probabilistic predictions asserted by the theory concern precisely these phys-
ical entities.
(b) Nowadays Quantum Mechanics is simply devoid of a theory of measurement. What is now called the quantum
theory of measurement concerns clearly only one particular category of microstates those that do not involve quantum
fields and for this particular category it is found to be unacceptable as much from a mathematical point of view as from a
conceptual one. So we are confronted with the question:
What significance can be assigned to a theory of microstates that cannot be directly perceived, if it does not include
a general and fully acceptable theory of measurements?
This question leads to a thorough investigation on the conditions required by the possibility to specify the content
and the result of an act of measurement achieved upon a microstate, of a mechanical quantity assigned to this microstate
by postulation, and to make verifiable predictions concerning the statistical results of such acts of measurement. This
investigation brings forth that inside the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical framework such conditions can be realized only for
the particular category of microstates that do not involve quantum fields.
Whereas for microstates that do involve quantum fields, it is unavoidably necessary to make explicit conceptual and
operational experimental use of de Broglies wave-corpuscle model of a microstate.
This recourse, however, is possible and can become conclusive only if the de Broglie-Bohm guidance trajectories
can be observed experimentally.
We have proved formally that contrary to what is believed the de Broglie-Bohm representation of micro-
phenomena is in fact formally compatible with the possibility to determine the momentum-value from experimental ob-
servations of elements of the guidance trajectory. Retroactively this formal proof can be incorporated to the category of
experiments called weak measurements (Aharonov-Vaidman). So we propose an experiment from this category, for
heavy microsystems. A way of realizing this experiment is thoroughly described inside the mentioned proof of formal
compatibility. But other ways might be equally possible.
In order to achieve and close our conceptual exploration, we have then just admitted by hypothesis that the men-
tioned experiment has been realized and shown to permit the determination of the momentum value in a free microstate
with quantum field. On this hypothetical basis, a theory of quantum measurements is delineated that takes into account all
the categories of microstates, free or bound, and involving quantum fields, or not.
The general principles of the new representation of microstates that incorporates this theory of quantum measure-
ments are then explicitly delineated. This new representation of microstates is called a second quantum mechanics and is
denoted QM2.
Inside QM2 all the major problems raised by the current Hilbert-Dirac formalism, vanish.
QM2 is directly rooted into the individual, physical, actual factuality. This, while it permits insertion in the math-
ematical representation, on the other hand entails operational-predictive independence with respect to the mathematical
representation specific of QM2.
QM2 is an intimate synthesis between Infra-Quantum Mechanics, the Hilbert-Dirac formulation of Quantum Me-
chanics, and a variant of the de Broglie-Bohm representation of micro-phenomena that is drawn into the realm of experi-
mental observation via explicit connection with Infra-Quantum Mechanics.
III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work would not have been possible without the life-long support of Sully Schchter.
IV

GRATITUDE

I am grateful to my sons Franois and Vincent for their constant support.

I express my deep gratitude to those who have encouraged me.

I feel particularly indebted to Genevive Rivoire, Henri Boulouet, Jean-Marie Fessler and Jean-Paul
Baquiast.
V

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Louis de Broglie


whose deep unconventional work has founded Quantum Mechanics
and 90 years later permits to re-found it.
VI

Contents

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1

I INFRA-QUANTUM MECHANICS

INTRODUCTION TO PART I 2

1 THE FIRST GERM OF A DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE 3


1.1 Definition of a microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Qualification inside IQM of one outcome of a microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Graphic representation of the definition and qualification of one outcome of a microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 DESCRIPTION OF A PROGRESSIVE (FREE) MICROSTATE


AND OF THE HUMAN GENESIS OF THIS DESCRIPTION 8
2.1 Preliminary construction of language: fundamental definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Primordial transferred description of a microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 THE PROBABILITY TREE OF A PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION


OF A PROGRESSIVE MICROSTATE 15
3.1 The probability tree of one progressive micro-state of one micro-system with non-composed operation G of generation 15
3.2 Probability tree of one progressive micro-state of two or more micro-systems: the most non-trivial class of probability
trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3 Probability tree of one progressive microstate with composed operation of generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 Remarks on the evolution of any progressive microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4 INFRA-(QUANTUM-MECHANICS) 23

II PRINCIPLES OF A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS

INTRODUCTION TO PART II 26

5 COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE QMHD AND THE IQM REPRESENTATION


AND A GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENT 27
5.1 The two ways to be compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 The comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3 A general announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

6 CLARIFICATIONS INSIDE THE PROVISIONAL FRAMEWORK [IQM-QMHD ]: A GENERAL


MODEL OF A MICROSTATE, USEFULNESS OF G, MEASUREMENTS 30
6.1 The [IQM-QMHD ] meaning of an eigenfunction of a quantum observable versus a general model of a microstate . . . 30
6.2 From the hidden presence of de Broglies model inside QMHD to its explicit, general, physical-operational incorpora-
tion into [IQM-QMHD ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 The operation G of generation of a microstate, versus eigenket, state-ket, absence of state-ket . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.4 On the QMHD representation of measurements on a microstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.5 Conclusion on Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

7 QUANTUM MEASUREMENTS THE EMERGENCE INSIDE [IQM-QMHD ] OF THE FIRST LINES OF


QM2 42
7.1 Preliminary investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2 Examination of the essence of the QMHD representation of measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.3 Statement of an essential prediction-verification IQMQMHD comparability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.4 A factual-mathematical [IQM-QMHD ]-representation of quantum measurements for a free microstate of one mi-
crosystem and without quantum fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4.1 Conservation of the Hilbert-Dirac representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4.2 [IQM-QMHD ] expression of the coding-(measurement-succession) [Gt .MesA] for a ms(free,1)G(nc) . . . . . . . 50
7.4.3 Gleasons theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.4.4 Factual-mathematical construction of the state-ket of a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
VII

7.4.5 Potential semantic contents of Diracs theory of transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55


7.4.6 On the concept of law of evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.4.7 On Borns postulate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.4.8 Conclusion on Section 7.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.5 Measurement-problem for free microstates with internal quantum field and a possible solution tied with a crucial
experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.5.1 Deadlock for the verifiability of the predictions of a state-ket of a free microstate with quantum field . . . . . . . 59
7.5.2 The principle of a solution tied with a crucial experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.6 The [IQM-QMHD ] representation of quantum measurements on a free microstate of one microsystem, with quantum
fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.6.1 Postulate for coding-measurement successions of the momentum-value of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) . . . . . 64
7.6.2 A transmutation of the dBB approach with respect to QMHD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.6.3 An experiment EXP.2 for verifying the factual truth of the quantum mechanical prediction . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.6.4 The [IQM-QMHD ] representation of measurements on microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.7 A remark on the faint possibility of an adequate Hilbert-space representation of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) . . . . 68
7.8 The case of one free microstate with two or more microsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.9 The case of bounded microstates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.10 Conclusion of Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

8 INTEGRATION OF QM2 70
8.1 The source-domains, the roles they played up to now, their present integrative role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.2 The boundaries of QM2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.3 The main characters of the inner structure of QM2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.4 The postulates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.5 Conclusion of Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

9 QM2 CONSIDERED FROM THE OUTSIDE 75


9.1 Universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9.2 Facts, mathematics, knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

INSTEAD OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION 76

Bibliography 78

APPENDIX 1 80

APPENDIX 2 93
1

PRINCIPLES OF A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS


GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In his preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote:


The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather, not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for,
in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore
have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

This crucial remark enlightens the more local situation in which thought finds itself with respect
to quantum mechanics: in order to be able to think about quantum mechanics one should be able to
place oneself on both sides of it. One should be able to perceive it globally from its exterior and
to subject its inner structure to a consensual and rigorous examination of significance, adequacy and
coherence, from all the locally pertinent points of view.
Of course the first attempts at a representation of microscopic physical entities started inside
the framework of classical thinking. Therefrom, classical models and ways of reasoning were lowered
more and more deeply into the domain of small space-time dimensions. This way of acting has come
to a clear crisis around 1900.
And then, de Broglies model fractured the evolution. It changed the origin on the vertical
that connects knowledge of macroscopic physical entities, to knowledge concerning microscopic en-
tities; for de Broglies model is placed just on the extreme frontier between the microscopic still
a-conceptual physical reality, and the realm of the already conceptualized. This instilled a necessity
to also reverse the direction of thought and of cognitive actions placed on the mentioned vertical of
knowledge. Instead of continuing to try to construct top-down, starting from the classical level and
advancing downwards into the realm of microscopic space-time dimensions via mental procedures
trussed up unconsciously into inertial strings, there appeared a new tendency to construct down-top
by a sort of conceptual climb in the dark. And this inversion induced obscure but recurrent mental
confrontations between ancestral habits of thought, and still featureless new conceptual possibilities
of which the presence and ampleness were strikingly sensed. The thought about physical reality was
undergoing mutation.
The mathematical representations of Schrdinger and Heisenberg led to impressing successes,
and these neutralized the conceptual disquietudes. Bohr, struck by certain radically new features that
he strongly perceived in the emerging theory, but of which the source and nature withstood iden-
tification inside his mind, chose to protect these features maximally by a preventive interdiction of
any model of a microsystem, founded on a general pseudo-philosophical requirement of a positivis-
tic attitude in science. This over-dimensioned interdiction protected indeed the development of the
mathematical representation, and later, its mutation into the nowadays Hilbert-Dirac reformulation.
But on the other hand it inhibited heavily the understanding of the formalism. For de Broglies model
remained quite essentially involved in the Hilbert-Dirac formalism. But it remained there in an only
hidden way, restricted and with a non-explicit conceptual status. So it keeps acting without being
exposed to control and optimization. And much more generally, the formalism occults main concep-
tual, factual, and operational features that are involved. Therefore, since 90 years the representation of
microstates nourishes endless questioning and groping that systematically pulverizes against a para-
doxical negative dike of absence of definite criteria for estimating the adequacy of the mathematical
representation. The formalism itself proliferated densely, and it still does so, but at its core there
subsists a deleterious semantic magma that entails an urgent need of overtly organized meaning.
What lacks dramatically is a structure of reference constructed outside the quantum me-
chanical formalism, that offer a simple, clear and thorough understanding of the non-classical speci-
ficities required by a human representation of non-perceptible microscopic entities. Only this could
permit an exhaustive and coherent critical examination of the way in which the formalism manages
to signify. In the first part of this work I construct such a structure of reference. In the second part I
outline the principles of a second quantum mechanics, freed of interpretation problems via an explicit
control of semantic-syntactic consistency.
2

PART I

INFRA-QUANTUM MECHANICS
A formalized structure of reference constructed outside the formalism

Pour atteindre la vrit, il faut une fois dans sa vie se dfaire de toutes les opinions que
lon a reues et reconstruire, ds le fondement, tout le systme de ses connaissances.
Descartes

INTRODUCTION TO PART I

A human being who wants to construct knowledge concerning microstates makes use of physi-
cal entities to which he associates this denomination, of instruments and operations, and he intro-
duces representational aims and corresponding methods of acting and thinking. Thereby the human
observer introduces also constraints that mark the process of construction of knowledge. It is not
possible to preserve this process from such marks. Nor is it possible to suppress them a posteri-
ori on the constructed knowledge. The constructed knowledge remains irrepressibly relative to its
genesis. So, if the observer wants to stay in control of the knowledge that he has generated, to be
able to understand and to freely optimize it he has to be thoroughly aware of the epistemological-
operational-methodological weft of this knowledge.
In what follows quite independently of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
the essential characters of an appropriate deliberate procedure for constructing knowledge on mi-
crostates will be structured in finite (effective) and explicit, qualitative but formalized terms. The
result is called in advance infra-(quantum mechanics) and is denoted IQM.
In order to insure self-sufficiency and controllable coherence to the exposition the trivialities
will not only be implied, they will be spelled out. This will offer a direct and contrasted perception of
the specificities involved by the cognitive situation in which a human being finds himself if he wants
to create knowledge on microstates instead of perceivable objects. Historically this aim is very new.
And only when the cognitive specificities and the ways to deal with them will be known explicitly,
will the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics stay face to face with the meanings that it
should express. The most marvelous formalism cannot marvelously express meanings that have not
been conceived directly, separately, clearly, as aims.
I would like to succeed to convey to the reader from the start what follows. Nothing through-
out the construction elaborated below is conceived as an assertion of objective intrinsic physical
truth. I just figure out a succession of methodological steps, each one of which, in order to instill
intelligibility, is tied to the structure of our classical thought-and-languages that have emerged and
settled in our minds by interactions with entities that are perceived. But on the other hand, each one
of the mentioned steps transgresses our classical forms of thought by definite features commanded
by an aim: to establish how to proceed in order to create scientific knowledge concerning a limiting
sort of entities that not only cannot be perceived but furthermore are drawn out directly from a
still a-conceptual physical factuality. IQM is the global procedural whole that is obtained when the
mentioned steps are put together.
In this work I expose a procedural reference-structure IQM and by its help I construct
a piece of intelligible and procedural knowledge QM2 on how to predict-and-verify on
microstates: QM2 itself will be conceived as only a piece of aimed procedural knowledge.
For I am deeply convinced that truth on how intrinsically is what we posit to exist outside
ourselves transcends scientific knowledge quite essentially and definitively. This sequence of words
designates just a vicious circle so vast and drawn on a ground so irregular that we do not make out
its contour. Search for objective, entirely neutral descriptions of how this or that really is, are just
illusion. Any description is marked in a non-separable way by what is described and by how it is
worked out, via what constraints, choices, aims. I vividly thank the reader for accepting to keep in
3

mind this personal attitude, in order to prevent the feeling of strangeness and intolerance that would
emerge if one expected to find inside this work assertions of intrinsic truths.

THE FIRST GERM OF A DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE

1.1. Definition of a microstate

In agreement with Dirac we distinguish between stable characteristics assigned to a micro-


system (mass, spin, etc.), and dynamical characteristics assigned to a micro-state (position, momen-
tum, etc.). So in this work we consider microstates: so far just a word to be used like sort of coordinate
of where the attention is called to focus. For each considered microstate is presupposed to be a phys-
ical thing that is entirely unknown as to its specificities.
A basic question. In current languages and in classical grammars and logic, an object-to-be-
qualified is usually supposed to pre-exist. Its definition is realized by use of grammatical predicates
(bring me the brown object from that drawer) or even by just pointing toward it. But how can
a non-perceivable and unknown microstate be introduced as what-is-to-be-studied? How can it be
defined, in a stable way, so as to be kept available for further cognitive action upon it, when it is not
even known whether it pre-exists, nor where and when?
Obviously, as soon as it is named an unknown microstate is already a priori conceived to
possess some minimal class-characters. But in order to become a possible subject of factual study,
it has to be factually generated via some definite, macroscopically controllable physical operation of
generation that accordingly to some previously established knowledge should produce it on some
specifiable space-time support: if not, we cannot even think of studying it. Let us then denote such
an operation of generation by G, and by msG the produced physical microstate.
The aim of constructing scientific knowledge concerning msG requires verifications. So re-
peatability of G and its result msG are unavoidable pre-conditions. But how can we know that when
G is repeated accordingly to just the parameters defined for its realization the result denoted msG is
systematically the same? How can we know that G itself emerges the same? We cannot know this
a priori, nor can we ensure it, because G can be inter-subjectively specified only by some finite defi-
nition that, quite essentially, is unable to constrain the whole factual singularity of any realized replica
of the operation G (Umberto Ecco has stressed that as soon as we speak or write we conceptualize and
thereby we lose irreversibly the infinite unspeakable singularity of any factual operation or entity).
However giving up because of this the whole project of creating knowledge on microstates, would
be an unacceptable weakness. This difficulty has to be dominated. It calls forth a methodological
decision:
MD1. We posit as just a definition of language that each time that an operation of generation
of a microstate denoted G, is realized in agreement with a definition expressed in terms of
macroscopically controlled parameters, the same G comes out, and that what emerges in
consequence of this realization of G is a singular specimen of something that is also each
time the same. This same something not the reralized specimen of it we label by meG
and we call it the microstate corresponding to G whatever be the a priori unknown factual
singularities of its specimens. This amounts to posit the one-to-one relation

G msG (1)

as well as the repeatability of this relation.


This statement introduces msG in a way that is exclusively factual-operational, that is void
of any specified semantic content concerning msG itself. Nevertheless this suffices as a ground for
just starting a subsequent experimental research on a microstate. And here the local aim is only this,
4

it is an provisional procedural aim. Indeed MD1 endows for the moment with the crucial possibility
to speak, to think and to act for trying to create later some definite genuine semantic content some
knowledge tied with that toward which points the symbol msG introduced in (1). MD1 acts as a
methodological provisional definition. There is an aim, to create not to discover factual, consen-
sual, and verifiable assertions tied with msG , and starting with the definition (1) will appear to be a
methodological step entirely fit for attaining this aim. But we accept a priori that as soon as some se-
mantic content will be available (1) will be completed so as to include it. We only initiate a dynamics
of procedural conceptualization, we do not assert intrinsic facts.
Mutation of the classical concept of definition. By this very first step the construction at-
tempted here has already imposed upon us a quite notable egress from the domain of classical think-
ing. The microstate msG to be studied has been brought in as a fragment extracted from an as yet
entirely unknown physical factuality. It is true that this fragment is conceived in advance to belong
to a certain class of physdical entities called microstates that, on the basis of previously constructed
knowledge, is admitted to exist and has been named. These however are no more than minimal in-
strumental pre-requisites for just connecting as yet non-specified subsequent cognitive actions and
the knowledge entailed by these, with previously organized thought, language, and knowledge. But
the connective strings involved by (1) are void of any knowledge on specifically the particular
given outcome of this or that specimen of the microstate msG produced by this or that particular re-
alization of the operation of generation G. So MD1 places us systematically, repeatedly, on a sort
of local platform of strictly zero-level knowledge of, the considered individual outcomes1 of what is
only generically denoted msG . And (1) does not bring us above this this zero-level of knowledge, it
only places on this level a void, purely syntactic receptacle for as yet not created knowledge on spec-
imens of msG . This is new with respect to the classical concept of definition where usually already
known qualifications of the defined entity, yield the support for new qualifications of this same entity.
The direct perceptibility presupposed by the classical organization of thought-an-language permits
this comfortable accumulation into concomitance of the stages previously involved in the considered
process of a long progressive creation of knowledge of which the early stages are now stocked in bio-
neural reflexes and a capacity of quick learning during the very first period of childhood. But when
the process of creation of knowledge is considered at its extreme origin and in cognitive situations that
are devoid of any support of direct perception, as is the case for microstates, such an accumulation
is no more possible because no previous stages do exist, the very first stages have to be created. So
in this case the accomplishment of each stage has to be realized separately and deliberately. In these
conditions the action of defining splits into an originating succession of mutually distinct primordial
steps that have to be constructed by a convenient method. The method chosen here consists of a pre-
liminary step that introduces a void conceptual syntactic receptacle for future still unknown semantic
contents, and subsequent steps that will have to elaborate a consensual way to pour semantic contents
into the pre-constituted receptacle. In consequence of this (1) violates our habits of just advancing
a little more on a path of knowledge that has started long before on the basis of direct perception
and has already stocked an innumerable succession of results into a thick substrate of concomitance
wherefrom time-order has been eliminated by biological evolution. This is a price to be paid for at-
taining the aim to insure intelligibility of procedures that deal with a highly non-classical cognitive
situation placed on the very first level of conceptualization, by connecting these procedures to the
slopes of the classical human thinking.
Composed operations of generation: a principle of composition. The just exposed method-
ological definition of a microstate-to-be-studied will now be completed by the assertion of a physi-
cal principle that introduces a distinction inside the category of operations of generation. From its
start, the study of microstates has brought into evidence a class of microstates that have been called
1 The expression one outcome of msG is to be understood only as the microstate tied with one given realization of the operation G
(our time-and-space where we are imprisoned forces us to distinguish between the realizations); so, if we introduce a numerical indexation
in a sequence of N successive realizations of G by writing G1 , G2 , . . . , Gn , . . . , GN , the result of G2 is the outcome msG(2) of msG . Inside
IQM the locution an outcome of msG remains devoid of a conceptual definition that individualizes it via an own character; it is just a
version of (1) transposed in successive terms. But in Part II of this work it will obtain such a re-definition.
5

(auto)-interference-states and that played a founding role in the emergence of quantum mechanics
(the paradigmatic case is Youngs two slits experiment). The process of generation of an interference-
state permits to distinguish at least two operations of generation G1 and G2 that are involved, in
the following sense: Each one of these can be produced separately, in which case two different mi-
crostates meG1 and meG2 emerge. But when G1 and G2 are composed into only one operation
let us denote it2 G(G1 , G2 ) there emerges one corresponding microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) that manifests
auto-interference effects. On this factual basis tied with the just indicated way of speaking, we in-
troduce here an only qualitative but nevertheless a general principle of composition of operations of
generation according to which certain operations of generation of a microstate, two or more such
operations deliberately produced by human researchers or brought forth by natural processes
can compose while acting upon a preliminary unspecified microstate, so as to generate together
one microstate-to-be-studied, in the sense of MD1. When this happens we shall speak of one mi-
crostate msG(G1 ,G2 ,...,Gn ) with composed operation of generation. This principle is certainly severely
restricted in as yet non-specified ways. 3 G(G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ). When this does not happen, for contrast
or precision we can sometimes speak of a simple operation of generation.
Though its global domain of applicability is still only implicitly and very feebly defined, the
principle of composition of operations of generation of a microstate will entail quite essential conse-
quences in the second part of this work4 .

1.2. Qualification inside IQM of one outcome of a microstate

Classical qualification. Inside the classical thinking an act of qualification brings in more or
less explicitly a genus-differentia structure. The genus can be conceived as a semantic dimension
(or space) and the differentia can be regarded as values from a spectrum of values carried by the
semantic dimension, numerical or not, ordered or not, and that can be specified by material samples
or otherwise. Let us denote the semantic dimension by X and by X j , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, the values from
the spectrum carried by X. (X can be colour, for instance, and then the spectrum of values X j can
be {red, green, blue, etc.}. The semantic dimension and the spectrum of values carried by it are both
freely chosen or radically constructed by the human qualifying subject the conceptor-observer
accordingly to his qualification aims. There usually exists some possibility to estimate what value
of the considered semantic dimension is realized for a given subject-to-be-qualified: this is a sort
of act of measurement-interaction between some measurement device (biological or not) and the
entity to be qualified; the result, when perceived by the observer, becomes a knowledge concerning
the examined entity. Let us denote MesX the measurement-interaction.
The operation MesX cannot be defined otherwise than by some finite and macroscopically
specified set of controllable parameters. Unavoidably, these are transcended by circumstances that
cannot be conceived a priori. So again, like in the case of (1), there is no other way than just admit
that all the realizations of MesX are the same with respect to the defining parameters5 .
When the estimation of the values X j is performed directly via a human biological sensorial
apparatus, a measurement-interaction generates in the observers mind a quale that usually can be
more or less freely communicated, by words, gestures, other signs. But when it is realized via some
non-biological apparatus, the procedure for encoding the result of the measurement-interaction in
communicable and consensual terms requires specific procedures (specification of units, etc.). Let
2 This notation stresses that only one operation of generation has been effectively achieved by composing other operations of generation

that could have achieved separately but have not been separately achieved.
3 We do not try to specify the conditions that restrict the possibility of such a composition (in particular, the space-time conditions).

Nor do we try to specify some limit to the possible number of composed operations of generation. These are still very little explored
factual questions because inside nowadays quantum mechanics together with the concept of operation G of generation itself they
remain hidden beneath the domain of the mathematically expressed; in particular, beneath the mathematical principle of superposition of
state-vectors.
4 Inside QM2 beneath the principle of linear superposition of the mathematical writings it will go to the physical roots of what is

there called (in a confusing way) a superposition microstate.


5 Suppositions of this kind are made everywhere inside science. The particularity, in this context, consists of the absence of direct

perceptibility of the entity-to-be-studied, which entails for the assumption mentioned above a strictly formal, methodological character.
6

us denote globally such an encoding procedure by cod.proc(X j ). So, in short, a classical grid of
qualification is a structure that can be symbolized as

gq[X, X j , MesX, cod.proc(X j )] (2)

Qualification of one outcome of an act of measurement on a microstate. How can a mi-


crostate msG be qualified? Obviously, the operation of generation G of this microstate must be fol-
lowed immediately by a measurement interaction MesX realized on the space-time neighbourhood of
the space-time support of the operation G. Indeed each outcome of a specimen of msG is by definition
a dynamical state, which means a changing entity, an entirely unknown changing entity, but a physi-
cal changing entity. So the human observer, though any specific knowledge of this specimen of msG
is lacking inside his mind, assigns it irrepressibly some space-time support, and to this support he can
assign a very vague location, on the basis of assumptions of continuity. 6 But this location cannot be
conceived to last, in general. Furthermore, usually each considered act of measurement-interaction
destroys the involved specimen of msG that has been involved in it.
So a whole succession [G.MesX] must be realized for each act of measurement.
This is well known, but usually it is not explicitly mentioned. Also, an act of measurement-
interaction with a specimen of a microstate necessarily requires a non-biological apparatus, and its
result must consist of publicly observable marks. And so on. All these questions have been already
discussed very much indeed and they have suffered heavy trivialization. But curiously a huge gap has
been left open:
What procedures exactly permit to endow the publicly observable marks produced by a
measurement-interaction, with meaning in terms of a given value of the measured quantity
assignable to precisely that outcome of a specimen of the studied microstate?
I call this the coding problem. This problem seems to have never been explicitly formulated
and examined exhaustively. Now, if we did not dispose of any theory of microstates inside which
some model of what is called a microstate is posited, then we would be devoid of any basis for
even only admitting that the concept of this or that given quantity X does apply to what we call a
microstate. But we do dispose of a theory of microstates, and this theory has been initiated by de
Broglies wave-particle model where the particle-like aspect a strongly localized singularity in the
amplitude of the de Broglie-wave accepts qualifications in terms of the mechanical quantities called
position, momentum, etc. And this has permitted to develop a quantum mechanics. For obviously,
qualification grids that are considered in order to construct a mechanics of microstates must involve
mechanical quantities that must be applicable to some aspect assigned to any specimen of a microstate
posited to admit mechanical qualifications.
The general content of a grid for mechanical qualification of a microstate, accepts the same
general form (2) that indicates a classical grid. But when a microstate is the object of qualification,
the signs X, X j , MesX, cod.proc(X j ) that are involved point toward entities and circumstances that,
with respect to the human observer, involve constraints radically different from those required in the
case of classical mobiles.
- The studied microstate itself remains constantly and entirely non-perceptible, so no qualia
whatever tied exclusively with the object-to-be-studied do come in, only a group {kX } of a couple
of marks kX on registering devices, with kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX . We will indicate this circumstance by
speaking of primordial radically transferred qualifications(transferred on a registration-device, in the
form of observable marks):
- The meaning of the marks {kX } whatever it be cannot be conceived in terms of some
property assignable to the studied microstate alone. These marks characterize exclusively the
measurement interaction as a whole, and this interaction stems from both the involved specimen
of the studied microstate and the utilized apparatus, while no criteria can be defined for separating
6 We mention this in order to stress how human thinking comes in irrepressibly.
7

mutually, inside the group of marks, the influences from these two sources, because the microstate
is not a perceivable nor a known entity.
- What is to be studied singular outcomes of the micro-state msG for which the one-to-one
relation G meG is posited has been extracted by the operation G directly from the as yet a-
conceptual physical reality.
- And, most important but much less claimed than what precedes: How the measurement in-
teraction MesX between an apparatus A(X) for measuring the quantity X on one outcome of msG ,
has to be conceived in order that the registered marks shall characterize something at all, and in
what a sense these marks can be brought to characterize the involved oucome of msG , precisely in
terms of a given value X j of the measured quantity X, is a highly non-trivial problem, namely pre-
cisely the coding problem. This problem is not addressed inside IQM because it cannot be treated
inside a mere reference-structure for estimating any given theory of microstates. But we want to
draw attention strongly upon the existence of this problem, because in the second part of this work
it will play a central role. As for now, let us clearly note that whatever be the still unknown solution
to the problems raised by measurements on microstates, in order to be able to specify what sort of
measurement-interaction is specifically convenient for measuring a given dynamical quantity X for a
given sort of microstate, and in order to be able to assign meaning to the obtained observable result,
it is imperative to dispose of a general model of a microstate. In the absence of any model no criteria
can be formulated for insuring such a specification and assignation. This refutes the very possibility
to obey Bohrs positivistic interdiction of any model. This proves that in fact this interdiction has
never been respected. It has only enormously intimidated and harmed, during a whole century.
As for the reference-structure that we are constructing now, we stress that throughout what
follows we just admit by hypothesis the existence, inside an acceptable theory of microstates, of the
following semantic elements, that here are deliberately kept unknown: (a) a model of a microstate,
that is made use of in order to determine, for any given pair (X, msG ), what operation is adequate as
a measurement MesX on msG ; (b) a coding rule that stipulates for any given pair (X, msG ) how the
observable marks produced by one measurement interaction, can be coded in terms of a value X j of X.
These hypotheses of mere existence, associated to the absence, here, of the corresponding contents,
stress the formal nature of the reference-structure that is researched:
We are building a sort of qualitative formal host-system tailored for, specifically, testing the ad-
equacy of any proposed theory of microstates; a structure of void conceptual loci for charging
into these the semantic elements necessary and sufficient for elaborating a satisfactory theory
of microstates and for specifying and ruling the mutual relations that these semantic elements
will induce into the host-system so as to animate it to function as a theory of microstates.

1.3. Graphic representation of the definition and qualification of one outcome of a microstate

The global content of the two basic points exposed so far are summarized graphically in Fig. 1.
This figure introduces one chain

[(G msG ) [G.MesX] {kX } X j ], kX = 1, 2, . . . , K, j = 1, 2 . . . , J (3)

which restrains to only one outcome of the microstate defined in Section 1.1. This chain constitutes
a small local operational-conceptual bridge that leads from an operation G of generation of one spec-
imen of a microstate msG , to a very first pale and vacillating dot of knowledge on this microstate
generated by G. This, however, is the germ of the whole theory of microstates, so it deserves atten-
tion.
In what follows this germ of knowledge on a microstate msG will be developed into a firm,
consensual, verifiable piece of procedural knowledge, that insures consensual predictions and verifi-
8

Fig. 1: Summary of the definition and qualification of one outcome of a microstate.


cation.

DESCRIPTION OF A PROGRESSIVE (FREE) MICROSTATE


AND OF THE HUMAN GENESIS OF THIS DESCRIPTION

2.1. Preliminary construction of language: fundamental definitions

Consider a measurement-interaction involving a microstate generated by an operation G. This


produces observable marks that have to be translatable in terms of. . . one value X j of one measured
dynamical quantity X defined for microstates. Several such values? Of one same quantity? Of several
quantities? Shall we organize our concepts-and-language so as to imply that one act of measurement
on only one outcome of the studied microstate msG , necessarily brings forth only one value X j of the
measured dynamical quantity X? Or that it necessarily implies (at most) only one set of compatible
quantities (which is not the same thing as in the preceding question)? Are we prepared to accept these
restrictions?7 Of course, the answer is negative, because the words micro-state and micro-system
designate different concepts. And one micro-state tied in the sense of (1) with one operation of
generation G can involve one or more micro-systems, this being a major advantage for distinguishing
between these two words. But how are we to count these one and two? What presuppositions have
to be incorporated in order to stay in agreement with the current ways of speaking that accompany
7 We embed structures of thought in structures of language and the structures of language quite currently are beds of Procust.
9

the formal quantum mechanical writings as well as those from the theory of elementary particles?8 It
is clear that we must pre-organize explicitly the conceptual ground. So consider a micro-state.
(a) It necessarily involves some micro-system (or several) of which it is the micro-state. The
whole human conceptualization associates the concept of state to some stable support that can be
called system(s), and violating such a fundamental slope of human conceptualization that mani-
fests the requirements of consensus and of minimal effort for insuring these would introduce many
confusions and would uselessly waste much energy in removing them.
(b) MD1 imposes G msG . This, for now, is unshakeable.
(c) Beneath the current ways of speaking and writing inside microphysics, we have discerned
the following conceptual organization more or less obscure and moving, but general that below is
explicated and adopted firmly because it insures continuity with the essence of the accepted language
and also global coherence relatively to the implications of nowadays microphysics.
Definition [(one micro-system) and (one micro-state of one micro-system)]
Consider a micro-state that is such that one act of measurement accomplished upon one out-
come of this micro-state can bring forth only one group {kX }, kX = 1, 2, . . . , m of observable marks.
We shall say that this micro-state brings in one micro-system and so we shall call it a micro-state of
one micro-system.
Definition [one micro-state of n micro-systems]9
Consider now n > 1 micro-systems of a type of which we know that, for each one of them
separately, it is possible to generate a micro-state in the sense of the preceding definiton. But let G(ns)
(ns: n systems) be only one operation of generation that, acting upon some physical initial support
regarded as prime matter, has simultaneously generated one common micro-state for all these n
micro-systems10 ; or has even simultaneously generated out of some initial substratum, altogether,
the n micro-systems themselves with their one micro-state. In both these cases we shall say that
the microstate generated by G(ns) is one micro-state of n micro-systems, and we shall denote it
by meG(ns) . (Let us note that in consequence of (1) the uniqueness of the operation G(ns) is to be a
priori conceived as a source of global observational specificities of msG(ns) , with respect to the above
defined case of n micro-states of n micro-systems each one generated separately (these observational
specificities might have a character similar to that of what is called interference effects in the case
of a Youngs two-slits experiment with some type of heavy microsystem.
Definition [complete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-systems]
One act of measurement performed on one specimen of a microstate msG(ns) of n micro-
systems, can produce at most n distinct groups of observable marks signifying n observable values of
dynamical quantities. An act of measurement that effectively realizes this maximal possibility will be
called a complete act of measurement on one outcome of a micro-state msG(ns) of n micro-systems.
We permit by definition the quantities X and the values X j to which these n distinct groups of marks
are tied, to be either identical or different.
Definition [incomplete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-systems]
One act of measurement accomplished upon one outcome of a microstate msG(ns) of n micro-
systems, that produces less than n distinct groups of observable marks, will be called an incomplete
measurement on msG(ns) .
Finally, for self-sufficiency of this set of definition, we restate here telegraphically the definition
8 When these questions are considered it appears clearly that what is developed here is a deliberate construction that is subject to aims,
so correlatively to constraints, methodological, as well as of another nature, a factual-conceptual nature. Thereby it becomes still more
obvious to what a degree this construction has not the nature of a passive discovery of natural facts. And even if it were required such, it
would not be possible to achieve it such.
9 This definition is crucially fertile: it will permit to open a constructed door toward unifying QM and the fields-theory.
10 This is the case, for instance, when G(ns) consists of an interaction between two pre-existing electrons, or one pre-existing electron and

one pre-existing proton, that brings forth a pair, etc.


10

from Section 1.1 of a micro-state msG(G1 ,G2 ,...,Gk ) generated by a composed operation of generation:
Definition [one micro-state generated by a composed operation of generation]
Consider indifferently either one micro-state of one micro-system, or one micro-state of
n > 1 micro-systems. If this micro-state has been generated by a composed operation of generation
G(G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ) in the sense defined in Section 1.1 then we call it a microstate with composed
operation of generation.
Definition [one bounded micro-state of several micro-systems]
This is the result of a natural operation of generation accomplished in consequence of the
laws of nature, before any human aim of investigation (like in the case of the natural realization
of an atomic structure). A bounded micro-state of several micro-systems manifests interference
effects and it seems likely that it can be thought of in terms of the result of a composed operation
of generation.
With respect to progressive (free) microstates, the bounded micro-states are an exception, at
least for two reasons. This is so because a bounded state pre-exists any desired investigation, just as
it is supposed for classical objects; and furthermore, because it can be assigned a definite spatial
delimitation. This fact might explain why the mathematical representation of bounded microstates
has constituted the passage from classical physics to early quantum mechanics.
In the present work however we want to explicate and stress the radical novelties imposed by
the representation of microstates; and a main such novelty is precisely the degree to which the sci-
entific representations can become deliberate constructions. Therefore here the bounded microstates
will constantly occupy a marginal position. We shall consider mainly free microstates.

2.2. Primordial transferred description of a microstate

What follows in this point Section 2.2 is formulated in terms that are valid for any microstate.
Preliminary requirements. Inside current thinking qualifications, in general, are not subject to
constraints, they are used as just freely communicable statements, more or less understandable by the
interlocutors. But a scientific description is required to be: certainly communicable with exactitude;
consensual; verifiable. This entails strong constraints. In particular, verifiability entails repeatability
together with some descriptive invariant with respect to repetitions, that shall permit corresponding
predictions. In the case of microstates this entails quite specific consequences.
- Repeatability. Since in general a microstate-to-be-studied does not pre-exist in some known
way, but has to be generated, while furthermore in general the specimen of the studied microstate that
is involved in an act of measurement interaction is destroyed by this interaction, one cannot consider
a measurement operation MesX separately from an operation of generation G. For each observation
of a result, one has to realize a whole succession [G.MesX], as it has been stressed in Chapter 2. So
when repetitions are necessary, sequences of successions [G.MesX] have to be realized.
- Descriptional invariant (an effective probabilistic invariant). Consider now the constraint
of existence of some descriptional invariant with respect to repetitions of successions [G.MesX] that
shall insure the possibility of prediction and verification.
In general when a given succession [G.MesX] is repeated one obtains different results X j . This
is a fact, notwithstanding that G and MesX are both considered to be the same.
We have come to an arm wrestling between IQM and the requirements of scientific knowledge.
There exist particular operations G for which repetitions of a given succession [G.MesX] produce all
the same result X j , but it general the obtained results are different. The expression primordially
statistic character points toward precisely this fact, that refers to the non-identity of the individual
acts of strictly first qualification represented in Figure 1.
The only possible observational invariant that can be opposed to this mutual inadequacy be-
tween the classical basic concept of physical law that asserts an individually specified invariance
11

and the primordial situation reminded above, is to be able at least to assert the existence of a pri-
mordial probabilistic invariant for the global result of a big number N of repetitions of the succession
[G.MesX]. But the classical concept of probability is a non-effective, an only limiting concept, while
here we have chosen to develop from the start an effective, finite approach (cf. the introduction to
Part I). So we proceed as follows.
From the well-known weak theorem of large numbers

j, (, ), (N0 : (N N0 )) P[|n(e j )/N p(e j )|) ] (1 ) (4)

we extract here explicitly the following quite usually employed finite implication. Consider a universe
of events U = [e1 , e2 , . . . , eJ ], j = 1, 2, . . . , J, with J a finite integer. If the probability p(e j ) of an
event e j is postulated to exist for any e j , then (4) insures that, for any pair of two arbitrarily small
real numbers (, ), there exists an integer N0 such that for any N N0 and with an uncertainty
not bigger than the relative frequency n(e j )/N observed for the event e j inside a sequence of
N events from U, does not differ from p(e j ) by more than . This statement will be considered
in what follows to define the general finite concept of an (, , N0 )-probability p(e j ) of the event
e j . In our case U consists of the finite spectrum of values X j assigned to X. And we make the
strong assumption that the one-to-one relation (1) msG G together with the systematic repetition
for any X, of the succession [G.MesX], are sufficient constraints for entailing convergence toward
an (, , N0 )-probability po (X j ), for any association between a chosen pair (, ) and the relative
frequency n(X j )/N found for a value X j , j = 1, 2, . . . , J that is present inside the chosen qualification
grid (2) gq[X,X j ,MesX,cod.proc(X j )] (the upper index o is to be read primordial)11 .
In short, given a definite microstate msG G, the stated assumption introduces for any couple
of pairs ((G, X), (, )), a corresponding (, , N0 )-probability law12

(, , N0 ) po (X j ), j = 1, 2, . . . , J (5)

- Specificity with respect to msG versus individualized compatibility of quantities. The aim
to construct a description of a microstate msG amounts in fact to the aim to substitute to the initial
definition (1) G msG of this microstate by a mere label G that specifies only how it is generated,
another definition in terms of predictive and verifiable assertions of semantic contents that establish
some knowledge on msG itself: We want to develop the very first germ of knowledge on msG defined
in Chapter 3, into a stable, consensual and verifiable knowledge on this entity.
Like the starting formal definition (1), such a semantic definition also should be specific of
msG . However, nothing entails that one probability law (, , N0 ) p(X j ), j = 1, 2, . . . , J established
for msG relatively to only one dynamical quantity X, cannot be observed also for another microstate
different from msG . Whereas it seems likely that two or more such laws considered together do
constitute an observational specificity associable to msG . This draws now attention upon the way in
which measurement operations of distinct dynamical quantities, can be associated in order to reach
observable qualifications that are specific of the studied microstate: Given one outcome of the stud-
ied microstate msG , is it possible to submit it simultaneously to operations of measurement of two
or several distinct dynamical quantities X defined for a microstate? This is the famous question of
complementarity largely debated by Bohr and intimately tied with Heisenbergs principle of uncer-
tainty. Here, however, this question is explicitly stated with respect to one given outcome of msG ,
which usually is not the case.
11 X j being identified starting from a group of observable physical marks, via the coding-procedure supposedly utilized inside any given
theory of microstates.
12 In a recent work (Mugur-Schchter, 2014a) I have examined Kolmogorovs non-effective concept of probability and I have constructed

in finite terms a concept of factual probability: just a deliberate artifact for creation of knowledge, notwithstanding unfavorable cognitive
conditions. Indeed, the mentioned work has brought forth a fundamental unity between the classical concept of natural law and the new
concept of factual probability. Namely, it has been shown that a factual probability law can be conceived to stem from partial perceptions
of one meta-whole that is not integrally perceivable, that is accessible to direct perception only in a parceled way, and furthermore, in
conditions that are insured by constraints deliberately constructed by the human observer to a degree considerably higher than in the case
of natural laws (cf. also Mugur-Schchter (2002b, pp. 291304)).
12

For instance, consider two distinct dynamical quantities X and X 0 6= X and one outcome (spec-
imen) of a microstate msG of one or several microsystems. Suppose that it is possible to specify
for X 0 and X one common measurement-interaction with a unique outcome of msG ) so an inter-
action that is globally endowed with a unique space-time support and that, via a convenient coding
procedure, entails a unique group {kXX 0 }, k = 1, 2, . . . , m of observable marks, out of which one
can afterwards work out conceptually the two distinct values X j and X j00 of the two quantities X and
X 0 that have been mutually distinguished on an abstract level only13 . In such a case we shall say
that the dynamical quantities X and X 0 6= X are compatible with respect to the considered sort of
microstate. This means that in fact the two dynamical quantities X and X 0 6= X only designate two
different conceptual utilisations of one same physical-operational qualification. So physically the
two (, , N0 )-probability laws (5) corresponding to X and X 0 act as only one such law, which is not
sufficient for insuring the required specificity with respect to the studied microstate msG .
While if the procedure indicated above is not possible with the quantities X and X 0 , we shall
say that X 0 6= X are incompatible quantities, with respect to the considered sort of microstate. In
that case the two corresponding (, , N0 )-probability laws (5) certainly act independently from an
observational point of view. Hence they constitute two factually distinct pieces of data, and, together,
they are likely to constitute a specificity of msG .
The concepts of compatibility or incompatibility of dynamical quantities that have been defined
above are essentially relative to: a unique outcome of a microstate; a microstate of a definite
sort; the considered pair of quantities; the available techniques; the model of a microstate that
is presupposed, that plays quite generally the central role14 .
Primordial transferred description. The considerations from the preceding point lead us to
consider together all the (, , N0 )-probability laws (5) established for msG : This, quasi certainly,
does insures a specific characterization of the studied microstate.
So, by definition, the set

(, , N0 ) po (X j )G , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, X (5)

of all the (, , N0 )-probability laws (5) established by use of one given operation of generation
G and all the dynamical quantities X defined for a microstate that translates in meaningful
terms the set of all the observable marks obtained for msG will be regarded as a descrip-
tion of msG , notwithstanding that this set does not concern the studied microstate meG iso-
lated from the measurement interactions that have been involved in the realized successions
[G.MesX], X.
This seems appropriate. Indeed, to the initial definition (1) of the microstate msG that only
labels this microstate by the operation G that has generated it, and to the chain (3) that endows us
with a very first and feeble dot of meaning tied with this microstate itself, (5) substitutes now a
specific characterization of msG in terms of a whole dense structure of communicable, consensual,
predictive and verifiable stable pieces of data that involve factually the microstate msG itself, and
that are intelligible, i.e. are connected to previously established classical knowledge, via the coding-
procedure cod.proc(X j ) applied to each observed group of physical marks accordingly to the grid of
qualification (2) that is made use of, redefined mor microstates. In this sense we are now finally in
presence of knowledge concerning the microstate msG , a knowledge conceptually tied with classical
mechanics of macroscopic mobiles. This finally installs the concept of a microstate msG as a scientific
concept endowed with stable and intelligible semantic contents.
Nevertheless, the sort of knowledge (5) concerning msG defined above violates strongly the
classical ways of thinking in terms of objects endowed with an inner and individual space-time
13 This happens, for instance, for the classical quantities p and p2 /2m = T for which it is possible to first determine in a physical-
operational way the numerical value of the common basic quantity |pp| = m(vx + vy + vz ), and out of this basic operational determination,
to work out afterward, conceptually, the two results pp and p2 /2m that are mutually distinct from a conceptual point of view as well as
by their numerical values). But it might also be realized in a quite different sense, as it will appear in the second part of this work.
14 In nowadays microphysics the concepts of compatibility or incompatibility of dynamical quantities are uncritically assigned a rather

mysterious absolute nature, which is the source of unending confusion.


13

organization and qualified in terms of properties that they would possess. It also violates the
conventional views on objective facts. Indeed this knowledge is:
* Quintessentially relative to:
- the operation of generation G that acts inside all the successions [G.MesX], X;
- the product itself, denoted msG , of each realization of G;
- all the involved grids of qualification gq[X,X j ,MesX,cod.proc(X j )], X.
* Quintessentially and radically devoid of any definite space-time structure.
Notations, denominations, comments. In order to deal efficiently with so saliently unusual
features, we shall introduce a very analytic way of naming them.
- The grid of qualification introduced by a dynamical quantity X defined for microstates will
be called the aspect-view X.
- The whole set {X} of dynamical quantities defined for a microstate will be called the me-
chanical view defined for a microstate and will be denoted VMec .
- The set of basic genetic elements

[G, msG ,VMec ] (6)

will be called the genetic triad of the set (5) of finite probability laws (it acts like a sort of inorganic
physical-conceptual DNA of this set).
- The whole vast set
{[G.MesX]}, X VMec (7)
of repeated successions of operations of the general form [G.MesX] achieved by the use of the genetic
triad (6) will be called the genesis of the set of laws (5).
Let us note that in contradistinction to the abstract predictive probability laws (5) the
genetic triad (6) of (5) has a physical-operational-methodological character. Correlatively:
The genesis [G.MesX], X VMec of (5) is quite essentially, strongly and deliberately endowed
with a space-time organization that expresses basic features of the current human thought and
actions.
- The brute result of the genesis [G.MesX], X VMec of (5) consists of the set-of-sets of
observable marks {{kX }, kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX , X}. This will be called the factual data on msG and will
be denoted by (msG ). So we write

{{kX }, kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX , X VMec } (msG ) (8)

The amount (8) of factual data emerges at highly dispersed moments, and hugely dispersed spatially
on various registering devices of various apparatuses for measuring various quantities X. Observa-
tionally, it is just a powder of heaps of traces of vanished interactions, transmuted into meaning by a
man-made operational-conceptual-methodological-theoretical machine15 . Nevertheless this powder
hides inside it a very elaborate unity of curiosity, project and method. The emergence of (8) has
been possible only on the organizing basis of the model of a microstate posited inside the utilized
theory of microstates, and of the correlative coding procedures that have immediately converted each
observed physical mark, into a significant datum. So, in a still non-expressed way, the factual data
from (msG ) are already marked in their inner content by the organizing relativities that, inside (5),
have been endowed with an explicit and intelligible expression. But, and this is very important to be
noticed:
Both the factual data from (8) and their explicit and utilizable organization from (5) are devoid
of any space-time organization and of any qualia tied with the microstate msG alone.
15 Let us stop a moment to realize how simplistic it would be to assert that this knowledge has been discovered!
14

- The definition (5) of the probabilistic predictive laws concerning msG separated from its
genesis (7) will be re-noted now as

DoM (msG ) (, , N0 ) {{po (G, X j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J} X VMec (9)

and it will be called the primordial transferred mechanical description of the microstate msG (the
upper index o is to be red primordial transferred; the lower index M is to be read mechanical);
and when only one quantity X is considered we shall write DoX (msG ) (, , N0 ) {{po (G, X j )}, j =
1, 2, . . . , J} and we shall speak of the primordial transferred description of a microstate msG with
respect to X. As we have already stressed, this description, by itself, is devoid of space-time organi-
zation, even though it is intelligible.
The whole that is constituted by both the genesis (7) of repeated successions [G.MesX],
X VM , and the intelligible result (9) DoM (msG ) brought forth by this genesis, will be called the
representation of the microstate msG and it will be denoted

DoM /G, msG ,VMec / (10)

(or DoX /G, msG , X/ if only one aspect-view X is involved). This symbol stresses the inseparable unity,
in the case of microstates, between the studied entity, the gained knowledge, and the conceptual-
physical-operational creation of this knowledge, wherefrom the intelligibility stems.
One feels already the challenge involved with respect to realism and objectivity in the ancient
classical sense.
A remarkable scission. So, even though the human cognitive actions that lead to the primordial
transferred description of a microstate are naturally and irrepressibly endowed with space-time fea-
tures, nevertheless the final result (9) of these cognitive actions has spontaneously emerged in a quite
non-classical state of rigorous absence of an inner space-time structure. This is a very remarkable
scission16 .
A scission of the same kind appears already in any classical statistical or probabilistic descrip-
tion, but never with this radical character, never entirely devoid, throughout the whole investigation,
of any perceptible material substrate of what is conceived to exist in space-time and is studied.
Inside the present construction of a reference-structure for estimating a theory of microstates, the pri-
mordial transferred description of a microstate reveals a radically non-classical character of a type
that up to now has never as yet been identified explicitly and listed, neither in the current grammars,
nor in logic and in the sciences.
Inside any mathematical theory of microstates, and in particular inside quantum mechanics, the
psychological impact of this character though observationally it can fully subsist is necessarily
diminished by the fact that a model of a microstate is constantly working inside the minds in order
to conceive appropriate measurement operations, coding-procedures, etc. Whereas here, inside the
qualitative but formalized general structure of reference that we are building, the new concept (9)
of a primordial transferred description emerges pure, naked17 , and also free of any mathematical
receptacle that withstands the full perception of its semantic peculiarity. So the limiting character
of such a description appears strikingly. And it becomes clear that this character constitutes a basic
conceptual novelty. This novelty revolutionizes the whole epistemology. 18 .
16 I have reported in (Mugur-Schchter, 2014a) how I became aware of this scission in consequence of a private exchange with Michel
Bitbol.
17 Possibly, that is what Bohr desired to preserve when he has interdicted any model of a microstate. He might have been trapped in an

implicit feeling of contradiction between the extreme peculiarities that he perceived in a primordial transferred description especially
the radical absence of any material support and any inner space-time organization and on the other hand, a total unawareness of the
fact that the process of conception and of factual realization of a description marked by such a limiting degree of lack of space-time
organization, does unavoidably require a model that cannot be imagined outside space and time. For in his time, the crucial role of coding
procedures was entirely ignored.
18 It permitted the present author to construct a fully general, entirely unified, qualitative but strictly formalized Method of Relativized

Conceptualization that eliminates a priori, by construction, the emergence of any false problem or paradox (Mugur-Schchter, 2006)
15

This illustrates the analytical powers that a qualitative formalization independent of mathemat-
ical formalization can bring forth for physics.

THE PROBABILITY TREE OF A PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION


OF A PROGRESSIVE MICROSTATE

3.1. The probability tree of one progressive micro-state of one micro-system with
non-composed operation G of generation

We consider first the basic case of one progressive microstate msG of one microsystem. We
shall elaborate for it a synthetic tree-like graphic variant of its symbolic representation (10). For
simplicity we introduce only two non-compatible quantities X and Y (in the sense of Section 2.2.
Individual level of conceptualization. The very numerous successions of operations [G.MesX],
X VMec , that are involved in the general genesis (7) start all with one same operation of generation
G. But then in consequence of mutual compatibilities and incompatibilities between dynamical
quantities (cf. Section 2.2 the space-time supports of these successions of operations [G.MesX] in
general fall apart in two distinct space-time branches. So a tree-like structure emerges19 It will
suffice to illustrate the general situation by the help of only two mutually non-compatible dynamical
quantities X VM and Y VM that generate only two branches.
Throughout what follows we distinguish radically between the individual level of conceptual-
ization, and the probabilistic one.
The two considered mutually incompatible dynamical quantities X and Y introduce, respec-
tively, the two qualification-grids of the form (2)

gq[X,Xk ,MesX,cod.proc(X j )], j = 1, 2, . . . , M gq[Y ,Yr ,MesY,cod.proc(Yr )], r = 1, 2, . . . , M (2)

(for simplicity we endow them with the same number M of possible values, X j and Yr ).
Let [dG .(tG t0 )] denote the space-time support of each one realization of the operation G
of generation of the studied microstate msG , and let [dX .(tMesX tG )] and [dY .(tMesY tG )], respec-
tively, denote the mutually distinct space-time supports of a measurement-operation MesX and
a measurement-operation MesY (the time origin is re-set on zero after each time-registration (obvi-
ous significance of the notations). So each realization of one succession [G.MesX] covers a global
space-time support
[dG (tG t0 ) + dX (tMesX tG )]
and produces a group of observable marks {kX }, kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX , that is coded in terms of a value
X j accordingly to (2); while each realization of a succession [G.MesY] covers in its turn a global
space-time support
[dG .(tG to ) + dY .(tMesY tG )]
and produces a group of observable marks {kY }, kY = 1, 2, . . . , mY , that is coded in terms of a value
Yr of the quantity Y . Thereby, for the considered case, the genesis (7) from the level of individual
conceptualization of the representation (9), is achieved.
This individual phase of elaboration of the representation (9) has a dominant physical-
operational character.
- Probabilistic level of conceptualization. Let us start now from the fact that one succession
[G.MesX] produces one group of observable marks, {kX }, with kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX . This group of
19 In Section 3.2 we have much stressed the various relativities that restrict the concept of mutual compatibility between dynamical
quantities defined for microstates that is introduced in this approach. In certain cases these relativities can entail a total absence of mutual
incompatibilities with respect to the studied microstate. In such a case, for the sake of generality of the defined language, one can speak of
a one branch-tree (This case is considered in (10) when only one qualifying quantity is considered).
16

marks {kX } is then coded into a value X j of X accordingly to the coding procedure indicated by the
utilized theory for the considered pair (G, X). The coding value X j is stored. Mutatis mutandis, the
same holds for a succession [G.MesY]. Suppose now that a sequence of a big number N of realiza-
tions of a succession [G.MesX]n , n = 1, 2, . . . , N, has been realized, the relative frequencies n(X j )/N,
j = 1, 2, . . . , M have been established (n(X j ) is to be read the number of values X j : n should not be
confounded with the lower index n introduced above), and an (, , N0 )-convergence in the sense of
(5) has been found to emerge indeed for these relative frequencies. In these conditions the primordial
transferred description (9) has been specified fully, both factually and numerically. Furthermore we
have constructed an effective and factual Kolmogorov probability-space for the pair (G, X): the uni-
verse of elementary events from the space is U = {X j }, j = 1, 2, . . . , M, and the probability law from
the space, namely the primordial transferred description (9) DoX (msG ) (, , N0 ) {po (G, X j )},
j = 1, 2, . . . , M on {X j }, is numerically defined20 . (For the moment the algebra on the universe of
elementary events is not considered explicitly, but it will be soon). Mutatis mutandis, the same holds
for the quantity Y and its values Yr .
Thereby the probabilistic level (9) of the representation (10) is also constructed.
On this level out of the observable factual data (msG ) generated for the quantities X and Y
by the individual and physical-operational genetic phase (7) has been worked out a purely numer-
ical probabilistic content. So this level of conceptualization has an abstract character. It induces a
promontory into the realm of the mathematized. As soon as we count we have already mathematized.
- A meta-probabilistic level of conceptualization. But we cannot stop here. The explicit aware-
ness of the role of the operation G of generation of outcomes of the studied microstate msG , hin-
ders that. The two different effective probability laws21 {po (G, X j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . , M and {po (G,Yr )},
r = 1, 2, . . . , M that crown the operational space-time branches from the zone of individual conceptu-
alization, stem both from one same trunk-operation of generation G. This, in a graphic representation,
stresses intuitively now that the two branch-probability laws concern one same microstate msG , in the
sense of (1). So it seems unavoidable to posit that there exists some sort of meta-probabilistic corre-
lation between the two probability laws {po (G, X j )} and {po (G,Yr )}. Such a correlation accepts an
expression of the general form

po (X j ) = F X j ,Y {po (G,Yr )}, r = 1, 2, . . . , M (11)

F X j ,Y {po (G, X j )}}, j = 1, 2, . . . , M


F XY (G) = {F (11)
where F X jY {po (G,Yr )} and F XY (G) are two functionals left unspecified here that express, re-
spectively, the individual probability po (X j ) in terms of the whole probability law {po (G,Yr )},
r = 1, 2, . . . , M, and the global correlation between the two whole laws {po (G, X j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . , M,
and {po (G,Yr )}, r = 1, 2, . . . , M. Together, the relations (11) and (11) will be called the meta-
probabilistic correlation involved by G msG with respect to (X,Y ) and will be symbolized by
(Mpc (G))XY (c: read correlation)22 .
So the description (9) of the studied microstate has to be explicitly completed: it has transmuted
into a description of the general form

DoM (msG ) [(, , N0 ) {po (G, X j )}, (M pc(G))XY ], XY VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , M, (9)

And in order to distinguish clearly between the probability-laws (, , N0 )-{{po (G, X j )}, j =
1, 2, . . . , J}, X VMec from (9) and the probabilistic correlations (M pc(G))XY , XY VMec defined
20 As it is well-known a complete Kolmogorov probability space has the structure [U, , p()] where is an algebra on the universe U
of elementary events and the probability p() defined on designates the only general concept of a probability law, non-specified
numerically; while nowhere is it indicated how to construct the numerically specified probability law that works in a given, factual,
particular probabilistic situation (Mugur-Schchter, 2014a).
21 For the sake of brevity, from now on we cease to write explicitly the specification (, , N ), but it will be constantly presupposed.
0
22 Mackey (1963), Suppes (1966), Gudder (1976), Beltrametti and Maczynski (1991), and probably other authors also, have tried directly

by purely mathematical means, to establish a satisfactory formulation of a meta-probability law associable with a quantum mechanical
state-vector. The tree-like structure constructed here explicates the qualitative and semantic foundations of such a law. This might facilitate
in the future the specification of a consensual mathematical expression for what is here denoted Mcpo (msG ).
17

STATISTICAL CROWN
ND
2 META-PROBABILISTIC LEVEL OF DESCRIPTION
Mpc(G)

t t
[(X1, X2,...Xk,...Xm), {p(X1), p(X2),..p(Xk),..p(Xm)}] [(Y1, Y2, ,...Yr,...Ym), {p(Y1), p(Y2),.. p(Yr).... p(Ym)}]
FIRST PROBA BILISTIC LEV EL OF DESCRIPTION FIRST PROBA B ILIST IC LEV EL OF DESCRIPTION
DoM(meG){p(G,Xj)}, j=1,2,..m DoM(meG){p(G,Yr)}, r=1,2,..m

coding of Xj coding of Yr
INDIVIDUAL

marks { kX} LEVEL OF DESCRIPTION marks { k Y}

MesX MesY [G.MesY]

[G.MesX]

dMesX(tMesX-tG) dG(tG-to) dMesY(tMesY-tG)

0 x

Fig. 2: The probability-tree T (G, (X,Y )) of a microstate msG (the coding is posited to have been
done, but inside IQM it is not defined)
by (11), (11), we shall say by definition that (9) contains probabilistic qualifications of the first order
whereas (M pc(G))XY , XY VMec expresses probabilistic qualifications of the second order.
The description (9) has been developed inside an a priori given cell for conceptualization,
namely (G,VMec ) that from now on we call an epistemic referential.
The global geometrized result: the probability tree T (G, (X,Y )). Figure 2 represents the
totalized result of the preceding construction. It possesses a tree-like structure. So let us denote it by
T (G, (X,Y )).
The green zone, of genetic conceptualization individual, physical-operational is clearly
separated from the yellow zone of abstract, purely numerical conceptualization, where only counts
according to various representational criteria have been performed upon the observable results drawn
from the individual physical-operational zone, in order to work out of them predictive probabilities
and meta-probabilities.
18

In Figure 1 time and successions have been eliminated. The final global result has been ge-
ometrized into a tree-like structure in front of which we can now rest a moment and contemplate.
This structure indicates a probabilistic whole of an essentially new kind where:
- the concept of random phenomenon is thoroughly explicated in terms of definite cognitive
genetic actions;
- the result of each action is specified (Chapters 1 3.1);
- the results of successive actions are progressively connected to form one final whole;
- the probabilistic dependences are of a non-classical nature (see below);
- the contents of the genetic elements (G, msG , (X,Y )) first indicated minimally can later be
variously specified accordingly to the definitions from Section 2.1.
More detailed examination of T (G, (X,Y )). We shall now show that the concept of
probability-tree of a microstate involves significances that are a far from being trivial23 .
Probabilistic point of view
- Random phenomenon. The classical theory of probabilities offers no formalization of
the concept of random phenomenon. It just makes use of the current verbal expression. Whereas on
Figure 2 one literally sees how a Kolmogorov probability-space emerges for a microstate factually
and conceptually from nothingness, and up to a numerically specified probability law. Thereby
the basic concept of random phenomenon acquires for this case a detailed inner structure, in non-
classical terms [G, MesX or MesY, marks {k }X or marks { j }Y , code Xk or code Y j ], wherefrom
Kolmogorov probability-spaces are then defined. But factually constructed probability-spaces, that
contain numerically specified (, , N0 )-probability laws that are effective and relativized in the sense
defined in (5). And this result can then be generalized and induced in an enlarged theory of probabil-
ities (Mugur-Schchter, 2002a,b, 2006, 2014a).
- Probabilistic dependence. The complete Kolmogorov probability spaces that crown
the two branches from the figure 2 admit, respectively, the denotations

[U(X j ), X , {po (G, X j )}], j = 1, 2, . . . , M, [U(Yr ), Y , {po (G,Yr )}], r = 1, 2, . . . , M

where X and Y are the respective algebras of events24 . Let us consider now explicitly these algebras
also. Inside the classical theory of probabilities the concept of probabilistic dependence is defined
only for events from the algebra of one given space. Kolmogorov has written (Kolmogorov 1950,
p.9) :
. . . one of the most important problems in the philosophy of the natural sciences is in addition to the well known
one regarding the essence of the concept of probability itself to make precise the premises which would make it
possible to regard any given real events as independent.
And he has posited by definition that two events A and B from the algebra of a probability
space, are independent from a probabilistic point of view if the numerical product p(A).p(B) of the
probabilities p(A) and p(B) of their separate occurrences, is equal to the probability p(A B) that
their (set)-product-event A B from occur; whereas if this is not the case, then A and B are tied
by a probabilistic dependence. But inside the classical theory of probabilities the concepts of prob-
abilistic dependence or independence are not defined for elementary events from one same universe
U. (Such a dependence can be apprehended only indirectly, by comparison with the probability law
that acts upon a universe of elementary events defined as a Cartesian product of two universes, one
of which is U. But this involves another random phenomenon, distinct from the random phenomenon
that generates the space where U is the universe of elementary events).
These classical definitions are sufficient if each one of the two probability spaces that crown
the two branches from Figure 2 is considered separately from the other one. But consider now an
23 The expression probability tree is already made use of, with various significances. All these should be very carefully distinguished
from the significance represented in the figure 1 that are new significances and highly non-trivial ones, both from an abstract purely
mathematical-probabilistic point of view and for an understandable physical theory of microstates.
24 An algebra of events defined on the universe U = {e }, j = 1, 2, . . . , J of elementary events e : a set of sub-sets e = {e } from U that
j j j
contains U itself as well as the void set 0/ and is such that if the subsets A and B of elementary events are contained in then contains
also the union A B and the difference A B.
19

elementary event X j from the space that crowns the branch MesX, and an elementary event Yr form
the space that crowns the branch MesY. Observationally, these two events are independent indeed.
Since the quantities X and Y are mutually incompatible, the measurement-operations MesX, and MesY
cannot be realized together for one outcome of the studied microstate msG , so the elementary events
X j and Yr cannot even coexist. But nevertheless the events X j and Yr concern the same microstate
msG , in the sense of (1). And even though one microstate in the sense of (1) cannot be identified
conceptually with one outcome of this microstate, the considerations that led to (11)+(11) required
the assertion of the meta-probabilistic correlation (M pc(G)) and the explicit extension (9) of (9).
Which means a sort of probabilistic dependence of the second order.
The classical theory of probabilities does also define the general concept of probabilistic cor-
relations, quite explicitly. But it does not singularize inside it a special class of meta-probabilistic
correlations that manifests specifically the fact that one same basic physical entity is involved in
different random phenomena25 . This, however, is obviously an important case because it can be a
extremely frequent one.
For all the above-mentioned reasons, it seems clear that the classical theory of probabilities has
to be enlarged, and in various directions26 . This conclusion is strongly reinforced below.
Logical point of view.
Up to now logical considerations concerning the description of microstates have been devel-
oped only on the basis of directly the mathematical Hilbert-von Neumann-Dirac formulation of
quantum mechanics. The concept of a probability tree of a microstate offers a more deeply set and
more general ground on which to place a logical examination27 .

3.2. Probability tree of one progressive micro-state of two or more micro-systems: the most
non-trivial class of probability trees

Consider now one progressive micro-state msG(2S) of two micro-systems S1 and S2 , in the sense
of the definitions from Section 2.1. Such a microstate is generated by an operation of generation
G(2S) to which it is tied in the sense of (1). One complete operation of measurement on one outcome
of msG(2S) involves [one measurement Mes1 X of a quantity X on S1 and one measurement Mes2 Y of
a quantity Y on S2 ] (in particular X and Y can identify, but in general they are different). For maximal
clarity we can write X1 and X j1 instead of X and X j , and Y2 , Yr2 instead of Y and Yr . So let us denote
such a complete act of measurement by Mes12 (X1Y2 ).
Another branch of this tree will have to be assigned to another pair of quantities, (W1 , Z2 )
where W1 is incompatible with X2 and Z2 is incompatible with Y2 , in the sense defined in 2.2, while
concerning W1 and Z2 there is no restriction of mutual compatibility. In this way is constructed a
two-branches tree of msG(2S) to be denoted T (G(2S), (X2Y2 ,W1 Z2 )).
Let us focus now upon the following fact: For one micro-state of two micro-systems, the two
dynamical quantities X2 and Y2 that are involved in a complete act of measurement Mes12 (X2Y2 ) can
always be compatible in the sense defined in 3.2, since they act via two measurements Mes1 X1 and
Mes2Y2 realized upon the different systems S1 and S2 , respectively, realized upon one outcome of the
microstate msG12 . So the pair (Mes1 X1 , Mes2Y2 ) of measurements involved in one complete act of
measurement Mes12 (X2Y2 ) can always be located inside one same branch of the tree T (G2S , X2Y2 ),
and the corresponding pair of marks ({kX1 }, {kY2 }) that can be assigned the unified re-notation
25 K.J. Jung has introduced a concept of synchronicity that seemed rather mysterious and has much struck Pauli, possibly because
quantum mechanics had suggested to him an explanation (Mugur-Schchter, 2002b, note pp. 279-281).
26 This enlargement has already been explicitly worked out in Mugur-Schchter (2002a,b, 2006, 2014a), in general terms, not only for the

case of microstates. And in the second part of this work, it will appear that it is asserted also inside nowadays quantum mechanics, since
more than 80 years, but via mathematical writings to which only a conventional significance is stressed, while their physical probabilistic
significance is not claimed.
27 This has been done in an only primitive way in Mugur-Schchter (1992); much later a quite general relativized reconstruction of the

logical and the probabilistic conceptualization has been accomplished (Mugur-Schchter, 2002a,b, 2006, 2014a) that leads to a unification
of these two so basic approaches of the human thought, while for the particular case of microstates an improved but not perfect version
of probability tree has been worked out in Mugur-Schchter (2009).
20

{k,X2Y2 } when it has been coded in terms of a pair of values X j1Yr2 , j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M, constitutes
one elementary event from the universe of elementary events U = X jYr , j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M from the
probability-space that crowns the branch of the complete measurements Mes12 (X2Y2 ); while the prob-
ability law on the universe of elementary events from this probability space consists of the transferred
description (9) DoM (msG(2S) ) (, , N0 )-{po (G2S , X j1Yr2 )}, j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M of msG(2S) with respect
to the pair of quantities (X2 ,Y2 ). Everywhere the pair (X2 ,Y2 ) of two quantities one of which qualifies
the system S1 and the other one, the system S2 , is involved as one whole And nevertheless, as by
now it is so well known:
The here-nows of the two physical events (in the usual sense, not in the probabilistic sense) ob-
servable on apparatuses of the human observers produced by one complete act of measurement
Mes12 (X2Y2 ), namely [the observation by a human observer, of a value X j1 that qualifies S1 ]
and [the observation by a human observer, of the value Yr2 that qualifies S2 ], can be separated
by an arbitrary space-time distance.
While the corresponding description (9) itself is devoid of space-time structure. We find our-
selves face-to-face with the problem of non-locality. It seems somewhat surprising, I think, that an
approach like that developed here, so general, brings forth so rapidly this face-to-face, independently
of any mathematical formulation and in a way so deeply tied with the basic tree-like representation
of a microstate. This way of reaching the problem brings clearly into evidence that what is called
non-locality is tied with the fact that any primordial transferred description (9) is radically void of
any inner space-time structure, so it cannot involve explicit space-time restrictions28 .
The non-locality problem emerges here in a particularly striking way, because it is explicitly
lodged inside the space-time frame of the human observers with their apparatuses29 . One complete
act of measurement Mes12 (X2Y2 ) involves two macroscopic apparatuses A(X2 , S1 ) and A(Y2 , S2 ) that
are endowed with perceptible delimited volumes and with perceptible registering devices that pre-
structure classes of possible observable results and mark perceptibly the spatial distance between
them and the space-time distance between the observable results coded X j1 and Yr2 . Moreover in the
nowadays state of absence inside quantum mechanics of an explicit use of a model of a microstate, the
systems S1 and S2 are implicitly imagined like two small balls, which rises strongly and intuitively
the question of what exists and happens between them.
The conceptual situation that is represented is also unintelligible from a probabilistic point
of view. The questions mentioned above point toward the inner features of what is symbolized by
msG(2S) , but they emerge in relation with a one branch-probability law (, , N0 )-{po (G2S , X j1 Yr2 )},
j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M, not only inside the meta-probabilistic correlation (M pc(G)). Thereby they appear
as tied with a sort of probabilistic dependence that is internal not only to the elementary events
{X j1 Yr2 )}, j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M, but also to the studied microstate msG(2S) to which both S1 and S2 belong
by definition; whereas the classical concept of probabilistic dependence cannot deal with such a
situation. The whole classical conceptualization is in the hot seat.
On the other hand, as long as one makes conceptual-formal use of the operation of generation
G(2S) and the successions [G(2S).Mes12 (X2Y2 )] for generating the events {X j1 Yr2 }, j, r = 1, 2, . . . , M,
one is locked inside the description (9) DoM (msG(2S) ) (, , N0 )-{po (G(2S), X j1 Yr2 )}, j, r =
1, 2, . . . , M of one micro-state of two micro-systems. So trying in this case to think of the events
X j1 separately of any event Yr2 as it has been very insistently tried is devoid of any defined
meaning30 . The possibility of such detailed mutually distinctive shades stresses the specific powers
of a rigorously defined method.
Finally, the two branches of the tree T (G(2S), (X2Y2 ,W1 Z2 )), considered together, introduce a
meta-probabilistic correlation (M pc(msG(2S) ))X2Y2 ,W1 Z2 . This also might appear to deserve some future
28 A model of a microstate could at least compensate this void by offering support to some explanation. But this cannot be offered inside
barely a reference structure, it would be too specifically assertive for the desired degree of generality.
29 In Appendix 1 we join the translation of a text about non-locality written at a time when the problem was not yet well explored.
30 While trying to conceive S and the qualifications {X }, in-dependently of S and the qualifications {Y } (or vice-versa), or trying to
1 j1 2 r2
conceive them independently of any operation of generation which still is a quite general and strong tendency amounts to surreptitiously
transmute the initially considered problem, into another problem, and an impossible problem, because it is a non-defined problem, as it is
explicitly shown in 1. This, we hope, is made quite clear now by the contents of 13.4) and quite particularly by the relation (1).
21

examination, in order to identify the specificities with respect to the meta-probabilistic correlations in
the case of one microstate of one microsystem.
The content of this point 3.4 can been generalized in an obvious way to the case of one progres-
sive microstate of several microsystems. It illustrates with a particular force the basic and major role
of the general concept of operation of generation G for the study of microstates. It also illustrates the
general clarifying power entailed by an explicit and systematic consideration of all the defined pos-
sibilities of relativisation posited a priori for a descriptional cell. It opens a constructed door toward
unification of the quantum theory with the theory of fields.

3.3. Probability tree of one progressive microstate with composed operation of generation

Consider the basic sort of a composed operation of generation G(G1 , G2 ) (Chapter 1) of a mi-
crostate in which only two simple operations of generation G1 and G2 are involved, like in Youngs
double slit experiment. The construction of the primordial transferred description (9) for the corre-
sponding microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) will be found in the second part of this work to raise a central coding-
problem; and the proposed solution to this problem entails that the probability-tree T (G(G1 , G2 ))
might appear to be a one-branch-tree. This cannot be discussed here, it requires the framework of a
theory of microstates, not of only a reference-structure for estimating such a theory. So, concerning
this case, we shall restrict ourselves to bring into evidence only a striking experimental-conceptual-
formal specificity.
Consider an effectively realized microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) . Let us compare its description (9) with
the descriptions (9) of the two microstates msG1 and msG2 that would be obtained, respectively, if the
two operations of generation G1 and G2 were realized separately. Not surprisingly, such a comparison
brings forth the physical fact that in general, between the probability po (G(G1 , G2 ), X j ) of the value
X j of a dynamical quantity X, and the probabilities po (G1 , X j ) and po (G2 , X j ) of this same value X j
for, respectively, the microstates msG1 and msG2 , there holds an inequality

p12 (G(G1 , G2 ), X j ) 6= p1 (G1 , X j ) + p2 (G2 , X j ) (12)

In this sense, the microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) cannot be regarded as the sum of the two microstates msG1
and msG2 . This is indeed a noticeable fact. But this fact has then been re-expressed in positive terms
by saying that msG1 and msG2 interfere inside msG(G1 ,G2 ) . Now, according to (1) this re-expression
is misleading from a conceptual point of view. Indeed only the one microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) is effectively
generated by the one operation of generation G(G1 , G2 ); and G(G1 , G2 ) is in a one-to-one relation
with msG(G1 ,G2 ) ; so it cannot be coherently conceived to generate also msG1 and msG2 . Inside the only
one realized microstate msG(G1 ,G2 ) the microstates msG1 and msG2 remain non-realized physically,
mutually non-singularized, just two potentialities of full operational individualization suggested by
the structure of G(G1 , G2 ). So msG1 and msG2 cannot interfere inside msG(G1 ,G2 ) where they have
not been brought into full existence. That is why the comparison made in (12) is very misleading31 .
The preceding considerations can be generalized in an obvious way to the case of an operation
of generation G(G1 , G2 , . . . , Gm ) that composes several operations of generation.
This closes our exploration on probability trees of progressive microstates. And, for the reasons
expressed at the end of 2.1, the concept of probability tree cannot be constructed as a an element
of reference useful for bounded microstates. So in what follows we add now brief consideration
concerning the evolution of a microstate.
31 The comparison from (12) and the way of expressing it verbally is deeply tied with the choice of the linear Hilbert-Dirac mathematical
framework for the formulation of quantum mechanics; and it will appear in the second part of this work 7.5.1) that it is the source of a
basic problem concerning quantum measurements. It would be flimsy to reject this sort of consideration as inadequate inside theoretical
physics: the basic conceptual choices of representation and the verbal choices for expressing facts can have unpredictable consequences,
and major ones.
22

3.4. Remarks on the evolution of any progressive microstate

Is it possible, inside this qualitative, and semantically open approach for constructing only
a reference-structure for how to construct some knowledge on microstate, to assert something con-
cerning the evolution of any progressive microstate? The answer is positive and, again, it brings into
evidence the crucial role of the concept of operation G of generation of a microstate.
Imagine the final moment t assigned to an operation of generation G from (1) that introduces
initially the microstate to be studied, msG . In contradistinction to what has been assumed before, let us
admit that during some time interval t1 = t1 t the human observer does not act upon the microstate
msG . So during t1 = t1 t, the initial microstate msG can be posited to, in general, evolve in
the exterior conditions EC that it encounters (exterior macroscopic fields, obstacles). This, however,
can be integrated in (1); for nothing interdicts to posit, in full logical coherence with the preceding
development, that the association of the initial operation of generation G, with this evolution, acts
like another operation of generation Gt1 = F(G, EC, (t1 t)) (F : some function) that generates a
corresponding microstate msG1 in the sense of (1), that can be studied via sequences of successions
[G1 .MesX], j = 1, 2, . . . , M, X VMec , exactly as specified before for any microstate msG . And
nothing hinders either to choose the time interval t1 t with any desired value, the external conditions
EC being maintained. So one can study successively a set of mutually distinct microstates msGk that
correspond, respectively, in the sense of (1), to the set of successive operations of generation:

G, G1 = F(G, EC, (t1 to )), . . . , Gk = F(G, EC, (tk tk1 )), . . . , G f = F(G, EC, (tK tK1 )), (13)

for k = 1, 2, . . . , K (K: an integer ; each time interval (tk tk1 ) is chosen as desired). For each op-
eration of generation Gk from this set one can construct the corresponding probability tree T (Gk , X),
X VM and so, the corresponding description (9). This description itself, however, is at any time
devoid of any definite inner space-time structure: the scission between the space-time organized cog-
nitive actions of the observer, and the absence of inner space-time organization of the constructed
description, subsist fully. (For the sake of clarity, for any Gk 6= G we write Gt . While for the consid-
ered microstate we write always msG , and when the operation G from (1) is followed by an evolution
we indicate this fact and we introduce the corresponding operation of generation

Gt = F(G, EC, (t to )) (13)

where to is the time when the initial operation of generation G finishes.


The relation (13) will reveal a very particular importance: it absorbs the evolution of a
microstate into the operation of generation G, and one act of measurement MesX on a microstate,
into one realization of a whole succession [Gt .MesX], with, in particular Gt = G. This permits to
re-write the core-result (9) of IQM in the generalized form

(DoM (msG ))t [(, , N0 ) pt (Gt , X j ), (M pc(Gt ))XY ], XY VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , M (9)

Everywhere, we can now re-write G as Gt if this is convenient, throughout the whole preceding text.
In this way it is in principle possible to construct in a purely factual way for msG knowledge
that is equivalent to that offered by a mathematical law of evolution, while on the other hand it is
entirely independent of the existence of such a mathematical law. For any time t one can re-write
msG as msGt . It deserves being noted that this remarkable possibility is founded upon the concept of
operation of generation of a microstate.
The considerations from this point close the announced construction of a reference structure
23

for estimating a theory of microstates. So let us now examine the global result.

INFRA-(QUANTUM-MECHANICS)

As announced from the start, the result of the approach developed in the first part of this work has
been a priori named Infra-[Quantum Mechanics] and is denoted IQM; this denomination is to be
understood as an ellipsis for the organization of a procedural global form of reference for then
constructing by its help an intelligible mathematical theory of a mechanics of microstates.
The mentioned organization has been created independently of any mathematical formalism. It
has been subjected to the choice of an aim: To start on the lowest possible level (Fig. 1) the level of
zero pre-accepted knowledge on the individual physical outcomes, specimens, of any microstate-to-
be-studied so as, therefrom, to be able to survey explicitly the progressive elaboration of mutually
connected local moulds that are necessary and sufficient for optimally receiving in them the semantic
elements out of which to construct intelligible and scientific knowledge concerning microstates, i.e.
intelligible communicable and consensual procedures for generating microstates and for predicting
and verifying the predictions concerning measurements on microstates. We have brought into evi-
dence the structure of the main constraints epistemological, physical-operational, methodological
that have to be obeyed when one wants to pre-elaborate this procedural structure of formal moulds.
We have elaborated formally, algebraically though in qualitative terms a whole of just mutually
connected void syntactic containers for the successive cognitive actions that are fitted for constructing
the desired knowledge, but that are not offered pre-fabricated inside the classical thinking, neither in
the current languages nor in the pre-existing mathematical structures. Of what does this whole new
and specific reference-structure consist?
1. The central radically new specific mould that emerges inside the mentioned reference-
structure is the concept of a primordially probabilistic transferred description (9)-(11)-(11), de-
veloped inside a pre-defined conceptual cell delimited by an epistemic referential (G,VMec )

(DoM (msG ))t [(, , N0 )pt (Gt , X j ), (M pc(Gt ))XY ], XY VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , M (9)

This concept has never before been identified and characterized in explicit terms. And it is
marked by very remarkable peculiarities indeed:
- It is devoid of inner space-time organization.
- It is strongly relative to three genetic elements (6) [G, msG ,VMec ] that can be constructed in
strict adequacy with the cognitive aim; the basic one among these, namely the physical operation G
of generation of the individual outcome of the microstate to be studied, has never been noticed before,
while here it reveals a ubiquitous and quintessential role.
- The genetic processes (7) {[G.MesX]}, X VMec that bring forth the qualifications that built
the description (9) are peculiar with respect to classical procedures in that it requires in general
systematic repetition of also the operation of generation G that is involved.
- The brute observable result (8) of one genetic process (7) a group {kX }, kX = 1, 2, . . . , mX ,
of physical marks emerges entirely meaningless by itself ; and in order to gain meaning it requires
a coding procedure able to connect it to previously established meanings. Which in its turn requires
unavoidably a general model of a microstate, so that such a model regarded as a methodological
artifact must be specified inside any acceptable theory of microstates. Furthermore this coding pro-
cedure depends also on the measured quantity X, and on the sort of studied microstate (the definitions
from Section 2.1).
2. In contradistinction to the descriptional structure (9) itself, the genetic processes (7) of
construction of this structure are quite essentially is endowed with a specific space-time structure
and the graphic representation (Fig. 2) of this space-time structure has a tree-like character that brings
forth intuitively non-classical probabilistic features of this descriptional structure (9), namely:
24

- The probabilistic implications of the structure (9) of a primordially probabilistic transferred


description require basic extension of the concept of probabilistic dependence, and these vary ac-
cording to whether one microstate of one microsystem is involved, or one microstate of several mi-
crosystems: this founds a clear procedure for connecting the theory of microstates to the theory of
fields.
- The probabilistic implications of the structure (9) of a primordially probabilistic transferred
description require a basic extension of also the classical logical conceptualization.
3. The genetic process (7) of a structure of a primordially probabilistic transferred description
(9), and this structure itself, constitute together one whole, in the sense that the descriptional structure
ceases to be clearly intelligible when it is separated from its genesis. This is why we have endowed
this whole with an own name the representation of the studied microstate and with a specific
symbolization (10), DtM /Gt , msG ,VMec /.
So, out of nearly a nothingness of explicit previously available knowledge on how knowledge
on microstates can emerge, a rather non-trivial sort of reference-structure for estimating the adequacy
of the quantum mechanical formalism has been explicitly defined: a sort of algebra of boxes of
cognitive steps to be taken, methodological, conceptual, physical-operational steps. At the core of
this reference structure is placed the concept of a primordial transferred probabilistic description
developed inside a definite and a priori given epistemic referential (G,VMec ).
And two specific, deliberate and intimately related lacunae mark the constructed reference-
structure a general model of microstate, and coding rules for identifying the result to be assigned
to this or that measurement succession from (7) {[G.MesX]}, X VMec . By contrast, these lacunae
bring into evidence that:
without a model of a microstate that shall permit to conceive appropriate modalities for
measuring this or that quantity X on this or that sort of a microstate,
without explicit coding procedures for translating the observable result of an act of measure-
ment, into meaning in terms of previously constructed knowledge
the primordial transferred descriptions are just a heap of inert puppets.The strings that can
bring these to work and create this potent impalpable thing that here we call procedural knowledge on
microstates, are a general model of the concept of microstate that permit to state explicit coding rules
for the results of individual measurement operations. Only a theory of microstates can and must
bring in such strings, and thus construct itself. But for this a definite domain of physical reality has to
be brought in, while IQM does not this, and in consequence of precisely this fact it is only a formal
structure of reference, but constructed to fit very precisely the aim of gauging quantum mechanics.
It is the formal character of IQM, this sort of algebraic structure of void con-
ceptual receptacles for factual-semantic contents that it defines via the set of concepts
[G, msG , [G.MesX], /G, msG ,VMec /, DoM , M pc(G)], that permits the separation of the actual knowledge
on microstates constructed inside the quantum theory, from an independently constructed structure
conceived as a procedural mould for constructing a quantum theory. Current language makes ob-
struction to such a separation. But in the second part of this work we shall now show how fertile
such a separation is. It will be able to act at the same time as a reference structure and an immersion
structure for the creation of a renovated quantum theory.
Before entering upon the second part, however, let us stop a moment to note this:
When one has watched the way in which IQM emerges, the navely realistic view that scientific
knowledge is discovery of pre-existing truth collapses into dust. And in its place one sees, one feels in
what a sense [conceptual-operational procedures and correlative conceptual instruments] pointing
toward physical operations or abstract ones can progressively be structured into a whole method
born from the human curiosity and inventiveness; a method for constructing this or that particular,
definite piece of procedural knowledge directed by a definite specific aim; not illusory pre-existing
intrinsic truth. We are trapped in a cage where intrinsic truth is irrepressibly felt to exist while on
the other hand such a truth is definitively out of reach of what we call rational knowledge. Under
this stress I perceive only one strategy that can preserve the capacity to deliver scientific effort: To
25

continue as deeply and rigorously as we are able to, an explicitly procedural investigation able to
bring and to maintain us incessantly upon the moving frontier between rational conceptualization and
metaphysical constructions. While constantly building on this moving frontier we constantly extend
the domain of rational knowledge. Who knows what unconceivable sort of liberation from our cage
this uninterrupted extension might bring forth some day?
26

PART II

PRINCIPLES OF A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS

To reach the point that you do not know you must take they way that you do not know.
San Juan de la Cruz

Only a new construction can ruin and replace a previously achieved construction.
Author of whom I have forgotten the name

INTRODUCTION TO PART II

The aim of the second part of this work is to define the main lines only of a fully intelligible
mathematical theory of microstates, in the sense already defined of a procedural piece of communi-
cable and consensual way of predicting about microstates and verifying the predictions. Thereby the
second part of this work will naturally keep continuity with respect to the result of the first part. So,
in order to avoid inertial attitudes of mind, we stress that:
What follows is not: a new interpretation of quantum mechanics; nor a new achieved theory
of microstates; nor a didactic exposition of something that already exists. It is an outline of a
newly conceived representation of microstates required to be, both, intelligible and scientific..
Obviously such an attempt, at the start, can concern exclusively foundational aspects. In order
to express these foundational aspects we shall make use of the two most utilized mathematical formu-
lations, the Hilbert-Dirac formulation denoted QMHD and the de Broglie-Bohm formulation denoted
dBB. With these we try to maximally keep in continuity, and out of these we shall try to bring forth
the sketch, just the sketch of an intelligible whole expressed in the way required by what is called a
mathematical theory of a domain of physical phenomena.
Throughout what follows QMHD as well as the essence of dBB are supposed to be well known.
For the sake of effectiveness we consider a priori only finite spectra. This amounts to:
(a) require that any grid for qualification shall introduce units for measuring the considered
qualifying quantity;
(b) take into account that the space-time domain of any investigation is always finite. (Conti-
nuity and infinities can be reached afterward, via specified and conceptually surveyed processes of
passage to a limit)32 .
The preceding set of specifications defines what we name principles of a second quantum
mechanics and we denote QM2.
Inside a common framework structured accordingly to IQM, QM2 will bring together as one
organic whole, factually constructed representations and mathematically expressed representations
drawn from QMHD , completed as required by IQM by an explicitly asserted general model of a
microstate and by corresponding coding procedures for the brute meaningless results of quantum-
measurements. The source of the mentioned model though not the model itself will consist of de
Broglies initial wave-particle model.
The core of novelty of QM2 will consist of a basic scheme proposed for the representation of
quantum measurements. This scheme involves a crucial question a choice between two a priori
32 The possibility of arbitrarily small units has to be controlled from a conceptual point of view: usually (and possibly always) one finds
a lower limit (for instance, is the constant of Planck compatible with a periodic time-unit that approaches zero without restriction?). If
this work is accepted, the condition of finiteness of the domain of investigation will have to be treated later with mathematical rigor. The
whole question of effectiveness brings face-to-face, on the one hand the requirement of a modern physics compatible by construction with
informatics, and on the other hand the classical mathematical analysis founded on continuity and infinity. Here we just announce a choice
of principle and a goal, but the corresponding elaboration will remain absent. However, the mentioned goal will be manifest in certain
notations that are not obviously compatible with the continuous and non-finite mathematics that are made use of in nowadays quantum
mechanics. This, inside the present work, is not an error, it is a deliberate choice. We ask the reader to perceive this as just an arrow that
indicates a direction of required improvement, and to tolerate it as such.
27

possibilities that, by its nature, can be settled only by an experimental study that is clearly defined.
But whatever the experimentally imposed answer will be, the approach developed here will leave us
with a fully intelligible representation of microstates of which the whole global contour as well as the
main lines of the inner structure are clearly drawn out.
QM2 will introduce for the factual representation of quantum measurements, the predictions
founded on these and the verification of these predictions, a remarkable degree of independence with
respect to the mathematical expression of the predictions.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE QMHD AND THE IQM REPRESENTATION


AND A GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENT

5.1. The two ways to be compared

The basic QMHD way of representing a microstate. We reduce the QMHD -representation of
a microstate to its strict essence. This consists of three purely formal problems and the correlative
procedures for obtaining the solution; a fourth factual-formal problem with its own solution:
- Problem 1: Determine the state-vector33 |(x,t)i that represents the microstate to be studied
inside the generalized Hilbert space H of the studied microstate (that contains also the eigenket).
Solution to problem 1: Write the Schrdinger equation of the problem, solve it, and introduce
the limiting conditions in order to identify the initial state-vector |(t0 )i. Therefrom the Schrdinger
equation determines |(t)i for any desired value t of time.
- Problem 2. Determine the predictive probability law {p(a j ) |c j |2 }, j, A A, concerning the
possible outcomes of the eigenvalues a j of the observable A that represents the classical dynamical
quantity A(x, px ), when measurements of A are performed on the microstate represented by the state-
vector |(t)i.
Solution to the problem 2: Construct the observable A from the classical definition A(x, px ) of
the quantity A, as a symmetrized function A ( X , P x ) of the observables X and P x associated to the two
basic classical dynamical quantities34 x and px .
Write the equation A |u(x, a j )i = a j |u(x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . and calculate from it the basis of
eigenvectors {|u(x, a j )i} introduced by A in H. Each eigenvalue a j of the quantum mechanical ob-
servable A is tied in this equation to a corresponding eigenvector |u(x, a j )i from this basis; and by
postulate a j is a possible outcome, at any time, of a measurement of A upon the studied microstate.
So the spectrum of A is {a j }, j.
Write now the spectral decomposition of |(x,t)i with respect to the basis {|u(x, a j )i}, j:
|ua j (x)i = j c(a j ,t) |ua j (x)i , j = 1, 2, . . . This is the representation of the studied microstate in H
and relatively to A . Form the set of squared absolute values |c(a j ,t)|2 , j, drawn from |A (x,t)i
and write the researched predictive probability law pt (a j ) = |c(a j ,t)|2 and {pt (a j ) |c(a j ,t)|2 }, j,
according to the probability postulate of Born.
- Problem 3. Specify the way in which you can transform the representation of the studied
microstate in H and relatively to A , into the representation in H of the same microstate, relatively to
another observable B with eigenvalues bk and eigenvectors |vbk (x)i , k.
Solution to the problem 3: Apply Diracs theory of transformations of the expansion coeffi-
cients c(a j ,t) into new expansion coefficients d(bk ,t) by writing:

d(bk ,t) = hvbk |(x,t)i = bk ,a j c(a j ,t) where j = 1, 2 . . . , bk ,a j = hvbk |ua j i , j, k


j
33 When the position vector r is not specifically necessary we write in only one spatial dimension; when no spatial dimension is specifically
relevant we write |progressive(t)i; and when sufficient, we write |progressivei. Inside the formalism of QM2 in general the spectra are
posited to be infinite, but in this work we represent them already by discrete writings supposed to extend over finite intervals.
34 Throughout what follows we write in only one spatial dimension.
28

and then proceed as in the case of A .


- Problem 4. Represent mathematically the measurement processes by which the predictive
probability law {pt (a j ) |c(a j ,t)|2 }, j, drawn from |(t)i, is verified.
Solution to the problem 4: Apply the quantum theory of measurement.
- Problem 5: Verify the statistical predictions of the formalism.
Solution to the problem 5: Accordingly to the quantum theory of measurements, prepare the
state-vector for measurement and operate the measurements. But concerning this point nothing is
clearly specified. Some authors seem to consider that the microstate has to be prepared or to be
also prepared ; the coding problem is not formulated, nor, a fortiori, treated explicitly; the implicit
treatment, in so far that it can be identified, raises questions). In short: The factual and conceptual
connections with problem 4 are not worked out.
The basic IQM way of representing a microstate. This consist of the Part I of this work that
we recall here telegraphically for self-consistency of this chapter :
* Definition (1) of a microstate msG via its individual physical operation of generation G, to
be radically distinguished from a preparation for measurement of a state vector.
* Two basic sorts of individual operations of generation G : simple or composed.
* Definition of one act of qualification and of the way to assign a meaning to the result, in
terms of one value X j of the qualifying quantity X, via a coding procedure founded on a model of a
microstate (supposed to exist necessarily in a theory of microstate, but left non-specified inside the
mere reference-structure IQM: primordial transferred qualification (Figure 1).
* Classification of the main sorts of microstates (the definitions in Section 2.1).
* Factual construction of a [(, , N0 )-probabilistic description DoM (msG ) (9) and the concept
of probability-tree of a microstate msG , via:
- long sequences of repetitions of the individual physical succession [G.MesX], X
VMec , each one including a coding process, and emergence of the factually established probability
laws (9) DoM (msG ) (, , N0 ) {po (G, X j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . J, X VMec .
- construction of the meta-probabilistic correlations M pc(G).
* The fully expressed primordial transferred description of a microstate (9), that is devoid of
inner space-time structure:
* A final full representation of the studied microstate, by the symbol (10) DoM /G, msG ,VMec /
and by the graphic representation called probability tree, that reminds of the space-time physical
geneses /G, msG ,VMec / (performed by the human observer and so marked by space-time features),
but also separates the observable abstract result DoM from its individual genetic elements in order to
stress the absence of space-time features inside the final observable result of each such element as
well as in the whole set of such results. (Everywhere G can be re-written as Gt if convenient and
introduce the corresponding change in the notation of the description).

5.2. The comparison

From now on, for notational uniformity, the classical dynamical qualifying quantities will be
indicated also inside IQM by A, B, . . . . Correlatively, the corresponding eigenvalues will be indicated
by a j , bk , etc. (we shall write, for instance: [(DoA (msG ) {po (G, a j )}, j = 1, 2 . . . J] or [(DoM (msG )
{po (G, a j )}, j = 1, 2 . . . J, A VM ), M pc(msG )]; etc.).
The most striking conclusions of the comparison are the following ones.
* The QMHD representation of a microstate is purely mathematical and algorithmic. The main
descriptional element is the concept of a state-vector |i from the Hilbert-space assigned to the
studied microstate. And this state-vector is determined via exclusively mathematical procedures. No
factual procedure of any sort comes in. Whereas in IQM the description (9) is purely factual.
* The concept of a microstate that indicates what the whole formalism represents is not
defined inside QMHD (so a fortiori the question of its definability is not considered) and it is even left
29

devoid of symbolization. A fortiori no model of a microstate is defined, though inside IQM this has
appeared as a necessity for a theory of microstates.
Correlatively, the concept of an individual and physical operation G of generation of a mi-
crostate is devoid of definition and of symbolization; whereas inside IQM it manifests a quite deter-
mining role, namely this concept in the sense of (1) leads to:
- The classification of the sorts of operation of generation (so of microstates, in conse-
quence of (1)) simple, composed, revolved inside the past (in the case of bound states).
- The relation between the mentioned classification and the different categories of mi-
crostates defined in Section 2.1.
- The basic tree-like structure from Figure 2 that summarizes graphically the whole IQM,
stems from an operation of generation.
* More synthetically expressed now, QMHD contains no explicit representation of practically all
the individual physical operations, concepts and entities that inside the reference-structure IQM have
been shown to be basically necessary for an intelligible theory of microstates: [G, msG , a general
model of a microstate, [G.MesA], coding procedures for translating the observable physical marks
produced by a succession [G.MesA], of in terms a value a j of the measured quantity A], all these
fundamental descriptional elements are devoid of definition and representation inside QMHD .
Nowhere inside QMHD does one find a clear distinction between individual or statistical rep-
resentation, so neither between representations of physical entities or of exclusively abstract
constructs.
A process of measurement is represented only statistically. The individual successions
[G.MesA] that constitute the factual basis of the statistical descriptions DoM (9) from IQM are not
brought into evidence inside QMHD (many physicists do mention verbally repetitions of the mea-
surement operation, but the concept of a whole succession [G.MesA] is ghost-like). The result of an
act of measurement of a quantity A is just postulated to be an eigenvalue a j of the observable A . The
coding problem is not singularized and dealt with explicitly; it is considered to be solved by purely
verbal,symbolic, or mathematical features of the quantum theory of measurement.
In short:
When compared with IQM, the Hilbert-Dirac formulation QMHD appears as a conceptual bas-
relief, not as a conceptual statue. The representation of its physical-operational support is lost undone
inside a conceptual substrate35 .
Whereas the IQM representation is explicitly constructed starting from a level of zero local
knowledge concerning the studied microstate, and therefrom the main features of all the successive
levels of conceptualization individual, probabilistic, meta-probabilistic are clearly characterized,
distinguished from one another, and mutually connected. As a formal reference-construct, it stands
upright on its feet and these are planted into (not upon) a-conceptual factuality, while the essential
concepts left undefined in consequence of the role of only a reference-structure assigned to IQM a
general model of a microstate, and the the coding procedures are overtly declared, and are required
as a necessity inside a theory of microstates.
Obviously the above conclusions of the comparison between QMHD and IQM bring into evi-
dence many questions, and fundamental ones. As long as they remain unanswered these questions
are enormous obstacles in the way of intelligibility. They did not need to be spelled out in order to
have constantly worked and created conceptual unease during so many years.

5.3. A general announcement

Plan. In what follows we shall begin by simply adding IQM to QMHD . This simplistically
enriched provisional framework will be denoted [IQM QMHD ]. By working inside [IQM QMHD ],
IQM will permit clarifications, modifications, extensions. These, progressively, will entail the fusion
35 A more violent metaphor would be to say that it appears as a genetically malformed conceptual being of which the legs, miniaturized,
are hidden in its belly.
30

of IQM and QMHD . This will naturally lead toward the researched second quantum mechanics QM2.
In this way QM2 will emerge endowed with a full representation of all the levels of conceptualization
that are involved, and endowed with an intelligible organization of these. In this way the reference-
structure IQM will have contributed to generate the theaory of microstates for which it has been
tailored.
* Chapter 6 will be devoted mainly to:
- The identification of the model of a microstate that does work, mute, inside QMHD .
- An explicit use of the operations G of generation of a microstate in the mathematical
writings from QMHD .
- A preliminary global critical conclusion on the quantum theory of measurement.
* In Chapter 7 we shall outline an intelligible scheme for representing the measurements on
microstates.
* In Chapter 8 we will outline the whole of QM2 itself: its contours, the main features of its
inner structure, its global neighborhoods.
* In the last chapter, Chapter 9, we shall briefly comment on the universal character of certain
features of QM2 and we shall try to discern how a well-controlled use can be made of these outside
quantum mechanics. We shall also draw very concise conclusions on the general question of the
relations between facts, semantic contents, and mathematical representations of these.
Effectiveness. As it has already been much stressed, QMHD introduces classical continuous
mathematical tools that entail continuous and infinite spectra. These, inside a theory of physics, lead
to ambiguities and useless problems (like those raised by continuous probabilities which we hold
to be a self-contradicting concept). In this work such problems are banished by construction via the
conventions announced in the introduction to the Part II. In consequence of this for the moment a
particularly marked character of unaccomplished will flaw QM2: certain notations (mainly concern-
ing spectra) remain incompatible with the continuous and infinite mathematics from QMHD . These
might seem unbearable to some readers. We ask tolerance from their part in this respect, and even, if
they feel interested, an action for improvement.

CLARIFICATIONS INSIDE THE PROVISIONAL FRAMEWORK [IQM-QMHD ]: A


GENERAL MODEL OF A MICROSTATE, USEFULNESS OF G,
MEASUREMENTS

6.1. The [IQM-QMHD ] meaning of an eigenfunction of a quantum observable versus a


general model of a microstate

Meaning of an eigenfunction. Consider the equation36 A |u j (x, a j )i = a j |u j (x, a j )i , j =


1, 2, . . . , J that determines the eigenfunctions {u j (x, a j )} from the basis of eigenket introduced by
A in the Hilbert space H of the studied microstate. In general such an eigenfunction is not square
integrable. This is considered to be a problem, in the following sense. A state-function (x,t) from
a state-ket |(x,t)i is required to be square-integrable, since it represents (a set of) distributions of
probability. But an eigenfunction in general is not square-integrable and it is not required such. But
why? That is the problem. Bohm (1951, pp. 210211) writes:
. . . We obtain = eipx /h . . . Strictly speaking, the above eigenfunctions cannot, in general, be normalized to unity
. . . Let us recall, however, . . . that in any real problem the wave function must take the form of a packet, since the
particle is known to exist somewhere within a definite region, such as in the space surrounded by the apparatus. To
36 A) and J(A
Rigorously one should write j(A A), but for simplicity we omit to take into account the dependence of the indexes on the
represented observable.
31

obtain a bounded and therefore normalizable packet, we can integrate over momenta with an appropriate weighing
factor.37

So Bohm adopts an exclusively mathematical point of view (and not the only one available, but
that one that is compatible with the Hilbert-Dirac mathematics). Not a moment does he focus on the
conceptual aspect. He does not even make use of a specific notation for distinguishing between eigen-
function and state-function. And in order to deal with the mathematical situation that he encounters
he accepts approximations without hesitation, notwithstanding that the considered question seems to
be a question of principle. While Dirac (1958, p. 48) writes:
It may be that the infinite length of the ket-vectors corresponding to these eigenstates is connected with their
unrealizability, and that all realizable states correspond to ket vectors that can be normalized so that they form a
Hilbert space.

(What does connected with their unrealizability mean here? That the ket-vectors represent
ideal concepts of something?). As for the didactic presentation of QM HD by CTDL38 , these authors
construct explicitly a physical solution to the difficulties (already proposed by Bohm (1951, p. 212),
but who does not assert the qualification physical)39 .
Now, recourse to history shows that the problem of non-integrability of an eigenfunction is a
false problem, because an eigenfunction has a meaning that is radically different from that of a state-
function. This meaning stems by generalization from Louis de Broglie (1924). Louis de Broglie has
derived his famous relation p = h/ from his well-known (and erroneously named) wave-particle
model of a microstate. This model has been induced into de Broglies mind by the usage made
of Fourier decompositions inside the classical electromagnetism. In a Fourier decomposition of an
electromagnetic wave each constant value of a monochromatic wavelength is associated with a
corresponding plane wave. Analogously, to each value px, j of the classical mechanical basic quantity
of momentum40 px of a free electron, de Broglie has associated a plane wave with corpuscular phase-
function (x,t) = ae(i/h)(x,t) where a denotes an arbitrary and constant amplitude p of vibration,
2
and the corpuscular phase is written as (x,t) = (Wt px, j x) where W = m0 c / 1 v2 /c2 is the
energy of the corpuscular-like aspect of the wave while px, j denotes the constant value posited for
the momentum of this corpuscular aspect4142 .
The corpuscular aspect of the wave remained devoid of representation inside the mathe-
matical expression that Louis de Broglie associated to his model. This has been a huge socio-
psychological mistake. In mathematical physics only what is a definite feature of the mathematical
writings does subsist. The rest does not regularly strike all the attentions and so it evaporates into
the air of history. But verbally, this corpuscular aspect has been clearly specified to consist of a
singularity of the amplitude of the wave, namely a very localized region where the amplitude is so
much bigger than its surrounding
p constant value, that it concentrates inside it practically the whole en-
2
ergy of the wave, W = mc / 1 v2 /c2 . This singularity in the amplitude of the wave was conceived
to glide inside the wave like a small classical mobile that in consequence of its strong spatial
37 Note that a packet of eigenfunctions belonging to a formalism that introduces an axiom of superposition, is not the unique possible
way for representing mathematically a delimited spatial support.
38 Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, and Lalo (1973).
39 Is it not very queer to find that a formal fact invented some day by some man, deliberately, in order to express something, can later

be indefinitely treated like a datum that nobody can change? Is it not a paradigmatic warning that such a formal deliberate choice of a
mathematical expression made at some moment t1 for a reason that has not been declared (or the declaration has not been noticed), can
become at a moment t2 > t1 a sort of factual circumstance of which one can only just accept the existence and deal with it like with the
course of a planet? Instead to research what the man who introduced it wanted to express, or even change the expression if it is found to
be inadequate from some point of view?
40 For simplicity we write everywhere in only one spatial dimension.
41 We introduce the notation in order to distinguish from the start the concept of a physical wave introduced by Louis de Broglie, from

the state-function (x,t) introduced inside a QM HD state-ket |(x,t)i that represents a mathematical tool for statistical predictions on
results of measurements on a microstate.
42 In de Broglies Thesis this representation of the microstate of one free electron is introduced as an ideal concept for which no physical

operation of generation G in the sense of IQM is defined. But when de Broglie himself, in the immediately subsequent pages, imagined
material realizations of this ideal concept, he introduced the notion of wave-packet, with an amplitude a(x,t) to which he assigned
the significance of a presence-probability. Thereby the systematic mixture and confusion between individual descriptive elements, and
probabilistic descriptive elements, started its stubbornly lasting career: Louis de Broglie himself committed this original sin.
32

localization and its relatively very high energy admits at any time the mechanical qualifications of
position and momentum, from which all the other mechanical qualifications can be constructed;
whereas the rest of the wave, of course, does not accept mechanical qualifications. So de Broglies
model introduces a corpuscular aspect of a wave, not a particle, it introduces exclusively a wave
with a corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude. And in only several lines de Broglie has
proved a theorem of concordance of the phases43 according to which:
The model of a microstate of a free electron can be stable if and only if the corpuscular-like
singularity of the amplitude glides inside the global wave in a way such that at any considered
moment t the phase of the vibration of the amplitude of the singularity is identical to the phase
of the oscillation of the amplitude of the portion of wave that surrounds the singularity.
This theorem is crucial for understanding the meaning of the QM HD -concept of eigenket. In-
deed, inside the Hilbert-Dirac formalism, Louis de Broglies wave-function that led to the rela-
tion p = h/ satisfies the equation for eigenket and eigenvalues of the momentum observable:
P x (ae(i/h)(x,t) ) = px, j (ae(i/h)(x,t) ). And the equation A |u j (x, a j )i = a j |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J
generalizes this mathematical fact and introduces it in the ket-bra expressions of the formalism. This
leads immediately to the identification of the general meaning of the equation:
The eigenfunction u j (x, a j ) from the eigenket |u j (x, a j )i associated with the eigenvalue a j of
the observable A , plays the role of a mathematical representation free from any spatial delim-
itation of a sample of a definite sort of wave-movement. Namely, if the wave-movement that
surrounds the singularity is represented by the eigenfunction u j (xa j ), then, the value a j of the
mechanical quantity A that qualifies in mechanical terms the displacement inside the wave of
the location of the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of the wave, remains constant
throughout this displacement.
As soon as this is spelled out, it leaps to ones eyes that the equation itself simply cries it
out on the roofs. So no offense to Bohr de Broglies model of a microstate is quite basically
present inside the whole formalism of QM HD . It defines the physical-conceptual meaning of all the
bases in the Hilbert-space of any microstate, as well as all the spectral decompositions of any state-
ket. No more, no less. The whole formalism of QM HD is an infusion from de Broglies model,
wherefrom the physical significances are drawn. In any decomposition of a state-ket |(x,t)i with
respect to the basis {|u j (x, a j )i}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, introduced in H by an observable A : |A(x,t)i =
j c(a j ,t) |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, the eigenket |u j (x, a j )i from the term c(a j ,t) |u j (x, a j )i is the
symbol of the sample of what is counted by the real squared modulus |c(a j ,t)|2 of the numerical
complex coefficient c(a j ,t), just like in the expression 34m the symbol m means that the length that
is measured is 34 times the length of the sample of a meter from the National Bureau of Standards of
Weights and Measures.
But in the case of discrete spectra like for the total energy in a bound state or like in any spin-
spectrum, the concept of state-ket and the concept of eigenstate have acquired inside the nowadays
mathematical formalism identical mathematical expressions, and this has been the main and very
strong obstacle to the identification of the radical difference between the concepts that underlie these
two concepts.
This is not a trivial conclusion.
Consequences of the identification of the meaning of an eigenfuction. The preceding con-
clusion has interesting consequences.
- It evaporates the false problem why in general an eigenfunction is not required to be square-
integrable: if it were required square-integrable, that would be a real problem.
- In classical thinking, one semantic dimension (think of color) suffices for carrying all its
values (think of red, green, etc.). But when a microstate is considered, it obviously is very
useful if not even necessary to analyse the representation more, namely so as to compensate for the
absence of any qualia produced in the human conceptors mind. The Hilbert-Dirac formalism realizes
43 A jewel of human thought.
33

this analysis by a formal splitting: an observable A represents separately the considered semantic
dimension alone (a momentum, a total energy, etc.); and on the other hand, like a catalogue joined
to A , the sets of pairs {{(|u j (x, a j )i , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J}, A
A that represents all the values carried by
the semantic dimension symbolized by A , each one value consisting of one pair (|u j (x, a j )i , a j ) j =
1, 2, . . . , J, because a wave and a mechanical qualification of the corpuscular aspect of that wave
are both involved and are tied in a one-to-one connection44 . This is marvelously expressive, and it is
also effective when it is discretized via the adjunction of a corresponding unit of measurement of the
considered quantity A.
- Moreover, this explains also the high adequacy of the use of a Hilbert space H for rep-
resenting mathematically the predictions on issues of measurements on a microstate: Each value
(|u j (x, a j )i , a j ), j = 1, 2, . . . , J, A
A, can be placed on a separate axis reserved to it alone, on which the
state-ket |A (x,t)i, when projected onto that axis, determines the complex number c(a j ,t), so also the
real number of times |c(a j ,t)|2 that the value (|u j (x, a j )i , a j ) is predicted to be found by quantum
measurement of the quantity A on the studied microstate, which mimics geometrically the expansion
|A(x,t)i = j c(a j ,t) |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J.
- The preceding remarks specify usefully that Diracs theory of transformations expresses math-
ematically passages from a given semantic space, to another one: the semantic, in each represen-
tation, consists of the sample of wave-movement expressed mathematically the basis of eigenket
|u j (x, A)i that characterizes the representation.
All is so clear now that a child can understand it. And by contrast, the clarification illustrates
to what a degree, when the semantic that worked in the mind of the human author of a mathematical
expression, gets lost, the mathematics left alone can indefinitely generate and preserve false problems,
on a background of general obscurity of meaning.

6.2. From the hidden presence of de Broglies model inside QMHD to its explicit, general,
physical-operational incorporation into [IQM-QMHD ]

We shall now draw de Broglies model into [IQM-QM HD ] in an explicit and physical-
operational communicable and consensual way (i.e. scientifically). We want to gain unrestricted
access to all the conceptual potentialities of this revolutionary model, instead of keeping it mute and
hidden inside purely syntactic algorithms with extracts from it of which the contents of meaning are
entirely forgotten.
Warning. After the severe cure of positivistic purity suffered by microphysics since nearly a
century, according to which models were interdicted, what follows might be irrepressibly perceived
as a shocking regression into intellectual primitivism. But I hold that we cannot indefinitely submit
to the psychological effects of longlasting arbitrary diktats, even if these have induced a strong reflex
acceptance. Modern microphysics obliges to penetrate now into the never as yet conceptualized, and
to optimally conceptualize out of that. And this simply obliges to specify a model for the considered
microstates, as it has been brought into evidence in the Part I and repeatedly recalled. So let us gather
the courage to modelize freely, like in the macroscopic techniques.
Association of the general concept msG defined in (1), with de Broglies model. The model
introduced by Louis de Broglie has up to now been currently made use of in a direct way, indepen-
dently of the formazlism of quantum mechanics. This has been very fruitful notwithstanding that the
the connection between this model and the concept of microstate has never as yet been worked out
explicitly. Which is not in the least surprising, since inside nowadays quantum mechanics the concept
of microstate itself is devoid of definition,it just swarms about in the verbal substrate of the formalism
where it is much identified with the word system. We hold that this is a lacuna. So in what follows
immediately we shall work out inside [IQM-QM HD ] a legal explicit connection between the concept
msG defined in (1) and de Broglies general model, as follows.
44 Degenerate spectra are not considered here.
34

(a) We want to reconstruct a mechanics of microstates. According to de Broglies model


essentially involved in QM HD only the corpuscular aspects from a corpuscular wave do admit me-
chanical qualifications. Consider now the definitions from Section 2.1, of various sorts of microstates.
It is clear that what is called there system has to be identified with de Broglies corpuscular-
like singularity (in the amplitude of a corpuscular wave).
So the operation of generation G of one micro-state of one micro-system (cf. Section 2.1)
must be posited to introduce into the domain of what can be subsequently qualified in mechanical
terms, one singularity in de Broglies sense. While an operation of generation G(ns) (ns: n sys-
tems) of one micro-state of n micro-systems (Section 2.1) must be posited to introduce n de Broglie-
singularities into the domain of what can be qualified in mechanical terms.
(b) Now, it would be arbitrary and also false no doubt to conceive that an operation of
generation G defined factually by the use of macroscopic apparatuses and conceptually by the use
of only macroscopically controlled parameters, can cut radically a singularity in the amplitude of a
corpusular-wave phenomenon, from the indefinitely extended wave that is asserted to incorporate
it before the action of G45 . So we have to posit that an operation of generation G just captures into
the domain of what can be subequently qualified by the human observer, a portion of corpuscular
wave carrying one de Broglie singularity when one microstate of one microsystem is generated, or
carrying n such singularities when one microstate of n microsystems is generated; while the main part
of the wave-like phenomenon to which this portion of corpuscular wave was incorporated before the
action of G, persists in the physical unobservable substratum, but connected with what we call the
microstate generated by G 46 .
Moreover, in order to insure mutual coherence between the one-to-one relation G msG from
(1) and de Broglies model in the most simple and radical way it seems convenient to posit :
(c) The non-singular part of the amplitude of the portion of corpuscular-wave trapped by the
operation of generation G into the domain of observability, admits the same representation for all the
outcomes of the microstate msG that corresponds to G.
(d) The location of the de Broglie singularity inside this common corpuscular wave, varies in
general from one outcome of msG to another one (this is an essential element from de Broglies own
view, that led him first to his fundamental relation p = h/ and (much later) to his theory of a double
solution (de Broglie, 1956)); and it also is implied in the nowadays de Broglie-Bohm interpretation.
(e) Finally, in agreement with de Broglies works and with those of the nowadays physicists
from Bohms school (in particular Holland (1993)), we also posit the famous guidance relation ac-
cording to which the phase of the corpuscular wave in the neighborhood of the singularity guides
the singularity by determining its momentum. (This point will play a crucial role in Chapter 7).
Now we can introduce the following small avalanche of new steps:
* Model of a microstate. The general model of a microstate that is specified by the assumptions
(a)-(e) is called the G-corpuscular-wave model and will be denoted msG,cw (cw: corpuscular wave).
* We introduce the following modeling postulate:
M P ( m s G,cw ) . Any one outcome of the microstate msG from (1) obeys the general model
msG,cw : it realizes a particular instance of this model via the conceived assignment of definite
even if unknown location(s) of the singularity (singularities) that is (are) involved for the
system(s) from the considered microstate, accordingly to the definitions Section 2.1.
45 Not even the macroscopic classical objects (a living body, a chair, etc.) are radically, absolutely cut from the surrounding physical
reality; any object emits and receives radiations of various natures, etc.
46 Of course and this we stress immediately and as strongly as possible this whole way of imagining and of speaking is just a

methodological procedure, strictly pure of any trace of a belief that it would express a truth intrinsic to the physical reality. I confess
again my profound conviction that reality-in-itself escapes definitively any scientific knowledge. (Correlatively, one feels inclined to
admit a non-describable coherence between the minds of men (and of animals) and on the other hand the unknowable physical reality-
in-itself, as just a datum that points toward a notion of outlined but permeable separation between the domain of rationalconceptualization
and action, and the domain of metaphysics. But obviously, this also is only a model; a global model that manifests its mysterious power
by the power of all the local models that we continually secrete as unavoidable instruments for conceptualizing and acting).
35

* Specimen of a microstate. So the modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ) entails from now on via the
above point (a) and (d) a defined difference between the inner contents of the two initial concepts of
the microstate msG and of one specimen of msG , introduced by (1) by just sticking exteriorly upon
them the label G.
* Modification of the methodological initial definition (1) of a microstate.On the basis of this new
inner distinction between the microstate msG and one specimen of msG , and since by construction
we have posited from the start that
msG { (msG )} (14)
we can now assign a new meaning to the (1) G msG :

G { (msG )}] (1)

where the new (1) stresses that difference between the involved specimens is tied with de Broglies
model. Thereby de Broglies initial general model of a microstate that has been introduced by him
with an only ideal, an even a metaphysical status (manifested by its mathematical expression by a
plane wave) is converted into assumptions that can be drawn into the scientific procedural repre-
sentation [IQM-QM HD ] without entailing basically numerical approximations nor the corresponding
supplementary concept of wave-packet.
So a new accent falls now upon the concept of operation G of generation of a microstate,
that also involves questions. A microstate of a system with electric charge or magnetic poles can
be drawn into the realm of the controllably observable by use of macroscopic fields. But of what
operations will G consist in the case of microsystems that are sensitive exclusively to a gravitational
field? Which means, a pure corpuscular de Broglie singularity in the amplitude of a corpuscular
wave? (May be a graviton conceived as a mass-quantum, a singularity with non-null spin?).
We come upon the evanescent frontier between quantum mechanics and the quantum theory
of fields. And much more radically, we are on a cognitive frontier.
On a universal cognitive frontier. Anyhow, a specimen (msG ) of a microstate remains non-
delimited conceptually in space-time, non-reducible to the notion of object in the classical sense,
immersed in the universal physical sub-stance called fields, that our minds irrepressibly throw
beneath all that is material, as an ultimate genus beneath the human conceptualization of what we
call physical reality. With respect to the evolving set of all the primordially transferred descriptions
defined by (9) that concern microstates), this ultimate genus is also the genus proximus. While the
primordially transferred descriptions (9) themselves form the very first stratum inside the evolving
volume of what is already captured into the conceptualized a stratum consisting of a proliferation
of various individual differentia specifica: namely values of positions of de Broglie singularities:
The relation (1) is placed just on the frontier between the conceptualized and the as yet a-
conceptual physical factuality (Figure 1). Inside [IQM-QMHD ] this frontier is now clearly
marked. And furthermore, it is continuously crossed.
The existence and the content of this very first stratum of the conceptualized is a universal
feature of human conceptualization.
On the other hand globally the framework [IQM-QM HD ] is from now on connected to the de
Broglie-Schrdinger initial wave-mechanics (and also to the present-day de Broglie-Bohm approach)
that, in its turn, is explicitly connected to classical analytic mechanics, via Jacobis approach and de
Broglies works.
One can now begin to sense the huge influence of this unremovable frontier upon thought,
language and conceptual attitudes.
Using the word system in isolation and trying to express qualifications via such a use of
language, does not lead at the same problems and solutions as when the expression state of
system is made use of in association with the definitions from Section 1.3.
36

Being in possession of a name and a symbol, or not, for how we introduce something in the
situation of an entity-to-be-studied, is far from being anodyne. Distinguishing between methodolog-
ical deliberate constructs that come in while our representations evolve, and an illusory objective,
passive, only descriptive attitude of search of what and how things really are, can be quite essential.

6.3. The operation G of generation of a microstate, versus eigenket, state-ket, absence of


state-ket

We shall now show that the concept of operation of generation G of a microstate to be studied, if
it is made use of, entails specifications that suppress fundamental obscurities and so strongly enhance
intelligibility.
The concept of state-ket |(x,t)i is introduced in QM HD as the representation of the microstate
to be studied. So quite obviously, inside [IQM-QM HD ] a state-vector |(x,t)i is connected with
the operation of generation G from the trunk of the probability-tree of the microstate to be studied.
Whereas the concept of an eigenket |u j (x, a j )i just appeared to have been constructed as a model of a
possible wave-movement inside a specimen (msG ) of the microstate to be studied, which in general
does not depend on an operation G of generation in the sense of (1). So, to begin with, it appears
that a previously defined use of the concept G would have economized the whole false problem of
why eigenkets in general are not square-integrable.
Below we bring into evidence other three fundamental sorts of circumstances where the concept
G entails clarification.
Spectral decompositions, superposition-state-ket, versus G. Inside QM HD works a mathemat-
ical principle of spectral decomposability of any state-ket |(x,t)i, i.e. the assertion that it is possible
to assert the equality47 :
|(x,t)i = c j (t) |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, . . . . (15)
j

- Furthermore, the general choice of a vector-space representation permits to write the state-ket as-
sociated to the microstate msG (G1 , G2 , . . . , Gn ) generated by a composed operation of generation
G (G1 , G2 , ...Gk ) 1.1 as a mathematical superposition of the state-ket associated to the microstates
msG1 , msG2 , . . . , msGk that would have been obtained if all the operations of generation G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk
that have been composed to obtain G (G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ) would have been realized physically, sepa-
rately:
|12...k (x,t)i = 1 |1 (x,t)i + 2 |2 (x,t)i + + k |k (x,t)i (16)
though it is admitted by construction that only |12...k (x,t)i has been physically realized.
- Last, the current extension of the Hilbert space H to a generalized-Hilbert space E where
the eigenket are included as a limiting sort of vectors, entails that from a mathematical point of view
the two writings (15) and (16) are both just a superposition of vectors permitted by the formal,
mathematical axiom that by the definition of the algebraic structure of a vector-space any two or
more elements from a given vector-space can be superposed (admit an additive composition).
On the basis of these circumstances a purely mathematical language has settled in, that calls
indistinctly superposition any additive combination of state-ket, or of state-ket and eigenket, or of
only eigenket (as in Diracs theory of transformations). Thereby decompositions of the type (15), or
superpositions of the type (16) are treated as just particular sorts of superposition of vectors inside
E. No physical criteria nor conceptual ones are made use of in order to make mutual specifications,
inside the general category of superposition writings inside H . From the physical and conceptual
points of view, the installed language is blind. This entails much confusion. In particular it induces
into many minds the more or less explicit belief that:
47 This mathematical principle is far from being obvious. As for the adaptation to a discrete representation and the correlative finiteness
of the domain of investigation as required by the choice of effectiveness, it will have to be introduced by an a posteriori conceptual-
mathematical study.
37

In the expression (16) the state-ket |12...k (x,t)i would represent not an only mathemati-
cal superposition of abstract descriptional elements |1 (x,t)i , |2 (x,t)i , . . . , |k (x,t)i but a
physical superposition of the microstates msG1 , msG2 , . . . , msGk , that would all coexist inside
|12...k (x,t)i and interfere there with one another.
In IQM, so also in [IQM-QM HD ] we have deliberately introduced ramparts against confusions
of the type indicated above.
- Definition (1) that introduces the general concept of an operation of generation G, permits
to recognize that - in (15) only the state-ket |(x,t)i from the first member corresponds to a physi-
cally generated specimen (1) (msG (G1 ,G2 ,...,Gk ) ) of the microstate msG (G1 ,G2 ,...,Gk ) , while all the terms
c j (t) |u j (x, A)i from the right-hand expansion of |(x,t)i are of an abstract nature, each one being
the symbol of a product of a number c j (t) and a model |u j (x, A)i of a possible corpuscular-wave-
movement.
- The physical principle from Section 1.1 according to which in certain conditions k
distinct operations of generation G of a microstate can be composed so as to realize one result-
ing operation of generation48 G (G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ), permits to be aware that the resulting one mi-
crostate msG (G1 ,G2 ,...,Gk ) that is effectively generated physically by the one composed operation of
generation G (G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ), cannot be conceived as a superposition in the physical sense of all
the microstates msG1 , msG2 , . . . , msGk that would have been obtained via the separate realizations of
G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk , because by definition these microstates have not been all physically generated sepa-
rately by G (G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk ); these are present only in the minds, as virtual possibilities that inside
QM HD are useful as representational elements. Namely, they are thought to be useful in QM HD
precisely because of the possibility to represent mathematically the state-ket |12...k (x,t)i by the ex-
pression (16) permitted by the axiom of superposition of vectors in a vector-space. Indeed this in its
turn permits to deal mathematically with the factual inequality

p12 (G(G1 , G2 ), X j ) 6= p1 (G1 , X j ) + p2 (G2 , X j ) (12)

namely via the spectral decomposition (15) of |12...,k (x,t)i on the basis of eigenket of the momentum
observable P x and application of Borns postulate of probability to the complex expansion coefficients
c j (t); which introduces mathematical interference terms. (But let us announce immediately that in
the following chapter precisely this assumption of usefulness will be reconsidered).
So inside [IQM-QM HD ] the knots of mathematical and of physical concepts of superposition
and of interference that entail uncontrollable gliding and confusion, can be avoided. In order to
stress this, from now on inside [IQM-QM HD ] we shall re-write (15) and (16) as follows:

|G(x,t)i = c j (t) |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . (15)


j

|12...,k (x,t)G
G(G1 , G2 , . . . , Gk )i = 1 |1 (x,t)i + 2 |2 (x,t)i + + k |k (x,t)i (16)
The new notations mark by an index G each state-ket that corresponds to an effectively realized
microstate. Indeed these are the only descriptional elements from QM HD that are tied to physical
individual entities. All the rest of the formalism is only formal descriptors that float freely above the
physical ground.
Absence of state-ket. When the microstate to be studied is one micro-state of two or several
micro-systems, the formalism of QM HD rightly represents it by only one state-ket, but for each
involved system it introduces a distinct representation-space, and the mathematical relation between
these spaces is specified, namely in the way indicated by the now current word intrication. This
produces a sort of consternation that is mirrored by the chosen name; it even produces a sort of
religious admiration for QM HD since the experiments on locality have confirmed the predictions of
48 The expression principle of superpostion has been carefully avoided because a physical principle of superposition asserts by definition
the full physically realized presence of each one of the superposed elements.
38

the formalism in such a circumstance49 . Certain authors speak of absence of an own state-ket for
each system; other authors speak of absence of information, as if a state-ket were a planet or
a village in a jungle, something that is there, outside somewhere, but nobody knows how to go and
see where and how it is. In the textbooks it is written that often a micro-system is represented
by a state-ket and if so the state is pure; while if it is not pure, then it is a mixture, but in such
a case (happily) one can nevertheless dispose of a statistical operator (the way of obtaining it being
not defined). But then, in the case concerned by the problem of locality not even a true statistical
operator exists, only a partial-trace one that cannot change the fact that there is non-separability
because a statistical correlation is observed even when the spatial distance between the involved
systems is very big.
These ways of speaking suggest that the state-ket, the statistical operators, etc., are conceived
to possess an existence quite independently of the representational choices, decisions, elaborations,
of the physicists who have invented them. As soon as there is a system, there also is its state-ket,
though sometimes it is absent and we do not know why, nor where it is gone.
In short, the special case of a microstate of two microsystems in the sense of Section 2.1 is a
strong discloser of the way in which the whole mathematical formalism from QM HD is conceived:
We are in presence of a reification of the formalism of QMHD .
But inside [IQM-QM HD ] one understands that these attitudes stem from the fact that:
- The definitions from Section 2.1 are not spelled out inside QMHD , while accordingly to the
current language that accompanies the use of the formalism, in such a case one speaks only of two or
several systems never of micro-states and so the one-one indirect connection

G |G(x,t)i (1)

that is logically entailed via (1) G msG is simply out of perceptibility, even though it is generally
accepted that a state-ket represents the studied system.
- No clear and systematic distinction is made inside QM HD between, on the one hand individual
concepts (msG , or |u j (x, a j )i) or individual physical entities (operations G, acts of measurement MesA,
or specimens (msG,cw ) of a microstate msG ), and on the other hand the statistical descriptors like
|G(x,t)i.
In these conditions, inside the minds used to QM HD like a New-York boy is used to Manhattan,
it seems unexplainable why sometimes some of the two or several state-ket that would be necessary
are absent.
Notational convention 1. We close this point by a notational convention:
Inside [IQM-QM HD ] any state-ket |(x,t)i that corresponds to a physically generated micro-
state, will be renoted by |G(x,t)i and the sort of operation G that indexes the state-ket will be
explicitly stated. In writings of the type (16) the effectively realized operation of generation from the
first member will be written in bold font in order to distinguish it from the only possible but not fully
realized operations of generations that are involved in the second member:

|12...,k (x,t)G
G(G1 ,G2 ,...,Gk ) i = 1 |1G1 (x,t)i + 2 |2G2 (x,t)i + + k |kGk (x,t)i (16)

Thereby we have already installed a class of emergency chords that connect the individual level of
conceptualization, with the statistical one.
49 It is true that it is amazing to record to what a degree the mathematical formalism is observant of (compatible with) the implication
or not by a given state-ket symbol, of an operation of generation G of a corresponding micro-state, as well as with the significance
of the involved ket, notwithstanding that inside the formalism the concept G is neither defined nor represented, while the peculiar
meaning of an eigenket in of the meaning of a state-ket has not been recognized : (a) a spectral decomposition (15) is usually conceived
to involve an infinite number of terms, the coefficients from these terms are complex numbers dependent on time, and the eigenfunctions
(models of wave-movement) are written independent on time; whereas (b) a superposition (16) of state-ket tied with a composed operation
of generation, has a finite number of terms, the coefficients are usually constant real numbers, and the ket from the superposition are
dependent on time. This raises strongly a very interesting question concerning the connection between mathematical internal coherence
and the external coherence between mathematical expressions and semantic contents.
39

6.4. On the QMHD representation of measurements on a microstate

Here we definitely walk into Absurdland, and so abruptly and totally that I do not dare to
immediately make use of my own voice, by fear of being considered subjective and malevolent. So I
first offer a look at the following extract from Wikipedia.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the problem of how (or whether) wavefunction collapse
occurs. The inability to observe this process directly has given rise to different interpretations of quantum mechanics,
and poses a key set of questions that each interpretation must answer. The wavefunction in quantum mechanics evolves
deterministically according to the Schrdinger equation as a linear superposition of different states, but actual measurements
always find the physical system in a definite state. Any future evolution is based on the state the system was discovered to
be in when the measurement was made, meaning that the measurement did something to the system that is not obviously
a consequence of Schrdinger evolution.
To express matters differently (to paraphrase Steven Weinberg[1][2]), the Schrdinger wave equation determines
the wavefunction at any later time. If observers and their measuring apparatus are themselves described by a deterministic
wave function, why can we not predict precise results for measurements, but only probabilities? As a general question:
How can one establish a correspondence between quantum and classical reality?[3].
Schrdingers cat
The best known example is the paradox of the Schrdingers cat. A mechanism is arranged to kill a cat if a
quantum event, such as the decay of a radioactive atom, occurs. Thus the fate of a large scale object, the cat, is entangled
with the fate of a quantum object, the atom. Prior to observation, according to the Schrdinger equation, the cat is apparently
evolving into a linear combination of states that can be characterized as an alive cat and states that can be characterized
as a dead cat. Each of these possibilities is associated with a specific nonzero probability amplitude; the cat seems to
be in some kind of combination state called a quantum superposition. However, a single, particular observation of
the cat does not measure the probabilities: it always finds either a living cat, or a dead cat. After the measurement the
cat is definitively alive or dead. The question is: How are the probabilities converted into an actual, sharply well-defined
outcome?
Interpretations (Main article: Interpretations of quantum mechanics)
Hugh Everetts many-worlds interpretation attempts to solve the problem by suggesting there is only one wavefunc-
tion, the superposition of the entire universe, and it never collapsesso there is no measurement problem. Instead, the act
of measurement is simply an interaction between quantum entities, e.g. observer, measuring instrument, electron/positron
etc., which entangle to form a single larger entity, for instance living cat/happy scientist. Everett also attempted to demon-
strate the way that in measurements the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics would appear; work later extended by
Bryce DeWitt.
De BroglieBohm theory tries to solve the measurement problem very differently: this interpretation contains
not only the wavefunction, but also the information about the position of the particle(s). The role of the wavefunction is to
generate the velocity field for the particles. These velocities are such that the probability distribution for the particle remains
consistent with the predictions of the orthodox quantum mechanics. According to de BroglieBohm theory, interaction with
the environment during a measurement procedure separates the wave packets in configuration space which is where apparent
wavefunction collapse comes from even though there is no actual collapse.
Erich Joos and Heinz-Dieter Zeh claim that the phenomenon of quantum decoherence, which was put on firm
ground in the 1980s, resolves the problem.[4] The idea is that the environment causes the classical appearance of macro-
scopic objects. Zeh further claims that decoherence makes it possible to identify the fuzzy boundary between the quantum
microworld and the world where the classical intuition is applicable.[5][6] Quantum decoherence was proposed in the con-
text of the many-worlds interpretation[citation needed], but it has also become an important part of some modern updates
of the Copenhagen interpretation based on consistent histories.[7][8] Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual
process of the wavefunction collapse, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference
effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities. See, for example, Zurek,[3] Zeh[5] and Schlosshauer.[9]
The present situation is slowly clarifying, as described in a recent paper by Schlosshauer as follows:[10]
Several decoherence-unrelated proposals have been put forward in the past to elucidate the meaning of probabilities
and arrive at the Born rule . . . It is fair to say that no decisive conclusion appears to have been reached as to the success of
these derivations. . . .
As it is well known, [many papers by Bohr insist upon] the fundamental role of classical concepts. The experimental
evidence for superpositions of macroscopically distinct states on increasingly large length scales counters such a dictum.
Superpositions appear to be novel and individually existing states, often without any classical counterparts. Only the
physical interactions between systems then determine a particular decomposition into classical states from the view of each
particular system. Thus classical concepts are to be understood as locally emergent in a relative-state sense and should no
longer claim a fundamental role in the physical theory.
A fourth approach is given by objective collapse models. In such models, the Schrdinger equation is modified and
obtains nonlinear terms. These nonlinear modifications are of stochastic nature and lead to a behaviour which for micro-
scopic quantum objects, e.g. electrons or atoms, is unmeasurably close to that given by the usual Schrdinger equation. For
macroscopic objects, however, the nonlinear modification becomes important and induces the collapse of the wavefunction.
Objective collapse models are effective theories. The stochastic modification is thought of to stem from some external
40

non-quantum field, but the nature of this field is unknown. One possible candidate is the gravitational interaction as in the
models of Disi and Penrose. The main difference of objective collapse models compared to the other approaches is that
they make falsifiable predictions that differ from standard quantum mechanics. Experiments are already getting close to the
parameter regime where these predictions can be tested.[11]
An interesting solution to the measurement problem is also provided by the hidden-measurements interpretation
of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis at the basis of this approach is that in a typical quantum measurement there is
a condition of lack of knowledge about which interaction between the measured entity and the measuring apparatus is
actualized at each run of the experiment. One can then show that the Born rule can be derived by considering a uniform
average over all these possible measurement-interactions. [12][13].
I now dare to continue by my own summary of the situation. In what follows immediately we
are inside QM HD alone, not inside [IQM-QM HD ]. So I make use of the current nowadays language
and reasoning about quantum measurements:
The representation of measurements on microsystems is that one proposed by von Neumann
in 1932: The Schrdinger equation of the problem endows us with the state-ket of the problem,
|(x,t)i. So this state-ket is given mathematically, we dispose of it from the start in consequence of
purely mathematical operations. We want now to represent the measurements. Therefore, according
to QM HD , we have to write the state-ket for the measurement-interaction. For this we proceed as
follows: Let t = t0 be the initial moment given in |(x,t)i. At a time t1 > t0 we want to measure
the observable A on the system represented by |(x,t)i. We take now into account that for t t1
there is interaction between the studied system and the measurement-apparatus. So for t t1 the
measurement-evolution must represent also the apparatus because the apparatus is also constituted
of microsystems. So the measurement-evolution is to be represented by a state-ket of [(the studied
A)) and |S+app(AA) (x,t)i.
system S)+(the apparatus for measuring A )]. Let us then write, say, (S + app(A
Since we measure the observable A , the expansion of |S+App (x,t)i with respect to the basis of A
comes in. Accordingly to the well-known quantum theory of a system composed of two systems we
write the tensor-product expansion:

|S+App (x,t)i = c j (t)dk (t) |u j (x, a j )i |qk (x, ak )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , k = 1, 2, . . . (17)


k j

where |qk (x, ak )i , k = 1, 2, . . . are the eigenkets of the observable called the needle-position of the
app(AA), that can be denoted ( A ) , with eigenvalues, say ((ak )), k = 1, 2, . . . , that express, respec-
tively, the needle-positions of app(A) that correspond to the eigenvalues ak of A. Furthermore
by the definition of the concept of apparatus for measuring A the set {c j (t)dk (t)} of the global,
product-expansion coefficients (c j (t)dk (t)) from (15) reduces to a set { j j (t)} (with j j = c j d j ) of
only the coefficients with non-crossed indexation, because the needle position ((a j )) of the app(A A)
is what alone indicates the obtained eigenvalue a j of A 50 . So in fact in this case we have only

|S+App (x,t)i = j j (t) |u j (x, a j )i |v j (x, a j i , j = 1, 2, . . . (17)


j j

The measurement evolution is produced accordingly to a measurement-Schrdinger equation


where the Hamiltonian operator H ( A ) commutes with A . And it is posited that this evolution
finishes with a definite needle position (a j ) that indicates one definite result51 a j .
Now, the above-mentioned representation is considered to raise two problems.
- The reduction problem: what happened to all the terms from (16) with index k 6= j that
accordingly to a linear formalism must subsist? Where are they?
- The problem of decoherence: how to prove that after the realization of the position (a j ) of
the needle of the apparatus that announces the result a j , the measurement interaction really ceases?52
Here finishes my own summary of the general framework accepted for the representation of
50 So no coding problem arises according to this measurement-theory, one is protected.
51 As far as I know, this has never been proved inside QM HD to be generally insured by the condition imposed upon the measurement
evolution.
52 The locality-problem incites to think that it does not, but, so what?
41

measurements. In what follows I go now back inside [IQM-QM HD ] and I speak again for myself and
by use of the language introduced up to now in this work.
Bertrand Russell has written somewhere that aims are induced by temperament while the choice
of a method is induced by intelligence. With respect to the aim to represent the measurements on
microstates, von Neumanns choice of a method is stunning. If we followed his argument in favor of
this choice, in order to measure the position of a star by use of a telescope, given that the telescope
and the star are both made of microsystems, we should represent [(the telescope)+(the star)+(the
measurement interaction between these two entities)], and in order to be precise we should achieve
the representation accordingly to the relativistic quantum mechanics (because of the stars); and we
should prove in terms of this theory that the star and the telescope do really separate physically ones
the stars position has been established.
But such an argument manifests a total blindness with respect to the rather obvious fact that
in science what decides the optimality of a representation is the cognitive situation of the observer-
conceptualiser with respect to that on what he wants to obtain some knowledge, etc. (?). The inner
constitution of that what has to be qualified, or of the instruments that are made use of, has nothing to
do with the criteria for generating the desired knowledge. Moreover, in the case of microstates, most
often what can be registered is just marks on a sensitive registering device and/or durations determined
by chronometers. From these data one has to construct conceptually the researched value of the
measured quantity that itself is constructed beforehand on the basis of conceptual-mathematical
operations. Moreover, von Neumanns representation of measurements dodges the crucial coding
problem. It simply makes it disappear behind an amorphous heap of words and symbolic writings
void of definition, so of meaning. Indeed:
Von Neumanns representation of measurements transgresses QM HD : The observable ( A )
A) is not a quantum mechanical observable, it cannot be
called the needle-position of the app(A
constructed formally in a definite way from one definite classical mechanical quantity, and so
its eigenfunctions cannot be calculated.
An apparatus that is made use of in a scientific description of something else than this apparatus
itself is introduced as a primary datum, if not one enters indefinite regression53 . This is a logical
interdiction. So I declare without shades that I quite radically reject von Neumanns framework for
representing quantum measurements. As for the essence of the content, it will examined in Chapter 7.

6.5. Conclusion on Chapter 6

- The eigenstates |u j (x, a j )i and eigenvalues a j introduced by an observable A have been


found to have a very special status inside QM HD : They are represented inside QM HD even though
they possess a quite essentially individual significance; but this significance has not been identified.
Consequently it has introduced false problems instead of contributing to intelligibility.
While the concept of an eigenvalue a j of an observable A is both represented and recognized
to possess an individual significance, but the emergence of an eigenvalue as the result of any act of
measurement is just postulated without explanation. So:
Inside QM HD there is no worked out semantic-operational coherence between the concepts
|u j (x, a j )i and a j , tough their intimate mathematical relation is overtly introduced by con-
struction.
We have identified that an eigenket has the meaning of a mathematically expressed possi-
ble wave-movement around a singularity in the amplitude of de Broglies general corpuscular-wave
model. This has triggered a succession of constructive steps that has led inside [IQM-QM HD ] to the
G-corpuscular-wave model denoted msG,cw and has been associated to a
definition of a general G
modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ). Thereby de Broglies general model ideal has been incorporated
53Wittgenstein has written somewhere: There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long, nor that it is not one
meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. I dare to complete: At least one class of things cannot be absorbed into the quantum
mechanical representation of measurements: the class of the measurement apparatuses.
42

to a procedural scientific approach. At the same time this has entailed a transformation of the initial,
purely methodological relation (1), into a relation (1) that transforms the mere labelling of the result
of one realization of the operation G of generation of a microstate, into a qualification of this result
itself, in terms of a set of specimens of msG,cw . Thereby from now on the framework [IQM-QM HD ]
is connected in an operational way with the de Broglie-Bohm approach. These are significant steps
toward our aim.
- We have then brought into evidence the general power of clarification entailed by a systematic
specification of the existence or not of a connection between a state-ket or an eigenket from a
mathematical QM HD -expression, with an operation of generation G of a microstate, and the with the
character of this operation (simple or composed). This led to a new notation that indicates explicitly
the relation between a state-ket that does represent a physically realized microstate, and the operation
of generation G of this microstate.
- Then the nowadays QM HD representation of measurements as introduced by von Neumann
has been examined. This, rather rapidly, has led to the radical conclusion that this representation
cannot be accepted. But the initial core of the representation of quantum measurements has not yet
been examined.
Thereby the preliminary critical-constructive examination of QM HD has come to its end. We
are now prepared to enter upon the construction of QM2. We shall try to achieve this construction
around a core consisting of a fully acceptable theory of quantum measurements, founded upon a
thorough examination of the initial representation of the quantum-measurements.
All the local constructions will be achieved inside the provisional conceptual-mathematical
structure [IQM-QM HD ]. This will cement to one another IQM and QM HD into the embryo of QM2.

QUANTUM MEASUREMENTS THE EMERGENCE INSIDE [IQM-QMHD ] OF


THE FIRST LINES OF QM2

7.1. Preliminary investigation

Questions. We shall now concentrate on the essence of the representation of quantum mea-
surements. The developments from Chapter 6 leave us, after the refusal of von Neumanns theory of
quantum measurements, with real, crucial representational problems that must be stated now inde-
pendently:
1. Why should one act of measurement be represented statistically? One usually constructs
abstract statistics just in order to predict statistically; in certain privileged circumstances this con-
struction can be purely mathematical (via an algorithm, equation, etc.), while in other much more
current circumstances the statistics has to be constructed factually, precisely via individual acts of
measurement. But the verification of a statistical prediction is always realized by a big number of
repetitions of individual acts of measurements, not by use of the predictive statistics itself. When the
problem of verification of a statistical prediction appears and has to be answered, the problem of the
construction of a statistical prediction is over; it has been solved already. And the obtained solution,
with the prediction that it entails, consists of just a set of abstract numbers that cannot scratch marks
on registering devices, nor trigger registrations by a chronometer. For this the presence of something
physical is required. So let us dare to pour out navely the childish questions that come in mind:
Does a state-function from a state-ket |(x, y)i (or |S+App (x,t)i, no matter) necessarily lodge
in itself something physical? Does a state-function from a state-vector systematically contain all the
specimens (msG ) of the studied microstate msG that are necessary for verifying all the statistical
predictions of the corresponding state-ket? How could this be conceived? Do some state-functions
contain such a specimen and other ones not? If so, which ones? In short:
What, exactly, is the physical content of this or that sort of wave-function from a state-ket?
How can the measurements that verify the statistical predictions drawn from a state-ket, be
43

represented intelligibly, explicitly, generally?


2. What coding procedure or set of procedures can effectively lead to the identification of
the result of an act of measurement? This amounts to asking how what is called one measurement-
operation MesA has to be realized in order that its result deserve on some definite grounds the de-
nomination of this or that given eigenvalue a j of the observable A ; and moreover, why should one
postulate a result a j 54 ?
3. How has it been possible to conceive an answer to question 2 even if only on the basis of
implicit reasoning without making use of a general model of a microstate? Has de Broglies model
of a microstate been made use of in fact, via the concept of eigenstate? If this is so, how has it been
made use of?
These are the genuine problems with which we are now left. Let us try to answer them and to
elaborate an intelligible representation of the quantum measurements.
Physical wave-functions versus abstract statistically predictive state-functions. We shall
first introduce a distinction. We have already noted that the wave function initially introduced by
Louis de Broglie was conceived to represent a physical corpuscular wave (x,t) = a(x,t)e(i/h)(x,t)
but of which the amplitude was first not specified and arbitrarily written as a constant. But immedi-
ately afterward this initial wave-function has been replaced by a wave-packet of which the amplitude
was used to express the presence probability of the singularity in the amplitude. Thereby the de-
scriptor became hybrid, and also what it described: a composition of a prediction, a piece of a type
of knowledge, and on the other hand by the same descriptor also a physical entity, a corpuscular
wave. This hybrid character of what is described persists in the nowadays usage of a state-function,
though Louis de Broglie has tried, but late after his thesis (de Broglie, 1956), to finally introduce a
clear separation. We shall try to rectify this by a second notational convention:
Notational convention 2. From now on the physical corpuscular wave-like phenomenon intro-
duced into the domain of scientific observability by one realization of the operation G of generation of
the microstate msG to be studied, will be denoted by the non-mathematical symbol (msG ) re-defined
in Section 6.2 in direct connection with both de Broglies general ideal model of a microstate, and
an operation of generation G. While a state-function G (x,t) = a(x,t)e(i/h)(x,t) from the QMHD state-
ket |G (x,t)i associated to msG will be treated as exclusively a mathematical tool for statistical
predictions on results of measurements on specimens (msG ). This distinction will much enhance
the intelligibility55 .
For instance consider again Youngs two-slits experiment that introduces one progressive mi-
crostate of one microsystem and with composed operation of generation. This state-vector will be
written as
|G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t)i = 1 |G1 (x,t)i + 2 |G2 (x,t)i (16)
and as such it is the mathematical tool for statistical predictions. But according to the dBB writings
for this case, the functional form of G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t) (that is not explicit in (16) is nearly identical
to the functional form of wave-function that can be denoted G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t) that represents the
physical individual wave-like phenomenon that comes in. Now, each act of a MesA A on a specimen
(msG(G1 ,G2 ) ) consumes that specimen, so in fact a whole succession [G(G1 , G2 ).MesA A] is necessary
for each act of measurement; in fact one act of measurement is a whole such succession. So:
54 When the spectrum of A is continuous this amounts to nothing, since any possible outcome of MesA A is a priori an eigenvalue of A so
only the predictive probability could characterize a given outcome, if it is unique (in absence of degenerescence). When the spectrum is
discrete some argument should be explicated.
55 There certainly exists a strong similitude between the mathematical functions that would be appropriate for representing (ms ), and
G
the state-function G (x,t) = a(x,t)e(i/h)(x,t) from the state-ket of a progressive microstate. But in consequence of the predictive task
assigned to G (x,t) = a(x,t)e(i/h)(x,t) there certainly is no identity (for the amplitude function a(x,t) this is clear by construction. But
even the phase (x,t) from G (x,t) might indicate only some sort of mean-phase with respect to the unknown phase functions that are
involved in the set of specimens { (msG )} of the studied microstate msG . Anyhow, for now the fact is that in general we do not know
what equation can yield the functional representation of any specimen (msG ) and nothing insures that the Schrdinger equation of the
problem would always be adequate.
44

The state-vector |G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t)i stays continuously available and undisturbed and it does not
contribute to the acts of measurement [G(G1 , G2 ).MesA A]. It only has predicted the prob-
abilities of all the possible outcomes of these, and now the prediction has to be verified.
Whereas G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t) represents what is present in each act of measurement, a specimen
(msG(G1 ,G2 ) ), and generates the observable marks, whereby it is consumed.
Everything becomes intelligible.
Similar considerations can be made for one progressive microstate of two or several microsys-
tems. But in the case of a progressive microstate of one microsystem and with simple operation G of
generation the distinction between the predictive statistics and the acts of measurement is already
a fleur de peau inside the minds. Moreover in this case the distinction between a specimen (msG )
of the microstate to be studied, and the corresponding state-ket is even more striking because what
is generated by one realization of the involved operation of generation G is devoid of a specified
mathematical descriptor even of an only approximate one like in the Young-slits case while the
state-vector |G (x,t)i is posited to be definable via the Schrdinger equation of the problem and the
introduction of the initial conditions. So this case is the most favorable for trying to discern by its
help what general assumptions are implicated in the formalism from QMHD concerning the coding
procedure for identifying the result of an act of measurement.

7.2. Examination of the essence of the QMHD representation of measurements

The coding rule implied by the formalism from QMHD . Since we refuse the von Neumann
representation of quantum measurements we go back to the essence of what is called the theory
of quantum measurements56 . We know that the state-ket |G,H H (t1 )i of the microstate msG to be
studied has been defined by the help of a Schrdinger equation acted by a Hamiltonian operator H .
At a moment t1 we want to measure the observable A on a specimen of msG . At that moment the
expansion of |G,HH (t1 )i on the basis {|u(x, a j )i}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J of eigenket of A is

|G,H
H (t1 )i = c j (a j ,t1 ) |u(x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (18)
j

Starting from t1 the action of H is stopped and the state-ket G,H H (t1 ) is subjected to a new evolu-
tion, a measurement-evolution defined by a new Schrdinger equation where acts a measurement-
Hamiltonian H ( A ) that commutes with A . So for the duration t f t1 that separates from one another
the time t1 when the measurement evolution begins and the time t f when it finishes, a measurement-
state-ket |G,H
H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is introduced. The spectral decomposition of this new state-ket on
the basis {|u(x, a j )i}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J of eigenket of A is

|G,H
H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i = c j (t1 ) |u(x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (19)
j

Now, the evolution (19) is supposed not to change the square moduli |c j (t1 )|2 of the coefficients
c j (a j ,t1 ), while the eigenket |u(x, a j )i are time-independent. So, what does evolve during the
measurement-evolution evolution (19)? What does H ( A ) 6= H entail that H did not entail? Why
has this whole representation been introduced?
When one remembers the case of the Stern-Gerlach method for spin measurement (Bohm,
1951), de Broglies analyses (1957), the time-of-flight method for measuring the momentum ob-
servable, studied by Park and Margenau (1968), Gottfireids presentation of quantum measurements
56 Let us note this: Our aim here is vry specific. We do not want to represent the measurement-process in a way such as to be most
exhaustive, or most beautiful according to this or that subjective perceptions. Our aim is strictly to identify how, inside QMHD , it has
been supposed that one can identify the result of an act of measurement in terms of a definite value of the measured quantity. Full point. To
those who want to understand clearly all the aspects of the problem I recommend strongly that they read the outstanding analysis of Bohm
(1951, pp. 588608). A patient reader will explicate from this analysis that for the procedural aim spelled out above, the von Neumann
representation is of no use while it permits to complicate the reasoning as much as one likes: This representation, beyond its unacceptable
character asserted in Section 6.4, is furthermore tied with a confusion of aims, which, independently and unavoidably, leads to confusion
in the realization. But the Stern-Gerlach illustration brings forth the essence.
45

(1966), etc., it appears that what is supposed is that a measurement-evolution (19) brings forth a
one-to-one correlation between a space-domain x j , where an observable impact is produced, and
a corresponding eigenvalue a j of A , for any index j. So what changes is perceptible in the Hilbert-
space-representation of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i with respect to X where the eigenket |u(x, a j )i are
represented by wave-packets a basic approximation and the presence-probability p(X j (a j ) of
presence of a specimen (msG,cw ) of which the singularity is mechanically qualified by the value a j
of A , is non-null. The wave-packets accomplish trajectories that establish dynamically a perceivable
one-to-one correlation between x j and the presence-probability p(X j (a j )), for any j, because the
spatial separation between any two packets tied with two distinct indexes j can be increased as much
as one wants via a convenient choice of parameters and by increasing the duration t f t1 .
Let us denote by BBGPM the approach developed by the above-quoted authors. If their view
is indeed factually true then a measurement-evolution (19) entails via the presence probability
p(X j (a j )) a coding rule :

[(impact observed on x j ) (outcome of the eigenvalue a j of A )] (20)

However as far as I know no general proof of such a rule has been worked out inside QMHD . So it
seems likely that a general proof is not possible.
But this is not crucial because Park and Margenau (1968) have proved the correlation (20) for
the momentum operator P x , for the space position operator X it is obvious, and the quantum mechan-
ical postulate of representation of the dynamical operators permits to form any other operator from
X , P x ). Nevertheless we want to understand inside [IQM-QMHD ] on what grounds the important
(X
correlation (20) is founded, in order to discern explicitly its domain of validity.
We consider the most simple case, that of one progressive microstate of one microsys-
tem with simple operation of generation. We go back to (19) and we place ourselves in the
Hilbert-space-representation of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i with respect to X . The measurement-ket
|G,HH (A) 1(t t t f )i from (19) is a statistical descriptor, and in Section 7.2 we have introduced
a radical distinction between statistical state-ket that are tools for predicting, and wave-functions
in general unknown that represent in agreement with the modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ) from
Section 6.2 a physical specimen (msG ) of the studied microstate msG , able to produce observable
manifestations. We know in advance that here we are in presence of an illustration of a violation
of this distinction, because in the BBGPM approach the statistical wave-packets from the Hilbert-
space-representation of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i with respect to X produce themselves the observable
effects. We know that, but we continue. We have chosen to consider a progressive microstate msG
of one microsystem and with simple operation G of generation. Such a microstate does not involve
possibility of quantum fields (in contradistinction to the case of Youngs two-slits experiment) (no
quantum potential is involved). So in our case exclusively the exterior macroscopic fields do act and
they act mechanically exclusively on the one singularity involved by msG . Then from a mechanical
point of view, the corpuscular singularity of de Broglie should behave exactly as a classical mobile.
But the formalism from QMHD does not distinguish between statistical descriptors and individual
ones. So, in order to clarify the reasoning as much as possible we go to the limit of the concept
|G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i and consider that its expansion (19) contains only one term:

c j0 (t1 ) = 0 j0 6= j, |c j (t1 )| = 1, c j (t1 ) = 1ei(x) , |G,H


H ( A ) (t > t1 )i = e
i(x)
|u j (x)i (21)

where (x) is an arbitrary time-independent phase-function. Since we are in the Hilbert-space-


representation of |G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i with respect to X , the eigenket |u(x, a j )i from (21) is rep-
resented by a wave-packet. The evolution generated by H ( A ) conserves the mean value of the eigen-
values of A that are involved. So in the particular case 57 (21) the unique eigenvalue a j that is
involved is conserved.
57 We stress that in this case the concept of wave-packet is not made use of.
46

Now, it is likely that inside classical mechanics one can prove that a mechanical displacement
of a mobile throughout which the value a j of a given mechanical quantity A keeps constant, if it lasts
sufficiently, leads the mobile into a spatial domain x j that can become as distant as one wants with
respect to any other domain x j that corresponds to another value a j of A, with j0 6= j. Which would
indeed entail the correlation (20), i.e.

presence probability p(x x j ) (probability of outcome of the eigenvalue a j of A) (20)

This seems to be what has founded the BBGPM approach. But let us retain the very important
restriction that:
The coding rule implied inside QMHD presupposes absence of quantum fields.
Conclusion on the QMHD -representation of quantum measurements. We now continue the
examination of the QMHD -representation of quantum measurements.
The statistical predictions concerning the studied microstate msG are obtained from the state-ket
|G,HH 1 )i associated to msG . This state-ket in its turn is obtained via purely mathematical operations.
(t
So inside QMHD the role of measurement operations is exclusively to verify the statistical predictions
drawn from |G,H H (t1 )i. The verification of statistical predictions requires a very big number of repe-
titions of individual measurement evolutions.
A mathematical representation of a domain of physical facts is not obliged to represent ev-
erything. But what it does represent should be clearly intelligible and acceptable, not only formally
but also conceptually. In particular it should not be an obstacle for imagining what is not repre-
sented. Now, QMHD is an only statistical representation of the microstates (cf. Chapter 5) and the
QMHD -descriptor for measurement evolutions |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )iis also, and directly, a statistical
descriptor conceived in order to represent the operations of verification of the statistical predictions
from |G,H H (t1 )i. The individual operations that must take place are not represented. This remains to
be done. But meanwhile:
Why are the coefficients from the expansion (19) of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i set a priori to be
identical to those from the corresponding expansion (18) of |G,H H (t1 )i when the aim of the
descriptor |G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is precisely to verify the coefficients from (18)?
This, even it is not detrimental, manifests conceptual confusion.
As for the so much discussed reduction of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i at the moment t f , from a
general conceptual viewpoint it is not clearly unacceptable when one thinks of the general formal
representation from the calculus of probabilities. But from a purely mathematical point of view it
draws attention upon the fact that an explicitly linear formalism is not perfectly consistent with the
way prescribed for making use of the descriptor |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i.
Moreover, in this respect also we are again in presence of an underlying conceptual confu-
sion. Indeed, though a probabilistic representation of individual measurements is permitted not to
represent the individual outcomes, a satisfactory theory where the considered representation is in-
volved should at least permit to imagine clearly if not to explain how the individual outcomes
do emerge (in Kolmogorovs theory of probabilities the individual outcomes are represented inside a
universe of elementary events, and these are asserted to be produced by individual realizations of an
experiment).
Now, it is often said in QMHD that at t1 the system is prepared for measurement, and
correspondingly is also prepared the measurement-evolution-state-ket |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f i. But
in fact, what happens on the individual level in order to verify the predictions drawn from the state-ket
(18) |G,H H (t1 )i by the help of (19) |G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i, is not stated. In particular, it is not speci-
fied how the operation G of generation of the physical microstate msG that is studied, does come in.
Indeed it is postulated that each reduction of |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is tied with the registration of an
eigenvalue of the measured observable A , so necessarily with a physical interaction between a spec-
imen of the studied microstate msG and a registering-device : did the reduced evolution-state-ket
|G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i contain this specimen of msG ? Where was the specimen? And whatever is
47

the answer to this particular question in general the obtained registration has consumed the involved
specimen. So, is |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i also consumed? Is the descriptor |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i re-
constructed somehow after each registration so as to charge a new specimen? Is it in only statistical
connection with what happens beneath it, on the individual level? Or is it constructed only once,
notwithstanding that it is reduced by each registration? Does it somehow function separately of the
specimens that trigger the registrations? If so, for getting the specimens, the operation of generation
G must be repeated for each one realization of an operation of measurement. If so, how do the times
coordinate? Is G to be conceived as an operation tied with the time t0 t1 when the initial conditions
for the whole state-ket |G,H H (t1 )i have been given (so tied with |G,H
H (t0 )i), or is it to be conceived
as an operation tied with the time t1 when the measurement-evolution |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t < t f )i starts?
In other terms:
When for the involved state-ket one writes successively |G,H H (t0 )i, |G,H
H (t1 )i,
|G,H (t
H (A) 1 t t f )i, what time is to be conceived for G? to or t 1 ?
When this flow of so long inhibited questions is associated with the fact that the application of
the coding rule (20), in fact, is itself an individual measurement evolution, while the representation
|G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is supposed to express just the corresponding statistical correlation (20), all of
a sudden the flow of questions stops; and on its place there springs up the whole unifying explanation
formulated below:
The descriptor |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is just an aborted attempt at a simultaneous statistical
representation of all the individual successions [Gt .MesA], A VMec that inside IQM lead to
the final and central primordially transferred description

(DoM (msG ))t [(, , N0 ){po (Gt , a j )}t , (M pc(Gt ))AB ], (A


A, B ) VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (9)

It is tried to represent by this descriptor alone, not only all the statistical coding-correlations
that these individual successions generate defined inside inside IQM generate, but both all
these statistical correlations and all the individual successions that generate them, all that by
one descriptor.
Indeed:
- The coding-evolution (20) involved by |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is precisely that what inside
one IQM-succession [Gt .MesA] is denoted MesA and finishes with the registration of a group of
observable marks (for which inside IQM a coding rule has been only required and supposed to be
defined and applied inside any acceptable theory of microstates, but remained not specified inside the
reference-structure IQM): It now appears that in QMHD one act of MesA, such as it is implied by
the mathematical statistical descriptor (19) |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i, tries precisely to secure that the
result shall code for a definite eigenvalue of the measured operator; notwithstanding that on the other
hand the result of a measurement-operation an eigenvalue a j of the measured observable is just
postulated, together with the separately postulated assertion that the microstate itself remains after
the act of measurement in the eigenstate |u j (x, a j )i corresponding to a j (the projection postulate),
which is the source of the reduction problem (and violates massively, systematically,the distinction
between state-ket and eigenket).
This by itself is a non-trivial elucidation: Indeed it contains much more specific features
than the von Neumann automatically realized needle-position. And these features draw on
a snow-white background, with thick dark lines, the face of the total conceptual confusion
inside which the QMHD representation of quantum measurements is entangled. And here, with
reference to IQM, all the lines of the inner chaos of this confusion crop up on its face.
- What is denoted Gt in (9) is not visible in |G,H H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i. It remains hidden in the
mist of a total confusion between what is placed on the physical individual level of conceptualization,
namely [G, (msG,cw ), the groups {kA } (8) of physical observable marks, the translation of a group
{kA } into one value a j of an observable A ], and on the other hand the statistical QMHD -concepts (18)
|G,H
H (t1 )i and (19) |G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i, and the probabilistic correlation (20).
48

- As for the time-parameters, they are not the same in the statistical descriptor
|G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i and the individual descriptor [Gt .MesA] where accordingly to (13) we have
Gt = F(G, EC, (t t0 )); these two sets of parameters cannot be compared, in consequence of a basic
lack of conceptual homogeneity: they are not defined for entities from one same realm of concep-
tualization and so they cannot be directly imbedded in one common dimension of time, and ordered
there. Only a meta-representation could achieve an order, by introducing a common meta-dimension
of time).
- And let us stress that for a free microstate in contradistinction to what happens for a bound
microstate each measurement evolution that has finished with a registration that (in general) has
destroyed one specimen of the studied microstate, requires inescapably some way for introducing
somewhere another specimen of the studied microstate, able to produce new observable marks.
- To all this must be added the fact that the coding rule (20), (20) that inside QMHD seems
to be presupposed for any measurement on any microstate can be understood more or less clearly
only in the particular case of absence of quantum fields; which is a huge restriction.
In short: The mathematical formalism from QMHD itself rejects its own in-distinction between
the individual level of conceptualization and the statistical one, that both are irrepressibly involved
and cannot be coherently stuffed together into only one common level of formal expression58 .
In consequence of this QMHD is devoid of an acceptable representation of measurements.
It is not surprising that such a stubbornly persistent effervescence of interpretations of quantum
mechanics is developing.
And nevertheless QMHD has worked and it continues to work. This theory has achieved re-
markable successes and it still could achieve other successes, just such as it now stands. Indeed the
enormous genius of human mind invents continuously local understandings that, even if from a log-
ical standpoint they are confuse, psychologically, permit to act adequately there where one actually
acts. It seems that for the experimenters it suffices to believe that a quantum theory of measurements
exists, in order to encourage them to measure adequately and to make progress. This also proves
that a fully satisfactory theory of quantum measurements is possible, since no doubt it is quite often
applied without being known. So there is no pragmatic urgency. But conceptually there is urgency.
Indeed:
What value of principle as a theory does a representation of non-perceptible microstates
possess, if it predicts via purely mathematical descriptors and does not state in a clear and
generally valid way how to conceive-and-perform measurements for verifying the predictions?

7.3. Statement of an essential prediction-verification IQMQMHD comparability

Let us try to synthesize the new situation in which we are left in consequence of Section 7.2.
(a) Inside QMHD the statistical predictions offered by the theory are obtained by mathematical
operations. These, for real physical situations not for didactical idealizations, are in general difficult
to accomplish (think also of Schrdingers treatment for solving the simplest real cases of the one
electron in a atom of hydrogen and of a linear harmonic oscillator). Moreover, in order to dispose
of the predictive state-ket of the problem one has to give the initial conditions, which often simply
might not be possible (think of an electron-microstate that would encounter from the start some irreg-
ular macroscopic material obstacle). Nearly always the mathematical production of the state-ket of
the problem involves approximations, basically. In these conditions, verifiability of the predictions is
essential. While in fact it is not treated clearly, with rigor and generality.
(b) IQM has been constructed like only a reference-structure for understanding QMHD . As such
it has been endowed with the maximal generality compatible with its status. This led to deliberately
58 Human conceptualization is dominated by a sort of methodological laws tied with an aim of a priori avoidance of false problems
and paradoxes (Mugur-Schchter, 2002a,b, 2006). Whether they are known or not these laws do work; and when they are violated, false
problems and paradoxes burst out and ring the bell.
49

leave undefined the model of a microstate; the measurement operations MesA remained equally
undefined inside IQM, as well as the external conditions EC from the generalized definition (13)
of an operation of generation Gt .
The contents of (a) and (b) entail that up to now the conditions of comparability between
the functioning of QMHD and IQM concerning prediction and verification are not defined as yet.
Only structural comparability has been possible up to now. Just below we shall now define also the
functional comparability concerning the essential questions of prediction and verification.
Let us go back to the conclusion from Section 7.2 that the QMHD -descriptor (19)
|G,HH ( A ) (t1 t t f )i is just an aborted attempt at a simultaneous statistical representation of all the
individual successions [Gt .MesA], A VMec that inside IQM lead to the final and central primordially
transferred description (9) (DoM (msG ))t . We complete this conclusion in the following self-evident
way:
The statistical predictions drawn from a state-ket (18) |G,H
H (t1 )i concerning an observable A
can be verified experimentally only via a very big number of repetitions of whole successions
[Gt .MesA], A VMec in the sense of IQM where:
- In the expression (13) Gt = F(G, EC, (t t0 )) the external conditions are posited to be
those admitted inside QMHD for the utilized state-ket |G,H H (t)i, (t0 t); that is, the initial operation
of generation G is realized in agreement with the mathematical initial conditions that inside QMHD
are introduced in order to determine the initial state-ket |G,H H (t0 )i, and the external conditions EC
are those expressed in QMHD by the Hamiltonian operator H and the obstacles that come in (holes,
barriers, wells).
- Inside each whole succession [Gt .MesA] the semantically void symbol MesA from IQM
is replaced by a coding-measurement-evolution acceptable accordingly to QMHD , so an evolution
imposed by a Hamiltonian operator H ( A ) , but that acts upon the unknown wave-function (x,t) =
ae(i/h)(x,t) of a physical individual specimen (msG ) of the studied microstate msG , able to interact
physically59 (cf. Section 7.1).
In these conditions we formulate explicitly the following assertion Ass.1 supported by a cor-
responding argument Arg(Ass.1)60 :
Ass.1. Consider the IQM-descriptor

(DoM (msG ))t [(, , N0 ){po (Gt , a j )}, (M pc(Gt ))AB ], AB VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (9)

If the description (DoM (msG ))t from (9) is constructed factually by use of the same successions
[Gt .MesA], A VMec specified in the above points (a) and (b) that have to be performed for verifying
the predictions of the corresponding mathematically defined QMHD -state-ket |G (x,t)i then the
predictions of |G (x,t)i can be found to be verified experimentally only if they are the same as the
predictions entailed by the non-mathematical expression (DoM (msG ))t .
Arg(Ass.1). Obvious. Since inside IQM the description (DoM (msG ))t is constructed factually,
to verify its predictions one has to just repeat its construction. So the verification of (DoM (msG ))t is
certain a priori61 . Then, if the factual verification of |G (x,t)i is accomplished in the same way
as the factual construction of (DoM (msG ))t , then, while it verifies |G (x,t)i it must also reconstruct
(DoM (msG ))t .
Let us immediately explicate the following crucial element from Ass.1:
Coding measurement-succession [Gt .MesA]. Any representation of the quantum measure-
ments belongs to the individual level of conceptualization, and its basic form consists of whole
59 This is what happens also in the case of the bound microstate from an atomic or molecular structure where one specimen persists and
interacts with test-particles or other devices (Zeeman or Stark effects, etc.).
60 Throughout what follows we speak in terms of assertions and arguments because we are not yet inside a formally stabilized structure.
61 Of course, it is presupposed that (Do (ms )) has been considered to have been accomplished only when a convenient choice in (5)
M G t
of the set of parameters (, , N0 ) has stabilized the identical recurrence of (DoM (msG ))t when one reconstructs the statistic inside the
correspondingly admitted fluctuations.
50

successions [Gt .MesA], A VMec , where the act denoted MesA has to be conceived so that
each realization of it shall code for a definite value of the quantity A.
At a first sight the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) might seem both circular and trivial. But in fact
the reverse is true: The pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) specifies by construction the necessary and sufficient
conditions for consensus between IQM and QMHD with respect to prediction and verification. It will
appear below that it also specifies a natural way for establishing inside [IQM-QMHD ] an organic re-
lation between the individual level of conceptualization, and the statistical one. And even, to express
this relation mathematically. Indeed on the basis of (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) it will become possible to
transform IQM into a factual-mathematical theory of microstates not only a structure of reference
for estimating QMHD that, inside [IQM-QMHD ] will stay face to face with any mathematical rep-
resentation accomplished before, whether this is mainly statistical like QMHD , or not, like the dBB
approach. Thereby the initial role assigned to IQM of only a structure of reference is strongly aug-
mented, and in a way that might come out to be very fertile at the time of Moores law. So a new aim
has taken form:
We want to construct a factual-mathematical replica of the quantum mechanical state-ket, ex-
plicitly and thoroughly rooted into individual, physical factuality, that be able to achieve inside
a second quantum mechanics both intelligibility and control. This would be a precious
parallel expression of the purely mathematical outputs of the present-day formalism.
Thereby IQM and QMHD will be brought to grow into a genuine merger from inside the provi-
sional structure [IQM-QMHD ].

7.4. A factual-mathematical [IQM-QMHD ]-representation of quantum measurements for a


free microstate of one microsystem and without quantum fields

7.4.1. Conservation of the Hilbert-Dirac representation

In Section 7.2 we have found that the sort of measurement-evolution that inside QMHD is pre-
supposed by the BBGPM approach, can be conceived in coherence with the Hilbert-Dirac represen-
tation to create the possibility to translate the registered observable result, into a definite eigenvalue
a j of the measured observable A . But it has also appeared that the mentioned supposition has a
restricted validity because it requires absence of quantum fields62 . The specific aim throughout Sec-
tion 7.4 is to construct inside [IQM-QMHD ] a factual-mathematical-Hilbert-Dirac representation for
exclusively the case of free microstates of one microsystem and non-composed operation of gener-
ation, so without quantum field. This will be a first step that should permit further progress later. Let
us denote such a microstate by ms(free,1)G(nc) (G(nc) ): non-composed operation G of generation).

7.4.2. [IQM-QMHD ] expression of the coding-(measurement-succession) [Gt .MesA] for a


ms(free,1)G(nc)

To begin with we want to transpose explicitly the basic IQM-concept of a coding-


(measurement-succession) [Gt .MesA] in the more detailed terms permitted by the [IQM-QMHD ]
framework such as it stands now in consequence of the gains obtained in Chapter 6 and Chapter
7. We first recall the gains that we want to take into account.
- In (13) the concept G has been generalized into the concept Gt .
- In Section 7.1 we have distinguished between the state-function (x,t) from a statistical
state-ket |(x, y)i and the individual wave-function (x,t) = ae(i/h)(x,t) associated accordingly to
(1) to one physical individual specimen (msG ) introduced by only one realization of the operation
of generation G from (1) G msG tied with the studied microstate msG .
- In Section 7.2 the limiting individual descriptor (21) |G,H i(x) |u (x)i to
H ( A ) (t > t1 )i = e j
which we have mentally reduced the statistical QMHD -descriptor |G,H H (A) (t > t1 )i (19), has been
62 At most, since it has not been proved inside QMHD .
51

imagined to accomplish under the constraint of the classical field involved by a Hamiltonian operator
H ( A ) that commutes with the measured observable A , an evolution that, in the representation-space
of the observable X of physical presence, leads a wave-packet tied with the term ei(x) |u j (x)i into a
space-domain (20) x j (outcome of the eigenvalue a j of A )] that codes for the eigenvalue a j of A ;
which insures the statistical correlation (20).
- But what is most important is the inversion of time-order of the conceptualization from IQM
such as it acts inside, specifically, the replacement of the descriptor |G,H H ( A ) (t > t1 )i by coding-
(measurement-successions) [Gt .MesA]: In Section 7.2 we had started from the statistical level, with
the statistical descriptor |G,H H ( A ) (t > t1 )i where all the individual state- descriptors were eigenket
(in fact ideal models of corpuscular-wave-movements). So we had no other choice than an eigen-
ket for representing the measurement-evolution of an individual specimen of the studied microstate.
While IQM, instead of the up-down inertial order of conceptualization induced by history, intro-
duces a down-up order (Fig. 1). This requires to start with the operation Gt and to continue with
the coding-measurement evolution MesA A. So the time order is reversed with respect to that from
the analysis of |G,H H (A) (t > t1 )i from Section 7.2; one begins with an unknown corpuscular wave-
function (x,t) = a(x,t)e (i/h)(x,t) associated with a specimen (msG ) of the studied microstate msG
introduced by Gt . This unknown wave-function must be subjected to a coding-measurement evolu-
tion determined by H ( A ) , if we want to make a measurement MesA A that shall contribute via the a
result a j to an experimentally established statistical distribution able to verify factually the predic-
tive statistic concerning the observable A drawn from the mathematically constructed state-ket (18)
|G (t1 )i. For there are reasons for conceiving that the Hamiltonian operator H ( A ) that commutes
with the measured observable A, if, in absence of quantum fields, it works on the wave-function
(x,t) = a(x,t)e(i/h)(x,t) associated to (msG ) since its creation, indeed installs progressively for it
a structure of wave-movement represented by an eigenket of A , while it also generates a dynamics of
the singularity of (msG ) that leads it into a space-domain x j (or a space-time domain (x j t j )63 )
that is in a one-to-one relation with a given eigenvalue a j of A . (This, very possibly, might be provable
with full generality; but as long as it has not been proved we can only postulate it.)
So, for the case of a ms(free,1)G(nc) , inside [IQM-QMHD ] we introduce the following postulate
of representation of a coding-(measurement-succession) [Gt .MesA]:
P(rep. [Gt .MesA])G(nc) . A measurement-evolution upon a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) obeys
the representation

[(Gt ).MesA
A( )] Schr.H
H ( A ) (x j t j : ' |u j (x, a j )i), j = 1, 2, . . . A VMec (22)

that is to be read as follows: Gt generates a specimen of msGt initially represented by an


unknown wave-function ; a measurement MesA A on , of the observable A, consists of a
Schrdinger-evolution of produced by the Hamiltonian H ( A ) that commutes with A ; this
leads the corpuscular-like singularity of into a space-time domain (x j t j ) that is in a
one-to-one relation with a given eigenvalue a j of A , while the initial wave-function of the
involved specimen of the studied microstate becomes represented around its singularity by
an eigenket64 |u j (x, a j )i .
Let us note that the postulate P(rep. [Gt .MesA])G(nc) replaces the inadequate descriptor
|G,H H ( A ) (t > t1 )i from (19) and also the very non-analyzed postulate of emergence of an eigenvalue
a j of A when A is measured.
63 Think of the method time-of-flight for measuring the momentum observable.
64 By now we are so deeply used to the salubrious purely mathematical and statistical air of QMHD that the content of the whole present
point Section 7.4.3 might seem unbearable inside a work of theoretical physics. But the reader is asked to remember that we want to root
quantum mechanics in factuality, and in a non-perceivable and as yet a-conceptual physical factuality. This requires necessarily to withstand
all the inertial psychological reactions induced since nearly a century by feebly intelligible, abstract, purely algorithmic representations.
Inside the classical disciplines of theoretical physics one accepts quite currently the labels and the norms that establish direct relation with
physical matter. These labels and norms are what ensures efficiency. But inside microphysics this ground has receded out of the domain of
reasoning and of representation.
52

7.4.3. Gleasons theorem

Since 1954 the Hilbert-Dirac linear representation is endowed with Gleasons well-known the-
orem. In the present context the essence of this theorem can be reduced to what follows65 . Suppose
that the generalized Hilbert space H associated to the studied microstate possesses a dimension of
at least 3. Let us denote by {(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . the set of events that consist of the registration
of an eigenvalue a j of A as result of a measurement of A on a specimen (msG,cw ) of the microstate
msG represented by the state-ket |G i. Suppose that it is possible to associate to the set of events
{(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . a probability law {p(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . . Gleasons theorem asserts that:
If a probability law {p(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . is given, the mathematical possibility to represent
it inside H is necessarily subjected to the identity of form

p(G , a j ) Gl |Pr. j |G i |2 , j = 1, 2, . . . (23)

where Pr. j |G i is the projection of |G i on the eigenket |u j i of A (the symbol Gl is to be


read identical according to Gleason).
So Gleasons theorem asserts the same mathematical form as Borns probability postu-
late
p(G , a j ) = [|Pr. j |G i |2 |c j |2 ] (23)

However there is no conceptual identity between (23) and (23). Indeed Borns postulate con-
tains assertions of fact: There exists a probability law {p(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . ; the state-ket |G i is
known; so the expression |Pr. j |G i |2 |c j |2 defines a numerical value and this numerical value is
tied with the Hilbert-Dirac form (23). Whereas Gleasons theorem has not the status of an assertion
of facts, it has the status of a logical implication. It asserts nothing concerning the existence, or not,
of a probability law {p(G , a j )}, j = 1, 2, . . . , nor if this law exists concerning the involved nu-
merical values. This theorem brought into light in 1954 the rather subtle notion that the mathematical
form postulated by Born long before, is not only possible, but furthermore is imposed if one chooses
a Hilbert-space representation but if for some reason concerning specifically a particular category
of microstates, one is led to abandon the Hilbert-Dirac representation for that category, than Borns
postulate remains without a constraint of formal representation, so arbitrary from a formal point of.
This has to be kept in mind.
Meanwhile, in the absence of quantum fields the Hilbert-Dirac representation has been found
not to oppose obstacles to the representation (22) of a measurement-evolution of a ms(free,1)G(nc) .
And it will turn out that in these circumstances Gleasons theorem is very useful indeed for a factual-
mathematical reconstruction of the QMHD -concept of a state-ket.

7.4.4. Factual-mathematical construction of the state-ket of a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc)

Consider a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) . Let |Gt i be the symbol of the unknown state-ket of
this microstate such as it would be obtained via the current mathematical procedures from QMHD .
Consider the probabilistic predictions that can be drawn from |Gt i. We make the following assertion
Ass.2:
Ass.2. Inside [IQM-QMHD ] all the spectral decompositions of the state-vector |Gt i to be asso-
ciated to a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) can be constructed via a factual-mathematical procedure
that makes no use of the Schrdinger equation nor of Borns postulate, and they can be rep-
resented in the Hilbert-space H of this microstate. Together, these constitute a factual-formal
equivalent of |Gt i with respect to prediction-and-verification.
65 Pitowsky (2006) has drawn this essence in connection with quantum logic.
53

Arg(Ass.2). Consider a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) and let |Gt i designate the correspond-
ing state-vector, that here is supposed to be unknown. According to Ass.1 and the postulate
P(rep.[Gt .MesA])G(nc) if the probabilistic predictions of the unknown state-ket |Gt i were available
and were also verified by coding-(measurement-successions) [Gt .MesA], A, t, then these predic-
tions would necessarily be the same as those from the statistical description

(DoM (msG ))t [(, , N0 ){po (Gt , a j )}t , (M pc(Gt ))AB ], AB VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (9)

constructed inside IQM via the same set of coding-(measurement-successions). Consider first ex-
clusively the first-order probabilistic predictions from (9), (, , N0 ){po (Gt , a j )}t , A VMec , j =
1, 2, . . . , J (i.e. not also the meta-probabilistic correlation betxeen branch-probability laws from the
corresponding probability tree). According to Ass.1 and Gleasons theorem (23) we must have the
succession of identities66 :

{p[|Gt i , a j ]} Gl {|c j (t)|2 } Ass.1 {po (Gt , a j )}t , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, A, t (24)

where: {p[|Gt i , a j ]} designates the whole (unknown) probability law asserted by the state-ket |Gt i
for the eigenvalues {a j } of A ; Gl is to be read identical according to Gleason; the set of real
numbers {|c j (t)|2 } designates the set of projections of |Gt i on the eigenket from the basis of eigen-
ket {|u j (x, a j )i} introduced by A in the Hilbert-space H of |Gt i; Ass.1 is to be read identical
according to Ass.1; {po (Gt , a j )}t is the probability law assigned by the IQM- description (9) to the
eigenvalues {a j } of A .
The identities (24) can be represented inside the Hilbert-space of |Gt i for any pair (|Gt i , A ),
via the following factual-formal procedure:
- First are determined for the studied microstate msGt accordingly to IQM but by use of
coding-(measurement-successions) (22) [Gt .MesA A] that obey the postulate P(rep.HD[Gt .MesAA]) the
factually constructed probabilities from (9) {po (Gt , a j )}t , A, t.
This exhausts the purely factual phase of the construction.
The results of this phase can now be represented in the Hilbert-space of the studied microstate:
- For all the observables A VMec , successively, one writes the corresponding spectral decom-
position, denoted |Gt i /A A, of the unknown state-ket |Gt i:

A = ei( j) |c j (t, A )| |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, t


|Gt i /A (25)
j

The expansion coefficients unknown mathematically describe the projections of |Gt i on the
eigenket from the basis {|u j (x, a j )i} in H , written in the explicit form

c j (t, A ) = ei( j) |c j (t, A )| (26)

of a product of an unknown real number |c j (t, A )| and a non-specified complex phase-factor ei( j)
(that will remain irrelevant for what follows).
- But we have :
|c j (t, A )|2 Ass.1 (po (Gt , a j ))t , j, t (24)
so we can re-write (25) in the factual-mathematical form
q
i( j)
|Gt i /A
A = e (po (Gt , a j ))t |u j (x, a j )i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, t (25)
j
66 We recall that accordingly to our choice of effectiveness the spectra are discrete and also finite in consequence of the finiteness of the
investigated space-time domain.
54

that makes explicit use of Gleasons theorem (23).


- The same procedure is applied for the spectral decomposition of |Gt i with respect to all the
other dynamical observables B , C , . . . defined in QMHD : |G (t)i /B B, |G (t)i /C
C , etc. This yields the
set q
{ ei( j) (po (Gt , a j ))t |u j (x, a j )i}, A, t (27)
j
of all the forms (25) corresponding to all the dynamical observables.
This settles the question of the absolute values of the coefficients from (26).
What about the complex factors ei( j) from (25)? This question can be answered by a lemma
L(Ass.2) formally established inside QMHD :
L(Ass.2). If in (25) an arbitrary set {ei( j) } of complex factors is introduced, then Diracs
theory of transformations determines consistently with this initial choice all the complex factors to be
introduced in all the other expansions of of |Gt i corresponding to any other dynamical observable
A, B] 6= 0, that does not commute with A.
B, [A
Proof of L(Ass.2). Consider the expansion
B = ei (k) |dk (t, B )| |vk (x, bk )i , k = 1, 2, . . . , K, t
|Gt i /B (25)
k

of |Gt i on the basis {|vk (x, bk )i} of eigenket introduced in H by an observable B , [A


A, B ] 6= 0, that
does not commute with A . For any given value of the index k we have inside QMHD
hvk (x, bk )|Gt i = ei (k) |dk(t, B )| = k j (A
A, B )c j (t, A ), t (28)
j

A, B ) = hvk |u j i , j = 1, 2, . . . , J. So for any complex factor we have a separate condition


where k j (A

ei (k) = hvk |G (t)i /|dk (t, B )| = k j (A


A, B )c j (t, A )/|dk (t, B )|, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, t (29)
j

(where / is to be read: divided by). This proves the lemma and it closes the formal phase of the
construction.
So we are in possession of the set
{ ei( j) |c j (t, A )| |u j (x, a j )i , A, t} (30)
j

of all the factually-formally constructed expansions of the unknown state-ket |Gt i with respect to all
the quantum mechanical dynamical observables from QMHD . According to QMHD (31) is equivalent
to |Gt i with respect to prediction-verification. In what concerns prediction the equivalence is insured
by construction. In what concerns verification, it follows obviously from the assertion Ass.1. So we
can write67 :
[{ ei( j) |c j (t, A )| |u j (x, a j )i}, A, t] prv.-verif. |G (t)i (31)
j
(where the sign prv.-verif. is to be read: identical with respect to prediction-verification). And no
use has been made of the Schrdinger equation, nor of Borns postulate. 
Comments on Ass.2
(a) For a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) , Ass.2 endows the state-ket |G (t)iobtained mathemati-
cally via the Schrdinger equation of the problem, with an equivalent that, no doubt, can be estab-
lished nowadays when Moores law acts, and that is directly rooted into individual physical factuality.
The advantages involved by this duplication are quite noteworthy:
67 The result (31) leaves open a purely mathematical question, but endowed with general interest. Inside QMHD is admitted a mathematical
principle of spectral decomposability that, in expressions of the form (15) permit to write the sign =. This sign however is far from
indicating with certainty the possibility of mathematical identification of the two terms of the asserted equality (think of the conditions of
possibility of a Fourier decomposition). This fact, when associated with (31), leads to wonder whether the availability of a mathematical
state-function is indeed a pragmatic necessity, or just an intellectual comfort offered by the belief in the existence of mathematical guarantee
and by the possibility of big amount of expressive calculi.
55

- The Schrdinger equation of a given problem is often very difficult to write down (think
of the non-Hamiltonian situations, of the cases of a time-dependent Hamiltonian of a problem, of
the problem of mathematical representation of material obstacles); this equation, once written, is
often very difficult to solve (think of Schrdingers memoirs for the solution that represents the one
electron from an atom of hydrogen, or of a harmonic oscillator); and if the equation is written and
solve, in order to reduce its general solution to the specific solution of the considered problem one
has to give the initial conditions, which often is simply not possible (think of the case of an electron
microstate that would encounter some rough piece of matter, instead of only an ideal barrier or
wall). Now, (13) and the procedure from the Arg(Ass.2) permit to construct factually the predictive
contents (31) of the state-ket |Gt i of the problem, whether this ket has been calculated, or not. If
|Gt i has been calculated, (31) permits to verify its predictions of and to bring forth by comparison the
non-predictable deviations from factual truth that |Gt i has inserted in consequence of mathematical
approximations. If it has not been possible to calculate |Gt i, then (31) permits, both, to replace its
predictive role (while the verification the factual truth is insured by construction).
- Since the Arg(Ass.2) is valid for any time, it specifies for a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) a general
way for constructing a factually rooted equivalent, in the sense of (31), of the initial state-ket |G (t0 )i
of the problem, in any situation. This facilitates strongly, extends and optimizes the use of the QMHD -
formalism.
- The genesis of the equivalence (31) separates radically the individual, physical level of con-
ceptualization, from the statistical one: from now on IQM is united with the formalism from QMHD .
(b). The relation (31) leaves open a purely mathematical question of high general interest.
Inside QMHD is admitted a mathematical principle of spectral decomposability that, in expressions
of the form (15) permit to write the sign =. This sign however is far from indicating a mathematical
certain possibility of identification of the two terms of the asserted equality (think of the conditions
of possibility of a Fourier decomposition). This fact, when associated with (31), leads to ask whether
the availability of a mathematical state-function is indeed a pragmatic necessity or just an intellectual
comfort offered by the belief in the existence of mathematical guarantee68 .
In short:
Inside [IQM-QMHD ] ms(free,1)G(nc) , [(13)+(31)] where is implied the coding-
measurement postulate P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]) endows the QMHD -representation of microstates
ms(free,1)G(nc) with: Independence with respect to the formalism from QMHD ; control upon
only mathematically established predictions; a degree of applicability that is notably enlarged
with respect to that of the formalism QMHD .

7.4.5. Potential semantic contents of Diracs theory of transformations

Consider now also the meta-probabilistic correlations (M pc(Gt ))AB from the IQM-description
(9). We make the following new assertion, Ass.3:
Ass.3. The relations69 (11) po (bk ) = F bk ,A {po (Gt , a j )}, k {k = 1, 2, . . .}, j =
1, 2, . . . , J, (A
A, B ) permit to consider that inside IQM define in qualitative and general terms
the meat-statistical correlations (M pc(Gt ))AB from (9), belong to the same conceptual cate-
gory as Diracs theory of transformations.
Arg(Ass.3). According to [IQM-QMHD ] the coding-measurement evolutions (22) for an
observable A define eigenvalues a j of A that constitute progressively a probabilistic description
(, , N0 ){po (Gt , a j )} from the description (9) (DoM (msG ))t , located in the crown of a branch re-
served to A in from the probability tree T (Gt ) of the studied microstate (Fig. 2) (cf. the last note).
Mutatis mutandis, the coding-measurement evolutions (22) for another observable B that does not
68 Anyhow, it is striking to notice the deep similitude between the just expressed interrogation and Husserls concept of a physical classical
object that, very far from being a paradigm of materiality as it is currently felt to be, in fact is just a very useful and quasi unconsciously
installed and named synthesis of a very complex and rich set of mutually distinct perceptual representations of an exterior and material
invariant (like is also a house with respect to an architects sketches from above, left, etc.).
69 The notations are adapted to the framework [IQM-QM
HD ].
56

commute with A , constitute another probability law (, , N0 ){po (Gt , bk )} from (DoM (msG ))t located
in the crown of a branch reserved to B inside the probability tree T (Gt ) of the studied microstate.
While on the meta-probabilistic level of conceptualization from the same tree T (Gt ) are located the
meta-probabilistic relations between pairs of probability laws for pairs (A A, B ) of non-commuting ob-
servables. These, by construction, are contained inside the IQM descriptor (M pc(Gt ))AB from (9)
and are defined in general non-mathematical terms by the relations

po (bk ) = F bk ,A {po (Gt , a j )}, k {k = 1, 2, . . .}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, (A


A, B ) (11)

Inside QMHD now, the Dirac transformation from the Hilbert-space representation of the state-ket
|G (t)i with respect to an observable A , to its representation with respect to an observable B that
does not commute with A , is defined by

A, B )c j (t, A ), (A
dk (t, B ) = k j (A A, B ), t (28)
j

This comparison entitles to consider that the IQM-descriptor (M pc(Gt ))AB deals with descriptive
elements attached to the same basic features of the concept of probability, as Diracs theory of trans-
formations (that, via expansion coefficients, concern probabilities of events). Inside QMHD these
descriptive elements from Diracs formulae are utilized inside Hilbert-space mathematics with
only a general algorithmic aim (of passage from one basis of representation, to another one) that is
entirely ignorant of an operational segregation of the observable events tied with microstates msGt
inside tree-like probabilistic unities founded upon operations of generation Gt . On the contrary, in-
side IQM this probabilistic segregation is explicit and foundational; inside one given probability-tree
it endows with definite semantic contents the conceptual relations between the operation Gt on the
one hand, and on the other hand the probabilities of observable events tied with the corresponding
microstate msGt . Though the formalism from QMHD is blind with respect to these semantic contents
explicated in IQM, nevertheless inside [IQM-QMHD ] the comparison of (11) with (31) shows that
basically and potentially there is a sort of equivalence (we denote it ):

(M pc(Gt ))AB [F F bk ,A {po (Gt , a j )}], k = 1, 2, . . . K, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, (A


F AB (Gt ) = {F A, B )

{dk (t, B ) = k j (A
A, B )c j (t, A )}, k {k = 1, 2, . . .}, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, |G,HD (t)i , (A
A, B )
j


Obviously this is much more a sort of identification of conceptual terms then a proof or even
an argument. But the idea brought forth by it points toward universal potentialities: It suggests the
possibility of mathematical calculi of semantic proximities that remains to be exploited.
Comment on the Ass.3
The Arg(Ass.3) brings into evidence that, at least for a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) , the complex
factors from the expressions (26) c j (t, A ) = ei( j) |c j (t, A )| of an expansion coefficient are active only
in the second-order probabilistic qualifications. This remark might gain much importance in the case
of microstates with a composed operation of generation, so with inner quantum fields.

7.4.6. On the concept of law of evolution

So (31) frees of the necessity to write and solve the Schrdinger equation of a given problem
concerning a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) when this involves too much difficulty, and it frees also of
the necessity of Borns postulate. This leads naturally to the following question: For exclusively
predictive aims, and for the case of microstates ms(free,1)G(n-c) , what exactly does Schrdingers
equation introduce specifically? We answer as follows.
57

To begin with, let us go back, attentively, to the relation (13) Gt = F(G, EC, (t t0 )) where
to is the time when the initial operation of generation G of the studied microstate finishes. There
we read concerning this relation: it absorbs the evolution of a microstate into the operation of
generation G, and one act of measurement MesX on a microstate, into one realization of a whole
succession [Gt .MesX], with, in particular Gt = G. So any process of contribution to a probabilistic
description from (9) (DoM (msG ))t is always initial in this sense that it always consist of one thread
of individual physical evolution that inside [IQM-QMHD ] and for a microstate ms(free,1)G(n-c)
consists according to P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]) of a coding-measurement-evolution

[(Gt ).MesA( )] Schr.H


H ( A ) (x j t j : ' |u j (x, a j )i), j = 1, 2, . . . A VMec (22)

where in particular one can have Gt = G. But concerning the way in which such a thread of individual
evolution develops in time, and how the various developments behave with respect to one another in
given physical exterior conditions EC (classical fields, obstacles), nothing is specified as long as no
equation of evolution is specified: the index Schr.H
H ( A ) that marks the arrow from (22) is essential. So,
because the question is important, we make explicitly the following assertion:
Ass.4. (a) The Schrdinger equation of a problem that concerns a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc)
involves a certain essence that is stressed by the index Schr.H
H ( A ) of the arrow from (22).
Arg(Ass.4.). Suppose that the situation is Hamiltonian and that it has been possible to construct
the equation of evolution of the problem, i(h/2)(d/dt) |G (t)i = H |Gt i, its general solution, as
well as the initial state-ket70 |Gt (t0 )i. The equation of evolution is of first order with respect to t, so
mathematically it is deterministic. This means that formally no unpredictable element can act
during the passage from the initial state-ket |Gt (t0 )i to the state-ket |Gt (t)i, for any t. This amounts
to the assertion that the equation of evolution transforms mathematically the factual contents charged
in |Gt (t0 )i, into those of |Gt (t)i, accordingly to constraints that represent mathematically, inside
the chosen mathematical framework, certain physical features that are characteristic of the studied
microstate and its exterior environment.
Now, such a transformation is not defined by (13) from IQM alone, this yields only a refer-
ence-structure for the representation of individual evolutions. The mentioned transformation proper
is specified only inside the framework [IQM-QMHD ] where coding-measurement evolutions (22) are
defined by composing the reference-structure (13) from IQM with the formalism from QMHD where
Schrdingers equation specifies a legal transformation in time (the arrow in (22)), for every indi-
vidual thread of evolution, and also yields a statistically integrated view on the effects of these, thus
permitting probabilistic predictions.
Comment on Ass.4.
Inside QMHD there is a separation of roles. The initial state-ket |Gt (t0 )i defines a global
introduction of mathematically expressed initial conditions. Thereby |Gt (t0 )i corresponds in the
sense of the Ass.1 to the description (DoM (msG ))t0 constructed by the repetition of factual, individual,
physical coding-measurement evolutions (22). And the equation of evolution is posited to transforms
these initial probabilities in those that are valid at subsequent times. That is all that it it is posited
to do. (cf. Mugur-Schchter, 2014a). But this, once it has been perceived and declared, seems
miraculous, not only in what concerns the legal transformations, but also and most in what
concerns the loading of the initial data to be transformed: How is it possible that all the relevant but
unspeakable factual data be incorporated into a mathematically abstractly and and globally worked
out abstract descriptor |Gt (t0 )i? What realized the factual, individual, physical harvest of the initial
data? What decided their initial relevance, or not? What meaning can possess the words all the
relevant factual data at t0 ? Here we find ourselves face-to-face with the absurd trend toward
absulutizing generalization. And also, we find ourselves face-to-face with Wigners unreasonable
power of mathematics (perception of fact from his part, or irony, in fact?). The two confrobntations
are certainly intimately related and the relation would be worth a thourough investigation.
70 The index t from G is defined in (13) and it designates the time when measurements begin; while t denotes the time when the
t 0
initial state-ket is defined.
58

Well, let us confine ourselves to only notice that [IQM-QMHD ] permits to control this power
by comparison with an initial state-ket that is factually constructed via [(13)+(28)], i.e. that, in
(22) starts with an operation of generation of the general form Gt = F(G, EC, (t t0 )) that at t0
consists systematically of the initial operation G of generation from (1), (1) that introduces a physical,
individual specimen of the studied microstate, such as it just comes in, with its whole unspeakable and
un-conceivable singularity. And furthermore, it permits to also control the adequcy of the equation of
evolution itself via the generalization to any value of time of the concept of operation of generation,
via the (13).
This, inside [IQM-QMHD ], permits to maximize a priori the efficiency of the equation of evo-
lution by always giving in an entirely factual way the initial state-ket |Gt (t0 )i, accordingly
to the procedure from the Arg(Ass.2).

7.4.7. On Borns postulate

For reasons that, no doubt, are of the same nature as those from the above comment on the
Ass.4, Borns postulate has seemed to many to be miraculous and there have been attempts at ex-
plaining it. Here we only stress that the association of Gleasons theorem with (13) and the postulate
P(rep.[Gt .MesAA])G(nc) , A
A, t, such as these elements are organized inside the scheme [(13)+(31)],
permits to simply eliminate this piece of mystery, for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) .
But in the cases in which the equation of evolution and its solution are available, Borns pos-
tulate can be used for controlling the relation between the predictions obtained mathematically, and
those obtained factually.

7.4.8. Conclusion on Section 7.4

The major results from Section 7.4 are the following ones:
- The elimination of the QMHD representation of measurements on exclusively the statistical
H ( A ) (t1 t t f )i.
level, via the malformed descriptor (19) of |G,H
- The displacement of the representation of measurements, on the individual level of conceptu-
alization where the basic descriptor is a whole succession [G.MesA A] of an operation of generation G
and afterwards an act of measurement MesA A.
Together, these two results clear away exhaustively and with full generality (for any aspect
and any sort of microstate) what is called the measurement problem.
- The specification of a succession [G.MesAA] for the particular case of microstates ms(free,1),
accordingly to the postulate P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]) expressed by the relation
[(Gt ).MesA
A( )] Schr.H
H ( A ) (x j t j : ' |u j (x, a j )i), j = 1, 2, . . . A VMec (22)
- The factual construction of the predictive equivalent
[{ ei( j) |c j (t, A )| |u j (x, a j )i}, A, t] prv.-verif. |G (t)i (31)
j

of the state-ket |G (t)i of a microstate ms(free,1)G(nc) . This explains what was researched when
the measurement postulates have been introduced, of emergence of an eigenvalue a j of the measured
observable A , and of projection (physical? mathematical?) of the state-ket on the corresponding
eigenket (in general with non-integrable modulus).
On the cleaned ground left by the elimination of the measurement problem, and for the particu-
lar category of microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) , these results establish an acceptable representation of the
measurements.
And furthermore they introduce a duplication of the basic formal descriptors and algorithms
from QMHD , by factual-formal corresponding descriptors that instill: intelligibility; possi-
bility of factual control of the mathematical predictions; a noticeable degree of independence
with respect to the mathematical formalism; and an extended domain of applicability.
59

Considered globally, the mentioned results transform the initial adjunction of IQM and QMHD
inside the provisional framework [IQM-QMHD ], into a genuine merger of these two different ap-
proaches; a merger solidly founded on the basic and quite general assertion Ass.1. This merger
should now be worked out exhaustively, for any sort of microstate.

7.5. Measurement-problem for free microstates with internal quantum field and a possible
solution tied with a crucial experiment

7.5.1. Deadlock for the verifiability of the predictions of a state-ket of a free microstate with
quantum field

Consider now a microstate of one microsystem but with a composed operation of generation
(cf. the definitions from Section 2.1. Let us denote it ms(free,1)cG(q f ) (cG(q f ) is to be read com-
posed operation G of generation involving quantum fields). Such a microstate involves possibility
of internal quantum fields. But in Section 7.1 we have found that, while the approach BBGPM pre-
supposes implicitly that any measurement on any sort of microstate permits a coding-procedure of
the type (20), (20), in fact such a procedure can be safely asserted only in the absence of quantum-
fields. So in the case of a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) the coding-postulate P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]) that
requires a coding-measurement evolution (22), probably ceases to be acceptable. But why, exactly,
should that be so? Let us examine the situation. The prototype of a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) is
that produced in Youngs two-slit experiment

|G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t)i = 1 |G1 (x,t)i + 2 |G2 (x,t)i (16)

Suppose that we want to measure the x-component P x of the basic momentum observable P . The cor-
responding eigenket |u j (x, px j )i are plane waves associated to the eigenvalues px j of P x . The Hamil-
tonian H ( P x ) that commutes with P x has no potential term: H ( P x ) = (h/2)2(d 2 /dx2 ), no external
macroscopic fields are involved. So in this case the procedure (22) required by P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA])
would be: suppress any external macroscopic field and, in (22) let the specimen of the studied
microstate, introduced by the performed operation of generation G, evolve freely until it reaches a
space-time domain (x j t j ) that, via free evolution, is known in advance to be characteristic of a
given eigenket |u j (x, px j )i, which means that the wave-function of has meanwhile acquired in
the vicinity of its singularity the form described by a plane-wave function distinguished by a given
corresponding index j (think of the time-of-flight procedure of Park and Margenau, asserted also by
Feynman). But:
For the microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) involved by (16), an evolution (22) produced by H ( P )
simply does not bring forth in any finite time a one-plane-wave structure |u j (rr , p j )i assignable
to at some given point. Up to infinite times there persists on each space-point a superposition
of two different waves (that become more and more, and only nearly plane): According to the
formalism of QMHD the term from the right-hand side of (16) cannot be subject to relevant
coding-measurement successions (22). So the QMHD -prediction calculated from (16) is not
verifiable, it amounts to just a definition71 .
Paradoxically, precisely the microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) might have strongly contributed to
the choice of a linear Hilbert-Dirac mathematical framework for the representation of microstates. Let
us go back in history. It has been very soon shown experimentally that the presence-probabilities in-
volved in the Youngs two-slits experiment lead to inequalities (12)12 (G(G1 , G2 ), X j ) 6= 1 (G1 , X j )+
2 (G2 , X j ). Now, at the first sight, the choice of a linear vector-space mathematical representation
seems to be particularly convenient for dealing with this sort of cases because, when associated to
Borns postulate, it converts an inequality of type (12) into a numerical equality, via a linear calculus
71 Correlatively, in this case the state-ket from (16) is not factually constructible any more in the sense of the Arg(Ass.2).
60

with complex expansion coefficients72 .

12 (pp j ) = |1 c j1 + 2 c j2 |2 = |1 c j1 |2 + |2 c j2 |2 + 1 c j1 (2 c j2 ) + (1 c j1 ) 2 c j2 (32)

But this conversion insured by the formal choice from (16) of representing the microstate
msG12 as linear combination of the virtual microstates msG1 and msG2 does not entail that the
numerical equality asserted in (32) is factually true. And moreover it comes out now that this is
not verifiable. While according already to IQM, the basic conceptual structure of the inequality
(12) has been found unacceptable for other reasons.
This is the problem. It illustrates to what a degree mathematical solutions to conceptual prob-
lems must be strictly controlled conceptually. Let us detail this problem extravagantly, because of
its importance. Since no coding-measurement succession for the measurement of the momentum ob-
servable P applicable to the microstate msG12 itself is defined as yet, for this case the left member
of the equality (32) is devoid of any direct relation with factuality. Only the right member involves
a possibility of factual verification. But with respect to the studied microstate msG12 this is only a
remote possibility because the two microstates msG1 and msG2 are not physically individualized by
the unique effectively realized operation of generation G(G1 , G2 ). With respect to the studied mi-
crostate msG12 the only one that is physically realized the two microstates msG1 and msG2 are just
a sort of liquid instillation from the operation of generation G(G1 , G2 ), lost in the global effect of
this operation. These two microstates could be fully realized separately, and if this is done then the
probabilities calculated by Borns postulate from their separate state-ket |G1 i and |G2 i can be ver-
ified accordingly to P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]) and (22), because separately msG1 and msG2 do not involve
a quantum field. But if indeed msG1 and msG2 are realized separately, then the factual connection
between the obtained result, and measurements on msG12 remains to be verified; while factually re-
alizable coding-measurement successions for achieving the verification, are not defined. That is why
the writing (32) does not express a prediction; it is just a definition, and a factually non-verifiable
definition.
By a formal extension of a mathematical framework that can be supposed to work for mi-
crostates ms(free,1)G(nc) , the formalism from QMHD has fictitiously covered hastily a whole category
of microstates that in fact escapes a verifiable applicability. While precisely this category is much
more specific of quantum-mechanics than the category ms(free,1)G(nc) where the mechanical behav-
iors still possess a quasi-classical character73 .
It seems that on this avenue the emperor QMHD is parading in his underpants.
On the other hand, the formulation of an acceptable theory of quantum measurements, so
well started in Section 7.4, is now blocked. The assertion Ass.2 does not apply to microstates
ms(free,1)cG(q f ) because no coding procedure is available as yet. We must identify a new sort of
coding-measurement successions, different from that one defined by (22). As long as this is not re-
alized a theoretical representation that is verifiable factually for any microstate, is not yet achieved,
neither by QMHD nor in this work.
One could believe that this whole problem can be eliminated by just refusing a posteriori the
concept of a composed operation of generation defined in Section 2.1 and by accepting the QMHD
direct postulation of the existence of superposition states of a microsystem. But this is not the case,
because:
An a posteriori rejection of the concept of a composed operation of generation would not
in the least change the fact that the prediction (32) cannot be verified experimentally, that it
amounts to just an abstract definition, for precisely the free microstates that are quantum
states in the most specific sense of the expression.
72 We re-note the probabilities by in order to avoid confusion with the eigenvalues p j of P , and in this case we consider the three-
dimensional eigenvalues a j p j for immediate comparability with the development from the subsequent point 7.5.2.
73 It seems likely that no verifications have been made for the momentum in a microstate ms
G12 , only the position-distribution has drawn
attention upon it. But for position (16) works indeed quite well, while on the other hand it is a degenerate sort of observable operator (in
the theory of particle it is replaced).
61

So in fact the the concept of a composed operation of generation has worked like a revelator
which proves a posteriori precisely its pertinence and so we have to continue the investigation.

7.5.2. The principle of a solution tied with a crucial experiment

Preliminary considerations. The momentum-quantity is quite essential in the present con-


ceptual circumstances. Indeed, as well known, the quantum-mechanical representation of the classi-
cal dynamical quantity A(rr , p ) is posited by a representation-postulate placed at the foundations of
QMHD according to which the observable A corresponding to a A(rr , p) is the linear operator A defined
by the symmetrized function A(R R, P ), with P x = (h/i)(d/dx), P y = (h/i)(d/dy), P z = (h/i)(d/dz).
The position-observable R raises no problems: with respect to the utilized referential it indicates just
a spatial location, in particular of any observable mark, which immediately defines an eigenvalue r j .
So if the coding problem raised by the microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) is solved for the observable P , it
is solved for any observable A .
So what solution can be conceived for coding-measurement successions of P for a microstate
ms(free,1)cG(q f ) ? One could think of indirect measurements, via test-particles that, after interaction
with a studied microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) , would admit a coding-measurement succession (22) in
which the interaction plays the role of operation G of generation of the testing-microstate (Comp-
ton interaction, for instance). This, however, would permit by construction non-representable and
a fortiori non-verifiable effects of the inner quantum fields of the studied microstate, upon the ob-
served eigenvalue. In other words, it would continue the systematic ignorance of the specificities
introduced by the quantum field from a free microstate with composed operation of generation; it
would amount to nourish the sort of unverifiable fictitious extensions of the linear Hilbert-Dirac iden-
tified in (32), from the case of microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) to the case of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) .
This however would be a heavy error, because the passage from microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) to mi-
crostates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) places on a conceptual frontier that marks an outside-inside passage. In
the coding-measurement successions from (22), the specimen of the studied microstate msG is
subject itself and as a whole to the coding-evolution via H ( A ) , nothing violates the inner structure
of the involved specimen. The corpuscular wave from contains no quantum field so it is as if
transparent for H ( A ) that works upon the singularity from from outside as if it were a small
classical mobile. While for a microstate from the category ms(free,1)cG(q f ) the inside of any
specimen (msG ) (cf. Section 6.2) withstands a purely classical effect of H ( A ) , from outside , at
least for the fundamental momentum quantity, that thereby ceases to be via (22) an observable in
the sense of QMHD , with respect to the representation (16) of the microstate msG12 To try to solve
such a problem by an intrusion of a test-microstate, would manifest an inertial blindness with respect
to the factual essence of the coding problem that must be solved.
An a priori possible way. These considerations lead us to the following general idea. The
whole dBB approach accepts quite essentially de Broglies well known guiding relation (indicated
in only one spatial dimension)

p (x, y, z,t) = grad.(x, y, z,t) = (ii / x + j / y + k / z)(x, y, z,t) (33)

where (x, y, z,t) is the phase-function of the physical corpuscular wave represented by the wave-
function (x, y, z,t) = a(x, y, z,t)e(i/h)(x,y,z,t) assigned to each specimen of the studied microstate,
accordingly to the modeling postulate from Section 6.2 and the notational convention from Section
7.1 (in this case one has to write in all three spatial dimensions).
Inside the dBB approach the guidance law (33) is asserted deductively and with full generality,
in the presence as well as in the absence of quantum fields. However the guidance law is
quasi-unanimously considered to be unobservable.
Even de Broglie and Bohm adhered to this view. It is believed that as soon as one would try
to register a guidance-trajectory by interaction of the singularity from the de Broglie wave (rr ,t)
62

assigned to a specimen of the studied microstate, the beginning of the interaction would disturb
the phase and compromise the continuation of the interaction. But this idea is asserted on the basis
of only a qualitative and absolute reasoning, without analyzing in detail whether yes or not a choice
of the values of the involved parameters is theoretically possible, that would permit the registration
of a guiding trajectory out of which the value of p j , at the time t when the interaction begins, can be
calculated.
So I have accomplished this theoretical examination (Mugur-Schchter, 1968b) inside de
Broglies double solution theory and I have realized the following proof concerning the guiding
trajectory, denoted guid :
guid . The assertion that registrations on de Broglies guiding trajectory are possible inside
an auto-interference microstate of the general type (16) in conditions that permit to calculate
from the registration the corresponding momentum-value from (33) for the time t when the
registration has begun, is compatible both conceptually and mathematically with de Broglies
theory of double-solution74 .
Now, once this abstract compatibility guid would have been associated with an experimentally
established possibility of registration, many consequences would follow:
- Its validity for any free microstate that a priori seems quasi-obvious would have to be
established formally with full generality.
- The dBB approach would then transmute from an interpretation of QMHD , into a verifiable
theory of microstates.
- The registration of guidance trajectories could then be organized into a systematic procedure
for organizing the coding-measurement succession for a concept of momentum defined by (33).
- The coding-measurement succession for the momentum via registration of guiding trajectories
would be applicable to any free microstate, with quantum fields, or not, so it would be more general
that (22).
- Since any classical dynamical quantity A is defined as a function A(x, px ), the mentioned more
general coding-measurement succession for the fundamental quantity of momentum would lead to the
definition of the corresponding coding-measurement succession for any dynamical quantity A.
- The whole structure indicated above for the organization of factual coding-measurement suc-
cessions would have to be placed beneath the postulate P(rep.HD[Gt .MesA]), on a ground level en-
dowed with remarkable generality75 and where the specificities of quantum fields appear fully. While
(22) would acquire the status of a particular possibility tied with the Hilbert-Dirac formalism and
concerning only the microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) , as case that neighbors classical mechanics and con-
nects to it.
These arguments suffice for indicating the importance of the way opened by (33).
On the proposed experiment. The preceding enumeration is not exhaustive but it suffices for
expressing that the stake involved by an experiment concerning the proof guid , is considerable. So
let us detail on the experiment. We denote it in advance EXP.1 (Experiment 1).
The proof guid idealizes the situation from (16) into a physical superposition of plane waves.
Nevertheless I summarize below the essence of the proof because it might contain suggestions for the
realization of EXP.1 (the notations do not distinguish between physical wave and state-function, but
the factual reality does, so it is certain that only physical waves specimens of microstates come in).
One starts with a free precursor state of electron of which the state-function has as much as
possible the structure of a plane wave. This precursor-state encounters a wave-front dividing element
that splits it into two practically plane wave-packets of state-ket 1 and 2 that superpose inside a
delimited but comfortably big space-time domain where reigns an interference-state from the same
general category as (16). This is the microstate to be studied. The directions of propagations of the
packets 1 and 2 make an angle , and they make equal angles 0 with the axis z . According to
74 We include a translation of the original French version in Appendix 2.
75 The case of bound states still remains to be examined.
63

QMHD the state inside the space-time domain where there is interference is represented by a state-ket

|G0 i = |1 i + |2 i = 2 cos(2(/V ) cos z + /2)e2i(t(x/V sin ) ei( /2) (34)

where designates the phase-difference. With respect to the introduced referential, the guidance
relation asserts for the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude the de Broglie-wave (x, y, z,t) =
a(x, y, z,t)e(i/h)(x,y,z,t) a velocity with the following components

vx = v0 sin = const, vy = vz = 0 (35)

So the momentum-components are

px = Mvx = Mv0 sin , py = pz = 0 (36)

where M designates the quantum mass of the electron, in the sense of de Broglie (1956).

Fig. 3

Now the proof guid shows that the values from (36) can be observed if the experimental pa-
rameters are adequately dominated: The effect of ionizing interactions between the singularity of
the corpuscular wave of the studied specimen of the microstate represented in (35) and the molecules
from the sensitive substance from the registration device, together with the quantum forces generated
by these interactions, do not suppress the phase relation that determines (33) if the kinetic energy of
the involved specimen of the studied microstate is sufficiently big with respect to the energy spent in
one elastic or ionising interaction. So:
With a sufficiently high kinetic energy for the incident state, one can calculate the momentum
from (35) by associating the tangent at the origin of the trajectory, with the total number of ionizations;
while the first impact defines the initial position r with respect the referential of the laboratory: Such
a registration would violate Heisenbergs principle and would permit to delimit clearly the domain of
validity of the uncertainty theorem from QMHD .
This is only what has been proved in guid , inside de Broglies theory of double solution. But of
course any other direct experiment of registration of guidance-trajectory data permitting to determine
the value of corresponding concept of momentum for heavy auto-interference microstates would
possess the same importance of principle. And probably the best choice would be to work with a
neutron-Young-state. This would from the start introduce relatively high kinetic energies, and would
avoid any effect produced by electromagnetic fields. In short:
Contrarily to an a-critical belief in various impossibilities, nothing, but nothing of logical or
mathematical nature withstands the idea of principle that it is possible to register on a free self-
interfering microstate, data concerning the de Broglie-Bohm guidance-trajectory, permitting to
determine from these the value of the de Broglie-Bohm concept of momentum of the involved
corpuscular-like singularity.
64

The essence of this same idea founds other recent developments, theoretical and experimental
ones: Outstandingly, the fundamental concept of weak measurements introduced by Aharonov and
Vaidman (2007), and Aephraim Steinbergs registration of photonic trajectories (2011).
The possible consequences of the realization of EXP.1. Let us estimate briefly the possible
consequences of EXP.1.
(a). This experiment EXP.1 could show that it is not possible to calculate the momentum-value
of a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) from the registration of the involved guidance-trajectory. In this case
the approach dBB remains indeed what it is considered to be, namely an interpretation of QMHD .
Correlatively, the representation of quantum measurements attempted at in this work, stops here.
(b). This experiment EXP.1 shows that it is possible to calculate the momentum-value of a
microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) from the registration of the involved guidance-trajectory. In this case the
approach dBB stops having the status of an interpretation of QMHD . The conceptual situation is in
fact radically reversed: While it has appeared here that QMHD cannot lead to experimental verifica-
tions of its calculated predictions concerning microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) , the approach dBB opens
up the possibility of such verifications, whereby it becomes a physical theory in the full sense of this
expression: A more fundamental and general theory than QMHD , since for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc)
measurements of the momentum by registration of traces are practiced currently and in most cases
the guidance relation (33) holds.
A constructive bet. In what follows I take the bet that the possibility (b) comes true. So, on
this only presupposed foundation, I immediately sketch out in what follows the [IQM-QMHD ] rep-
resentation of, also, measurements for ms(free,1)cG(q f ) , inside the same general framework that has
been defined for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) . In this way the representation of quantum measure-
ments upon free microstates according to [IQM-QMHD ] will be available already just from now, to be
gauged and perfected.

7.6. The [IQM-QMHD ] representation of quantum measurements on a free microstate of one


microsystem, with quantum fields

7.6.1. Postulate for coding-measurement successions of the momentum-value of microstates


ms(free,1)cG(q f )

The coding-postulate. If the value of the fundamental dynamical quantity of momentum in


a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) can be calculated from an observable registration of the guidance-
trace, this permits inside the general framework for coding-measurement successions defined in to
replace the coding postulate P(rep.[Gt .MesA])G(nc) for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) with the following
coding-postulate P(rep.[Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) valid for any free microstate :
P(rep.[Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) . A coding-measurement-succession where the measurement opera-
tion acts upon a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) obeys the representation

[[(Gt ).Mes.pp( )] dB guid.trace p j ], j = 1, 2, . . . , J (37)

that is to be read as follows: Gt generates a specimen of msGt initially represented by an


unknown wave-function ; a measurement Mes.pp on consists of registrations on the de
Broglie guidance-trace that permit to calculate out of them the value p j of p accordingly to the
de Broglie definition (33), for a microstate, of the fundamental concept of momentum.
The concept of momentum involved in (37) circumvents the Hilbert-Dirac definition of a
quantum-mechanical observable. It circumvents the whole Hilbert-Dirac formalization. Moreover,
the point where the registration of a guiding-trace begins, defines the position r (t) of the singular-
ity in the amplitude of the involved specimen , so (37) gets rid of Heisenbergs principle and
of the Heisenberg theorem from QMHD , if the experiment EXP.1 establishes the calculability of the
65

momentum-values from observable registrations of guidance-traces. This permits also a conjoint


version of (37):

[[(Gt ).Mes.pp( )] dB guid.trace r k , p j )], k = 1, 2, . . . , K, j = 1, 2, . . . , J (37)

The coding-measurement postulate (37), (37) transposes the classical concept of momentum di-
rectly from the classical mechanics to the de Broglie-Bohm wave-mechanics, via the Jacobi formu-
lation of classical mechanics by the use of the action-function, that has founded de Broglies thesis
(1924, re-edited in 1963) as well as his theory of double solution (1957). It entails a prolongation
based on considerations concerning orders of magnitude, of the classical way of defining any dynam-
ical quantity A(t) as a function A(rr (t), p (t)), into the dBB representation.

7.6.2. A transmutation of the dBB approach with respect to QMHD

The dBB representation of microphenomena starts with the Jacobi formulation of classical
mechanics where it suppresses the conditions that restrict to a geometrical approximation. Then
this representation is progressively specified without individualizing neither only conceptually nor
in a physical-operational way the concept of microstate and of specimen of a microstate. This
representation, though it is mathematical, remains global, continuous, a-observational, it concerns the
microphysical reality as a whole described in current language in a way that contains individualizing
words. Louis de Broglies theory of measurements (1956) remains as if juxtaposed in a peripheral
way to this representation.
Whereas inside the framework [IQM-QMHD ] if the experiment EXP.1 establishes the calcu-
lability of the values p j and (rr k , p j ) from, respectively, (37) and (37), then the association

[(MP(msG,cw ))((1)G { (msG })((37),(37) P(rep. [Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) )] (38)

(where MP(msG,cw ) is the modeling postulate from Section 6.2), constitutes a channel for the adduc-
tion of the approach dBB into the realm of scientific representations in operational terms compatible
with communication, verification and consensus. This entails an immediate prolongation of classical
mechanics to heavy micro-systems consisting of de Broglie corpuscular waves.
Thereby inside [IQM-QMHD ] the whole dBB approach transmutes from a sort of mathematized
metaphysics of the microscopic physical reality, into a basic and extended domain of the fully
verifiable theory of microstates that we try to delineate here.
The QMHD formalization could then be superposed to this ground level for the particular case
of the microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) . A genuine inversion takes place, with respect to the belief that the
dBB approach is an interpretation of QMHD ].

7.6.3. An experiment EXP.2 for verifying the factual truth of the quantum mechanical prediction

The coding-measurement postulate (37) permits to verify the factual truth of the QMHD predic-
tions of the type (32). We stress immediately that:
The question of the factual truth of the prediction (32) has to be radically distinguished from
the question of non-verifiability of the prediction (32) by procedures that are mathematically
compatible with the Hilbert-Dirac representation of microstates.
Indeed it is not at all excluded a priori that the prediction (32) be factually true approximately
notwithstanding that it is not verifiable inside QMHD . This seems even very likely in consequence
of the primordially statistical character of any representation of microstates, i.e. in consequence of
the fact foundational inside IQM that a transferred description (9) of a microstate is irrepress-
ibly a primarily probabilistic description. Indeed the coding-measurement successions (22) that are
consistent with the Hilbert-Dirac representation are statistical correlations tied with the fluctuations
involved quite essentially in the basic relation (1); while these same fluctuations act also in (37). If
66

the QMHD prediction came out to be sufficiently factually true, the conceptual situation would be
interesting. It would manifest a sort of foggy refraction from the inside the specimens of of the
studied microstate involved in (37), into the linear formalism of QMHD where only the action of the
external macroscopic fields from the Hamiltonian operators H are represented explicitly76 , while the
observable effects of the quantum fields from inside a microstate with quantum fields in the sense
of the modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ) from Section 6.2 are taken into account only implicitly, from
the outside of the microstate and globally.
Now, notwithstanding that the assertion Ass.2 is no more available when the predictional effi-
ciency of the Hilbert-Dirac representation (32) is to be examined, the verification of the existence of
an approximate factual truth of the QMHD prediction (32) can be achieved by an experiment EXP.2,
as follows.
According to the assertion Ass.1 valid for any sort of microstate one generates the IQM
probabilistic description for the momentum-values p j

(DoM (msG ))t /p [(, , N0 ){ 0 (Gt , p j )}t , (M pc(Gt ))AB ], AB VMec , j = 1, 2, . . . , J (9)

via coding-measurement-successions (37) (/: relatively to). Then the obtained probabilities from
the probability law { 0 (Gt , p j )}t determined factually in this way, are compared one by one with
the corresponding QMHD probability 12 (pp j ) predicted by (32). If the results show equalities (inside
the a priori accepted fluctuations involved in (9) by the choice of a triad (, , N0 ) and in (22) by
the choice of a space-time domain (x j t j ), then the QMHD prediction is factually sufficiently true,
though the process of verification cannot be represented in terms compatible with QMHD .

7.6.4. The [IQM-QMHD ] representation of measurements on microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f )

If the experiment EXP.1 establishes the experimental calculability of the momentum-value p j


from the registration of its guidance-trace, the formulation of an acceptable theory of microstates
inside the provisional structure [IQM-QMHD ] defined here is de-blocked. Indeed this representation
can now be investigated and outlined rigorously, on the level of principles for also the case
of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) , in direct prolongation of the representation specified already for
microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) . In this case:
- IQM remains of course entirely valid at the basis of, also, the question of measurements
on microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) . So, in particular, the principle that any measurement on a free
microstate can only be represented on the individual level of conceptualization, via repetitions of
individual coding-measurement successions [Gt .MesA], remains generally valid and fundamental.
- The assertion Ass.1 remains generally valid and fundamental as an unavoidable connective
between IQM and on the other hand QMHD as well as any other mathematical theory of microstates.
From here on we enter a domain of uncertainties, to be settled:
- The coding-measurement-evolution for a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) obeys now specifically
the postulate (37) P(rep.[Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) . But P(rep.[Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) is valid for also for mi-
crostates ms(free,1)G(nc) . So:
- The assertion Ass.2 remains valid, but only in the following sense:
* If the experiment EXP.2 shows factual approximate validity of the QMHD predictions
(32), then the assertion Ass.2 but involving the coding-measurement successions (37), (37) re-
mains practically valid also for the microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) . So from a pragmatic point of
view the calculi inside the QMHD representation can be made use of as before, as well as for con-
structing factually a QMHD state-ket of the type (16) exactly as indicated by the Ass.2.
76 It seems queer to speak of the inside and outside of a concept so vaguely delimited in space as a microstate in the sense of the
modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ). But the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of a physical corpuscular de Broglie wave is
clearly inside this wave, whether this waves does generates a quantum field, or not. The coding-measurement successions (22) explicated
inside QMHD transform globally the physical wave of the involved specimen ; whereas the coding-measurement successions (37),
(37) are accomplished inside this physical wave. This distinction might come out to be very fertile.
67

But of course, from a conceptual point of view this would be a heterogeneous attitude
that remains to be modified. Indeed on the level of principle there remains a true problem that has to
be solved even if the mathematical representation of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) by a linear super-
position of mutually non-orthogonal state-vectors does work approximately:
What sense would have inside [IQM-QMHD ] a basis of eigenket in a Hilbert space assigned
to a state-vector |G(G1 ,G2 ) (x,t)i, when there is no coding-measurement evolution that on
the basis of an in principle rigorous representation leads factually to an eigenket from that
basis? (Even inside QMHD alone already, what sense has the projection postulate?).
* If moreover the experiment EXP.2 shows an observable factual non-compatibility with
the QMHD predictions (32), then for a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) the the assertion Ass.2 is reduced
to exclusively the possibility of factual construction of the probabilistic description (DoM (msG ))t /pp
(9) by use of coding-measurement successions (37). So everything is clearly outside the Hilbert-
Dirac-Gleason formalism, both from a practical standpoint or a point of view of principle. Then
the mathematical QMHD representations of type (16), (16) of the state-function to be tied with this
factually constructed description would be devoid of any utility and it would have to be reconsidered
immediately.
- The assertion Ass.3 drops out. So a mathematical representation of the meta-probabilistic cor-
relations (M pc(Gt ))AB inside the probability-tree of the studied microstate ms(free,1)cG(q f ) , remains
to be worked out.
- The assertion Ass.4 remains valid. But when a Hilbert-space representation of the studied the
microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) is found to be useless Gleasons theorem is absent, while correlatively
no mathematical representation is available, so Borns postulate is of no use either.
In short:
For factual verifications and for factual constructions the framework founded upon (37) P(rep.
[Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) can be utilized for any free microstate of one microsystem, with or without quan-
tum field, and this permits to make use of the classical definition A(t) = A(rr (t), p (t)) for any dynam-
ical quantity A (neglecting the principle and the theorem of Heisenberg).
As for the particular case of microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) the representation worked out in Sec-
tion 7.4 remains integrally valid in its principle also with respect of this new treatment. But for
microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) the assertions Ass2-Ass.4 apply only as specified above.
And the problem of a conceptually rigorous mathematical representation of microstates
ms(free,1)cG(q f ) remains open:
Quite independently of the outcome of the EXP.2, the problem of verifiability of (16) i.e. of
the coding-measurement successions formulated in Section 7.5.1 entails already by itself the
quite fundamental question of principle of the conceptual adequacy of an additive mathematical
Hilbert-space representation of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) ; and even more radically, of the
possibility of an adequate Hilbert-space representation of such microstates.
The problem of verifiability of the probabilistic predictions for microstates with quantum fields
opens up the question how verifiable probabilistic predictions for such microstates can be represented
mathematically in a way that be rigorously acceptable from the joint points of view of mathematical
coherence, of verifiability of the factual truth of these predictions, and of intelligibility.
These considerations close the question of the representation of quantum measurements on free
microstates inside the framework [IQM-QMHD ]. The general scheme of how this representation can
be dealt with is fully sketched out for any free microstate ms(free,1). The unanimously recognized
problem of reduction is finally closed; while new problems have been revealed and left open for
now. But they are spelled out and their position of principle is specified.
68

7.7. A remark on the faint possibility of an adequate Hilbert-space representation of


microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f )

We add just a hasty remark concerning the direction in which one could try to define in extremis
a factually verifiable Hilbert-space representation of microstates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) .
If one follows the line of thought that generates the definitions of Section 2.1, a microstate
ms(free,1)cG(q f ) can be designated as :
One physically realized micro-state of one micro-system involving two or several only partially
instilled micro-states of that one micro-system.
The de Broglie operator (33) (grad) acts exclusively on the phase function of this unique
physically realized microstate, at an explicit level of mathematical expression the amplitude function
does not come in. This hinders any direct connection with probabilistic estimations by the help of
this operator; it is an internal operator with respect the studied microstate. On the other hand this
de Broglie internal operator introduces eigenvalues that are vector-sums of those introduced by the
Hilbert-space representation of the microstate |G(G1 ,G2 ) i from (16) with respect to the basis defined
by the quantum mechanical momentum operator (h/i)grad. In these conditions one might try to
consider the possibility of a Hilbert-space representation by a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces
of the two state-ket summed in (16) that are only partially realized inside the studied microstate,
genetically mixed with one another by the operation of generation G(G1 , G2 ) (this would addition
the two phases so the global gradient would introduce vector sums of separate momenta, while the
expansion coefficients would yield way to calculi of probabilities). But in such a case none among
the descriptors already defined inside QMHD seems to be adequate (neither a tensor product of two or
more Hilbert spaces each one of which includes its own representation of a physical space-time, nor
a density matrix)77 . One should envisage a tensor product of two exclusively abstract Hilbert spaces
for |G1 i and |G2 i and that are somehow conveniently connected with one common physical space-
time Hilbert-space for |G(G1 ,G2 ) i alone where an observable interference pattern should be asserted
for the presence probability as a function of time.
But such a convenient connection might come out not to be possible (not any mathematical
language is fit for expressing any physical-conceptual situation).

7.8. The case of one free microstate with two or more microsystems

We consider only the case of one microstate of two microsystems that is involved in Bells the-
orem on non-locality. I have exposed elsewhere what I call a conceptual invalidation of Bells proof
(namely the fact that the conclusion, as it is expressed verbally, does not follow from the mathemat-
ical proof). But this feature is not relevant in the present context. So here I confine to the following
remarks.
According to the modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ) from Section 6.2 every specimen of one
microstate of two microsystems (defined in Section 2.1) involves two corpuscular-like de Broglie
singularities. On the other hand the dBB wave function is common by definition because only
one operation of generation G comes in. So it seems natural to conceive that it subsists through-
out the coding-measurement succession where is involved, while the singularities recede from
one-another. So these singularities are never isolated from one-another. So the spins of these two
singularities that are likely to be only features specific of the singularities involved by can
be conceived to be permanently connected via the common wave, so there is no a priori reason for
believing that their values are not correlated; on the contrary. And though the way in which they are
correlated is not stated for now, in the future it might be stated in a way that has nothing to do with the
77 A tensor product of two exclusively abstract Hilbert spaces somehow connected with only one physical space-time frame could be
envisaged. But a guidance trace depends on the existence of a quantum field. This might involve gauge conditions while a general
mathematical theory of quantum fields is not available, etc. So it might be that a fully convenient Hilbert-space representation of microstates
ms(free,1)cG(q f ) is not possible.
69

orientations of the two involved apparatuses. These can be conceived to determine what will be reg-
istered concerning the two spins, so which correlation will become manifest, but without determining
also the existence of a correlation for each possible apparatuses-orientation. In these conditions, what
is the point in imposing an Einstein condition of locality? What is the point in hasting for changing
the orientations of the apparatuses just at the last moment before the registration? One has the feeling
that the whole reasoning related with Bells theorem applies to two pebbles that are receding from
one another.
Of course, all these considerations are on models. But I hope that nobody will object any more
that models are interdicted. By now Bohr is far and it has become clear, I think, that without models
one cannot even try to construct a theory of microstates, one cannot reason, prove, conceive. And
indeed the whole problem of non-locality concerns a model. And Bells proof only eliminates the
model implied by him.

7.9. The case of bounded microstates

With respect to the essential specificities of the descriptions of microstates such as these have
been organized first inside IQM and then inside the framework the framework [IQM-QMHD ], the
case of bounded microstates cumulates the limiting conceptual characters that expose to confusions.
Among these the following two are major sources of confusion:
- The state is permanently captured inside a small domain physical space-time (not an abstract
space of representation) that is included into a bigger abstract representation space. This leaves much
place to confusions.
- In this case, like in the case of a free state (16), the state-function from the statistical state-ket
|Gt i and the de Broglie wave-function superpose nearly exactly (only the variable location onside
the wave-function makes the difference).
- The state-ket is from the start conceived to be also an eigenket of the total energy observable
H , which in this case is formally possible, conceptually as well as formally.
- The human observer did not himself achieve deliberately the involved operation G of gen-
eration; this operation has been achieved naturally before the beginning of the human investigation.
So from the point of view of the basic operation G a bound microstate is like a classical object, it
just pre-exists outside there. So the measurements can be conceived in the classical manner, outside
successions [G.MesA].
These features tie the problem of measurements operated upon bound states, to classical
physics as much as to quantum mechanics. These measurements are achieved via test-elements (pho-
tons, Compton collisions, etc.) or by effects in classical fields (Stark, Zeeman) and entail a merger
with classical atomic and molecular physics. Thereby the most specific problems raised by quantum
measurements remain hidden in the case of measurements on bound states. By appropriate identifi-
cations of conceptual terms these measurements can be a posteriori integrated into a well-organized
theory of quantum measurements (Mugur-Schchter, 2014b), but in fact such a theory of quantum
measurements is not necessary for measurements on bound states.

7.10. Conclusion of Chapter 7

Throughout this work the problem of quantum measurements has worked like a revealing tool.
It has brought into evidence that the representation of microstates offered by QMHD is founded upon
the belief that it is possible to construct statistical predictions concerning non-perceptible microstates
by a nearly exclusive use of mathematical means (the unique exception very inconspicuously intro-
duced is the fact that one has to give initial conditions for disposing of the solution of the problem
via Schrdingers equation). Thereby the whole problem of the construction of the predictive statistics
itself out of nothingness is occulted. The whole content that in this work has been concentrated
inside the reference-structure called IQM remains simply unrealized inside QMHD . In these condi-
70

tions the distinction between the individual and physical conceptualization on the one hand, and on
the other hand the abstract statistical representations, is absent.
And when finally one is face-to-face with the problem of the verification of the only mathemat-
ically obtained statistical predictions, it is tried to represent also the verification itself by statistical
means, namely by the help of a sort of state-ket for measurement evolutions, supplemented by all
the necessary postulates. The result is that
Nowadays quantum mechanics is devoid of a conceptually acceptable and factually applicable
representation of measurements.
Inside this Chapter this incredible lacuna might come out to have been compensated in its
essence by a constructive approach. This approach, whether the development will be confirmed or
not, has been possible only in consequence of the use of the reference structure IQM and because von
Neumanns scheme for representing measurements has been dropped from the start78 . The construc-
tion remains to be achieved. It incorporates two fundamental questions that remain open.
The first question consists of the result of a crucial experiment on the measurability of the
de Broglies concept of momentum via registrations of guiding traces. This experiment has been
thoroughly defined and all the major consequences of the possible outcomes have been discussed.
The second question concerns the mathematical Hilbert-space representation of microstates
with quantum fields.
This question however does not threat the basic features of the representation of measurements
sketched out in this Chapter: the individual conceptual level, the general structure, the connec-
tions with factuality as well as with the statistical level of conceptualization.
I choose to bet that the outcome of the proposed experiment EXP.1 will permit the new repre-
sentation of microstates proposed here. I make this choice in order to be able to close the constructive
approach from the second part of this work, by a final integration. But also, much less avoidably,
I ground the mentioned choice upon the fact that measurable dBB momenta of corpuscular-like
singularities would insure so much intelligibility and conceptual unity that it seems to me unlikely
that this measurability be not possible; the marvellous harmony that manifests itself so strikingly and
continuously in the inner relations from this Whole formed by the physical reality and the human
mind, does not tolerate violation.

INTEGRATION OF QM2

In the course of Chapters 57 various features of what has been a priori named QM2 have emerged
scattered chaotically. Now I shall very briefly organize them in an integrated way that permit to per-
ceive the sources, the contours and the essence of the contents of QM2. Here this process will be
synthetic in the extreme. Any elaboration will be banished. Inside this work the aim is not to offer a
fully achieved new theory of microstates. It is only to identify the conceptual loci wherefrom unin-
telligibility is spouting inside QMHD , to clean these away, and to open up a well-defined framework
for an exhaustive subsequent elaboration of an achieved new representation of microstates.

8.1. The source-domains, the roles they played up to now, their present integrative role

The source-domains that come in are the Infra-(Quantum Mechanics) IQM, the Hilbert-Dirac
formulation of quantum mechanics QMHD , and the de Broglie-Bohm representation of microreality
dBB.
Retrospect. IQM has first acted as a reference structure that has offered a priori conceptual
78 Imagine what would have happened all along the path followed inside Chapter 7 if von Neumanns representation would have been
accepted. The whole false problem of decoherence would have come in, where physical phenomena of coherence and decoherence
(Cohen-Tannoudji et al., 1996, 1973) are confounded with only formal mathematical facts.
71

insight on any mathematical theory of microstates. Then QMHD has been brought and IQM and
QMHD have constituted together a provisional framework [IQM-QMHD ] where a critical-constructive
examination of QMHD has been developed. This examination has brought forth the absence inside
QMHD of an acceptable representation of quantum measurements. The attempt at compensating this
lacuna hit a limit of the adequacy of the Hilbert-Dirac formalism and it drew in with a sort of necessity
the dBB approach also. While this evolution developed, inside the framework [IQM-QMHD ], IQM
and QMHD merged into an embryo of the researched new representation of microstates named MQ2.
QMHD is still considered nowadays quasi-unanimously as a formally general and factually true
theory of microstates, but that raises questions concerning the representation of quantum measure-
ments involved by it. At its start the aim of the present work was only to elucidate the representation
of measurements inside QMHD . But as soon as IQM had been constructed and the comparative anal-
yses with QMHD began, the efficiency and adequacy assigned to the formalism from QMHD , suffered
the above-mentioned deterioration. And this process went progressively so deep and so far that the
initial aim of this work transmuted into the new aim to sketch out a new representation of microstates.
Integrative aim. The Hilbert-Dirac framework remains very attractive in consequence of the
fact that Gleasons theorem permits a very direct and systematic association with factuality, in the
sense of assertion Ass.2.
On the other hand, the dBB approach associated with the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw )
and with the coding-measurement successions (37), (37) and with the basic definition of any
mechanical quantity A as a function A(rr , p ) permits to represent in a unified way the mea-
surements on any free microstate, while the case of bound states is organically tied with the
classical microphysics.
So we have to organize more explicitly a conceptual whole where a general ground level offers
the possibility to represent measurements on any free microstate, while on a second level, also a fully
acceptable Hilbert-Dirac representation of measurements is secured for a category of free microstates
as large as possible because such a mathematical representation is very practical for algorithmic
dealings with probabilities. But we stress that the adequacy of the Hilbert-Dirac framework for rep-
resenting quantum measurements on microstates of any type, is in no way a sine qua non condition
for an acceptable theory of microstates, while the coding possibility is a sine qua non condition, and
it requires a general model of a microstate.

8.2. The boundaries of QM2

These are defined by the ground level introduced by the dBB approach. The dBB approach is
utilized inside QM2 via the adduction-triad

[ (MP(msG,cw )) ((1) G { (msG )}) ( (37),(37) P(rep. [Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) )] (38)

that permits to specify the coding-measurement successions involved by the factor MesA from a
measurement-succession [G.Mes(A)]. It also introduces a mathematical though metaphysical rep-
resentation for the whole microscopic factuality (probably a unique sort of case in modern science).
Via the dBB approach QM2 merges with the Jacobi representation of the classical mechanics by the
help of an action function that unifies the Newtonian mechanics and the geometric optics. Louis
de Broglie has continued the Jacobi representation by suppressing the restriction geometrical optics,
whereby the microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) were introduced (cf. de Broglie 1956). While via the dBB
approach again QM2 with a postulated factual micro-physical substratum called the quantum fluctu-
ations.
In particular, for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) the coding-measurement successions defined by
the postulate ((37),(37) P(rep. [Gt .MesA])cG(q f ) ) can be replaced by (22) P(rep.[Gt .MesA])G(nc)
and in this case the Hilbert-Dirac representation steps in. So according to QM2, the Hilbert-Dirac rep-
resentation is edified upon the general scientific ground-level extracted from dBB via the channel
72

(38) that operates adductions in terms accessible to generation of verifiable and consensual human
knowledge.

8.3. The main characters of the inner structure of QM2

The inner representation of the formalism from QM2 is strictly subjected to all the requirements
from IQM. These introduce the general structural qualitative but syntactic requirements to be a
priori imposed to any theory of microstates:
- The individual level of conceptualization, and the statistical one, are explicitly and radically
distinguished from one-another.
- The microstates are classified according to the definitions from Section 2.1.
- The passage from the individual level of conceptualization, onto the statistical one, is webbed
by individual coding-measurement successions [G.Mes(A)].
- The description of any microstate is a primordially transferred description and it is always
inserted into a tree-like structure of the general type defined in Chapter 3 and Fig. 2. This sort of
structure defines a sort of unity of primordially transferred description. Etc. In short:
The general structural aspects are defined outsideQM2, by IQM. And inside the mathematical
theory of microstates QM2 the semantic aspects are introduced by the modelling postulate
MP(msG,cw ) and the coding-measurement successions defined by the postulates (37), (37) or
(22). Without these the passage from the individual level of conceptualization, onto the
statistical one, cannot be factually achieved.
The revelation of the unavoidable necessity inside any mathematical theory of a domain of
physical reality of descriptive elements of the same nature as MP(msG,cw ) and (22), (37), and playing
the same general type of role, constitutes one of the main results generated by the face--face IQM-
QMHD : Bohrs interdiction of any ontological model, and the long-lasting stagnation caused by it,
are finally dissolved and this liberates the means to go deeper.
As for QMHD , it shows how a mathematical Hilbert-space representation can be made use of,
it suggests the Ass.3, and most important it offers a list of conceptual errors to be avoided from
now on.
The connection between the IQM qualitative syntax and the QM2 Hilbert-Dirac mathematical
syntax is insured by the assertions Ass.1, Ass.2, Ass.4.
These assertions swathe the whole mathematical representation in a trellis of factual constructs
that merge with it and duplicates and controls its outputs. This sort of new possibility also is a
specific effect of the face--face IQM-QMHD , and a potentially very useful one at the time of
Moores law.
The general features of MQ2 spelled out above suffice for just defining the principles of the
representation of microstates entailed by the approach developed in this work. The possibility of a
Hilbert-Dirac representation of microstates with inner quantum-fields is the main problem that non
dramatically remains open.

8.4. The postulates

1. Validity of the whole reference-structure IQM is postulated.


(This is a massive structural postulation).
2. The modeling postulate MP(msG,cw ).
3. The coding-measurement postulate (22) for microstates ms(free,1)G(nc) .
4. The coding-measurement postulate (33) for miocrostates ms(free,1)cG(q f ) .
(The postulates 3 and 4 will probably come out to be replaceable by deductions).
5. The postulated equation of Schrdinger evolution of a state-function |G (rr ,t)|.
6. A postulated equation of evolution of a individual physical wave-function (rr ,t) (possibly
distinct of the Schrdinger equation).
73

7. The postulate of presence probability (rr ) |G (rr ,t)|2 .


It will probably be possible to introduce all the other necessary propositions either as defini-
tions, or as conclusions of theorems.
It seems worth to notice that besides the coding postulates 3 and 4 that will probably both
transmute into proved assertions) there are no measurement-postulates79 :
The postulation of the IQM general structure introduces a clear distinction between syntactic
aspects and semantic aspects and thereby it economizes semantic postulates and it introduces intelli-
gibility.

79 Practically the whole inner content of QM2 can be constructed in a way similar to that practiced for IQM.
74

Classical mechanics (Jacobi formulation)

Zone of the approximation of geometrical optic.

Zone where the approximation is abolished

The dBB representation,


The corpuscular wave model of
Louis de Broglie

G
IQM IQM
QMHD

[G.MesA], MP(msG-cw), (msG)

QM2
75

8.5. Conclusion of Chapter 8

We have outlined very succinct indications on the sources, the contours and the postulates for
an explicit future development of QMHD from the embryo constituted inside Chapter 7 around the
problem of quantum measurements. Such a development can now be performed upon a conceptual
ground that has been cleaned up via the explicit construction of the main lines of an acceptable theory
of quantum measurements where we have defined the basic structures and the open problems. Those
not numerous indeed who feel critical with respect to QMHD (for instance Abbott, Calude, Conder,
and Svozil, 2012, Svozil and Tkadlec, 1996, Svozil, 2012, 2014), might draw some profit from the
existence of this modified ground).

QM2 CONSIDERED FROM THE OUTSIDE

9.1. Universality

It is often perceived that QMHD is endowed with a remarkable universality and it is believed
that this is entailed by the fact that any material entity is a structure of microstates. But this belief is
illusory, for two distinct reasons, an epistemological reason and a formal one.
The epistemological reason is the following one.
Though in a non-explicit way, inside what is called quantum mechanics the origin of the cre-
ation of new, of specific knowledge on a given fragment of physical reality but scientific knowl-
edge, communicable, verifiable and consensual, not exclusively imagined metaphysical knowledge
is placed just upon the extreme boundary between the still strict absence of such knowledge, and the
previously conceptualized in scientific terms (Fig. 2). Inside QMHD this origin is not immediately
perceivable because the individual level of scientific conceptualization is occulted, only the already
statistical level is explicitly represented. Nevertheless the individual level also is irrepressibly present
and active. This, I hope has become clear in this work. Now, in such an ultimate epistemological
situation each condition for generating the mentioned sort of knowledge acquires necessity; it be-
comes sine qua non. So, under the pressure of logical-mathematical constraints of coherence and
via trials and errors, each condition becomes perceptible, separately. And even it is not explicated,
purified and put under magnifying glasses as we tried to do in this work, nevertheless it is felt to
be there. Those who perceive universality in the formalism of quantum mechanics perceive more or
less clearly the presence of the concept that we have called transferred primordial description of a
microstate and have denoted D/G, msG ,V /. And they also feel more or less faintly that this concept,
with its primordially statistical character and its relativizing trio /G, msG ,V /, is not confined to the
case of microstates, that msG can be replaced by the symbol of a quite general entity, say G ,
the object-of study-entity generated as such by the operation G80 . They perceive that the study
of microstates introduces an epistemological method that is necessary and sufficient for starting at
some local but total relative zero of knowledge, a process of creation of new and communicable local
knowledge that, by its structure, permits verification and consensus. This happens frequently inside
the classical processes of conceptualization, as much as when micro-entities are involved. But in the
case of micro-entities all the involved descriptive characters are radicalized, non-degenerate, mutually
separable, and that is why the concept of primordially transferred description has revealed itself for
the first time inside microphysics and has entailed new and striking questions of intelligibility as well
as mathematical specificities.
As for the formal reason announced above, it is the following one.
The concept of Hilbert-vector-space via Gleasons theorem offers a very expressive frame-
work for just lodging inside it probability laws that have been established outside this framework.
80 Mugur-Schchter (2002a,b, 2006, 2011).
76

And the concept of probability is omnipresent. But:


This circumstance has no necessary connection with, specifically, microstates. It is illusory
to believe that there exists a direct logical relation between, for instance, social sciences in
general, and on the other hand the concept of microstate.
All the more so as a Hilbert-space formalism seems to possess an only limited adequacy for
satisfactorily representing probabilistic probabilities of measurements on microstates. We are still far
from thoroughly knowing the conditions that restrict the acceptable and fertile association between,
on the one hand, this or that mathematical formal system, and on the other hand a given domain of
reality physical, or social, or economical, or of engineering, etc.
This introduces the following last point.

9.2. Facts, mathematics, knowledge

The approach developed in this work brings into evidence very general and fundamental ques-
tions concerning the relations, inside a mathematical theory of a domain of physical facts, between:
the nature of the considered physical factuality; the cognitive situation that is involved; the sort of
descriptive aims that act; and the mathematical framework that is made use of.
We have created a contrast between two different sorts of descriptive systems, IQM and QMHD .
IQM is a qualitative structure determined by the cognitive relations and the cognitive aims that are
involved when one wants to generate knowledge on microstates, but a structure that is deliberately
constructed void of any definite semantic content. Whereas QMHD is a mathematical theory of mi-
crostates where the semantic contents must be introduced in order to insure the possibility of consen-
sual and verifiable prediction. This has permitted to become fully aware of the crucial role of channels
of adduction of semantic contents into a mathematical theory of physical facts. In the absence of such
channels and well formed the theory is disconnected from the domain of facts that it should
represent. It does not. . . make sense. Furthermore, the semantic void from a mathematical theory of
real facts is always is perceived, it is apprehended as an unintelligibility of which the source cannot
be imagined nor located. And in presence of this sort of unintelligibility the human mind secretes
in a reflex way a tendency to consider the mathematical formalism as if it were a physical reality of
some superior essence, out of reach and immutable like a galaxy or like gravitation. In this way a
mathematical formalism that is applied to an important domain of facts, but is not understood is, both,
reified and transmuted into an idol. It slips out of the domain where we conceive to practice control, it
is just accepted, adored, watched and awed. Often this process involves also a tendency to generalize
to the representation of everything the deified mathematical representation (a representational variant
of proselytism). Which leads to many arbitrary, very long and very difficult elaborations devoid of
any real utility, that often induce us into genuine mathematical fairy tales; like the supposition of a
multiverse (or even a whole set of them), as the theater of the outcomes of acts of measurement, all
this conceived as a (physical ?) consequence of the mathematical von Neumann representation of
quantum measurements!!Which illustrates the stunning degree of implicit identification that quite
currently can be conceived between physical facts and mathematical representations.
I dare to assert that in the present stage of development of the human thought the first, and big
urgency is a scientific and methodological epistemology of the processes of generation of knowledge.

****

INSTEAD OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION

It is likely that the reader of this attempt has often felt himself surprised, tired, and also repelled by
formulations and symbolizations that concern cognitive operations and procedures, not exclusively
the mathematical representation of facts, as required since already three centenaries, with such
77

remarkable success. In as much as this is so the reason might be that this work probably is the
very first one written by a physicist who introduces an epistemological and methodological reference
structure, because knowledge concerning entirely non-perceivable physical entities cannot be created
in exactly the same way as knowledge that starts from direct perceptions of what is described.
Anyhow, now, since the approach and its results are exposed, it has become possible for those
who have accepted to read, to admit or to reject them advisedly.
78

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80

APPENDIX 1

REFLEXION SUR LE PROBLEME DE LOCALIT

M. Mugur Schchter

UNIVERSIT DE REIMS
B.P 347 51062 REMS CEDEX

(EXTRAIT)

Goal
For the past eight years, the so-called locality problem has garnered more and more attention.
Theoreticians, experimentalists, and multi-disciplinary thinkers have all made considerable efforts to
clarify the problem. The technical aspects mathematical and experimental have already been
examined in a large number of works and are well known to those who carry out related research. But
the relevant conceptual framework seems to me to be less well defined. The goal of this section is
to examine this conceptual framework. I shall attempt to carry out this examination in as simple and
striking a way as possible, almost poster-like given the extensive use of diagrams and tables. This
technique seems to me the most suited to the task of highlighting the insufficiencies that I see in the
very definition of the locality problem.
Brief Review.
The EPR Paradox (1935). The locality problem was considered in a well-known theorem by J.
Bell (1), formulated in response to an argument made in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (2).
This argument, known as the EPR paradox", was devised to demonstrate that the quantum mechan-
ical formalism does not provide a complete description of individual microsystems. The hypotheses
that form the point of departure for the EPR paradox are given in the table below (abbreviated nota-
tions are associated with them):

Hypothesis Representation

All quantum mechanical predictions are correct. QM

Quantum mechanics provides a complete description of mi- C(QM)


crosystems.
Physical reality exists independently of observation. It is (d.l.r.)
deterministic and local (or separable).

The EPR paradox consists of proving that the hypotheses listed are not compatible.
The interpretation proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen of this proof is as follows:
The predictions of the quantum formalism are correct. As a result there is no basis for aban-
doning hypothesis QM. Hypothesis (d.l.r.) expresses a metaphysical belief that we are free to
accept or reject. But if we accept it, it must be added to the predictions of quantum mechanics. In
this case, the proof of the incompatibility of the system of hypotheses [QM + C(QM) + (d.l.r.)]
requires us to abandon the completeness hypothesis C(QM). In other words, this proof requires us to
accept the possibility of a deterministic local theory (DLT) of micro-phenomena, in which the quan-
tum formalism would be completed by additional descriptive elements, hidden (with respect to the
quantum formalism) deterministic and local parameters (d.l.h.p.), which make it possible to produce a
complete description of individual microsystems. The complete description provided by a DLT must
81

be compatible with quantum mechanicsgiven hypothesis QMand with relativity theorygiven


hypothesis (d.l.r.), which is an integral part of relativity theory. This set of ideas can be represented
by the following diagram:

EPR Paradox: [ QM + C(QM) + (d.l.r.) ] incompatible

[ EPR Paradox + QM + (d.l.r.) ] X


C(QM)
 
XX
X
| {z }

It must be possible to construct a theory such that:

QM
{DLT [QM + d.l.h.p.]}

RT

Thirty Years Worth of Reactions. Reactions have varied, but the dominant note has clearly
been positivist. The realist hypothesis (d.l.r.) is devoid of operational significance. It is essentially
metaphysical, and therefore external to the scientific approach. The incompatibility of the so-called
EPR paradox only exists with respect to this non-scientific hypothesis and so is not a scientific
problem. It is a false problem as far as science is concerned.
J. Bells Theorem (1964). Thirty years after EPR, John Stewart Bell presented a theorem
that seemed to contradict the interpretation made by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen of their own
proof. The conclusion of Bells theorem can be stated as follows (and in other equivalent ways):
it is not possible in every case using deterministic and local hidden parameters to obtain the same
predictions as quantum mechanics; in some cases these parameters lead to different predictions. In
order to re-establish compliance with the quantum mechanics predictions, the local nature of the
introduced hidden parameters must be removed, which would contradict the (d.l.r.) hypothesis that
is part of relativity theory. Consequently the deterministic theory DLT, compatible with both quantum
mechanics and relativity theory, which Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen thought they had shown to be
possible, is in fact impossible.
The proof is based on an example. Consider two systems S1 and S2 with non-null and cor-
related spin created by the disintegration of an initial system S with null spin. Suppose that spin
measurements are taken in three directions a, b, and c on S1 using apparatus A1 , and in the same di-
rections on S2 using apparatus A2 which may be located at an arbitrarily large distance from A1 . The
(d.l.r.) hypothesis is then formalized: hidden parameters are introduced subject to the condition that
they provide a mathematical translation of deterministic and local constraints. In this way the
conceptualization introduced earlier at the level of clear but qualitative semantics is raised to the level
of syntactisized semantics. Such a procedure is often important because it can make mathematical de-
ductions possible from quantitative conclusions. And in fact Bell showed that the (d.l.r.) hypothesis,
formalized in this way, necessarily brings with it an inequality in the statistical correlations between
the spin measurements recorded by apparatuses A1 and A2 . And yet this inequality is not satisfied by
the statistical correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. One might be able to recover the quan-
tum correlations by removing the condition that mathematically translates the local characteristic
of the hidden parameters introduced, i.e., by giving up part of the (d.l.r.) hypothesis. This can be
expressed by stating that, in the given circumstance, quantum mechanics is non-local or implies
non-local effects, which render it incompatible with (d.l.r.). Bells contribution can be expressed
schematically as follows (note that (d.l.h.p.)B , are the hidden parameters subject to Bells conditions).
82

Bells theorem: (a) (d.l.r.) (d.l.h.p.)B


(b) QM predictions 6= predictions (d.l.h.p.)B

(d.l.r.) X

 X QM


X

HH 
HH QM 
DLT
H

 
HH
RT H
 HH
impossible

Since the statistical results in question are observable, it is possible in principle to establish
experimentally whether the physical facts correspond to the predictions of quantum mechanics or
to those that result from Bells deterministic and local hidden parameters. This is one of the most
significant points of Bells theorem.
If the experiment proved quantum mechanics wrong, the conceptual situation created would
be clear. The possibility of a deterministic and local theory of micro-phenomena, different from that
envisioned by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, would have to be accepted, because EPR would not
comply with the requirement for equality with quantum mechanics in every case.
A certain number of verification experiments, however, have already been conducted and the
results obtained up to the presenteven though they are not yet definitivestrongly support the
supposition that the predictions made by quantum mechanics are correct.
The question, therefore, is one of understanding the conceptual situation that seems to have
arisen and that is generally referred to as the locality problem.
Interpretations
Reactions to the locality problem have varied. By omitting or glossing over nuances, they can
be reduced to three main schools of interpretation.
1- The Rejectionists. A certain number of physicists seem to think once again that it is a
metaphysical problem that exists only with respect to the non-operational concept of the hidden pa-
rameters. Reject this concept and the problem disappears. Others think the problem does not exist
because it is posed incorrectly (3).
2- The Minimalists. According to other physicists81 ((4), (5), (6), (7), etc.) the problem this
time satisfies the most draconian of positivist norms, because it leads to experimental tests. Nonethe-
less they refuse to consider anything beyond what such tests involve. They restrict themselves exclu-
sively to the statistical correlations between measurement events which are separated by a space-like
distance and which can manifest either instantaneous independence, i.e., locality, or, on the con-
trary, instantaneous dependence, i.e., non-locality. Any reference to the underlying explanatory
concepts is avoided. From this point of view the concept of hidden parameters only plays a concep-
tually revelatory (or catalyzing) role for a problem to which it remains external. That is because the
problem, once perceived, persists without needing to refer to the hidden parameter concept. In fact, it
represents a conflict between quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

?
QM RT
- H
h.p.
 %
 H

eliminated
81 I apologize in advance to those who do not accept that they fall into this category.
83

3- The Epistemologists. And finally, there is a tendency (8) to link the problem of locality to the
most widespread way of thinking about reality, which postulates the existence of independent objects
that have intrinsic and permanent properties. Violation of Bells inequalities would be incompatible
with such suppositions. In the final analysis, then, we are dealing with a conflict between quantum
mechanics and fundamental epistemological postulates, which is centered on the concept of hidden
parameters and relativity theory.

QM h.p. + RT Fundamental epistemological postulates


via

I shall refrain from examining the rejectionist interpretation, since it can contribute nothing
new.
As for the two conflicts implied by the two other interpretations, neither of them seems to be
viable given the current state of the debate. Only one question stands out clearly:
What exactly does the locality problem involve?
To find an answer, the investigation that follows will show that current ways of thinking and
tests of Bells inequality cannot be sufficient. Certainly alternate ways of thinking and new tests
based on them will have to be used. Otherwise no definitive conclusion can be drawn, even if Bells
inequality is clearly violated.
The locality problem and the underlying conceptual base Let us take another look at the locality
problem trying to keep separate what is directly observed during experiments, what is calculated, and
the intermediaries that link what is observed to what is calculated.
A. What is observed during experiments. We observe (omitting all of the details) an object A0
located between two pieces of equipment, A1 and A2 located, respectively, at equal distances to the
left and right of A0 . Every now and again, visible marks appear on certain parts of A1 and A2 .

A1 A2
A0
marks marks

B- What is calculated. Statistical correlations are calculated using three types of probability
distributions that lead to three correlation functions: a function F(DLT)B , characteristic of a determin-
istic local theory in the sense of Bell, a function FQM that functions according to quantum mechanical
algorithms, and a function Fobs that corresponds to observation statistics. Bells inequality distin-
guishes F(DLT)B from FQM . The experiment should show whether the observed reality reproduces FQM
or F(DLT) :

F(DLT)B , FQM , Fobs

Bells inequality = F(DLT)B bound , FQM > bound


?
Experiment = Fobs bound

C- The intermediaries between what is observed and what is calculated. The set of these inter-
mediaries is rich and complex. It does not make sense to attempt an exhaustive list and description.
Instead I present a sampling, while distinguishing between the words used, the ideas linked to these
words, and the syntactical organizations into which these ideas are integrated.
84

(See the table on the next page)


The central column of the table may be a little shocking from a positivist point of view. But
in any case Bells deterministic and local hidden parameters violate the semantic restraints dictated
by positivism. So we may as well continue and acknowledge all of the semantic questions related to
interpretations 2 and 3 of the locality problem as laid out above.
I shall begin with the minimalist interpretation. I see two questions.
Firstly, does the semantic content assigned to the qualifiers deterministic and local, implied
by Bells mathematical modeling, permit the most general representation imaginable of the process
of observing a microstate using a macroscopic apparatus?
Secondly, supposing that Bells modeling of an observation process does not really introduce
any unnecessary restriction, exactly what kind of non-locality would violation of Bells inequality
demonstrate? Is it the non-locality that relativity theory clearly prohibits? Or is it spontaneous and
still fuzzy extensions of this prohibition that might turn out to be contrary to reality?
Since for the time being I lack the elements needed to delve into the first question, Ill pass
directly to the second:
To the extent that it exists, the so-called system that disintegrates into A0 , must include some
original non-null spatial extension xs (t0 ) 6= 0. (Is what populates this spatial domain an object, a
process, or both at once? The very definitions needed to answer the question are missing.) How
are we to understand the concept described by the terms disintegration or creation of the pair S1
and S2 ? In the conceptual substratum, the words suggest a process, a real entity that is undergoing
change. In order to exist, such a process must take place somewhere and must last, it must occupy
a certain non-null space-time domain sc (t).tc 6= 0 (where the subscript c denotes creation), within
which the original system S still exists but is changing, while S1 and S2 do not yet exist but are in
formation.
85

Words Concepts Syntactical Organization

Logic of object classes and


A system Macro-object, object
predicates

Change, process, SUCCESSIVE


Creation of a pair
EVENTS, DURATION, TIME

correlated

?
Two correlated systems Objects

isolated

Macro-object capable of reacting


Apparatus
meaningfully with a micro-system

Spin Observational property

Observation process,
Measurement Event connecting macro- and
micro-objects

Intrinsic and permanent properties


Hidden parameters
(of an object or a process)

Predictable?
Deterministic
On what basis?

Local, signal Propagating at a speed v < c Relativity theory

Statistics Random phenomena (events, pro-


Probability theory
Probabilities cesses, objects)

Quantum predictions State vectors, quantum algorithms Quantum mechanics

Change carried at a speed


Action at a distance ?
v<c
86

In the writing that designates the space-time domain, the duration factor tc = t12,0 t0 extends
by definitionfrom a supposed initial time value to where the creation change begins, to a final
time value t f = t12,0 at which the correlated system pair S1 and S2 begin to exist (objects? processes
as well? both at once?). As for the spatial extension factor sc (t), since we are dealing with a process,
it seems we are obliged to suppose that it changes as a function of the time value t, with (t0 < t < t f ),
but nonetheless meta-stably staying connected as long as t < t f (i.e., as long as S subsists and S1 and
S2 have not yet been created). For every t > t f , however, this spatial domain ought to have become
non-connected via a more or less catastrophic fission leading to a new form of stability referred to
as the pair S1 , S2 of correlated systems.
Let me pause for a moment and look at what I have just written. What a mixture of the nec-
essary and the arbitrary, of signs and words that seem to point towards a precise designation and yet
behind which one finds only blurred and moving images hooked onto these signs and words in an
entangled way. I wrote in inverted commas time value, for example, because every time that I think
about the level of unexploredness of the concepts of duration and time and their relationship, I am
reluctant to write anything absent from an algorithm that will set the rules of the game. Parameteri-
zation of the basic property of duration using the time variable t (similar to the parameterization used
in existing theories and even in relativity) is still doubtless very simplifying and often falsifying, too
rigid, and somehow mechanizing. Changes are not always movements of internally stable entities. To
be able to fully account for the entire diversity of types and intensities of change, we would need a
kind of vector scale, a process time field defined at each point of abstract space framed by the duration
axis and by the envisioned change axes.
But would such a time comply with the Lorenz transformation? What role does the speed of a
light signal play vis--vis the propagation speed of influences (?) in such a process space? What
does relativity theory really impose on any process and what does it leave unspecified? When there is
a locally very intense process, like the creation of a pair probably is, what becomes of time?
In the general relativity theory of gravitation, for example, a non-null gradient in the gravi-
tational field is linked to the impossibility of defining a unique time for two observers in the same
reference frame, when these observers are separated from one another in space. As for the invariance
of the speed of light itself (rather than the speed of other kinds of influences) when moving from
one reference frame to another, it is only postulated locally, because there is no uniform definition of
distances and times in variable gravitational fields (curved space-time) (9). How can we know what
sort of local space-time curvature results (or not) from theessentially variableprocess of pair
creation?
And finally, relativity theory does not introduce any quantification in the quantum mechanical
sense; its description is continuous. When we write [speed = distance/time], time is a continuous
variable.
If we go on to ask how we can find the value of t, we notice that it is of the form NTH , where N
is an integer and TH is a clock period (supposedly constant!) which brings us back to the discrete. In
macroscopic terms that can be negligible as much on the principal level as on the numeric level. But
when we consider quantum and relatively short processes, how much significance does a condition
such as the one below have?
distance distance
v= = = const?
time NTH
What clock should we choose, with what TH , and besides that how can we be sure, when writing
t = 10x , that we are doing anything more than an empty calculation?
Faced with such questions, it is understandable that positivist prudence and norms advise keep-
ing within the healthy zone of the operationally defined and of the syntactisized, where thought
circulates on well-worn and fixed tracks. Beyond this, we plunge into a veritable semantic swamp.
Nevertheless it is only there, in that murky swamp, where one must force the eye to discern moving
forms, that perhaps one perceives something new. In fact the locality problem forces us to do just
87

this: it is a very fundamental problem, where any inertial behavior, not analyzed or approximate,
leads inevitably either to suspending the capacity to reason or to illusory problems and perspectives.
At this point we cannot follow a path just because it has been laid. We have to choose and follow the
appropriate direction.
Let me now return to the creation of a correlated pair S1 and S2 . I envisage this process as
having analogies with drop formation. (This may be wrong, but is not a priori impossible, and I only
need one possible example.) So I draw the spatial projection (in two dimensions) of the space-time
domain sc (t).tc , t0 < t < t f , for four stages:
* t = t0 ;
* t0 < t < t f
* t0 < t < t
f (i.e., immediately before t f );
and t = t +f (i.e., immediately after t f ).


Now suppose that the distance d12 between apparatuses A1 and A2 is smaller than the maximum
projection sc (t) on the x-axis corresponding to t = t
f .
Apparatuses A1 and A2 will not therefore be impacted by S1 and S2 respectively, but by
S in the process of disintegration, which is nonetheless capable of registering an impact on A1 and
A2 . Further suppose that the duration of the measurement events is such that with respect to d12 the
space-time distance between the measurement events is spatial. And finally, suppose that in spite
of everything, the measurement events are not independent in the sense of Bell; in other words let
us suppose that a change in A2 can act at a speed v > c on the result of one of the A2 recordings.
The statistics related to recordings on A1 and A2 will therefore be not locally correlated and Bells
inequality will have been violated. But in this case, is it justifiable to conclude that a contradiction of
relativity theory has been proved? Relativity theory only concerns itself with signals (how exactly
are they defined?) propagating in a vacuum. It does not say anything at all about the transmission
of influences (definition?) across a system (object? process?). In particular, in no way does it
constrain the temporal order (?) (causal or not causal) (?) of events located in different places
in the same system. The example given the pair creation model simply does not belong to
the factual domain described by relativity theory. No established theory has yet described it. And yet
this example, whatever its inadequacies when faced with unknown reality, certainly is characteristic in
an essentially acceptable way of what deserves to be called a process of pair creation: such a process
88

must occupy a non-null space-time domain whose spatial projection, although initially dependent,
eventually evolves to become independent.
This example of the possible seems to me sufficient as a basis for the following conclusion:
results of tests meant to verify Bells inequality, even if these results definitively violate the inequal-
ity, can never alone establish the fact that the relativity principle of locality has been infringed. To be
more precise about what is at stake, Bells model and the corresponding test should be used with other
models and other tests of both non-observable (creation) and observable (measured) extensions of
space-time that occur. The minimalism of the minimal interpretation is no more than prudence, a
remaining positivist fear of letting oneself go too far beyond what has already been established. Such
prudence runs into an indecisive confrontation in which quantum mechanics is opposed vaguely to
relativitys locality and to inertial and confused extensions of the latter which do not fit into any estab-
lished conceptual framework. But this kind of prudence cannot last. A whole series of thoughts has
been surreptitiously set in motion which no artificial obstacle can stop. This claim is not a criticism;
it is simply a way of highlighting the soundest value that I see in Bells approach and of expressing
my confidence in the human mind.
Let us now consider the epistemological interpretation. This brings us immediately to the in-
evitable supplementary modeling. The terms under consideration are a single system and two
systems that are correlated but isolated one from the other (in the relativity theory sense). The sup-
plementary modeling referred to brings up the usual epistemological postulate on the existence of
intrinsic properties for real, separated entities. From this postulate we deduce the same type of in-
equalities as those of Bell with respect to the statistics of measurement results on supposedly isolated
entities. As a result we establish a connection between tests of observable inequalities on the one hand
and, on the other, the epistemological postulate on the existence of intrinsic properties for separated
objects in the sense of relativity theory. On this basis, we must accept (it seems to me?) that the vio-
lation of Bells inequality in and of itself invalidates any significance of this way of thinking in terms
of separated entities that have intrinsic properties. As it happens I have already shown elsewhere (10)
(in terms that are too technical to be repeated here) that that is not possible. Here I will limit myself
to some qualitative remarks.
First of all, the points made above about the creation of a pair can also obviously be transposed
onto the case of epistemological interpretation. But extending such thoughts further, this time let us
begin by positioning ourselves at that instant in time t = t0 at which S1 and S2 are created. For t > t0 , S1
and S2 now occupy two disjoint spatial domains s1 (t) et s2 (t), which move away from one another
and then encounter, respectively, apparatuses A1 and A2 , producing measurement interactions. The
measurement interaction of S1 with A1 is itself an event that occupies a non-null space-time domain
sm1 (tm1 ).tm1 6= 0 (the subscript m is for measurement), where tm1 tm1 and the duration factor
tm1 depends on the spatial extension sm1 (tm1 ) linked to the stage tm1 tm1 (assuming that the
spatial extension remains constant in the stage tm1 tm1 ). The same is true of the measurement event
on A2 , whose spatial extension is sm2 (tm2 ).tm2 6= 0. How should we define the space-time distance
between these two measurement events? No matter what the fixed spatial distance is between A1 and
A2, how can we know if the corresponding space-time distance between the measurement events is
spatial or not? Because that determines whether or not the crucial condition of reciprocal separation
of these measurement events exists or not; and it is on the basis of that condition that we expect Bells
inequality in the statistics of the results recorded. Whether or not the space-time distance between
measurement events is spatial obviously depends (among other things) on the spatial extension factors
sm1 (tm1 ) and sm2 (tm2 ). But what do we know about the value of these factors? Do S1 and S2 move
in tandem or mechanically as the de Broglie model and the recent soliton idea suggest? Or do
they spread out as the standard quantum model of Schrdingers linear evolution of wave packets
suggests?
We might possibly hope to have a clearer response for the case in which S1 and S2 are photons
whose speed is c. But the speed of what? Of the front of the photonic wave, yes, but what should
we conclude about the rest of the photon? How is a photon made? Is it like a de Broglie microsystem
89

with a singularity and a more extensive presence surrounding it? The behavior shown by radio waves
would suggest so. What kind of extension then? In the current phase, what exactly do we know
individually about these entities that we call photons? Newtonian quantum mechanics does not
describe them; electromagnetism does not describe them individually. Quantum field theory has been
marked in recent years by semi-classical experiments, whose goal is quite simply to eliminate the
notion of a photon in order to avoid conceptual difficulties linked to renormalization algorithms (11).
We can therefore conclude completely generally that, whatever the fixed spatial distance be-
tween A1 and A2 (whether we are dealing with microsystems that have non-null mass or photons),
in order to know whether the measurement events on these microsystems are separated or not by a
space-time distance of a spatial nature, we need to know (among other things) the spatial extension
of the states of these microsystems as a function of time.
Without going into detail on inessential logical chains of thought, these few remarks should be
sufficient to indicate the basis for the following statement.
By themselves the tests of Bells inequality will never make it possible to reach a final con-
clusion on the significance of assigning intrinsic properties to separated real entities as defined by
Einsteins relativity theory. So, for the moment, there is no conflict between quantum mechanics
and the epistemological postulates of our standard way of thinking about reality. Only a line for fu-
ture inquiry has been sketched, which indicates why further research into the space-time structure of
so-called individual microsystems would be of interest. This line of thought seems to me both coura-
geous and important, but only to the extent that it is clear-eyed and context-aware. It fits naturally
with recent research on the extension of microsystems with non-null mass at rest (12), (13) and on
the concept of the photon (11). It is quite remarkable to see that all of this research concentrates on
interference phenomena and concepts. In fact it is here that the individual emerges from the mass of
statistics; here that we see the failure to distinguish between the mathematical interference of stan-
dard statistics on the one hand, and on the other the statistics of physical interference of an individual
entity superposed on itself (14), (15).
By addressing the locality problem I have intentionally directed attention to the semantic layer
that underlies the words we use. The nature of this layer is to some extent the main subject of these
remarks. The semantic sludge in which we happily slide from algorithm to algorithm, attached only
to the safety cord of words, seems to me to be worthy of closer attention. We have to dive into it to
forge the new concepts that we lack and to draw their outlines in such a way that we can advance to
expressing the syntactizations.
The idea of an object in the macroscopic sense of the word is rigorously situated albeit qual-
itatively within the logic of object classes and predicates. This is in essence an explicitly structured
theory of macroscopic objects that is of maximum generality. But this theory is fundamentally un-
suited to an unrestricted description of changes. Indeed, the logic of object classes and predicates
is based on the membership relationship : if for an object x the predicate f is true, then x is a
member of class C f defined by f : f (x) x C f . But this fundamental membership relationship
is conceived from the very beginning in a static, hypostasized way. No subsequent adjustment can
compensate for the rigidity introduced at the outset. Probability theory on the one hand, and on the
other the various physical theories (mechanics, thermodynamics, field theories, quantum mechanics,
and relativity theory) have managed to compensate for this shortcoming to varying degrees. But each
of them for a particular category of facts and each by implicit and diverse methods. No general and
specific theory of events and processes, no logic of absolute changes using an explicit and unified
methodology has yet been devised82 .
Take another look at the logic of object classes and predicates. It is fundamentally incompati-
ble with the individual, since it describes classes. It would seem therefore naturally suited to numeric
quantification of the statistical or probabilistic type via probability measurements of classes. Never-
82I have learned about an original and courageous attempt to formalize duration (16). So far, only values associated with duration (time)
have been the object of formalization attempts.
90

theless, so far, such numeric quantification of logic has not been achieved. The logical quantifiers
, f orall, and 0/ remain qualitative in nature!
In a complementary manner, probability theory to date has failed to explicitly develop a clas-
sification theory. The fundamental concept used is one of a probability space [U, , p()] where p()
designates a measure of probability imposed on a sigma-algebra of events , defined in a universe
U = {ei , i = 1, 2, . . .} of elementary events ei . This algebra may, in particular, reflect a classification
of the elementary events ei governed by a predicate f . In this case, specific logical properties follow
for the probability space [U, , p()]. Via these classifying properties, an initial connection between
logic and probability could be developed. But no such attempt has yet been made and so for the
moment the connection remains unspecified.
Now consider quantum mechanics. It introduces probability spaces, but the relationships be-
tween these spaces are such that some mathematicians state that quantum mechanics is not a proba-
bility theory. The connection between probability theory and quantum mechanics also remains very
obscure for the time being.
On the other hand, the relationship of quantum mechanics to the various concepts suggested
by the language it uses one system, one system of two correlated systems, etc. is also very
obscure. In fact, quantum mechanics does not say anything at all about these concepts to the degree
they might be thought of as beyond observation. Even the probability of presence is only a probability
resulting from observation interactions: in quantum mechanics we can suppose that a system that
makes a mark on a screen at time t is itself as far away as we like from this mark at as short a time
as we like before time t. Quantum mechanics is perfectly silent about the reality whose observable
manifestations it codifies so richly and in such detail via measurement interactions.
And finally, consider relativity theory, which at bottom is discrete, non-statistical, and con-
tinuous, i.e., non-quantified. Furthermore, it describes what is, although in relation to the state
of observation. Its relationship to the quantum mechanical probability space with fundamentally
observational and quantified events raises very well-known and very thorny problems.
Thus, we currently have several well-constituted rule-based constructions, each very complex,
rich, and rigorous; but they are like the tips of icebergs emerging from the sea of semantic sludge,
below the surface of which the edges and bases disappear. As for the set of concepts related to the
fundamental property of duration, the concepts of process, event, change, permanence, succession,
and TIME, they only act freely in a very sparse, primitive, and subjective state induced in our minds
in varying ways by experience and language. Because the ways in which these concepts have been
organized (within relativity theory, probability theory, or some other physical theory) are all partic-
ularizing and limiting. The situation remains that described by Bergson, Deduction is an operation
regulated by the processes of matter, modeled on matters mobile articulations, and finally, implicitly
given with the space that underpins matter. As long as it moves in space or in spatialized time, all it
needs to do is let go. It is duration that puts spokes in the wheels. (17)
Once again, I have summarized the above in a diagram:

?
LOGIC PROBABILITIES
?
QUANTUM MECHANICS PROBABILITIES
??
QUANTUM MECHANICS RELATIVITY THEORY

LOGIC OF EVENTS, PROCESSES,

? ARBITRARY CHANGES, ?
SUCCESSIONS, TIME

SEMANTIC MUD
91

When there is still no unification between the statistical, discrete, and observational approach
oriented towards the microscopic area of quantum mechanics and the individual, continuous, and re-
alistic approach oriented towards the cosmology of relativity theory; when everything that touches
upon duration and time is still barely elucidated; when everything that concerns the nature of those
entities referred to as microsystemsor better still, microstatesis still so unexplored, then what
sense does it make to maintain thaton the basis of non-locality testswe are faced with a de-
terminative conflict, direct or not, between quantum mechanics and relativity theory? Or between
quantum mechanics and our conception of reality?

Conclusion

Personally, I feel I must set aside the conflict that other physicists think they see. For me, the
value of Bells theorem resides elsewhere: this theorem and its fallout illustrate in a striking fash-
ion the active power of mathematized modeling when linked to experiments. For decades positivist
taboos have been an obstacle to models. The result is this vertiginous void of syntactic and even
qualitative models that one finds today in quantum algorithms. And yet Bells model has triggered
a conceptualization and rule-based dynamic that might even arrive at the positivist position. Perhaps
it will even shake up quantum mechanics and relativity theory. This is because it attracts attention
to and keeps it on the state of the conceptual milieu in which current theories are immersed. Out of
this prolonged contact new theories will perhaps emerge that are more unified and have more breadth
and depth. Here as in information theory I can see the first movements towards formalization of epis-
temology, the first outlines perhaps of a mathematized methodology of knowledge. And that could
prove to be more fertile than any particular theory of a given reality-based domain.

REFERENCES

(1) Bell, Physics, I, I95, (I964).


(2) Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (I935).
(3) Lochak, Found. Phys. 6, I73 (I976).
(4) Costa de Berauregard, Found. Phys.6, 539 (I976), Phys. Lett. 67. A, I7I.
92

(5) Selleri, Found. Phys. 8, I03 (I978).


(6) Stapp, Phys. Rev. DI3, 947 (I976).
(7) Vigier, Nuovo Cimento Lett. 24, 258 (I979).
(8) dEspagnat, Phys. Rev. DII, I454 (I975) et DI8.
(9) Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology, J. Wiley Sons, N.Y. (I975).
(10) Mugur-Schchter, dans Espistemological Letters (I976).
(11) Cohen Tannoudji, Expos au Collge de France, juin I979.
(12) MugurSchchter, Evrad, Tieffine, Phys. Rev. D6, 3397 (I972).
(13) Evrard, Thse, Univ. de Reims (I977).
(14) MugurSchchter, dans Quantum Mechanics a Half Century Later (eds. J Leite Lopes
and M. Paty) D. Reidel (I977).
(15) MugurSchchter, Etude du caractre complet de la Mcanique Quantique, G. Villars
(I964).
(16) Schneider, La logique self-rfrentielle de la temporalit (non publi).
(17) Bergson, lEvolution Cratrice (1907 ).
93

APPENDIX 2

Proof of the compatibility of the experiment EXP.1 with de Broglies theory of double solution

Let a free microsystem in a state 0 of interference with itself be obtained as indicated in


the figure below:

 
v x 0
e2iv(i V sin ) ei 2 .

0 0
= 1 + 2 = 2 cos 2 cos z + (1)
V 2

According to the theory of the double solution, and thus also the theory of two measurement
types, the considered microsystem consists of a corpuscle  for which the probability
 to be found
 is
0 2
2
h
i
given by | | , and for which the guidance law v = c + (/c) A ( /t) U (5 )
defines in 0 the velocity

v 0 with components

c2 sin 0
vn = = v12 sin 0 = const, vy = vz = 0
V
[v12 = |v1 | = |

v2 | is the common magnitude that the guidance law assigns to the velocity of the corpus-
cle in 1 and 2 from (1) and the figure below]. Since the quantum potential Q = (h2 /8 2 m0 )a/a


(5 ) is constant on 0 , the quantum forces F Q = Q (5 ) which act on the corpuscle are zero in 0 .
The corpuscle thus moves in 0 in the direction Ox of the bisector of , along a maximum of the
amplitude of 0 where | 0 |2 6= 0.


The spectrum of the momentum p in 0 of (1) reduces, according to the theory of two measurement
types, to a unique vector quantity p 0 corresponding to the velocity
v 0 defined above, while the




quantum spectrum of p consists of the two vector quantities p 1 and p 2 shown in the figure. Let us
show that p 0 is measurable by a measurement M () by trace: during the first interaction with the
G
sensitive environment, the corpuscle undergoes, on the one hand, the diffusing effect of a Coulombian
collision directly, like a classical mobile and, on the other hand, the effect of quantum forces that
give rise to the modification of the wave of the microsystem, that the expressions of the guidance
law of the quantum potential and forces associate with the modification produced on the dynamics
of the corpuscle by the Coulombian diffusion. Under fixed external conditions, for any given angle
of diffusion, the amplitude of the diffusion is a decreasing function of the momentum of the diffused
microsystems only. As a result we can choose v and 0 in (1) such that p 0 = (hv/c2 )v sin 0 =
12
p12 sin 0 assures a negligible deviation of the corpuscle due to the first Coulombian collision. In this
case, in the state 1 which follows the first interaction the direction of displacement of the corpuscle
is practically the same as in 0 . This clarifies the the effect of the Coulombian diffusion on the
94

dynamics of the corpuscle of the microsystem. What then is the modification of the wave associated
to this effect? In 1 the probability of presence is | 1 |2 , so the direction of the amplitude maxima
is that of the displacement of the corpuscle: the direction of the amplitude maxima also suffers a
negligible variation during the passage from 0 to 1 . During the first interaction the amplitude of
the wave is implicitly a function of time:

 
01 v 1 01
[a(z,t)] = 2 cos 2 (t) cos (t)z + (t) . (2)
V 2

If we accept that v/V and vary independently with respect to time, then the term
(1/c2 )( 2 a/t 2 ) of the dAlembertian in the quantum potential is a second-degree polynomial func-
tion of z, which leads to a quantum force field which depends linearly on z. This result is physically
unacceptable, since the wave phenomenon described by the amplitude of (1) and (2) is periodic with
respect to z. We must thus accept that v/V and vary in such a manner that the coefficient of z2 in
2 a/t 2 is zero.
This leads to the condition
v p1z p2z
2 (t) cos (t) = = = = const (6 ).
V h h
If we introduce this condition in (2), the result is that the interfringe distance does not change
either: the first interaction does not modify the symmetry (11 = 21 ) or the structure of the microsystem
(although the waves composing 1 and 2 change their propagation direction and frequency). The
quantum forces corresponding to (2) are


01 h2 d 2 01

Fa = 2 2 2 01 2
Oz, (3)
c 8 m0 dt |[a(z,t)] |

where = const. The location of the fringes with respect to Oz, however, will have changed if
d 01 /dt 6= 0. In this case, we must accept that d 2 01 /dt 2 6= 0 as well, since, in agreement with
the meaning of | 1 |2 , the corpuscle will be found in 1 on one of the maxima of the new amplitude
which, if d 01 dt 6= 0, are all displaced with respect to the maxima of 0 , and the non-zero forces
(3) must have acted to accomplish this change. In this case, then, the forces (3) create a component
v01
cz according to Oz of the velocity of the corpuscle during the duration ti of the first interac-
tion, which brings the corpuscle, in 1 , onto a maximum of the amplitude of the wave, displaced by
z01
c
01 it with respect to the amplitude of 0 that it was previously on. Given the nature
= hvcz i
of the mechanism that develops v01 cz , and in particular its brevity, we must accept that vcz
01 is of

a Newtonian order of magnitude. On the other hand, the corpuscle is found at any given moment
during ti , with the highest probability, in a point of the field (3) where the amplitude (2) is maximal.
Hence, at the locationwhere the forces (3) find an object to act on they take a value corresponding to
{max[a(z,t)]01 } = 2. If we take into account these facts we obtain, for the displacement z01 c ,
the expression z01c = (h 2 /4c2 m2 ) 01 , where 01 is the variation of during t . z01
0 i c
is thus proportional to 01 , its direction being random, as well as the sign of 01 . We can thus
conclude that, following the first interaction, the corpuscle conserves the direction of its displacement,
while the amount of displacement changes if 01 6= 0. If we now consider the second interaction,
which leads from 1 to a state 2 , it immediately seems that all the preceding conclusions are can be
transposed, point by point, since the new initial state 1 is of the same type as 0 . Gradually, for a
large enough initial v and sufficiently reduced thickness and density of the sensitive environment, the
conclusions concerning the first interaction are transposable to all the interactions undergone during
the entire crossing of the sensitive environment: the direction of the displacement of the corpuscle is
conserved, while the amount changes by zll+1 e = (h2 /4c2 m20 ) ll+1 during the lth interac-
tion if ll+1 6= 0. The form of the trace of the microsystem is determined by the relative positions
95

of the successive ionizing interactions. These relative positions are described by the angles with Ox:
l+i+1
zej j+1
ll+1 = arg tan (4)
j=l j j+1
h2 l+i1 j j+1
= arg tan (l = 1, 2, . . . , N; 1 i N l),
4c2 m20 j=l j j+1

where j j+1 is the distance separating the interactions j and j + 1, and j indicates the elastic in-
teractions produced between the two successive ionizing interactions l and l + i. If, in place of a
continuous sensitive environment we first use a sensitive strip that is fine enough that the probability
of a further ionization occurring there is very small, followed by a sensitive layer placed at a distance
and think enough that the energy of the microsystem vanishes within it, then the first term of (4) is
01 = arg tan[h2 01 /4c2 m20 ] and its average value is inversely proportional to . By increas-
ing one must find, to the right which combines the first two ionizations, an average direction closer
and closer to the direction of the bisector of , while the directions p and
1
p of (1) predicted
2
by quantum mechanics must be independent of . This allows one to measure, with controllable
approximation, the direction p 0 of
p corresponding to the guidance law, different to the quantum



directions of p 1 and p 2 , and considered to be hidden in the theory of the double solution.
( ) Session on the 25 March 1968.
(1 ) M. Mugur-Schchter, Comptes rendus, 266, srie B, 1968, p. 585.
(2 ) L. de Broglie, J. Phys. Rad., no 5, 1927.
(3 ) D. Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, no 2, 1952.
(4 ) L. de Broglie, Une tentative dinterprtation causale et non linaire de la mcanique ondulatoire : la
thorie de la double solution, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1956.
(5 ) This notation is that used in (1 ).
(6 ) This condition was pointed out to us by Louis de Broglie.

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